towards authoritarianism: a comparative study of …
TRANSCRIPT
TOWARDS AUTHORITARIANISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE STYLES
OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF FERDINAND MARCOS AND
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
AN UNDERGRADUATE THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES MANILA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
BY
CHRISTOPHER REYSON P. TARIGA
APRIL 2014
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES MANILA
PADRE FAURA, ERMITA, MANILA
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis, entitled Towards Authoritarianism: A Comparative Study of the
Presidential Leadership of Ferdinand Marcos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and written
by Christopher Reyson P. Tariga in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS in POLITICAL SCIENCE is hereby recommended
for approval.
_______________________________
Professor Doroteo Abaya, Jr.
Adviser
This thesis is hereby accepted and approved as partial fulfillment for the
requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science.
_______________________________
Professor Sharon A. Caringal
Chairperson
Department of Social Sciences
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title
Approval Sheet
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Chapter I: Introduction Research Question
Specific Questions
Thesis Statement
General Objective
Specific Objectives
Scope and Limitations
Organization of the Study
Review of Literature
Historical Foundation
Democratic Ideals of the President
Legal Authorities
Analytic Framework
Instruments to Influence
Situational Style of Leadership
Methodology
Data Gathering
Data Analysis
Chapter II: Executive Supervision and Control
Chapter III: Executive-Legislative Relations
Chapter IV: National Defense
Chapter V: Foreign Affairs
Chapter VI: Conclusion and Recommendation
Bibliography
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The Office of the President has an inherent nature of concentrating and centralizing
power. This is not uncommon even in democratic societies. It is because this
“concentration and centralization of power” – herein termed as authoritarianism – seems to
provide an alternative method of leadership particularly in maintaining stability and order
during fragile periods and when democratic means appear to be ineffective.
This method of concentrating and centralizing power even within the bounds of
democracy stands as a major concern in understanding political structures and institutions
specifically of those belonging to democratic societies. This is because the presence of
authoritarianism within a democracy, even if justified as the only alternative means of
exercising leadership, offers an undefined distinction between the two doctrines. Such
presence offers a social dilemma in defining whether maintaining majority’s social order
and stability, the core values of authoritarianism, should be emphasized over the
observance of individual liberties.
Through time, the Office of the President has imperatively claimed popular
attention brought by its inherent authoritarian nature. Such attention raises inquiries
fundamental to the study of modern politics. How, for instance, does authoritarianism
progress in a democratic government? Or, is authoritarianism to be regarded more as a
decision-making process, a problem-solving undertaking, or a leadership technique rather
than a distinct political doctrine? This paper aims to provide an objective view on the role
of the Office of the President in paving way to the centralization and concentration of
power in a democratic government. Using the presidential leadership of Ferdinand Marcos
and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, this study focuses on understanding how the legal
authorities and leadership style of a President provide for the rise of authoritarianism.
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Research Question
Is authoritarianism a political doctrine or a means to achieving political agenda?
Specific Questions
1. What are the social, political, and economic situations in the Arroyo
administration which are parallel to that of the Marcos regime?
2. What are the policies and leadership techniques applied by Presidents Marcos
and Arroyo in response to the political, economic, and social conditions of their
respective regimes?
3. What are the results and outcomes of pursuing such leadership?
Thesis Statement
When the Office of the President invokes its legal authorities to use to justify the
stabilization of certain conditions such as political turmoil, economic instability, and social
anxiety, it trudges on authoritarianism in a democratic environment regardless of the
changes in history and constitutions.
General Objective
To understand how the Office of the President provides for the concentration and
centralization of power using comparative analysis
Specific Objectives
1. To identify similar variables to be used as the basis for comparison;
2. To seek patterns of authoritarianism in the Philippine presidency using these
variables
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Scope and Limitations
In studying the phenomenon of the rise of authoritarianism in a democracy using
presidential leadership, it is essential to give comparisons to the leadership styles of
different presidents. Comparative studies are significant in understanding the internal
dynamics of a certain phenomenon because they provide patterns on structures and events
that suggest a causal relation (Dragnich and Rasmussen 1986). They extensively examine
the different factors affecting such phenomenon to generate a conclusion that is important
in predicting future behavior.
In comparing presidential leadership, studying presidents of different countries
could prove to be ineffective since their forms of governments have their own distinctive
feature. They have their own historical and cultural settings, and their own political
instruments to influence. As such, comparison has to be made with presidents under one
country in order to draw common categories for a more accurate comparison.
The Philippine Presidency, as of today, has been occupied by fifteen individuals
since the establishment of the First Republic. The President widely known for an
authoritative decision-making will have to be Ferdinand Marcos. He has imprinted such a
legacy, especially during Martial Law, that his regime became the model of an
authoritarianism molded to fit the Philippine settings. Marcos’ leadership serves as a
credible basis for a comparative study on the rise of authoritarianism through presidential
leadership.
Another controversial President, owing to the fluidity of events in her
administration, will have to be Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Issues on the policies of her
Presidency offer similarities with Marcos’ leadership. This poses an inquiry on the
leadership style of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. This study, therefore, focuses on Ferdinand
Marcos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
This study aims to identify how authoritarianism progresses in a democratic
environment. Therefore, only the pre-martial law years of Ferdinand Marcos, i.e. from
1965 to 1972, is examined.
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Organization of the Study
The study is organized into 6 chapters. This chapter provides an introduction to the
topic and the research question attended to in this thesis, a review of literature, the scope
and limitations, the framework for analysis, and the methodology. The succeeding chapters
examine a feature of the Office of the President and compare each president in question
based on the particular feature cited.
Chapter 2 examines the constitutional authority of the president to supervise and
control the executive machineries of the government. It also identifies which institutions
are directly affected with this authority. It also determines how the President influences
those institutions using the authority of executive supervision and control.
Chapter 3 analyzes the legal authority of the president to influence the legislature.
The Congress is a major power bloc in the Philippine government. It is responsible for
creating laws and treaties needed by the government for it to function effectively. If the
President intends to execute all his plans for the government, it would be essential for him
to collect the support of the Congress. This chapter looks into the legal authorities that the
President uses to influence Congress in concentrating authority.
Chapter 4 examines the president’s legal authorities as the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces. This chapter focuses on how the president uses his military powers to
concentrate power in his Office, all in the guise of national defense.
Chapter 5 examines the authority of the president in dealing with the country’s
foreign affairs. All nations are interdependent. This is the reason why it is necessary to
establish good foreign relations. In this chapter, the legal authority of the President to
administer foreign policies is explored in an effort to identify which policies were created
to further and maintain the concentration and centralization of power.
Chapter 6 presents conclusions and generalizations. The aim of this study is to
derive common categories for comparison in order to formulate a theory on how the
President of the Philippines uses his legal authorities to concentrate power. The preceding
chapters examine and analyze the events that led to the authoritarianism of Philippine
Presidents. This chapter focuses on the results and outcomes of these events. It also
provides recommendations for further studies.
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Review of Literature
Authoritarianism in the Philippines may be attributed to three factors: the historical
background of political leadership in the country, the perversion of the democratic ideals of
the President, and the nature of the Office of the President and its legal authorities. These
factors contribute to the formation of a stage for the concentration and centralization of
power and authority. They present an explanation on how authoritarianism developed
within the geographical and political contexts of the Philippines.
Historical Foundation
The presence of authoritarianism in the Philippines began at the country’s ancient
units of government called the barangays. Each barangay was a state in itself, that is, they
were economically and politically autonomous. The political authority in a barangay was
held by a single individual – the datu. The datu was the head of the community. He thus
exercised extraordinary powers, which were even comparable to that of a monarch. He was
the chief executive, the legislator, the judge, and the military commander of the
community. (Zaide 1970: 8)
Upon the arrival of the Spanish colonizers, the political leadership in the
Philippines started to evolve. During this era, the Philippine political structure was
changed. The barangays were consolidated into towns (pueblos) and, further, into
provinces (provincias). An organized, hierarchical and highly centralized government
system was thus established. In the new system, political power rested in the central
government, which had authority over all of the affairs of the lower municipal and
provincial governments. As Gregorio Zaide (1970) explained:
The administration of justice, the collection of taxes, the maintenance of peace
and order, the construction of public works, and the educational activities in the
provinces and towns were subject to the control and supervision of the central
government. (p17)
At the apex of the central government was the Spanish governor-general, who was
appointed by the king of Spain. The governor-general became the new “monarch” of the
Philippines. He exercised greater powers, which surpassed that of the datus. Political
authority of a much larger scale was concentrated in him. He had the whole country’s
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executive, the legislative, and the judicial powers1. He was also the captain-general or the
commander-in-chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, the supervisor of the newly
acknowledged Philippine foreign affairs, and the royal vice-patron2. (Zaide 1970; Celoza
1997: 11)
The governor-general had almost all of the political power in the Philippines.
However, it was not exclusively exercised by him. As the barangays evolved into towns,
the authority from the datus was eroded. The authority in the local politics was transferred
from the datus to the friars or the parish priests (padres). The friars supervised all the
activities and affairs of the local government such as provincial or municipal elections,
education, charities and social welfare. Their recommendations to the central government
were always very significant and thus, carried weight. They were obeyed, even revered, by
the community because their words became the law. (Celoza 1997)
The Spanish governor-general and the friars controlled the Philippines’ political
scenery for more than 300 years. However, their administration did not convert the
Philippines into a progressive country. This is because the governor-general, the friars, and
even the government officials were very abusive and despotic. They ran the government
with favors, nepotism, discrimination and partiality against the Filipino “indios”. Their rule
only caused severe social, political, and economic inequalities and oppressions. As a result,
a number of revolts were launched by Filipinos. (Agoncillo 1960; Constantino 1975)
On November 1, 1897, during the war against the Spaniards, a Republic was
established in Biak-na-Bato by the Filipino revolutionaries. The main purpose of the
Republic was to declare the separation of the Philippines from the Spanish monarchy and
to establish it as an independent state. (Zaide 1970)
The Biak-na-Bato Republic vested its government a Supreme Council. This was
headed by a President. The President of the Council had most of the political authority of
the republic. He exercised both the legislative and the executive powers. This was the
practice especially when the republic ended and the Dictatorial Government was
established.
1 In 1861, the governor-general was removed as the president of the Supreme Court or Royal Audiencia. See
Gregorio F. Zaide, Government of the Filipino People, 4th
ed. (Manila: The Modern Book Company, 1970) 2 The royal vice-patron has the power to control all religious matters and concerns in the Philippines. Ibid.
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Only on June 23, 1898, when the Dictatorial Government became the
Revolutionary Government, was the legislative power of the President shifted to a newly
convened Revolutionary Congress. This Congress created the Malolos Constitution which
gave birth to the ‘First Republic of the Philippines’. (Zaide 1970; Agoncillo 1960)
The First Republic recognized the President as the highest political head of the
country. Since the Republic was established under the principle of separation of powers,
the President could only exercise executive and quasi-legislative functions. Legislative
power was vested in the Assembly of Representatives while the judicial power was
exercised by the Supreme Court. (Zaide 1970)
The First Republic had a brief existence. In a treaty made in Paris, the Spanish
colonizers ceded the Philippines to United States. The U.S. overruled the young Republic
and, instead, established a military government in the country. (Agoncillo 1960; Wolff
1960)
The American military rule gave the president of the United States all
governmental powers in the Philippines. However, the one who was actually exercising all
authorities in the country – executive, legislative, and judicial – was the American
president’s delegated military governor. This changed only when the Second Philippine
Commission was created. (Constantino 1975)
The Second Philippine Commission, also known as the Taft Commission, was
composed of American civilian dignitaries. It had the basic objective of providing the
Philippines a Civilian Government. This Government, however, simply transferred
political authority from the military governor to the Commission. This meant that,
although a judicial system was later instituted, the Commission’s president, or the
country’s civil governor, still held the executive and legislative powers. It was just in 1903,
when the first president of the Commission (Judge William H. Taft) left the Philippines for
a new obligation, that the authority of the civil governor was limited to executive
functions. (Constantino 1975; Zaide 1970)
The Civilian Government did not allow the Filipinos to govern themselves as an
independent nation. Even when the legislature was eventually filled by Filipino
representatives, the judiciary and the executive continued to be controlled by the United
States. In 1935, after numerous campaigns, demonstrations, and negotiations, a
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Commonwealth Government was established. This new government was transitional in
form aimed to give the Philippines its independence. This reorganized the Philippines’
political structure. (Zaide 1970)
The Commonwealth provided the Philippines a separation of power among the
three distinct branches of government: the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, and the
Executive department. It also provided for a Filipino president, who would exercise
leadership over the struggling independent nation and the newly founded government. The
Commonwealth would eventually pave the way to the establishment of a Republic.3
Democratic Ideals of the President
The President of the Philippines performs numerous tasks and roles to exercise
leadership over the State and the Government. These can be generalized into three basic
functions (Abueva, Abueva, et. al. eds. 2004). First is the diagnostic function. Here, the
President identifies the current problems and situations and the future challenges of his
government. Second is a policy function whereby the President initiates and formulates the
courses of action to deal with problems and situations. And third, the President carries out
his implementing function by “mobilizing human and material resources in order to deal
with the problems, in order to effect policy” (Abueva, Abueva, et. al. eds. 2004: 26).
These functions that the President performs to effect leadership operate in the State
and the Government through two important factors – ideology and legal authority.
Leadership performs alongside legitimacy (Tendero 1993). Ideology and legal authority
provides the President the legitimacy needed to exercise leadership.
The President, to establish an effective leadership through the success of his
program of government, necessitates an ideology or a set of political beliefs and values
(Marcos 1980). His ideology provides him normative and regulating principles and
direction to his political actions. Such ideology offers an interpretation of the present
situation and a concept of the desired future, and includes a program “of what ought to be
done to alter the direction of the present” (Marcos 1980: 10). Such political beliefs and
3 This only happened after the Japanese occupation during which the Philippines was under a Japanese-
dictated puppet government. See Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited. (Quezon City: Tala
Publishing Services, 1975)
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values provide the basis for the President’s formulation of national policies and programs.
The same set of beliefs and values, if stated in simple and motivational terms, should
mobilize human and material resources to secure societal integration. This provides the
President legitimacy and justification for his actions in the exercise of his leadership
(Baradat 2000).
Pathology of Democracy. The ideology of the President, as of any other political
individual, may largely be influenced by the pre-existing major political ideologies that
instituted the different systems of government observed today (Calderon 1973). Of these
ideologies, one has been particularly committed to by the governments of most countries –
democracy (Wessen 1985). Democracy’s promise of equality and liberty, along with its
concept of distributing power to the citizenry, has generally attracted the post-war world
that “almost all countries proclaim some sort of democratic system as [their] ultimate goal”
(von der Mehden 1964: 118). The substance of democracy takes its form through the
interpretation and implementation of the President, being the head of the state and the
government (Abueva, Abueva et. al. eds. 2004). As such the President’s ideology, in
accordance to his democratic government, may thus, be affected by the theoretical
foundations of a democratic philosophy.
It is evident that democracy has evolved from a mere classical philosophy of
political significance into a major contribution to modern ideologies (Wessen 1985). In
translating the ideological concept of democracy into national policies, the President must,
therefore, acquire a set of values which provides for a democratic way of life (Wit 1953).
This should serve as an ideological framework and the basis of the President’s political
actions and decisions.
However, “change and fluidity are important traits of a democratic way of life; the
feeling and the desire for change are also important categories of the democratic frame of
mind” (Barbu 1956: 5). This imperfect, constantly changing nature of democracy, along
with the lack of authoritative interpretation (unlike that of Marx’s communism or
Mussolini’s fascism), makes the democratic ideals susceptible to dictatorial processes
(Barbu 1956; Ingersoll 1971). This is because in realizing the objectives of democracy, the
President is at risk of using measures that are contrary to one or more of the ideology’s
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foundations. The methods of democratization, or of balancing freedom and equality, often
involve undemocratic means particularly in situations where social inequalities are
extremely evident (Cariño 1992). Consequently, as Juan Linz (1978) puts it,
Making democracies more democratic by undemocratic means has all too often
contributed to regime crises and ultimately paved the way to autocratic rule (Linz
and Stepan eds. 1978: 97).
In other words, democracy is a mode of dictatorship (Barbu 1956). The Philippine
Presidency stands as a witness to such concept.
Under the context of democratic government, President Ferdinand Marcos initiated
a democratic revolution for equality that intends to articulate political, social, economic,
and cultural changes and, therefore, “deliver social justice to the poor majority” (Cariño
1992: 78). In achieving this “revolution from the center” ideology, President Marcos
undertook certain strong measures that expanded his authority. He abolished the legislature
and held a Constitutional Convention that created the 1973 Constitution (Cariño 1992).
Such measures allowed Marcos to write almost indefinitely numerous presidential decrees,
which were supposedly aimed at cutting or regulating the political, social, and economic
powers of the oligarchy and distributing social service to the masses (Marcos 1973). In
order to effect this ‘democratic revolution’, Marcos strengthened his military support, a
measure that seriously affected individual freedoms (Celoza 1997; Seagrave 1988). He
promised equality through economic growth at the expense, however, of individual
liberties. Later, with the $28 billion foreign debt and the 59.3 percent of the Filipino
families falling below the poverty line, it was proven that Marcos did not lead the society
closer to democracy, or even to social equality (Cariño 1992). Rather, his use of the
military just caused the misappropriation of his public office and powers, which only
resulted to authoritarianism (Celoza 1987; Celoza 1997). With his new legislative powers
and the military backup, Marcos centralized authority within the Presidency and called
such step as “constitutional authoritarianism” (Cariño 1992: 79). Marcos, in assumingly
achieving a more democratic environment using undemocratic means, digressed to an
authoritarian regime with the democratic idea of equality as its façade.
Marcos was not the only President that used undemocratic means to supposedly
further democracy. On May 24, 1898, President Emilio Aguinaldo proclaimed the
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establishment of the Dictatorial Government to administer the Philippines by decrees
promulgated under his sole responsibility until the country attains ‘complete’
independence and the people experience ‘complete’ liberation (Zaide 1970). President
Manuel L. Quezon practiced centralization of power and authority under the guise of
American-sponsored democracy (Celoza, 1987).4 President Elpidio Quirino in 1950
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus5 in order to suppress the imminent
disorder brought by insurgencies that presented a threat on the people’s enjoyment of their
other liberties (Marcos 1973).
The Philippine Presidency, through time, has therefore, presented the possibility of
using authoritarianism to ironically promote democracy, even at the expense of inhibiting
the other foundations of democracy.
Despite the effect of using undemocratic practices to supposedly attain a more
democratic goal, the Filipino people, before EDSA Revolution, became subservient to their
government and to their President. This is because the promise of the ideology of the
President solicited popular support needed by the regime. Therefore, the Philippine
Presidency has shown the importance of ideology in rationalizing the measures taken by
the President (Calderon 1973).
Legal Authorities
Although it was not until Marcos declared Martial Law that authoritarianism
spawning from a democracy took its most tangible form, the “Office of the President is
always conceived as a potent tool of dictatorship” (Cruz 1986: 1). This is not merely
because of the possibility that the President’s democratic ideology perverts to dictatorship.
This is also due to the legal and political powers provided for the Philippine President to
supposedly ensure the implementation of his programs and policies (Cruz 1986). More
than the President’s ideology, the legal authority afforded by the State and the Government
to the Office of the President provides him legitimacy for any measures taken to effect his
leadership functions – diagnostic, policy, and implementing functions (Tendero 1993).
4 Manuel L. Quezon was criticized to be the first President who experimented with the legal authorities of the
Office to prolong his term. (Zaide, 1970; Celoza, 1987) 5 This refers to the arresting of any person and keeping them under custody for any periods of time without
any charges before the court.
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Therefore, the authoritarianism – or the concentration and centralization of power – of the
President is also attributed to the political authority constitutionally guaranteed by the
government of the Philippines.
The President of the Philippines, according to the historical account of Gregorio
Zaide (1970), has been exercising executive power, or the power to enforce and administer
laws, since the establishment of the Biak-na-Bato Constitution on November 1, 1897.
During Aguinaldo’s Dictatorial Government on 1989, two powers of the President became
evident: military power and the power to supervise local governments. On August 6, 1989,
after the Dictatorial Government became the Revolutionary Government, Aguinaldo
initiated diplomatic powers by addressing “a memorandum to the foreign powers asking
for recognition of Philippine belligerency and independence” (Zaide 1970: 38). With the
ratification of the 1935 Constitution, the powers of the President expanded to provide the
Republic the leadership that it needed to be able to stand as an independent state.
The President’s authority, under the 1935 Constitution, included the executive
power, or (1) the power to exercise discretion, and, (2) the power to take necessary and
proper steps to carry into execution national policies and laws. Also, according to this
Constitution, the President had administrative power, or the (1) power to exclusively
control all executive departments, bureaus and offices, and, (2) the power to generally
supervise local governments. The President also had legislative power, or (1) the power to
approve or veto legislations, and, (2) the power to promulgate rules and regulations such as
executive orders, executive proclamations, and administrative orders to supplement the
laws passed by Congress. The Philippine President also had the power to appoint or
remove heads of the Executive Department, the ambassadors and other public ministers
and consuls, and top officers of the Armed Forces. The President was also provided with
extensive diplomatic powers, or the powers to initiate treaties, establish foreign relations,
and shape foreign policies. The President had budgetary powers, or (1) the power to
prepare the annual budget of government income and expenses, which was the basis for the
general appropriations bill, and, (2) the power to impound funds, i.e. the refusal to spend
funds made available by the Congress. The President also exercised pardoning power, or
the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment. With the same
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Constitution, the President was also given military power, or the power to call for the
armed forces, or to declare martial law, or to suspend the writ of habeas corpus to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, rebellion, insurrection, or invasion. Moreover, the President
had been provided with miscellaneous powers such as the power to declare a state of
emergency in times of war, calamity, or any other abnormal periods, and, the power to call
for special elections (Cruz 1986; Fernandez 1974).
The 1935 Constitution provided for a strong President (Corpus 1973: 85). It
concentrated authority within the Executive despite the checks and balance offered by the
other branches of the Government. Thus, coupled with dictatorial ideology, such legal
authorities could certainly provide for the development of authoritarianism.
Analytic Framework
To enable a president in a democratic environment to concentrate and centralize
power, he: (1) must possess legal authority; and (2) is an effective leader. Also a situation
that calls for authoritarian rule must be present.
Leadership is a concept having numerous definitions that relies on the different
interpretations of its processes and dynamics (Bass & Stogdill 1981). Despite the various
explanations used to define such a complex idea, leadership can be generally regarded as
an influence process, which may range from persuasion to the use of coercion, to achieve a
desired end (Taylor and Rosenbach 1989). It is the ability to convince others to support
and participate in activities proposed to attain a certain set of objectives. Commitment to
such activities and loyalty to their cause are the requisites of effective management and
leadership. An effective leader must, therefore, instill influence and solicit commitment
and loyalty by employing all the necessary instruments, techniques and measures.
Instruments to Influence
The President of the Philippines performs roles and responsibilities from which the
authority to influence emanates. The President, upon assumption of office, becomes: (1)
the Chief Executive, or the embodiment of executive powers, head of the Administration,
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prime enforcer of laws, and general supervisor of local governments; (2) the Chief
Legislator, or the principal initiator of laws to be passed to the Congress; (3) the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, or the chief protector of peace
and order; and, (4) the Chief Diplomat, or the chief formulator and administrator of foreign
policies. (Abueva, Abueva, et. al. 2004: xvii) Accordingly, the President (a) provides
direction and control to the national bureaucracy and local government units; (b)
establishes executive-legislative relations; (c) dispenses national defense for national
security; and, (d) administers foreign policies. These powers may, consequently, ensure the
operation of the President’s program of government (Wit 1953).
However, while such powers are an “ingredient of leadership,” the exercise of the
President’s authority does not always make for effective leadership (Tendero 1993: 75).
The success of an administration also relies on the methods of leadership and the
leadership style that the President employs in an effort to exert influence and gather the
necessary and sufficient support and participation from the people.
The Situational Style of Leadership
The leadership style or the leadership behavior is generally affected by three factors
(Tendero 1993: 79). These are: 1) the value orientation or ideology of the leader from
which the kind of supervision is determined; 2) the value orientation of the subordinates or
the political culture, which proposes the response of the populace to the authority exercised
by the leader; and, 3) the situational factors, which determines the effectiveness of the
methods of leadership to be employed.
The last category identifies situations as the external factors causing a particular
leadership style or behavior. It recognizes the importance of critical environmental
pressure within a definite time frame in formulating appropriate leadership methods. The
kind of leadership thus required is considered situational. A situational leadership style
varies according to the situation on hand and may not fit another situation.
In situational leadership, leaders are expected to be responsive toward a given
situational context. They are considered leaders only as they provide solutions during
critical conditions particularly in situations where there are instability and disorder
(Tendero 1993). Such situations may include political, economic, and social crises. In the
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presence of these situations, a particular leadership style in resolving immediately the crisis
at hand is usually adopted – authoritarianism. That is, in uncertain and fluid situations, an
authoritarian leadership style is preferred (Tendero 1993).
Authoritarianism in this sense refers to the centralization or concentration of
authority and power in one person or clique (Cariño 1992: 7). This, in effect, may be
associated with the lack of popular consensus under a democratic government and the lack
or insufficient mobilization from the masses in opposition to the leadership (Linz 1978).
Methodology
For this paper, comparison is made between presidents of the Philippines. The
categories to be used are, thus, based on the instruments to influence which are peculiar to
the Philippine presidential leadership. These instruments are: executive supervision and
control, executive-legislative relations, national defense, and foreign affairs.
To identify which presidents of the Philippines are suitable for comparison, the
historical approach is used. Historical or diachronic approach is the exploration and
examination of events under the same settings “not only in terms of contemporaneous
factors, but also in relation to how focal institutions and [his] influences on them have
changed over time” (Cariño 1992: 20). The presidents to be compared, therefore, would
have to exhibit a similarity in the causal “events”.
The comparative study of the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos and Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is essentially descriptive in nature. It discusses with emphasis the
political processes in the leadership of both presidents given the political, economic, and
social situations of their respective regimes. It also outlines a set of categories as the basis
of comparison while it identifies similarities in the leadership styles of the personalities in
question.
The study uses a positivist approach in analyzing presidential leadership.
Positivism is a scientific inquiry seeking causes and general relationships of which a
certain political process is the result.6 It is concerned with identifying patterns applicable in
different contexts and periods. It concentrates on observable behavior to produce useful
6 For this study, Authoritarianism is the resulting political process.
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and verifiable theories. It combines social science with the production of reliable results to
confirm or reject hypotheses about political behavior, which, in effect, develops data
needed for a more accurate comparison (Wesson 1981: 6). Since the study intends to
produce necessary information to develop a theory on the connection of authoritarianism
with presidential leadership as the outcome of certain conditions by using comparative
politics and the particular cases of Marcos and Arroyo, it is appropriate to employ a
positivist approach as a framework of analysis.7
Data Gathering
The study of presidential leadership necessitates a comprehensive analysis. It
requires a sufficient collection of needed information. To collect the adequate details vital
for the analysis and for the logical deduction of conclusion, an extensive library or
document research is used. This is the examination of political variables as recorded and
analyzed by other professionals and experts in the field. Available primary and secondary
written sources are covered to gather the necessary data. However, to maintain conceptual
focus, only documents containing the critical analyses of the leadership techniques of both
presidents and the situations in their respective regimes are considered. These included a
variety of books, masters’ theses, doctoral dissertations, and articles from broadsheets and
periodicals. Also, for the purpose of verification, public documents containing legislative
acts such as the constitution, laws and resolutions, statutes, and speeches are examined.
These sources, in effect, isolate sufficient facts needed for the comparison.
Data Analysis
The general procedure for analyzing the gathered data is constructionist in nature;
i.e., it involves the configuration of segments of information to develop a meaningful
conceptual pattern. As such, it uses analytic induction as its method for generating
7 With positivism, the study could be more objective in its approach. This will allow for the establishment of
a universal concept that the Office of the President of the Philippines is authoritarian in nature, which was
extensively explained in this Chapter. Consequently, it can now be deduced that every President holding the
Office has the legal capacity to be authoritarian. What is now being analyzed is the tendency of the President
to be authoritarian, which is tested through the examination of the leadership styles of the Presidents being
studied. This, in effect, will allow for a more definitive conclusion, which eventually, could answer the
question: Are the two Presidents authoritarian.
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conclusions. The analytic induction approach requires a careful assessment of all the
collected data by isolating information according to the definition of the phenomenon
being studied, the hypothetical explanation of the phenomenon, and the individual cases
confirming the hypothesis (Jupp 2006:146-7). This approach also requires an intensive
analysis of data by examining the cases needed for the study until a universal pattern is
established, and by comparing cases with each other to create a higher level of
conceptualization (Jupp 2006:146-7).
The first step in the analysis is the search for themes or recurring regularities. Open
coding is a research technique used to derive themes and generalizations of critical items
relevant to the topic (Neuman 1994). It is applied to raw data to provide for an organized
analysis. In the study of presidential leadership, the data collected from the archival or
library research uses open coding to identify the facts necessary for the comparative
analysis. The analytic framework and the research questions are used as guidelines in the
formulation of a more systematic coding.
After deriving relevant themes, the collected data are interpreted using content
analysis. Content analysis is a research technique that deals with available documentary
materials (Calderon and Gonzales 1993). Through content analysis, the time sequences, the
major decision points and events, and the factors affecting the decisions in the two cases
being studied are highlighted.
Historical and comparative approaches are then applied to the interpreted data to
discover if there are similarities and/or differences in the cases of the presidents being
studied.
CHAPTER TWO
Executive Supervision and Control
The President of the Philippines is vested by the State with the Executive power.
This is in accordance with the principle of separation of power that distributes and
delineates powers and authorities relative to the functions of the government. As such, in
congruence with the Executive power, the President is afforded with the government’s
fundamental duty of enforcing and administering national programs and policies.
To perform his administrative and enforcement functions, the President is
empowered with the authority to supervise and control the executive machineries of the
government. This authority, in return, ensures the implementation of the government’s
programs for the Republic. Such authority also ensures that the plans of the President for
the government are executed. If this authority is properly and cautiously exercised, it may
ensure the success of any of the objectives of the President. In the rise of authoritarianism
through presidential leadership, this authority, therefore, takes a paramount role. It may, if
the President intends to, guarantee to some extent the concentration and centralization of
power.
The President’s authority of executive supervision and control centers on two
essential institutions: the national bureaucracy and the local governments. These
institutions are the adjuncts of the President. They are thus expected to perform their
executive functions under the leadership and authority of the President. In studying the
development of authoritarianism through presidential leadership, it is, therefore, important
to determine how these institutions are supervised and controlled by the President in order
to perform activities that are tended to concentrate and centralize power.
Considering how the President uses the national bureaucracy and the local
governments in an aim to concentrate and centralize power is necessary due to the fact that
these institutions function as the official operating instruments of the President. They are
inevitably involved in performing the activities included in the President’s program of
government. They therefore, largely contribute to the accomplishment of the President’s
will.
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Other governmental organs, i.e. the Congress and the Supreme Court, have proven
to be vital in ensuring the success of parts of the President's plan for the government. Other
institutions, such as the political parties and the interest groups, have also established that
they play as major components in the realization of the objectives of the President. For this
chapter, however, emphasis shall be given on the national bureaucracy and the local
governments since they are the institutions immediately affected by the President’s
Executive power and their executive functions are constitutionally subjected to the
President’s authority.
National Bureaucracy and Local Government: Major Power Blocs of the Society
The national bureaucracy and the local governments are the immediate
implementers of national programs and policies. Hence, they provide as the primary
executive mechanisms of the government. However, their importance to the President goes
beyond their function as the enforcers and administrators of programs and policies. This
could be better understood by defining the roles of each of these institutions.
National Bureaucracy
The national bureaucracy is the principal implementing organ of the Executive
department. It is therefore, the bureaucracy’s foremost function to carry out the programs
and policies prepared by the Chief Executive Officer, the President. However, it is evident
that bureaucracy is not limited to such purpose. Its significance transcends more than being
a mere implementing instrument of the President. This is brought by the fact that the
national bureaucracy could exercise an unwritten yet recognized power8 aside from the
administrative authority delegated by the President. This power, when used, enables the
bureaucracy to involve itself to the whole policy process, including decision-making for
policy formulation, lobbying for policy approval, and policy promulgation, rather than just
policy implementation.
The unofficial power of the bureaucracy is best explained by the organization’s
distinctive characteristics; wherefore, the power of bureaucracy is implicitly derived
8 Power, in this sense, is the exercise of political influence and authority.
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from the impersonal basis of [the bureaucracy’s] strength; from its huge size as
an organization; from its permanence, functional indispensability, and monopoly
of expert knowledge; from its self-consciousness as an aristocratic status group
and power elite and from its patient and oblique obstructiveness (Rosenberg
1966: 176, as cited in Kamenka and Krygier 1979: 8).
This inherent power suggests that bureaucracy stands, though discreetly, as an
essential power bloc. This is the reason why Weber (1947) concluded that it is always
important to consider the “question on who controls the existing bureaucratic machinery"
(Weber 1947: 338 in Cariño 1992: 5).
Contrary to the common notion of Executive domination, the bureaucracy may
attempt to become co-equal with the President in terms of decision-making. This means
that the bureaucracy may prefer to generate and stand for its own policy ideas. Thus, the
bureaucracy may decide if it will observe the President’s priorities or follow its own
agenda. If it desires to pursue its own course of actions, the bureaucracy may even choose
which part of the society it will be accountable to. According to Ledivina Cariño (1992),
The apex of the bureaucracy may side with the political and economic elite but
may also, like the rank and file, identify more strongly with their underprivileged
clientele because of frequent contact with them and commitment to the spirit of
their programs (1992: 13).
The bureaucracy may maintain its neutrality, allow all the political decisions
emanate from its legal and institutional superior – the President, and serve as a mere
implementing hand of the Executive; or, it may, instead, acknowledge its political worth,
create its own policies, and further, decide who will be the beneficiary of such policies.
There is always a tendency for the bureaucracy to go towards the direction of the latter as it
chooses to become more democratic and politicized. In such a case, the bureaucracy
becomes independent from the President as the Chief Executive Officer, although it still
considers the President as the nation’s formal head (Hegel 1969).
Local Governments
Aside from the national bureaucracy, the other implementing arm of the national
government, at least in principle, are the local governments. Similar to bureaucracy, the
local governments are expected to observe national programs and policies. However, aside
from being the government’s immediate executive machineries, the nature of the local
Tariga 21
governments provides more differences than similarities with that of the national
bureaucracy.
The local governments exercise a clear, obvious, legally-provided power as they
have been vested by the State with political and administrative authority in order to
perform both of their national and local responsibilities. This is in congruence with the
Maura Law promulgated in 1893, which promotes the autonomy of local governments
(Tigno, Shimomura ed. 2003:265). Hence, the local executives’ principal function is not
limited to the implementation of policies outlined by the national government. Their basic
function further includes the organization and management of their respective local affairs
(Tigno, Shimomura ed. 2003).
Moreover, the local governments, in contrast with the bureaucracy, often practice
their political autonomy, which, at times, results to a conflict with the President. This
political conflict is usually committed when the local governments cut across the plans and
priorities of the national government, and thus of the President, if they perceive that there
is a need to do so. As such, in contrast with the subtlety of the national bureaucracy, the
local governments present as a noticeable power base of the society.
Local governments are significantly powerful because they do not only have an
influence in the making of political and administrative decisions at the national echelon,
especially when they defy to follow the prerogatives of the national government; they also
have a direct participation in enforcing such decisions within their local jurisdictions
(Elkind 2011). This direct involvement, complemented by citizen awareness of the
responsibilities of the government, makes the local chief executives very critical of the
national policies drafted by the President. As such, there is always a possibility that the
President’s objectives result to fragmentation and emasculation.
Controlling the Philippine Bureaucracy and Local Chief Executives
Both national bureaucracy and local governments clearly perform as major political
actors in deciding for or against the success of the President’s programs. Also, they are
both clearly capable of playing an active role in policy designing and implementation.
Thus, they have an impact not only to the society of which they can directly relate to, but
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as well as to the political community of which they are a part of. The national bureaucracy
and the local governments are considerable power bases that the President must influence
if he desires to centralize power in his Office.
In the Philippines, for authoritarianism or centralization of power to occur, the
President just needs to exert enough effort to influence and control the national
bureaucracy and the local governments. This is due to two basic reasons. First, the type of
governmental structure already provides for the centralization of power in the Office of the
President. And second, the Philippine political culture allows for the adoption of structures
and practices that are predominantly authoritarian.
Bureaucratic Management
The Philippine’s bureaucracy follows a pattern of Executive ascendancy or
bureaucratic subordination in terms of its relationship with the President (Cariño 1992).
This structure provides a hierarchy of control, which runs through a single line from the
President down to the lower levels of the bureaucracy. The ideas of politics and decision-
making are, thus, the prerogative of the President while the bureaucracy remains politically
neutral and simply implements the decisions of the regime.
The submissive nature of the Philippine bureaucracy to the President yields from
the culture of the society that recognizes unquestioned obedience and conformity. (Cariño
1992) This culture developed from a societal structure that nurtured the people’s
acceptance of the role of the subordinate and their deference to age and authority.
Moreover, such culture was maintained by the mindset of the Philippine society, which
places a premium on the observance of smooth interpersonal relations defined primarily by
kinship ties and patron-client relationships (Celoza 1997). Thus, the national bureaucracy
has “found it easier to simply implement laws rather than argue with superiors. . . .”
(Cariño 1992:65)
Local Government Supervision
The Philippines has a highly centralized political structure. This is a product of the
unitary system of government which has been established by the Spanish colonizer.
According to Avelino Tendero (1993),
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The autonomous barangays gave way to the centralizing pressure exerted by the
[Spanish] colonial governors to hasten the subjugation of the remaining areas
resisting foreign rule, in the name of peace and order through the establishment
of a strong central authority as an instrument for unity and integration, hence a
unitary structure (1993: 18).
This structure placed administrative and political powers in the hands of one man,
who at those times was the governor-general (Zaide 1970). After the declaration of
independence from various colonists, these powers eventually resided in the President's
office (Agoncillo 1960). Henceforth, governance became centralized with the President
holding central authority.
Over the years, there had been a major clamor for political devolution from the
central government. This was in response to the people’s struggle for a more efficient
service delivery, economic development, and poverty alleviation. The result was the
establishment of an elaborate local government system.9
The local governments in the Philippines saw several developments towards
decentralization. For years, national legislations have been consistently responsive to the
movement for local autonomy.10
As a consequence, the central government can only
practice general supervision over the now completely autonomous local governments. This
means that the central government will just be responsible for setting the national standards
for policy formulation, and all national, sectoral or departmental programs will be effected
only in consultation with the local governments.
Political jurisdictions of local governments are practiced also with full
administrative autonomy. The power of general supervision by the President over local
governments, as provided for in the Constitution, is now limited and extend only to
provincial governors and mayors of highly urbanized cities.11
9 The evolution of local governments in the Philippines began from the establishment of the City of Cebu in
1565. (Domingo-Tapales, et. al. 1998) However, a more comprehensive local government system was
supported only during the 20th
century. See Alex B. Brillantes, Jr. and Donna Moscare, Decentralization and
Federalism in the Philippines: Lessons from Global Community; available from http://www.up-
ncpag.org/pdf/decentralization_federalism.pdf 10
See Local Autonomy Act of 1959, Barrio Charter and the Decentralization Act of 1967, and the local
government provisions on the 1972 and 1987 Constitutions. 11
This still follows the unitary structure of governance where the President has direct influence over the
higher level local chief executives, who, in turn, have general supervision over the officials of the lower
levels of their jurisdiction.
Tariga 24
Despite the political and administrative autonomy enjoyed by the local government
units, the central government still has means to exert influence over the local officials in
the form of fiscal management and regulation. Each local government unit is provided with
economic self-sufficiency along with its political autonomy. However, there is still a
dependency from the central government for local funding, i.e. internal revenue allotments,
loans and/or subsidies (Co, Abueva, et. al. eds. 2004).
The regulatory function of the central government on the local government’s
finances serves as an effective control mechanism that supposedly ensures the promotion
and maintenance of national standards. However, in a society where a culture of kinship
ties and patron-client relationship is deeply embedded, this regulatory function of the
central government results to a reliance of the local executives to the central government as
the dispenser of privilege and favor. (Tendero 1993; Celoza 1987; Domingo-Tapales, et.
al. 1998) Consequently, this function may even pressure the local chief executives to
pursue any policies prepared by the central government.
The Executive Power of Ferdinand Marcos (1965 – 1972)
The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices,
exercise general provision over all local governments as may be provided by law,
and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
- Section 10 (1) Article VII, 1935 Constitution
Ferdinand E. Marcos was elected twice as the President of the Republic before his
imposition of Martial Law. On his first term in Office, which practically began in 1966,12
Marcos was left with a struggling economy. The national treasury was empty, with “daily
spending one-third in excess of revenues” (Spence 1969:323). There was an incredible
increase in foreign debt. The country’s credit was very unreliable, so much that the World
Bank considered withdrawing loans already in commission. The Philippine peso was even
in recommendation for devaluation by the International Monetary Fund. (Spence 1969;
12
Ferdinand Marcos was elected in 1965 and was inaugurated only in December 30 of the same year.
Tariga 25
Valera 1988) Newsweek13
reported in its February 1966 publication the state of the
country’s economy:
The Philippine economy, in fact, despite its frequently glossy surface, is
staggering badly. Food production has fallen behind the rate of population
growth, especially in rural areas where 70 per cent of the people live. Industrial
growth is spotty and sluggish. (Newsweek 2/14/66, as cited in Gleeck 1993)
The response of Marcos to the fiscal crisis left by the previous administration was a
Four Year Economic Program. Aside from creating new and higher tax bases as the
primary source of national income, Marcos’ Economic Plan assigned priority projects
according to the availability of funds. To remain consistent with the Program’s objectives,
Marcos’ priority projects just focused on two areas – public works and rice production.
“On the obvious thesis that economic expansion required an infrastructure. . . first priority
was directed to public works” (Spence 1969:331).
According to his first state of the nation address, to entice investors and increase
monetary fluidity domestically, Marcos deemed it necessary to first improve the country’s
infrastructures, particularly roads and bridges, irrigation facilities, airports and seaports,
electric power and water supply, and school houses.14
However, because the treasury was
bare, Marcos had to be both resourceful and strategic in implementing his public works
projects. For example, he made agreements with the United States15
to provide additional
funds to finance his infrastructure buildings and community development projects.
(Timberman 1991: 58; Spence 1969; Gleeck 1993; Noble, Bresnan ed. 1986; Bonner 1987)
In addition, in order to minimize the expenditure, particularly on the cost of labor, Marcos
utilized the Armed Forces of the Philippines and “specified it as one of the key
governmental bodies that would be involved in socioeconomic… and civilian development
projects…” (Casper 1995:91; Celoza 1997)
The road towards economic growth using infrastructure development required
Ferdinand Marcos to handle the executive department in a common yet effective manner.
13
Newsweek is the second largest weekly news magazine in the United States that began its publication in
1933 in New York City. Its print edition was distributed internationally. 14
Source: Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines - First State of the Nation Address of Ferdinand
Marcos 15
Agreements between Ferdinand Marcos and the United States will be further discussed on the Chapter on
Foreign Affairs.
Tariga 26
His initial step was to expand the bureaucracy. He created various committees that would
only focus on completing public works projects. (Spence 1969; Noble, Bresnan ed. 1986)
However, to control the growing bureaucracy efficiently, Marcos became stern,
uncompromising in achieving the deadlines of his laid out plans. There were instances
when he dismissed city engineers who were unable to meet their schedules.16
In addition to the expansion of the bureaucracy and managing it to dedicate on
investing to infrastructures, Marcos also made sure that the local governments were
heading towards the same national goal. He approved a law17
authorizing provinces to
withhold thirteen per cent (13%) of their own internal revenue collections to finance their
own public works projects. By the end of his first term, these efforts of Marcos to build
infrastructures became the President’s most visible accomplishment. (Cariño 1994)
Aside from infrastructures, the other solution of Ferdinand Marcos to the country’s
economic crisis was to focus on self-sufficiency in rice production. Marcos’ rice program
was his answer to the gross drain in foreign exchange incurred by the national government
just to import rice. (Spence 1969) To effectively launch this program, Marcos enlisted the
aid of the renowned technocrat, Rafael Salas18
. He then used the funds allocated for rice
importation to finance researches and improvements on rice and its production. Finally, he
created a coordinating committee which will include all agencies responsible for rice
production, management, and even marketing. This coordinating body would report
directly to the Office of the President (Iglesias 1976 in Cariño 1994) As a result, by 1968,
the Philippine’s reliance on rice importation decreased dramatically. The country even
became a minor rice exporter in Asia. (Gleeck 1993)
While Marcos’ programs on infrastructures and rice production were in progress,
the government simultaneously paid attention to the other hindrances to Marcos’
perception of economic growth, to wit, land reform, industrialization, and labor expansion.
(Spence 1969) Here, Marcos issued a number of Presidential Proclamations claiming
agricultural lands for the purpose of his land reform program. This program was to be
16
See Administrative Order 97 series of 1967. 17
Republic Act 5185, An Act Granting Further Autonomous Powers To Local Governments 18
Rafael Salas was the first Executive Secretary of Ferdinand Marcos and was regarded as the man who
solved the Philippine’s age-old rice problem. See Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr, The Third Philippine Republic: 1946-
1972. (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1993), p. 358.
Tariga 27
funded by the Land Bank19
. He also initiated the passage of the Investment Incentive Act20
,
which had the objective of expanding the country’s industrial complex through private
initiative and investment. Finally, with the expansion of industries, he created the
Manpower Development Council21
, an agency responsible for increasing the labor force
brought by industrialization.
The early efforts of Ferdinand Marcos towards economic solvency were initially
progressive. Coupled with his creation of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO)22
, an anti-graft and corruption government
organization, Marcos’ first incumbency, particularly from 1966-1968, could be treated as a
success. In 1967, he used these accomplishments to campaign for his Nacionalista Party on
the November mid-elections. This resulted to the election of his Party to forty-eight of
sixty governorships and to most of the lower level local government posts (Spence 1969).
Towards the end of his first term, Ferdinand Marcos encountered several glitches in
his Four Year Economic Development Plan. His infrastructure program became more
expensive to finance annually.23
His rice self-sufficiency initiative “has fallen out of favor,
as it was based on expensive and ecologically unsafe inputs of pesticides and fertilizers”
(Cariño 1994:60). His land reform program alienated the politically all-powerful
landowner elite and, thus, became difficult to implement. (Philippines: Country Study
Guide 2008:79) Even his anti-corruption agency was having internal issues. (Cariño 1994)
As he approached the last year of his term, these glitches escalated especially because 1969
was dedicated to campaigning for his reelection.
From the late months of 1968 up to the early weeks of the next year, the economy
began to manifest its depression24
. Moreover, graft and corruption, particularly through
19
Republic Act 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code created the Land Bank of the Philippines in
response to Ferdinand Marcos’ First State of the Nation Address on land reform program 20
Republic Act 5186 21
Executive Order No. 53, series of 1966 22
Executive Order No. 4, series of 1966; PARGO was the “watchdog committee” of Ferdinand Marcos
which aimed at reviewing charges of venality in the civil service. 23 See Marcos’ 3rd State of the Nation Address where he admitted the problem in financing his infrastructure projects. 24 See Walden Bello, et. al. Development Debacle: The World Bank on the Philippines. 1982. p.136
Tariga 28
smuggling25
, resurfaced inside the bureaucracy.26
However, despite such precedents,
Ferdinand Marcos still sought the much eluded second term. When campaign period
started, Marcos used the advantages of his incumbency – the virtually unlimited
government funds for campaigning and vote-buying, the goon squads, and the control of
the polls – to secure his victory. (Steinberg 1994:120; McCoy 2009:52) It was even
reported that he was dispensing peso-filled envelopes with amounts as much as P100,000
to barangay captains and mayors (Bonner 1987). Consequently, in November 1969,
Ferdinand Marcos became the first president of the independent Republic to be reelected.
The second term of Ferdinand Marcos was an extension of his previous
administration. With the addition of the emphasis on tourism and export-oriented
industries, Marcos’ plan of governance was just a sequel of his 1966 Development
Program.27
However, the most noteworthy during this incumbency was not Marcos’
programs for the Republic. It was his reorganization of his Cabinet.
The first year of Marcos’ second term saw the rise of ‘radical chic’ in the country.
Students, workers, and peasants launched series of violent demonstrations against
Ferdinand Marcos from as early as his fifth address to the nation. These demonstrators,
according to Marcos, were associated with the Communists – “the ideological group
strongly opposed by the United States” (Jones 1989:38-42). Marcos’ reply to this crisis
was two-fold. First, he tried to silence the unrest by his “campaigns of rapprochement with
the (Socialist) USSR and (Communist) China…” (Gleeck 1993:368) Then, he reorganized
his Cabinet with pro-American bureaucrats in an attempt to cushion the idea that Marcos
tolerates communism in the country. According to Nick Joaquin (1983),
By bringing these pro-American technocrats, Marcos was in effect delivering the
message to the Americans that he was still their boy (Joacquin 1983:347)
The reorganization of the Cabinet also saw Marcos’ first steps towards a brewing
declaration of Martial Law. Marcos imported Alex Melchor from Annapolis to become his
executive secretary. This resulted to the recruitment of officers graduating from the
25 See Sterling Seagrave. The Marcos Dynasty. 1988. pp. 203-204 26 See Ma. Concepcion P. Alfiler. Administrative Measures against Bureaucratic Corruption: The Philippine Experience.
1979. p.343 27
See Marcos’ Fifth State of the Nation Address (Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines).
Tariga 29
Military Academy and U.S. service academies to certain bureaucratic posts. (Seagrave
1988) Marcos also solicited the aid of Attorney Juan Ponce Enrile to take over the
consolidated positions of justice and defense. (Gleeck 1993) The combined positions of
justice and defense made Marcos sure that the suspension of habeas corpus would be
legally supported under one office. (Joacquin 1983; Bonner 1987) These measures would
eventually benefit Ferdinand Marcos during his Martial Law era.
The Executive Power of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
- Section 17 Article VII, 1987 Constitution
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) was the longest to hold on to the Presidency
since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Her first term of office, from 2001 to 2004,
was the continuation of the ouster of the previous administration. Her second was a
product of election, albeit plagued with controversies, which gave her a full-six year term.
GMA’s first term was constantly challenged from its onset regarding its legitimacy
and constitutionality. (Bernas 2007) Eventually, it was unanimously decided by the
Supreme Court that GMA had become the “de jure president”.28
However, despite the
High Court’s ruling, Arroyo wasn’t able to immediately recover from the political
instability arising from her ascendancy to the Office. According to Arroyo’s then Chief of
Staff Rigoberto Tiglao, the first year and a half of GMA’s Presidency were spent curbing
the political crisis and consolidating her political base. (Coronel 2003) It was not until the
midterm elections in May 2001, when her administration party came out victorious, that
the opposition started to dwindle. By this time, GMA was finally able to focus on the
situation of the economy left to her by the previous administration.
The Philippine economy prior to GMA’s presidency was on its verge of recovery
from the Asian Financial Crisis29
until politics took over resulting to the downfall of the
incumbent president. (Canlas, Khan, and Zhuang 2011:15) The aftermath of this political
malaise witnessed a high degree of economic uncertainty. When GMA assumed office, she
28
See Supreme Court decision [G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001] 29
See William C. Hunter, et. al. eds. The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications, and Solution.
(Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).
Tariga 30
inherited a paralyzed economy. As described by Mark Landler30
(2001) in his editorial at
the International Herald Tribune31
,
[The previous administration] left behind a nation staggering under a greater
burden: spiraling budget deficits, a battered stock market, a devalued currency, and
a new reputation for chicanery that sent even the most loyal investors packing…
(Landler 2001 as cited in Yap 200132
)
GMA’s response to the economic situation given to her administration was the
Medium Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP), a plan formulated in coordination
with the private sector and the civil society33
– two groups responsible for the ouster of the
previous president (Encarnacion-Tadem 2009:246). MTPDP was a compilation of policies,
strategies, and programs emphasizing on the reinvigoration of economic environment
through market reliance.34
Moreover, since GMA attributed the turbulence in the economy
to the previous administration’s issues on corruption, MTPDP was focused on sustaining
growth and development with what she envisioned as good governance.
GMA’s vision of good governance for the people was through the establishment of
a “strong republic”. (Macapagal-Arroyo 2003) To realize this goal, she created an agenda
consisting of building up a strong bureaucracy, void of graft and other corrupt practices.
She also included in her agenda the lowering of crime rates, increasing of tax collection,
improving the economic growth, and intensifying counter-terrorism efforts.35
GMA’s first step to achieving her ‘strong republic’ was establishing a more
responsive and accountable government. She created “ad hoc bodies and task force” in her
desire for the government’s quick action on the problems of the society. (Co, Abueva, et.
al. 2004) She then abolished cluster and committee systems and replaced them with
30
M. Landler, “Daunting Task for Manila’s New Finance Chief,” International Herald Tribune. (10-11
February 2001) 31
The International Herald Tribune is an international English newspaper printed and distributed throughout
the world. It was renamed into International New York Times on October 15, 2013. 32
Josef T. Yap, “The Philippine Economy: What lies ahead in 2001.” Philippine Institute for Development
Studies: Development Research News Vol. XIX No. 1, (January – February 2001). 33
See Highlights of Secretary Romulo L. Neri’s Lecture. 2004. Alternative Views and Assessments of the
Macapagal-Arroyo Presidency and Administration: Record and Legacy (2001-2004) p. 35 34
Ibid. 35
Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines – First State of the Nation Address of Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo
Tariga 31
individual Cabinet member’s accountability on their mandates.36
This ensured that her
programs were implemented and the objectives of the national government were met.
For the duration of her three-year term, GMA boasted her achievements in job
creation, improvements in medical care, developments in the agriculture and fisheries
sector, as well as government accountability.37
GMA’s Executive Secretary Alberto
Romulo attributed these accomplishments to Arroyo’s method of managing her Cabinet.38
Romulo considered the Cabinet as the “primary and immediate coordinating mechanisms”
of the President.39
By holding her Cabinet responsible for the successes or failures of the
programs of their respective sectors, GMA was able to generate her expected results.40
GMA’s system of direct coordination between her Cabinet and the bureaucracy had
its political byproducts. Giving her Cabinet responsibility led to accountability. However,
that much responsibility would also equate to independence, and autonomy was always
susceptible to corruption. (Doig & Theobald 2000:67; De Dios & Ferrer 2001:6-7) A few
months after her assumption to office, a member of her Cabinet, the secretary of the
Department of Justice, was already involved in an extortion scandal.41
Not long after that,
the secretary of Finance was then linked to a P1.4 Billion profiting scheme.42
But perhaps
the most controversial effect of GMA’s bureaucratic management was exhibited when her
Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Angelo Reyes, demoted Rear Admiral Guillermo Wong, then
Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, after exposing irregularities in the
Philippine Marines’ procurement of equipment amounting to P3.8 million.43
This was
controversial not because of the gravity of the accusation, but of the crippling effect of
36
Highlights of the Open Forum on Executive Direction and Control, Alternative Views and Assessments of
the Macapagal-Arroyo Presidency and Administration: Record and Legacy (2001-2004), 2004 pp. 33-34 37
Ibid. 38
Highlights of Secretary Alberto G. Romulo’s Lecture, Alternative Views and Assessments of the
Macapagal-Arroyo Presidency and Administration: Record and Legacy (2001-2004), 2004 pp. 23-24 39
Ibid. 40
Ibid. 41
Department of Justice Secretary Hernando Perez allegedly extorted $2 million from a $470-million power
plant rehabilitation contract awarded to Industrias Metalurgicas Pescarmona Sociedad Anonima in exchange
for the Department’s opinion that favors the deal. See Mark Jimenez v. Hernando Perez, Ernest Escaler,
Ramon Arceo [OMB-C-C-02-0857-L]; Field Investigation Office v. Hernando Perez, Ernest Escaler, Ramon
Arceo [OMB-C-C-05-0366-K]; Field Investigation Office v. Hernani Perez, Ernest Escaler, Ramon Arceo
[OMB-C-C-05-364-K] 42
Finance Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho was the brother of Socorro Camacho-Reyes, the personality
accused of profiting from the anti-poverty bonds issued by the government. (Source: http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/special-report/07/17/09/scandals) 43
Silencing the Marines. Ibid.
Tariga 32
having a Cabinet member rule on behalf of the President. The demotion not only caused
the whistle-blower Wong to resign; it also contributed to the event44
that would unfold
towards the end of GMA’s three-year term.
In December 30, 2002, Arroyo announced in her speech at Baguio City that she
would not seek a new term. After ten months, however, she retracted her statement and
declared her intention to run for presidency on 2004. Since the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, no president has ever been reelected. This is because the Constitution limits
the presidency to just one term. Since GMA assumed Office as only a succession from the
previous president, she had the privilege of seeking another term through election.
Fortunately for her, this privilege came with the advantages of incumbency. Thus, in June
30, 2004, Arroyo took her oath of office for her full six-year term.
GMA’s first term was filled with scandals, mostly involving her Cabinet and
members of her family. Her second term was the stage for more controversies.
GMA’s second term began with the allegations of using government funds for her
2004 election. These allegations involved the Department of Agriculture45
, Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration and Philippine Health Insurance Corporation46
, and even
the Commission on Election47
. Naturally, the anomalies implicating members of the
bureaucracy attracted much attention of the public as well as the Congress, particularly the
Senate. Consequently, a plethora of investigations was launched by the Blue Ribbon
Committee.48
44
This event refers to the Oakwood Mutiny which will be discussed further on the Chapter on National
Defense. 45
PSR 327 “Resolution Directing the Committee on Agriculture and Food to Conduct an Inquiry, in aid of
Legislation, on the Alleged Mismanagement and Use of the Fertilizer Fund of the Department of
Agriculture’s Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Program to the Detriment of the Filipino Farmers with the End
Voew of Charting Effective Policies and Programs for the Agriculture Sector” by Senator Ramon
Magsaysay, Jr. 46
PhilHealth cards used for campaigning; Francisco I. Chavez v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Virgilio R.
Angelo, Francisco Duque III, and Alberto G. Romulo. 47
Hello Garci controversy; Virgilio O. Garcillano v. The House of Representatives Committees on Public
Information, Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms [G.R. 170338, December 23, 2008] 48
The Senate’s power to conduct investigations is an inquiry in aid of legislation (Section 21 Article VI,
1987 Constitution). The Committee tasked to do these investigations is the Senate’s Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, or popularly known as the Blue Ribbon Committee.
Tariga 33
The response of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the investigations conducted by the
Upper House of Congress was an Executive Order49
directing all heads of the departments
of the Executive Branch, generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces, and Philippine
National Police officers to secure the consent and permission of the President before
appearing to the congressional hearings. For several months, until its declaration of
unconstitutionality50
, this directive prevented any executive government official from a
compulsory attendance to congressional inquiries.
Controversies on GMA’s administration were not limited to her bureaucracy.
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments.
- Article X Section 4, 1987 Constitution
From as early as her three-year term, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo recognized the
importance of the local governments to her administration. In March 29, 2001, GMA
issued an Executive Order (E.O.)51
repealing E.O. No. 189, series of 1999, a directive that
held back twenty (20) percent of the internal revenue allotment (IRA) of local government
units. By releasing the entire IRA to the local officials, GMA allowed these chief
executives to decide for themselves how to spend their own share of taxes. (Bondoc 2004)
The consequence of this was observed in two ways. First, GMA developed loyalty and
patronage from the local chief executives, a stride she used from the start of her election
campaign until the duration of the extension of her term. And second, though in an
opposite effect, GMA became unpopular with the people. Jarius Bondoc (2004) explained
this phenomenon,
49
Executive Order No. 464, series 2005 50
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate
President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N.
PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as
Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY
EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J.
GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III,
RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines,
Respondents. [G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006] 51
Executive Order No. 9, series of 2001
Tariga 34
I have discovered a trick of past Administration concerning the IRA releases. The
reason why other Presidents withheld 10, 15, 20 percent of the IRA was to
“connect” with the masa in a feudal way.
[T]his is how it works in the case of the IRA. Why does a President withhold part
of the IRA? So that when he visits a certain locale, he can gather the people and
ask them what they want, and then he would make a show of granting them the
money for it. If the people say they need irrigation, the President would readily
reply, “Here’s the money for it.” The same goes when the people cry for flood
control or for more health centers in the barrio. The people do not realize that what
the President is giving away all along is their withheld IRA.
[T]hat is why Macapagal-Arroyo is very popular with appreciative local officials,
but not with the masa who do not know about the inner workings of the
government. (2004:31-32)
GMA’s Executive Order on IRA releases was probably one of the reasons52
why
she and her programs were not recognizable by the people. However, it was certain that
this Executive Order helped her in establishing her political base (Bondoc, Abueva, et. al.
2004).
When GMA took her second term of office, there had been a constant effort to
reinforce and strengthen this political base. For example, there was a report that, aside
from still giving full discretion to their IRA, the Malacañang Palace was handing out ‘cash
gifts’ to the local chief executives.53
These cash gifts, however, were a source of
controversy in GMA’s administration since there were no funds allotted for such purpose.
Nevertheless, this was GMA’s strategy of keeping the loyalty of her allies; a strategy
which would eventually be useful to her in handling the crises during her second-term
incumbency.
Comparative Analysis
The first two terms of Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1972) experienced a democratic
Presidency. Even the manner by which Marcos exercised his Executive Power, i.e. the
implementation of laws, was democratic in nature. However, the style by which he
52
Shiela S. Coronel cited other possibilities why GMA was lacking popularity (Coronel,
Shiela. “The Problem with Gloria,” The Investigative Reporting Magazine, Volume IX Number 2, April-
June 2003.) 53
Atienza says ‘cash gifts’ are normal fare in Arroyo Palace, October 16, 2007,
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/64616/news/nation/atienza-says-cash-gifts-are-normal-fare-in-
arroyo-palace
Tariga 35
directed, supervised, and controlled the national bureaucracy and the local governments
was an undermining of the institutional foundations of democracy. This is because Marcos’
enforcement of executive supervision and control was an exploitation of the social culture
of unending indebtedness, patron-client relationship and kinship ties.
Before Marcos was first elected in 1965, he was the Senate President and the
consistent president of the political party in power, the Liberal Party (LP). However,
because of the lack of support from his own party, he resigned as the party president of LP
to run against the party’s bet, the then incumbent President Diosdado Macapagal. He then
interloped, joining the opposition Nacionalista Party (NP) and taking the Senate presidency
with him. This move suddenly gave the Nacionalistas control of the Senate. In return, he
asked to be NP’s guest candidate for president. (Seagrave 1988; Spence 1969)
After securing the Presidency, Marcos, almost immediately, started paying his political
debts to his followers from both parties. He appointed to his Cabinet three Nacionalistas –
Dr. Garcia, Balatbat, and Castañeda; and Liberal Party’s Jose Yulo. (Gleeck 1993:330)
Others who supported his party presidency when he was still in LP and some members of
the Nacionalistas, including their respective families and relatives, were paid in the
bureaucracy, either as qualified policy-making associates who were exempted from
eligibility requirements, or as normal employees applying for a particular job in the bureau
(Cariño 1992; Varela 1988).
Marcos’ means of repaying his political debts with posts in the bureaucracy had
consequences. On his first term in office, Ferdinand Marcos called for austerity
measures.54
In the bureaucracy, this meant retrenchment. However, this task proved to be
difficult especially to Marcos who was still paying his political dues. In the early months
of 1966, Marcos also issued an Order55
outlining the criteria for the approval and removal
of personnel in the civil service. This Order was supposed to provide guidelines on
screening the appointment of all casual employees and hire them according to merit.
However, this also proved to be challenging even for the President. The culture of
patronage, which placed a premium on patron-client relationships and kinship ties,
54
This was announced on the first inaugural address of Ferdinand Marcos (Source: Official Gazette of the
Republic of the Philippines – Inaugural Speech of Ferdinand Marcos on December 30, 1965) 55
Refer to Memorandum Circular No. 85, series of 1965
Tariga 36
overturned any Order he issued and ignored all of his efforts towards austerity. According
to Avelino Tendero (1993):
Kinship ties and primary group interests prevail over formal legal relations.
Sense of pity and sympathy, gratitude for whatever one has done for somebody in
the past makes for dynamic relationship resulting in parochialism and
personalism. These breed reciprocal ties, with kinship obligations overturning the
principle of merit and fitness (49).
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has similarities in this aspect. Though it wasn’t brazenly
observed until her second term, when GMA started appointing unqualified personalities as
members of her Cabinet56
, the culture of parochialism and personalism had been GMA’s
practice since her first rise to the Presidency.
GMA’s ascension to the Office relied heavily to the people who initiated the ouster
of her predecessor. While Marcos owed his new Nacionalista Party for his nomination as
their Presidential bet, GMA owed the political factions that helped bring her to power – the
non-government organizations (NGO) and the military. Immediately after her assumption
to Office, GMA offered positions in her Cabinet to these two particular sectors. She
appointed Dinky Soliman, a well-known NGO activist, and Vicky Garchitorena, a director
of a private foundation (Silva 2001). She also appointed the Armed Forces Chief of Staff
of her predecessor, Angelo Reyes, who was one of the orchestrators57
of the People Power
II movement58
.
The culture of patron-client relationship and kinship ties observed in the interaction
of both Presidents with the bureaucracy did not only manifest itself as a form of gratuity to
the people responsible for their rise to power. It also provided a mode of control of these
Presidents to their respective bureaucracies. In Albert Celoza’s definition of a patron-client
relationship,
56
See The Transcription of Chair David’s Speech at the Makati Business Club General Membership
Meeting, January 22, 2008 (Source: http://pcij.org/blog/wp-docs/Karina_David_speech.pdf); See also Grave
Abuse of Discretion, Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 19, 2008 57
See Francisco S. Tatad, A NATION ON FIRE: THE UNMAKING OF JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND THE
REMAKING OF DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES (2002), note 38, p 530 58
People Power II movement, also known as EDSA 2, overthrew the previous government of Joseph Estrada
and elevated the then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
Tariga 37
The dominant party is the patron, while the subordinate is the client. In a national
network, one is both a client and a patron depending on the level of power and
authority, wealth, professional access to government services and other possible
gains for reward and prestige. . . . (1987:36)
This means that both Presidents became clients at one point. When they became
persons of power, both of these Presidents would expect that their ‘now clients’ in their
respective bureaucracies would follow their prerogatives. However, in this respect, Marcos
was more adept than GMA. This is due to three reasons. For one, Marcos was more
charismatic than GMA. In a recollection made by Carlos P. Romulo (1988),
[I]n the beginning of Marcos era, the President enjoyed widespread support, not
only with the mass populace, but with the so-called intelligentsia and career
government people – myself included. He appeared to be a powerful leader. . . .
There were many of us who found his intelligence, his leadership qualities, his
grasp of history and his apparent sense of purpose enormously attractive.
(1988:134)
This charisma was supplemented by Marcos’ firmness. According to a testimony of
Marcos’ Minister of Labor Blas Ople, “[Marcos]… left no doubt of who would make the
final decision” (as quoted in Gleeck 1993). Those who were not captivated by his sense of
leadership were either afraid of him or were intimidated.
In contrast, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, ever since her first Presidency, was
observed to have an inability to inspire affection. In her editorial entitled The Problem with
Gloria, Shiela S. Coronel asserted that,
Macapagal-Arroyo, does not pack in the crowds. She performs badly in public.
The gravelly voice does not help. On television, she looks like she is perpetually
suppressing a pout. Sure, she will sing, dance and smile, but the more she tries to
please, the more people perceive her as unappealing, humorless, and insincere.
(April-June 2003. The Investigative Reporting Magazine, Volume IX, Number 2)
This is one of the reasons why GMA needed to exert more effort in managing her
bureaucracy, even with the presence of the culture of patron-client relationship. GMA’s
lack of charisma is a question on her innate leadership qualities.
Another reason for GMA’s extra effort emanates from the means by which the two
Presidents came into power. Marcos had been preparing for the 1965 election since 1961.
(Spence 1969) When he was elected he already had a program of government. GMA, on
Tariga 38
the other hand, occupied the Office in an instant. Though there was still a short amount of
time to prepare59
, GMA never really had the chance to meditate on the gravity of being the
President. It just seemed that she was only after the position. (Coronel 2003) So, while it
was clear to Marcos how he would handle the powers of a President, this idea might still
be a conundrum to GMA. The lack of preparedness caused by the instant ascendancy
brings doubts from the bureaucracy regarding GMA’s firmness and her leadership
capabilities.
When GMA’s order to cease the operation of the graft-ridden Public Estates
Authority (PEA) was defied by its functionaries60
, it became obvious that, unlike with
Marcos, the system resulting from the culture of patron-client relationships was not always
applicable to her. She had to constitute extraordinary measures to control the bureaucracy.
One of these measures was a strategy used by then Armed Forces Chief of Staff Angelo
Reyes. When a Navy officer exposed irregularities in the procurement of army equipment,
Reyes demoted him.61
Eventually, the Navy officer resigned. The same strategy was used
by GMA when, in 2002, she removed Home Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG)
president and chief executive officer Manuel Crisostomo after he opposed the suggestion
to put his agency under the proposed Department of Housing.62
In 2006, GMA, through her Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, employed the
same strategy with the Department of Education Undersecretary for Finance Juan Miguel
Luz when he refused to accept three postdated checks that Malacañang released for a
congressman’s scholarship program.63
The cases of Manuel Crisostomo and Miguel Luz conveyed much weight especially
to the bureaucracy. This is because both of them were career service officers (CESO), a
position guaranteed with the security of tenure under civil service rules.64
Crisostomo was
59 The events that led to EDSA 2 began in January 16, 2001. In January 20, 2001, GMA sent a letter to then Chief Justice
Hilario Davide requesting the latter to have the oath administered to her on January 20, 2001, noon time. See Estrada v.
Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, Mar. 2, 2001; Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, Mar. 2, 2001. See also
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, A NATION ON FIRE: THE UNMAKING OF JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND THE
REMAKING OF DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES (2002), note 38, p 530. 60 Coronel, Shiela. April-June 2003. “The Problem with Gloria.” The Investigative Reporting Magazine, Volume IX
Number 2 61 Silencing the Marines. (Source: http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/special-report/07/17/09/scandals) 62 See Crisostomo’s Saga, Miriam Grace A. Go, March 18, 2002 (Source: http://archives.newsbreak-
knowledge.ph/2002/03/18/crisostomos-saga/) 63 Juan Miguel M. Luz Re: Reassignment/Transfer [OCOM-C Memo No. 04, s. 2006] 64
See Career Executive Service Board Resolution No. 619
Tariga 39
a CESO 1, the highest level in the civil service system; Luz was a CESO 3. They were
replaced by political appointees.
Throughout GMA’s nine-year incumbency, there had been CESOs placed on
“floating” status, relieved from their civil executive service (CES) positions and either
replaced by non-eligibles or demoted to non-CES positions.65
There were also non-CESOs
and non-eligibles appointed to CES positions despite the availability of CESOs or third-
level eligibles.66
GMA’s effort to remove, as in the case of Crisostomo, or reassign, as with Luz,
even career bureaucrats with tenures for not following her directives sent a clear message
to the bureaucracy: they would be managed by the President with ‘carrots and sticks’67
.
The limitations of the social culture of indebtedness (carrots) by which GMA could only
capitalize would be replaced by a system of sticks. It was, therefore, not a surprise when,
by the end of GMA’s term, the bureaucracy was congested with appointees loyal to her,
though mostly were officers or retired officers of the military and the national police.68
GMA’s way of controlling the bureaucracy to do any policies or programs in her
agenda is an exhausting endeavor. It is unlike Marcos’ leadership style of reliance on the
bureaucracy’s pre-existing practice of subordination and the social culture of personalism,
both embedded deeply within the Filipino psyche. Even the most basic and fundamental
process of distributing government posts has proven to be more challenging to GMA than
Marcos. For instance, in the beginning of his Presidency, Ferdinand Marcos simply
instituted within the bureaucracy, particularly his Cabinet, personalities who, in his
perception, would be beneficial in establishing his political base. He appointed members of
his Nacionalista Party who were selected just for the purpose of “rewarding party
regularity” (Gleeck 1993:330). He also appointed a respected member of the opposing
Liberal Party, two locally influential family members (Romualdez and Ramos), a youth
leader, a graduate from a military educational institution, and representatives from the
economic elitist, the labor group, the Muslim minority, and the media. (Gleeck 1993:330)
65
Ibid. 66
Ibid. 67
See The 48 Laws of Power, Robert Greene, 1998; See Also The Emotional Capitalists: The New Leaders,
Martyn Newman, 2009 68
See Arroyo's Risky Politics of Patronage, Joel D Adriano, December 9, 2008 (Source:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JL09Ae01.html)
Tariga 40
By designating these individuals, Marcos, using the culture of personalism and reciprocity,
was eventually able to pay his political debts and further widen his political alliance.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, on the other hand, had difficulties in this area, that is,
the appointment of even the Cabinet members. The nature of her first ascendancy into
power created various political crises that it became daunting just to recognize political
allies. According to her 2004 Chief of Staff Rigoberto Tiglao,
One of the most important requirements of the presidency is you have to trust
people, and you need a good sense of character. The people around her came from
all sorts of places. It was difficult to trust people you don’t really know in crisis
periods… (As quoted in Coronel 2004:11)
It took sometime before GMA was able to obtain her alliance within the
bureaucracy. It was only after her reelection that she finally learned the art of handling the
bureaucracy. By the end of her term, she was able to impose on every of her directives,
including those which remain controversial even after the end of her incumbency in
2010.69
Both Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Ferdinand Marcos demanded authority from
the national bureaucracy. However, controlling this executive machinery was seen to be
more difficult for one than the other. Marcos’ exploits on the nature of the bureaucratic
structure and the Philippine culture of personalism, kinship ties and patron-client
relationship were enough to exude leadership towards the bureaucracy. GMA, although
performed under the same culture, needed to be more authoritative. Whatever manner by
which they governed the national bureaucracy, one thing is definite. Controlling this power
bloc was necessary for them to effectively implement their own programs – may they be
productive or controversial.
Exerting influence over another executive’s power bloc, the local governments, was
more uncomplicated than dealing with the national bureaucracy for both Ferdinand Marcos
69 One of these refers to Executive Order No. 848, series of 2009, Authorizing the Use of the Special Account in the
General Fund (Fund 151) of the Department of Energy for Purposes as May be Directed by the President of the
Philippines. The Executive Order transferred funds from the Malampaya Gas Project to programs identified by the Office
of the President. The fund was supposed to be used for rehabilitation and reconstruction of provinces affected by natural
calamities in 2009. However, the P900-million fund was misappropriated and became involved in what is now referred to
as the Malampaya Fund Scam. The Malampaya Gas Project Fund was created by Marcos’ Presidential Decree 910 for
energy development.
Tariga 41
and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Since there was already a dependence on the central
government for the local governments’ funding, both Presidents simply exploited the
culture of clientelism for their local governments to carry out their respective plans.
For Ferdinand Marcos, the reciprocity of his relationship with the local
governments was mostly exhibited in the election. (Bonner 1987; Spence 1969;
Timberman 1991; Gleeck 1993) However, establishing and maintaining this relationship
was a constant effort. To be able to solicit the support of the local officials for his
reelection, Marcos had to supervise the local governments under a very consistent patron-
client framework70
. For instance, when Ferdinand Marcos launched his massive
infrastructure and community projects, he increased the discretionary funds and directly
distributed them to local government officials. By doing this, Marcos was able to extend
his political advantage. (Timberman 1991:58-59; Thompson 1995:33-35) He was able to
“broaden the flow of resources and executive contacts” and, consequently, influence the
local officials enough to secure votes for his reelection. (Shantz 1972:148; Ross 2001:56)
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, meanwhile, had similarities with Marcos’ way of
influencing the local officials, i.e. through the use of discretionary funds. However, while
Marcos used the local governments to ensure his reelection, GMA constantly depended on
the local governments not only for her reelection, but more importantly for the political
survival of her troubled presidency.71
70
For a better understanding of the patron-client framework, see Carl H. Lande’s. Leaders, Factions, and
Parties: the Structure of Philippine Politics, 1965, pp. 24 and 82. 71
See Compact for Peaceful Elections: Mobilizing Citizens for Peaceful Elections in 2007 Political Report,
Active Citizenship Foundation (ACF), July 2007
CHAPTER THREE
Executive – Legislative Relations
“Greater opportunity for presidential influence exists when instead of attempting to
convince individuals to adopt a more or less liberal position with respect to a single
policy issue, the president controls the context within which the debate occurs by
defining the issue for Congress”
- Maslin-Wicks 1998:108
In a Presidential system, the President holds the executive power while the
Congress is vested with the legislative72
. However, under the same system, while the
President solely exercises his executive authority, the Congress shares its power with the
President through the principle of blending powers (Neustadt 1962; Lazo 2006:64; Muñoz
& Muñoz 2002:30). This is a situation where “one department acts in a manner
complementary or supplementary to another” (Albano 1996: 254). For instance, in the
enactment of laws, a bill passed and approved by Congress cannot become a law unless the
President signs it; if the President objects, the bill is vetoed and returned to Congress
where the President’s decision can be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both Houses.73
In
the study of the rise of authoritarianism through presidential leadership, this principle of
blending powers shall be of the foremost consideration. This doctrine serves as the
foundation and basis of the authorities that the President uses not only in interacting with
the Congress, but as well as in concentrating even the legislative power in his Office.
In the Philippines, the Congress determines the public policies to be enacted as
laws. Nonetheless, because of the principle of blending of powers, the President is allowed
to partake in this legislative process. Such is demonstrated by his authority to recommend
to the Congress certain policies that are a part of his plan of governance. This participation
even makes the President the government’s chief legislator or the principal initiator of
public policies (Neustadt 1962; Herring 1940).
The President’s direct involvement in the policy-making process is a manifestation
of the undeniable engagement of the Executive with the legislative power. However, this
involvement has no correlation with the success of the President’s administration. The
72
Legislative power is the authority to enact all laws proper and necessary for the execution of the same.
(Skousen 1985; Levy 2006) 73
See Section 20 (1), Article VI, 1935 Constitution; also, Section 27 (1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution
Tariga 43
success of his plans for the government, particularly in terms of legislation, is determined
by his effectiveness in exercising his legislative leadership.
Legislative leadership is chiefly defined by the immediate response of the Congress
on the President’s policy preferences. Although he is constitutionally recognized as a
policy initiator, the President does not have a command on the Congress for an automatic
enactment of his proposed policies. His duty to initiate and recommend legislation to
Congress only serves as a tool significant to his legislative leadership. To effect a
successful legislative leadership, i.e. the attainment of his goals within the legislative
arena, the President will have to depend on his innate ability and legal capacity to persuade
the members of the Congress to perform activities necessary for the achievement of his
objectives. This chapter shall focus on these abilities and authorities which provide as a
means to influence the Congress and the legislative process.
Influencing the Philippine Congress
The Philippine Constitutions of 1935 and 1987 (Section 1, Article VI of both
documents) declare that “The Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives . . . .” As such,
the Congress shall have the power to enact laws, which includes the power to make, alter,
and repeal them. Moreover, both Constitutions also vested the Congress with non-
legislative powers such as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution74
, power
to canvass presidential elections75
and power to declare the existence of a state of war.76
Both Constitutions also provide the Congress with the exclusive power to impeach.77
These powers, both legislative and non-legislative, are the reason why it is
necessary for the President to establish and maintain excellent relationship with the
Congress. These powers do not only ensure the success of the President’s plan of
governance; they also strengthen the security of tenure of the President.
Establishing executive - legislative relations constitutionally begins at the opening
of the regular session of the Congress when the President delivers his state of the nation
74
Section 1, Article XV, 1935 Constitution; Section 1 (1), Article XVII, 1987 Constitution 75
Section 2, Article VII, 1935 Constitution; Section 4, Article VII, 1987 Constitution 76
Section 25 and 26, Article VI, 1935 Constitution; Section 23, Article VI, 1935 Constitution 77
See Article IX of the 1935 Constitution and Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
Tariga 44
address (commonly on as SONA). Basically, the SONA of the President contains
particular policies and measures as part of his program of government. These measures are
recommended to the Congress for enactment. The success of the President’s administration
is interconnected with the immediate enactment of his prepared measures (Neustadt 1962;
Bond & Fleisher 1990). Therefore, it will be the objective of the President to influence the
Congress to prioritize the policies and measures enumerated in his SONA.
There are various situations by which the President can influence the Congress to
pass the bills that he prefers. Gregorio Zaide (1970) suggests four venues where the
President may have the opportunity to persuade the members of the Congress to support
his policy preferences. First is in the Council of State.
The Philippine Council of State is one of the President’s advisory bodies78
initially
created to harmonize the executive and legislative departments particularly in policy-
making (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). It is composed of Executive officers79
and
Legislative leaders80
. These Legislative leaders could sponsor the policies proposed by the
President. (Zaide 1970)
Another premise where the President can solicit the support of the members of the
Legislature is within the party system (Johari 2006:344). According to Zaide (1970),
The President is usually the head of the party in power. He can call the members of
the Congress who belong to his party to a meeting, known as a party caucus, and
convince them to vote for the administration measures. If the party caucus decides
that a measure should be passed, the majority members of the Congress ordinarily
vote solidly for its approval (1970:120-121)
The third venue for the President’s exertion of influence over the Congress is in the
bureaucracy using presidential appointments under the system of patronage81
. (Zaide
1970:121) Members of the Congress who have candidates seeking important positions in
the bureaucracy will more likely support the President’s preferred bills. (Lewis 2008:63-
65)
78
Another government body with advisory capability is the Cabinet (Zaide 1970:119) 79
Executive officers include the President, the Vice-President, and the members of Cabinet. 80
The legislative members of the State of Council include the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the President Pro-tempore of the Senate, the Speaker Pro-Tempore of the House of
Representatives, and the Floor Leaders of both Houses. 81
Patronage is the process of personalism where the members of Congress “recommend” persons for
government positions while the President “vets” these recommendations as either a means of debt payment or
bargaining tool (Lewis 2008:63)
Tariga 45
The fourth place where the President may influence the members of Congress to
pass his preferred measures and policy proposals is in his Office through private
conferences and personal interviews. (Zaide 1970:121) This venue though, relies heavily
on the President’s ability to convince and persuade. This is where the President mostly
practices his negotiating and bargaining skills. (Neustadt 1962)
Congressional bargaining in the Office begins when a member of the Congress
necessitates certain favors, either personal or political, from the President. Since the Office
represents “authority and status”, it has the perfect environment to yield bargaining
advantages. (Neustadt 1962:35) Takeshi Kawanaka (2013) described these advantages as a
part of a “compromise exchange” between the Congress and the President. A member of
the Congress could support the President’s legislative initiatives for fast enactment “in
exchange” for more budget allotment for his local projects82
. (Kawanaka, Kasuya ed.
2013)
All of these venues provide a stage for the President to influence the Congress to
prioritize his proposed bills. They also give the President an opportunity to convince the
members of the Congress to cooperate with his program of governance. If the President
intends the Congress to perform activities which are beneficial to him (either in the form of
policy enactment or in a demonstration of political support), these venues could serve as
his mechanisms to influence its members.
FERDINAND MARCOS AND THE CONGRESS
The Congress of the Republic during Ferdinand Marcos’ first term was composed
of 24 Senators and 104 Representatives and was dominated by Nacionalista (NP) and
Liberal (LP) parties. It convened as the Sixth Congress from January 17, 1966 until July
17, 1969. In its initial years, it was occupied by twelve (12) Senators from the Liberal
Party, one from the Nationalist-Citizen’s Party, and eleven (11) from Marcos’ Nacionalista
Party. (Paras 2000; Teehankee, Schafferer ed. 2006:81-102) The seats in the House of
Representatives, on the other hand, belonged to 61 members from LP and only 38 from
82
Following the assumption that members of Congress seek to further their political career, there will be a
need for a member to advertise his accomplishments. (Mayhew 1974) It is therefore important that his local
projects are funded adequately to be able to proceed accordingly.
Tariga 46
NP; five (5) were independent. (Hartmann, et. al., Hartmann, Nohlen, and Grotz ed. 2001:
185–230)
The opening of the 6th
Congress emphasized the insufficient number of members of
Marcos’ Nacionalista Party in both Houses. Generally, the objective of every political
party is to hold both of the Presidency and the Congress. (Rivera 1962:203) This allows for
more control of the legislative process and less obstructions in the determination of
national policies. Since NP had the Presidency while LP had more members in the
Congress, it was clear that neither of the dominant parties had a monopoly on legislation.
For Ferdinand Marcos, this could result to a fragmentation in his plan of government.
It is always crucial for a new president to have the numbers in Congress. Numbers
translates into votes; and votes equates to the success of the president in the legislative
arena. According to Bond and Fleisher (1990), “what the president needs most from
members of Congress [are] their votes. . . Votes… are the basic commodity of presidential-
congressional relations” (1990:8). The lack of members of Marcos’ Nacionalista Party in
the Congress in the first two years of its assembly should therefore, suggest that Marcos’
policy preferences would not solicit enough votes for enactment and would only result to
executive-legislative gridlocks. However, examining the content of the laws enacted during
this time would prove otherwise.
When Marcos held his first special session83
with the 6th
Congress in January 1966,
he reiterated his legislative agenda already enumerated in his SONA. Of course, it included
the development of agricultural industries towards self-sufficiency in rice and corn
production. In March 8, 1966, the Congress enacted Republic Act 4643, an amended law
adopting a program which aims to stabilize the price of rice and corn, to provide incentives
relating to their production, and to create an office which would be responsible for its
administration.
Marcos also recommended during his first special session with the Congress his
plan to incur or guarantee foreign debts to be used for particular purpose such as
infrastructure and community development. In July 18, 1966, the Congress passed a bill84
authorizing the President to incur loans from International Bank to finance programs on
83
See Proclamation No. 2, Series of 1966 84
Republic Act No. 4853
Tariga 47
irrigation development. In August 8 of the same year, the Congress also enacted three
similar laws85
authorizing the President to incur foreign debts, guarantee foreign loans, and
issue bonds to be used in financing public works projects.
Evidently, there is a pattern in the relationship of Ferdinand Marcos and the 6th
Congress in 1966. Marcos would call the Congress for a special session and outline his
priority bills. The Congress would then, adopt and draft his bills and, further, enact them
into laws. Although not all of his administration bills were passed by the Congress, this
was still a productive legislative process for Marcos. Thus, the next year, he continued to
utilize this pattern86
as he waited for the Congress to pass his proposed bills.87
The pattern resulting from the relationship between Ferdinand Marcos and the 6th
Congress during its introductory years was a deviation from what should be a common and
logical outcome in the legislative arena; that is, the number of the president’s party
members in Congress should be equal, with a marginal difference, if any, to the votes that
a president could solicit. The Marcos – 6th
Congress relations exhibited a different result.
The similarities with the Congress’ enacted laws and Marcos’ preferred bills were just
irrefutable. This implied that Ferdinand Marcos was effective in consolidating all of his
political allies in the legislative arena.
It was evident that in the beginning of the 6th
Congress, there was a deficiency in
the number of members of Marcos’ NP in both Houses. However, what Marcos lacked in
actual numbers, he made up for in influence.
When the 6th
Congress convened, almost all of the leadership in the Senate was
occupied by Marcos’ Nacionalista Party. Arturo M. Tolentino, who was the Senate
President from 1966 to 1967, Lorenzo M. Sumulong, the Senate President Pro-Tempore,
and Jose J. Roy, the Majority Floor Leader were all from NP. (Paras 2000) Meanwhile, in
the House of Representatives, where NP obtained just more than a third of the seats,
Marcos was able to maintain his political relationship with some of the members of his
85
Republic Act No. 4860; Republic Act No. 4861; Republic Act No. 4862 86
See Proclamation No. 226, Series of 1967 87
A prominent result of Marcos – 6th
Congress relationship in 1967 was the enactment of Decentralization
Act of 1967, or Republic Act 5185. This was the first item in Ferdinand Marcos’ 1967 agenda, as written in
his Proclamation No. 226. It was enacted and approved by the Congress on September 12, 1967.
Tariga 48
former, now opposing, Liberal Party, including House Speaker Cornelio T. Vilareal.
(Spence 1969; Cariño 1992; Gleeck 1993:333-344)
Having a political relationship, either partisan or personal, with the leaders in
Congress was beneficial to Marcos. Congressional leadership is synonymous to influence.
(Paras 2000; Elliot & Ali 1984:213-232; Bond & Fleisher 1990:122-152) Hence, despite
the insufficiency in numbers of party members, Ferdinand Marcos, using his connections
with the leaders of the 6th
Congress, still solicited sufficient support during its initiation.
In 1968, after the midterm elections, the Congress became more favorable to
Marcos. By this time, sixteen (16) seats were occupied by his Nacionalista Party. Although
there was a change in Senate Presidency88
, most of the leadership in the Upper House still
belonged to Marcos’ party. Also, due to his popularity89
and authority90
, political turncoats
into his NP became rampant within the House of Representatives. (Gleeck 1993:345)
Thus, it became easier for Ferdinand Marcos to impose on the Congress his legislative
agenda.
Towards the end of his first term, Marcos’ bill preferences were more frequently
enacted by the 6th
Congress. Among his priority bills91
which gained support from the
Congress were the re-appropriation of funds for public works92
, creation of the Student’s
Loan Fund Authority93
, and the amendments on the Internal Revenue Code94
.
The frequency by which Marcos’ preferred bills were enacted into law was a result
of two factors. First, his Nacionalista Party was still a majority in the Senate. And second,
the nearing end of the 6th
Congress meant the beginning of the campaign for the 1969
general elections. Reelection success was the incentive of the members of the Congress
with their voting decisions (Mayhew 1974:54) Members of the Congress whose aim was to
be either reelected or move up the political ladder sought election assistance from Marcos
88
Arturo M. Tolentino was replaced by Gil J. Puyat as Senate President. Puyat was a member of the
Nacionalista Party. 89
From 1966 to 1968, Ferdinand Marcos was “genuinely reformist and sought for a time successfully to limit
graft” (Gleeck 1993:339). This contributed, for a moment, to his popularity with the electorate. 90
See Richard E. Neustadt. 1962. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. 91
See Proclamation No. 562, Series of 1969 92
Republic Act No. 5979, approved on July 24, 1969 93
Republic Act No. 6014, approved on August 4, 1969 94
Republic Act No. 6110, approved on August 4, 1969
Tariga 49
who had the executive machineries95
, including the national treasury, at his campaigning
arsenal. (Timberman 1991) Assistance would be given in exchange for a vote on Marcos’
bill preferences.
In the 1969 elections, political supporters of Marcos were provided with much
assistance. (Bonner 1987) However, the Nacionalista Party still had a greater advantage.
(Timberman 1991; Gleeck 1993) This was proven by the Congressional election turnouts.
Seven (7) of the eight (8) senators and 86 of the 110 Lower House representatives were
elected from Marcos’ Nacionalista Party (Teehankee, Schafferer ed. 2006:81-102) The
short-lived Marcos – “NP” Congress, or the Seventh Congress, would eventually
commence.
The 7th Congress held its first meeting on January 26, 1970 until it was dissolved
during Martial Law in September 23, 1972. It was dominated, even after the midterm
elections, by Marcos’ Nacionalista Party. Since members of the same political party share
common policy goals and preferences (Bond and Fleisher 1990), nearly all of Ferdinand
Marcos’ bill proposals, including some of those which were in his SONAs during his first
term, were almost immediately enacted into law.
Among Ferdinand Marcos’ proposed priority bills96
that gained support from the 7th
Congress were the amendment on the Revised Penal Code97
, the passage of a liberal
Export Incentive Act98
, the creation of a new election code99
, the amendment on the
agricultural land reform code100
, and the creation of an agrarian reform special account in
the general fund101
. Marcos’ most important proposal, however, which gained much
support from the Congress, was his recommendation102
to change the 1935 Constitution.
This was an important proposal because it became a prelude to Marcos’ intention of
extending his term for more than what the 1935 Constitution allowed. (Bonner 1987;
95
See Richard Bonner. 1987. Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy.
pp. 63 – 77; See also Alfred W. McCoy. 2009. Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the
Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State. p. 52 96
See the Fifth State of the Nation Address of Ferdinand Marcos and Proclamation No. 878, Series of 1971 97
Republic Act No. 6127 98
Republic Act No. 6135 99
Republic Act No. 6388 100
Republic Act No. 6389 101
Republic Act No. 6390 102
See the Fifth State of the Nation Address of Ferdinand E. Marcos
Tariga 50
Celoza 1997) In August 24, 1970, the 7th
Congress replied with the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act103
, which had the objective of drafting a proposal for a new constitution.
The 7th
Congress was initially favorable to Marcos. However, since the Congress
convened under extreme political turmoil, Marcos’ legislative support slowly began to
decline. This started in as early as January 26, 1970, when the opening of the Congress was
greeted with controversies arising from the November 1969 elections. (Bonner 1987;
Gleeck 1993) According to Timberman (1991),
The election was the dirtiest and most expensive presidential contest the country
had ever experienced. Marcos and the Nacionalistas spent between 800 and 900
million pesos (about US$200 million in 1969), about half of which came from
government sources… (1991:63)
The political and economic effects of the 1969 election controversy fuelled
demonstrations and protests from student and labor groups. Conditions continued to
worsen the rest of the year and into 1971. Public dissent became grandiosely noticeable.
Eventually, the Nacionalista Party began to lose its popularity. When the bombing of the
opposition party in Plaza Miranda during the 1971 senatorial campaign was linked to
Marcos and his NP (Bonner 1987; Timberman 1991), it became clear who would succeed
in the midterm elections. Soon, the opposing Liberal Party would dominate the polls and
win six (6) out of eight (8) seats in the senate. (Teehankee, Schafferer ed. 2006:81-102)
The results of the 1971 senatorial election, in addition to the growing discontent
and disenchantment of the public, provided as indicators of the members of the 7th
Congress in reconsidering their next legislative moves. Moreover, the numerous exposés of
the opposition to Ferdinand Marcos’ outright attempt to extend his term via extra-
constitutional means became the basis of some of the members of the Congress104
to revisit
their political alliance. (Bonner 1987; Timberman 1991; Gleeck 1993) For Marcos, this
was the beginning of a significant loss in his political influence in the legislative arena.
(Gleeck 1993) Consequently, his bill preferences became more difficult to enact.
103
Republic Act No. 6132 104
The leadership of the Nacionalista Party never supported Marcos’ plan of extending his term through
unconstitutional means; neither was the idea that Marcos’ wife, Imelda, should replace him in case extending
his term was not possible (Bonner 1987; Timberman 1991; Gleeck 1993; Celoza 1997)
Tariga 51
In September 23, 1972, culminating in the events that followed since 1969,
Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the Philippines under Martial
Law. The Proclamation not only suppressed Marcos’ political oppositions; it also
suspended the Congress. (Bonner 1987; Celoza 1997)
The 7th
Congress attempted to reconvene in January 22, 1973 under the leadership
of NP’s Senate President Gil Puyat. (Celoza 1997) Its purpose was to call for a plebiscite
which would vote for the ratification of the new Constitution drafted through the 1971
Constitutional Convention Act. However, with the Congressional buildings locked up and
guarded by military personnel, the meeting of the Legislature was never allowed to
proceed by Ferdinand Marcos. (Bonner 1987) The 7th
Congress was eventually dissolved
by the controversial approval of the new Constitution. (Celoza 1997; Timberman 1991)
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the Congress
When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took Office in January 20, 2001, the 11th
Congress
was three weeks away from closing its convention. Some of its members were in the midst
of preparing for the end of their terms. Others were already campaigning for the May 2001
legislative elections. But before the term of the members of the Congress officially ended,
GMA was able to call for a special session105
allowing the 11th
Congress to pass two more
bills – the Electric Power Industry Reform Act106
, and the Supplemental Appropriation for
Fiscal Year 2001107
. This was the beginning of GMA’s nine-year relationship with the
Legislature.
The 11th
Congress was brief relative to GMA’s assumption to the Presidency. Its
significance nonetheless was never disregarded nor diminished by the new President. After
all, this Congress was responsible for the impeachment trials that led to the ouster of the
previous president. Hence, GMA began to “stabilize and develop relations” with the 11th
Congress by “respect[ing] its leadership status quo” (Vera 2004: 51). The result was a
cycle of the culture of “compromise exchange”108
between GMA and the Congress.
105
Proclamation No. 49, Series 2001 106
Republic Act No. 9136 107
Republic Act No. 9137 108
Compromise exchange is the term used by Takeshi Kawanaka (2013) in his paper, Interaction of Powers
in the Philippine Presidential System. It refers to the process of bargaining between the President – who has
Tariga 52
Although much of the compromise remained to be seen on the following years, this culture
manifested itself in as early as the final adjournment of the 11th
Congress.
When the 11th
Congress ended, two important events were inaugurated. First was
the opening of the 12th
Congress. Second was the rise to power of Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo’s Administration Coalition. The Philippine Congress when GMA became the
President was defined by a multi-party system organized into two prominent alliances:
GMA’s Administration Coalition, or the People Power Coalition (PPC), and the
Opposition Coalition, or the Puwersa ng Masa. After the midterm elections, it became
obvious which of these two political blocs would dominate the 12th
Congress.
Similar to any other elections, there is always a higher percentage of electoral
success for the political party belonging to the administration. (Rivera 2011:46-80) GMA’s
Coalition, inevitably, won eight (8) of the thirteen (13) Senatorial seats and 194109
of the
214 seats from the House of Representatives (Teehankee, Schafferer ed. 2006:81-102;
Fortaleza 2004:58). Evidently, the 12th
Congress became an assembly of GMA’s
legislative allies.
Having most of the members of the 12th
Congress in her alliance was beneficial to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, particularly in soliciting support for her policy initiatives. In her
first State of the Nation Address, GMA called for policies which would focus on her “four
pillars of governance” – Macroeconomic Stability and Equitable Growth (Pillar 1), Rural
Modernization with Social Equity (Pillar 2), Human Development and Protection of
Vulnerable Sectors (Pillar 3), and Good Governance and Rule of Law (Pillar 4).110
The 12th
Congress responded by enacting 78 laws of national application111
; 19 of which were
concerned with Pillar 1, 29 concerned with Pillar 2, 19 with Pillar 3, and 11 with Pillar
4.112
In her special sessions with Congress, GMA also called for the enactment of her
priority bills. The House of Representatives replied by passing 8 out of the 20 she
power in the budget process and policy implementation – and the Congress – which has the power to
legislate policies – in order to generate agreeable policy outcomes. 109
77 of these seats belonged to GMA’s Lakas ng EDSA-National Union of Christian Democrats (LAKAS-
NUCD) Party. (Teehankee, Schafferer ed. 2006:81-102) 110
Source: Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines – First State of the Nation Address of Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo 111
Alternative Views and Assessments of the Macapagal-Arroyo Presidency and Administration: Record and
Legacy (2001-2004). 2004. Highlights of Secretary Gabriel S. Claudio’s Lecture: Executive – Legislative
Relations. p. 49 112
Ibid. Bernard Leo M. Karganilla. Alternative Views and Assessments. p. 59
Tariga 53
submitted. (Kawanaka, Kasuya ed. 2013:99) Moreover, the 39 treaties and international
agreements that GMA submitted to the Upper House were eventually ratified by the
Senate.113
These numbers would naturally suggest that GMA’s alliance with most of the
members of the 12th
Congress had developed a relatively healthy presidential-
congressional relationship particularly in the area of policy-making. It would be not
unreasonable to presume that this relationship would continue to the 13th
Congress.
The end of the 12th
Congress marked the beginning of the national elections. When
GMA announced her bid for a second term, the possibility of her newly founded
Coalition114
to dominate the polls was thus, expected115
. Eventually, seven (7) of the 12
Senatorial seats and 201116
of the 213 seats of the District Representatives were won by
GMA’s Coalition.117
With most of the members of the soon convening 13th
Congress in
alliance with GMA, the continuation of her previously established relationship from the
12th
Congress was thus inevitable.
In July 26, 2004, the 13th
Congress opened and held its first regular session. Here,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered her fourth State of the Nation Address, her first as an
elected president. GMA’s SONA appealed to the Congress to enact revenue measures that
would aim at solving the budget deficit. By December 15, 2004, the House of
Representative approved a bill118
amending the National Internal Revenue Code and
thereby, increasing the excise tax rates imposed on alcohol and tobacco products. The next
day, December 16, the Senate passed the same bill119
in its objective to add a source of
revenue for the government. In December 21, the bill was finally enacted into law120
.
The 13th
Congress enacted four more revenue-related laws in response to GMA’s
fourth SONA. These are Republic Act No. 9335 or the Lateral Attrition Law, or the Act to
Improve the Revenue Collection Performance of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
113
Ibid. Highlights of Secretary Gabriel S. Claudio’s Lecture: Executive – Legislative Relations. p. 50 114
Koalisyon ng Katapatan at Karanasan sa Kinabukasan (K4, Coalition of Truth and Experience for
Tomorrow) was the remnant of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s People Power Coalition. 115
See SWS May 2004 Final Pre-Election Survey (Source: http://www.sws.org.ph/pr050804.html) 116
There were 213 seats for District Representatives in May 2004. Four (4) were vacant. (Source: House of
Representatives Congressional Library) 117
House of Representatives Congressional Library 118
House Bill No. 3174 119
Senate Bill No. 1854 120
Republic Act No. 9334
Tariga 54
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) through the Creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and
of a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board; Republic Act No. 9337, or the Expanded
Value Added Tax Law; Republic Act No. 9399, or the law on One-Time Amnesty for
Businesses in the Special Economic Zones and Freeports; and, Republic Act No. 9480, or
the Tax Amnesty Act of 2007.
GMA’s policy initiatives on revenue generation were clearly supported by the 13th
Congress. Moreover, there were other initiatives not limited to fiscal measures that GMA
proposed and the 13th
Congress enacted. For instance, GMA’s call for a “sufficient,
efficient, cheap energy in the near term”121
and a “legislation encouraging renewable and
indigenous energy”122
was answered by the 13th
Congress with the Biofuels Act of 2006123
.
Her urge for a “swift passage of an antiterrorism law”124
was replied with the Human
Security Act of 2007125
. And, her plight to reduce red tape126
in the national government
was responded with the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007127
.
The enactment by the 13th
Congress of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s policy
initiatives, albeit not immediate, could be considered as an evidence of the latter’s
influence over the Legislature. However, while it is undisputable that there was a
relationship between GMA and this Congress, it appears that influence was never
complete. It could be observed that ever since the opening of the 12th
Congress, not all of
GMA’s bill preferences and policy initiatives were approved by both Houses. Only 40
percent of her preferred bills were enacted (Kawanaka, Kasuya ed. 2013). As a
continuation of the 12th
Congress, the same trend could be observed with the convention of
the 13th
. Studying the SONAs delivered by GMA in the duration of the 13th
Congress and
comparing them to the enacted laws at the time would give an objective analysis that not
all of the initiatives of GMA were given priority. Complete influence over the Congress
just seemed to elude the leadership of GMA.
121
See Fourth State of the Nation Address of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 122
See Fifth State of the Nation Address of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 123
Republic Act No. 9367 124
op. cit. 125
Republic Act No. 9372 126
See the Fourth State of the Nation Address of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 127
Republic Act No. 9485
Tariga 55
GMA’s incomplete influence over the Congress consequently resulted to the
enactment of a relatively low number of laws not just in terms of GMA’s bill preferences
but in its entirety. The 12th
Congress enacted only 172 laws compared to the 415 bills
passed by the 11th
Congress or the 517 passed by the 10th
Congress; the 13th
Congress,
meanwhile, enacted only 162 bills.128
The legislative performance of the Congress has a correlation with a president who
has specific legislative objectives. (Coronel, et. al. 2004) The low number of enacted bills
of the12th
and 13th
Congress, however, cannot be solely attributed to GMA’s vague, often
uninspired, legislative agenda. Their deteriorating performance was a result of the political
situation during their convention.
In the case of the 12th
Congress, it convened under intense political bickering
between GMA’s Administration Coalition and the remnants of the political alliance of the
ousted president. (Co 2004) The “predominance of divided party government” within the
Congress often “brings conflict, delay, and indecision and frequently leads to deadlock,
inadequate and ineffective policies, or no policies at all” (Binder 2003:1). It is therefore,
not atypical for the 12th
Congress to record a low quantity of bills.
As for the 13th
Congress, its relatively inadequate legislative performance was an
outcome of two events primarily instigated by GMA. One refers to the annual reiteration of
perhaps the most debatable proposal of GMA, the Charter Change.129
The other one arises
from controversies of election fraud involving GMA. The sessions of the 13th
Congress
were therefore, held just to discuss the process of amending the Constitution and just to
perform the two non-legislative functions of the Congress, namely, impeachment and
congressional oversight130
.
The 14th
Congress was more productive legislatively. 650 laws were passed during
its convention. It was also more favorable to GMA. Though only five (5) of the twelve
128
House of Representatives Library of Congress 129
GMA’s interest on amending the Constitution started since the end of the 12th
Congress. (Jesus F. Llanto.
Charter Change pet issue of GMA since 2004. August 15, 2008. http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/nation/08/15/08/charter-change-pet-issue-gma-2004) Debate on charter change was formally
and officially proposed by GMA on her fourth SONA in front of the 13th
Congress. It continued to the
convention of the 14th
Congress. 130
There are three categories under the oversight power of the Congress: supervision, scrutiny and
investigation (Article VI, 1987 Constitution). In this case, however, congressional oversight chiefly refers to
the Congress’ inquiry in aid of legislation.
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(12) seats in the Senate were won by GMA’s new coalition of Team Unity, having the
majority of the House of Representatives in her alliance was enough for GMA’s policy
initiatives to be enacted.131
Some of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s policies132
enacted into law by the 14th
Congress were RA 9502 or Cheaper Medicines Law, RA 9994 or the Expanded Senior
Citizens Act133
, RA 9745 or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009134
, and RA 9851 or the
Philippine Act on Crimes against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other
Crimes against Humanity135
.
Comparative Analysis
The enactment of the policy measures initiated by both Ferdinand Marcos and
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was a result of their relationships with their respective
Congresses. These executive-legislative relations, on the other hand, were the outcome of
their mandates provided in their respective Constitutions. Therefore, Ferdinand Marcos
and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo were given the legal authority to interact with the
Legislature and the legislative processes which ultimately enabled them to, in essence,
enact the laws included in their legislative agenda.
The Constitutional Foundation136
131
The majority of members of the House of Representatives were also responsible for GMA’s political
survival by junking impeachment cases against GMA.(For a list of anti-impeachment Congressmen, see
http://pcij.org/blog/wp-docs/anti-impeachment_and_those_who_withdrew_endorsements.pdf) 132
See the Seventh State of the Nation Address of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. 133
The Expanded Senior Citizens Act was the Congress’ response to GMA’s call for a “legislation that
brings improved long-term care for [the] senior citizens”. 134
The Anti-Torture Act of 2009 was supposedly the reply of the Congress to GMA’s request to enact “laws
to transform state response to political violence…, laws to guarantee swift justice from more empowered
special courts…, laws to impose harsher penalties for political killings…, [and] laws reserving the harshest
penalties for the rogue elements in the uniformed services who betray public trust and bring shame to the
greater number of their colleagues who are patriotic”. 135
Republic Act No. 9851 was the firmer, more significant, and internationally recognized version of the
Anti-Torture Act of 2009. (R.A. No. 9851 – Breakthrough law for IHL enforcement in the Philippines,
http://www.preda.org/en/media/research-documents/r-a-no-9851-breakthrough-law-for-ihl-enforcement-in-
the-philippines/) 136
This chapter focused on the mechanics of Executive-Legislative Relation – how it is established and how
it is maintained – in connection to the President’s legal authority to set the legislative agenda. While the
President’s power to veto is a constitutionally provided means to influence the Congress (Larocca 2006), it
does not institute executive-legislative relations nor does it identify the President as the Chief Legislator.
Rather, it connotes a negative relationship with the Congress and the legislative process. (Cameron 2000) It
Tariga 57
The beginning of the political relationship between Ferdinand Marcos and the 6th
and 7th
Congress was based on two provisions in the 1935 Constitution. One of these
provisions referred to the authority of the President to recommend to the Congress certain
policy measures. As stated,
The President shall from time to time give to the Congress information on the state
of the Nation, and recommend to its consideration such measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient.
- Section 10 (5), Article VII, 1935 Constitution
The other one pertained to the provision allowing the President to call for special
sessions with the Congress:
The Congress . . . may be called in special session at any time by the President to
consider general legislation or only such subjects as he may designate.
- Section 9, Article VI, 1935 Constitution
These provisions specified in the 1935 Constitution authorized Ferdinand Marcos
to establish a relationship with the Congress specifically on the pretext of policy-making.
The Section on recommendation provided Marcos with an important means to outline to
the members of the Congress his priorities and concerns with regards to policy. The
Section on special sessions, meanwhile, permitted him to emphasize to the members of the
Congress his policy initiatives and to further urge them to enact his bill preferences.
Both of these provisions not only served as Ferdinand Marcos’ legal foundation to
initiate congressional relations; they also directly involved Marcos with the power to
legislate. This direct involvement allowed Marcos to enact the laws necessary for his
programs on agricultural self-sufficiency and infrastructure development. Furthermore, and
perhaps the most noteworthy, this direct involvement enabled Marcos to participate,
through initiation and reiteration, in the enactment of laws137
that would eventually become
the preamble to his plan of extending his term.
is therefore the proponent’s intention to exclude the constitutional provisions on the President’s veto power
as the legal basis of the President’s relationship with the Congress in order to maintain conceptual focus and
continuity. 137
There are two laws that clearly contributed to Ferdinand Marcos’ unconventional efforts for his term
extension. Republic Act No. 4864, or the Police Act of 1966, was created to supposedly emancipate the
police force from being used by local politicians for their personal purpose. Instead, “it centralized what until
then had been a local function and would conveniently serve Marcos’ purposes later when he declared
martial law” (Cariño 1994:62) Republic Act No. 6132, or The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, on the
Tariga 58
The initiation of executive-legislative relations of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in
similarity with Marcos’, also had its Constitutional basis. According to the 1987
Constitution,
The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He
may also appear before it at any other time.
- Section 23, Article VII, 1987 Constitution
This provision gave GMA a mandate to deliver to the Congress her policy
initiatives. However, since her initiatives were often very broad and overly simplistic
(Navera 2011), instead of being utilized to maximize participation with the process of
legislation, this authority only served as GMA’s propaganda tool for justifying her
previous policies and for “saving face in the midst of political crises.” (Navera 2011:339-
340) What Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo primarily and frequently used as the basis for her
involvement with the legislative power was the provision in the 1987 Constitution
regarding the President’s exclusive authority to call the Congress to special session138
.
Special sessions allowed GMA to urge the Congress to pass her priority bills which
were prolonged and delayed due to the different political conditions during her Presidency.
For example, when GMA first took office in January 2001, the 11th
Congress was just a
few weeks away from its adjournment sine die. Due to the fluidity of the situation in the
political arena brought by the effects of both the ouster of the previous president and the
sudden transition to the new leadership (Coronel 2003; Co 2004), adding to the
preoccupancy of the members of the 11th
Congress with the start of the campaign period
for the midterm election139
, the bill on the “appropriation of a supplemental budget” to
fund GMA’s bureaucracy was never enacted during the Congress’ regular sessions.
Thereafter, even though some of the members of the Congress were already in the middle
of their campaign, GMA, by virtue of her constitutional authority, issued Proclamation No.
49 calling them to a special session. The Proclamation’s objective was to discuss the
other hand, was formed because of the public’s clamor for drastic change. (Bonner 1987) However, this law
just became Marcos’ means to draft a new constitution which would eventually grant him enormous powers
and thereby extend his term indefinitely (Bonner 1987; Celoza 1997) 138
Section 15, Article VI, 1987 Constitution 139
Alternative Views and Assessments of the Macapagal-Arroyo Presidency and Administration: Record and
Legacy (2001-2004). 2004. Highlights of Secretary Gabriel S. Claudio’s Lecture: Executive – Legislative
Relations. p. 49
Tariga 59
enactment of two particular bills which included the proposal for a supplemental budget.
Both bills were enacted into law in June 08, 2001, less than a month after the term of some
of the members of the 11th
Congress ended.
Evidently, like Ferdinand Marcos and the 1935 Constitution, both provisions in the
1987 Constitution provided Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo legal basis for establishing
relationship with the Congress. Although, the Section calling for special session was more
beneficial to her when it comes to intermeddling with the Congress’ legislative power.
However, while these provisions provided GMA legal foundations for her legislative
relationship and her direct involvement with the legislative power, she still needed a venue
to facilitate and maintain this relationship. The Presidential Legislative Liaison Office
(PLLO)140
and the Legislative Executive Development Advisory Council (LEDAC)141
functioned for this purpose. (Kawanaka, Kasuya ed. 2013)
LEDAC is a consultative and advisory body composed of the President, the
members of the Cabinet, and leaders of the Congress. Its purpose is to meet together and to
prepare and discuss a legislative agenda. According to Gabriel S. Claudio, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo’s political adviser in 2004, LEDAC served GMA as a “formal venue”
for “executive-legislative consultation” through which “consensus was reached toward the
passage of the common legislative agenda.”142
The passage of the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act and the Anti-Money Laundering Act in 2001, the enactment of the Civil
Aviation Authority Act and the Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines
Act in 2008, and the ratification of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA), also in 2008, “exemplified the collaborative relationship” between GMA and the
Congress which was brought by LEDAC.143
The PLLO, on the other hand, is an institutional mechanism under the Office of the
President. It was created to promote the President’s legislative initiatives. PLLO is another
venue “through which the President intervene[s] in the legislative process to facilitate the
140
LEDAC is created in December 9, 1992 through Republic Act No. 7640 141
PLLO is created in November 11, 1987 through Memorandum No. 128, Series of 1987 142
Alternative Views and Assessments of the Macapagal-Arroyo Presidency and Administration: Record and
Legacy (2001-2004). 2004. Highlights of Secretary Gabriel S. Claudio’s Lecture: Executive – Legislative
Relations. p. 50 143
Ibid.
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passage of Administration-sponsored measures.”144
It “has offices at the Senate and the
House and lobbies the Legislature on a daily basis for passage of the President’s priority
bills.” (Kawanaka, Kasuya ed. 2013) However, for GMA, PLLO became more than a
venue to lobby her priority bills. Over the years during her incumbency, PLLO’s function
shifted. From being used to primarily promote the President’s policy measure, PLLO under
GMA focused on intervening with the non-legislative powers of the Congress, particularly
its power to impeach.145
Through PLLO, GMA managed to establish an executive-
legislative relationship with individual members of the Congress which allowed her to
dodge the impeachment cases filed against her and ultimately, enabled her to survive the
political downfall of her controversy-ridden Presidency.
LEDAC and PLLO were the venues used by GMA to establish relationship with
the Congress. LEDAC was used for her involvement in the legislative process; PLLO was
used for her intervention with the non-legislative.
The Imperfect Influence
Since Ferdinand Marcos had been first elected into Office, he had been outlining
his policy initiatives in front of the Congress through State of the Nation Addresses and
special sessions as mandated by the 1935 Constitution. Even though most of his bill
preferences in his SONAs and special sessions were enacted into law by both Houses, it
could still be observed that Marcos had no absolute control of the Congress, especially on
his first years. This could be observed in his proposal to reorganize the bureaucracy which
had been constantly bypassed by the Legislature. It was reinserted to his legislative agenda
every year until it was finally enacted146
in September 1968, one year before the national
election. (Cariño 1992:64) It should be noted that during this time, the majority of the
Senate were members of Marcos’ Nacionalista Party; while political turncoats from the
House of Representatives were a frequent guest in the Office.
Other examples demonstrating Marcos’ incomplete influence on the Congress were
the creation of a peace and order special fund, which was added in Marcos’ 1969 priority
144
Ibid. 145
“PLLO was very active in the two impeachment complaints during the 13th
Congress”. See the report of
Jaileen F. Jimeno. No Coming Out Party for PLLO. 2007 (http://www.pcij.org/i-report/2007/pllo.html) 146
Republic Act No. 5435
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bills but was only enacted into law147
in November 4, 1970; the amendment on land reform
authorizing the President to sell military camps and reservations148
, which was only
enacted in September 10, 1971, two years after Marcos’ initial proposal; the amendments
on the tariff and custom code and the national internal revenue code, which were only
enacted through presidential decrees149
during Martial Law; and the Magna Carta for
Students, which was never enacted into law.
Similar to Ferdinand Marcos, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had been proposing her
policy initiatives to the Congress through SONA and special sessions as provided by the
1987 Constitution ever since her first assumption to presidency. However, also like
Marcos, she had an imperfect influence over the members of the Legislature evident from
the moment she took Office via extra-constitutional means. But since the 11th
and 12th
Congress performed under GMA’s lack of experience in resolving political divisiveness,
the succeeding 13th
and 14th
Congress, which followed the presidential election, mostly
exhibited this thesis.
An example of GMA’s imperfect influence over the Congress was observed in
perhaps GMA’s most controversial150
policy initiative – the proposal to change the
constitution. In most of her State of the Nation Addresses since she was re-elected in 2004,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo kept on urging the Congress to start the debate on reforming the
1987 Constitution or Charter change. In August 19, 2005, she even issued an Executive
Order151
creating a consultative commission “to propose the revision of the 1987
Constitution in consultation with various sectors of society.” In December 2006, some of
the members of the 13th
Congress, particularly the majority in the House of
Representatives, fast-tracked the approval of a House Resolution152
calling for the
convention of the Congress as a constituent assembly153
“to propose amendments to or
revision of the 1987 Constitution”.154
In December 2008, GMA’s allies in the 14th
147 Republic Act No. 6141 148 Republic Act No. 6389 149 Presidential Decree 1464 and Presidential Decree 1158, respectively 150 It became controversial because of the blatant efforts initiated by GMA and her allies to pursue the policy. 151 Executive Order No.453, series of 2005 152 House Resolution 1450; revised into House Resolution 197 153 Constituent assembly is one of ”three agents authorized to propose the amendment” (Bernas 2007:189) 154 See The Tyranny of the Majority. December 7, 2006 (http://pcij.org/blog/2006/12/07/the-tyranny-of-the-majority)
Tariga 62
Congress submitted 30 House measures with Charter change initiatives.155
Even towards
the end of GMA’s Presidency, a House Resolution156
was still being submitted in response
to her call for changing the Constitution. However, despite the frequency of GMA’s
reiteration and the excessive number of proposed measures, the rest of the Congress, most
specifically the Senate, did not approve any of the resolutions sponsored by the Lower
House, consequently denying GMA’s proposal for Charter Change.
Historically, the seemingly incomplete support of the Congress to both Ferdinand
Marcos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo could be attributed to the lack of cohesiveness of
the political parties in the Philippines. The weak party system allowed most of the
members of the Congress to change indefinitely their preferences. (Lande 1965; Rivera
2011) These members would often identify their positions and preferences according to
their personal and political interests. (Coronel, et. al. 2004) Influencing the members of the
Congress, thus, depended on the concessions and incentives which the President would be
willing to provide. (Kawanaka, Kasuya ed. 2013)
For both Ferdinand Marcos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, incentives as a means of
persuading the Congress took the form of pork barrel and patronage. However, Marcos’
use of these incentives focused mainly on legislation and reelection.157
(Bonner 1987;
Timberman 1991; Gleeck 1993:333-344; Cariño 1994:61; Ross 2001:56) GMA, on the
other hand, used the disbursement of appropriation158
and bureaucratic patronage159
mainly
for her political survival.
155 See A Torrent of Cha-Cha Measures. December 1, 2008 (http://pcij.org/blog/2008/12/01/a-torrent-of-cha-cha-
measures) 156
See House Resolution No. 1109 157
There was a proposal to impeach Ferdinand Marcos after his reelection in 1969 brought by allegations of
corruption, fraud and hidden wealth. (Seagrave 1988:219) The impeachment proposal did not proceed since
most of the members of the House of Representatives belonged to Marcos’ Nacionalista Party and thus,
benefited in Marcos’ reelection. 158
See Congress on the dock, November 25, 2008 (http://pcij.org/blog/2008/11/25/congress-on-the-dock);
No Coming Out Party for PLLO, Jaileen F. Jimeno (http://www.pcij.org/i-report/2007/pllo.html); and,
Palace, not Congress, holds power of the purse, Efren L. Danao, October 14, 2007
(http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/oct/14/yehey/top_stories/20071014top5.html) 159
See A sackful of carrots, September 5, 2005 (http://pcij.org/blog/2005/09/05/a-sackful-of-carrots)
CHAPTER FOUR
National Defense
One of the vital responsibilities of the government is to maintain national security
and stability by defending the state against internal and external threats, enforcing the law,
and keeping peace and order to be able to provide an environment conducive to social and
economic growth and national development. The task of the President is to ensure that this
responsibility is being performed by the government. (Zaide 1970) In the study of the rise
of authoritarianism through presidential leadership, it would be important to understand
how the President tends to centralize and concentrate power while accomplishing this task.
In the Philippines, the primary institutions mandated to maintain national security,
peace, and order are the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the National Police.
At the apex of the organizational structure of these two institutions is the President, the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines160
. This chapter shall therefore,
discuss the legal authorities and leadership technique that the President uses as the
Commander-in-Chief to effect authoritarianism while supposedly preserving national
security, stability, and peace and order.
Ferdinand Marcos as the Commander-in-Chief
When Ferdinand Marcos was elected in 1965, there were already two major issues
concerning his national defense that he must address: the persistence of smuggling and the
increase in crime rate. (Spence 1969:358-60; Gleeck 1993:332) Eventually, he would also
have to deal with the emergence of radical ideologies. (Timberman 1991:62)
Smuggling, though regarded as an organized yet common crime, became a national
security concern to Ferdinand Marcos due to its “adverse effect” not only to the society but
especially on the economy. According to Hartzell Spence, “smuggling romanticized
lawlessness and stripped hundreds of millions of pesos from national revenues.”
(1969:359) In his first State of the Nation Address, Marcos emphasized this issue.
There are other crimes whose pernicious influence rests not so much on their rate
of incidence, but more importantly, on their adverse effects on the national
160
Paragraph 2, Section 10, Article VII, 1935 Constitution & Section 18, Article VII, 1987 Constitution
Tariga 64
economy. I refer particularly to the problem of smuggling—that cancerous evil that
has wreaked havoc on our economy and weakened the moral fiber of our people.161
To address this matter, Marcos appointed retired army officer Colonel Jacinto
Gavino as his customs commissioner. Gavino used three strategies to cut smuggling and
increase the collection of customs: inviting trade groups to make sure that their foreign and
local competitors were paying full duty; supervising the unloading of cargoes and the
collection of fees; and, “keeping a sharp eye” on collection officials. (Seagrave 1988:204)
Thus, before the end of 1966, until Gavino was replaced by Marcos’ lawyer, Juan Ponce
Enrile, smuggling was for a moment minimized if not totally eradicated.162
(Spence
1969:360; Seagrave 1988:204)
Aside from appointing Gavino to the customs, Ferdinand Marcos, in his capacity as
the Commander-in-Chief, took both military and legislative measures to respond to the
problem of smuggling. On his first month in office, Marcos sent “paratroopers” and
“marines” into smugglers’ camps in Semirara (an island between Mindoro and Panay) and
Capipisa (a village found on the south coast of Luzon). (Seagrave 1988:200) On August 8,
1967, he signed Republic Act No. 5173, otherwise known as the Philippine Coast Guard
Law of 1967. On October 10, 1967, by virtue of this Act, Marcos created the Coast Guard
and tasked it to “patrol southern waters where smuggling was most virulent.” (Spence
1969:359) Marcos also created the Philippine Constabulary’s Southwest Command “to
uproot smuggling in the southern islands.” (Spence 1969:359)
As for his predicament on the incidence of criminal violence, Marcos attributed its
increase and prevalence not only to the inadequacy of the police force in maintaining law
and order,163
but most especially to the lack of direct authority of the President on the local
police164
. To solve this problem, Marcos “rammed through legislation” to pass Police Act
of 1966 to “put all local police under a central administration.” (Seagrave 1988:204) Then
161
Source: Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines – First State of the Nation Address of
Ferdinand Marcos 162
Juan Ponce Enrile yielded to the issues of smuggling and corruption. According to Sterling Seagrave
(1988), “the moment he took over from Gavino, Enrile announced he would never be able to bring smuggling
and corruption under control. . .” (1988:204) 163
A study initiated by Marcos suggested that “20,000 of 30,000 police were unqualified to hold their jobs,
had been hired without training, and were subject to little or no supervision… They were inadequately
equipped and poorly armed…” (Spence 1969:360) 164
According to Sterling Seagrave (1988), “In the old system, municipal police forces came under the
authority of mayors; provincial Constabulary were controlled by governors and congressmen.” (1988:204)
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he created the Metropolitan Command, which he later expanded into Metropolitan Area
Command, to “complement and/or supplement local police action to repress and prevent
the commission of crimes...”
In 1968, Marcos started to have serious concerns with the rise of radical groups.
(Timberman 1991; Ferrer, Tan ed. 2007) Their emergence became a physical manifestation
of massive discontent against the government and the existing social structure. Their
ideology promising a “sweeping, revolutionary change” could “provide a potent and
persistent formula for rebellion.” (Timberman 1991:62) When the economy began to
manifest a worsening state, and corruption started to unravel within the bureaucracy, these
radical groups became even more noticeable. (Alfiler 1979; Cariño 1992; Celoza 1997;
Timberman 1991; Gleeck 1993) On January 26, 1970, amidst the controversies of his
involvement in election fraud, Marcos experienced the initiation of what would be a
longstanding crisis with these groups. Eventually, their courses of actions, along with other
factors165
, became Marcos’ basis to use all the powers provided to him by the 1935
Constitution as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces – “the calling out power or
the power to call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence or rebellion;
the power to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus to allow the arrest of persons
without the need of a warrant; and most importantly, the power to impose Martial Law to
broaden his police and military power as the President.”
Proclamation No. 1081: Marcos’ Martial Law
Ferdinand Marcos’ martial rule was a product of a series of domestic security
threats that provided the rationale for its imposition. However, what really served as a
catalyst to Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law was his controversial reelection in 1969.
(Timberman 1991) The first President of the independent Philippines to win reelection,
“Marcos was widely perceived as having secured his incumbency with levels of fraud and
intimidation not seen in decades” (Slater 2010: 126) Inevitably, the controversies166
surrounding Marcos’ reelection resulted to political turmoil and social unrest. According to
165
See Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia,
2010. pp. 126-34 (New York: Cambridge University Press) 166
For a more detailed account on how Marcos cheated in the 1969 election, see Sterling Seagrave, The
Marcos Dynasty, 1988. pp. 213-27 (New York: Ballantine Books)
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Sterling Seagrave (1988), “[s]o obvious was the election fraud that Ferdinand became a
target of unprecedented contempt from students and opposition.” (1988: 219)
When Marcos was about to deliver his inaugural speech in December 1969, he was
greeted by thousands of demonstrators – students, workers, and peasants – denouncing his
fraudulent victory. (Seagrave 1988) The protesters remained on the streets for days until
they were dispersed violently by Marcos’ paramilitary police force, the Metropolitan
Command167
. (Lacaba 1982; Bonner 1989) A few weeks later, on January 26, 1970, in his
fifth state of the nation address in the Legislative Building in Manila, Marcos was once
again met by thousands, about 50,000, disgruntled students, workers, and farmers. (Lacaba
1982) The events that followed became the preamble to what was known as the First
Quarter Storm168
.
The First Quarter Storm saw Ferdinand Marcos’ initial steps in justifying Martial
Law. It began in January 26 with a rally that voiced the demonstrators’ anger towards
Marcos’ corruption (as symbolized by a crocodile cardboard) and election fraud (in
reference to a cardboard coffin symbolizing the death of democracy). (Seagrave 1988) The
rally then escalated into a violent and bloody exchange of “attacks and counterattacks”
which continued up to the infamous Battle of Mendiola Bridge in January 30. (Lacaba
1982) Marcos predictably proclaimed that the disorder and violence were an act of
“rebellion and subversion”169
and that they represented a “revolt by local Maoist
Communists,”170
“hell-bent on burning down Malacañang171
and toppling his democratic
government.” (Slater 2010:127) Following such pronouncement, Marcos, in as early as
February 1970, mentioned the possibility of declaring Martial Law. He even raised this
167
The Metropolitan Command (METROCOM) was a unit of the Philippine Constabulary created in July 14,
1967 through Executive Order No. 76. Its main function was to “repress and prevent the commission of
crime.” In February 16, 1968, METROCOM was expanded into Metropolitan Area Command through
Executive Order No. 120. It was to be composed of the Philippine Constabulary and military personnel from
all major services of the armed forces. Its function was widened – from combating criminality, smuggling,
piracy and illegal fishing, to suppressing subversion and insurgency. 168
For a detailed account on the events during the First Quarter Storm, see Jose F. Lacaba, Days of Disquiet
Nights of Rage: The First Quarter Storm and Related Events, 1982. (Manila: Salinlahi Publishing House) 169
Ibid. pp. 81 and 88 170
Quoted from “FM Blames Reds for Riot,” The Manila Times, 1 February 1970, in Dan Slater, Ordering
Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia, 2010. p. 127 (New York:
Cambridge University Press) 171
In the January 30 mayhem, “militants commandeered a fire truck that had been sent to disperse them,
crashed it through one of the palace’s main gates. . . [S]ome protestors lobbed Molotov cocktails onto the
palace’s main gates.” (Slater 2010:127)
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possibility twice in the duration of the First Quarter Storm, “once after a soothsayer had
told him he was about to be assassinated.” (Bonner 1987:78) But Marcos did not follow
through with the idea of the declaration after his most trusted military advisers told him
that “the army would not be able to enforce it if the people rose in protest.” (Bonner
1987:78)
The First Quarter Storm lasted until April 1970, “when students left Manila for the
provinces and the start of summer vacation.” (Bonner 1987:79) The urban unrest would
resume in August 1971.
1971 was the year of the Constitutional Convention (Con-Con) and the
congressional elections. It was also the year when a series of bombings were used as an
extreme technique for intimidation. In August 16, 1971, the effort to intimidate was
initiated – first was with the delegates of Con-Con, when a bomb exploded in the men’s
room where the Convention was being held. (Seagrave 1988:240) Then, less than a week
later, the “deadliest” attack on the opposition party took place. (Slater 2010) As Raymond
Bonner (1987) graphically narrated,
Shortly before 9:15 P.M. on August 21, 1971, during a Liberal party rally of more
than 10,000 supporters at Plaza Miranda – in the heart of downtown, Manila’s
Hyde Park- two fragmentation grenades were hurled at the speakers’ platform;
other explosives were detonated beneath the stage. In the bloody heap of bodies
just below the microphones were those of a ten-year-old cigarette vendor and two
newspaper photographers. At least six other persons were killed. All of the Liberal
party’s eight senatorial candidates were among the more than 100 seriously
wounded. (1987:79)
Soon after the chaos, Ferdinand Marcos hastily concluded that the attacks,
particularly of the Plaza Miranda bombing, were acts of the Communists. (Bonner 1987;
Seagrave 1988; Timberman 1991) On August 23, he announced the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, declaring the Philippines under a state of
rebellion and thereby suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Proclamation No. 889, which was amended to Proclamation No. 889-A, allowed
Marcos to: firstly, emphasize the involvement of persons and organizations with “Marxist-
Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs” to the “attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila
on August 21, 1971.” And, secondly, the Proclamation provided Marcos with the legal
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basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which was invoked
from Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2 of the 1935 Constitution, where it is stated that,
In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when
public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
. .
Consequently, Marcos, by virtue of the said Proclamation was able to issue the
arrest without warrant and then detain a number of radical students and labor leaders who
were suspected to be members of organizations with Communist ideals. Most of the
personalities arrested, prior to their detention, were openly expressing their opposition to
the Marcos administration.172
The regional suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, however, failed
to restore peace and order. A series of subsequent bombings on notable sites in Manila
continued to terrorize the public. (Slater 2010:132) In the accounts of Bonner (1987),
In March two men on a motorcycle threw a bomb at the Arca Building, shattering
windows on the ground floor; a month later four men in light blue Impala threw
their bomb at the entrance of the Filipinas Orient Airway’s office; in May, two
hand grenades exploded on the porch of the South Vietnamese embassy; in June
there were three separate incidents, an explosion shattering the glass walls of the
Phil-American Life Building, apparently aimed at the Far East Bank and Trust
Company and the American Express office, and two weeks later a bomb was found
in the Senate’s publications office. 173
(1987:95)
Ferdinand Marcos attributed the bombings to communist activities. (Slater
2010:132) He accused the Communists to be “well organized, well armed, and violent.”
(Bonner 1987:95) This assertion would provide Marcos the premise he needed to impose
Martial Law.
According to the 1935 Constitution,
The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines,
and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public
172
See G.R. No. L-33964; G.R. No. L-33965; G.R. No. L-33973; G.R. No. L-33982; G.R. No. L-34004;
G.R. No. L-34013; G.R. No. L-34039; G.R. No. L-34265; G.R. No. L-34339, December 11, 1971 173
These attacks occurred late at night or early morning when few, if any, people were around. No serious
injuries were reported. This led to speculations that Marcos created these conditions in order to justify
Martial Law. (Bonner 1987:97; Seagrave 1988:243-244)
Tariga 69
safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under Martial Law.
- Paragraph 2, Section 10, Article VII, 1935 Constitution
With such accusation, Marcos had laid down the requisites for the imposition of
Martial Law. However, he was short of establishing the actual presence of “insurrection,
rebellion or imminent danger”. The social unrest brought by the First Quarter Storm and
the Plaza Miranda bombing appeared insufficient to declare Martial Law.174
However, this
changed when the frequency of bomb attacks escalated to unprecedented proportions.
In August 1972, a month before Marcos imposed Martial Law, the incidents of
bombings continued to an almost daily occurrence. Bonner (1987) had a detailed timeline:
On August 15 the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Exchange Office was
bombed; seven minutes later the Philippine Sugar Institute was the target. Two
days later the Department of Social Welfare was hit, and two days after that a
powerful plastic explosive tore a huge hole in a water main in Quezon City. The
month staggered to a conclusion: On August 30, at 12:30 A.M., the Phil-Am Life
Building was target again; fifteen minutes later an explosion destroyed an armored
car in front of the Philippine Banking Corporation; a few hours later an attaché
case containing a twelve-pound bomb was found on the ground floor of the
Department of Foreign Affairs Building.
On the evening of September 5 a powerful device exploded inside Joe’s
Department Store. A woman was killed and forty-one persons were injured. . .
Two days later a few blocks away, at the foot of the escalator on the ground floor
of the Good Earth Emporium, a homemade explosive... was discovered. On the
ninth a nighttime explosion in the Manila City Hall demolished three rooms. On
the eleventh, between 12:20 and 12:55 A.M., three power company substations
were hit, causing widespread blackouts. The next morning, again shortly after
midnight, a bomb destroyed a forty-eight-inch pipe and a twenty-six-inch main of
the water and sewage system. (1987:97)
On September 19, another bomb exploded in Quezon City Hall during the meeting
of the Constitutional Convention; eleven persons were injured. (Bonner 1987:98; Seagrave
1988:244) Then, on the night of September 22, there was an assassination attempt on
Marcos’ Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile; gunmen opened fire at Enrile’s two-car
174
Dan Slater (2010), in his analysis on the onset of Marcos’ authoritarianism, suggested three “predominant
types of urban unrest” as the “presage to the declaration of Martial Law” – student protests and riots, labor
strikes and activism, and terrorist bombings. (Slater 2010:126-134)
Tariga 70
convoy.175
(Slater 2010:134; Seagrave 1988:244-245) The incident sealed Proclamation
No. 1081, which placed the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the Commander-in-Chief
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nine-year incumbency was troubled with various
national security issues.176
Upon her first assumption to Presidency in 2001, GMA was
already confronted with three177
major persisting domestic threats: the Communist Party of
the Philippines – New Peoples’ Army – National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF); the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); and the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf (ASG).178
During her first term, she issued Executive Order No. 21 and approved a policy
entitled Oplan Bantay Laya to address her problems with the CPP-NPA-NDF and the
MILF. The Executive Order was a directive to “require a holistic approach consisting of
political, socio-economic/psychological, security and information components” in solving
the country’s problem on insurgency. Oplan Bantay Laya, on the other hand, was a
counterinsurgency program combining intensive military operations, and intelligence and
civic actions.179
GMA’s solution, however, eventually just focused on pursuing peace
talks.180
175
“Enrile later admitted that the ambush was staged” as a “final justification of Martial Law” (Seagrave
1988:245; Bonner 1987:100) 176
See Abueva, et. al. eds., Chapters 10 and 11, Alternative Views and Assessments of the Macapagal-Arroyo
Presidency and Administration: Record and Legacy (2001-2004), 2004, pp. 169-96. (Quezon City:
University of the Philippines Press) 177
In 2007, The Department of National Defense included the “ultra-rightist, politico-military groups, which
attempted to seize power through destabilization/military adventurism and/or coups d’état” as a major
security threat to the Philippines. See Department of National Defense, Strategic Defense and Security
Outlook: The Emerging and the Furture Defense and Security Environment, Government of the Philippines,
May 2007. 178
“Highlights of Secretary Norberto B. Gonzales’ Lecture,” Abueva, et. al. eds., Alternative Views and
Assessments, 2004. p.169. 179
See Benjie Oliveros, U.S. Role in Counter-insurgency Operations: Nuns lead march against U.S. troops
in the Philippines, September 26, 2010, http://ifprs.org/index.php/download/doc_download/18-us-role-in-
philippine-counter-insurgency-operations) 180
“Highlights of Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita’s Lecture” in Abueva, et. al. eds., Alternative Views and
Assessments, 2004, pp. 181-2.
Tariga 71
In her second term, while she still maintained peace negotiations with MILF, GMA
changed her tactic with the Communists and instead declared an “all-out war”181
against
them. (Becker 2013:80) With such declaration, GMA, as the Commander-in-Chief,
launched a “lethal strategy…matched by legal moves intended to stiffen counterinsurgency
operations.” (McCoy 2009:516) This strategy included the ordering of joint AFP and PNP
operations against “key NPA Zones”; the creation of Inter-Agency Legal Action Group
(IALAG)182
in January 2006; and the approval of a national internal security program,
Oplan Bantay Laya II183
, in December 2006 (McCoy 2009). GMA’s ultimate goal in using
this tactic was to defeat the CPP-NPA-NDF before her term ended in 2010. (Barrios,
Werth, Becker, & Hernandez eds. 2013:199-200)
As for the ASG, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, from the start of her Presidency in
2001, had clearly and firmly ordered military pressure towards the terrorist’s
neutralization.184
On January 2002, GMA, in her capacity as the Commander-in-Chief,
commenced “Operation Balikatan” or “Balikatan 02-1,” which allowed 1,200 U.S. troops
to be deployed to Basilan (Abu Sayaff’s stronghold). She also permitted the U.S special
operations forces to train counterterrorism techniques to the Philippine military. Finally,
she ordered the Philippine Marines to coordinate with CIA and U.S. Navy SEALs to
conduct a series of operations for the complete defeat of the Abu Sayyaf forces. (Banlaoi,
Lehr ed. 2007:130; McCoy 2009:511) When the U.S.-supported operation in Basilan
ended in mid-2002, GMA sent more troops of the AFP to the southern islands of Mindanao
to stiffen the fight against the ASG. (McCoy 2009) In 2004, due to “combat losses and loss
of bases and popular support” the terrorist group was “forced off” Basilan; however, with
the reported aid from the MILF and the Jemaah Islamiyah (an international terrorist group),
181
GMA’s “all-out war” policy was an “end-game strategy against the armed left, targeting [the] so-called
communist front organizations engaged in development, media, and religious work.” (McCoy 2009:516) 182
IALAG was created through Executive Order No. 493, series of 2006. It aimed at addressing specific
offenses against national security concerns such as rebellion, sedition and related actions. GMA allotted P50
million for its initial funding. 183
Oplan Bantay Laya II was a harsher version of Oplan Bantay Laya (a “failed” internal security plan
launched by GMA in 2001). See Joi Barrios, “Theaters of Vigil and Vigilance: A Playwright’s Notes on
Theater and Human Rights in the Philippines,” in Brenda Werth, Florian Nikolas Becker & Paola Hernandez
eds., Human Rights in Twenty-First Century Theater, 2013, p. 199. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) See
also Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the
Surveillance State. 2009, p. 516 (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press) 184
“Highlights of Secretary Norberto B. Gonzales’ Lecture,” Abueva et. al. eds., Alternative Views and
Assessments, 2004, pp. 169-70
Tariga 72
ASG began to regroup while concurrently recruiting new members. (Banlaoi, Lehr ed.
2007; McCoy 2009: Abuza 2012) When GMA took Office for a second term, she used
Oplan Bantay Laya II to address the still unresolved problem with ASG. (McCoy 2009)
Aside from communist insurgency, Islamic secessionism, and terrorism, GMA
faced another type of domestic crisis that she needed to address – the anti-GMA campaign.
This type of internal security concern was defined by multiple instances of social unrest
caused by a series of instigations challenging to remove her from Office. It all began a few
months after she first took office in 2001.
On April 25, 2001, GMA’s predecessor, former President Joseph Estrada was
arrested for a plunder case filed against him. Since that day, huge demonstrations had been
organized by the supporters of the deposed President.185
On May 1, “[l]oyalists of ousted
President Estrada, mainly unorganized and uneducated, trooped to the presidential palace
to protest...” (Pangalangan, Ramraj & Thiruvengadam eds. 2010:424) Apparently,
the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives, forearms, bladed weapons,
clubs, stones and other deadly weapons,. . . continue to assault and attempt to
break into Malacañang with the avowed purpose of. . . [depriving] the
President…of her powers and prerogatives. . .
- Proclamation No. 38, May 1, 2001
In response to the chaos, GMA, called upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to
reinforce the Philippine National Police (PNP) to guard the premises of the presidential
residence.186
After a melee erupted, the crowd was eventually forcefully and violently
dispersed.187
At noon, even after the rallyists had already been disbanded, GMA invoked
her Commander-in-Chief powers and issued Proclamation No. 38, placing National Capital
Region under a State or Rebellion188
. The Proclamation allowed GMA to call on all armed
forces to “suppress and quell the rebellion.”189
It also allowed her, even without
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to order the arrests without
185
Kapunan, J., dissenting opinion, Lacson vs. Perez, GR. No. 147780, May 10, 2001 186
Ibid 187
Ibid 188
Under Republic Act No. 6968, “The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking
arms against the Government for the purpose…of depriving the Chief Executive…, wholly or partially, of
any of [his] powers or prerogatives.” 189
Presidential Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1, May 1, 2001
Tariga 73
warrant190
of several key leaders of her opposition whom she accused as the instigators of
the incident.191
Although GMA did not actually impose Martial Law,192
the Proclamation
enabled GMA to use the full military and police powers provided by the 1987 Constitution.
On July 27, 2003 another incidence of instigation challenged to remove GMA from
Office. This time it was caused by military adventurists193
. More than three hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the army and the navy “armed with high-powered firearms and
explosives…publicly declared withdrawal of support”194
to GMA’s Presidency. (Arugay,
Mietzner ed. 2011:91) The soldiers, called Magdalos, staged a mutiny at the Oakwood
Premier Ayala Center Hotel. They were protesting against the rampant corruption within
the military which involved high-ranking officers including GMA’s then National Defense
Secretary Angelo Reyes. (Hernandez, Severino & Salazar eds. 2007) While the rebel
soldiers had “legitimate military grievances,”195
subsequent “investigations of, and
intelligence information regarding the Oakwood Mutiny” suggested that the Magdalo’s
protest was “a part of a plot,” a conspiracy among the Magdalos, the ousted President
Estrada and other former military officers, “to remove President Arroyo” from Office.
190
By declaring a state of rebellion, GMA was able to order warrantless arrests even without actually
suspending the privilege of writ of habeas corpus. According to Joaquin Bernas (2007), “[w]arrantless
arrests of persons caught in flagrante delicto, or “caught in the act,” are constitutionally allowed. Moreover,
rebellion…is considered in jurisprudence a “continuing crime”; that is, one who is involved in rebellion is
deemed to be always actually committing rebellion…and hence may be [arrested] without a warrant” (Bernas
2007:175) 191
Kapunan, J, dissenting opinion, Lacson vs. Perez, GR. No. 147780, May 10, 2001 192
In Justice Santiago Kapunan’s dissenting opinion on the legality of Proclamation No. 38, “if the motive
behind the declaration of a ‘state of rebellion’ is to arrest persons without warrant and detain them without
bail, and thus, skirt the Constitutional safeguards for the citizen’s civil liberties, the so-called ‘state of
rebellion’ partakes the nature of martial law without declaring it as such.” (Lacson vs. Perez, GR. No.
147780, May 10, 2001) 193
Military adventurists were the product of the “freezing of the military reform agenda…[and] the swelling
dissatisfaction from the lower ranks.” (Arugay, Mietzner ed. 2011:93) During GMA’s 9-year presidency,
three (3) instances of military adventurism were recorded: the Oakwood Mutiny in 2003, the Marine stand-
off in 2006, and the Manila Peninsula siege. See Aries A. Arugay, “The military in Philippine politics: Still
politicized and increasingly autonomous,” in Marcus Mietzner, The Political Resurgence of the Military in
Southeast Asia: Conflict and leadership, 2011, pp. 93-4 (New York: Routledge) 194
Presidential Proclamation No. 427, series of 2006 195
In 2001, when Angelo Reyes was the Army Chief of Staff, he demoted Navy Rear Admiral Guillermo
Wong for exposing irregularities in the Marine’s procurement of equipment amounting to P3.8 million. (See
Lei Chavez, Scandals! (Silencing the marines), July 18, 2009, http://abs-cbnnews.com/special-
report/07/17/09/scandals). In 2011, Reyes was investigated by the Congress for receiving not less than P50
million as send-off money when he retired as military chief of staff in 2001. (See Kimberly Jane Tan,
Witness: Ex-AFP chief Angelo Reyes got P50-M ‘pabaon’, January 27, 2011,
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/211614/news/nation/witness-ex-afp-chief-angelo-reyes-got-p50- m-
pabaon)
Tariga 74
(Hernandez, Severino & Salazar eds. 2007:88; Arugay, Mietzner ed. 2011:91) GMA’s
response to this threat was Proclamation No. 427, declaring another State of Rebellion.
The Proclamation, similar to the first one, allowed GMA to call for the AFP and PNP to
once again “suppress and quell the rebellion,” to make warrantless arrests, and even to
conduct search and recovery operations during the imposition of the state of rebellion.196
In 2005, just a year after she won her second term, GMA experienced yet another
instance of instigation wanting to remove her from Office. The unrest was stemmed by
charges of election fraud.
When GMA won in the 2004 elections by a questionable margin of votes,197
there
had been accusations of “massive election fraud and irregularities, widespread and
systematic cheating, blatant vote-buying, etc., and a rigged and highly controversial
congressional vote count for president.” (Muego, Wah & Singh eds., 2005:293) There
became a general sense, a popular perception that the “traditional oligarchs had stolen the
presidency from the people.” (Weatherbee, Tellis & Wills eds., 2007:240) Soon, such
perception would be confirmed through a scandal sensationalized by the media as the
“Hello Garci” controversy.
The controversy resulted to massive rallies all over the country calling on GMA to
resign. The protest rallies were unabated with each major assembly mustering larger
numbers than the last. GMA, as the Chief Executive, responded by enforcing a stricter
policy, which her then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita termed as “rule of calibrated
preemptive response” or CPR. CPR, according to Ermita’s Undersecretary Edwin Enrile,
was a “more pro-active and dynamic enforcement of existing laws, regulations and
ordinances,” An example, he added, would be the “strict implementation of the ‘no permit,
no rally’ rule”. With CPR, GMA was able to formulate a strategy that allowed her to
relatively control the size and frequency of the rallies and demonstrations. Raul
Pangalangan (2010) explained how this strategy worked:
196
Tinga, J., decision, Sanlakas vs. Reyes, GR. No. 159085, February 3, 2004 197
The Commission on Election claimed that GMA won the election with around 1.1 million votes over her
closest opponent, Fernando Poe, Jr. However, there was a study asserting that the difference was much
smaller, around 156,000 votes or less. See Roberto Verzola, “The True Results of the 2004 Philippine
Presidential Election Based on the Namfrel Tally”, Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies,
vol. 19, no. 2, 2004 pp. 92-118
Tariga 75
Each time there is a big anti-Arroyo protest, the government confines the
attendance of provincial protesters by blocking their buses and ‘jeepneys’ on the
national highways leading to Manila. Sometimes they invoke national security, and
conduct a vehicle-by-vehicle, passenger-by-passenger search that delays the
protesters and prevents them from reaching time-bound protests… [S]tudent
protesters from the University of the Philippines were barred as they marched to a
protest in Manila. The reason? Their rally permit was for Manila, not for Quezon
City where the school is located. (2010:429)
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo used CPR to literally prevent any mass actions which in
her perception might escalate into her ouster. She also issued Proclamation No. 1017,
which placed the Philippines under a State of National Emergency. The Proclamation was
in congruence with the principle of CPR. That is, it was preemptive in nature, thus,
preventing the commencement of political rallies and even other programs and activities
related to the celebration.198
While CPR was a directive approved by GMA in her capacity
as the Chief Executive, Proclamation No. 1017 was issued in accordance with the
authorities of the president as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces. Proclamation
No. 1017 enabled GMA to preempt mass activities by calling on the AFP and PNP to
arrest people without warrants199
, and even seize facilities by the National Police200
in the
event of “conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents, and some members
of the political opposition”201
to “oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns
of government.”202
On November 23, 2009, three years since the denouement of the turmoil brought by
massive protests, GMA was once again confronted with another domestic crisis – the
social unrest caused by an election-related massacre in the Province of Maguindanao203
,
198
Immediately after the issuance of Proclamation No. 1017, all rally permits issued by local governments
were revoked. See Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez’s decision. David vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 199
Proclamation No. 1017 did not suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus. However, GMA’s then
Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that “warrantless arrests…can already be
implemented.” Ibid. 200
Proclamation No. 1017 invoked Section 17, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which authorizes the State
to “temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest” 201
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., decision, David vs. Arroyo 202
Ibid. 203
For details on the events that led to Maguindanao Massacre, see Gerard Clarke, Civil Society in the
Philippines: Theoretical, Methodological and Policy Debates, 2013, pp. 93-94 (New York: Routledge); see
Tariga 76
where the accused were political allies of GMA. The abduction and murder of 57 people
including thirty-two journalists and media workers and two human rights lawyers attracted
even international attention.204
(Fuller 2013)
In response to the unrest, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in her capacity as the
Commander-in-Chief, ordered her National Defense Secretary and her AFP Chief of Staff
to “personally oversee military action against the perpetrators of these dastardly acts.”205
She also directed the AFP and the PNP to form a joint task force to “conduct immediate
and relentless pursuit of the perpetrators and secure the affected areas.”206
On November
24, a day after the incident, GMA declared a State of Emergency in Central Mindanao “for
the purpose of preventing and suppressing lawless violence” in the province.207
On
December 4, GMA issued Proclamation No. 1959, officially declaring Martial Law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindano. This Proclamation
suspended local government functions, searched and arrested personalities without
warrants and allowed military and police forces to take full control of the province.208
The reason behind GMA’s Proclamation No. 1959 was rebellion and insurrection
allegedly coming from the political allies of the perpetrators of the massacre.209
Such
rationale provided GMA with a legal foundation210
that enabled her to exercise, though
only in Maguindanao, all the constitutionally-given powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief.211
Proclamation No. 1017: GMA’s State of National Emergency
also the statements of witnesses in Justice Carpio’s dissenting opinion, G.R. No. 190293, G.R. No. 190294,
G.R. No. 190301, G.R. No. 190302, G.R. No. 190307, G.R. No. 190356, G.R. No. 190380, March 20, 2012 204
Eva-Lotta Hedman, The Maguindanao Massacre, Critical Elections and Armed Conflict in the
Philippines, LSE Ideas, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43685/1/SA006.pdf 205
Arroyo: Hunt down Maguindanao massacre killers, ABS-CBN News. November 24, 2009.
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/11/23/09/arroyo-hunt-down-maguindanao-massacre-killers 206
Ibid. 207
Presidential Proclamation No. 1946, series of 2009 208
See facts of the case in Justice Carpio’s dissenting opinion. G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012 209
Ibid. 210
Section 18, Article VII, 1987 Constitution 211
Proclamation No. 1959 suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposed Martial Law. It
had in its precedence Proclamation No. 1946 or the State of Emergency in Central Mindanao, which already
called for all the armed forces of the Philippines.
Tariga 77
On February 24, 2006, around 11:25 A.M., Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appeared on
national television and issued Proclamation No. 1017 declaring the Philippines under a
“State of National Emergency.” The Proclamation, according to Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.
(2007), was an embodiment of two topics. First, “it represent[ed] [GMA’s] assessment of
the national situation. . . Second, she put down her response to the disturbing situation.”
(Bernas 2007:174) Considering Fr. Bernas’ first topic, GMA’s “assessment” of the
situation of the Philippines in February 2006 was straightforward.
[O]ver these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the
extreme Right, represented by military adventurists. . .who are now in tactical
alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front,
to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004.
[T]hese conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President.
- Proclamation No. 1017, February 24, 2006
GMA’s assessment, albeit appearing to be presumptuous, was not without
basis. There were indeed several political oppositions that had been “repeatedly” trying to
“bring her down.” Since GMA took Office in 2001, there had been two major attempts to
remove her from the Presidency – one incident was instigated by the supporters of her
predecessor; the other was a failed coup. In her second term, various militant groups had
been occasionally protesting on the streets due to popular disaffection against her
administration. Issues of corruption, mostly involving her bureaucracy and her husband,
and her support on the U.S.-led Iraq invasion became the topics of most of these protests.
(McCoy 2009:498) However, since her election in 2004, the anti-GMA protests had been
relatively small, just enough to attract the attention of the media until June 2005 when a
damning evidence of GMA’s involvement to election fraud was released.
On June 6, 2005, GMA’s presidential spokesperson, in a seemingly preemptive
tactic, released CDs containing wiretapped audio recordings of phone call conversations
between GMA and Virgilio Garcillano, an official of the Commission on Election. On June
10, a deputy director of the National Bureau of Investigation provided the media with the
original copies of the said recordings, which apparently were conversations about rigging
the 2004 national election results.212
Three weeks later, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appeared
on national televisions giving a speech, “admitting [to] calling a COMELEC official before
212
For a full transcription of the conversation between GMA and V. Garcillano, see http://pcij.org/blog/wp-
docs/hellogarci-transcript-final.pdf
Tariga 78
and during the canvassing of the results of [2004’s] elections”213
; after which she
apologized to what she considered as a “lapse in judgment.”214
The speech seemed to
confirm the allegations of cheating in the election. With such admission and apology, the
public’s suspicion of GMA’s involvement in the manipulation and fraud was solidified.
Consequently, the approval ratings of GMA “plunged to the lowest point any president had
seen since the last year of the Marcos administration…” (Weatherbee, Tellis & Wills eds.,
2007:241) Demonstrations and protest activities became inevitable.
On July 8, in the aftermath of the election fraud controversy, ten cabinet
members215
of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared their resignation and called on GMA to
do the same. Later that day, Senate President Franklin Drilon, one of GMA’s staunch
political allies, called on the President to step down. Drilon, being the Liberal Party’s
president, also announced that his party would be withdrawing its support from GMA.
Shortly after Drilon’s announcement, former president Corazon Aquino, the uniting force
in EDSA Revolution and a key player in GMA’s assumption to Office in 2001, issued a
statement calling on GMA to “make the supreme sacrifice to spare the country from the
violence that threatens it”. Aquino’s statement was then followed by a media conference
held by the Makati Business Club (MBC), a business group representing the “modernizing
bourgeoisie”216
and the country’s financial district. The MBC reiterated the call for GMA’s
resignation. That afternoon, thousands of protesters – opposition groups composing of rival
electoral parties, civil society, and radical activists – began gathering in Manila and in
other parts of the country. Most assembled in the streets of Ayala, the district of a city
headed by Jejomar Binay, an opposition politician. The organizers said that they would
hold an “indefinite vigil” until GMA resigned. Notwithstanding the call of the people for
213
See Apology in a can of worms, June 28, 2005, http://pcij.org/blog/2005/06/28/apology-in-a-can-of-
worms 214
For a full text of GMA’s speech, see The president says, ‘I am sorry; I want to close this chapter.’ June
28, 2005. http://pcij.org/blog/2005/06/28/the-president-says-i-am-sorry-i-want-to-close-this-chapter-2 215
The cabinet members were labeled by the media as the Hyatt 10, in reference to the hotel where they held
their media conference to announce their resignations. These were Emilia Boncodin of Budget, Cesar
Purisma of Finance, Alberto Lina of Customs, Guillermo Parayno of Internal Revenues, Juan Santos of Trade
& Industry, Florencio Abad of Education, Corazon Soliman of Social Welfare, Teresita Quintos Deles
(adviser on peace process), Imelda Nicolas of the National Anti-Poverty Commission, and Rene Villa of
Agrarian Reform. 216
Modernizing bourgeoisie was the term used by Joel Rocamora to describe Makati Business Club. See Joel
Rocamora, “From Regime Crisis to System Change,” in Rodolfo C. Severino & Lorraine Carlos Salazar eds.,
Whither the Philippines in the 21st Century?, 2007 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) p. 21
Tariga 79
her resignation, GMA dismissed the idea of vacating the Office and instead, insisted that
her dissidents follow the rule of law and file an impeachment complaint against her in
Congress. (Duka 2008:361) Since GMA has the majority of the House of Representatives,
impeachment seemed to be impossible. (Quimpo, Case ed. 2010:152) Thus, a series of
massive demonstrations and street rallies was prompted.
On July 13, an assembly of tens of thousands of people was organized by members
of political opposition and civil society. On July 25, when Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
about to deliver her fifth State of the Nation Address, a gathering of around 40,000
militants was mustered by labor and student groups.217
On September 6, a protest march of
a huge crowd led by former President Aquino was held to denounce the hastiness218
done
by the Lower House in dismissing the impeachment case filed against GMA. By the end of
the year, the streets of Metro Manila had been constantly filled by well-coordinated, fully-
diverse, large-scale rallies calling on GMA to resign.
The series of continuous demonstrations calling for her resignation was probably
what GMA was referring to in her Proclamation No. 1017 when she stated that political
opponents “have repeatedly tried to bring down the President.”219
Meanwhile, as for
GMA’s political opponents, the protests on the streets of Metro Manila became assemblies
of all sorts of personalities. Students and out-of-school youths, farmers and landowners,
teachers and other members of the academe, vendors and business owners, ‘white-collar’
and ‘blue-collar’ professionals, priests and nuns, and even celebrities, all gathered and
assembled to demonstrate their opposition against GMA’s presidency. However, while
these people were indeed responsible for anti-GMA mass actions220
, they were not the
“political opposition” that GMA was inferring to when she issued her assessment of the
Philippine’s situation in Proclamation No. 1017.
217
Katherine Adraneda, Pro and anti-Arroyo rallies peaceful during SONA, The Philippine Star Headlines,
July 26, 2005, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/288326/pro-and-anti-arroyo-rallies-peaceful-during-sona 218
See Carlos H. Conde, Arroyo foes walk out on impeachment talks, The New York Times, August 31,
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/30/world/asia/30iht-phils.html 219
If GMA’s Proclamation No. 1017 was based on an assessment of the situation during her second term,
then the two major efforts to remove her from Office in 2001 and 2003 – allegedly instigated by her
predecessor, ousted President Estrada – were thus, disregarded. 220
According to GMA’s then Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales, “political rallies were organized for purposes
of destabilization.” See facts of the case in Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez’s decision, David vs. Arroyo. G.R. No.
171396, May 3, 2006
Tariga 80
In the oral arguments held in the Supreme Court on March 7, 2006, in the aftermath
of the declaration of the State of National Emergency, GMA’s Solicitor General specified
the “facts” leading to the issuance of the Proclamation:
On [February 23, 2006], at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco,
President Cory Aquino’s brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials
plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME
Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S.
government official about his group’s plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon
also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo
Lim, Commander of the Army’s elite Scout Ranger. Lim said “it was all systems
go for the planned movement against Arroyo.”
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen.
Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that
a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and
armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005.
According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the
soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces
foist to unseat the President
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front
(NDF) at the North Central Mindanao. . .claimed that with the forces of the
national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties,
coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is
probable that the President’s ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half
of 2006.221
(emphasis in the original)
These prominent individuals cited in the Solicitor General’s statement were clearly
the “elements in the political opposition” that GMA inferred to in her Proclamation No.
1017. They were the dissidents “[who] have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme
Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA, and the extreme Right represented by military
adventurists.”
In terms of conspiracy between the right-wing factions in military and the leftist
groups who, according to GMA, “are now in tactical alliance…to bring down the duly
constituted Government elected in May 2004,” Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo used two
subsequent occasions as the basis for her assessment. The first occurred on February 17
when Government authorities obtained a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I.” The
document contained “detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine
Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot, allegedly drafted by
221
Facts of the case, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., decision, David vs. Arroyo
Tariga 81
Magdalo officers and leaders of radical Leftists, “was to assassinate selected targets
including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself.”222
The next incident that GMA used as her basis was the re-arrest of a Magdalo
escapee, 1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan, on February 21 by military intelligence units in
Batangas after an alleged meeting with representatives of the CPP-NPA. Seized from San
Juan were “two flash disks, a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies
of subversive documents.”223
The disks contained minutes of the meetings224
between
seven Magdalo officers and seven CPP-NPA representatives. Apparently, a formal
agreement was reached and signed by the two camps fortifying an alliance aimed at
ousting GMA.225
This “conspiracy” and “tactical alliance” completed GMA’s assessment
on the February 2004 situation. Given such assessment, GMA responded by invoking two
provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Article VII, Section 18 and Article XII, Section 17.
In Proclamation No. 1017, GMA “command[ed] the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by [her] or
upon [her] direction.” This authoritative order, illustrating similarities to Ferdinand
Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081, had its legal basis. In the 1987 Constitution, it is stated
that:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion
or rebellion, when public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
- Section 18, Article VII
222
Ibid. 223
Ibid. 224
The AFP made transcripts of the meetings between the Magdalo officers and the CPP-NPA leaders. The
transcription was entitled “Document Exploitation Report: Re Magdalo-CPP Alliance.” For a copy of the
transcript, see http://www.timawa.net/der.html. 225
In July 19, 2006, 1st Lt. San Juan confirmed in his 13-page affidavit the involvement of some military
officers and leftist groups with the drafting of Oplan Hackle. See Cecille Suerte Felipe, Magdalo soldier
confirms Oplan Hackle, July 20 2006, The Philippine Star,
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/348349/magdalo-soldier-confirms-%C2%91oplan-hackle%C2%92
Tariga 82
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo mirrored this provision in her Proclamation 1017 with
much omission; thus stating , “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may
call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .”
The other provision that GMA cited in her Proclamation No. 1017 was Article XII,
Section 17, which stated,
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.
- 1987 Philippine Constitution
This provision was GMA’s response to “certain segments of national media”226
which, according to GMA, were recklessly aiding and abetting the conspiracy of the
elements of the political opposition.227
Comparative Analysis
Ferdinand Marcos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had similarities in handling
national defense. For one, both focused on rebellion or insurrection as the primary threat to
national security. However, for Marcos, rebellion was always caused by insurgency. The
rise of the Communist Party of the Philippines in 1968 and its New People’s Army in 1969
seemed to provide Ferdinand Marcos logical justification for concluding, prematurely or
otherwise, that any armed uprising against his administration was brought by communist
insurgents.228
This inference was even reinforced by two known facts: First, from 1968 –
1972, CPP-NPA’s size, range, and strength had rapidly increased due to its appeal and
popularity among the general public. (Niksch 1985:36; Timberman 1991:60-2) Second,
since CPP-NPA’s establishment in 1968 and 1969, respectively, it had already conducted a
number of guerrilla war fronts throughout the country, from the northern, central and
southern provinces of Luzon, to the eastern and western Visayas, and to the outskirts of
226
See Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, series of 2006 227
According to GMA’s then Presidential Chief of Staff, Mike Defensor, the takeover is “meant to show a
strong presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing
down [the] government.” See Petition in ALG vs. Ermita, G.R. 171400, May 3, 2006 228
In 1970, a Muslim separatist in Mindanao, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was formed. By
1972, the MNLF guerrillas “were tougher, better organized, and better armed than the [CPP-NPA] units…
Though they presented a serious military problem, it was an isolated one.” (Bonner 1987:119)
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Mindanao. (Kessler 1989:54) While the former suggested CPP-NPA’s capability to
influence the public all over the country, the latter emphasized the Communist’s capacity
to take arms against the government. Moreover, the existence of the Anti-Subversion Act,
which outlawed the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm in the 1950s,
recognized the CPP-NPA’s potential in “overthrow[ing] the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means.” Thus, when a melee broke out on the First Quarter Storm, or when a bomb
exploded at Plaza Miranda on August 1971, or when his Secretary of National Defense
was attempted to be assassinated, Marcos was easy to declare that such acts of violence
and rebellion were perpetrated by the CPP-NPA.
For GMA, on the other hand, rebellion was defined as an act committed by any
person or organization to “continue to rise publicly against the government”. It did not
matter if such person or organization took arms or just merely “shown hostility”229
. As
long as the act was committed “for the purpose of depriving the President of the
Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives,” such act, in GMA’s
mind, was interpreted as rebellion.230
This was evident in the premises of her
Proclamations No. 38 and No. 427, both declaring a State of Rebellion, Proclamation No.
1017, announcing a State of National Emergency, and Proclamation No. 1959, imposing
Martial Law. Therefore, whereas Marcos blamed rebellion on the insurgents, particularly
the CPP-NPA, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo incriminated all persons or groups of persons
whose acts resembled rebellion. These included an “angry and violent mob,” “certain
elements of the Armed Forces,” “elements of the political opposition,” and armed groups
belonging to a political clan accused of massacre.
By focusing on rebellion as the foremost concern of national security, both
Ferdinand Marcos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo were able to invoke the three
constitutional powers of the president as the Commander-in-Chief. From the most basic,
229
See Presidential Proclamation No. 38, series of 2001 230
GMA’s process of implicating rebellion to the act itself rather than to a specific ‘enemy of the state’ was
unlike that of Marcos’ strategy of directing culpability exclusively to the Communists. However, similar to
Marcos’, GMA’s tactic had legal merit. While Marcos had Republic Act No. 1700 or Anti-Subversion Law,
an act “to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar associations,” GMA had Republic Act
No. 6968, an amended law on the Revised Penal Code entitled “Rebellion, Coup D’États, Sedition and
Disloyalty.”
Tariga 84
“mildest” power to call the Armed Forces to come to the aid of the police, to the two
powers that have serious implications to human rights – the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law – the presence of
rebellion allowed both presidents to use the abovementioned authorities as the response of
their national defense to an imbuing crisis.
The highlight of Ferdinand Marcos’ national defense was Proclamation No. 1081,
the declaration of Martial Law. Through this Proclamation, Marcos was able to assert all of
his Commander-in-Chief powers. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, on the other hand, had four
instances where she used all of these authorities: Proclamation No. 38, declaring a State of
Rebellion in the National Capital Region, Proclamation No. 427, declaring a State of
Rebellion, Proclamation No. 1017, declaring a State of National Emergency, and
Proclamation No. 1959, proclaiming Martial Law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the Province of Maguindanao. However, Marcos’ Martial Law was
national in scope; and it clearly contained within its context the employment of the three
powers of the Commander-in-Chief. As it was written,
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2)
of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I,
Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their
commander-in-chief, do hereby command the armed forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.
In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all
others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion. . .shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by me
or by my duly designated representative.
- Proclamation No. 1081 (emphasis added)
GMA’s Proclamations, on the other hand, were either national in scope or had in
their declarations the written expression of using the three Commander-in-Chief
authorities; but never both. Proclamation No. 38 (State of Rebellion in the National Capital
Region), Proclamation No. 427 (State of Rebellion), and Proclamation No. 1017 (State of
National Emergency) only had the power to call on all the armed forces written in its
Tariga 85
context; the other two powers were just implied (Bernas 2007; Pangalangan, Ramraj &
Thiruvengadam eds. 2010). Although, aside from Proclamation No. 38, they were effected
nationwide. Meanwhile, Proclamation No. 1959 declared to use the entire constitutional
powers of the Commander-in-Chief. However, its enforcement was exclusive to the
Province of Maguindanao.
Following the above premise, Ferdinand Marcos’ Martial Law was relatively
dissimilar with GMA’s Proclamations. Perhaps the executive decree of Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo showing the closest similarity with Ferdinand Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081,
Martial Law, was Proclamation No. 1017, the State of National Emergency. A rhetorical
analysis between the two Proclamations would suggest uncanny resemblances. For
instance, consider the reason for their issuance: Martial Law assigned fault to “lawless
elements of the communist and other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the
Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force”; the State of National Emergency
blamed “elements in the political opposition [who] have conspired with authoritarians of
the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by
military adventurists…who are now in tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and
systematic conspiracy…to bring down. . . the democratic Philippines State.” Although
GMA’s State of National Emergency involved other actors, the presence of the
communists still gave the two Proclamations a common variable. Moreover, both
Proclamations recognized that these “elements” were either “organized” or “engaged in a
concerted and systematic conspiracy” of either “overthrowing” or “bringing down” the
“democratic” “Republic of the Philippines.”
The premises for the issuance of both Proclamations were not the only provisions
demonstrating parallelism. Even, and especially, the concluding texts of the two
Proclamations were displaying similarities. In fact, the content and wordings of the
concluding part of Proclamation No. 1017 were very similar to Proclamation No. 1081 that
it would not be surprising to surmise that GMA’s declaration of the State of National
Emergency copied some of the content of Marcos’ Martial Law.
The similarities between GMA’s State of National Emergency and Marcos’
Martial Law were not limited to rhetorics. In fact, there were resemblances in the executive
orders that followed their declarations.
Tariga 86
A few hours after the imposition of Martial Law, at midnight, Ferdinand Marcos
ordered the arrest of his foremost political opponent, Senator Benigno Aquino. (Bonner
1987:100-1) Then, he directed the AFP to “seize control of all communications and public
utilities, to close schools and universities, and to arrest more than forty opposition
politicians and newsmen [who were] charged with plotting to overthrow the government
by violence and subversion.” (Seagrave 1988:245) The declaration of Martial Law allowed
Marcos to implement restrictive measures – prohibiting any type of rallies and
demonstrations on the streets, arresting members of Congress, governors, students and
labor activists, journalists and publishers and even priests, and closing several newspapers,
radio and television stations – against all of his political opposition. (Bonner 1987;
Seagrave 1988; Celoza 1997)
Meanwhile, immediately upon the declaration of State of National Emergency,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the AFP to aid the police in dispersing the protesters, as
effective as they can be, before the latter could all organize into an assembly.231
All rallies
and demonstrations were then cancelled. The next day, at around 12:20 in the morning, a
directive was given to the operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group of
the PNP to search the offices of The Daily Tribune and seize their news materials; the
same happened to the Malaya and its sister publication, Abante.232
All of these publications
were pro-opposition. This was followed by a proposal from the police to issue guidelines
in reporting and covering of events. (Pangalangan, Ramraj & Thiruvengadam eds. 2010:
427-8) Police takeover, closure, or cancellation of franchise of “any broadcast outfit”
would be the PNP’s response to those “who would not follow the standards set by the
government during the state of national emergency.”233
On the following days, other legal
leftist representatives234
were either arrested or ordered to be arrested without warrants235
.
The State of National Emergency’s strategy of not allowing any type of protest, the arrest
231
David vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 232
Niñez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 171409, May 3, 2006 233
David vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 234
Anakpawis Congressman Crispin Beltran, along with his supporters, and Bayan Muna Representative
Josel Virador were arrested on February 25, 2006. Anakpawis Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna
Representatives Satur Ocampo and Teodoro Casiño, and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza were forcefully
detained at the House of Representatives. Ibid. 235
Anakpawis Representative, and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno, Crispin Beltran was shown with a
warrant of arrest dated 1985, which “stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos
regime.” Ibid.
Tariga 87
of members of Congress, the searching and seizure of media outlets, all were familiar with
that of Marcos’ imposition of Martial Law.
Aside from the similarities in their aftereffect, i.e. the orders following their
impositions, Marcos’ Martial Law and GMA’s State of National Emergency had also a
homologous beginning. For one, the catalyst for their declarations was the same – both
started from controversies of election fraud during their second term. Moreover, both were
issued after a series of social unrest, though Marcos’ case involved violence and chaos
brought by a sequence of explosions.
Considering the timing of their declarations, it would appear that both Marcos’
Martial Law and GMA’s State of National Emergency were responses to a progression of
social unrests and domestic threats to national security in the form of rebellion. (McCoy
2009: 516; Slater 2010:134-5) However, it would likewise appear that both were a political
reaction to troubled presidencies filled with issues of legitimacy and corruption. (Seagrave
1988; Celoza 1997; McCoy 2009; Pangalangan, Ramraj & Thiruvengadam eds. 2010)
Whatever the reason for their implementation, one thing became evident. Marcos’ Martial
and GMA’s State of National Emergency had the same objective – the suppression of mass
actions and the repression of political opposition.
CHAPTER FIVE
Foreign Affairs
It is the government’s responsibility to exert necessary efforts to strengthen foreign
relations to be able to ‘secure continued access to foreign markets, industry and
technology.’ This is done by creating strategies and foreign policies that will establish
better ‘linkages’ with other nations while still promoting and safeguarding the interests of
the country and its people. In the Philippines, the task of formulating foreign policies is
shared by the President and the Congress. However, as the country’s top diplomat, i.e. “the
‘sole’ national spokesperson for foreign affairs and the ‘sole’ national agent for dealing
with foreign nations,” the President steers the course of foreign policies. (Abueva, Abueva,
et. al. eds. 2004:xvii; Malaya and Oblena 2010:2; Bernas 1995:101-2) In the study of the
rise of authoritarianism through presidential leadership, it would be necessary to identify
the foreign policies that the President prioritizes in an effort to concentrate and centralize
power in his Office. This chapter shall, therefore, discuss how the President deals with the
country’s foreign affairs while consequently effecting authoritarianism.
Foreign Policies of Ferdinand Marcos
The center of the foreign policies of Ferdinand Marcos from 1966 to 1972 had a
connection, either partially or wholly, with Philippines’ relationship with Vietnam and
Malaysia. As he stated in his First State of the Nation Address, “[t]he conflicts in South
Vietnam and Malaysia present security problems of the gravest concern.”236
The war in
Vietnam, a product of Cold War, created a perception that communism in Asia posed a
threat to the “passion” of the Philippines237
“to preserve and extend democracy.” (Spence
1969: 348) The claim of Malaysia to the territory of Sabah, on the other hand, presented as
a major issue on the sovereignty of the Philippines. (Indorf 1984:23-27)
236
Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines – First State of the Nation Address of Ferdinand
Marcos 237
See Ricardo T. Jose, “The PHILIPPINES during the Cold War: searching for security guarantees and
appropriate foreign policies, 1946-1986,” in Malcolm H. Murfett, Cold War: Southeast Asia (Singapore:
Marshall Cavendish International, 2012) pp. 50-80
Tariga 89
The Vietnam War
On February 2, 1966, a month after Ferdinand Marcos’ inauguration, the
government of South Vietnam requested the Philippines for assistance in its fight against
communist forces from the North. (Ragos-Espinas, Lim ed. 1997:59) Marcos
recommended the request to the Congress. On June 18, 1966, he signed Republic Act No.
4664 – an Act authorizing the President to increase238
Philippine economic and technical
assistance to South Vietnam. The Act allowed Ferdinand Marcos to create “engineer
construction, medical, and rural community development teams.” These teams, named as
the first Philippine Civic Action Group (1st PHILCAG-V), would be tasked to undertake
socio-economic projects in South Vietnam.239
On August 3, Marcos, together with the
leader of the Republic of Vietnam, signed the Mata-Tam Agreement, a military working
agreement which would specify the role of the PHILCAG in the war.
On October 1966, still in line with South Vietnam’s request for assistance, Marcos
hosted a two-day South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and ANZUS conference.
The seven-nation ‘Summit Conference of the Orient’, which included the heads of state of
Thailand, South Korea, South Vietnam, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and United
States, had the purpose of discussing and offering solutions to the worsening situation of
Vietnam and to the containment of communism in Southeast Asia.240
(Spence 1969:347)
In accord with the Summit’s objectives, Marcos proposed that the Philippines
should be the mediator in the peace-keeping efforts in Vietnam. (Bonner 1987; Spence
1969) This proposal, which in effect, raised the concept that “disputes in [Asia]…should
be settled by nobody but Asian themselves” (Spence 1969:348,350), served Ferdinand
Marcos two purposes – to boost the standing of the Philippines as a credible Asian nation
in the international community, particularly with its Asian neighbors (Jose, Murfett ed.
2012:78); and to demonstrate to the United States and to other countries that the
Philippines had a “sophisticated international image,” one which presented the country as
“a self-respecting independent nation”. (Spence 1969:348)
238
An economic and technical assistance from the Philippines was first extended to Vietnam on July 21,
1964 through Republic Act No. 4162. 239
Republic Act No. 4664 240
President Marcos Conducts SEATO Conference in Manila 1966,
http://www.firstpost.com/topic/person/ferdinand-marcos-president-marcos-conducts-seato-conference-in-
manila-1966-video-Glqvzrgs898-3018-1.html
Tariga 90
While Marcos indeed revitalized Philippine’s diplomatic status, most especially
with the country’s Asian neighbors241
, his representation of the Philippines as an
independent nation, particularly from the United States, however, was more controversial
than realistic.
On September 1966, during the United Nation’s General Assembly in New York,
Ferdinand Marcos called on the Soviet Union, which supported the communists in North
Vietnam, to join the Asian countries in resolving the Vietnam impasse. (Jose, Murfett
2012; Spence 1969:348-349) In 1967, he, together with the 6th
Congress, sent a mission to
Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, and mainland China to explore possible trade relations.
(Spence 1969; Jose, Murfett ed. 2012) The mission recommended the removal of all
barriers – including the travel ban on Filipino citizens – between the Philippines and the
socialist and communist countries.242
Then, on January 27, 1969, in his State of the Nation
Address, Marcos announced the Philippines’ increasing need for a “modus vivendi with
Red China.”243
All of these measures, though initiated out of economic necessity, would
naturally suggest Marcos’ independence of American anti-communist/socialist policies.
However, the Philippines’ active participation in the Vietnam War, the presence of
American army facilities and personnel at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, and the
Philippines-U.S. foreign relations not only complicated but also contradicted Marcos’
sense of independence. (Bonner 1987; Jose, Murfett ed. 2012; Dagdag 1999)
Notwithstanding Marcos’ interpretation of Philippine independence, on October
1966, during the SEATO-ANZUS Summit and in front of an American President, Marcos
“committed to send a Philippine contingent to Vietnam,” as “an expression of [his] unity to
the allied participation in a collective security effort in Southeast Asia against Communist
aggression in Vietnam.” (Bonner 1987:49-50; Savage 2004:275; Jose, Murfett ed.
2012:76-77)
241
After the Summit, the Philippines emerged as an activist in international affairs. (Spence 1969) In 1967,
Philippines’ view of how an inter-Asian organization should be created was adopted in the formation of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See Edgardo E. Dagdag, “The Philippines and the Quest for Stable
Peace in Southeast Asia: A Historical Overview,” Asian Studies Journal, Vol. 35 (1999), pp. 99-100. 242
Benito Lim, “The Political Economy of Philippines-China Relations,” PASCN Discussion Paper, No. 99-
16 (Philippine APEC Study Center Network) pp. 7-13 243
Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines – Fourth State of the Nation Address of Ferdinand
Marcos
Tariga 91
On October 25, 1966, the last day of the Summit, Marcos, along with the leaders of
SEATO and ANZUS countries, produced the Manila Declaration of Peace and Progress,244
an agreement among the seven nations to withdraw their troops from South Vietnam as
soon as peace was restored. (Savage 2004)
The Malaysian Claim
When Ferdinand Marcos took Office in 1965, there were no bilateral contacts
between the Philippines and Malaysia – ambassadors were withdrawn and diplomatic
relations were suspended. (Indorf 1984:24) This was the result of former Philippine
President Diosdado Macapagal’s non-recognition of the newly created Federation of
Malaysia. Malaysia’s claim on Sabah245
was unacceptable to Macapagal that he never
acknowledged Malaysia’s new government. (Ishikawa 2010:86)
On June 3, 1966, a few months into his Presidency, Marcos reestablished
diplomatic relations with Malaysia by agreeing with its leader, through a Joint
Communiqué, to “sit together” for the purpose of “clarifying the claim and discussing the
means of settlement.” (Indorf 1984:24; Severino 2011:50) Then, on August 8, 1967,
Marcos and the Prime Minister of Malaysia, together with the leaders of Thailand,
Singapore and Indonesia, initiated the formation of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN). Marcos reiterated that this new organization “should not be a military
nor an anti-communist league”246
to be able to “eventually gather all of Southeast Asia
under its wing, keep Southeast Asia out of the quarrels of the strong, strengthen stability in
the region,” and most importantly, “promote peace among its members.” (Severino
2011:51)
The formation of ASEAN provided Marcos and Malaysia the “motivation for not
allowing bilateral disputes to get in the way of regional peace, stability and cooperation.”
(Severino 2011:51) On September 1, 1967, less than a month after the foundation of
244
The Manila Summit Conference on October 25, 1966 produced three communiqués: Declaration of Goals
of Freedom, Joint Statement, and Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific. See Lyndon B.
Johnson: "Manila Summit Conference Documents," October 25, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27958 245
Philippines had been claiming Sabah, or North Borneo, long before the Federation of Sabah had been
created. For a historical background, see Alfredo G. Parpan, S.J., “The Philippine Claim on North Borneo:
Another Look,” Philippine Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1988) 246
Quoted from “ASEAN and the Philippines, 1997-1998,” ibid. p. 100
Tariga 92
ASEAN, Marcos, through his then Foreign Affairs Secretary Narciso Ramos, and
Malaysian Foreign Minister Tun Abdul Razak Bin Dato Hussein entered into an agreement
that basically ceded Sabah to Malaysia.247
Because of the agreement, for quite some time,
the dispute between Philippines and Malaysia subsided. Until March 28, 1968, when
opposition Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. revealed in his privilege speech248
Ferdinand
Marcos’ “Operation Merdeka,” a failed plan to create a covert special force unit – the now
infamous Jabidah – to use military intervention to infiltrate and reclaim Sabah. (Indorf
1984; Gleeck 1993; Severino 2011) The Senator’s exposé reignited the tension between
the two countries. In September, Malaysia once again suspended diplomatic relations with
the Philippines and withdrew its ambassador from Manila. (Severino 2011) Marcos,
meanwhile, approved and signed on September 18, 1968 Republic Act No. 5446 redefining
the baselines of Philippines’ territorial seas around the territory of Sabah. Apparently,
Malaysia saw Marcos’ approval of the law as a pretext for the annexation of Sabah to the
territory of the Philippines. Malaysia’s parliament responded by repealing the agreement it
made with the Philippines on September 1, 1967. (Severino 2011)
In December 1968, with the intervention of the ASEAN foreign ministers, the
Philippines and Malaysia agreed on “yet another cooling-off period.” (Severino 2011:54)
The next year, on January 22, 1969, Marcos, declared in his State of the Nation Address
that he would “pursue the claim” on Sabah249
; however, in recognition of the ASEAN’s
objectives, he would continue to do so using “all available peaceful resources.” (Spence
1969) On December 16, during the third ASEAN ministerial meeting at the Cameron
Highlands, Malaysia, Marcos, through his then Foreign Affairs Secretary Carlos P.
Romulo together with Malaysian Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj
issued a joint communiqué reestablishing the Philippine-Malaysia relations. During the
meeting, the Malaysian leader announced,
247
See the “Agreement on Anti-Smuggling Cooperation Between the Government of Malaysia and the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines,” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines; see also
“Protocol to the Agreement on Anti-Smuggling Cooperation Between the Government of Malaysia and the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines,” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. 248
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., “Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil?,” March 28, 1968; available from
http://www.gov.ph/1968/03/28/jabidah-special-forces-of-evil-by-senator-benigno-s-aquino-jr/ 249
Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines – Fourth State of the Nation Address of Ferdinand
Marcos
Tariga 93
…in the spirit of goodwill and friendship and because of the great value Malaysia
and the Philippines placed on ASEAN, it was agreed that diplomatic relations
between Malaysia and the Philippines would be normalised forthwith and that the
ambassadors of their respective countries would be appointed.250
Since then, diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Malaysia were
formally resumed. On August 4, 1977, during the second ASEAN summit in Kuala
Lumpur, Ferdinand Marcos concluded his claim to Sabah after he reassured the leaders of
Malaysia that he would “undertake definite steps to eliminate…[the] claim”. (Indorf
1984:25)
Foreign Policies of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
The foreign policies of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, when she assumed Office in
2001, were generally based on “three important pillars”: the preservation and enhancement
of national security; the promotion and attainment of economic security; and the protection
of rights and promotion of the welfare and interests of Filipinos overseas.251
By November
2001, through these three pillars, GMA was able to identify “The Eight Realities”252
in the
Philippines’ internal and external environment. These realities were: (1) China, Japan, and
the United States and their relationship would be a determining influence in the security
situation and economic evolution of East Asia; (2) Philippine foreign policy decisions
would have to be made in the context of ASEAN; (3) the international Islamic community
would continue to be important for the Philippines; (4) the coming years would see the
growing importance of multilateral and inter-regional organizations to promote common
interests; (5) the defense of the nation’s sovereignty and the protection of its environment
and natural resources could be carried out only to the extent that it asserts its rights over its
maritime territory and gets others to respect those rights; (6) the country’s economic policy
would continue to be friendly to both domestic and foreign direct investments; (7) the
Philippines could benefit most quickly from international tourism; and (8) overseas
250
Joint Communique of the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Cameron Highlands, 16-17 December 1969 251
Highlights of Secretary Delia Domingo Albert’s Lecture, in Alternative Views and Assessments of the
Macapagal-Arroyo Presidency and Administration: Record and Legacy (2001-2004), ed. Jose V. Abueva,
Victoria A. Bautista, Proserpina Domingo-Tapales, Ma. Oliva Z. Domingo, and Eleanor E. Nicolas (Quezon
City: University of the Philippines Press, 2004), p.197 252
Office of the President, “President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s Speech during the Manila overseas Press
Club (MOPC): ‘The President’s Night’.” (Manila: Office of the President, August 6, 2004) p. 1
Tariga 94
Filipinos would continue to be recognized for their critical role in the country’s economic
and social stability.
While the Eight Realities of Foreign Policy provided Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
“guidelines and direction”253
, the real focus of the majority of her foreign policies was the
establishment of an ‘equi-balancing’254
relationship with China and the United States.
GMA recognized the economic and military superiority of these three countries and thus
reiterated the need for the institution of diplomatic relations with them. (de Castro 2010)
This was the reason why in September 2001, GMA immediately joined U.S. President
George Bush’s ‘Coalition of the Willing’ as a manifestation of her endorsement to the
latter’s ‘war on terror’ policy; and why starting September 2004, GMA engaged in “high-
level” dialogues with China despite its increasing intrusions into the Philippines’
territories. Whereas foreign relations with Japan and China increased the possibility of
bilateral trade, thus amounting to economic growth, the diplomatic relations with the
United States provided GMA economic assistance and military security.
U.S. War on Terror Policy
Since the closure of U.S. military bases in 1992, the Philippines-U.S. security
relations significantly frayed. (McCoy 2009) This prompted Chinese incursions in the
South China Sea and the ‘negotiations over combat’ strategy in dealing with insurgency.
(Abuza 2012; McCoy 2009) After a decade, the security alliance between the Philippines
and the U.S. was repaired – a result of the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11)
attack on the United States. (Tyner 2005; McCoy 2009; Fuller 2013)
The 9/11 terrorism, while tragic, was extremely beneficial to Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. (Simon 2001) GMA “seized upon this opportunity to strengthen relations with the
United States.” (Talosig, Abueva et. al. eds. 2004:202; Simon 2001:47; de Castro
2010:360) Immediately after the attack, GMA sent a letter to U.S. President George W.
253
“Hostaged? Philippine Foreign Policy After Angelo Dela Cruz, A Public Forum, August 12, 2004, Claro
M. Recto Hall, Faculty Center, University of the Philippines-Diliman,” in Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of
Third World Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2004): 113-141 254
“Equi-balancing” is the term used by Renato Cruz de Castro (2010) in describing the relationship of a
small power such as the Philippines to a big power such as China and US. It refers to the small power’s
manipulation of circumstances to gain even disproportionate power relations with the big powers. See Renato
Cruz de Castro, “Engaging both the Eagle and the Dragon: The Philippines’ Precarious and Futile Attempt in
Equi-balancing,” Pacific Focus, Vol. XXV. No. 3 (December 2010), 356-275.
Tariga 95
Bush to express her condolences, to declare her participation to his ‘war on terror’ policy,
and to enlist to the U.S.-led ‘Coalition of the Willing.’ (Talosig, Abueva et. al. eds. 2004:
Tyner 2005; Fuller 2013) After which, she enunciated an anti-terror policy, which included
the “[making of] Philippine’s Clark Air Base and Subic port available for transiting U.S.
forces255
; the enactment…of anti-money laundering legislation; and even the [sending] of
combat troops to Afghanistan if requested by the United Nations.” (Simon 2001:48) In
November, during GMA’s state visit to Washington – a rarity for Filipino presidents –
GMA and Bush issued a joint statement “announc[ing] that the two nations would maintain
a robust defense partnership into the 21st century.” (Talosig, Abueva et. al. eds. 2004:203;
McCoy 2009:511) The U.S.-Philippines security alliance was hence officially revived.
The objectives of the revitalized Philippine-American alliance were to reinforce the
Philippines as a strong U.S. ally in Southeast Asia; to assist the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts; to support peace
process in Mindanao; to help AFP in its modernization; and to provide assistance for
political and economic development.256
With these objectives in mind, the United States
from 2001 to 2004 provided the Philippines a “sizable military and economic package,”
which included $19 million – a “down payment on a projected $4.6 billion” – in military
aid, a C-130 transport aircraft, two Point-class cutters, a Cyclone-class special-forces
landing craft, thirty UH-1H Huey helicopters, and 30,000 M-16 assault rifles. (McCoy
2009:511; de Castro 2010:361) By 2003, the military aid had already amounted to $114.46
million making the Philippines the “fourth largest recipient of US foreign military
financing.” (Talosig, Abueva et. al. eds. 2004:204) Also included in the U.S. package was
the commencement of joint Philippine-U.S. military training257
. (McCoy 2009)
255
In her speech on July 12, GMA reiterated that military alliance with the US is a “strategic asset for the
Philippines.” Her then Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes even suggested to turn Subic Bay into a “naval base
for hire” making it available to the US Navy as well as forces from other countries. See Lyall Breckon,
“Solid in Support of the US…So Far,” US-Southeast Asia Relations, Center for Strategic & International
Studies. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0103qus_seasia.pdf 256
Thomas Lum and Larry A. Niksch, “The Republic of the Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations,”
CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service (January 15, 2009) 257
Starting January 2002, U.S. dispatched around 1,700 troops to the Philippine’s southern islands of
Mindanao. These troops would conduct “training exercises” with the AFP, focusing on counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism warfare, logistics and equipment maintenance, intelligence training, and civic-military
operations. (McCoy 2009; de Castro 2010; Fuller 2013)
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In exchange for the economic and military package of the United States, GMA
enthusiastically endorsed the U.S.-led invasion258
of Iraq. (Fuller 2013) Then, on April 14,
2003, after Bush declared the war over, GMA issued Executive Order Nos. 194 and 195 to
send a humanitarian mission for Iraq’s reconstruction. However, these two measures
eventually resulted to a momentary crisis in the US-Philippine relations.
In 2004, GMA decided to withdraw the Philippine humanitarian contingent to Iraq
earlier than schedule – a decision brought by the hostage-taking incident of Angelo dela
Cruz259
, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW) in Iraq.260
Because of this, the United States
removed Philippines from its ‘Coalition of the Willing.’ This was the start of the “cooling
off” in Philippine-U.S. relations. (Tyner 2005; de Castro 2010; Fuller 2013)
A few weeks after the U.S. officially announced that the Philippines was out of the
Coalition, GMA went to China for a state visit to discuss “key areas of defense
cooperation, such as sea rescue, disaster mitigation, and exchange of training.” (de Castro
2010:363) The United States responded by formulating a comprehensive program for joint
military exercises in the Philippines that would continue up to 2009. On February 2005,
less than a year after the Angelo dela Cruz incident, U.S. resumed the joint military
exercise known as the Balikatan. This was to be conducted annually. Then, under the guise
of America’s support to AFP’s counterterrorist operations, the United States “proliferated
semi-permanent U.S. military stations and facilities throughout the littorals of Southern
Mindanao,”261
while it established a “more permanent facility in Manila”262
. The United
States took all of these measures just to “establish a prolonged and sustained cooperative
security agenda in the Philippine military,” which would eventually “ensure that the United
States of America remain as the Philippines’ only strategic ally.” (de Castro 201:365)
258
In October 2002, U.S. President Bush declared to invade and occupy Iraq as part of his war against
terrorism; combat operations started on March 2003. (Tyner 2005; Fuller 2013) 259
For a detailed background on this incident, see Ken Fuller, The Long Crisis: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and Philippine Underdevelopment (Quezon City: Flipside Publishing, 2013) 260
According to the Philippine government, the decision to pull out the Filipino humanitarian contingents to
save an OFW was in congruence with the third pillar of GMA’s foreign policy. See Kasarinlan: Philippine
Journal of Third World Studies. 261
See de Castro, p. 366 262
Ibid.
Tariga 97
China’s Claim to Spratly Islands
China’s territorial dispute with the Philippines became more noticeable in the
1990s, when the former began to assert its claims on areas within the latter’s territorial
waters. (McCoy 2009) In 1992, China promulgated a territorial law claiming a large
portion of the South China Sea. (de Castro 2010) In 1995, it seized and constructed
military outposts on Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef, a feature of the long-disputed
Spratly Islands263
. (Abuza 2012) These intrusions and assertions into the Philippine
jurisdictional claims caused a rift in the Sino-Philippine relations which was founded in the
1970s.
In 1996, China started to reestablish, albeit “low-key,” political and diplomatic ties
with the Philippines. When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took Office in 2001, a more fluid
security, sociocultural, and most especially, economic cooperation was already in place. In
June 2002, GMA furthered this alliance by issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 148
which declared June 9 of every year as “Philippine-China Friendship Day.” As for the
territorial dispute, GMA initiated to the leaders of the ASEAN countries the creation of a
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” to maintain the status quo
in Southeast Asia. (Weatherbee 2009:147-8)
In early September 2004, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo went to China for a three-day
state visit and high-level dialogues with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao, and chairman of the Central Military Commission, Jiang Zemin. During the
meeting, GMA discussed with the leaders of China the possibility of a bilateral joint
exploration and development of the Spratly Islands. (Weatherbee 2009:147) The
discussions resulted to the signing of the “Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic
Undertaking on Certain Areas in the South China Sea” (JMSU).264
According to GMA,
this Agreement was a “diplomatic breakthrough for peace and security in the region.” In
263
For a brief history on the Sino-Philippine dispute on Spratly Islands, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, Philippines-
China Security Relations: Current Issues and Emerging Concerns (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for
Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012) pp. 22-5 264
The China National Offshore Oil Corp and the Philippine National Oil Company signed the Agreement on
September 1, 2004. On March 14 2005, Vietnam’s PETROVIETNAM was joined into the Agreement. See
Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009) pp. 147-8.
Tariga 98
August 2005, the Sino-Philippines (along with Vietnam) joint marine seismic survey of the
South China Sea was initialized. It was expected to be completed by 2008.
GMA’s trip to China, aside from coming into an Agreement regarding the disputed
Spratly Islands, also led to the signing of a number of economic accords, one of which was
an agreement to increase bilateral trade to $20 billion within five years. (Fuller 2013) Since
2000, the trade between Philippines had increased to an average rate of more than 35%
annually. (Wong, Er, Yaqing, and Mu eds. 2013:281) In 2001, bilateral trade between the
Philippines and China had increased by 41%; while in 2003, bilateral trade went up to $9.4
billion, an increase of 78.7%. (de Castro 2010:362) But in 2006, in the aftermath of the
GMA’s 2004 visit, the bilateral trade amounted to $23.4 billion. In 2009, it went up to
$20.5 billion; and in 2010, the trade between China and the Philippines reached $27.7
billion. (de Castro 2010; Wong, Er, Yaqing, and Mu eds. 2013)
With such figures, China had become the third largest trade partner of the Philippines after
U.S. and Japan.
Since GMA’s visit in 2004, the bilateral relationship between the Philippines and
China had been significantly progressive specifically in the area of trade and industry.
However, the Sino-Philippines relation was weak in terms of defense ties. (Banlaoi 2007)
So on November 7, 2004, following the effects of the cold treatment of U.S. to the
Philippines due to the Angelo dela Cruz incident, GMA sent her then Defense Secretary
Avelino Cruz, Jr. to China. Secretary Cruz’s assignment was to attend a one-week meeting
with his Chinese counterpart to discuss the proposal for more military exchanges between
the People’s Liberation Army of China and the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the
setting of a consultation mechanism between the military departments of the two countries;
the enhancement of cooperation against terrorism and other internal security threats; and
the holding of a joint exercise. (de Castro 2010) The 7-day affair eventually led to the
signing of a “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defense cooperation” between
China and the Philippines.
On May 22, 2005, under the framework of the MOU, GMA hosted the “first ever”
Philippine-China Annual Defense and Security Dialogue. During the Dialogue, China
proposed a “military exchange program between their armed forces” and a joint naval
exercise, particularly in the area of search and rescue operations. Also, GMA received a
Tariga 99
$1.2 million donation of military engineering equipment. (Banlaoi 2007:245) The 3-day
Dialogue ended with the signing of a protocol agreement to hold annual defense and
security talks between China and the Philippines. (Banlaoi 2007:246)
With the signing of the new defense protocol, plus the bilateral trade agreements,
the Sino-Philippine relationship became sturdier. And this was the case from 2001 up to
2008. (de Castro 2010)
In 2001, the foreign relations between the two countries were already promising.
When GMA had a temporary fallout with the United States in 2004, the Sino-Philippine
bilateral relationship became even more progressive and dynamic. (Banlaoi 2007) Even
Chinese President Hu Jintao acknowledged this unprecedented development.265
However,
in 2009, the Philippines-China relationship began to deteriorate. This was primarily266
brought by China’s reversion to its intrusive methods in its territorial claims. According to
Clive Schofield and Ian Storey (2009),
…China has reverted to a more assertive posture in consolidating its jurisdictional
claims, expanding its military reach and seeking to undermine the claims of other
states through coercive diplomacy. Examples of China’s renewed hard line include
increased naval patrols in the South China Sea, pressure on foreign oil corporations
to cease operations in contested waters, the establishment of administrative units to
oversee claims to Paracel and Spratly Islands, the unilateral imposition of fishing
bans, and the asperity of its responses to the outer continental shelf submissions to
the United Nations by other claimants. (2009:1)
When Chinese government began to physically manifest its assertion over the
Philippine jurisdictional claims, it became evident that the Sino-Philippines diplomatic
relationship was collapsing. On March 10, 2009, GMA responded to China’s intrusive
policies by signing Republic Act No. 9522 or the Philippine Baseline Act, “reiterating the
Philippine’s claim on its territorial waters and declaring the extension of its sovereignty
over its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.” (de Castro 2010) China replied by
gradually deploying seven patrol vessels in the disputed areas in the Spratly Islands within
265
“Address of His Excellency, President Hu Jintao,” Record of Plenary Proceedings: Joint Session of
Congress, 13th
Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, April 27, 2005, pp. 130-3 266
The other reason for the China-Philippines fallout was the controversies surrounding GMA’s foreign
policies with China including the JMSU, the National Broadband deal or the ZTE-NBN, and the North Rail
Project. For details, see Renato Cruz de Castro, Pacific focus.
Tariga 100
the territorial claims of the Philippines. Henceforth, a worsening foreign relationship
between China and the Philippines became apparent.
Comparative Analysis
Ferdinand Marcos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had the same underlying theme in
dealing with their foreign affairs - - national security. With Marcos, national security was
always in relation with the outbreak of communism. With GMA, when it came to foreign
affairs, national security concern took the form of terrorism. These issues – communism
and terrorism – became the core of the two presidents’ major foreign policies.
Ferdinand Marcos’ important foreign policies were initiated by the war in Vietnam.
This country’s internal conflict resulting from the rise of communism served as Ferdinand
Marcos’ catalyst in establishing foreign relations not only with Vietnam267
, but also with
other Asian countries, and especially with the United States.
In the process of establishing foreign relations, Marcos became very strategic. First,
Marcos reconnected diplomatic ties with the Malaysian government on June 3, 1966. This
gave the impression that Marcos had numbers in his Asian alliance, an important aspect
which the United States needed in its participation in the Vietnam War (Bonner 1987).
Then, he expressed his willingness to join the War on Vietnam by signing Republic Act
No. 4664 on June 18, 1966, notwithstanding his strong opposition to it when he was still in
Senate and during his presidential campaign. On July 20, Marcos signed the Mata-
Westmoreland Agreement, which was a working military agreement between the
Philippines and the United States specifying the task of PHILCAG in the Vietnam War.268
On September 14, 1966, he monitored the establishment of PHILCAG in South Vietnam
before he went to Washington to deliver the news to the American President. In his visit to
Washington, Marcos, as a manifestation of his initiative in supporting America’s policy,
also invited the U.S. President to a SEATO-ANZUS Summit to discuss the Vietnam War.
When he returned to the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos brought with him pledges of $31
million in settlement of Philippine veteran’s claims, $3.5 million for the Special Education
267
See M. Ragos-Espinas, “Philippine-Vietnam Relations: A Preliminary Study,” eds. Benito Lim and Maria
Teresa R. Melgar, Asian Studies, Vol. No. 33 (Quezon City: Asian Center, 1997) pp. 59-60 268
For a more detailed history on the Vietnam War, see Stanley Robert Larsen and James Lawton Collins, Jr.
Vietnam Studies: Allied Participation in Vietnam. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985.
Tariga 101
Fund, and $45 million in economic assistance and 10 engineering battalions (men and
equipment), which Marcos used for his rice and infrastructure programs. (Bonner 1987:53
Gleeck 1993:333)
In 1967, Marcos co-founded the ASEAN. While the purpose of this Organization
was to promote peace and political security in the region by settling border disputes,
ASEAN became a stage for Ferdinand Marcos to stress his anti-communism stance.
(Spence 1969) By becoming the Asian forefront of U.S. in its anti-communism policy,
Marcos was designated by the U.S. President as his “right arm in Asia,” a move that made
Marcos more popular among Filipinos. (Celoza 1997:102) Moreover, because of
Ferdinand Marcos’ stand on communism, he was able to collect staggering amounts of
economic assistance and approved military aid. (Bonner 1987; Seagrave 1988) From 1970
to 1972 alone, Marcos had acquired $135.5 million of economic assistance; while from
1967 to 1972, he had collected $151.9 million in military aid. (Steinmetz 1984: 155-6)
From 1970 to 1972, Ferdinand Marcos’ anti-communism approach became more
significant to him, especially when he declared martial law. Because of his claims that the
lawlessness and the violence in the Philippines were caused by communists, the Americans
not only sanctioned Marcos’ declaration, they also provided him economic and military
assistance that were supposed to be used to suppress the communism outbreak. (Bonner
1987; Celoza 1991) Instead, these economic and military aids were used to maintain his
hold on the AFP and to promote a culture of patronage within the Philippine political
arena, especially during the Martial Law.269
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s foreign policies particularly with the United States was
founded by the 9/11 attack. Similar to Ferdinand Marcos’ reaction to U.S. anti-communist
policy, GMA proclaimed immediately her enthusiastic support to the ‘War on Terror’
policy. As such, GMA was rewarded with economic and military assistance packages.
269
For a more detailed information on how Ferdinand Marcos used U.S. aid in patronage politics during
Martial Law, see Albert F. Celoza. Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of
Authoritarianism. USA: Praeger Publishers, 1997. For an interesting view on the foreign policy of Ferdinand
Marcos, see Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy.
New York: Times Books, 1987.
Tariga 102
(McCoy 2009; de Castro 2010; Fuller 2013) However, also similar to Marcos, these
packages were grossly misused. (McCoy 2009)
While there were truths to the threats of terrorism and insurgency in the Philippines
during her administration (Abuza 2012), GMA’s policy initiatives on the ‘war on terror’
had profound domestic ramifications. Alfred W. McCoy (2009) summarized these
ramifications,
Washington’s global war on terrorism provided GMA with an infusion of military
aid, revitalizing the state’s security apparatus and providing her with diplomatic
support in the face of both international criticism and domestic opposition.
The millions in military aid and thousands of American troops that followed over
the next eight years served to shore up Arroyo’s shaky administration, checking
Islamic rebels in the south, strengthening her ties to the armed forces, and assuring
U.S. diplomatic support against her domestic rivals.
She used her renewed U.S. security alliance to partisan advantage, courting allies
within the military and unleashing a clandestine assassination campaign against her
left-wing opponents. (2009:499,511,512)
America was not the only country that GMA allied with to fight terrorism and
insurgency. In the “cool off” period between Philippines and the United States, GMA
turned to China, and launched the First Philippines-China Defense and Security Dialogue
in May 2005. However, like her U.S. relations, GMA’s foreign policies with China had
domestic consequence and implication:
Beijing offered Manila $3 million for the establishment of a Chinese language-
training program for the Philippine military, donated engineering equipment, and
invited the Philippines to participate in naval exercises. Moreover, in the midst of
stern U.S. criticism of the withdrawal of the Philippine medical team from Iraq,
President Arroyo signed a confidential protocol with China on the exploitation of
South China Sea resources. With her presidency in dire straits, Arroyo will gladly
accept more largesse from Beijing.270
270
Dana Dillon, “Crisis in the Philippines: What does it mean for the U.S.?”, The Heritage Foundation Web
Memo. (18 July 2005) 799
CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion and Recommendation
Presidential leadership is the composite of the authorities and leadership styles that
the President uses to influence – by either persuasion or coercion – individuals or
institutions that are necessary for the achievement and the success of any of his objectives.
The study of the rise of authoritarianism through presidential leadership is an
understanding of how the President uses his authorities in the process of concentrating and
centralizing power. This study discussed the legal authorities of the President that provided
the legal basis for his exertion of influence over the power blocs and major political
institutions of the society.
Summary and Implications
Every chapter of the study determines a particular authority of the President and
identifies which political institution is directly affected by this authority. In Chapter 2 the
President’s power to supervise and control the executive machineries of the government,
i.e. the national bureaucracy and the local governments, was explored. Chapter 3 discussed
the constitutional authority of the President to address the Congress and recommend policy
initiatives. In Chapter 4, the military powers of the President were analyzed; while in
Chapter 5, the authority of the President to establish foreign affairs was scrutinized.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 identified the key institutions that are considered as the power
blocs of a democratic society: the bureaucracy and the local government units, the
legislative body, and the most important and integral institution in a democracy, the
opposition. These three chapters focused on how the President concentrates power by
influencing those institutions. Meanwhile, Chapter 5 discussed on how the President
maintains the concentration of power once it is achieved.
In Chapter 2, the overall situation of the country when the two presidents assumed
Office was explored. This was necessary to determine how effectively they used the
authority to supervise and control their executive machineries to implement their programs
Tariga 104
for the government. For both presidents, aside from the assertive authority of supervision
and control, two other factors were considered: the structure of the government and the
pre-existing political culture.
The structure of the government of the Philippines made the two executive
machineries, the national bureaucracy and the local governments, to have a strong regard
for the President. The culture that persists within Philippine’s politics, on the other hand,
nourishes the centralization and concentration of power in the Office of the Chief
Executive. This combination of governmental structure and political culture results to a
form of governance which developed a paternalistic attitude of reliance and dependency
upon the central government as dispenser of privilege and favor.
For both Ferdinand Marcos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, this tripartite
mechanism of influence – legal authority, government structure, and political culture – was
a recipe for success. Success at this point refers to the full utilization of the bureaucratic
offices (both funds and personnel) and the local executives. Being able to use the
bureaucracy and the local chief executives at the president’s discretion is the first step in
concentrating power. For example, Marcos’ use of bureaucratic discretionary funds to
directly finance the projects of the local chief executives deprived the members of the
Congress from practicing their long culture of personalism with their constituents. GMA’s
influence on most of the metropolitan mayors to deny the issuance of rally permits
contributed to the failure of the opposition to remove her from office.
The authority to supervise and control the executive machineries had a two-part
effect. It concentrates the power inherent to the bureaucracy and the local governments;
and with this power, the president would have the capability to concentrate the power of
the other institutions. This would be evident in Congress, especially when a congressman
seeks patronage. (Coronel, et. al. 2004) In any case, having the power of the bureaucracy
and the local governments would eventually prove to be useful in concentrating power.
In Chapter 3, it was seen that the authority of the President over the Congress relied
more on persuasion than assertiveness. This is in congruence with Neustadt’s (1960)
concept of presidential power as the power to persuade. Here, presidents are expected to do
much more than their authority allows them to do. Thus, persuasion and bargaining
Tariga 105
becomes the means that the president uses to influence policies. This is where the full
control of the bureaucracy comes at play.
For both GMA and Marcos, this was true, but only up to a certain extent. There was
still the incomplete influence. For example, in Ferdinand Marcos’ case, the incomplete
influence was a product of multiple interconnected factors. One of these was the economic
status of the members of the Congress. When Marcos became President, most of the
members of the Congress were provincial aristocrats (Thompson 1995). Their rise to
power was a result of the traditional relationship of “mutual aid” between a more
“prosperous patron” and a poorer “dependent clients”. (Lande 1965) These patron, in
return, became “highly responsive” to the “particularistic demands” of their voting clients.
Political survival, therefore, depended on the voters and not on Marcos personally.
Moreover, Marcos’ move to award discretionary funds directly to the local
governments as a part of his infrastructure and community development program
minimized the local officials’ dependence upon the political brokers in the legislative
branch. (Shantz 1972:148) This move reduced the quality and quantity of the clientelist
relation between the Congress and the local officials who had proven to be useful in the
reelection of the members of the Congress. (Timberman 1991)
The lack of his own, and the removal of the Congress’, bargaining tool,
consequently, caused Marcos’ influence on the Legislature to suffer from completion. With
crises arising from the 1969 election controversies provoking mass discontent, even some
of the members of the Congress belonging to his NP began to shift allegiances. (Bonner
1987; Gleeck 1993) Absolute influence was never established, thus resulting to executive-
legislative deadlocks.
GMA suffered the same fate. With the consistent effort either to impeach her or to
investigate her bureaucracy, it instantly became evident that there was an imperfect
influence.
Chapter 4, national defense, studied the events that led to the climax of the process
of concentrating power. Here, the identification of the socio-political condition was given
priority. According to Dan Slater (2010), authoritarianism is the product of different
patterns of situations or “contentious politics.” The determination of whether the president
Tariga 106
was able to concentrate power in the presence of these situations was the focus of this
chapter.
One of the indicators of a working democracy is the presence of an opposition.
(Shapiro 1996) The absence of which, or its oppression, is simply the antithesis of
democracy. Marcos’ use of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief effectively
concentrated power and authority in his Office. Through this, not only did Marcos resolve
his issue on the incomplete influence on Congress (by first, arresting his political
opponents, and then, abolishing the Congress), he was also able to cease mass movements
that were resisting his plan of governance. With the lack of opposition in his regime,
Marcos’ issuance of Proclamation No. 1081, or the declaration of Martial Law, formally
ended democracy.
While it was clear that following Ferdinand Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081,
democracy digressed into a dictatorship, this was not the case with Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo.
GMA found a perfect recipe for silencing her opposition while still functioning
under a democracy. Her CPR, her two States of Rebellion, Proclamation No. 1017, all
were used to prevent oppositions to her presidency. Even without actually declaring
martial law on a national scope, military repression became evident. (McCoy 2009) As
such, unlike Marcos, GMA was able to maintain an “idea” of a democracy while
concentrating and centralizing power in actuality.
In Chapter 5, Foreign Affairs, the focus was on the foreign policies of the two
presidents which were used to maintain the concentration of power. For both Ferdinand
Marcos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, much emphasis was given to their foreign relations
with the United States. This was due to the economic and foreign assistance that U.S. was
providing for the two presidents. These assistance, were in turn, used by Marcos and GMA
to maintain military support. For both presidents, the armed forces became paramount for
the continuance of their regimes. Marcos used his military for the extension of his term;
GMA used hers for the stability of her troubled presidency. To be able to sustain and
preserve their relationship with the armed forces, both presidents did not only use the
Tariga 107
bureaucracy as compensation, they also diverted the assistance provided mostly by the
United States, as a form of remuneration.
Conclusion
All of these chapters had been committed to answering the specific questions
presented in the beginning of the study. Every chapter outlined the social, political, and
economic situations during the administration of the presidents in question. Each chapter
also determined the responses of Ferdinand Marcos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to those
situations. There was always a degree of concentration of power while both presidents
were dealing with the crises during their incumbencies. On the problem of economic
solvency, a certain amount of sternness was applied by both presidents particularly to their
bureaucracies. On political and social crises, on the other hand, a greater thrust towards
their immediate resolution was preferred by the two presidents.
As for the parallelism on the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos and Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, a few things could be observed. Foremost was the similarity in their
economic situations when they first came into office; both had the problem of economic
depression, thus, both became focused on implementing a platform of governance based on
fixing the economy. Both presidents also had the problem of incomplete influence over the
Congress, a crisis affecting not only Marcos’ and GMA’s policy initiatives, but their
political stability as well. Moreover, both presidents were plagued with social unrests
culminating from legitimacy issues especially during their second terms. Both evidently
resulted to using extreme force to solve the problems at hand.
The presidencies of Ferdinand Marcos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo were not
effected without severe consequences. This is because, more than a political doctrine set
into practice, Marcos’ and GMA’s authoritarian styles of leadership became a decision-
making process of maintaining authority and power within the Office. Their leadership
styles in resolving crises became an extreme leadership technique of applying influence
Tariga 108
over the State and the Government. (Celoza 1997; Seagrave 1988; McCoy 2009;
Pangalangan, Ramraj & Thiruvengadam eds. 2010).
Four decades had passed and a couple of constitutional changes transpired after
Marcos explored the vast powers of the President provided by the 1935 Constitution.
However, time had not effaced, or at least diluted, the strength of the President’s authority.
With the 1972 Constitution, though the President was regarded as a mere symbolic Head of
the State, it was clear that President Marcos still possessed the legal authority he needed to
continuously hold the political and administrative powers (Cariño 1992: 78; Fernandez
1977). Even the 1987 Constitution, which was proposed to re-democratize the country
after Marcos dictatorship, had not limited the powers of the President. Though provisions
were made to provide impediments on the President’s exercise of authority, such as the
provision on declaring Martial Law, same constitutional powers are afforded to the
President (Bernas 2007). As a result, same issues on the executive and administrative
orders, foreign loans, political relations, and military administrations had affected the
people (Pangalangan, Ramraj & Thiruvengadam eds. 2010; McCoy 2009).
Recommendations
This study had been limited to two presidents due to time and material constraints.
Since common variables had already been outlined, future comparative studies using other
presidents would further establish the concept of authoritarianism within a democracy.
Also, this study had been mostly concerned with the Constitutional authorities of
the president, which were inherently authoritarian. Further study of other non-
constitutional legal authorities of the president which could be used to influence other
significant institutions – such as political parties and interest groups – is thus encouraged.
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