towards a perspective theory of decision making and judgment

.u __ -_ FfB ELSEVIER

acta psychologica

Acta Psychologica 87 (1994) 155-178

Towards a perspective theory of decision making and judgment

Henry Montgomery *

Dept. of Psychology, Stockholm Unix&y, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract

The notion of perspectives in its literal perceptual sense is assumed to shed light on thinking in general and evaluative processes in decision making and judgments in particular. Three determinants of perspectives in thinking are identified: (a) the subject, i.e., subject orientation, (b) the object, and (c) psychological distance between subject and object. Dependent on the congruence between subject orientation and characteristics of the object different figure-ground relationships are formed. When an inside perspective is adopted (the object is seen as affiliated with the subject) positive features form the ground and negative features are in the background. Conversely, when an outside perspective is adopted (the object is seen as separate from the subject) negative features form the figure and positive features are in the background. A model is outlined for relationships among perspectives, evaluations and external constraints in decision making and judgment. Empiri- cal data from three empirical studies illustrate the validity of the framework described in the paper.

1. Introduction

In today’s research on human decision making and judgment it is typically assumed that people are adaptive within the limitations set up by situational and cognitive constraints (see the review by Payne et al., 1992). In the present paper I will side with this view of decision making and judgmental processes, which contrasts with research in the seventies and eighties that portrayed man as a victim to cognitive illusions (e.g., Hogarth, 1987; Kahneman et al., 1982). I will not repeat other researchers’ arguments for adaptivity and against the notion of cognitive

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156 H. Montgomery /Acta P.yychologica 87 (19941 155-I 78

illusions (e.g., Berkeley and Humphreys, 1982; Juslin, in press; Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Zukier, 1986). Instead I will focus on one of the oldest concepts in thinking about human thinking, a concept which may shed some light on the notion of the adaptive decision maker functioning under constraints. This is the concept of perspective. The sophist Protagoras (485-415 B.C.) was perhaps the first philoso- pher who apparently used this concept in his dictum of “horn0 mensura” which implies that in every issue completely opposite, but equally plausible, views could be held (cf. Billig, 1991).

Before discussing the role of perspectives in decision making and judgment, I will examine possible components and variants of perspectives in people’s thinking as well as how perspectives may be related to features of the external world.

2. Determinants of perspectives in perception and thinking

In its literal sense the term perspective concerns fundamental characteristics of how living organisms perceive the world. The term refers to a relationship between a subject and object in a perceptual process. A subject perceives an object from a certain perspective, The adoption of a perspective implies a limitation in what can be perceived. On the other hand, a perspective mirrors characteristics of the external world. Something is actually perceived, namely those features that are focussed from the adopted perspective.

In the present paper it is assumed that there is a close similarity between perspectives in perception and thinking. Such a similarity may be due to the fact that cognition is closely intertwined with perception (Montgomery, 1991) or it may reflect the fact that perspectives in thinking are analogous to, but causally independent of, perspectives in perception.

The following factors determine how perspectives vary and what is experienced from a given perceptual or cognitive perspective. Firstly, perspectives differ as a function of characteristics of the subject or, more precisely, in terms of subject

orientation. In perception, the subject’s viewing angle will give rise to different perspectives (e.g., a frontal perspective or seeing from underneath). In cognition, different perspectives are elicited by the adoption of different roles (e.g., sex roles, professional roles) or by identification with certain persons (with oneself or some other person or a group of persons) or with certain interests (e.g., economic interests, environmental interests). Interests are in turn related to the subject’s values or goals. Roles, persons, and interests are more or less overlapping with and dependent of each other. In particular, it may be noted that interests are dependent on roles and persons. By identifying him/herself with a certain role or person or with a group of persons the subject will orient him/herself to certain interests. For example, one may orient oneself to different interests as a private person or as a member of some profession.

Secondly, certain features of the object, or more precisely certain relationships between object features are of importance for what is noticed or apprehended in the object. In visual perception, features which differ from other features in terms of

H. Montgomery /Acta Psychologica 87 (1994) 155-l 78 157

size, shape, colour or mobility will attract the subject’s attention. Also the relationship between object features and the viewing angle is important for how the object is experienced. Hence, features which are positioned in front of other features or are centrally located in relation to the subject’s viewing angle will be seen more completely or clearly than is true for other features. Similarly, in thinking striking characteristics of an object or characteristics which are particularly relevant to the subject’s current interests will come into focus.

A third determinant of perspectives is the distance to the object. In perception, the closer the distance is to a given object the more intensive and detailed is the experience of the focussed features and the less is seen of the object as a whole. In thinking an object may be experienced as more or less close to one’s current interests. The experienced distance to a thought object, or put differently, the psychological distance to an object, may be more or less intimately related to the physical or temporal distance between subject and object. If one thinks about an object or an event which is closely related to one’s current interests one will intensively experience details of the object but, as a consequence, one may not be able to attend to the object as a whole at a given moment. In other words, the differentiation between more and less relevant features will be greater the closer the distance is to the object. This perspective effect should be distinguished from effects of relationships between object features which concern what features are seen as relevant and less relevant, respectively.

3. Inside and outside perspectives

A central tenet of the present paper is that the evaluation of an object is determined by the perspective from which the object is seen. For example, the same object (e.g., unrestricted car driving) may be evaluated very differently from an individualistic perspective (positive evaluation) than from a societal perspective (negative evaluation). Conversely, different objects may be evaluated differently from the same perspective (e.g., workers and capitalists from a socialistic perspective).

The relation between perspectives and evaluation is assumed to be mediated by figure-ground relationships. Again, a paralell with perception can be made. Figure-ground relationships are experienced as a function of characteristics of the object and the subject. In perception those parts of the world which are focussed become figure and the rest is background. The figure is perceived as more vivid and more organized than the ground, which implies that different figure-ground relationships will give rise to different views of the world. In the same way, as a consequence of how features of an object relate to the subject’s current interests different figure-ground relationships exist in people’s thoughts about the world. The subject’s knowledge, expectations or current interests may be of importance for the formation of figure-ground relationships. Of particular importance in the present paper is the role played by the subject’s interests. It is assumed that those parts of the world which are seen as fulfilling or threatening the subject’s current

158 H. Montgomery /Actu Psychologica 87 (1994) 155-I 78

interests will become figure and, hence, more sharply focussed, whereas parts which are irrelevant to the subject’s interests will become background and, hence, less sharply focussed or just ignored. The differentiation between figure and ground is assumed to be clearer the closer the psychological distance is between object and subject (i.e, the more relevant the object as a whole is to the subject’s current interests).

To further elucidate the relation between perspective and the evaluation of a given object, I will make two distinctions. The first distinction is between subject and object based perspectives. I have already exemplified different kinds of subject-based perspectives, i.e., perspectives anchored in subject orientation. Ob- ject-based perspectives concern which aspects of an object will become figure and ground, respectively. The second distinction is between two types of object-based perspectives, namely between inside and outside perspectives. An inside perspective implies that an object is seen from “the inside”, inasmuch as the object is seen as affiliated with or identified with the subject. The subject views the object as part of, and belonging to, her action sphere. Conversely, an outside perspective implies that an object is seen from “the outside”, inasmuch as the object is seen as having a separate existence outside the subject’s action sphere.

Inside perspectives imply that the subject experiences some degree of control of the object, either directly or indirectly by trusting the object to function in line with his or her current interests. The object is seen as benevolent, as basically “good”. As a consequence, when an inside perspective is adopted the subject focusses on the advantages of the object. The advantages constitute the figure whereas the disadvantages form the background. In contrast, when an outside perspective is adopted the disadvantages may come into the foreground, especially when the distance to the object is short. This is because the perceived independence of the object will make the subject alert on the object’s potential to threaten his or her current interests.

Let us now examine how inside and outside perspectives may be combined with different subject-based perspectives. Perhaps the most fundamental classification of subject roles is in terms of Ego (identification with self), We (identification with self plus some other entity or entities), and Other (identification with some other entity or entities). Table 1 shows how one may interpret combinations of inside and outside perspectives with perspectives based on these three subject roles.

The distinctions in Table 1 suggest two basic possibilities of “gestalt shifts” in how a given object is seen. First, the subject may discover new features of the object which will induce a shift from an inside to an outside perspective or vice versa. Such a shift could occur for a fixed subject-based perspective. For example, a person who has bought a car which turns out to function badly may switch from seeing the car from an ego-oriented inside perspective (How is the car useful to meet my personal interests?) to viewing the car from an ego-oriented outside perspective (How can the car threaten my personal interests). Second, the subject may identify him- or herself with a new role and as a consequence switch from an inside to an outside perspective or vice versa. For instance, unlimited car driving is naturally seen from an inside perspective when an ego-perspective is adopted, but

H. Montgomery /Acta Psychologica 87 (1994) 155-178 159

Table 1

Combinations of different subject-based perspectives with inside and outside perspectives

Subject-based Inside perspective Outside perspective

perspective

Ego-oriented

perspective

Object is seen as

affiliated with Ego

and behaving in line

with Ego’s interests.

We-oriented

perspective

Other-oriented perspective

Object is seen as

affiliated with Us

and behaving in line

with Our interests.

Object is seen as

affiliated with

Other and behaving in line with Other’s

interests.

Object is seen as

separate from Ego and

behaving in line with its

own interests or

dispositions, which may threaten Ego’s interests.

Object is seen as

separate from Us and

behaving in line with its

own interests or

dispositions, which may

threaten Our interests.

Object is seen as

separate from Other and

behaving in line with its own interests or

dispositions, which may

threaten Other’s

interests.

could be seen from an outside perspective when a societal we-perspective is adopted (e.g., with respect to environmental interests).

The perspectives in Table 1 can be broken down further by introducing different types of objects for each type of subject. Also the objects may be classified in terms of Ego, We, or Other. By doing so, comparisons could be made with types of perspectives that have been suggested in the literature on social cognition. In attribution theory, a distinction is made between actor perspective (how the actor views him- or herself, subject = Ego, object = Ego) and observer perspective (how the actor views other people, subject = Ego, object = Other) (Jones and Nisbett, 1972). An actor perspective may primarily be associated with an inside perspective since in the normal case the actor probably views him- or herself as striving to attain his or her current goals. Conversely, an observer perspective may be associated with an outside perspective to the extent that this perspective concerns other people who are seen as distinct from the subject. Mead’s (1934) “generalized-other” perspective primarily corresponds to an other- oriented outside perspective directed towards the ego (subject = Other, object = Ego, outside perspective since Ego is seen as separate from Other). Finally, Janis and Mann’s (1977) notion of group think and similar notions such as group polarization (Isenberg, 1986) may be interpreted as a combination of two perspectives. On the one hand, group members adopt a we-oriented inside perspective when viewing themselves as long as they see themselves as striving to attain a common goal. On the other hand, group members will adopt a we-oriented outside

160 H. Montgomery /Acta Psychologica 87 (1994) 155-l 78

perspective when viewing the world outside the group (which is seen as separate from the group and as potentially hostile).

4. Empirical evidence for the relationship between inside/outside perspective and positive/negative evaluation

A crucial assumption in the present account is that an inside perspective favours a positive evaluation of the focussed object whereas the reverse is true for an outside perspective. To examine the empirical evidence for this assumption, if any, we need to identify factors which favour the adoption of each of the two perspectives, respectively, and then examine the relationship between these factors and how a focussed object is evaluated.

A factor, which, by definition leads to the adoption of an inside perspective is identification with the focussed object. Several empirical findings show that when a person identifies herself with some other person(s), i.e. sees the world in the other person’s eyes and, hence, shares the inside or outside perspectives of the other person(s), then the person tends to view the other person(s) in a positive manner. (Note that sharing the other person’s inside or outside perspectives implies that the other person him- or herself is seen from an inside perspective.) Conversely, disassociation or lack of identification may lead to a negative evaluation of the focussed object. The following research findings may be cited to illustrate relationships between identification/disassociation and positive/negative evaluation: - Ability to take the marriage partner’s perspective is related to marital satisfac-

tion (Franzoi et al., 1985). _ Empathy with another person leads to more positive evaluations of him/herself

(Brehm et al., 1981; Grover and Broeckner, 1989). - People who are on one’s own side in a conflict (identification) are seen as

personally responsible for their praiseworthy behaviour whereas their blamewor- thy behaviour results from situational constraints. The reverse explanations are used for the opponents’ behaviour (Heradsveit, 1981) in a study of the Arab- Israeli conflict).

_ Two conflicting groups will get along better if they are confronted with a common enemy (identification with other group’s interests) (Levine and Camp- bell, 1972).

_ People who do not help an accident victim tend to view a helper (who they presumably do not identify themselves with) as doing harm to the victim (Cacioppo et al., 1986).

- Subjects who saw their reflections in a mirror (disassociation from self) while completing a self-assessment test tended to show more signs of self-dissatisfac- tion and negative affect (Hass and Eisenstadt, 1990).

A second factor which may induce an inside perspective is familiatity with the focussed object. Familiarity implies possibilities of identification and affiliation and, hence, also possibilities of an inside perspective. A number of studies have


demonstrated that familiar objects tend to be liked more than non-familiar objects (for reviews, see Berscheid, 1985; Harrison, 1977). Zajonc (1980) showed that this may be true even for objects that are shown tachistoscopically below the threshold for conscious identification. Another striking demonstration of familiarity effects on liking is the finding that police trainees whose second names were close to each other in the alphabet liked each other more than was true for trainees whose names were alphabetically more distant (Segal, 1974). The reason was that the former trainees were more familiar with each other since rooms and classroom seats were assigned to trainees in alphabetical order of their surnames.

A third factor which may distinguish between inside and outside perspectives is the perceived control of the focussed object. As noted above, the adoption of an inside perspective implies that the subject perceives him/herself to be able to control (or to trust) the object to behave in line with his/her current interests. Hence, to the extent that this assumption is valid, one might expect that perceived control of a focussed object favours a positive evaluation. Indeed, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that people prefer options with controllable outcomes to non-controllable outcomes (Heath and Tversky, 1990). This was true even when subjects rated the probability for a positive outcome to be somewhat higher for non-controllable objects than for controllable objects.

In summary, it appears that there are links between factors which may induce an inside or outside perspective and the evaluation of the focussed object. These findings support the notion that the same object may be evaluated differently due to the perspective that is adopted. How is this possible? In the following section, it is asserted that there is a basic characteristic of objects in the world that allows very different evaluations of the same object.

5. The positive-negative two-sidedness of reality

Let us return to Protagoras’ dictum that in every issue completely opposite, but equally plausible, views could be held. “Opposite” might mean two things. Aspects could be opposite to each other in an evaluative sense (e.g., good versus bad) or in a descriptive sense (e. g, big versus small) (Lewicka, 1977). In the following, I will discuss the possibility that in every issue it is possible to find a basis for opposite evaluations of a given object or case.

It is a well-known phenomenon that a given personality trait can be interpreted in a positive or negative manner. A person who spends little money can be seen as economical or greedy. A brave person can instead be regarded as foolhardy. Peabody (1967, 1984) found that the great majority of the most common personality traits could be split up into positive or negative variants. He assumed that the negative variants were more extreme than the positive variants. For example, a person who is extremely restrictive with money would be regarded as greedy, whereas a person who is moderately restrictive would be regarded as economical. It is also possible, however, that the same behavior might be evaluated positively or negatively depending on the perspective that is adopted. Imagine that you will

162 H. Montgomery /Acta Psychologica 87 (1994) 155-178

inherit a wealthy man who is extremely restrictive with money. From that perspective, it will be natural to describe the man in positive terms as being economical. The wealthy man will be seen from an ego-oriented inside perspective. Other people who would like to be helped by the wealthy man before he dies might use other more negative terms to describe his way of dealing with money. These people will experience the wealthy man from an ego-oriented outside perspective. A behaviour could also be seen differently from different subject-based perspectives. For example, a person who needs money now from the wealthy person (ego-oriented perspective) could switch perspective if he or she puts him- or herself into the inheritor’s shoes (other-oriented perspective), especially if there are good reasons for letting the money go to the heir.

The fact that people sometimes very easily switch their perspective suggests that they are more or less consciously prepared for the possibility that a different view is possible in a given issue (e.g., Brehm et al., 1981; Hass and Eisenstadt, 1990). This seems to be taken for granted in Billig’s (1991) rhetorical approach to the study of human thinking. In a number of penetrating case studies he presented evidence for the idea that any stand-point is taken against the background of an alternative stand-point. When a person presents his or her view in an issue he or she is implicitly or explicitly doing it in order to counter an alternative view. The person wishes to persuade him/herself or other persons. There is a rhetorical purpose in the person’s thinking. Billig goes so far as stating that everyday thinking of its essence is rhetorical. The very process of thinking is fundamentally a process of argumentation and debate against alternative views.

6. A model of relationships among evaluations, perspectives, and external constraints

Does the idea that there is always an alternative view mean that any view is possible in a given situation? The notion of perspectives implies that the answer is no. Since a perspective is anchored in the external world the variation of possible views in a given situation will be constrained by factual circumstances. The four panels of Fig. 1 give a preliminary and probably very simplified account of how evaluations, perspectives and external constraints may be related to each other. The model in Fig. 1 is based on the following assumptions: (1) Objects may be described in terms of their positions on bipolar continua which

may be more or less descriptive or more or less evaluative (Fig. 1A). For example, big-small may primarily be seen as a descriptive bipolar continuum, whereas good-bad definitely is an evaluative bipolar continuum. Spacious- overcrowded is both descriptive and evaluative inasmuch as spacious is related to big and good and overcrowded is related to small and bad. The attractiveness of the ends of a descriptive continuum may not be strictly neutral (e.g., big may in itself be seen as somewhat attractive and small as somewhat unattractive).


(2) For a given descriptive continuum there exists a set of evaluative-descriptive continua which intersect the descriptive continuum in such a way that the ends of the continua will form a circle (Fig. 1A). The position of each continuum in the circle depends on how strong its evaluative and descriptive components are, with mainly descriptive continua being close to the descriptive continuum and mainly evaluative continua being close to a purely evaluative continuum. Each evaluative-descriptive continuum intersects the descriptive continuum in its middle in such a way that the positive ends will cluster on the one side of the descriptive continuum and the negative ends on the opposite side. In this way, it will be possible to refer to the positive or the negative side of the descriptive continuum. As a rule, the positive side is focussed when an inside perspective is adopted whereas the negative side is focussed from an outside

perspective. (3) The closer a descriptive-evaluative continuum is to a descriptive continuum,

that is, the more descriptive the continuum is, the less extreme is the attractiveness of the positive and negative ends of the descriptive-evaluative continuum in question (cf. the ordinate of Fig. 1A).

(4) An object’s perceived position on a descriptive continuum is fairly fixed across different perspectives, at least in a relative sense (see how the positions of the filled circles in Figs. 1B and 1C are enclosed by the walls of the semicircular “corridor” within which the circle is located). Thus, to the extent that people have the same conceptions about the meaning of the end-points of a bipolar descriptive continuum they will agree that one object, say, is fairly small and another object very big. However, dependent on their perspective they may disagree with respect to their emphasizing features on the positive or negative side of the relevant position of the descriptive continuum (see the intersection between the relevant “beam” and semicircular corridor for a given descriptive position in Fig. 1B and Fig. lC, respectively). The area in which different emphases may occur is normally restricted to the region which is oriented towards the same end of the descriptive continuum, i.e., within a given semicircular corridor in Figs. 1B and 1C. For example, one person may emphasize that a small flat is overcrowded and another person that the flat is cosy. However, none may regard the small flat as spacious or desolate.

(5) If one object with a certain position on a descriptive continuum is seen from an inside perspective then another object with an opposite position will be seen from an outside perspective or vice versa (see the intersections between the perspective lines and the two opposite semicircular corridors in each of Figs. 1B and 10

(6) The greater the distance from the object the more likely it will be that both positive and negative features are seen from a given perspective (Fig. 1D).

In order to make a preliminary test of some of the above assumptions the following experiment was carried out. A total of six pairs of opposite adjectives were selected. (The adjectives were Swedish, but in the following they are trans- lated into English.) All adjectives could be used to characterize flats. Two of the

164 H. Montgomery /Acta Psychologica X7 (1994) 155-178

+

E .- 50 z :

A

Eva1 -descr COlltlllUUm

DeSCflptlVe continuum \

/ EvaI.-descr

conllnu”m

/

\

4 0 - p

Descriptive bipolar dimension

Inside

B

r- 4 u


Fig. 1. A model of relationships among perspectives, evaluations and descriptive features (external

constraints). A: Some components of the model. B and C: Illustration of how given descriptive features

(the filled circles) will be evaluated on different evaluative-descriptive continua from different subject-

based perspectives. The “beams” enclose what may be focussed from a given perspective. The

semicircular “corridors” show possible variations in how the experience of a given descriptive feature may vary with respect to the relative emphasis on descriptive and evaluative contents. D: Illustration of

how a long viewing distance facilitates noticing both positive and negative features.

Outside perspective

H. Montgomery /Acta Psychologica 67 (1994) 155-I 78 165

+

E .- 50 Ti :

Q Outside perspective

Inside \ perspective

f 0


D

Inside

1 Outside perspective

4 0 - ’ Descriptive bipolar dimension

Fig. 1 (continued).

six pairs, viz., old-new and big-small, were assumed to correspond to the ends of bipolar descriptive continua. The remaining four pairs were assumed to correspond to the ends of bipolar evaluative continua, with the two pairs charming-

166 H. Montgoome~ /Acta Psychologica X7 (1994) 155-l 78

sterile and comfortable-uncomfortable assumed to be primarily related to old-new and with the remaining two pairs spacious-overcrowded and cosy-desolate assumed to be primarily related to big-small. Eleven undergraduate students of psychology at Stockholm University were given a questionnaire requiring them to rate various aspects of apartments. Subjects were first asked to rate the similarity between all possible pairs of the twelve adjectives. The ratings were made on an 1 l-point scale ranging from 0 (no similarity) to 10 (identity). The subjects were thereafter asked to rate the attractiveness of apartments, each of which was characterized by two adjectives (e.g., a small and cosy flat>. These adjective pairs fulfilled the following requirements: (a) opposite adjectives were not included in the same pair, (b) one, and only one, of the two adjectives in each pair was always a descriptive adjective (i.e., big, small, new, or old). All 16 pairs which fulfilled these requirements were included in the questionnaire. These 16 pairs consisted of two 2 x 4 factorial combinations of adjectives with the one factor corresponding to two opposing descriptive adjectives and the other factor to the four evaluative adjectives related to the two former adjectives. The attractiveness ratings were made on a scale ranging from 0 (very unattractive) to 10 (very attractive). The midpoint of the scale (5) was defined as neither unattractive nor attractive.

The similarity ratings were analyzed by means of nonmetric multidimensional scaling (Guttman’s method in the SYSTAT statistical package, see also Lingoes and Roskam, 1973). Two similarity matrices were selected for analysis, viz., all pairs of the six adjectives big, small, spacious, overcrowded, comfortable, uncomfortable (adjectives related to big-small) and all pairs of the six adjectives new, old, comfortable, uncomfortable, cosy, desolate (adjectives related to new-old). Two- dimensional solutions with stress values 0.00339 and 0.02308 respectively, were selected. The solutions are shown in Fig. 2. It can be seen that the adjectives are related to each other in line with predictions which could be made from the assumptions given above (see also Fig. 1). In line with Assumption 1, the continua vary with respect to their closeness to the descriptive continuum with specious- overcrowded being very close (in relation to big-small), charming-sterile moderately close (in relation to new-old) and cosy-desolate and comfortable-uncomfortable least close (in relation to big-small and new-old, respectively). As predicted by Assumption 2, pairs of opposing adjectives are arranged in a circular fashion. The continua going between the adjectives in each bipolar pair intersect each other in the middle of each continuum. All positive adjectives are located on the one side of the bipolar descriptive continuum and all negative adjectives on the other side. Note, however, that for big-small the negative poles are on the upper side and the positive poles on the lower side, which implies that the negative dimension is reversed as compared to the model in Fig. 1.

Assumption 3 (relationship between descriptiveness and attractiveness) was tested in the following way. An attractiveness value for each adjective was computed based on functional measurement (e.g., Anderson, 19811, by taking the mean of the ratings of all pairs in which the adjective was included. That is, means were computed across all ratings in each row and column for each of the two 2 X 4 evaluative versus descriptive adjective matrices. The resulting attractiveness values

H. Montgomery /Acta Psychologica 87 (1994) 155-I 78 167

I -

> --

Comfortable

q 7.28

4.46

NW. 7.87

A

Charming

209 q

Ste~lle

0 2

Desolate

Overcrowde” 2 63

-2 - 1 0 1 2

Fig. 2. Multidimensional scaling of similarity ratings of hvo sets of housing-related adjectives. Attrac- tiveness values (computed by functional measurement) are given for each adjective.

are shown in Fig. 2. First, it should be noted that positive adjectives were rated as positive and negative adjectives as negative. Second, it can be seen that the adjectives defining the descriptive continua were not strictly neutral in an evalua-

168 H. Montgomery /Acta Psych&&a 87 11994) 155-178

tive sense. Big was slightly positive and small was negative. Old was slightly positive and new was slightly negative. Hence the transition between positive and negative evaluations did not exactly coincide with the supposedly descriptive continua.

To study in more detail the relationship between descriptiveness and attractiveness (Assumption 31, descriptiveness was defined in terms of the angle between the relevant evaluative-descriptive continuum and descriptive continuum at the point where the two continua intersect each other. Hence, the descriptiveness is maximal when this angle is 0 and 180 degrees and minimal when the angle is 90 and 270 degrees. Fig. 3 shows plots of attractiveness of adjectives against the descriptiveness angles in relation to big-small and old-new, respectively. In both plots the function Attr, = b sincangle;, + c) + a was fitted, where Attr, = attractiveness of adjective i, angle,, = angle at the intersection between evaluative-descriptive continuum for adjective i and the descriptive continuum j, and b, c, and a = constants. The constant c is included to account for the fact that the transition between positive and negative evaluations did not coincide exactly with the descriptive continua. The constants u and b were fitted by the method of least squares for different values of the constant c until an optimal fit was found. It can be seen that the fit is very good for the old-new adjectives and quite good for the big-small adjectives. This means that the first and second dimensions of the circular patterns shown in Fig. 2 could be interpreted as a descriptive and an evaluative dimension, respectively. In other words, Assumption 3 is supported by the present data.

Assumption 4 (constraints and possible variations) cannot be tested by means of the present data. However, earlier research suggests that people with different views in a political issue agree with respect to how alternatives (e.g., alternatives in energy politics) may be characterized on a number of descriptive attributes (such as big scale-small scale, small size of venture-large size of venture), but diverge with respect to the positive or negative implications they see from given levels of these attributes (e.g., god/bad economy, good/bad environmental consequences) (Biel and Montgomery, 1986, 1989). Additional data illustrating the validity of Assumption 4 will be presented in a following section of the present paper.

Assumptions 5 and 6 may be seen as challenges for further research. It should again be stressed that the model in Fig. 1 probably is oversimplified. It

may hold better in some situations than in others. For example, there will probably be deviations from the circular structure if the ends of the descriptive continuum represent very extreme positions (e. g,. extremely small, extremely big). In that case both ends could be seen as unattractive (cf Peabody, 1967), which obviously is incompatible with a circular structure in the kind of evaluative-descriptive space shown in Fig. 1.

7. Perspective search in decision making

In previous research I have launched the idea that decision making is a search for a dominance structure, that is, a cognitive structure in which one alternative

H. Montgomery /Acta Psychoiogica 87 (1994) 155-l 78 169

dominates the others (e.g., Montgomery, 1983, 1989). Recently, Svenson (1992) suggested a more generally formulated model stating that decision makers attempt to find an optimal differentiation between a to-be-chosen alternative and its competitors. Differentiation can be attained either by a dominance structure or in other ways.

Following this suggestion I now propose that decision making involves a search for a perspective which leads to an optimal differentiation between a to-be-chosen alternative and other available alternatives. This description of a decision process is assumed to be valid for cases when the decision maker attempts to resolve a conflict between advantages and disadvantages associated with different alternatives (see Svenson’s, 1990, Level 3 and 4 decisions). More specifically, I assume that the present perspective model implies that differentiation is closely related to dominance structuring. The adoption of a perspective compatible with a dominance structure is facilitated by the presumed positive-negative two-sidedness of features of objects in the external world. By seeing a to-be-chosen alternative from an inside perspective and other alternatives from an outside perspective, positive features of the former alternative are focussed, whereas negative features are focussed on the other alternatives. If this differential focussing occurs uniformly across all descriptive continua on which the to-be-chosen alternative differs from its competitors then, obviously, a dominance structure will be attained.

The present perspective model also gives an idea of the limits on finding a dominance structure. The possibilities of finding such a perspective may be hampered by such factors as (a) lack of information (e.g., information which may help to decide whether a small flat primarily should be seen as cosy or overcrowded), (b) absence of descriptive-evaluative features which could be used for differentiating a to-be-chosen alternative from its competitors (e.g., in cases in which the to-be-chosen alternative has an extreme position on a descriptive continuum which may imply that no positive features are available), (cl constraints following from the subject-based perspective that is adopted by the decision maker (i.e., it may not be possible to focus all relevant positive and negative features from the same subject-based perspective).

In his/her search for a suitable perspective the decision maker may shift between different perspectives in order to find a perspective which yields sufficient differentiation among alternatives. In the discussion which follows I will suggest how perspective shifts may be related to different stages in a decision process. The dominance search model states that a decision process goes through four stages, viz., pre-editing (selecting important attributes and screening of alternatives), finding a promising alternative (finding a candidate for the final choice), dominance testing (checking disadvantages of the promising alternative), and dominance structuring (attempts to neutralize disadvantages of a promising alternative which may be facilitated by bolstering of advantages). These stages may be related to perspectives in the following way: in screening all alternatives are seen from an outside perspective. When an alternative is experienced as promising, this will result in seeing it from an inside perspective. Dominance testing implies that a more or less critical attitude is taken against the promising alternative. Hence in

170 10 -

9-

0-

it : 7-

it! ._ u 6-

: - is 5- u

4-

3-

2-

l-

H. Montgomery /Acta Psychologica 87 (1994) 155-l 78

o! .,.,.,.,.,I,. I.,.,

-45 0 45 90 135 180 225 270 315 360

Angle

8

0 Emp. values

. Pred. values

Spacious

ii : 7- : cosy

.- w 6-

: Big

= L 5- <

4

ij;\ Small 3

ol ,I .I .,.,.(.(.,.,.,

-45 0 45 90 135 180 225 270 315 360

Angle

Fig. 3. Attractiveness of housing-related adjectives (see Fig. 2) as a function of angle between the

relevant evaluative-descriptive and descriptive continuum (see Fig. 2). The fitted curve is a sinus function.


this phase, the promising alternative may temporarily be seen from an outside perspective and the other alternatives from an inside perspective. In dominance structuring the promising alternative is again seen from an inside perspective whereas its competitors will be seen from an outside perspective.

As indicated above, perspective shifts between outside and inside perspectives may occur within a given subject-based perspective or result from a shift between

different subject-based perspectives. Dominance structuring may be associated with both types of perspective shifts. Presumably, the former type of shifts, which requires a less drastic mental change than the latter, is the type of shift which normally occurs when the decision maker switches between different stages in the decision process. Shifts between different subject-based perspectives (i.e., adopting new roles or values) may occur when the decision maker does not succeed in finding a dominance structure within a given subject-based perspective.

It may be concluded that the present perspective model is compatible with the dominance search model, but also that it indicates limits of the latter model as well as possibilities of developing it.

8. Preliminary empirical illustrations of perspectives and perspective shifts in decision making

A necessary requirement for the validity of the present perspective model is that the same alternative will be seen differently depending on whether it is chosen or not. In the former case the decision maker will see positive features of the chosen alternative on relevant descriptive continua and in the latter case negative features will be focussed for each descriptive continuum. To investigate this, think-aloud data on housing choices reported by Montgomery and Svenson (1989) were reanalyzed. The data were from twelve subjects (psychology students) who chose among five authentic housing alternatives described in booklets used for marketing the houses. As in the Montgomery and Svenson (1989) study, statements in the protocols were analyzed in terms of (a> focussed alternative, (b) focussed attribute, and (cl the evaluation (positive or negative or no evaluation) of the alternative on the focussed attribute. The attributes consisted of 11 fairly general dimensions or categories such as size of house, part of town, plan of house (see Table 2). Montgomery and Svenson (1989) compared how the same subject evaluated chosen and non-chosen alternatives. No data on evaluations on particular attributes were reported. Now, we will compare how the same alternative is evaluated on particular attributes by subjects who chose that alternative and by subjects who did not choose it.

Table 2 shows the distribution of positive, negative, and neutral judgments of one of the five alternatives in the Montgomery and Svenson (1989) study. Separate frequencies are given for the three subjects who chose that alternative and for the nine subjects who did not choose it. First it can be seen that for ten out of the eleven attributes both positive and negative evaluations were made. Thus, these results show how the same alternative can be positively and negatively evaluated

172 H. Montgomery /Acta Psychologica 87 (1994) 155-178

Table 2

Frequencies of positive, negative or neutral evaluations of one alternative by subjects who chose the

alternative and by subjects who did not choose the alternative

Attribute Alternative chosen Alternative not chosen

Pos. Neg. Neutr. (“) Pos. Neg. Neutr. (“1

Part of town 3 3 0 0 3 8 0 2 Communic./

distance

Service

Plan of area Plan of house

Exterior Equipment/

construction

Size of house

Date when

house compl

Recreation

Economic

2

3

0

2 4

3 0

4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

2 1 0 0

0 0 0 1

0 2

0 1

0 8

0 7

0 2

0 3

0 3

3 0

2 2

0 5

13

6

0

1

3

0

1

2

3

8

7 2

aspects Sum

Sum for final

part of process

37 13 2 5 38 58 11 40 15 0 0 18 10 15 7 69

iI Alternative not characterized on relevant attribute.

on the same attribute. Across all attributes choice subjects make clearly more positive than negative evaluations whereas no-choice subjects make clearly more negative than positive evaluations. The difference between the distributions of evaluative judgments for the choice and no-choice subjects was particularly great at the end of the decision process. In the final part of the process (identified by finding a meaningful starting-point for approximately the final third of each protocol) choice subjects made only positive evaluations on the nine attributes that were attended to, whereas the distribution of positive and negative evaluations did not change noticeably for no-choice subjects. Approximately the same pattern is found for choice and no-choice subjects with respect to the other alternatives. For 48 out of the 55 possible combinations of attributes and alternatives (87%) both positive and negative evaluations occurred. The frequency of positive and negative evaluations of all chosen alternatives were 138 and 60, respectively. The corresponding frequencies for non-chosen alternatives were 141 and 243. In the final part of the decision process (defined as described above) the two former frequencies were 59 and 7 and the latter ones were 18 and 39.

Table 3 gives concrete examples of how the same alternative by attribute combinations may be evaluated from different perspectives. All examples in the table concern the alternative referred to in Table 2 and they all deal with the attributes Distance to city and Plan of house. The examples are deliberately chosen to illustrate how the same descriptive feature, which often is one out of many descriptive features that are associated with a given attribute (e.g. of the plan


Table 3

Examples of outside perspectives and inside perspectives from think-aloud protocols on housing

choices. Number of subjects for each perspective is given in parentheses

Outside Descriptive Inside

perspective feature perspective

Far to city (5) Peripheral Close to location countryside (1)

Efficient

transportation (1)

Too far away, too long

time (5) by train

45 minutes travel Opportunity for relaxation (2)

Jumbly (1)

Necessary to pass

the kitchen to get to

the living room (1)

Varied plan of house

Kitchen and

living room

united

Stimulating and

funny (1)

Nice, cosy (3)

Too many rooms (1) Many small

rooms Possibility to

create a big room by

tearing down a wall (1)

of house or of the equipment), may be seen from a positive or negative side. Sometimes, subjects started out from different descriptive features of an attribute (e.g., different features of the plan of house) when they arrived at different evaluations. It is a task for further research to analyze more in detail the extent to which subjects start out from same or different features when they arrive at different evaluations of a given alternative by attribute combination.

The data discussed above suggest that for the great majority of alternative by attribute combinations there were possibilities to find a positive and a negative side and that these possibilities were used by subjects to differentiate the to-be- chosen alternative from its competitors.

We will now examine the extent to which dominance structures result from the differential focussing of positive and negative features of chosen and non-chosen alternative. A dominance structure was assumed to exist when the chosen alternative had at least one advantage and no disadvantages in relation to other alternatives. An advantage was operationalized as (a) a positive evaluation of the chosen alternative on a given attribute coupled with a negative or a neutral or with no evaluation of non-chosen alternatives on the same attribute, or (b) a negative evaluation of a non-chosen alternative on a given attribute coupled with a positive or neutral or with no evaluation of the chosen alternative on the same attribute. Conversely, a disadvantage was operationalized as (a) positive evaluation of a non-chosen alternative on a given attribute coupled with a negative or neutral or with no evaluation of the chosen alternative on the same attribute, or (b) a

174 H. Montgomery /Acta Psychologica 87 (1994) 155-l 78

negative evaluation of the chosen alternative coupled with a positive or neutral or with no evaluation of a non-chosen alternative. It was found that six subjects (50%) fulfilled the above requirements of a dominance structure in the final part of the decision process. Four subjects exhibited one violation of dominance (one disadvantage of the chosen alternative) and the remaining two subjects exhibited two violations (two disadvantages of the chosen alternative). Four of the six subjects who violated dominance found at least five more advantages than disadvantages of the chosen alternative. It should be noted, however, that the results might be related to the fact that subjects were highly selective in their attention in the final part of the decision process. Typically, subjects in that stage of the process compared the to-be-chosen alternative with only one other alternative on five to eight of the eleven attributes.

To conclude, at least ten subjects (83%) apparently succeeded in forming a dominance structure or came very close to a dominance structure according to the present operational definition of this concept. Of course, we do not know exactly the extent to which the present results over- or underestimate the prevalence of dominance structures in subjects’ thinking about the object since presumably subjects did not convey all their thoughts. In other words, the results should not be taken to imply that there are degrees of dominance but rather that they point to a certain degree of plausibility of the notion of dominance structuring.

The dominance search model specifies various operations for attaining a dominance structure. The present analysis of Montgomery and Svenson’s (1989) think- aloud data suggests that a combination of the bolstering and cancellation operations largely account for subjects’ differentiation between chosen and non-chosen alternatives. Bolstering implies that positive features of chosen alternatives and negative features of non-chosen alternatives are emphasized. Evidently, the Mont- gomery and Svenson (1989) subjects emphasized features related to chosen and non-chosen alternatives in this way. Cancellation implies that negative features of a chosen alternative are neutralized by positive features of the same alternative and vice versa for non-chosen alternatives. Montgomery (1983) stated that there should be some kind of natural connection between the features involved in a cancellation operation. The present perspective model suggests that this connection consists in the fact that the positive and the negative feature involved in a cancellation operation are related to the same descriptive feature. For example, a negative feature related to big (descriptive feature) flats could be cancelled by a positive feature also related to big flats. As shown above, the Montgomery and Svenson (1989) subjects, depending on their choice, found positive or negative features related to the same descriptive features or attributes. This might be interpreted to mean that each subject by focussing on a feature with a particular positive or negative value implicitly attempted to cancel features with an opposite value that were related the relevant descriptive feature or attribute. This interpre- tation is consistent with Billig’s (1991) description of thinking as a rhetorical activity. Thus, the decision maker is seen as involved in an (implicit) argumentation against alternative views on how particular options might be described on particular attributes.


Table 4 Frequencies of perspectives and perspective shifts in pre- and postdecisional processes in descriptions

of important private decisions

Sequence of perspectives Predecisional process

Ego inside-ego inside 8

Ego inside-ego outside la

Ego inside-other outside 0

Ego outside-ego inside 2

Ego outside-ego outside 2 We inside-ego outside la

a One case concerns non-chosen alternative.

Postdecisional process

I

1

2 la

3” 0

As a final empirical illustration of perspectives in decision making I will present data giving tentative information about shifts of perspective in a decision process as well as shifts which might occur after a decision has been made. The data are taken from a master’s thesis (Blom Kemdal, 1992). Eleven persons with various backgrounds were asked to select one or two important decisions that they had made and were encouraged to describe their thoughts, feelings, and actions before and after the decision was made. The subjects were told that they could select a decision that they were pleased with or one that they regretted. A total of 14 decisions were selected by the subjects.

The descriptions of the decisions were analyzed as follows. In each decision process three situations were identified, viz., the initial situation, the moment of decision, and the situation after the decision. For each situation and alternative the dominant perspective was identified in terms of the scheme shown in Table 1. It was found that in each situation both the chosen alternative and the non-chosen alternatives, respectively, were seen from the same subject-based perspective and that in each situation, with the exception of one decision process, the two types of alternatives were seen from different object-based perspectives (inside or outside perspective). The exceptional case was a decision in which the subject did not differentiate between two available unattractive options (probably because she hoped that a third more attractive option would appear) and, hence, both options were seen from an outside perspective. Table 4 shows frequencies of combinations of perspectives in the initial situation and at the moment of decision, and in the latter situation and the situation after the decision. Because of the regularities in how chosen and non-chosen alternatives were viewed Table 4 only shows the codings of one alternative in each decision process. This alternative usually was the chosen one. In two decision processes the subject appeared to primarily attend to a non-chosen alternative and, hence, the perspective identified for this alternative is shown in Table 4.

Table 4 shows that in the predecisional processes most subjects did not shift their perspective. Typically, the subject at an early stage found a promising alternative, which was seen from an ego-oriented inside perspective and this was still true when the decision was made. There were two ego outside-ego inside shifts implying that initial doubts about the to-be-chosen alternative were over-

176 H. Monfgomery /Acta Psychologica 87 (1994) 155-I 78

come. For another subject an inside-outside shift (for a non-chosen alternative) was associated with a shift in the subject-based perspective. This subject who made the decision to divorce his wife describes vividly a shift from a we-oriented inside perspective to an ego-oriented outside perspective: “She did not want to eat or drink, her eyes were wet and far away. the corners of her mouth twitched. Everything got clear to me. I became more objective. What am I arguing about with that girl?”

In postdecisional processes there were two perspective shifts within an ego-oriented perspective. In one case, a decision to buy a second-hand car, the subject regrets that she did not check the car carefully before buying it. Evidently she thought that she focussed too much on the positive sides of having a car. In the other case the subject began to miss a piano that he earlier had decided to sell. “I experienced the room as empty without the piano.. . I felt like having broken off a love relationship”. This quotation, which illustrates how the subject identified himself with the lost piano (inside perspective), contrasts with the outside perspective which was at hand when the subject made his decision to sell the piano. “I experienced the piano as too big and to stand in my way.”

Two persons shifted from an ego- oriented inside perspective to an other-oriented outside perspective in their postdecisional processes. In both cases the decision implied that another person’s needs was neglected. However, at the moment of decision the decision maker focussed on his/her own comfort and had various excuses for not doing anything for the other person. By contrast, after the decision the subject saw him/herself with the other person’s eyes and felt how he/she had neglected the other person’s needs. One of the persons, a construction worker, described a genuine gestalt shift in his perception of himself, after an accident had happened to an apprentice of his: “Directly afterwards I thought that I had been bloody lazy.. . it was because of sheer laziness that I told him to cast”.

9. Concluding remarks

The ideas put forward in the present paper were guided by a vision of the human thinker as residing at or moving between different positions among objects in a mental space. From a given mental position, certain features of the objects are seen clearly whereas other features are not seen or are in the background. The objects are seen from a certain perspective. All objects are potentially useful or are potential threats depending on the perspective from which they are viewed. By moving between different positions in the space and by focussing on particular features of the objects the perspective may be changed.

I have made a case for the idea that the decision maker always views available choice options from a certain perspective. I assume that the perspective which is adopted as well as shifts between different perspectives play a crucial role in how the decision maker evaluates the options.

In behavioural decision research a rich conceptual framework has been devel- oped to describe how a decision maker interprets, evaluates and integrates


information about choice alternatives. The notion of perspectives could be seen as complementing this conceptual framework. It might be a challenge to future behavioural decision research to find out if it is possible to acquire a deeper understanding of human decision making by complementing descriptions of decision processes with a perspective analysis. The aim of such an analysis would be to understand how perspectives constrain the processing of information of choice alternatives as well as open up possibilities for alternative ways of viewing the choice alternatives. A perspective analysis might also reveal the extent to which decision makers search for a perspective that allows an optimal differentiation among the choice alternatives.

Acknowledgments

This paper was supported by a grant from The Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. I thank Maria Hovemyr for her assistance with literature search and Pirjo Niemenmaa for helping me with collecting and analyzing empirical data and for her assistance with literature search. I also thank Anders Biel, Gunnar Karlsson, Ola Svenson, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on a previous version of the paper.

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