1

Table of Contents Pp v Bayotas. G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994 ....................................... 2

Elcano v Hill July 17, 2011 77 SCRA 100 – May 26, 1977 ............................... 3

DMPI Employees vs. Velez Metal-NAFLU G.R. No. 129282, November 29,

2001 ................................................................................................................ 4

PRBL INC v Pp G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456 ....................... 5

Manliclic v. Calaunan G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007 512 SCRA 642 ........ 6

SPS. Pacis v Morales G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010 .............................. 7

Hun Hyung Park vs. Eung Won Choi G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007 ...... 8

Air France v. Carascoso and CA G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966 ....... 10

LRTA v Navidad GR 145804, 6 February 2003 ............................................... 11

Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. CA G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995 241

SCRA 671 ....................................................................................................... 12

Andamo v IAC G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990 ........................................ 13

Castro v Pp G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008 .................................................. 14

Picart vs. Smith March 15, 1918 37 Phil 809 ................................................. 14

Guillang v Bedania 588 SCRA 73 ................................................................... 15

ANECO v Balen et al., 11/25/09 .................................................................... 16

Mckee v IAC, G.R. No. L-68102, July 16, 1992, 211 SCRA 517 ...................... 17

Addenbrook v Pp, G.R. No. L-22995 June 29, 1967 ...................................... 17

Manila Electric Co. v Remoquillo, 99 Phil 117 ............................................... 18

PLDT vs. CA G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989 178 SCRA 94 ................. 19

Corliss v Manila Railroad Company, G.R. No. L-21291 .................................. 19

Negros Navigation v CA, G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997 ...................... 20

RCPI v CA, G.R. No. 79528, March 1991 ........................................................ 20

Chan Jr. v Iglesia ni Cristo G.R. No. 160283 October 14, 2005 ..................... 21

Taylor v Manila Electric, G.R. No. L-4977 March 22,1910| 16 Phil.8 ............ 21

Africa vs. Caltex, G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966 16 SCRA 448 ............... 23

Malayan Insurance vs CA G.R. No. L-36413, September 26, 1988 165 SCRA

536 ................................................................................................................ 23

Batiquin v CA 258 SCRA 334 .......................................................................... 24

RAMOS vs. CA 321 SCRA 584 ........................................................................ 25

Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan v Pp Gr No. 158996 ............................................... 26

Flores vs. Pineda............................................................................................ 27

Professional Services Inc. v. Agana, Gr No 126279 ....................................... 28

Manila Doctors Hospital v Chua G.R. No. 150355 July 31, 2006 ................... 29

Mercury Drug v De Leon G.R. No. 165622 .................................................... 30

Del Mar v CA and Del Mar G.R. No. 139008 March 13, 2002 ....................... 31

BPI vs. Casa Montessori Internationale, G. R. No. 149454 & 149507, May 28,

....................................................................................................................... 32

Philippine School of Business Administration vs. CA 205 SCRA 729 GR No.

84698. February 4, 1942 ............................................................................... 32

Child Learning Center v Tagario G.R. No. 150920 November 25, 2005 ........ 33

PNB vs Pike Sept. 20, 2005 ............................................................................ 34

Pacis v Morales G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010 .................................... 35

Lamis v Ong G.R. No. 148923. August 11, 2005 ........................................... 37

Ong v Metropolitan Water DistrictG.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958 ........... 38

Gotesco Investment Corporation vs. Chatto G.R. No. 87584, June 16, 1992

210 SCRA 18 .................................................................................................. 39

NPC v. Heirs of Casionan ............................................................................... 40

2

Sing and Ngo v Giap and Sons Inc G.R. No. 170596 ...................................... 42

Pp v Bayotas. G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994 Facts:

In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y

Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal

of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio

respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato

carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its

Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it

required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas'

civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his

comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of

accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his

commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the

case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved

for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the

civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand,

opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the

accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both

his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel

invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia

which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the

criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused

should die before final judgment is rendered.

Issue:

Whether death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

extinguishes his civil liability?

Held:

Affirmative. ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.

Criminal liability is totallyextinguished:1. By the death of the convict, as to

the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is

extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final

judgment; Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:"When a separate civil action

is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no

criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a

preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act

complained of."What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate

civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a

criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no

criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case,

the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be

that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of

evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking

Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the

criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex

delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the

accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in

the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is

extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal.

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter. In pursuing

recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the

criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil

action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of

accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive.

The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which,

if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable

consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in

the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is

contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the

3

institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a

criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego, however, failed to take note of this

fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for

the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate

civil action referred to under Article 30.Surely, it will take more than just a

summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil

action to an independent one such as that contemplated under

Article30.Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply

Article 30, the resolution of notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main

decision:"Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of

showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which

his estate would be liable."In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue

of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether

Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld

Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil

liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final

determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the

criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's

civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his

conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no

longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted

therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,

grounded as it is on the criminal. Applying this set of rules to the case at

bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his

criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of,

i.e., rape.

Elcano v Hill July 17, 2011 77 SCRA 100 – May 26,

1977 Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from

Crimes

Facts:

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano).

Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for

“lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against

Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the

Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in

the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been

extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by

reason of his marriage.

Issue:

Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article

2180.

Held:

Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the

filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the

offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and

found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if

accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both

scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of

the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words,

the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,

refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal

Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict

only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the

criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not

4

been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes

voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon

emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,

emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is,

however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage

of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage

or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the

child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though

he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real

property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can

sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or

guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC

however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age,

Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.

DMPI Employees vs. Velez Metal-NAFLU G.R. No.

129282, November 29, 2001 Facts:

An information for estafa was filed against Carmen Mandawe for

alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of

P608,532.46.Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen

Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller

of petitioner. Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta

Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint against Carmen

Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with

preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In time,

petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the ground that there is a

pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, Trial

court issued an order dismissing the case. However upon respondent’s

motion for reconsideration, the order of dismissal was recalled On Feb. 21

1997

Issue:

Whether or not the civil case could proceed independently of the

criminal case for Estafa without the necessary reservation exercised by the

party

Held:

Yes. As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries.

The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to

be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the

second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury

is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature.

Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."

This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the

commission of an offense.

Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and

indemnification of consequential damages

The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising

from thecommission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action

is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately

instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,

which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that: "(a) When a

criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability

arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the

criminal action

5

unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to

institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal

action."

Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that — "After the criminal

action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom

cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal

action

."

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability

under Articles 32,33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act

or omission, the rule has been changed. Under the present rule, only the

civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the

criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his

right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the

criminal action.

There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the

independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only

to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the

offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under

Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from

the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without

a reservation.

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining

to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000

are applicable to this case.

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending

and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in

the rules of procedure. Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil

action for damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent

Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even

if there was no reservation as to its filing.

PRBL INC v Pp G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427

SCRA 456 Facts:

On July 27, 1994, accused was found guilty and convicted of the

crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical

injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of

4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years, and to pay damages. Admittedly,

accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention that

Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal

when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and

provided by, filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We

affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.

Issue:

Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the

defense of its accused employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction

independently of the accused.

Held:

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged

is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the

offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it

separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary

civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code

may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction

6

meted out to the employee. What is deemed instituted in every criminal

prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil

liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,

contracts or quasicontracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately,

the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the

offended party may — subject to the control of the prosecutor — still

intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil

interest therein.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the

pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of

the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the

former's subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.

Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is

highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

Manliclic v. Calaunan G.R. No. 150157 January 25,

2007 512 SCRA 642 Facts:

Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.

(PRBLI) While driving his bus going to Manila, he bumped rear left side of

the owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan.

Because of the collision, petitioner was criminally charged with

reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property with physical injuries.

Subsequently, respondent filed a damage suit against petitioner and PRBLI.

According to respondent, his jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to

70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the

Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the

jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At

the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the

jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the

jeep when the jeep was hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner,

explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about togo to the left

lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was

to overtake another jeep in front of it.

Petitioner was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him.

However, in the civil case, he, along with his employer, PRBLI, was still made

to pay damages to respondent.

Issue:

What is the effect of Manliclic’s acquittal to the civil case?

Held:

Since the civil case is one for quasi delict, Manliclic’s Acquittal Does

not affect the case. Manliclic and PRBLI are still liable for damages

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under

the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is

entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists

between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for

quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing

damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal

Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under

the Civil Code.

It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a

finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil

liability based on quasi delict.

In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable

doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by

preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the

7

basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or

that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil

might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based

on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or

delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In

this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the

delict complained of.

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana,

same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of

reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission

complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact

from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility

arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict Is entirely separate and

distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under thePenal Code.

An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the

civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

SPS. Pacis v Morales G.R. No. 169467 February 25,

2010 Facts:

Petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against

respondent Morales.

Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student

who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and

Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store.

On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and

Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales

was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store

customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a

drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the

store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from

the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun,

the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the

gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the

bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.

A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag,

however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting

circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.

By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal

case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as

part of their evidence in the instant case.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering

the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual

damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the

plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.

Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court’s

Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of

the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition.

Issue:

Was Morales negligent?

Held:

Yes. This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of

petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may

enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the

crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent

civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of

8

enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against

Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages

against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners

based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil

Code.

Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of

the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under

Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own

negligence. Article 2176 states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such

fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between

the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this

Chapter.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun

store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and

Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of

purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic

security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to

Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.

Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in

his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous

in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in

possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take

exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike

the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a

business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher

degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable

about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded

weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others.

Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not

loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition

when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With

more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded

precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge

such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when

he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without

ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun

should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for

repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent

any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm

from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has

personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to

insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.

Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a

License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to

restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and

diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care

required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt

him from liability in this case.

Hun Hyung Park vs. Eung Won Choi G.R. No. 165496

February 12, 2007 Facts:

9

Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22,otherwise

known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133

postdated August28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was

dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded

not guilty.- After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion

for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his

Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received

the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of

knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.- (2/27/03) The MeTC of

Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. The

prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied.- Park appealed the

civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending that the dismissal

of thecriminal case should not include its civil aspect. The RTC held that

while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove Choi’s criminal

liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly

granted Park’s appeal and ordered Choi to pay himP1,875,000 with legal

interest.- Upon Choi’s motion for reconsideration, however,the RTC set

aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC “for

further proceedings, so that Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of

the case.” Park’s motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case

having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which dismissed his

petition.

Issue:

Whether the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil

aspect of the case in view of his demurer.

Held:

Yes. n case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the

accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the

demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case

because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of

evidence in suchaspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny

the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the

demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not

insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same

evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere

preponderance of evidence.- On the other hand, if the evidence so far

presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not

follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of

evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil

aspect of the case generally proceed. The only recognized instance when an

acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when

there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may

arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of

the case must perforce continue.- In the instant case, the MeTC granted the

demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or

omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not

assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for

a remand. Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the

civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on

appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, and (2) when respondent orally opposed

petitioner’s motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with

respect to the civil aspect of the case continue. Petitioner’s citation of

Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a court has jurisdiction over the

subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was

committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises

jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve. One of the

issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from

the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the

Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the

initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.- As for petitioner’s attribution

of waiver to respondent, it cannot be determined with certainty from the

records the nature of Choi’s alleged oral objections to Park’s motion for

reconsideration of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the

10

right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity

in the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon; hence, courts must

indulge every reasonable presumption against it. Dispositive Petition is

DENIED.

Air France v. Carascoso and CA G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966 Facts:

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its

authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class"

round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,

plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the

defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was

occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there

was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the

seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be

expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be

taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said

Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the

tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot

discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.

Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"

and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

Issue:

Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and

therefore entitles to damages?

Held:

Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to

and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that

said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of

the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed

reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist

class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no

guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend

upon the availability of first class seats. If, as petitioner underscores, a first-

class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the

fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air

passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security

then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline

aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and

say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the

passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a

written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be

notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between

passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.

Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence

intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.

Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at

Bangkok, if he had no seat or, if another had a better right to the seat? To

authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud

or bad faith. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith

in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn

from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was

averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the

action is put on wrongful expulsion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire

as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify

an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured

by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not

even required. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They

11

have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,

courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against

personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such

employees. So it is that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of

employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages

against the carrier.

LRTA v Navidad GR 145804, 6 February 2003 Facts:

On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past 7:00 p.m., Nicanor

Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a

“token” (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on

the platform near theLRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard

assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an

altercation between the twoapparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No

evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who,

between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the

LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by

Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and

he was killed instantaneously.

On 8 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad,

along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito

Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc.

(Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman

filed a counter claim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and

Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had

exercised due diligence in the election and supervision of its security guards.

The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin,

instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad

had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11

August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, ordering Prudent Security

and Escartin to jointly and severally pay Navidad (a) (1) Actual damages of

P44,830.00; (2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; (3) Indemnity for

the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; (b) Moral damages

of P50,000.00; (c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000; and (d) Costs of suit. The court

also dismissed the complaint against LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of

merit, and the compulsory counter claimof LRTA and Roman.

Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August

2000, the appellate court promulgated its decision exonerating Prudent

from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the

LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. The appellate court modified

the judgment ordering Roman and the LRTA solidarily liable to pay Navidad

(a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;(b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages; (c)

P50,000.00 as moral damages; (d)P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of

the deceased; and (e) P20,000.00 a sand for attorney’s fees. The appellate

court denied LRTA’s and Roman’s motion for reconsideration in its

resolution of 10 October 2000.

Issue:

Whether LRTA liable for tort arising from contract.

Held:

YES. The premise for employer’s liability for tort (under the

provisions of Article2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article

2180 of the Civil Code) is negligence or fault on the part of the employee.

Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the

basis of the presumption juristantum that the employer failed to exercise

diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of its

employees. The liability is primary and can onlybe negated by showing due

diligence in the selection and supervision of theemployee. Herein, such a

factual matter that has not been shown.

12

The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its

obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by

reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common

carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of

passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of

the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In

either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under

the contract of carriage.

A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the

same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual

and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well

apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort

is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which

constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of

a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the

contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the

rules on tort to apply.

Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. CA G.R. No. 108164

February 23, 1995 241 SCRA 671 Facts:

In October 1986 Luis Luna applied for a FAREASTCARD with Fart East

Bank. A supplemental card was also issued to his wife, Clarita. On August

1988, Clarita lost her card and promptly informed the bank of its loss for

which she submitted an Affidavit of Loss. The bank recorded this loss and

gave the credit card account a status of “Hot Card” and/or “Cancelled Card.”

Such record holds also for the principal card holder until such time that the

lost card was replaced. On October 1988, Luis Luna used his card to

purchase a despidida lunch for his friend in the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant.

His card was dishonored in the restaurant and he was forced to pay in cash,

amounting to almost P600.00. He felt embarrassed by this incident. He then

complained to Far East Bank and he found out that his account has been

cancelled without informing him. Bank security policy is to tag the card as

hostile when it is reported lost, however, the bank failed to inform him and

an overzealous employee failed to consider that it was the cardholder

himself presenting the credit card. The bank sent an apology letter to Mr.

Luna and to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure that Mr

Luna was a very valuable client. Spouses Luna still felt aggrieved and thus

filed this case for damages against Far East Bank. Far East Bank was

adjudged to pay the following: (a) P300,000.00 moral damages;(b)

P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.

Issue:

Whether Far East Bank is liable for damages to the Spouses Luna

amounting the above-mentioned figures?

Held:

Spouses Luna are entitled only to nominal damages but not moral

and exemplary damages. Moral damages are awarded if the defendant is to

be shown to have acted in bad faith. Article 2219 states that, “Moral

damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A

criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing

physical injuries; It is true that the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to

personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing however, can

sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of the Bank to cause

harm to private respondents. Neither could the bank’s negligence in failing

to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to

malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional

design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is

different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith

contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or

13

ill will. Nominal damages were awarded because of the simple fact that the

bank failed to notify Mr. Luna, thus entitle him to recover a measure of

damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly:

"Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the

plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be

vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the

plaintiff for any loss suffered by him."

Andamo v IAC G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990 Facts:

Spouses Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land which is

adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La

Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent

corporation, water paths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were

constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused

a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed

away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioner sand their laborers

during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other

improvements to destruction. Petitioners filed a criminal and a separate civil

action for damages against the respondent.

Issue:

Whether he IAC erred in affirming the trial court’s order dismissing

the civil case as the criminal case was still unresolved.

Held:

Yes. A careful examination of the afore quoted complaint shows

that the civil actionis one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on

quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a)

damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant,

or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the

connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the

defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Clearly, from

petitioner's complaint, the water paths and contrivances built by

respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of

petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between

the act of building these water paths and the damage sustained by

petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may

be the basis for the recovery of damages. petitioners' complaint sufficiently

alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage

due to the water paths and contrivances built by respondent corporation.

Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the

petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly

constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act

and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the

parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. Article 2176,

whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not

punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional

and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against

the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted

and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not

allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover

damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to

the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases

vary.

14

Castro v Pp G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008 Facts:

Justin Albert was the son of Mr. Tan. Justin was a Grade 12 student

of Reedley International School (RIS). He was dismissed for violating the

rules of his probation. Tan requested for a reconsideration and RIS imposed

non-appealable conditions such as not allowing Albert to participate in the

graduation ceremonies. Tan filed a complaint in the DepEd, claiming malice

and bad faith. DepEd nullified RIS sanctions as unreasonable and a denial of

due process. DepEd orders readmission of Albert without any conditions.

Albert finally participated in the graduation ceremonies. After the

graduation ceremonies, Tan talked to a fellow parent Ching, intimating his

contemplating suit against officers of RIS in their personal capacities,

including Asst. Headmaster Castro. Ching relayed the information to Castro.

At the end of the conversation, Castro said“ be careful talking to Tan, that’s

dangerous” Ching then relayed the information to Tan, and Tan filed a grave

oral defamation suit against Castro.

Issue:

Whether petitioner can still be held liable, or has double jeopardy

set in?

Held:

No. Petitioner cannot be held liable as double jeopardy has set in.

Double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent

court (3)after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and (5)

when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or

otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Thus, an

acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and

unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception is when

the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as we held in Galman

v. Sandiganbayan, when there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can

assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the

State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. He

rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial

court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for

this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.

Picart vs. Smith March 15, 1918 37 Phil 809 Facts:

Amando Picart seeks to recover from the defendant Frank Smith the

sum of Php31,100 as damages alleged to have been caused by an

automobile driven by Smith. The incident happened on Dec 12, 1912, at the

Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando, La Union. Picart was riding on his pony aver

the said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached

from the opposite direction driving his vehicle at 10 to 12miles per hour.

Smith blew his horn to give warning as he observed that the man was not

observing rules of the road. Smith continued his course and made two more

blasts. Picart was perturbed by the rapidity of the approach that he pulled

his pony to the right side of the railing. As the automobile approached,

Smith guided the automobile to its left, that being the proper side of the

road for the machine. Smith noticed that the pony was not frightened so he

continued without diminution of speed. When he learned that there was no

possibility for the pony to go on the other side, Smith drove his car to the

right to avoid hitting the pony, but in so doing the vehicle passed in a close

proximity to the horse that it became frightened and turned its belly across

the bridge with its head towards the railing. The horse was struck on the

hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.

The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. It showed

that the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the

railing was probably less than one half meters. The horse died and Picart

15

received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required

medical attention for several days.

Issue:

Whether Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise to a civil

obligation to repair the damage done to Picart and his pony.

Held:

Yes, the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Picart the

amount of P200. The sum is computed to include the value of the horse,

medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles

of his apparel. In the nature of things, this change in situation occurred

while the automobile was still some distance away. From this moment it

was no longer possible for Picart to escape being run down by going to a

place for greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed

entirely to Smith, and it was his duty to bring his car to an immediate stop

or seeing no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass

sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid collision. There was an

appreciable risk that a horse not acquainted with vehicles would react that

way. The Test to Determine the Existence of Negligence in a particular case

may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent

act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person

would have used the same situation? If not then he is guilty of negligence.

The law in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the

imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The

existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to

the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law

considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in the man of

ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. A

prudent man, placed in the position of Smith in the Court’s opinion would

have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with

risk and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as a

reasonable consequence of that course.

Guillang v Bedania 588 SCRA 73 Facts:

One afternoon of October 1994, Guillang was driving his Corolla

along Aguinaldo Highway in Cavite when it was hit by a turning 10-wheeler

truck driven by Rodolfo Bedania and owned by Rodolfo de Silva. The

passengers of the car were rushed to the Medical Center in Dasmariñas,

Cavite for treatment. Because of severe injuries, Antero, one of the

passengers, was later transferred to the Philippine General Hospital.

However, on 3 November1994, Antero died due to the injuries he sustained

from the collision. The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor

damage. On 24 April 1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the

heirs of Antero instituted a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict

against respondents Bedania and de Silva. On 5 December 2000, the trial

court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court found

Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a

sudden U-turn in the highway without due regard to traffic rules and the

safety of other motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly

negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver, Bedania. On appeal,

the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the civil case

for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed a MR but to no avail. Hence, this

case.

Issue:

Who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners?

Held:

16

The trial court held Bedania and de Silva, as Bedania’s employer,

liable because the proximate cause of the collision was the sudden U-turn

executed by Bedania without any signal lights. On the other hand, the Court

of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and held Genaro liable because

the proximate cause of the collision was Genaro’s failure to stop the car

despite seeing that Bedania was making a U-turn.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of

the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance

which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers

injury. In Picart v. Smith, we held that the test of negligence is whether the

defendant in doing the alleged negligent act used that reasonable care and

caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation

Clearly, Bedania’s negligence was the proximate cause of the

collision which claimed the life of Antero and injured the petitioners.

Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and

without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision

is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed

with the proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have

happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a

serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize

that risk. The truck’s sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led to

the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of

petitioners.

ANECO v Balen et al., 11/25/09 Facts:

Petitioner Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO) is a

duly organized and registered consumers cooperative, engaged in supplying

electricity in the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City. In 1981,

ANECO installed an electric post in Purok 4, Ata-atahon, Nasipit, Agusan del

Norte, with its main distribution line of 13,000 kilovolts traversing Angelita

Balen’s (Balen’s) residence. Balen’s father, Miguel, protested the installation

with the District Engineer’s Office and with ANECO, but his protest just fell

on deaf ears.

On July 25, 1992, Balen, Hercules Lariosa (Lariosa) and Celestino

Exclamado (Exclamado) were electrocuted while removing the television

antenna (TV antenna) from Balen’s residence. The antenna pole touched

ANECO’s main distribution line which resulted in their electrocution.

Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa suffered extensive third

degree burns.

Issue:

Whether there was negligence involved.

Held:

Yes. The taking down by [respondents] of the antenna in MIGUEL

BALEN’s house would not have caused their electrocution were it not for

the negligence of ANECO in installing live wires over the roof of the said

house.

Clearly, ANECO’s act of leaving unprotected and uninsulated the

main distribution line over Balen’s residence was the proximate cause of the

incident which claimed Exclamado’s life and injured respondents Balen and

Lariosa. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening

cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise.

17

Mckee v IAC, G.R. No. L-68102, July 16, 1992, 211

SCRA 517 Facts:

A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by

private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car

driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh

McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee,

Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford

Escort. When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from

the southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the

right side of the road and into the lane of thecar. Jose Koh blew the horn of

the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then

switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter

attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with

the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the

opposite lane, on the said bridge.

Issue:

Whether the owner and driver of the Truck were responsible for the

collision.

Held:

Yes. The Proximate cause of the collision was the over speeding of

the truck showing its negligence. The test of negligence and the facts

obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to

Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to

avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they

were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such

immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the

vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very

well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming

car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who

suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without

time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the

impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what

subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better

method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by

his own negligence"

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was

the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the

collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As

employers of the truck driver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of

the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The

presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their

employee. That presumption, however, is only

juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they

exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the

damage, which they failed to do.

Addenbrook v Pp, G.R. No. L-22995 June 29, 1967 Facts:

At about 3:15 in the afternoon of 9 January 1960, the front bumper

of the Stanvac Service Truck with Plate No. 2740, Manila, 960, while

travelling southward along Marquez de Comillas being driven then by

accused William Addenbrook, and in front of House No. 1010, came into

contact with the body of a pedestrian Wenceslao Risaldo with the result

that the latter fell and was taken to the Philippine General Hospital by

accused and his helper in the truck named Amando Valeriano, but was dead

on arrival, it having been found that he had received abrasions on the left

18

forehead, and contusions with lacerations on the face, left arm, right thigh,

knee joints, and right buttocks and waist and fracture of the skull, Exh. B, so

that the Fiscal filed the present criminal case for homicide thru reckless

imprudence against accused resulting in his conviction.

Upon impact of the van against the victim, the latter fell and rolled to a

distance of 15 paces, as shown by 2 sets of bloodstains observed by

patrolman Emilio Guzman in his ocular investigation immediately after the

occurrence of the incident. From these facts, the appellate court found it

difficult to believe that the van was travelling at a slow and reasonable

speed. Considering further that as postulated by the accused himself, his

view of the street was partly blocked by a parked car in front of house No.

1010, Marquez de Comillas, from behind which the deceased tried to cross

the street; and with the added fact that the appellant did not blow his horn

despite the visual obstruction by the parked car, the Court of Appeals

concluded that he failed to observe that reasonable care required of a

driver of a motor vehicle.

Issue:

Whether Addenbrook was negligent.

Held:

Yes. The objection to patrolman Guzman's competency because he

was not presented as an expert witness, nor did he see the incident actually

happen, is untenable. What Guzman testified to are what he saw in his

ocular investigation, such as the 2 sets of bloodstains and the 15 paces

distance between them, that were facts derived from his own perception.

At any rate, that the accident could not be avoided because the victim was

so close to the truck when he, as alleged by appellant, suddenly darted

across the street, does not exculpate the accused, since the latter was

driving at excessive speed. The fact that a pedestrian came into the path of

the car suddenly and so close that the driver could not stop and avoid

striking him will not excuse the driver, where the car was being driven at an

unreasonable rate of speed under the circumstances. While the general rule

is that a driver is not held accountable just because he failed to take the

wisest choice in a sudden emergency, the rule does not apply where the

emergency is of the driver's own creation or devising.

Manila Electric Co. v Remoquillo, 99 Phil 117 Facts:

Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his

brother-in-law. While making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which

was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner

Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2

feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action

for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the

CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at

fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been

installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did

not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.

Held:

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if

such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise

to the occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened

between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,

unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would

not have happened but for such condition or occassion.

19

PLDT vs. CA G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989

178 SCRA 94 Facts:

The Esteban’s jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open

trench, an excavation undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its

underground conduitsystem. Esteban failed to notice the open trench which

was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning

light or signs. The Estebans allegedly sustained injuries. PLDT, denies liability

on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were

the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held

responsible, Barte an independent contractor which undertook the

construction.

Issue:

Whether PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by the Estebans.

Held:

The accident which befell the Estebans was due to the lack of

diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to

negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.

The negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his

injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of

the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their

right to recover damages. Furthermore, Antonio Esteban had the last clear

chance or opportunity to avoid the accident.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the

burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative

thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively

established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his

cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence

of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.

Corliss v Manila Railroad Company, G.R. No. L-21291 Facts:

Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the

railroad crossing in Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957.

Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s siren. Plaintiff´s husband

slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with

the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiff´s husband was injured and died

asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the

death of her husband.

Issue:

Whether the plaintiff can recover damages.

Held:

Complaint was dismissed. ¨ A person in control of an automobile

who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not

exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the

same almost immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of

criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs and injury results.¨ The

accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s husband and she was

not allowed to recover.

20

Negros Navigation v CA, G.R. No. 110398 November 7,

1997 Facts:

In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased

from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411,

74412, 74413 and 74414) for his wife, daughter, son and niece who were

going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets were for

Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April

22, 1980. The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule. At about

10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas

Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the

Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and

Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank.

Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some

of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of

private respondents' families were never found.

Issue:

Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are

excessive, unreasonable and unwarranted.

Held:

Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies,

private respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as

moral damages because in the Mecenas case, the amount of P307,500.00

was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Under

petitioner's formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43,857.14, while the

De la Victoria spouses should receive P97,714.28. Here is where the

principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of differences in the

personal circumstances of the victims.

RCPI v CA, G.R. No. 79528, March 1991 Facts:

On the 24th of January 1983 private respondent spouses sent a

telegram of condolence to their cousins through the herein petioner RCPI.

The telegram was in perfect resemblance as to what was intended by the

spouses however, it was written on a birthday card and was sealed in on a

“Christmasgram” envelope. The spouses contended there was a breach of

contract on the part of the RCPI, they in turn filed complaint on the trial

court where it rendered its decision in favor of the spouses whereas, it was

appealed in the CA where also the judgment in the lower court was affirmed

in toto. Thus, the RCPI came to this Court for relief contending issues that

the CA erred in rendering such judgment.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner committed a breach of contract?

Whether or not the RCPI are held liable for damages?

Held:

The Court agrees with the appellate court in its decision and per

endorsement of the trial court’s findings that the RCPI as a corporation

dealing with telecommunication are engaged in public interest and

therefore rests in their shoulders an obligation to serve the public with care

and without negligence. The reason of shortage in their production of the

appropriate envelope is of no value to merit for it is their duty to have

produced such. The negligence committed is evidentially sufficient to

recover damages because the spouses suffered from ridicule amongst the

people who have come to have knowledge of such activity.

21

Chan Jr. v Iglesia ni Cristo G.R. No. 160283 October

14, 2005 Facts:

The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner. It is

located in Sta. Rita East, Aringay, La Union, and bounded on the south by a

chapel of the respondent. The gasoline station supposedly needed

additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. In view of this, the

services of Dioscoro “Ely” Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of the Armed Forces

of the Philippines, was procured by petitioner, as the former was allegedly a

construction contractor in the locality. Diggings thereafter commenced.

After some time, petitioner was informed by the members of the

respondent that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land

belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a

tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the

respondent.

Issue:

Whether there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the

parties.

Held:

No. All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious

act was the excavation which caused damage to the respondent because it

was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the

foundation of the chapel. The excavation on respondent’s premises was

caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation

between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on

the other. For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are

jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or

more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. As a general rule,

joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,

encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission

of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.

Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They

even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure

if any is found within or outside petitioner’s property line. Thus, the MOA,

instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that insures

that he be so declared as liable.

Taylor v Manila Electric, G.R. No. L-4977 March

22,1910| 16 Phil.8 Facts:

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the

injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer,

more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable

aptitude and training in mechanics. On the 30th of September, 1905,

plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed

the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one

Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a

cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not

in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and

perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in

machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises.

The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they

saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had

asked for Mr. Murphy. They walked across the open space in the

neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and

ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass

fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of

22

the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to

it two long thin wires by means of which it may bed is charged by the use of

electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of

dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After

some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take

them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which

each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they

met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went

to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of

experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric

light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a

stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then

they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with

a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while

Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed,

causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys

proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened

and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his

hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several

particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an

extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in

to care for his wounds.

Issue:

Whether Manila Electric is Liable for damages to petitioners.

Held:

No. The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which

resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the

contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal

occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover." In the

case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of

15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his

age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a

mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the

record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take

care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,

despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive

character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of

experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as

described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation.

His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his

efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his

endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of

the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be

any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion

might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age,

who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of

the cap, became frightened and ran away. The law fixes no arbitrary age at

which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and

appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it

negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the

commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps

impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of

negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand

the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which

a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own

acts and their consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to

have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature

of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him.

23

Africa vs. Caltex, G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966 16

SCRA 448 Facts:

A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started

while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground

storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck where the nozzle of the

hose was inserted. The fire then spread to and burned several neighboring

houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. The

owners of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of

the station) and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation). Trial court and CA

found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had

exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of

their employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur on the grounds that “as to its applicability xxx in the Philippines,

there seems to be nothing definite,” and that while the rules do not prohibit

its adoption inappropriate cases, “in the case at bar, however, we find no

practical use for such docrtrine.”

Issue:

Whether without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply as to presume negligence on the

part of the appellees.

Held:

The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor applies and contends that Caltex is

liable. Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which

caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of

defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course

of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use

proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of

defendant, that the incident happened because of want of care. The report

by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver

of the gasoline tank wagon who was transferring the contents thereof into

the underground storage when the fire broke out, strengthen the

presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district

and pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the

area is used as a car barn for around 10 taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a

store where people hang out and possibly smoke cigarettes is located one

meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the concrete walls

adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 ½ meters high at most and cannot

prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.

Malayan Insurance vs CA G.R. No. L-36413,

September 26, 1988 165 SCRA 536 Facts:

Petitioner, Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., issued in favor of private

respondent Sio Choy Private Car Comprehensive Policy covering a Willys

jeep. The insurance coverage was for "own damage" not to exceed P600.00

and "third-party liability" in the amount of P20,000.00. During the effectivity

of said insurance policy. The insured jeep, while being driven by one Juan P.

Campollo an employee of the respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc., collided

with a passenger bus belonging to the respondent Pangasinan

Transportation Co., Inc. (PANTRANCO, for short) causing damage to the

insured vehicle and injuries to the driver, Juan P. Campollo, and the

respondent Martin C. Vallejos, who was riding in the ill-fated jeep. As a

result, Martin C. Vallejos filed an action for damages against Sio Choy,

Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. and the PANTRANCO. He prayed therein that

the defendants be ordered to pay him, jointly and severally, the amount of

P15,000.00, as reimbursement for medical and hospital expenses;P6,000.00,

24

for lost income; P51,000.00 as actual, moral and compensatory damages;

and P5,000.00, for attorney's fees. PANTRANCO claimed that the jeep of Sio

Choy was then operated at an excessive speed and bumped the

PANTRANCO bus which had moved to, and stopped at, the shoulder of the

highway in order to avoid the jeep; and that it had observed the diligence of

a good father of a family to prevent damage, especially in the selection and

supervision of its employees. Defendant Sio Choy and the petitioner

insurance company, in their answer, also denied liability to the plaintiff,

claiming that the fault in the accident was solely imputable to the

PANTRANCO. Sio Choy, however, later filed a separate answer with a cross-

claim against the herein petitioner wherein he alleged that he had actually

paid the plaintiff, Martin C. Vallejos, the amount of P5,000.00 for

hospitalization and other expenses, and, in his cross-claim against the

herein petitioner, he alleged that the petitioner had issued in his favor a

private car comprehensive policy wherein the insurance company obligated

itself to indemnify Sio Choy, as insured, for the damage to his motor vehicle,

as well as for any liability to third persons arising out of any accident. Also

later, the herein petitioner sought, and was granted, leave to file a third-

party complaint against the San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. for the reason that the

person driving the jeep of Sio Choy, at the time of the accident, was an

employee of the San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. performing his duties within the

scope of his assigned task, and not an employee of Sio Choy; More so, San

Leon Rice Mill, Inc. is the employer of the deceased driver, Juan P.Campollo,

it should be liable for the acts of its employee, pursuant to Art. 2180 of the

Civil Code. The herein petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered against

the San Leon Rice Mill, Inc., making it liable for the amounts claimed by the

plaintiff and/or ordering said San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. to reimburse and

indemnify the petitioner for any sum that it may be ordered to pay the

plaintiff.

Issue:

Whether petitioner is entitled to be reimbursed by respondent San

Leon Rice Mill, Inc. for whatever amount petitioner has been adjudged to

pay respondent Vallejos on its insurance policy.

Held:

The appellate court overlooked the principle of subrogation in

insurance contracts. Subrogation is a normal incident of indemnity

insurance Upon payment of the loss, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated

pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may have against the third

person whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. Moreover, that

right is not dependent upon , nor does it grow out of any privity of contract.

It follows, therefore, that petitioner, upon paying respondent Vallejos the

amount of riot exceeding P20,000.00, shall become the subrogee of the

insured, the respondent Sio Choy; as such, it is subrogated to whatever

rights the latter has against respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. Article 1217

of the Civil Code gives to a solidary debtor who has paid the entire

obligation the right to be reimbursed by hisco-debtors for the share which

corresponds to each. In accordance with Article 1217, petitioner, upon

payment to respondent Vallejo sand thereby becoming the subrogee of

solidary debtor Sio Choy, is entitled to reimbursement from respondent San

Leon Rice Mill, Inc.

Batiquin v CA 258 SCRA 334 Facts:

Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the

latter's private patient sometime before September 21,1988. In the morning

of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and nurses,

performed a caesarean operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully

delivered the latter’s baby. After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to

25

suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually

lost her appetite, soshe consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who

prescribed for her certain medicines. However, the pains still kept recurring.

She then consulted Dr.Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho

suggested that Mrs.Villegas submit to another surgery.- When Dr. Kho

opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge

inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out

pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the

right side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber

appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This was the cause of all of the

infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by

Mrs. Villegas. The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in

court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for

examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which

mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record,

an Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record ,and a Physician's Discharge

Summary. The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence

as mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or persons who

prepared the mare deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated-

There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2

versions arose from Dr. Kho’s testimony: 1) that it was sent to the

Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho

threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The failure of the Plaintiffs to

reconcile these two different versions served only to weaken their claim

against Defendant Batiquin. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants.

The CA reversed the decision.

Issue:

Whether respondent is negligent.

Held:

Yes. While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a

petition for review on certiorari , there are exceptions, among which are

when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict,

when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on

record, or when the appellate court misapprehended the facts. The focal

point of the appeal is Dr. Kho’s testimony. There were inconsistencies within

her own testimony, which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA.

The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred when it isolated the

disputed portion of Dr. Kho’s testimony and did not consider it with other

portions of Dr. Kho’s testimony. Also, the phrase relied upon by the trial

court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private

respondent Villegas' abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory and then

to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist. Furthermore, Dr. Kho's

knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than first-

hand knowledge for, as she asserted before the trial court.

RAMOS vs. CA 321 SCRA 584 Facts:

Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was advised to undergo an operation for

the removal of her stone in the gall bladder. She was referred to Dr. Hosaka,

a surgeon, who agreed to do the operation. The operation was scheduled

on June 17, 1985 in the De los Santos Medical Center. Erlinda was admitted

to the medical center the day before the operation. On the following day,

she was ready for operation as early as 7:30 am. Around 9:30, Dr. Hosaka

has not yet arrived. By 10 am, Rogelio wanted to pull out his wife from the

operating room. Dr. Hosaka finally arrived at 12:10 pm more than 3 hours of

the scheduled operation.

26

Dr. Guiterres tried to intubate Erlinda. The nail beds of Erlinda were bluish

discoloration in her left hand. At 3 pm, Erlinda was being wheeled to the

Intensive care Unit and stayed there for a month. Since the ill-fated

operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died. The

family of Ramos sued them for damages.

Issue:

Whether there was an employee-employer relationship that existed

between the medical center and Drs. Hosaka and Guiterrez.

Held:

Private Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their

attending and visiting consultant staff. While consultants are not technically

employees, the control exercised, the hiring and the right to terminate

consultants fulfill the hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship with

the exception of payment of wages. The control test is determining.

In applying the four fold test, DLSMC cannot be considered an employer of

the respondent doctors. It has been consistently held that in determining

whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties, the

following elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of

services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the power to hire and fire; and (4) the

power to control not only the end to be achieved, but the means to be used

in reaching such an end.

The hospital does not hire consultants but it accredits and grants him the

privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients. It is the patient

who pays the consultants. The hospital cannot dismiss the consultant but he

may lose his privileges granted by the hospital. The hospital’s obligation is

limited to providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation

and other things that will ensure that the doctor’s orders are carried out.

The court finds that there is no employer-employee relationship between

the doctors and the hospital.

Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan v Pp Gr No. 158996 Facts:

In this case, the circumstances that caused patient Roy Jr.’s injury

and the series of tests that were supposed to be undergone by him to

determine the extent of the injury suffered were not under the exclusive

control of Drs. Jarcia and Bastan. It was established that they are mere

residents of theManila Doctors Hospital at that time who attended to the

victim at the emergency room. While it may be true that the circumstances

pointed out by the courts below seem doubtless to constitute reckless

imprudence on the part of the petitioners, this conclusion is still best

achieved, not through the scholarly assumptions of a layman like the

patient’s mother, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert

witness/es. As to whether the petitioners have exercised the requisite

degree of skill and care in treating patient Roy, Jr. is generally a matter of

expert opinion.

Issue:

Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies.

Held:

Yes. This doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means "Where the thing which

causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and

the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if

those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable

evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the

27

accident arose from want of care." The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule

of evidence is unusual to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima

facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a

substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine, however, is not a

rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural

convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a

given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of

proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines

and regulates what shall be prima facieevidence thereof and helps the

plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when

and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent

and not readily available. The requisites for the application of the doctrine

of res ipsa loquiturare: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not

ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or

agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the

person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any

voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.

Flores vs. Pineda Facts:

Teresita Pineda consulted Dr. Fredelicto Flores, regarding her

medical condition. She complained of general body weakness, loss of

appetite, frequent urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal bleeding. Dr.

Fredelicto initially interviewed the patient and asked for the history of her

monthly period to analyze the probable cause of the vaginal bleeding and

subsequently advised her to return the following week or to go to the

United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in Quezon City for a general check-

up.

Teresita did not return the next week as advised. However, when

her condition persisted, she went to further consult Dr. Flores at his UDMC

clinic in Quezon City. Dr. Fredelicto did a routine check-up and ordered

Teresita's admission to the hospital. In the admission slip, he directed the

hospital staff to prepare the patient for an "on call" D&C operation to be

performed by his wife, Dr. Felicisima Flores, despite his suspicion that

Teresita was suffering from diabetis.

Teresita was taken to the operating room. It was only then that she

met Dr. Felicisima, an obstetrician and gynecologist. The two doctors - Dr.

Felicisima and Dr. Fredelicto, conferred on the patient's medical condition,

while the resident physician and the medical intern gave Dr. Felicisima their

own briefings. She also interviewed and conducted an internal vaginal

examination of the patient which lasted for about 15 minutes. Dr. Felicisima

thereafter called up the laboratory for the results of the tests. At that time,

only the results for the blood sugar (BS), uric acid determination, cholesterol

determination, and complete blood count (CBC) were available. The

preliminary laboratory results indicated that the blood sugar of the victim

was high.

After the operation, Teresita's condition had worsened. She

experienced difficulty in breathing and was rushed to the intensive care

unit. Further tests confirmed that she was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus

Type II. Insulin was administered on the patient, but the medication might

have arrived too late. Due to complications induced by diabetes, Teresita

died in. Believing that it was negligence of petitioners that caused the death

of Teresita, respondents filed a medical negligence case. The trial court and

the CA rule in their favor.

Issue:

Whether petitioners were negligent.

Held:

28

Yes, however it is proper that a discussion of the meaning and

elements of medical negligence must be made before proceeding to the

ruling on to the issue.

A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong

committed by a medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the

death of a patient. There are four elements involved in a medical negligence

case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation.

However, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff, thus he must

prove that: (1) the physician either failed to do something which a

reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did

something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and (2)

the failure or action caused injury to the patient. Expert testimony is

therefore essential since the factual issue of whether a physician or surgeon

has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his

patient is generally a matter of expert opinion.

Professional Services Inc. v. Agana, Gr No 126279 Facts:

Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of

bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be

suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior

resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left

ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr.

Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr.

Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in

order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was

about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some

remarks on the Record of Operation: "sponge count lacking 2; announced to

surgeon search done but to no avail continue for closure" (two pieces of

gauze were missing). A "diligent search" was conducted but they could not

be found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.

A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but

the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery.

Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the

cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. After

months of consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she

was free of cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of

gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted

this, assuring Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain

worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece

of gauze was found in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.

Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of

Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable

for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad's body, and

malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also filed

an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against

the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr. Fuentes

was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the cases,

Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found PSI and the two

doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case

against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes.

Issue:

Whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil's negligence

Held:

Yes.PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through

the report of the attending nurses + the fact that the operation was carried

29

on with the assistance of various hospital staff. PSI also liable under NCC

2180. It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of

a good father of the family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil.

Manila Doctors Hospital v Chua G.R. No. 150355 July

31, 2006 Facts:

On December 13, 1993, respondents filed a Complaint averring that

on October 30, 1990, respondent Chua, the mother of respondent Vicky Ty,

was admitted in petitioner's hospital for hypertension and diabetes; that

while respondent Chua was confined, Judith Chua, the sister of respondent

Ty, had been likewise confined for injuries suffered in a vehicular accident;

that partial payments of the hospital bills were made, totaling P435,800.00;

that after the discharge of Judith Chua, respondent Chua remained in

confinement and the hospital bills for both patients accumulated; that

respondent Chua was pressured by the petitioner, through its Credit and

Collection Department, to settle the unpaid bills; that respondent Ty

represented that she will settle the bills as soon as the funds become

available; that respondent Ty pleaded to the management that in view of

the physical condition of her mother, respondent Chua, the

correspondences relating to the settlement of the unpaid hospital bills

should be relayed to the former; that these pleas were unheeded by the

petitioner; that petitioner threatened to implement unpleasant measures

unless respondent Ty undertakes her mother's obligation as well as the

obligation of her sister, Judith Chua, to pay the hospitalization expenses;

that petitioner made good its threat and employed unethical, unpleasant

and unlawful methods which allegedly worsened the condition of

respondent Chua, particularly, by (i) cutting off the telephone line in her

room and removing the air-conditioning unit, television set, and

refrigerator, (ii) refusing to render medical attendance and to change the

hospital gown and bed sheets, and (iii) barring the private nurses or

midwives from assisting the patient. Respondents thus prayed for the award

of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Issue:

Whether the respondents are liable to the petitioner to pay the

hospital bills arising from the hospitalization of respondent Chua and Judith

Chua; and second, whether the parties are entitled to their respective

claims for damages.

Held:

Yes. The Court takes judicial notice of the pending Senate Bill No.

337, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Detention of Patients in Hospitals and

Medical Clinics on Grounds of Non-Payment of Hospital Bills or Medical

Expenses," which declares, among others, that it shall be unlawful for any

hospital or medical clinic to cause directly or indirectly the detention of

patients for non-payment, in part or in full, of their hospital bills, and,

furthermore, requires patients who have fully recovered and are financially

incapable to settle the hospitalization expenses to execute a promissory

note, co-signed by another individual, to the extent of the unpaid obligation

before leaving the hospital. While this Court may have touched upon these

matters in the adjudication of the instant case, it must be stated that this

decision should in no way preempt any constitutional challenge to the

provisions of Senate Bill No. 337 if passed into law, bearing in mind the

standards for the exercise of the power of judicial review as well as the

recognition that the tenor of the bill may adjust with the times, or that the

bill itself may fail to pass, according to the dynamism of the legislative

process, especially in light of the objections interposed by interest groups to

date.

30

Mercury Drug v De Leon G.R. No. 165622 Facts:

Respondent Raul T. De Leon, a judge, noticed that his left eye was

reddish. He also had difficulty reading. On the same evening, he met a

friend who happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla. The latter prescribed

the drugs “CortisporinOpthalmic” and “Ceftin” to relieve his eye problems.

Before heading to work the following morning, De Leon went to the

Betterliving, Parañaque, branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy

the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to petitioner

AurmelaGanzon, a pharmacist assistant. At his chambers, De Leon

requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops. As instructed, the

sheriff applied 2-3 drops on respondent’s left eye. Instead of relieving his

irritation, respondent felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected

eye with water, but the pain did not subside. Only then did he discover that

he was given the wrong medicine, “CortisporinOtic Solution.” De Leon

returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red and

teary. When he confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of

the prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize and instead brazenly

replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription and it was her

supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have

stock of the needed CortisporinOpthalmic. De Leon wrote Mercury Drug,

through its president, Ms. Vivian K. Askuna, about the day’s incident.

Instead, two sales persons went to his office and informed him that their

supervisor was busy with other matters. Having been denied his simple

desire for a written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a complaint for

damages against Mercury Drug.

Issue:

Whether or not the Mercury Drug and Ganzon are liable.

Held:

Yes. Mercury Drug and Ganzoncannot exculpate themselves from

any liability. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the

public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them.

Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have laid salutary

rules for the protection of human life and human health. In the United

States case of Tombari v. Conners, it was ruled that the profession of

pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise care of a

specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In

other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of

prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards

consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life

may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution

of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.

In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an

employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there has been

negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or

supervision of one’s employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a

clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and diligence of a

good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such

presumption.

Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live up

to high standard of diligence expected of them as pharmacy professionals.

They were grossly negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the

prescribed eye drops to De Leon.

As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of

Mercury Drug and its employees in dispensing to him the right medicine.

This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and

seller do not stand at arm’s length. There exists an imperative duty on the

seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent death or injury to any

person who relies on one’s absolute honesty and peculiar learning.

31

Del Mar v CA and Del Mar G.R. No. 139008 March 13,

2002 Facts:

The private respondent, Norma Ebersole Del Mar, and her sister,

Florence Ebersole Finch, inherited three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT

Nos. T-58397, T-58398 and T-58402, situated in Mabini, Santiago City, with a

total area of 29,736 square meters, more or less. On December 6, 1974,

Florence Ebersole Finch, a resident of New York, USA, executed a general

power of attorney naming and constituting private respondent as her

attorney-in-fact with regard to the subject property.On January 29, 1975,

private respondent, acting for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Florence

Ebersole Finch, executed Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner

covering the three aforementioned parcels of land. The private respondent

is the mother of herein petitioner.On March 25, 1976, Florence Ebersole

Finch executed a Deed of Confirmation in New York, USA, confirming and

ratifying all the acts and deeds executed by Norma Ebersole del Mar, in

conveying properties to Robert E. del Mar, ‘as appearing in Document Nos.

1780, Page 57, Book No. 14, Series of 1975; 1781, Page 58, Book No. 14,

Series of 1975; and 1782, Page 58, Book No. 14, Series of 1975, of the

Notarial Registry of Paulo Pascua, a notary public for and in the Province of

Isabela, Philippines’. This document was authenticated by Wenceslao J.O.

Quirolgico, Vice-Consul of the Philippine Consulate Office in New York, USA.

After the peaceful and continuous possession by petitioner of the subject

properties for more than twenty-two (22) years, a complaint for

reconveyance was filed by x x x private respondent against x x x petitioner

on May 15, 1997, alleging, inter-alia, that x x x petitioner obtained the

aforementioned Certificates of Title through fraud and deceit. Private

respondent claimed that x x x said properties were left by her under the

administration of petitioner, who allegedly transferred the ownership of x x

x said realty in his name by causing the issuance of Certificates of Title in his

name without her knowledge and consent. However, records show that

before she left for the United States, private respondent executed the

corresponding Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner. This case,

entitled ‘Norma Ebersole del Mar represented by Gerald del Mar vs.

Roberto del Mar and the Register of Deeds, Province of Isabela’ was filed

before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Branch 35 and docketed as

Civil Case No. 2373

Issue:

Whether the accused acted in negligence.

Held:

Yes. The negligence of Atty. Abuan does not fall under these

exceptions. His negligence in this case was his inexcusable failure to file the

required appellant’s Brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of

petitioner. But the latter was not without fault. He was aware of Atty.

Abuan’s failure to appear at the pretrial conference, a failure that had

placed him in default. Because petitioner was in default, private

respondent’s evidence was received ex parte by the RTC. No wonder, the

trial court decided against him. Yet, he retained Atty. Abuan’s services for

the appeal. One is bound by the decisions of one’s counsel regarding the

conduct of the case, especially where the former does not complain against

the manner in which the latter handled the case. In effect, petitioner

consented to the shabby and negligent treatment of his case by his counsel.

Hence, he should not complain now of the negligence or “fraud” done to

him by his lawyer. A party’s counsel cannot be blamed for negligence, if the

party was likewise guilty of the same. Clients should suffer the

consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the

counsel whom they themselves hired, and whom they had full authority to

fire at any time and replace with another.

32

BPI vs. Casa Montessori Internationale, G. R. No.

149454 & 149507, May 28, Facts:

CASA Montessori International opened an account with BPI, with

CASA’s President as one of its authorized signatories. It discovered that 9 of

its checks had been encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos whose name

turned out to be fictitious, and was used by a certain Yabut, CASA’s external

auditor. He voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature and encashed

the checks. RTC granted the Complaint for Collection with Damages against

BPI ordering to reinstate the amount in the account, with interest. CA took

account of CASA’s contributory negligence and apportioned the loss

between CASA and BPI, and ordred Yabut to reimburse both. BPI contends

that the monthly statements it issues to its clients contain a notice worded

as follows: “If no error is reported in 10 days, account will be correct” and as

such, it should be considered a waiver.

Issue:

Whether or not waiver or estoppel results from failure to report the

error in the bank statement

Held:

Such notice cannot be considered a waiver, even if CASA failed to

report the error. Neither is it estopped from questioning the mistake after

the lapse of the ten-day period. This notice is a simple confirmation or

"circularization" -- in accounting parlance -- that requests client-depositors

to affirm the accuracy of items recorded by the banks. Its purpose is to

obtain from the depositors a direct corroboration of the correctness of their

account balances with their respective banks. Every right has subjects --

active and passive. While the active subject is entitled to demand its

enforcement, the passive one is duty-bound to suffer such enforcement. On

the one hand, BPI could not have been an active subject, because it could

not have demanded from CASA a response to its notice. CASA, on the other

hand, could not have been a passive subject, either, because it had no

obligation to respond. It could -- as it did -- choose not to respond.

Estoppel precludes individuals from denying or asserting, by their

own deed or representation, anything contrary to that established as the

truth, in legal contemplation. Our rules on evidence even make a juris et de

jure presumption that whenever one has, by one’s own act or omission,

intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be

true and to act upon that belief, one cannot -- in any litigation arising from

such act or omission -- be permitted to falsify that supposed truth.

In the instant case, CASA never made any deed or representation

that misled BPI. The former’s omission, if any, may only be deemed an

innocent mistake oblivious to the procedures and consequences of periodic

audits. Since its conduct was due to such ignorance founded upon an

innocent mistake, estoppel will not arise. A person who has no knowledge

of or consent to a transaction may not be estopped by it. "Estoppel cannot

be sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference x x x." CASA is not

barred from questioning BPI’s error even after the lapse of the period given

in the notice.

Philippine School of Business Administration vs. CA

205 SCRA 729 GR No. 84698. February 4, 1942 Facts:

Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the second floor premises of

the schools by assailants who were not members of the schools academic

community. This prompted the parents of the deceased to file a suit in the

RTC of Manila for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. The

defendant schools (now petitioner) sought to have the suit dismissed on the

33

ground of no cause of action and not within the scope of the provision of

Art 2180 since it is an academic institution. The trial court overruled the

petitioner’s contention and its decision was later affirmed by the appellate

court.

Issue:

Whether the decision of the appellate court primarily anchored on

the law of quasi-delicts is valid.

Held:

Although the Supreme Court agreed to the decision of the Court of

Appeals to deny the petition of motion to dismiss by the PSBA, they do not

agree to the premises of the appellate court’s ruling.

Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176 of the civil code establishes

the rule of in loco parentis, they can not be held liable to the acts of Calito’s

assailants which were not students of the PSBA and because of the

contractual relationship.

The school and the students, upon registration established a

contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations. The institution of

learning must provide their students with an atmosphere that promotes or

assists its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge, and maintain peace

and order within its premises.

The SC dismissed the petition and the case was remanded to the

trail court to determine if the school neglected its obligation to perform

based on the contractual relation of them and the students.

Child Learning Center v Tagario G.R. No. 150920

November 25, 2005 Facts:

This petition started with a tort case filed with the Regional Trial

Court of Makati by Timothy Tagorio and his parents, Basilio R. Tagorio and

Herminia Tagorio, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-1389. The complaint1

alleged that during the school year 1990-1991, Timothy was a Grade IV

student at Marymount School, an academic institution operated and

maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of March 5,

1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boy’s comfort room at

the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He,

however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy

started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several

times for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call

for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through

and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical

treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.

An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by

respondents against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors, namely

Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo Narciso and

Luningning Salvador, and the Administrative Officer of Marymount School,

Ricardo Pilao. In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing

defective about the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of

Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that

it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to

ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students.

Issue:

Whether the Institution of Child Learning Center, Inc is negligent.

Held:

34

Yes. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,

plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages

suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or

some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection

of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages

incurred. Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission which causes

damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the

actor to repair such damage. Negligence is the failure to observe for the

protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution

and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Fault requires the

execution of a positive act which causes damage to another while

negligence consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to

another. The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window

shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently

points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door

knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa

loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant

an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s

negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or

instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person

charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not

have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the

person injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that

the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working condition. The

fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door,

shows that something was wrong with the door. Our pronouncement that

Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the

door, negates petitioners’ other contention that the proximate cause of the

accident was Timothy’s own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the

fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by

any intervening cause, that originated from CLC’s own negligence.

PNB vs Pike Sept. 20, 2005 Facts:

Norman Pike often traveled to and from Japan as a gay entertainer

in said country. Sometime in 1991, he opened U.S. Dollar Savings Account

with PNB Buendia branch for which he was issued a passbook. The complain

talleged that before Pike left for Japan on 18 March 1993, he kept the

passbook inside a cabinet under lock and key, in his home. A few hours after

he arrived from Japan, he discovered that some of his valuables were

missing including the passbook; that he immediately reported the incident

to the police which led to the arrest and prosecution of a certain Mr. Joy

Manuel Davasol. Pike also discovered that Davasol made 2 unauthorized

withdrawals from his U.S. Dollar Savings Account. Pike went to PNB’s

Buendia branch and verbally protested the unauthorized withdrawals and

likewise demanded the return of the total withdrawn amount of U.S.

$7,500.00, on the ground that he never authorized anybody to withdraw

from his account as the signatures appearing on the subject withdrawal slips

were clearly forgeries. PNB refused to credit said amount back to Pike’s U.S.

Dollar Savings Account , and instead, the bank wrote him that it exercised

due diligence in the handling of said account. Pike filed a case against PNB.

PNB, on the other hand, claimed that before Pike went to Japan, he and

Davasol went to see PNB AVP Mr. Lorenzo Val and instructed the latter to

honor all withdrawals to be made by Davasol. After the loss of Pike’s

passbook, he allegedly withdraw the balance from his passbook and

executed an affidavit promising not to hold responsible the bank and its

officers for the withdrawal made. The trial court ruled that the bank is liable

for the unauthorized withdrawals. The bank was negligent in the

performance of its duties such that unauthorized withdrawals were made in

the deposit of Pike. The CAaffirmed the findings of the RTC that indeed

defendant-appellant PNB was negligent in exercising the diligence required

of a business imbued with public interest such as that of the banking

industry, however, it modified the rate of interest and award for damages.

35

Issue:

Whether the award of damages was proper

Held:

Yes. The award of moral and exemplary damages is left to the sound

discretion of the court, and if such discretion is well exercised, as in this

case, it will not be disturbed on appeal. An award of moral damages would

require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or

psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act

or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or

omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained

by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the

instances expressed or envisioned by Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil

Code. Specifically, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral

damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in

bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad

faith,[38]or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. Verily, the

breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious, or in bad faith, oppressive or

abusive. There is no reason to disturb the trial court’s finding of the bank’s

employees’ negligence in their treatment of Pike’s account. In the case on

hand, the Court of Appeals sustained, and rightly so, that an award of moral

damages is warranted. For, as found by said appellate court, citing the case

of Prudential Bank v. Court of Appeals, “the bank’s negligence is a result of

lack of due care and caution required of managers and employees of a firm

engaged in so sensitive and demanding business, as banking, hence, the

award of P20,000.00 as moral damages, is proper. The award of exemplary

damages is also proper as a warning to petitioner PNB and all concerned not

to recklessly disregard their obligation to exercise the highest and strictest

diligence in serving their depositors .Finally, the grant of exemplary

damages entitles respondent Pike the award of attorney's fees in the

amount of P20,000.00 and the award of P10,000.00 for litigation expenses.

Pacis v Morales G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010 Facts:

Petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against

respondent Morales. Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year

old student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and

Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store. On

the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as

sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila.

The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was

left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales

would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers.

It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on

top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of

the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed and

handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred

in the head.A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag,

however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting

circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC. By agreement of

the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against

Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in

the instant case. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners,

ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred,

actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the

plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF. Respondent appealed to the

CA, which reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent from

civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this

petition.

Issue:

36

Was Morales negligent?

Held:

Yes. This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of

petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may

enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the

crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent

civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of

enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against

Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages

against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners

based their Claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil

Code.

Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC,

the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article

2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own

negligence. Article 2176 states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault

or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the

parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this

Chapter.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun

store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and

Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of

purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic

security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to

Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.

Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in

his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous

in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in

possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take

exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike

the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a

business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher

degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable

about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded

weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others.

Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not

loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition

when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With

more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded

precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge

such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when

he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without

ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun

should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for

repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent

any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm

from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has

personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to

insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.

Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a

License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to

restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and

diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care

required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt

him from liability in this case.

37

Lamis v Ong G.R. No. 148923. August 11, 2005 Facts:

Sandigan Protective and Investigation Agency, Inc. (Sandigan),

petitioner, was the security agency providing security services at the Manila

Chinese Cemetery. The visiting hours were at 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.

Sandigan instructed the security guards not to allow any one to enter the

cemetery from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. On September 20, 1994, Vicente

Lamis, also a petitioner, was the guard assigned at the south gate of the

cemetery for the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. slot.

Around 3:00 in the morning, a Mitsubishi Lancer, with a PSM 679

plate, driven by David Y. Ong, herein respondent, arrived at the south gate

of the cemetery. He beeped his car and continued doing so, but Lamis did

not open the gate. Eventually, he went outside the gate and informed

respondent that being beyond visiting hours, he cannot enter the cemetery.

Suddenly, respondent accelerated the speed of his car, trying to enter the

cemetery. This irked Lamis. He closed the gate and took a shot gun

entrusted to him by one of the roving guards.

About thirty minutes thereafter, respondent’s car returned at full

speed toward the closed gate where Lamis was standing. He fired a warning

shot but respondent did not stop his car. Lamis fired another warning shot.

Respondent then alighted from his car. Seeing it was closed, he got inside

the car, but before he could do so, Lamis shot him, hitting his right arm, left

hip, and right waist. He managed to drive to the Chinese General Hospital

where he was examined and treated. Thereafter, the hospital guard

reported the incident to the police who immediately conducted an

investigation. Petitioner Sandigan conducted its own investigation but did

not turn over to the police the firearm used by Lamis. Subsequently,

Sandigan paid Lamis’ mother the amount spent for his medical expenses.

Meanwhile, he was given another job but he absented from work without

leave. Thus, he was suspended and eventually dismissed from the service.

Issue:

Whether the CA is correct in awarding damages in favor of the

respondent.

Held:

As earlier stated, the trial court found that Lamis’ act of shooting

the respondent was “deliberate and intentional,” hence, both petitioners

are jointly and solidarily liable to respondent for damages.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that “Whoever by an act or omission

causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay

for the damage done. x x x.” The obligation imposed by this Article is

“demandable not only for one’s own wrongful acts or omissions, but also for

those persons for whom one is responsible.” Thus, petitioner Sandigan,

being the employer of petitioner Lamis, is likewise liable for damages

caused by the latter.

As stated earlier, petitioner Sandigan already paid the medical expenses (or

actual damages) incurred by respondent.

We find, however, that the trial court erred in awarding to respondent

moral damages in the sum of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of

P300,000.00 and attorney’s fee in the amount of P50,000.00. These

amounts are quite excessive. We have held that although the trial court is

given the discretion to determine the amount of such damages, the

appellate court may modify or change the amount awarded when it is

inordinate, as in this case.

It bears stressing that the award of moral damages is meant to compensate

the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious

anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social

humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused by the defendant’s wrongful

acts. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must

38

somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted.

Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer,

neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. There is no

hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable

amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own

peculiar facts. Trial courts are given discretion in determining the amount,

with the limitation that it should not be palpably and scandalously

excessive. We hold that an award to respondent of P30,000.00, instead of

P500,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.

Likewise, we are convinced that the award of exemplary damages should be

reduced from P300,000.00 to P25,000.00. Such damages are imposed not

to enrich the claimant and impoverish the defendant but to serve as a

deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious

actions.

Finally, an award of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fee is deemed sufficient

considering that the suit involved is merely for damages. Attorney’s fee

may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to

protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party, as in

the present case.

Ong v Metropolitan Water DistrictG.R. No. L-7664

August 29, 1958 Facts:

Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools

at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for

which a nominal fee is charged . 14 year old Dominador Ong drowned while

swimming in one of those pools.

Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs’ son was drowned in one of

its swimming pools but avers that his death was caused by his own

negligence or by unavoidable accident. Defendant also avers that it had

exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its

employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the

circumstances.

After trial, the lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is

untenable and dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs.

Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to this Court because the amount

involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.

Issue:

Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to

the negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs

to recover damages.

Held:

We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the

record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The

only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers

that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from

that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was

retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the

negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of

defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care

and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant

notwithstanding his negligence. Or, “As the doctrine usually is stated, a

person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,

notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a

third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely

responsible for the consequences of the accident.”

39

Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming

pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in

violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the

pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as

soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the

body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to

bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of

the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee.

The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party

charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be

avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should

have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of

the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.

Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the

trial court, which we find supported by the evidence: “There is (also) a

strong suggestion coming from the expert evidence presented by both

parties that Dominador Ong might have dived where the water was only 5.5

feet deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his forehead against

the bottom of the pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned, and

which to his drowning.

Gotesco Investment Corporation vs. Chatto G.R. No.

87584, June 16, 1992 210 SCRA 18 Facts:

Gloria E. Chatto and her 15-year old daughter Lina went to see the

movie “Mother Dear” at Superama I theater, owned by Gotesco Investment

Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find

seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly 10

minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of the balcony collapsed and

pandemonium ensued.

The Chattos managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling and walk to

the nearby FEU hospital where they were confined and treated for a day.

Later, they had to transfer to UST hospital, and because of continuing pain

in the neck, headache, and dizziness, had to even go to Illinois, USA for

treatment.

Gotesco tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse was due

to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any

structural or construction defect. The trial court awarded

actual/compensatory and moral damages and attorney’s fees in favor of the

Chattos. The CA also found Gotesco’s appeal to be without merit. Hence this

petition.

Issue:

Whether the cause of the collapse of the balcony ceiling was force

majeure.

Held:

Collapse of the balcony ceiling not due to force majeure. Gotesco is

Thereby Liable. Gotesco’s claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the

theater was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its

own witness, Mr. Ong, admittedthat he could not give any reason for the

collapse. Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that

the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have

collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation

does not imply force majeure.

Spanish and American authorities on the meaning of force majeure:

Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause

which is irresistible; such as lightning, tempest, perils of the sea, inundation,

40

or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person. [Blackstone] The

event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as, for example, the

lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by

robbers; [Esriche] Any accident due to natural causes, directly, exclusively,

without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any

kind of oversight, pains, and care reasonably to have been expected.

Gotesco could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if

indeed it were due to force majeure. The real reason why Mr. Ong could not

explain the cause is because either he did not actually conduct an

investigation or because he is incompetent (notan engineer, but an architect

who had not even passed the government’s examination). The building was

constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident. It was not shown that any

of the causes denominated as force majeure obtained immediately before

or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been

discovered if only Gotesco exercised due diligence and care in keeping and

maintaining the premises. But, as disclosed by Mr. Ong, no adequate

inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. That the

structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City

Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued

do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially

as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove

that it was ever inspected at all. And even assuming arguendo that the

cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, Gotesco would still be liable

because the trial court declared it to be guilty of gross negligence. As

gleaned from Bouvier’s definition, for one to be exempt from any liability

because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been

guilty of negligence.

NPC v. Heirs of Casionan Facts:

In the 1970s, NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines

of 69 kilovolts traversing the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon. Eventually,

some lines sagged, thereby reducing their distance from the ground to only

about 8-10 ft. This posed as a threat to passersby who were exposed to the

danger of electrocution. As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon

made verbal and written requests for NPC to institute safety measures to

protect trail users from their high-tension wires. In 1995, Engr. Banayot,

NPC Area Manager, informed the Itogon mayor that NPC installed 9

additional poles, and they identified a possible rerouting scheme to improve

the distance from its deteriorating lines to the ground.

19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner. In 1995, Noble

and his co-pocket miner Melchor Jimenez were at Dalicno. They cut 2

bamboo poles, and they carried one pole horizontally on their shoulder,

with Noble carrying the shorter pole. Noble walked ahead as they passed

through the trail underneath the NPC high-tension lines on their way to

their work place. As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the

tip of the bamboo pole that he was carrying touched one of the dangling

high-tension wires. Melchor narrated that he heard a buzzing sound for only

about a second or two, then he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor

rushed to him and shook him, but Noble was already dead.

A post-mortem examination by the municipal health officer

determined the cause of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular

fibulation, secondary to electrocution. There was a small burned area in the

middle right finger of Noble.

Police investigators who visited the site confirmed that portions of the

wires above the trail hung very low. They noted that people usually used the

trail and had to pass directly underneath the wires, and that the trail was

the only viable way since the other side was a precipice. They did not see

any danger warning signs installed. After the GM of NPC was informed of

the incident, NPC repaired the dangling lines and put up warning signs

around the area.

41

Noble's parents filed a claim for damages against NPC. NPC denied being

negligent in maintaining the safety of the lines, averring that signs were

installed but they were stolen by children, and that excavations were made

to increase the clearance from the ground but some poles sank due to

pocket mining in the area. NPC witnesses testified that the cause of death

could not have been electrocution since Noble did not suffer extensive

burns. NPC argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it was due to his

own negligence.

RTC decided in favor of Noble's parents. RTC observed that NPC

witnesses were biased because all but one were employees of NPC, and

they were not actually present at the time of the accident. RTC found NPC

negligent since the company has not acted upon the requests and demands

made by the community leaders since 1991. CA affirmed RTC with

modification--award of moral damages was reduced from 100k to 50k, and

award of attorney fees was disallowed since the reason for the award was

not expressly stated in the decision.

Issue:

Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of Noble.

NO; hence, NPC is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability.

Held:

Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the

interest of another, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the

circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,

contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below

the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There

is contributory negligence when the party's act showed lack of ordinary care

and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It

is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the

person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the

proximate causeof the injury.

The underlying precept is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his

own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear

the consequences of his own negligence. NCC 2179 provides that liability

will be mitigated in consideration of the injured party's contributory

negligence.

Precedents + [non-]application to the case at hand

In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having

contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that

brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending

danger to health and body. In this case, there were no warning signs, and

the trail was regularly used by people since it was the only viable way from

Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what

was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.

NPC faults Noble in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by

DENR in the area. In Añonuevo v. CA, the Court held that the violation of a

statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate cause

of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was

intended to be prevented by the statute. The fact that pocket miners were

unlicensed was not a justification for NPC to leave their transmission lines

dangling.

Damages awarded

Noble's unearned income of 720k [loss of earning capacity formula: Net

Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80 - age at time of death) x (gross annual income -

reasonable and necessary living expenses)]

Exemplary damages of 50k [since there is gross negligence]

Moral damages of 50k

42

Sing and Ngo v Giap and Sons Inc G.R. No. 170596 Facts:

Petitioner spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo owned a lot at 745

Caballero St., Binondo. In 1978, they decided to construct a 5-storey

concrete building thereon, the NSS Building, and for this project, they

contracted the services of Contech Construction Technology Development

Corporation (Contech) as their General Contractor. Adjacent to their lot is a

semi-concrete building known as the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG Building),

owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. (respondent). During the construction of

the NSS Building, the respondent, through its general manager, John T. Lee,

received complaints from their tenants about defects in the building. There

were cracks appearing on the floors, the steel door was bent, and concrete

slabs of the walls were falling apart. An inspection of the premises revealed

that the excavation made by Contech on petitioners’ land was close to the

common boundary, exposing the foundation of the LSG Building. As a

gesture of goodwill to their neighbors, the petitioners assured the

respondent that repairs would be undertaken by their contractor. In

December 1979, Contech announced that it had completed repairs on the

LSG Building. Notwithstanding this assurance, more defects in the LSG

Building appeared, i.e., tilted floors, cracks in the columns and beams,

distorted window frames. Apparently, the LSG Building was continuously

sagging and the respondent felt that it was no longer safe to occupy the

building.

In 1981, the respondent was constrained to consult engineers, E.S.

de Castro Ph.D. and Associates, through Control Builders Corporation, to

investigate the cause of the damages in the LSG Building and to determine

its present structural integrity. It was immediately noticed that the LSG

Building underwent differential settlement. Based on their ocular inspection

on the building measurement of the actual differential settlement,

structural analysis of the building and determination of the sub-surface soil

conditions, the consultants concluded that the structural failure of the LSG

Building resulted from the differential settlement caused by the excavation

during the construction of the NSS Building. Since the building had

undergone large differential settlements beyond safe tolerable limits, the

consultants recommended the complete demolition of the LSG Building. The

demolition and reconstruction of the building was estimated to cost the

respondents about P8,021,687.00. The respondents demanded that the

petitioners rebuild the LSG Building or pay the cost of the same, which the

petitioners refused.

Issue:

Whether or not the building is a new edifice or built on the old

ashes is really of no moment.

Held:

This only goes to show that the additional two floors put up on the

LSG Building could have overburdened the foundation’s load-bearing

capacity and contributed to the sagging of the building. The possibility of

settlement due to weak foundation cannot, therefore, be discounted. As the

trial court correctly ruled: “adding more floors without touching or

reinforcing the building’s bottom line or foundation are already manifestive

of some negligence or ignorance on the part of said building owner. Had

plaintiff stuck to his original building 2-storey with its kind of foundation,

the excavation by its adjacent neighbor would not matter much or affect

the building in question at the outset.” Contributory negligence is conduct

on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he

has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to

conform for his own protection. In this case, considering that respondent’s

negligence must have necessarily contributed to the sagging of the LSG

Building, a reduction of the award is warranted. We, therefore, agree with

the trial court that respondent should likewise share in the cost of the

43

restructuring of its building. This is more in keeping with justice and equity.

As the trial court ratiocinated:

After going over the records of the case, the Court believes and so holds

that plaintiff is equally negligent in not providing the necessary foundation

and reinforcement to accommodate/support the additional floors and this

finding is supported by plaintiff’s evidence more particularly the declaration

of John Lee that the 3rd and 4th floors were built on the skeleton of the

ground and 2nd floor which was burned (tsn pp. 8-9, July 9, 1985). To be

adding additional floors to the original 2-storey of plaintiff’s building and

depending merely on the skeleton of the ground and second floors for its

third and fourth floors without touching or reinforcing that building’s

bottom line or foundation are already manifestive of some negligence or

ignorance on the part of said building owner (plaintiff). To put all the blame

and responsibility for the defects, cracks and tilting or sagging of the

building in question on the shoulders of the defendants is not proper.

Plaintiff must realize his share of the faults and defects of his property in the

situation.

In the case at bench, the negligence of Contech caused the damages

sustained by the building, which did not discharge its duty of excavating

eight (8) inches away from the boundary line from the lot of plaintiff with

insufficient lateral and subjacent support

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,

if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called

a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The requisites of quasi-delict are the following:

(a) There must be an act or omission;

(b) Such act or omission causes damage to another;

(c) Such act or omission is caused by fault or negligence; and

(d) There is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

These requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the

excavation done without observing the proper safeguards. Although the

trial court stated that petitioner as land owner had every right to excavate

on his own land, such right is not absolute as to deprive the adjacent owner

sufficient lateral support pursuant to Article 684, New Civil Code, which

states that:

No proprietor shall make such excavation upon his land as to deprive any

adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.

For the damage caused to the respondent, petitioners and Contech are

jointly liable as they are joint tort-feasors. Conformably with Article 2194,

the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the quasi-delict

is solidary.

*MEA Builders,Inc v. CA

Ramos v. C.O.L. Realty Corporation Facts:

On or about 10:40 o’clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along

Katipunan (Avenue), corner Rajah Matanda (Street), Quezon City, a

vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing Plate

Number XDN 210, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and

44

driven by Aquilino Larin ("Aquilino"), and a Ford Expedition, owned by x x x

Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"), with

Plate Number LSR 917. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat

("Estela") sustained injuries. She was immediately rushed to the hospital for

treatment.

(C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving

the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah

Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue

when (Ramos’) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the car’s right rear

door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180

degrees towards the direction where it came from.

Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City

found probable cause to indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for

Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. In the meantime,

petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses

incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela in the

aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting

(C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before

the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City,

docketed as Civil Case No. 33277, and subsequently raffled to Branch 42.

As could well be expected, (Ramos) denied liability for damages

insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which

was the proximate cause of the accident. (Ramos) maintained that the

sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the

concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the

intersection.

(Ramos) further claimed that he was not in the vehicle when the

mishap occurred. He asserted that he exercised the diligence of a good

father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver, Rodel.

Issue:

Whether petitioner could be held solidarily liable with his driver,

Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty the amount of P51,994.80

as actual damages suffered in a vehicular collision. It declared the following

doctrines on proximate cause and contributory negligence

Held:

1. Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in

this case, viz:

Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the

immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate

cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may

recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed

that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the

mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

2. If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by

the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the

latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s

action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory

negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is

made.

3. Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case,

Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes

negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the

proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any

damages suffered by respondent from the accident.

4. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and

continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,

45

produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first

and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in

motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each

having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final

event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and

probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances

that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary

prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the

moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably

result therefrom.

5. If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing

Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have

happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA

prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who

resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had

reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and

probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is

considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare

and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It

was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the

principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the

plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his

injury, he cannot recover damages.

6. Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s

contributory negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s

recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.

Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos

seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may

have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of

damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory

negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not

eliminate respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s negligence which is the

proximate result of the accident.

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpetanos GR No. 143363,

February 6, 2002 Facts:

Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school

year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were

studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other

high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio

Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven

by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged

that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned

turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.

Issue:

Whether petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

Held:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218

and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent

in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor

students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or

omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the

injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the

accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by

any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show

such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva

admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless

46

driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the

jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor

to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over

which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the

death resulting from such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public

service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for

injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but

the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for

damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for

determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

Rodriqueza v. Manila Railroad Company Facts:

Defendant Manila Railroad Company operates a line through the

district of Daraga in the municipality of Albay, that on January 29, 1918, one

of its trains passed over said line and a great quantity of sparks were

emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive and fire was thereby

communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs

respectively and the same were entirely consumed. It is alleged that the

defendant Railroad Company was conspicuously negligent in relation to the

origin of said fire in failing to exercise proper supervision over employees in

charge of the locomotive, in allowing the locomotive which emitted these

sparks to be operated without having the smokestack protected by some

device for arresting sparks and in using a fuel of inferior quality.

On the other hand, the sole ground which the defense is rested is

that the house of Rodrigueza stood partly within the limits of the land

owned by the defendant company. It further appears that after the railroad

track was laid, the company notified Rodrigueza to get his house off the

land of the company and to remove it from its exposed position. Rodrigueza

did not comply with this suggestion, though he promised to put an iron roof

on his house which he never did. Instead he changed the materials of the

main roof to nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered with cogon.

Upon this fact it is contended that there was contributory negligence on the

part of Remigio Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of the

Railroad Company, and for that reason the company is not liable.

Issue:

Whether Rodrigueza is guilty of contributory negligence.

Held:

It is to be inferred that the house of Rodriguez already stood upon

before the Railroad Company laid its line over this course and there is no

proof that Rodrigueza had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad’s property

in the act of building his house. What really occurred undoubtedly is that

the company upon making its extension had acquired the land only leaving

the owner of the house free to remove it. Hence he cannot be considered to

have been a trespasser in the beginning. Rather, he was there at the

sufferance of the defendant company and so long as his house remained in

its exposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might

have resulted from fires occasioned by the defendan’s locomotives if

operated and managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have

assumed the risk of any ldamage that might result from the unlawful acts of

the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself against

the possible negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the

other will use the care of the ordinarily prudent man.

In the situation under consideration the proximate and only cause

of the damage that occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in

causing the fire. The circumstance that Rodrigueza’s house was partly on

theproperty of the defendant company and therefore in dangerous

47

proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in

fact have made the disaster possible, but the circumstance cannot be

imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action

because, first, the condition was not created by himself, secondly, because

his house remained on the area by toleration and therefore with the

consent of the Railroad Company and thirdly, because even supposing the

house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in

negligently destroying it. The circumstance that the defendant company,

upon planting its line near the house of Rodrigueza, had requested him to

remove it, did not convert his occupancy into trespass or impose upon him

any additional responsibility over and above what the law itself imposes in

such situation. In this connection it must be remembered that the company

could at any time have removed said house in the exercise of the power of

eminent domain but it elected not to do so.

Therefore, a railroad company, admittedly guilty of negligence in

allowing sparks to escape from a locomotive engine, by means whereof fire

destroys houses near its track, is liable for the damage and the owner of a

house thus consumed by the fire cannot be said to be guilty of contributory

negligence, in relation to such fire merely because his house is built partly

on the land of the railroad company – especially where the house on the

same spot prior to the laying of the railroad track.

Far Eastern Shipping Company v. CA Facts:

On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of

the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC),

arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about

7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila

International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was

tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the

vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots'

Association(MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of

the vessel to Berth No. 4.- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine

anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the

vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov

of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lift edanchor from

the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port.

The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.- When the

vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor)

one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the

vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the

anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on

the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the

anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not

slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief

conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When

Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured

Gavino that there was nothing to it.- After Gavino noticed that the anchor

did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was

then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier

fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino

thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and

additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of thevessel rammed into

the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel

sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his

report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports

Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident.- The

rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the

amount of P1,126,132.25.

48

PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE

The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is

under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section8, Article III of Philippine

Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85:SEC. 8.

Compulsory Pilotage Service.

For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through

rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking

at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel

engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.-

In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of

the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same

regulation: SEC. 11.

Control of vessels and liability for damage.

On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the

service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or

to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be

absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural

calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to

prevent or minimize damage. The Master shall retain overall command of

the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or

overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event,

any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of

the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability

of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to

recourse against said Master.

Issue:

Whether both the pilot and the master were negligent

Held:

Yes. The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary

object and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the

moving object (based on common sense and logic). It then went on to

determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent.

PILOT

A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to

conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert

who’s supposed to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not

know because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform

his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and

property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake.- Capt. Gavino was

found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to

the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too

slow. As an expert he should’ve been reacting quickly to any such

happenings.

MASTER

In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master

of the vessel. The master, however may intervene or countermand the pilot

if he deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of

the pilot or if the pilot is drunk.- Based on Capt. Kavankov’s testimony, he

never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didn’t hold and they

were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is

negligence on his part. He was right beside the pilot during the docking, so

he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing.- The

master’s negligence translates tounsea worthiness of the vessel, and in turn

means negligence on the part of FESC.

49

Bernardo vs. Legaspi Facts:

Plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a collission of

plaintiff's automobile and that of the defendant. Defendant filed a cross-

complaint against the plaintiff claiming that the collission was due to

plaintiff's negligence. The trial court found both drivers negligence.

Issue:

Whether the plaintiff is negligent in handling his automobile.

Held:

Complaint Dismissed. Where two automobiles, going in opposite

directions collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the

evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were

equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as

determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for the

damages suffered.

*U.S. v. Ortega