Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and AlfredoStroessnerAuthor(s): Paul C. SondrolSource: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Oct., 1991), pp. 599-620Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/157386 .Accessed: 22/03/2011 10:48

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Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner

PAUL C. SONDROL

Personal dictators remain a key feature of contemporary regimes termed 'authoritarian' or 'totalitarian', particularly in their early consolidating phases. But there is still disagreement over the seemingly ideological, polemical and indiscriminate use of the term totalitarian dictatorship as an

analytic concept and tool to guide foreign policy formulation.1 Jeane Kirkpatrick elevated the taxonomy to a vociferous level of debate with a

1979 Commentary article. Entitled 'Dictatorships and Double Standards', the work raised anew semantic hairsplitting concerning the qualitative differences between all previous tyrannies and those bearing organisational similarities with the Nazi, Fascist or Stalinist prototypes.2

Some have sought to do away with the totalitarian construct as merely a product of the Cold War. Others argue against the comparability of

right- and left-wing regimes. Still others argue that totalitarianism is a

concept applicable only to the epoch between Mussolini's assumption of

power in 1922 and Stalin's death in 195 3.3 More seriously, Kirkpatrick's thesis implied the immutable nature of totalitarianism, an assertion belied

by recent events in Eastern Europe. Despite the general validity of some of these objections, and even if one harbours doubts about the universal

explanatory power of this schema, I suggest that the totalitarian/ authoritarian dichotomy remains a powerful and effective tool to highlight and compare distinctive features of Castro's Cuba and Stroessner's

Paraguay.4 1See Robert C. Tucker, 'The Dictator and Totalitarianism', World Politics, vol. 7, no. 4 (I965), pp. 555-82. For a review of the scholarly debate concerning the concept of totalitarianism, see Carl J. Friedrich et al., Totalitarianism in Perspective (New York, I969).

2 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards (New York, 1982). 3 See Karl Dietrich Bracher, 'The Disputed Concept of Totalitarianism', in Ernest A.

Menze (ed.), Totalitarianism Reconsidered (Port Washington, NY, I981), pp. II-34. 4 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for reminding the author of this caveat. The article was revised with these and other comments in mind.

Paul C. Sondrol is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs.

J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 23, 599-620 Printed in Great Britain 599

600 Paul C. Sondrol

Table i. Characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian dictators

Totalitarian Authoritarian

Charisma High Low Role conception

Leader as individual No Yes Leader as function Yes No

Ends of power Public Yes No Private No Yes

Corruption Low High Official ideology Yes No Limited pluralism No Yes

Legitimacy Relatively high Relatively low

The intensely personal element of leadership common to both forms of

autocracy differs. Key dichotomies between authoritarian and totalitarian dictators centre around three foci shaping the subsequent discussion.

(i) Unlike their bland and generally unpopular authoritarian brethren, totalitarian dictators develop a charismatic 'mystique' and a mass-based, pseudo-democratic interdependence with their followers via the conscious

manipulation of a prophetic image. (2) Concomitant role conceptions differentiate totalitarians from authoritarians. Authoritarians view them- selves as individual beings, largely content to control and maintain the status quo. Totalitarian self-conceptions are typically teleological. The

tyrant is less a person than an indispensable 'function' to guide and

reshape the universe. (3) Consequently, the utilisation of power for

personal aggrandisement is more evident among authoritarians than totalitarians. Lacking the binding appeal of ideology, authoritarians

support their rule by a mixture of instilling fear and granting rewards to

loyal collaborators, engendering a kleptocracy. Table I highlights these differences.

In Latin America, Fidel Castro of Cuba and Alfredo Stroessner of

Paraguay represent cases reflecting the similarities and differences of the

totalitarian/authoritarian taxonomy. In Cuba and Paraguay, the dic-

tatorship is/was extremely personalist. Both Castro and Stroessner totally dominated their respective regimes for over thirty years, becoming by the

early I98os the longest-ruling leaders in the Western hemisphere. In both

regimes a single mass-based party structure penetrated civil society, buckling it to the regime. Beyond those similarities, however, Castro and Stroessner diverge almost completely, occupying polar extremes both in

ideological orientation and in their role conceptions concerning the ends of political power.

Castro and Stroessner compared 6o0

This paper analyses and explicates the diametrics of the totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorship via comparison of Castro and Stroessner.

Examining how closely Castro and Stroessner approximate the proto- typical models helps to determine the utility of these intellectual constructs and whether it is justified for scholars indiscriminately to label Castro totalitarian and Stroessner authoritarian.

The study shows that Castro is quintessentially totalitarian in his charismatic appeal, utopian functional role and public, transformative utilisation of power. Stroessner remained at base an authoritarian dictator, lacking ideological vision and employing tyrannical power for essentially private ends. Yet, a proto-totalitarian atmosphere pervaded his dictator-

ship, including a mass base and totalist 'impulse' to penetrate the military and bring other organisations under his personal control. Moreover, both dictators share a common, Latin American caudillo heritage buttressing their power, conceptually absent from the larger, general taxonomy. A conclusion summarises these findings and argues for retention but re- evaluation of the totalitarian construct.

Totalitarian and authoritarian dictators

The nature of dictatorship informs a long history of scholarship. Plato,

training Syracuse's young tyrant Dionysius II in philosopher-kingship, describes in his Statesman the ideal lawless utopia where the pre-eminent ruler, in unfettered flexibility, adapts the art of dictation to changing circumstances. The statesman must be absolute, argues Plato, for only he

perceives the just society and necessary social transformations to achieve that end. Plato's visionary satrapy is identified by some as a forerunner of the totalitarian leadership doctrines of the twentieth century.5

Aristotle's Politics reflects Plato's tremendous influence. But Plato's

mythical statesman concentrated on public ends: ideal rule for the common good. Aristotle's tyrant (the unteachable Dionysius, again) ruled for essentially selfish purposes: to extract as much as possible for personal gratification. This 'perversion' of just government expresses the oldest and most corrupt form of non-democracy: authoritarian dictatorship.6

Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes extended Aristotle's auth- oritarian construct while Jean Jacques Rousseau refined Plato's ideal state, anticipating the pseudo-democratic nature of modern totalitarianism. The Prince expressed Machiavelli's blueprint for the autocratic seizure and maintenance of power. Hobbes' Leviathan argued for the absolute

authority of state over citizenry to guarantee security in a 'brutish' world. Rousseau's The Social Contract argued that the 'general will' and

5See Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies: The Age of Plato, vol. I (Princeton, 1945). 6 Aristotle, Politics, Book v, 9 (London, 1941).

602 Paul C. Sondrol

infallibility of the collective people legitimised government. Modern totalitarians justify their dictatorships as a reflection of this volontege'nerale that only the dictator truly discerns.7

Classic totalitarian and authoritarian precursors intersect in Max Weber's pioneering analysis of' charismatic' leadership. Charisma (the gift of grace) is heaven-sent, irrational, emotive and popular. Weberian charisma consists in a leader's apparent possession of superhuman qualities; a messianic vision and role in determining the course of human events. Charisma also implies a close personal union between inspirational leader and willing followers, legitimising rulership. The leader bears the collective will of the people. Tenure is not dependent upon the

superficiality of elections; rather, the leader is 'elected' from on high.8 Dictators such as Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin defined themselves in

terms of prophetic, personal qualities elevating them beyond the rank and file. Their dictatorships created a mystical bond with the masses, merging authority with control and representation into a leadership principle (FiihrerprinZip) and absolutist regime (Fihrerstat). The unique mission and transcendental qualities of these totalitarians were functional requisites to their ideological imperatives demanding the wholesale destruction, restructuring and expansion of state and society, domestically and

internationally. Totalitarians thus appear to possess what Hannah Arendt calls a 'truer reality' than the flawed perceptions of mere mortal men, justifying breakthrough measures to achieve some fated destiny.9

As evidenced by Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Castro, totalitarians, unlike

authoritarians, envision not only a transformed domestic society, but also an expanded national influence on the world's stage. A symbiotic relationship looms between the totalitarian's demand for constant

agitation, enthusiasm and unanimity and a confrontational foreign policy posture towards an external enemy: the pursuit of a great and noble aim and the need to vanquish the enemy totally are required to maintain the

system in a permanent state of mobilisation, to deflect internal socio-

political tensions, and thus repeatedly re-equilibriate the system. Few authoritarians are imbued with such a self-appointed global role - often

taking on messianic dimensions - as the totalitarian, who invariably embarks on an expansionist, internationalist course.10

7Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (New York, 1952); Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, in George C. Christie (ed.), Jurisprudence (St Paul, I973), pp. 297-357; Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (New York, I954). See also J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York, I966).

8 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York, I958), pp. 246-9.

9 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, I95I), pp. 33-75. 0 The author gratefully acknowledges a second anonymous reviewer who suggested

analysing the characteristic totalitarian internationalist posture.

Castro and Stroessner compared 603

Moreover, while pressing for increasing politicisation, integration, conscientisation and conversion, totalitarians concomitantly attempt to reduce, desocialise, detach or destroy commitment to other foci of

allegiance, such as the Church, guild, region or family in order to narrow

diversity of thought and opinion. Harmony in the political sphere is to derive solely from the messianic leader. As the personification of the state, party and people and the embodiment of their interests and aspirations, charisma is institutionalised.11

Charisma defines the functions the totalitarian fulfils in the political system. This dictator is the 'moving spirit' of the totalist state.12 Arendt

conveys the sense of centrality and unsurpassed concentration of power in the leader's hands:

In the center of the movement, as the motor that swings it into motion, sits the Leader... [within] an aura of impenetrable mystery which corresponds to his 'intangible preponderance'.1

As the subsequent analysis of Castro illustrates, the totalitarian functions to unify and personify the movement. The leader's indis-

pensability emanates from his uni-personal command and assumption of blanket responsibility, justifying all measures to accomplish revolutionary, historic, possibly even apocalyptic change. Lower functionaries are thus relieved of responsibility for drastic actions taken to destroy the ancien

regime and usher in the new order.14 The myth of complete unity between dictator and masses exists to effect

total societal restructuring, not simply personal goals. The totalitarian fulfils certain needs of the system, but he is not sustaining personal, private-regarding aggrandisements. Ideological dedication to utopian futures substitutes for mere materialistic concerns. Whatever the

psychological motivations, the empirical goals of totalitarians are

decidedly public, not private. Expanding and updating the original Weberian formulation, the

charisma so often ascribed to totalitarian dictators is a combination of

prophetic vision and magnetism, but also includes the politics, ideological persuasion, mass propaganda and terror by which the dictator establishes a one-man tyranny. Not anticipated by Weber is the chiliastic vision, democratic veneer and particularly the modern technological sophistica-

1 Leonard Schapiro, Totalitarianism (New York, 1972), p. 22. 12

Sigmund Neumann, The Permanent Revolution: The Total State in the World at War (New York, 1942), p. 43. 13 Arendt, Origins, p. 361.

14 For the psychology of subordinate behaviour under totalitarianism, see Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York, I963). See also Stanley Milgram, 'Obedience to Authority', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, vol. 67, no. 4 (I963), pp. 37I-8.

604 Paul C. Sondrol

tion of totalitarianism. Together, these components make totalitarian

dictatorship a sui generis form of autocracy outside the scope of classic

conceptualisation. Friedrich and Brzezinski note the inadequacy of Weber's, or any other traditional typologies, in distinguishing this form of leader from previous satraps. 'There is no particular reason for

inventing a weird term to designate this type of leadership, other than to

say that it is "totalitarian ". '5

Dictatorial behaviour emanates in large part from role expectations. The position assumed carries certain objectives and performance demands. Totalitarian dictators seek a 'passion for unanimity' - the ideal of conflictlessness and the total politicisation and participation of all in

society. More than just an autocrat depriving people of rights and

perpetuating his rule, the totalitarian is a creative, revolutionary force, attempting to refashion man and culture, working 'in the amorphous raw material of history itself' as the ideocrat Ivanov asserts in Koestler's Darkness at Noon.16

Authoritarians normally labour under no such prophetic illusions.

Possessing no desire for the total mobilisation and restructuring of society or the creation of a 'new man', they sense their own limitations, the intractable nature of social relationships and the non-malleability of culture. Authoritarians are less concerned about those disaffected, as long as they do not challenge the regime. Dictators of this ilk boast no agenda to penetrate and change the thoughts and values of peoples; they settle for

political control. Shakespeare's King Henry V captured the authoritarian's

view, saying, 'Every subject's duty is to the king; but every subject's soul is his own.'17

The totalitarian despises, intends to obliterate and replace the moribund old order; a Burkean revulsion for the excesses of radicals and revolutions

permeates the authoritarian milieu. Order and the veneration of tradition

prevail.18 Power, tempered by custom, conventions, understandings and the more pluralist nature of society, constrains these leaders.

Totalitarian dictators view opposition, even neutrality, as treason. Stroessner exhibited a marked intolerance for mere absence of opposition, but stopped short of Castro's addiction to unity. True totalitarians possess millennial aims that demand all be anointed in the exclusive claim to the

truth, compelling men to compete for degrees of dedication, for levels of devotion. By contrast, authoritarians generally view obedience as the absence of overt resistance. A certain amount of token opposition (as

15 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd ed. (New York, 1965), p. 44.

16 Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon (New York, 1941), p. 8z. 17 William Shakespeare, King Henry V (Cambridge, MA, 1954), p. I00. 18 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York, i966).

Castro and Stroessner compared 605

existed under Stroessner) may even be allowed to channel off discontent and create a democratic facade. 'Limited pluralism' - tolerated patterns of

semi-opposition not controlled by the regime, that exist and even criticise without fundamentally challenging the dictator- is absent from true totalitarian dictatorship. While certain authoritarian regimes may practice terrorism on a totalitarian scale in the attempt to instil fear in the public at large (the Argentine military of the late 1970s), no attempt is made to

refashion social relations nor emasculate all autonomous groups except those created by the State.19

Limited pluralism reflects the circumscribed goals of authoritarians. Dictators like Stroessner strive to command and avoid challenges to their rule, not to transform social reality. Bereft of utopian goals requiring a mobilised and penetrated polity, true authoritarians (unlike Stroessner) do not seek mass approbation; they rely on fear rather than involvement and are satisfied with acquiescence or apathy. Ideological commitment to a

visionary future informs larger tasks for totalitarians such as Castro. They not only command and manage, but strive to organise consent, to develop a broad consensus and inspire the polity to engage in societal upheaval by state-directed action.

A final area of differentiation concerns the ends of non-democratic rule and the corruption of the dictator. Corruption represents a type of private- regarding behaviour exploiting public political authority for essentially private material motivation and advantage.20 As Lord Acton recognised, no absolutist regime can be immune from this type of graft. Regarding the

dictator, however, a qualitative difference exists. Power utilised for

essentially private ends is endemic in authoritarian dictatorship. Lacking the constraining ideological goals and roles which normatively bind

totalitarians, Stroessners, Somozas and Trujillos treat the national

patrimony essentially as a huge private domain. Lacking a prophetic vision, authoritarian support is based not on a shared ideology, but on a

vaguer 'mentality' or secular spoils system engendered by interests created by the dictator's rule.

Personal aggrandisement distinguishes authoritarians. Stalin's, Hitler's Mao's or Castro's dictatorship was/is not directed to the personal enrichment of the dictator, his family or cronies. These leaders could never have sustained their prophetic charisma, or the admiration and

loyalty of their people (including intellectuals and foreigners), had they not based their rule on higher, impersonal principles and objectives than

simply lining their own pockets. Totalitarians may fuse the public and

19 See Juan Linz, 'An Authoritarian Regime: Spain', in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen (eds.), Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems (Helsinki, 1964), pp. 291-341.

20 Stephen D. Morris, 'Corruption and the Mexican Political System', Corruption and

Reform, no. 2 (Dordrecht, Netherlands, I987), pp. 3-I5.

606 Paul C. Sondrol

private in their zeal for ideological objectives, but a boundary exists between the public treasury and the private wealth of the ruler.

Increasingly that wall is breached as one moves along the spectrum in the authoritarian direction.21

Charisma, role and corruption, then, distinguish totalitarians and authoritarians. Totalitarians are visionaries, destined to direct and

embody the will of the mobilised masses towards the millennium. As

agents of history, they are motivated and legitimised by a far higher calling than personal greed. Authoritarians harbour no such illusions about either themselves or the malleability of man, values or society. No

ideological vision of a utopian future informs their role. They function to

perpetuate power, maintain order, enrich themselves and buy the loyalty of their coterie concomitant to a more pluralist environment. Distinctions between totalitarian and authoritarian dictators categorise non-democratic

leadership types intelligibly. This framework bears directly on the

subsequent analysis.

Fidel Castro - totalitarian dictator

Fidel Castro is the totalitarian dictator of communist Cuba. Overwhelming governmental power encroaches upon virtually every aspect of Cuban life. No autonomous groups or non-regulated 'counter-revolutionary' forms of behaviour exist independent of Castro. After more than thirty years, he remains not only the inspirational lzder maximo (maximum leader), guiding the transformation of people and culture in Cuba, but also the messianic comandante, exhorting the constant anti-imperialist struggle (lucha) for a

revolutionary brave new world via Cuba's internationalist foreign policy in Africa and Asia.22 In Castro, stark absolutism is cast in mystical terms:

21 Juan J. Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes', in Fred Greenstein and Nelson

Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3 (Reading, Mass., 1975), pp. 260-2. A clear exception is Romanian Nicolae Ceausescu, whose overthrow and execution on 25

December 1989 revealed a palatial life-style. However, Ceausescu's megalomania and

prophetic delusions - more than mere greed - prompted his plundering. Also, the Eastern European regimes had totalitarianism imposed upon them. Unlike Castro, Hitler, Mussolini or Mao, Ceausescu or East Germany's Erik Honecker did not achieve

supreme power by leading their own revolution, but rather through Soviet-sponsored intra-party competition. See Mary Ellen Fischer, 'Idol or Leader? The Origins and Future of the Ceausescu Cult', in Daniel N. Nelson (ed.), Romania in the I98os (Boulder, 1981), pp. I17-4I.

22 For Castro's symbiosis of the totalitarian regime's domestic needs (militancy, agitation) and its confrontational, expansionist foreign policy, see Richard Fagen, 'Mass Mobilization in Cuba: The Symbolism of Struggle', Journal of International Affairs, vol.

20, no. 2 (1966), p. 267. More current and detailed is Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1989).

Castro and Stroessner compared 607

[Castro] remains the ideologue, the guerrilla leader, the founder, the heroic leader who defied not only foes (Batista and the United States) but also friends (the Soviet Union). He...is the inspirational source of political mobilization and support. Marxist-Leninism and the [Communist Party] are painted in his own colors... Only in Nazi Germany has the personal element accounted for so much.23

Castro is the dominant force creating and amalgamating the political regime with a mobilised Cuban civil society. When the totalitarian

template of prophetic charisma, function, and dictatorship for impersonal purposes is laid over Castro, the match is almost perfect. Additionally, Castro's totalitarian dictatorship superimposes a deeper, Latin American caudillo heritage.

The centrality of Castro to Cuban totalitarianism rests largely in his charismatic leadership and embodiment of the Revolution. During the

long struggle against the Batista dictatorship, Castro remained the

undisputed guerrilla leader, ideologue and caudillo. He led the bloody attack on the Moncada barracks that launched the Revolution in I953. Castro's trial speech 'History Will Absolve Me' became the creation myth for the regime -the moral imperative crystallising the reasons for rebellion -and remains the fundamental, venerated and legendary scripture of the Revolution. Castro co-founded the 26th of July Movement, the main opposition to Batista during the insurgency. He commanded the Granma expedition from Mexico and the rebel army it

spawned that fought the guerrilla war and ultimately took power. Finally, Castro imposed, nurtured and guided the Marxist-Leninist framework on the revolutionary political system he stood above.24

Castro's charisma and personal interrelationship with Cuba's masses reflects the totalitarian mystique. The messianic quality is a pillar of

regime legitimation. Richard Fagan argues that Castro's followers see him as blessed, protected and acting in concert with larger historical forces not

always visible to more ordinary men. Accordingly, Castro alone retains the right to determine the 'correct' direction of the Revolution.25 Jorge Dominguez sees Castro's spellbinding 'History Will Absolve Me' speech as a clear articulation of totalitarian messianism. Castro depends not upon superficial elections; he is 'elected' by an historical, supernatural force and

authority. Castro both commands and represents; the leader is not a

'sovereign' imposing himself upon followers. Rather, it is Castro who follows the people and history: 23 Roy Macridis, Modern Political Regimes (Boston, 1986), p. 209. 24 Fidel Castro, Revolutionary Struggle 7947-79I8: Selected Works of Fidel Castro, edited by

Roland E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes (Cambridge, MA, 1972). 25 Richard Fagan, 'Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro', Western PoliticalQuarterly, vol. i8, no. 2 (I965), pp. 275-84.

608 Paul C. Sondrol

History-as-god elects the revolutionary leader to act with and for his followers... The cause, the idea, history incarnate in the people elects the leader to serve, to implement, and hence to rule: the essence of charismatic legitimation. 26

Castro functions as an essential instrument of the totalitarian movement in Cuba. Attachment to Castro and the mass following he generates substitute for political and party organisation. Castro's absolutism during the early years of revolutionary Cuba provided the substance and sustenance of the new order. During the critical formative decade of the i96os, few permanent stable institutions - even as basic as the political party - emerged. Consequently, revolutionary ideology and legitimacy blurred with the persona of Castro.27

Castro's personality cult permeates the regime. Although declaring himself a Marxist-Leninist in December of 1961, the ideology of socialist Cuba quickly bore the unique stamp of Castro. Fidelismo, argued revolutionary ideologue Che Guevara, formed something distinct from Marxist-Leninism. While the latter stresses historical determinism and a

vanguard party organisation, fidelismo is non-specific, anti-organisational and undogmatic; a 'revolution without blueprint' retaining the highly personalised leadership of Castro via the 'close dialectical unity which exists between the individual [Castro] and the masses'.28

Theodore Draper views 'Castroism' as representing a particular cross- fertilisation, blending Latin America's personalist and revolutionary tradition and Europe's socialist tradition. Draper interprets Castro as a

novel, Latin American socialist caudillo, needing to justify power ideologically. 'Castroism is a leader in search of a movement, a movement in search of power, and power in search of an ideology. '29

This analysis strikes a responsive chord amongst Latin Americanists. While Castro possesses charisma, vision, ideology, rhetorical gifts and

intellect, these 'totalitarian' qualities are necessary but not sufficient factors to explain his iron grip over Cuban political life for a third of a

26 Jorge I. Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., I978), pp. I97-8. 27 William M. LeoGrande, 'Party Development in Revolutionary Cuba', Journal of

InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 21, no. 4 (I979), pp. 457-80. 28 Ernesto Che Guevara, Man and Socialism in Cuba (Havana, 1967), p. I7. For expanded

analysis of fidelismo see, among others, Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (New York, 1967); and Edward Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma (Boston, 1974), pp. I46-67. Gonzalez perhaps best explains this blending of personalism and ideology into fidelismo, comparing it to Stalinism where party and state institutions were subordinate to the fiat of the dictator. By this definition, fidelismo appears little different from the fiihrerstat of Germany.

29 Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York, I965), pp. 48-9. An additional perspective that probes Castro's mindset is a Rand Corporation study by Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, Castro, Cuba, and the World (Santa Monica, CA, I986).

Castro and Stroessner compared 609

century. Like all Latin American strong-men, Castro benefits from a caudillo tradition: 'the union of personalism and violence for the conquest of power'.30 This heritage augments personal autocratic power and imbues the region with the 'spirit of caudillaje...an ethos which grants individual deference and respect on the basis of taking and holding public power .31

As Castro's precursor, the caudillo was a political buccaneer whose

personal power was the notable characteristic. Caudillos such as Argentina's Juan Manuel de Rosas whom Domingo Faustino Sarmiento castigates indirectly in Facundo, or Paraguay's Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia, fictionalised in the Roa Bastos novel Yo El Supremo, supported their rule

by machismo and leadership qualities, not theoretical and abstract de jure powers.32 The caudillo possessed and exhibited an extraordinary char- ismatic virility, moral authority and penchant for the naked exercise of

power. The Venezuelan pensador Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, describes the caudillo

as a 'democratic caesar', whose authority is founded on the unconscious

suggestion of the masses. Vallenilla Lanz was not analysing totalitarianism, nor Castro, when he cast the democratic caesar as the personification of the people, the ideals of society, always representing the collective will of the masses, yet the similarities are striking. The caesar's (Castro's) moral and political authority transcends law, constitution, political party or

principle. He is 'democracy personified... the nation-made man. In him are synthesised... democracy and autocracy.'33

The tradition of political power as personal identifies the leader with the state and defines the role of charismatic dictators like Castro. As the maximum leader, Castro fulfils a psychic functional requirement in Cuban

society, still permeated by the hispanic traditions of caudillaje. Castro embodies in his own attractive and legendary mannerisms - bravado, machismo, a superb intellect, hidalgo generosity - those inner qualities that Cubans themselves feel and would like to manifest, were they only able to do so.34 30 Robert Gilmore, Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela (Athens, Ohio, i964), p. 47. See

also William S. Stokes, 'Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics', Western Political Quartery, vol. 5 (I952), pp. 445-68.

31 Glen Caudill Dealy, The Public Man (Amherst, 1977), p. 33. Caudillaje typifies a style of life oriented to the values of public leadership. The word itself may be translated as the domination of a caudillo.

32 Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Facundo: Civiligacion y Barbarie (Buenos Aires, i959); Augusto Roa Bastos, Yo El Supremo (New York, I986).

33 Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, Cesarismo Democrdtico (Caracas, I96i), p. 207. Translation by author.

34 See the more general analysis by Eric Wolf and James C. Hansen, 'Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis', Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 9, no. 2 (95 7), pp. I68-79.

6 o Paul C. Sondrol

Castro's personality cult is congruent with the totalitarian model, but also derives from a more general Hispanic caudillo tradition. Unique Cuban/Latin American aspects supporting Castro's dictatorship are variables conceptually absent from the larger, general totalitarian

taxonomy formulated by Friedrich, Linz and elaborated by Kirkpatrick.35 Castro's totalitarianism also manifests itself in a vision concerning the

ends of total power. Rampant private privilege under Fulgencio Batista and Castro's ideological orthodoxy regarding the redistributive public purposes of revolutionary government combine to imbue him with a rigid revulsion to materialism, graft and corruption. Material incentive is anathema to Castro's core revolutionary ideals and laissez faire de- centralisation threatens his political control over the economy. Continual

railings against 'evil money', personal enrichment, exhortations regarding improbity and appeals to the 'higher values' of revolutionary con- sciousness (conciencia), sacrifice and discipline particularly distinguish Castro from other hemispheric despots. The characteristic totalitarian

utopianism is evident in his public orations:

Perhaps our greatest idealism lies in having believed that a society that had barely begun to live in a world that for thousands of years had lived under the law of 'an eye for an eye...', the law of egoism, the law of deceit and the law of exploitation could, all of a sudden, be turned into a society in which everybody behaved in an ethical, moral way.36

Castro remains personally immune to the proverbial corruption affecting autocrats long in power. As head of state, he enjoys a degree of

luxury and privilege, yet on a modest scale compared with many Latin American presidents, and even Communist leaders elsewhere. Far from ascetic in his taste for good scotch whisky or his once-famous penchant for cigars, Castro seems, however, to have no interest in the more base accoutrements of power, such as fancy clothes, philandering liaisons, or wealth. The Sierra Maestra legend informs Castro's habitual wearing of the olive-green uniform and guerrilla beard, perpetuating the spartan guerrillero image. His female companion of thirty years' standing, Celia

Sanchez, died of cancer in I980. Castro's revolutionary elan demands that he remain above reproach, and no personal scandal has ever besmirched this reputation.

Castro also demands rectitude from other public officials. While old-

style theft of public funds or bribery occasionally occurs, unscrupulous public officials are automatically branded enemies of the state and

35 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship; Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes'; Kirkpatrick, 'Reflections on Totalitarianism', in Dictatorships and Double Standards, pp. 96-1 3 8.

36 Fidel Castro, Granma Weekly Review (20 Sept. 1979).

Castro and Stroessner compared 6II

socialism. Apostasy is punished severely, with public confession, disgrace, and stiff prison sentences. The mid-i989 drug-smuggling scandal, trial and execution of one of the nation's most decorated military officers, General Arnaldo Ochoa, along with four other high-ranking officers, illustrates this and subsequent points.37

Periodic moral rectification campaigns and persecution of officials for

corruption also serve other ends. First, Castro's rhetoric accompanying anti-corruption campaigns pre-empts public debate or scrutiny of fundamental regime flaws, allowing him to mobilise support and escape system-level accountability by blaming 'scapegoats' for an inability to attain revolutionary goals. Second, episodic purges against high officials like Ochoa pulverise opposition or nascent 'limited pluralism' (actual, potential and imagined) while still in embryonic form; thus re-establishing totalitarian elite cohesion.38 Finally, the ceremonial 'uprooting of the evil in society' helps rejuvenate popular faith in the moral integrity of Castro's

regime, reinforcing faith in the egalitarian goals of the Revolution.39 Scarcities and privations mount in Cuba as Castro continues to appeal to moral incentives. But his commitment to probity and demands that all share in the ideals and burdens of the Revolution helps sustain affective

supports (diffuse, generalised attachments) even while instrumental

supports (specific, utilitarian considerations) wane.40 Fidel Castro's rule conforms to the syndromatic features of totalitarian

dictatorship superimposed over a deeper, Latin American caudillo heritage. Castro remains the charismatic leader; he functions as the indispensable prophet and ideologue guiding Cuba towards a socialist utopia, and utilises his dictatorship for impersonal purposes. Corruption has dwindled from pre-revolutionary days. When it appears, it is used as a diversion from structural flaws, including the dysfunctionality of Castro's cen- tralisation of power.

Alfredo Stroessner - authoritarian dictatorship and proto-totalitarianism

General Alfredo Stroessner's long rule and precipitous fall provides an

apparent textbook case for conventional perceptions of the quintessential authoritarian dictator: a soldier in mufti, corrupt, repressive, standing for

nothing more than personal aggrandisement, anti-Communist and

37 For transcripts of the show trial, see Vindicacion de Cuba (Havana, I989). 38 For an analysis of this aspect in the Ochoa episode, see the commentary in the New

York Times Review of Books, 'Fidel and Religion', 7 Dec. 1989. 39 Morris, 'Corruption', pp. 3-I5. 40 Dominguez, Cuba, pp. 229-33; also Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York,

1986), p. 8i. The terms 'affective' and 'instrumental' supports come from David Easton, 'A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support', British Journal of Political Science, vol. 5 (1975), pp. 435-57.

612 Paul C. Sondrol

eventually overthrown. But, while stereotypes abound, Stroessner's has

largely remained a forgotten dictatorship in comparison with other, better-known hemispheric despots, such as Castro. The dearth of serious

study stems from Paraguay's geographic isolation, lack of great power investment or Cold War considerations and Stroessner's own low profile. Stroessner, if discussed at all, is usually dismissed out-of-hand by ill- informed and inaccurate generalisations.

A closer examination, utilising the rubric of (i) charisma; (2) role; and

(3) corruption, reveals important similarities and contrasts with both Castro and the totalitarian/authoritarian taxonomy. While his regime was at base an authoritarian personalist (not military) dictatorship, a totalitarian 'impulse' pervaded Stroessner's rule, including a militant, mass-based party apparatus and a penetrated, politicised armed forces.

Stroessner's longevity had little to do with personal charisma. He was never a prophetic leader proselytising utopian futures. In personal demeanour, Stroessner is described as a 'taciturn man... heavy and

ponderous in his movements'.41 In contrast to spellbinding orators such as Castro, Stroessner was given to rather pedantic patriotic banalities and

boring recitations of his regime's economic improvements. Yet Stroessner appeared to be relatively popular. Interviews with

Paraguayans, the general impression gained from field research, and corroboration by other scholars and US intelligence officers support the view that Stroessner relied on a base of popular support buttressed by a

42 disciplined mass party.4

Few twentieth-century dictators last a third of a century relying on hamfisted repression alone. Paraguayan acceptance of Stroessner stemmed from the nation's political culture, Stroessner's own manipulation of

Paraguayan values, and his control over the three mainstays of his regime: the Colorado Party, the military and corruption.

No nation in Latin America has a more firmly rooted authoritarian

legacy than Paraguay. Throughout its history, the political culture

approximates Samuel Huntington's 'praetorian society', characterised by the weakness of effective political institutions, lack of consensus among groups concerning legitimate methods of resolving conflicts and a continual involvement of the military in government.43 Spanish colonial rule was mixed with ideological thought control perpetrated by the early

41 Richard Bourne, Political Leaders of Latin America (New York, I970), p. IOI. 42 Interviews with, among others, Adriano Iralla Burgos, Director, Oficina de Estudios

Paraguayos, Universidad Cat6lico, Asunci6n, 5 June 1988; these conclusions confirmed in interview with Jack Martin, Political Officer, US Embassy, Asunci6n, 7 June 1988 and conversation with Paraguayan specialist Paul H. Lewis, Asunci6n, 12 June 1988.

43 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, I968), pp. 192-263.

Castro and Stroessner compared 61 3

Jesuits who established a system of reducciones, regulating every aspect of

daily life for a century among the native Guarani Indians in the i6oos. Sterile despotism continued after independence by the dictatorships of Dr

Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia (1814-40), Antonio L6pez (I84I-62) and Francisco Solana L6pez (i862-70). Francia set the early tone.

Emerging from the wars of independence in the i8ios determined to break the resistance of the upper classes and refashion Paraguay into a

unique and autonomous nation, Francia created a hermit police state by sealing off the borders:

... there was a totalitarian atmosphere about the [Francia] regime that was more oppressive than the brutal but chaotic caudillo governments elsewhere in South America ... spies and informers were ubiquitous ... terror was systematic.44

Continuing with the two Lopez', a tradition of extremely repressive dictatorship was ingrained into the national consciousness. These caudillos ruled during the formative generations of Paraguay's history, perpetuating a traditional intolerance to opposition and dissent, political repression, exaggerated adulation of strongman leadership and political monism. Involvement in two of the bloodiest wars (the Triple Alliance, I865-70 and the Chaco, I932-5) in the continent's history enhanced the position of the armed forces as major political actors and national saviours, fostering a history of martial intervention in politics.

The decidedly fascist cast to the military regimes headed by Major Rafael Franco, Marshall Felix Estiggaribia and General Higinio Morinigo throughout the I93os and 1940S reinforced the traditional xenophobia permeating Paraguayan political culture, enshrining authoritarian values. These strongmen buttressed the norms of resistance to and suspicion of

'foreign' ideas, as in democratic ideology and systems of government not

geared to the realities of the Paraguayan experience.45 This monotonous

history of dictatorship with only brief and chaotic interludes of open government paved the way for Stroessner's own golpe in 1954.

Such a persistent authoritarian pattern is an underlying factor nurturing and sustaining a soldierly elite vested in militarism and producing a public psychologically habituated to dictatorship. Knowing no other political arrangement than authoritarianism, the people boasted no expectations of a more balanced polity. Politically naive, apathetic and xenophobic, Paraguayans accepted Stroessner (exalted, appropriately as 'El Continu-

ador') more or less willingly as congruent with the milieu.46 44 Paul Lewis, Socialism, Liberalism and Dictatorship in Paraguay (New York, i982),

p. 23. See also Guido Rodriguez Alcala, Ideologia autoritaria (Asunci6n, I987). 45 Alfredo Seiferheld, Nazismoyfascismo en el Paraguay (Asunci6n, 1985), pp. 2II-I6. 46 On these and related points, see Paul C. Sondrol, 'Authoritarianism in Paraguay: An

Analysis of Three Contending Paradigms', Review of Latin American Studies, vol. 3, no. i (I990), pp. 83-105.

23 LAS 23

614 Paul C. Sondrol

A crucial determinant of Stroessner's longevity centred on his

recognising the importance of ceremony and symbolism in Paraguayan culture. Stroessner effectively manipulated the myths and values of the nation to lend legitimacy to his dictatorship, approximating the

archetypical caudillo described by Hugh Hamill:

The success of the caudillo is not only the number of years in power but also ... the skill with which he weds himself to the patriotic mythology, history, folk, customs, religious observances, fraternal and kinship groups, national psy- chology, and political traditions.47

Stroessner's communion with Paraguayans took two seemingly contradictory forms - the 'common' and the 'regal' style. Stroessner was a perfectly approachable and familiar figure to Paraguayos, practising a

petitionary form of rule in keeping with Paraguay's 'shirt-sleeve

populism'.48 Congruent with the egalitarian nature of Paraguayan society, Stroessner devoted an enormous amount of time to parochial concerns, including photo opportunities with schoolchildren, meetings with well-

wishers, consultations with leaders of industry, business and labour, average citizens, or any complainant with a problem, often of a personal nature, who felt the right to go directly to the President. At least prior to

Nicaraguan ex-President Anastasio Somoza's assassination in 1980, Stroessner drove himself without protection to the local chess club in downtown Asunci6n and played any and all challengers who happened to

stop.49 Stroessner ruled a small nation of 3.5 million for almost two

generations. By I985, 70 % of the population had grown to adulthood

knowing no other leader. Stroessner's apparent folksiness and availability, aside from the obvious

public relations benefit, was functional to his conception of role and rule. Stroessner had no larger utopian vision than keeping himself in power. He may or may not have cared about political popularity - which was

impossible to gauge empirically given restrictions on press and free

expression. But being surrounded in the Presidential Palace by sycophants had an isolating effect. Travelling the country and meeting with ordinary citizens, regional military commanders or local party officials afforded Stroessner continued access to new channels of information, keeping him abreast of a changing political environment. This sort of 'constituency service' distinguished Stroessner from more removed authoritarians who

simply retired to corpulent languor in the presidential palace and never visited the country.50 It also legitimated Stroessner by making him appear

47 Hugh Hamill, Dictatorship in Spanish America (New York, 1965), p. 13. 48 Paul H. Lewis, Paraguay Under Stroessner (Chapel Hill, I980), p. 108.

49 Bourne, Political Leaders, pp. i82-5. 0 See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York, 1966).

Castro and Stroessner compared 61 5

responsive to the people. Stroessner's singular ability to play the role of ombudsman in redressing local grievances was similar to the personal link that Castro performs.

Stroessner's pre-eminence, like Castro's, allowed him to bypass institutional channels for decision-making and to determine policy or course corrections by fiat. Stroessner alone commanded the attention to

galvanise public opinion behind regime initiatives. He was no mere

figurehead. Stroessner, like Castro, was the 'great helmsman' and guiding spirit of the Stronato (the Stroessner regime).51 Personal inspection tours, often unannounced, allowed Stroessner to serve, as does Castro, as his

regime's 'intuitive barometer of popular sentiment, sounding out public opinion and eliciting criticism from the rank and file'.52 Stroessner's direct, common touch was important in cultivating and maintaining mass

allegiance over many years. Stroessner proved equally adept at the more regal functions associated

with chief-of-state duties. He presided over the nation's most important ceremonial occasions with a solemnity that a still traditional, highly religious and intensely nationalistic populace appreciated. Glittering occasions such as the feast days of San Blas, Corpus Christi, or Heroes Day and Chaco Armistice, found the President laying a wreath or giving a

patriotic speech. Stroessner headed the pomp and pageantry surrounding visits by foreign heads of state, trade delegations or military missions, ceremonies which received heavy coverage by the local, controlled press and were followed closely by the people. As citizens of a small, poor country, Paraguayans obviously enjoyed and took pride in these displays of the importance of the nation, its traditions, and the dignity that Stroessner displayed.53

Machiavellian designs to maintain power fail fully to explain Stroessner's longevity. Retaining control clearly was the overriding goal, but other motives existed. Stroessner was a patriotic hero of the Chaco War. Like Castro, Stroessner exhibited in his personal mannerisms and style of leadership the same sorts of qualities his countrymen admired. Because he was so typically Paraguayan - authoritarian, ultra-nationalist

51 Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro, pp. 82-5; Paul Lewis, Socialism, p. 69; Carlos Miranda, The Stroessner Era (Boulder, 1990). 52 Gonzalez, ibid., p. I84.

53 The author remembers attention in Asunci6n riveted on Stroessner's June 1988 speech before the United Nations General Assembly on (of all topics) nuclear disarmament. The speech was carried live via direct satellite feed on both of Paraguay's television networks. It was patently crafted for domestic consumption; being more a nationalistic defence of democracy 'Paraguayan style'. The cameras remained glued to Stroessner. Later, it was revealed the General Assembly was almost empty of spectators who were boycotting the speech in protest against Stroessner's dictatorship. The speech was a huge success in Asuncion.

23-2

6 6 Paul C. Sondrol

and xenophobic - Stroessner succeeded in eliciting an almost irrational admiration on the part of many Paraguayans more characteristic of a totalitarian like Castro. While he dedicated his energies to maintaining power, Stroessner also clearly believed in the conservative, patriotic and

religious values of the society from which he emerged. He saw nothing incompatible in the manipulation of those symbols to support his rule.

Stroessner's durability thus rested on considerable skill as an astute

politician. An unquestioned administrative capacity, coupled with a

penchant for details, long work hours and a ruthless obsession for

personal power helped him overcome initial opposition from within the Colorado Party, bureaucracy and military.54

Identifying himself with the century-old Colorado Party, Stroessner secured a popular base for his regime; a key difference from other

contemporary right-wing dictatorships in Latin America, such as Brazil

(1964-84) or Argentina (1966-72; 1976-82). Stroessner's decision to collaborate with the Colorados was a pretext to bring the party under his formal control.

A pseudo-totalitarian 'caesarist' impulse to expand the scope of his control pervaded the Stronato.55 By purging the Colorados of dissidents, Stroessner adeptly transformed the organisation into a personalist vehicle of his dictatorship. By 1976, no factions divided the Colorados; everyone was a stroessnerista. Since the only avenue to a modicum of safety, prosperity and power lay with the hegemonic regime, allegiance and

proximity to Stroessner became the sine qua non of political survival. Moreover, a fanatical partisanship akin to totalitarian cadres, clearly going beyond that normally associated with rightist, conservative authoritarian

regimes, handed Stroessner a weapon shared by Castro: a disciplined, militant mass-based party totally subservient to the dictator.

Stroessner reorganised the Colorados along verticalist lines. Mem-

bership was structured (and later computerised) through a national network of seccionales and subseccionales (branches and block wards). Similar to Castro's Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, these grass- roots organisations functioned to maintain party discipline and militancy, keep a registry of members, disseminate propaganda, dispense welfare and

patronage to correligionarios (party brethren) and keep oppositionists under surveillance.

Under Stroessner, a key criteria for securing employment in govern- ment was political affiliation and the growing bureaucracy represented an

54 For Stroessner's consolidation of power, see Leandro Prieto Yegros, El Coloradismo Eterno Con Stroessner, tomo I (Asunci6n, 1988).

55 The term comes from Lanz, Cesarismo Democrdtico. See also Franz Neumann's

conceptualisation of the term in his The Democratic and Authoritarian State (Glencoe, I957), P. 236.

Castro and Stroessner compared 617

enormous patronage network for loyal Colorados. Party headquarters became the central agency for public sector sinecures. In a poor country like Paraguay, a good job in the burgeoning popular sector engendered loyalty to Stroessner. As head of this spoils system, Stroessner was the ultimate patron and thus counted on a loyal bureaucracy directly responsive to his policy preferences. With only lip service paid to merit, Stroessner

enjoyed almost complete control over tenure, salaries, promotions, pensions and retirement. Party bureaucrats were also required to make

mandatory 'contributions' to Colorado coffers. Stroessner never relinquished formal command as head of the military

that brought him to power in 1954, and he intervened directly in troop movements and promotions of all officers. Not satisfied with mere obedience, he introduced political criteria (Colorado Party membership) for promotions and assignments, oaths of loyalty to Stroessner personally, and penetration via indoctrination in Stroessner's thoughts and pro- nouncements.56 As a counterweight to the military, Stroessner created a

parallel structure; a I,5 00 man elite presidential escort regiment of heavily armed soldiers, each carefully screened by the secret police before being allowed to join.57

Ameliorating Stroessner's totalitarian leanings, however, was the absence of any ideological imperative to restructure society and values as in Castro's Cuba. Moreover, while mirroring Castro's almost complete domination over the regime he headed, loyalty to Stroessner was not based on any comprehensive and intellectually elaborate ideology or charisma, but rather on a mixture of fear and rewards threatened and offered to his collaborators. Linz terms this form of leadership 'patrimonialism' whereby the binding norms and relations of bureaucratic administration are constantly subverted by the personal arbitrariness of the ruler.58

Loyalty to Stroessner by core regime elites - party hacks, bureaucrats, cabinet ministers and army officers -was ultimately based on the establishment of personal, reciprocal ties of faithfulness and obligation. Anthropologist George Foster calls these clientelistic relationships 'dyadic contracts' that 'tie people... of significantly different socioeconomic status

(or orders of power), who exchange different kinds of goods and services'. Lower ranking members of the contract anticipate protection,

56 See, for example, Dr Augusto Moreno, La epoca de Alfredo Stroessner: Valoracionpolitica, histdricayfilosofica (Asunci6n, I966); Ubaldo Centuri6n Morinigo, Stroessner, defensor de las instituciones democrdticas (Asunci6n, I983); Alfredo Stroessner, Politicay estrategia del desarrollo (Asunci6n, 1986).

57 This personal Presidential Escort Regiment fought the motorised Cavalry Divisions headed by General Andres Rodriguez in the coup of 3 Feb. I989. Approximately 300 men from both sides died in the fighting. 58 Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes', pp. 259-63.

6 8 Paul C. Sondrol

economic aid and security while higher status members of the dyad expect fealty, deference and service.59

These interweaving clientelist links characteristic in Latin America are an authoritarian theme of Paraguayan political culture, intersecting at the

apex of the national authority structure under Stroessner's dictatorship. Frederick Hicks argues that emphasis on reciprocal loyalties and

obligations forms the basis for caudillismo. It had been transcended in most of Latin America by 1870, but continued under Stroessner, featuring personalist rule supported and maintained by the creation of a loyal following of retainers rewarded by '...wealth or the power to bestow

patronage through control of access to the sources of wealth'.60

Cronyism, corruption and contraband were essential components binding subordinates to Stroessner. Lacking the ideological consensus found in Castro's Cuba, Stroessner substituted more materialistic inducements for loyalty. Moreover, unlike high-profile, accessible (but also easily controllable) and strategic Cuba, Paraguay's geopolitical position as a small, landlocked, isolated country bereft of great-power investment or Cold War considerations made racketeering a logical consequence. Many high-ranking military officers enjoyed lucrative side interests involving rich sinecures in state monopolies controlling major commercial areas, providing a front for the narcotics, contraband and

prostitution trades. Foreign companies (mostly Argentine and Brazilian) owning close to 80% of the nation's legitimate large businesses made

regular payoffs to Colorado bureaucrats to evade taxes and governmental red-tape.61

Stroessner's enormous black market racketeering bought complicity and support from leading figures in the armed forces, businessmen and

politicians resulting in elite groups owning a personal stake in Stroessner's rule and spoils system. An oft-repeated phrase heard in Asunci6n,

reportedly turned by Stroessner himself, summed up the nefarious

59 George M. Foster, 'The Dyadic Contract', American Anthropologist, vol. 63 (I96I), pp. I,173-92; idem., 'The Dyadic Contract II', ibid., vol. 65 (I963), pp. I,281-94. Quotation from p. 1,281.

60 Frederick Hicks, 'Interpersonal Relationships and Caudillismo in Paraguay', Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 13 (1971), pp. 89-i i. Quotation from

p. 99. 61 General-President Andres Rodriguez, long a Stroessner intimate before turning on

him, is considered by law enforcement authorities to be Paraguay's No. I drug trafficker. See The Arizona Daily Star, 5 Feb. i989.

The assassination of deposed Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza was rumoured to be linked to a faction of the officer corps surrounding Rodriguez, for Somoza's

parvenu involvement in the military's international cocaine trade. See COHA's

Washington Report on the Hemisphere, 30 Sept. 1980. For more on military corruption, see Carlos Maria Lezcano G., 'Lealtad al General-Presidente', Investigaciones Sociales Educacion Comunicacion - ISEC, vol. 6 (Asunci6n, 1986), p. 3.

Castro and Stroessner compared 619

philosophy thus:' It is necessary to foment criminality, because criminality produces complicity and complicity produces loyalty'.62

Conclusion

The Stroessner and Castro dictatorships offer parallels merging Latin American authoritarian, totalitarian and caudillo rule. Both Stroessner and Castro were and are the critical fulcrums of their respective regimes. Both autocrats cultivated a personality cult, fanatical following and dominated a single, official mass-based political party organised along personalist lines.

Beyond these similarities, however, the two dictators diverge. Castro is a pure totalitarian. Stroessner was largely authoritarian, yet a proto- totalitarian urge pervaded his rule. Castro remains the charismatic, visionary ideological strongman. Stroessner possessed no ideology beyond social conservatism, rabid anti-Communism, maintaining and

increasing his power. Castro is needed, not just as a person, but as a function to sit at the centre of his movement, to guide, give shape and lend it legitimacy. Stroessner's 'function' was Stroessner in power and little else. Loyalty to Castro is based on a blend of revolutionary, public-spirited ideological utopianism and caudillismo, creating a psychological and emotional identification between leader and followers. In Stroessner's

regime, caudillismo, but also corruption, bound elites together in felonious

complicity via a notorious web of clientelistic 'contracts'. And yet, the

political backwardness and traditions of Paraguay afforded Stroessner's

predatory sultanism a degree of popularity with the very masses repressed by his retainers.

Castro conforms to the larger, general totalitarian taxonomy. He evokes leadership comparisons with Hitler, Mussolini, Mao or Stalin. He is Cuba's charismatic maximum leader and continues to dominate a

political system largely his own creation and bearing his indelible stamp. Revolutionary Cuba without Castro is almost inconceivable; no better measure of his influence exists.

Stereotypes of Stroessner's long rule abound, but are largely inaccurate as no perfect analogy to his dictatorship exists. The Stronato was never a

military junta or faceless bureaucratic-authoritarian dictatorship. Neither the collective Paraguayan military nor the Colorado Party ruled Paraguay: Stroessner ruled. Stroessner was not simply primus inter pares within an

oligarchy; he was a personalist dictator, totally dominating the political regime. Stroessner even appeared relatively popular for an authoritarian

62 Robert J. Alexander, 'The Tyranny of General Stroessner', Freedom at Issue, vol. 41 (1977), pp. I6-I7. Quotation from interview with journalist and author Guido

Rodriguez Alcala, 7 June I988, Asunci6n. Translation by author.

620 Paul C. Sondrol

autocrat. Mass acceptance of Stroessner stemmed from Paraguay's unique authoritarian heritage, Stroessner's own belief in and manipulation of the nation's socio-cultural values, his control of a mass-based official party, the penetration and politicisation of the military and corruption binding the regime's elites.

Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner mirror the diametrics of totalitarianism and authoritarianism in ideological orientation, role

conception, and the public versus private ends of dictatorship. Exam- ination reveals how they intersect as unique examples of personalist dictatorship in Latin America. Analysis of Stroessner, in particular, implies that totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships are relative rather than absolute concepts. Stroessner's regime inched towards totalitarian-

ism, but the rudimentary nature of the political system, the limited

pluralism and parameters of custom and convention conspired to render it authoritarian in actual application.

Dictatorships are 'more' or 'less' totalitarian. Instead of Platonic ideals or rigid typologies, research should focus on directions, impulses and trends. This, however, is not to deny the valuable purpose totalitarianism serves in comparative analysis. Simply calling Castro's or Stroessner's

'personalist' or 'single-party' regimes utterly fails to capture the

distinguishing features of such systems, other than their being autocracies. Totalitarianism continues to distinguish dictatorships such as Castro's and

Stroessner's, but in these cases, less in kind than in degree.