towards a spatially and socially explicit chinese agricultural policy model: a welfare approach m.a....
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Towards a spatially and socially explicit Chinese agricultural policy
model:A welfare approach
M.A. Keyzer
Lecture 3
Presentation available:www.sow.vu.nl/downloadables.htm
www.ccap.org.cn
1. Introduction
2. Welfare economics, AGE-modeling, CHINAGRO
model
3. New algorithm to solve very large partial
equilibrium welfare program with transportation
4. Conclusion
Overview of the lecture
Part I : Welfare economics, AGE-modeling, CHINAGRO model
2.1 Welfare optimization and competitive equilibrium
(justifies welfare approach)
2.2 CHINAGRO general equilibrium welfare model
Part II : Algorithm to solve spatially explicit partial
equilibrium
Prototype for next generation model
(Check on transport flows and price margins in
CHINAGRO)
1. Introduction
Consumers are indexed
Commodities are indexed
Consumers have concave increasing utility functions
where is consumption vector with elements .
Exchange economy:
Consumers obtain an income from given endowments
2.1 Welfare & competitive equilibrium
i 1,...,m
k 1,...,r
i iu ( x )
ix ikx
i ih p
Competitive exchange equilibrium: Consumption and
prices
Welfare optimization: Consumption solving, given
weights
2.1 Welfare & equilibrium: Definitions
ix 0 i i i i i imax { u ( x )| px h }, for h p , all i
i iik ikx , for all k
i ix 0,all i i i i
i ii i
max u ( x )
subject to
x (p)
i
First Welfare Theorem:
“A competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient”
(no consumer can be made better off
without making some other consumer worse off)
Second Welfare Theorem:
“Every Pareto efficient allocation, including the welfare
optimum, is a competitive equilibrium with transfers”
(lumpsum transfers are efficient for income redistribution)
2.1 Welfare & equilibrium: Theorems
Negishi Theorem:
“There exist welfare weights such that a welfare
optimum is a competitive equilibrium without
transfers”
The Negishi-weights reflect marginal utilities of income.
A competitive equilibrium without transfers is a welfare
optimum where consumers with a high marginal
utility of income have a low welfare weight.
2.1 Welfare & equilibrium: Theorems (2)
The three basic theorems of welfare economics equally
apply when production takes place and consumers
obtain income from given endowments and from
shares in the profit of producers indexed j :
The welfare program then reads :
2.1 Welfare & equilibrium: Theorems (end)
i j ix 0,all i,y ,all j i i i
i i ji i j
j j
max u ( x )
subject to
x + y (p)
y Y
i i ij jpx p py
Institutional requirements :
1) all goods in the economy are priced (no free use)
2) no one can manipulate prices (no monopoly)
3) all consumers pay the price of what they use, and
receive the price for what they sell (no crime).
4) producers maximize profits independently of
preferences
(shareholder value principle).
2.1 Welfare & equilibrium: Institutions
Point of departure:
Static equilibrium welfare model from the previous
lecture:
2.2 CHINAGRO model: point of departure
j s s s s sv 0;q ;c ,g ,y 0;z ,z 0
gs s S ss s 1 L s s s s s s
s S js j
max
u ( c ) C ( v ,...,v ,q ) ( z z ) p g
subject to
c v q (p )
j s Sj s s s
s s s s s
s s s s
q v ( y z z )
c z y z (p )
y f ( g ,e )
Modifications:
1) Consider all goods simultaneously; linear trade technology.
(variables become vectors; product becomes inner product)
2) Open economy, trading with the outside world at given
prices.
3) Incorporate balance of payments constraint.
4) Conversion from utility to money metric utility through
welfare weights.
5) Detailed component for agricultural production.
2.2 CHINAGRO full model
Implication for modeling:
1) Inputs agriculture subsumed under net supplies of site
s ;
For transport requirements :
2,3)Balance of payments with exports, imports and
world market prices :
where is the total of non-trade transactions.
4) Write for .
5) Write for .
2.2 CHINAGRO full model (2)
j s Sj j s s s sg v z z
j s s, ,
p p
w ,w
(p w p w ) B
B
s s su ( c )s s s su ( c )
s s sF ( y ,e ) 0 s s s sy F ( g ,e )
Full CHINAGRO general equilibrium welfare model :
2.2 CHINAGRO full model (end)
j s s s ss s s sv 0;g 0;c ,y 0;z ,z 0;w ,w 0
+s S j j s Ss j j s s s
j s Sj j s s s s
s s s s
max u ( c )
subject to
c g v w v ( y z z ) w (p )
g v z z
(p w p w ) B
c z y z
s
s s s
(p )
F ( y ,e ) 0
CHINAGRO model is suited to represent a complex
economic system in a transparent way.
Nonetheless, it assumes that all transportation cost within
counties are truly incurred. As explained in the
previous lecture, this assumption would need to be
relaxed.
Therefore, as a background check on transport flows and
price margins in CHINAGRO, and as a prototype for next
generation models, consider again the single-
commodity partial equilibrium approach.
3. Partial equilibrium with transportation
3. Spatially explicit equilibrium model
Recall, from lecture 2, the model that maximized
the sum of money-metric utilities minus transport costs
subject to commodity balance at every site.
Demand + Outflow = Production + Inflow
Outflow from site s to r = Inflow into site r from s
sr s s s sv 0;q ,c 0 s s s s1 sS s
rs sr s s
rs rs s
max u ( c ) C ( v ,...,v ,q )
subject to c v q (p )
q v e
3. Spatial model: transport cost
Work focused on transport cost along main highways,
railways, and waterways, and along secondary
roads.
Spatially explicit data were collected for rice and
wheat.
The resulting map of transport costs per ton-kilometer
is shown on the next sheet.
3. Spatial model: solution
Objective : Find equilibrium
supply, demand, flows and price on a map
Tool : A new algorithm to solve a large scale,
spatially explicit welfare program
Advantage : Integration between disciplines
3. Spatial model: what are the costs?
Costs over formal infrastructure(waterways, railways and highways) relatively low:
But these are only a small fraction of the consumer price.
We must also allow for storage cost, cost of changing from the informal mode of transportation to the formal and cost at both ends of the chain: collection and retail distribution
Spatial equilibrium models Connect districts, or nodes in a network Not spatially explicit
3. Spatial equilibrium models
3. Partial equilibrium: new algorithm
Key algorithmic principle: gravity driven flow Gravity : water does not flow uphill Transport : goods never flow to lower price
Low price
High price
3. Partial equilibrium: new algorithm (2)
Two step algorithm:Step 1 Solve gravity constrained welfare program
Impose gravity rule: exclude flows from high to low prices
Per site from low to high price:
(a) update availability = production + inflow
(b) maximize utility of site + value of sales
subject to
consumption + outflow = given availability Per site from high to low price:
update sales price on basis of customer’s value
3. Partial equilibrium: new algorithm (3)
Step 2 Improvement achieved?
Yes:
Update gravity ordering on basis of prices of gravity-constrained program and go to Step 1
No:
Otherwise, end (optimum is found)
3. Partial equilibrium: new algorithm (4)
Application to spatially explicit welfare model for China
Exogenous variables production map cereals population map tariffs and world market prices cereals freight costs per ton
Study world market price penetration
Grid of cells of 10-by-10 km = 93125 cells (markets)
4. Conclusion
CHINAGRO: Multicommodity general equilibrium welfare model with spatially explicit partial equilibrium models in the background.
General equilibrium model: work in progress to be discussed further tomorrow.
Partial equilibrium model: preliminary results show that it is possible to generate meaningful spatially explicit equilibrium, with “very large” number of geographical units to represent transport flows and price margins in China.
A next, challenging partial equilibrium application will be the pork industry considering the meat and feed markets simultaneously