Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain

Annual Conference

New College, Oxford

1 - 3 April 2016

Towards an educational theory of radicalisation Dr Stijn Sieckelinck

Utrecht University

s.m.a.sieckelinck@uu.nl

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Radicalisation, even if it may not always produce societal violence, destroys (often young) lives, bring families to despair and leave professionals behind in defeat. Hence it is not only a security issue but also a socialization issue par excellence: it usually refers to young people in full development, looking for their place in society. This contribution intends to show how, judged from a pedagogical perspective, radicalisation tolerates no one-dimensional approach. The process of radicalization can be considered both a (response to a) crisis in education and an opportunity to grow political consciousness. Where black and white thinking is typical to the radical mind-set, it is a challenge to radicalisation researchers not to limit one’s analyses to black or white viewpoints. This contribution presents some insights from almost ten years of teaching and research into radicalization of youth, a largely underrepresented field in social and educational research. A remarkable dearth, as open democracies inherently bear the possibility of political and religious radicalisation. Historically, miscellaneous ideologies have been labelled radical, of which the most discussed are: ultra-right-wing nationalism, animal right activism, left-wing anarchism, and Islamist fascism. A common element in all these narratives is the refusal to live by the laws of constitutional democracy. Whereas all these strands have been subject to academic investigation in the past, the series of unsuccessful revolutions in the Middle East (euphemistically called the Arab Spring) brought unprecedented momentum into those parts of the world that many young citizens in our countries - by birth and/or identification with the underdog (see below) - feel affinity with. The alleged interference of the Western powers (either assumed or proven) gave an enormous sweep to the already disgruntled youths looking for a way to alter the course of their lives, by resisting the Western neo-colonial, neoliberal and secular world design. This accumulation of local and global dynamics resulted into the (among radicals highly anticipated) establishment of Islamic State, catering mainly for Muslims who feel like their religion is under threat, yet grown into a fascistic society with its own territory and legislation, cleansing the territory from every presence or reference to other worldviews, religions, or traditions. Confronted with previously unknown high numbers of youth leaving for the violent Jihad in the Levant, policy makers in all Western countries are giving educational institutions a central position in their public safety agenda against extremism (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2015), causing all kinds of practical and philosophical complications. Deconstructing and reconsidering the definition of radicalisation for educational purposes, analysing the different dimensions of this growing landscape, and reflecting upon possible counter-practices, this contribution makes an attempt to draw out the philosophical questions of educating against extremism and explores whether we are in need of a pedagogy1 of radicalisation.

1 Unlike its use on the European continent, the term ‘pedagogical’ in English has a narrower, classroom-bound meaning. The European equivalent ‘pedagogisch’ (Dutch) or pädagogisch (German) has its roots in the continental philosophical

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A contested concept As noted above, the recent sequence of civil uprisings in the Arab world and its echoes in the heads and actions of Western youth, predominantly with a migrant background, have attracted a hitherto unseen amount of interest in youth’s radicalisation by scholars and practitioners alike. Among professionals and officials, the concept of radicalisation is usually understood as a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2009). Radicalisation is, more specifically, understood by many as the process in which a person becomes increasingly hateful towards a part of society and anyone who defends the status quo. At the same time the term ‘radicalisation’ should never be taken for granted in any context. This can be illustrated by considering the differences between the definitions of the Secret Services of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (see also Borum, 2011). The principal difference concerns the use of the term ‘terrorism’. In the UK version, radicalisation leads practically straight to (support for) terrorism, whereas in the Dutch version, terrorism is one of the means or a strategy that could eventually be used by someone who is currently going through a process of radicalisation. This difference in definitions relates to the difference between radicalisation that funnels and results in violence on the one hand, and radicalisation that, although usually very annoying or unpleasant for its direct environment, remains non-violent in character on the other hand. Bartlett and Miller (2012) defend an elaborate view of the difference between violent and non-violent extremism, that it’s not what people say or think, but whether they commit violent acts that counts. This difference is very important, since only a miniscule minority of individuals with radical opinions turns to terror (Dearey, 2009; Bartlett & Birdwell, 2010). Nevertheless, even if not all radicalisation leads to extremist actions or terror, all terrorism appears to be caused by a form of radicalisation. The link between the concepts of radicalisation and terrorism is therefore logical and deserves caution at the same time.

Whilst from a professional perspective, the need for insights and tools to counter radicalisation is legitimate and tangible, from a philosophical view we should be wary of using the concept of radicalisation too easily. The term is derived from the Latin word ‘radix’ or roots. Radicalisation then is the movement of someone going back to the roots. But this needs not result into violence. Several researchers have warned against a too facile use of the term radicalisation. The process we call radicalisation is, according to Mandel (2009) ‘relative, evaluative and subjective’. He suggests that becoming radical is not merely a matter of being extreme, and in fact, is always in comparison with something, such as the law or tradition. Another implication is that, according to Sedgwick (2010), the concept of radicalisation focuses on individuals, and to a lesser extent on the group and ideology, omitting the wider circumstances and possible root causes. In Kundnani’s (2014) analysis of the concept, the notion of

tradition, and refers to the entire business of rearing children – educational, cognitive, social, emotional – in family, school, and society (De Winter, 2012).

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radicalisation is seen as having undergone a multitude of remarkable transformations since its birth, mainly in the direction of practical usefulness in order to prevent violent extremism. (p. 14-35). A particular powerful critique is that the young people we call at risk of so-called radicalisation actually are not going back to their roots, instead they break with every tradition to cultivate a version of Islam that is free of any cultural embedding. Olivier Roy (2014) finds in the modern disconnection between faith communities and socio-cultural identities a fertile space for fundamentalism to grow: “Instead of freeing the world from religion, secularization has encouraged a kind of holy ignorance to take root, an anti-intellectualism that promises immediate, emotional access to the sacred and positions itself in direct opposition to contemporary pagan culture.” Many radical youth are found at the margins of their religious and ethnic communities. Usually, parents have no clue and are fearful of their offspring’s ideas. This observation is important as it may indicate that Jihadi’s who turn to extremism should better not be called ‘radical’, as they are not reinterpreting a lost tradition, no matter how hard they try to reclaim a lost Prophet’s tradition in their propaganda. Is there any alternative term we can use? Paulo Freire, in his preface to his seminal work ‘The Pedagogy of the Oppressed’(1970) makes a pivotal distinction between the radical and the ‘sectarian’: On one side, there is radicalization. Radicalization, nourished by a critical spirit, is always creative… [it] criticizes and thereby liberates. On the other side, there is sectarianism. Sectarianism, fed by fanaticism, is always castrating… [it] mythicizes and thereby alienates (p37). The pedagogy of the oppressed… is a task for radicals; it cannot be carried out by sectarians.” (p39) From this it follows that young Jihadi’s actions fit more within a scheme of sectarianism than radicalism. This critique shows that, whereas the concept of radicalisation is practically relevant, it is not entirely without problems. It is even, in Gallies (1956) words, essentially contested, which is probably a positive label in this context, as radicalisation is closely related with the political sphere. Having deconstructed the concept of radicalisation, is there a way to reconsider the definition for educational purposes? According to a recent study, radicalisation occurs: When a child or adolescent starts to develop political or religious ideas and agency that are so fundamentally at odds with the educational environment or mainstream expectations that the pedagogical or educational relationship is increasingly put at stake. This definition was constructed in an attempt to be more attentive to the meaning experienced by actors in an educational environment (youth and teachers alike), (adapted from AUTHORS OWN, Kaulingfreks & De Winter, 2015). On a theoretical note, it certainly adds a pedagogical flavour to the aforementioned, more security-oriented, definitions. Again this shows that defining radicalisation deserves on-going discussion. Typologies and journeys

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The question ‘who are the radicals?’ puzzles researchers to this day. For decades, there was an almost general consensus that terrorists are normal persons like you and me. Notably Silke (2008) in his forensic research found no pathogenic, pathological profile that sets the very few people who engage into terrorism apart from the general public who refrain from it. His findings can be seen as an empirical corroboration of Arendt’s ‘Banality of Evil’-these, developed by the latter following the trials of Nazi-official Eichmann. Recently, this consensus has come under pressure. In a study by Weenink (2015) it is concluded from police files in the Dutch database that more than half of the foreign fighters suffer from what he calls ‘psycho-social’ problems. At least 20 percent shows severe disorders of conduct or has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, autism, or psychosis. However, methodologically, it remains unclear to what extent these individuals can be labelled as such, given the fact that the researcher was not allowed to look into their medical files. The biggest problem with this paradigm however is that the criminal behaviour is assumed as an indication of individual psychopathology which makes every rebellious behaviour a sign of psychosocial disorder. This study risks putting the cart before the horse by suggesting that mad acts are produced by mad minds, drawing from a simple causality-scheme to explain complex deviant behaviour. Nevertheless, more and more researchers see this work as an invitation to attack Silke’s claim of normality by looking into the pathological character of the radical subjects. As yet, this discussion is far from settled. If we were to build a profile of the foreign fighter, we would soon find out that the diversity is larger than commonly expected. New realities emerge very quick and are almost unpredictable. Before the Islamic State was declared, the motivation of the leadership figures had a well-founded, even ethical character. But soon followed in their wake an assembly of fellow travellers, hungry adventurers, often naive and crazy about arms. The intensification of the military struggle seems to have brought a shift in the type of youngster who travel. Young people who were in the past involved in criminal activities, discover a new market for their delinquent lifestyle in the Caliphate. Or as a colleague and convert entrusted: "Actually there are two types of conversions today: You convert to Islam or you can turn to jihad." The first requires study, dedication and patience; the latter a deep-seated discontent, desire for violence, and a rogue state in development. Of course, we already knew that ideals often don’t turn out positively, especially in the minds of young people, who are known for wanting to die or kill for the wrong causes. But seizing the violent Jihad as the next chapter in an already battered life that is dominated by crime, drugs and a lack of prospects seems to have little to do with striving for a better world. The hardening of the battle in the Levant may have changed the nature of extremism itself. Were we already unsettled by the first, by ideals fed, anger, then the second, by the desire for violence fed variant confronts us with an even bigger puzzle. To get the pieces right, it pays to look at material conditions and predicaments, as well as spiritual and moral questions underlying the motives for joining radical environments. Most importantly, as radicalising youth are in adolescence, which is naturally a phase of big transitions, a credible typology starts from this dynamic reality, rather than from static categories. Grouped by their prevailing ‘leitmotiv’, a recent study (Sieckelinck & De Winter, 2015) reports the following ‘journeys’:

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1. Being pushed away: pushed away from problems in the family and/ or neighbourhood, a polarized environment, experienced lack of emotional support. Pushed towards a surrogate family, towards authority figures with ideals that seem to give an answer to tensions and insecurities. Eventually, de-radicalisation is set into motion because the person has had enough of the hatred, the negativism, and the common violence in such movements. 2. Being pulled towards: pulled towards the magnetic force of extremist movements. Growing up in a warm and stable family context. Intelligent, ambitious youngsters, with a strong emotional response to injustice. A desire for depth, meaning and a clear goal in life. Because the family cannot meet this specific need, these persons break away and find a new destination in the radical movement. Ultimately, de-radicalisation is often triggered by boredom or sudden insight into the hypocrisy of the extremist organisation. 3. Passionate personalities: certain youngsters are drawn to special and extreme challenge, of whatever nature. Family and social environment cannot fulfil their powerful desires for which they will go to extremes. For example, such individuals are known to have memorized religious or ideological books word by word. In the end, de-radicalisation starts with dissatisfaction about the simplified content of these studies and of the extremist ideal.

What connects these three journeys is a deranged quest for identity. In very different ways, every ‘radical’ is in an obsessive search for meaning: what is my role in life, where do I belong, what does really matter to me? Where the debate over ethnic, religious and political identity in society is intensified, the search for identity development can more easily derail among young people. And what the family context or larger society cannot provide in this sense is provided for by the radical groups: a clear sense of identity, a secure hold, a clear purpose and a sense of belonging. These three journeys may allow us to think beyond homogeneous checklists as forms of risk assessment. Plus they convincingly demonstrate that if researchers don’t take the dynamics and differences into account, they risk making the same mistake as their participants once did: pinning people down on one of the many aspects of their complex identities. In his study of social movements, the sociologist Manuel Castells (1997/2010) distinguishes three types of identities that are directly connected with the meaning we give to and gain from being in the world. First, there is the legitimating identity, secondly the resistance identity, thirdly, the project identity. The first identity is built with blocks of established institutions, the second withdraws into the trenches and enters opposition to the status quo, the third criticizes the institutions in order to participate in better institutions. Already in the nineties Castells designated violent jihadists as a prototype of the resistance identity. These groups manage to reach young people who are disappointed by the institutions (which often have problems with this group)

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and take them into a 'perfect storm' by the combination of global Internet mobilization and the promise that they offer the only global alternative worldview and revolutionary, though politically ultra-conservative, practice. Security vs Socialization Research in the landscape where intelligence and security meet education is extremely scarce and what is out there is preliminary and hypothetical. When radicalisation first appeared on the international policy and research agendas, it was almost exclusively understood as a security issue, demanding more specialised judicious and criminological expertise (San, AUTHORS OWN & De Winter, 2013; Glees, 2015). Nowadays policy makers and researchers consider the social domain more and more important in countering violent extremism (Veenkamp & Zeigler, 2015). Therefore, the recent impact of political and religious radicalisation on our societies has generated a search for effective preventative interventions in the social and educational domain. But what can be expected from teachers and youth professionals? Security and Intelligence services have a well-defined role: by approaching young people with radical ideas as at least suspect and – since anti-terrorism legislation was passed unequivocally – even as guilty before charges, they track down youngsters who dare to show any active sympathy with a radical political or religious discourse that may hamper the democratic status quo. In a reaction to the tendency of approaching young sympathisers for jihad as criminals, an important group of scholars has explored an –until then- overlooked dimension in times of ‘war on terror’: the victimisation of young people leaving for jihad. Illustrative are the well-received publications by Weine et al. (2009) and Weine (2012). Pedagogically speaking, judging adolescents for their subversive views or activities is highly contested, as young persons, to successfully negotiate the transition from childhood to the adult world, have to perform an array of developmental tasks in which the status quo is never sacred (Erikson, 1968 ; Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009 ). Many young people explore modes of engaging with radical and alternative perspectives when grappling with identity issues. While adolescents already face many transitions in various domains of life (friendships, identity and in their families), ‘ a crucial time of flux follows when they begin to take a view on international events and on their own socio-political identity’ (Bhui et al ., 2012 ). This developmental dimension somewhat corrects the static nature of both the victim- and the villain-approach. What’s more is that not only the villain-perspective, but the victim-perspective as well is deeply problematic for educationalists as it overlooks the fact that the people involved are active agents themselves. These agents may actively decide that they do not want to belong to a certain group. People construct, maintain and transform their identities actively. The portrayal of radical youngsters as vulnerable city children brainwashed by malign recruiters or the frequently found reference to ‘bumping into the wrong friends’ somewhat dismisses this active dimension. While intelligence investigators look primarily for suspects, teachers aim to educate and transform their students. Although there may be an overlap somewhere, these goals are clearly distinctive. The difference is best illustrated by the way both domains approach radical youth. Intelligence and security services cannot but approach them as suspect and dangerous, whereas

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educational institutions approach their students at least as worthy of education, which in Biesta’ s view (2015 ) consists in socialisation, qualification and individuation. In this light, society’ s inclination to come after these young people with a repressive agenda from the first indicator on appears problematic if not all available educational cards have been played. This reflex characterises what Ben-Porath (2006 ) has called a belligerent society, in which education is reduced to an instrument for public safety. A thriving democracy, Ben-Porath argues, requires expansive education, in particular when public safety is at issue. When landscapes of security, intelligence and education start to shift, this may reduce educational possibilities to counter radicalisation unless a feasible educational outlook is developed that can inspire professionals, citizens and families to deal with the early stages of radicalisation. This outlook is very welcome as educational professionals are increasingly confronted with radicalisation-related challenges. Not only are educational institutions increasingly expected to signal deviant behaviour of pupils and arrange follow-up trajectories in case someone is flagged. Moreover, schools feel an obligation to respond to highly media covered extremist events and reassure their pupils in the wake of attacks or in enduring conflict. Finally, teachers are frequently confronted with pupil’s polarized opinions and conspiracies about collective identities and global politics. This democratic deficit presents a huge challenge to schools and societies. Towards a pedagogy of radicalisation2 Now that the questions regarding definition, typologies, and the socialization dimension are presented, one may ask: what educational strategy is defendable? From the arguments in the last section it follows that the goal of our education cannot be that students will learn to keep quiet on issues that seem important to them. Osler (2009) argues that we need to recognise these pupils as ‘ emergent cosmopolitan citizens living in an age of globalization and human rights’ (p. 65). When students practice hate speech they are better approached, not as villains or victims, but as political agents in spiritual and educational need. As Miller (2013) puts it, young people (and perhaps some of their teachers) may be attracted to radicalism and they may hold extreme views but this is the very stuff of [Religious] Education: ‘To fail to address such issues in a way that will lead to dialogue, disagreement, investigation, analysis and criticism is to fail those young people and to fail to promote their moral development.’ (2013, p. 197). Meanwhile, we should also be careful not to give too much credits to hurt feelings (as this would patronize their radical activism). Above all, in a societal context of increasing polarization and populism from all sides of the political spectrum, it is misleading to suggest a merely organizational response or a technocratic correction will bring any sustainable solutions. The term ‘pedagogy’ is often interpreted as a ‘teaching’ method rather than a philosophy or a social theory. The educational outlook on radicalisation

2 An important share of this section is based on personal conversations with David

Kenning, real world expert on extremism. All inaccuracies are the author’s

responsibility.

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that so many practitioners are in need of, though, cannot be limited to a method or a set of tools, but requires a pedagogy of radicalisation. As the Greek roots of the word ‘pedagogy’ illustrate, education is inherently directive and must always be transformative. In other words, what these practitioners seem deprived of is a philosophical anthropology: a theory of human nature, or a vision of the kind of mind-set we are dealing with here. This pedagogy allows us to approach these youth in the classroom as emerging political agents who may adopt an extreme ideology to escape from their everyday life world in which one runs considerable risk ending up victim or villain, with often little in between. This reality is the real fuel of fascist projects such as the Islamic State. Unlike the intelligence and security perspective, an educational outlook allows youth, through extensive educational interaction, to probe identities that differ from the expectations and demands by the mainstream environment.

Awareness programs are often aim to warn children against dangers for their development or the community, but education can go further than instruction about vulnerabilities. Looking at radicalisation from a less anxious point of view, it would be an interesting challenge to include youngster’s daily experiences, conflicts and emotions in the programmes. Of course, one can speak with them in idealistic terms about what is evil about war or the violation of human rights, but if there is no room to discuss their own feelings or the hate or fear of certain others, education loses its credibility. Teaching resilience against extremism can go hand in hand with teaching peaceful resistance. Issues such as the rapid multiculturalisation of neighbourhoods, the bio-industrial footprint on the planet or lethal drone attacks without trial require negotiation, and classroom disagreement on these matters should not be considered a failure but may even indicate that the shared process of deal-making has yielded a win-win outcome. Neglect of this dimension may result in a highly undesirable situation in which adolescents either fall into a kind of nihilism, cynicism or stupefaction, or else they embrace radicalism. It is much more sensible, just as Davies (2008) argues, to provide room for youth’s own narratives, perspectives, emotions and ideals. Naturally, this will sometimes lead to conflict, but the important difference from emotions and hostilities that are released on the streets or the internet - or worse, that fester away under the surface – is that they can be used in an educational context as a basis for constructive (i.e. controlled) expression of peaceful combat in an atmosphere of ‘positive’ conflict (De Winter, 2012).

Any pedagogical response to radicalisation is unlikely to succeed if it merely aims at de-radicalisation; it may work better as a vessel for ‘re-radicalisation’. Instead of trying to deradicalize their students, teachers may have more impact when directing the need for combat (or ‘Jihad’) into the right direction by employing three strategies on three different levels: mental, relational, and behavioural. Firstly, on the mental level, it is important to take the obsession serious and work on elements of it, piecemeal fashion, through dissolution: What is behind my mind-set? Breaking down in pieces everything that feeds one’s uncertainty or discomfort (this conversation is not about ideology or radicalisation or religious arguments, but about feelings and dignity. Arab poetry could help with reaching this deeper level). Secondly, on the relational level, the teacher takes alienation, disenfranchisement, victimisation serious through deflection: Who is my enemy? As their minds are in a neurotic state, many are angry at their father, seeking his attention and despising his way

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of life altogether. This very anger is then directed at the West, again seeking attention and despising it’s culture at the same time. The strategy aims to bring the direction of one’s combat in a ricochet: which party deserves my efforts? Thirdly, on the behavioural level, it is important to recognize the need for risk taking so that it does not escalate into recklessness through a strategy of displacement: How can I make an impact on the world otherwise? Awareness programmes should go hand in hand with exercises and activities that help students acquire peaceful protesting skills, as this is the only way to respect the sense of agency so vital in radical biographies by reframing his initial question: how can I prove myself/my value?

It proves unnecessary and counter-productive tying the superiority of British or Western values to this pedagogy of radicalisation. The radical mind-set will be hardly impressed by a focus on the nation state or on the democratic state. What may have impact is a focus on his own state of mind. Not by neuro-imagining, but by trying to understand what meanings of the world are central in the developing mind. The rise of the radical mind-set calls for solutions in which the adolescents decision making processes are central. Interventions against extremism will have little effect unless this problematic mind-set nourished by the youth’s struggles underneath the shell of the ‘radical identity’ are sufficiently addressed. If necessary, students’ minds may benefit from co-creating a ‘counter-culture of semi-darkness’ instead of complying to the high standards for clear and constructive British or European citizenship.

Finally, research suggests that parents are only very rarely a direct cause for radicalisation, just as they are almost never a direct trigger for de-radicalisation. Nevertheless, the family – together with other ‘educators’ like school, youth-work, church or mosque - can and must play an important role in the search of young persons for identity and a place in society. It is in precisely this area of identity development that a major hiatus occurs. It is worth looking into the strength and pitfalls of authoritative coalitions between parents, schools and others involved. The forces working upon the youth are often too powerful and complex for individual parents and teachers to handle. Together, adults surrounding the youth may offer the moral authority that these youngsters need to successfully perform their rite of passage (Mahdi et al, 1998; Grimes, 2000) from childhood to adulthood. CONCLUSION

The popularity of radicalisation research has generated studies that are mainly motivated by the policy question: how to counter radicalism? To this day, however, the most pressing fundamental questions have hardly been investigated and remain unsolved: what is radicalisation? How is it caused? And, who should we ask? A continuously contested concept, radicalisation remains an elusive notion. Methodologically, due to a dearth of empirical qualitative field work, the meanings given by the young people themselves are largely unaccounted for. Unless these fundamental issues are addressed, one may question the value of radicalisation research, no matter how booming. Although studies on terrorism have been piling up, we still lack a pedagogy of radicalization. There is a clear and urgent need for more educational/ pedagogical insights on these matters in a time when in Europe as

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in the United States, on primary and secondary schools and universities, by the Far Right and Islamic Fundamentalists, but also leftist and rightist single issue groups, the political polarisation in our societies is almost visibly growing. Hence radicalisation ought not to be considered a problem in itself or (even worse) the domain of Islam, but is better regarded as a phenomenon which shows that we do not completely succeed in offering every youth in our polarizing societies what they need. Extremism has roots in a context of identity politics over issues such as religion and multiculturalism and in some families or neighbourhoods, children will lack the safety net that helps them overcome critical life events. Both conditions may interfere dramatically with the adolescent’s moral development, as explained above. While extremism studies will always be connected to public safety issues, this contribution shows the problems with approaching radicalisation from a security perspective only. Underneath the apparently impenetrable coat of the radical identity are universal needs that involve navigating the transition of childhood to adulthood. Radicalisation emerges as a coping mechanism, as a way to explore the world, as means of resistance, as a manner to ban existential uncertainties, as a way to be guided, as a mode to acquire answers, as a stronghold in difficult times, and as a context in which a firm self can be established. Behind radicalisation there are real and important needs having to do with the challenges of the transition between youth and adulthood. A pedagogical perspective demonstrates the interconnectedness of psychological mechanisms and ideological narratives at this life stage. A pedagogical contribution to understanding and dealing with issues of radicalisation and extremism will have to negotiate precisely this complex developmental reality.

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