together in orbit the origins of international cooperation in the space station

8/8/2019 Together in Orbit the Origins of International Cooperation in the Space Station

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TOGETHER IN ORBITThe Origins of InternationalThe Origins of International

Participation in the Space StationParticipation in the Space Station

John M. Logsdon

Monographs in Aerospace History #11


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TOGETHER IN OThe Origins of IntThe Origins of Int

Participation in the SpaParticipation in the Spa

John M L


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ForewordForeword

interest to many people, particlaunches of space station elemethe process of assembling anduse the International Space Sta

Logsdon has made revisions to

in 1991, adding a concluding anastudy to the present, inserting recthe footnotes, and fixing a few guistic infelicities. It seemed esperecognize that the partnership bdescribed in this account had bee1993 invitation to Russia from the

join them in the station enterpriseLogsdon let the study stand.

This is the eleventh in a serprepared under the auspices ofDivision. The Monographs in series is designed to make avaiof investigations relative to the tics and space. These publicatiobe tightly focused in terms of short in length, and reproduced

format to allow timely and broaresearchers in aerospace historadditional publications in thAerospace History series are w

FROM VIRTUALLY THE BEGINNING of the twentiethcentury, those interested in the human explorationof space have viewed as central to that endeavorthe building of an Earth-orbital space station thatwould serve as the jumping-off point to the Moonand the planets. Always, space exploration sup

porters believed, a permanently occupied spacestation was a necessary outpost in the new frontierof space. The more technically minded recognizedthat once humans had achieved Earth orbit about250 miles above the surfacethe presumed location of any space stationthe vast majority of theatmosphere and the gravity well would have beenconquered, and then human beings were abouthalfway to anywhere they might want to go.

Space station advocates also recognized that thescientific and technological challenge of buildingan Earth-orbital space station was daunting andthat pooling the resources of many of the spacefaring nations of the world would maximize the probabilities of success. Thus, when the space stationproject was born in the in the mid-1980s, it almostimmediately became an international program.

This monograph describes the process of conceptualizing the international partnership and craftingits contours.

This study was completed by John M. Logsdonof George Washington University in late 1991, butit was not published in a form suitable for wide cir


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Table of ContentsIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Origins of the U.S. Invitation to Cooperate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Laying the Foundation for International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Space Station Task Force and International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The All ies Are Interested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mission Requirements Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Making the Space Station International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Resistance to International Involvement Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Space Station Decision Process and International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . .Adding the International Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Extending the Invitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Partners Accept the Invitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Early Agreement Sought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Europe Charts Its Future in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ESA Planning Includes a Cooperative Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Developing Poli tical Support for Station Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ESA Ministers Approve Long-Range Plan, Station Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Japan Determined Not to Miss the Boat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Canada Sets Its Space Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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AcknowledgmentsAcknowledgments

THIS STUDY TOOK a long time to complete, for avariety of justifiable and not so reasons. Along theway, the number of people who have helped hasbecome very large, and I am sure that I will fail togive due credit and thanks to all who deserve it.

The study was carried out under contract to theNASA History Division, using funds provided bythe Office of Space Station. Robert Freitag andTerence Finn, of the latter office, recognized thehistorical signifi cance of the space station programand were willing to support outside, independentscholars to track the evolution of the program innear to real time. They also supported the creationof a Space Station Historical Archive; its manager,

Adam Gruen, and his assistants did a superlativejob of assembling documents and other materialsfrom the early days of the program, from which Ihave drawn extensively in preparing this study.Freitag and Finn also read several drafts of thestudy and provided their on-the-spot perspectiveson how events unfolded. Overseeing the space station historical effort and this study until she movedto the Administrators office was NASA Historian

Sylvia Fries, who provided gentle but firm guidance and insightful comments on early drafts of thestudy. Roger Launius was Sylvias successor asDirector of the History Division, and he wasunderstanding as I pushed to finish the study.

Of the many others within NASA who helped

Pedersen read the manuscript acomments.

Individuals from U.S. station out of their way to be helpful inReeth, Ian Pryke, Gabriel Laffe

Arets of the European Space AKarl Doetsch, and Bill CockbuMasanori Nagatomo, ShinichiYasahiro Kawasaki of Japan. Owould not have been possible wness of many in the United Stattake time for an interview.

At George Washington

Hitchcock provided valuable resehe pushed to complete his own space station project. Lois BMcDonnell typed early drafts of thly learned to use a word processo

Underpinning this whole effortin NASA that what the agency donificance, is paid for by public fu

open for scrutiny by outsiders suchfrom abroad are amazed at the opsibility of U.S. government officiness of government agencies tomost sensitive files to external exapose for doing so is valid. NASAwithin the government in this resp


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vi Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participatio

I am grateful for the assistance offered by all The time when the space stathose mentioned above and by others who international cooperation can bcontributed to this study. It goes wi thout saying that is fast approaching. It certainlyI alone am responsible for all errors of fact and time in coming!

interpretation in this work and that the conclusionsand findings are mine and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or George WashingtonUniversity.


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Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station

IntroductionIntroduction

ON JANUARY 25, 1984, in his annual State of theUnion address to a joint session of Congress,President Ronald Reagan announced that tonight,I am directing NASA to develop a permanentlymanned space station and to do it within thedecade. A few moments later, he added: We want

our friends to help us meet these challenges andshare in their benefits. NASA wil l invite other countries to participate so we can strengthen peace,build prosperity, and expand freedom for all whoshare our goals. 1 Just over a year later, during theAprilJune 1985 period, Canada, Japan, andEurope accepted in principle the U.S. invitation toparticipate in the space station program. Thus wasinitiated the most extensive experiment in interna

tional technical cooperation ever undertaken.This essay is a history and analysis of the steps

leading to the origins of the space station partnership between the United States and its closestallies. It traces the process that led to the decisionto invite other countries to participate in the pro

ject and their reasons for accepting that invitation.Not covered in this account are the difficult nego

tiations during the 19841988 period that led firstto an initial set of agreements that allowed theprospective partners to work together during theearly stages of the space station program and thento the final set of agreements creating the originalspace station partnership. Also, the 1993 invitationto the Russian Federation to join the original part

connotation, but properly interpattempt to projectto propagatsage. The message sent to the wness of the United States to sharspace with others is that of an oneering society, eager to share

achievements with others. Whensupplemented by the demonstracal and organizational skill Apollo, the space program cleameans of validating the U.S. cership.

Using the space program as aforeign policy was relatively ea

United States and the Soviet Uncapability to put humans and torbit and beyond, particularly Union had a space program chacy and by limited contact with cits socialist allies. In the aftermatlanding, however, the United Staother countries were seeking thaccess to space and that the Co

between the United States andmight be replaced by an era of dthese emerging realities, durinperiod, the United States conscapproach to space cooperatiostressed data exchange, workingtific projects and providing laun


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2 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participatio

resulted in Canada developing an essential hardware element for the Space Shuttlethe RemoteManipulator Systemand Europe building a laboratory for use in the Shuttles payload bay

Spacelab. These cooperative engagements werevery different in character from any that had takenplace before. They raised concerns about whetherEurope and Canada had the technological capabilities to build sophisticated, highly reliablehuman-rated hardware, or whether the UnitedStates would have to provide them access to sensitive or proprietary technology for them to be successful in their projects. A contrary concern was

whether the U.S. invitation would stimulate itspartners to develop indigenous technologicalcapabilities that then would be competitive withthose possessed by the United States. Clearly, thiswas a form of cooperation qualitatively differentfrom that involving a foreign scientist participatingin an experiment flown aboard a U.S. spacecraft!

During the 1970s, both the United States and its

partners went through a sometimes difficult period oflearning to work together in developing new hardware for use by humans in space. The United Statesstill was by far the dominant partner in the post-Apollo cooperative relationship. It was the United

States that established the basic dbe developed and, more or less oit basis, told its potential partners contribution might be. As their

own capabilities increased duringas the result of their success coopera-tion, this attitude was bable to Europe and Canada. Iinvolved with the United States and challenging hardware devewould have to be on a more equi

This then was the context in

States took the initiative as the 198with Europe, Canada, and Japan able to participate in the post-Apoble cooperation in the next logicaopment of spacethe creation ofEarth orbit, a space station. Onspace undertaking was being puU.S. policya policy that for mohad used the space program to de

best about American society. As suggest, embodying that objectivtion of U.S. leadership that accomharmonious space station partnereasy task.


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Origins of the U.S.Origins of the U.S.

Invitation to CooperateInvitation to Cooperate

Background

WHILE THE HIGHLY VISIBLE personal endorsement byPresident Reagan of foreign participation in the U.S.space station program may have come as a surprise tomany in the United States and in potentially collaborating countries, the notion that the United States

would welcome some form of international cooperation in the program certainly was not unexpected.During 1982 and 1983, as NASA had tried to lay thebasis within the U.S. government for approval of itsspace station proposal, possible international involvement had been a subject of extensive discussion bothwithin the United States and between the UnitedStates and its potential partners. That discussion itselfbuilt on a record of cooperation that extended back

to the early years of the U.S. civilian space programin the late 1950s.3

The 1958 Space Act had set as one of NASAsobjectives cooperation by the United States withother nations and groups of nations. 4 NASAs cooperative activities were limited primarily to space science programs during the 1950s and 1960s, but as apost-Apollo program was being planned during the

19691971 period, there was a decision to broadenthe basis of cooperation to include involvement in thedevelopment of hardware, particularly systems related to the human spaceflight program.5

NASA asked Europe, Canada, and Japan in late1969 to consider ways of participating in its pro

had so changed the possibilitieparticipation that there was no involvement. Canada was eagSeveral years of discussions led toCanada would provide the ReSystem for the Space Shuttle. The

out to be the only element of post-Apollo plans for human sapproved by the Nixon administ

Negotiations between the UEurope on post-Apollo coopertentious and left many in Europisfied with the bargain struck.7established, by 1971, that the

the only major NASA project foto receive funding, NASA andleaders agreed that Europe wooptions for involvement in the S

1. Teaming between Europetry to develop specific porbiterfor example, thebay doors

2. European development ofvehicle, known as the Tugfrom the Shuttle payload b

3. A Research and Applicacalled the sortie can, to


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NASAs View: The Next Logical StepIn 1982, with the successful completion of the four Space Shuttle orb

began planning activity to define a possible space station. The station was viewed as the next logical step in s

nations past experience in space and provided, for the first time, the capability for permanent use of the spac

(NASA photo 83-H-368).

First, the Nixon administrations interest in cooperat

ing was later interpreted by the White House as aninterest in European involvement in the use of spacerather than in joint engineering projects. Second,NASA found that the European aerospace industrylagged approximately five to ten years behind U.S.industry. Therefore, NASA dropped the idea of jointdevelopment of technology, speculating that the

non-U.S. involvement with thes

satellites was not welcome to thcommunity.

The U.S. government thus foution of having to walk back fromception of the cooperative possibactivities that had been encourag


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for independent action. However, other countries, ledby the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, hadbecome eager to become involved in developinghardware qualified for human spaceflight, thereby

gaining skills in systems engineering and quality control. After hard negotiations within Europe, a packagedeal was agreed to in which funds were made available to develop a French-supported European launchvehicle (Ariane), to participate in the U.S. post-Apolloprogram through Spacelab development, and todevelop a maritime communications satellite of primary interest to the United Kingdom. As part of thepackage deal, a new cooperative organization, the

European Space Agency (ESA), was created to poolthe technical and financial resources of Europeancountries and to manage Ariane and Spacelab development and other cooperative projects.10

The U.S.-European agreemenproject became a source of tepartners. At the time it was negprojecting fifty or more Space Sh

at a cost per flight of less thanof these flights were expected tuse. Thus the thought was thaSpacelab hardware would beagreed in 1973 to develop the fown expense and then transNASA; NASA agreed to purchSpacelabs required, with a minpurchase guaranteed.

By the time Spacelab was development costs had risen torather than the approximat


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originally estimated. Projections of Space Shuttleusage had dramatically shrunk, and the UnitedStates decided to purchase only the one additionalSpacelab it was obligated to buy, at a cost of $128

million. Any chance for Europe to recoup some ofits development costs through Spacelab production thus vanished. The agreement provided forone joint U.S.-ESA Spacelab mission at no launchcost to ESA. After that, ESA would have to paylaunch costs for any Spacelab missions it wantedto undertake. By the early 1980s, the combinedcosts of preparing the experiments for a Spacelabmission and paying Shuttle launch fees exceeded

ESAs resources, and the agency was left in a position of not being able to afford the use of the system it had developed. (Germany undertook twoSpacelab missions of its ownone in October1985 and the second in Apri l 1993.)

The U.S.-European interaction in the post-Apollo period has been described in some detailbecause it provided much of the context for U.S.-

European discussions on potential space stationcooperation.11 In hindsight, some top Europeanspace officials described themselves as stupid inaccepting the U.S. terms for involvement in itspost-Apollo program, attributing their weakness toan early 1970s lack of confidence in Europeancapabilities and to a belief that only throughcooperation with the United States could thosecapabilities be improved.12 Thus, according to this

analysis, Europe was wi ll ing to pursue cooperationon almost any terms, no matter how one-sided. Bycontrast, in the early 1980s, with the completion ofSpacelab and the successful development of theAriane booster, Europe approached possible spacestation cooperation with a strong sense of its owncapabilities and a determination to accept only anarrangement that recognized its position as a majorspacefaring actor.

It is clear that Europe received substantial benefits from its post-Apollo cooperation with theUnited States. In particular, Europe gained experience in the systems-level management of complexspace projectsan experience that was quicklyapplied to other European projects such as Ariane.

had been most directly involved, the experience programmatically sonally rewarding. Also, Canadapleted its contribution to the Spac

process earned the confidence of the Johnson Space Center, some tical about the wisdom of non-UAmericas human spaceflight effosit on the sidelines during Shuttledetermined not to be left out of therative opportunity. As NASA bepossibility of international involvestation, there was a basis of pos

expectations among potential paproceed.

Laying the Foundation for Intern

Cooperation13

The proposal to make a spaceproject in NASAs post-Apollo pdecisively rejected by the Nix

during the 19691970 period. some kind of crewed orbital factial element of any plan for exteopment did not die, however; NASA sponsored a number of apossible space station missiotions.14 By early 1981, as the newPresident Ronald Reagan took major human spaceflight cent

Space Center in Houston, TexasSpace Flight Center in Huntsvieach developed a preferred spaThe two concepts were very difThe Marshall station began wi thtended platform that would gradpermanently occupied facil ity; was as a research laboratory. Thwas a large facility primarily in

space operations, such as in-fueling of spacecraft, and thhuman missions to the Moon acenters were traditional rivals wized NASA organization, and NASA Headquarters to adopt itthe agencys next major project


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Administrator, James Beggs and Hans Mark,respectively, appeared before a Senate confirmation hearing on June 17, 1981. Beggs had servedbriefly in NASA in the late 1960s and then hadbecome under secretary of the Department ofTransportation; during the late 1970s, he had risento a senior position with General Dynamics, amajor aerospace corporation. Mark had beendirector of NASAs Ames Research Center in theearly 1970s and had served as under secretary andthen secretary of the Air Force during the Carteradministration. Both were intimately familiar withspace policy and program issues. They had actual

ly been selected for their NASA positions in mid-March, and shortly thereafter Beggs had obtainedMarks agreement that we would try to persuadethe new administration to adopt the constructionof a permanently manned orbiting space station asthe next major goal in space. 15 Beggs and Markannounced that intent to the senators at their confirmation hearing.

It would take some time to develop the case forthe space station and to convince Ronald Reaganto approve the project.16 Before they could concentrate on station advocacy, Beggs and Mark hadto bring the Space Shuttle into what could be characterized as operational status. They also had tofend off, as best they could, 1981 attempts by thenew director of the Office of Management andBudget (OMB) to make major cuts in NASAs exist

ing budget.17

Thus, even though the two top NASAofficials had publicly strongly endorsed the stationas the next logical step in space, the station program took some time to pick up momentum,although early planning activities began almostimmediately. An initial Space Station Conferencewas scheduled for November 1981 to inform individuals throughout NASA and the U.S. governmentof NASAs thinking to date and to lay the basis for

the more intensive planning effort that all knewwas required.

From the start, the possibility of internationalinvolvement in any station program that might be proposed was part of that planning. As mentioned earlier, a bias toward international involvement in its

space station, particularly with Eutive continuation of the relationshing the 1970s.

Kenneth Pedersen, the DirectorInternational Affairs, was another tional cooperation. Unlike Freitaga long-time NASA employee; hespace agency in 1979 from his policy analysis and evaluatioRegulatory Commission. Pedersepolicy-level advisor on internatNASA Administrator and as NAS

discussions of international spacWhite House and other executivgave him and his staff a different pheld by people such as Freitag, winternational programmatic and one of the line offices of the agand his associates were enthuscooperation within and outside NAto take a more cautious approach

of the skepticism about the benescale international technological iwidespread among key membersnational security community andadministration.

If there was skepticism anwithin the space agency about national involvement in NASAs

resided primarily in the field chad to deal with the added maninevitably introduced by such imany at the Marshall Space Fligbeen involved with cooperatioprogram were receptive to intment in the space station, staSpace Center tended to be morewisdom of intimate internationa

When NASA convened the iworkshop on space station plan1981, international involvementagenda item, and the report of tnoted that:


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are properly structured and controlled. Thesebenefits may include economic cost sharing,access to unique or otherwise valuable expertise,and improvements in the linking of foreignprograms to STS utilization.

The subject of potential internationalparticipation in a U.S. space station programmust be approached carefully and proceed underclear assumptions and guidelines. A fundamentalground rule should be that planning for a spacestation wi ll be conducted as if the entire projectis to be developed as a wholly U.S. effort.Planning should proceed, however, on the basisthat it does not foreclose internationalcooperation. Potential foreign participants shouldbe encouraged to fund and undertake parallelstudies of space station requirements andconcepts which could benefit NASA in its designof the space station. Procedures should bedeveloped to facilitate controlled exchanges ofstudy results. All potential partners should be

clearly informed that such exchanges duringPhase A do not represent a commitment on thepart of NASA to foreign involvement in the actualdevelopment of the station.18

These 1981 perspectives guided NASAs approachto possible international involvement in the stationover the subsequent several years. Indeed, those within NASA responsible for technical-level liaison with

Europe for some time had been discussing with theirEuropean colleagues the possibility of a U.S. spacestation program and of European involvement in it.19The approach articulated at the November conference reflected those discussions.

Another agenda item at the workshop was potential Department of Defense (DOD) involvement in thespace station. The support of the national security

community had been essential to gaining WhiteHouse approval for the Space Shuttle, but a fairdegree of tension in the NASA-DOD relationship hadrisen in the decade since. However, the workshopreport noted that the climate for initiating major newNASA/DOD space endeavors is improving. Thereport also recognized that national security interests

For this purpose, NASAs internKenneth Pedersen convened a meSpace Center on January 13, 19this meeting on his own authinformed NASA Administrator Bdoing so. Pedersen had been onNASA staff members to work after he had been selected to hattended the Paris Air Show in JAdministrator-designate, and hewith representatives of other coNASAs future. These meetingson-one discussions made it clea

Beggs was an internationalist based on his experience with ination and co-production of the F-16 fighter, understood the vStates of involving allies in majoWhile there had been no formalto begin the process of solicitinticipation in the space station, 1982 felt on safe grounds in cal

sentatives of potential partneCanada, and Japan for a status rtion planning and a discussion oNASA would take to assessingtional involvement.

NASAs international partnersing two decades had been critiction for deciding by itself on t

design of projects and only thinvolvement, on terms largely Pedersens major point at the Jathat there would be a shift in potential partners were being involved at a very early stage in so that their inputs could helpchoices and they could understoptions for their participation.

stressed, had risks as well as benthe foreign representatives at thmeetings: [T]his is going to be and a frustrating process: excitiyou will see just how a programtogether from the nuts and boltbecause youre going to suffer t


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cooperative programs under a set of guidelines thatprovided the agency almost total control over thecharacter of those activities. Key to those guidelines were the notions of cooperative projectsbeing undertaken only when they were clearly ofmutual interest, no exchange of funds or unwarranted transfer of technology, clean technological interfaces, and NASA as overall project manager. While these guidelines were not explicitly modified as station planning began in earnest, the veryfact of involving non-U.S. entities in that planningimplied that other changes in the NASA approachto international cooperation were possible. To aslight but perceptible degree, NASA was recognizing the need to share with others control overshaping potential partnerships.

Space Station Task Force and International

Cooperation

In February 1982, NASA Associate DeputyAdministrator Philip Culbertson created an infor

mal task force on the space station. This task forcewas organized around a nucleus of people fromthe Advanced Programs Office of the Office ofManned Space Flight, in addition to several individuals from elsewhere in NASA. AdministratorBeggs on May 20, 1982, formalized the existenceof the Space Station Task Force. A major purposefor creating the task force was to make space station planning an agencywide process operating in

direct contact with NASAs most senior management, thereby both minimizing the Marshall-Johnson rivalry that had previously pervaded theplanning process and involving other NASA cen

ters in defining the organization ject. Named to head the tasHodge, a British-born veteranGemini, and Apollo programs wprevious decade working for tTransportation. Hodge had beeinformal task force members sinto NASA; he had already indicastrong proponent of internatiothe station program.

While the task force had theplanning the programmatic aspstation, NASAs Office of Internin charge of developing the pocussions of international particgram. A May 25, 1982, bHeadquarters officials captureding on international involvemention. Pedersen identified four kanswered:

Can such a major projectbe undertaken on an intestill be effectively manage

Dont major internationalresult in technology leaka

Is international involvementsible U.S. military utilization

What are the quids pro qtributions to a space stati

This 1982 artists con

mature space station


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During the early days of task force operations,Hodge created a number of informal workinggroups. Most addressed technical issues, but twohad as their focus more programmatic concerns.One was a Program Planning Working Groupand was chaired by Robert Freitag. The other wasthe International Cooperation Working Group. Italso was initially chaired by Freitag, but was soontaken over by Robert Lottmann, although Freitagstayed closely involved. These working groups hadas members not only individuals from the taskforce, but also people from other offices at NASAHeadquarters and from various field centers.Throughout the period covered in this study, theInternational Cooperation Working Group broughttogether people at the working levels of NASA todiscuss international cooperation issues.

Freitag and Lottmann used the working groups astools for articulating the benefits of cooperation toworking-level skeptics throughout the agency. Theystressed that the additional financial contribution

from potential partners would enhance the scope ofthe station and that the possibility of internationalcooperation would increase support for the programoverall in the administration and Congress. They alsoargued that learning to work together on long-termcomplex projects could form the basis for cooperation on even more ambitious programs in the future.

A series of interactions with potential partners

during May and June 1982 had emphasized toJohn Hodge the high international interest in station involvement. In a July 30 memorandum toKenneth Pedersen, Hodge noted that international interest in our space station planning activity isnow relatively high. Recent actions by ESA,Canada, and Japan suggest that this interest will bepursued. . . . Hodge laid out a series of questionsthat had to be addressed to develop a task force

approach to international cooperation, and heasked Pedersen for his ideas on them.25

Pedersens response was a fourteen-page, single-spaced strategy memorandum. In it, he highlightedmany of the issues that NASA would have toaddress in crafting its approach to space station

Department of Defense ofhad begun to brief the emunity on NASAs plannother agencies such aScience and TechnologDOD, NSC [the Nationaland ACDA [the ArmDisarmament Agency] areed in the international aspprogrammatic ones, and the Space Station Task Faspects in i ts briefings to t

2. Foreign Reaction to Mi lPedersen noted that thissue, since the interest amilitarization of space is aHe thought that it was imto be fairly straight forwthe probability and levement expected. . . . We to accommodate both civ

within the basic design ofso that one does not maksible.

3. Technology Transfer. Pehistorically NASAs coohad been structured cunwarranted technology tly by avoiding relationsh

and foreign industry that transfers. He thought thchoose the cooperative example, we might makediscrete hardware piecesfaceswe can minimizetechnology transfer. 26 Bnoted growing interestadministration in the to

transfer.27

He saw evidencation of existing exporeview of appropriate futuing the flow of advancedhe recognized the need ftain close and continuingexport control community


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These briefing slides show the space station program elements and the complex as envisioned for 1990. (NAS

Briefing, a substantial amount of non-U.S. planning related to the space station had begun. NASAhad adopted a strategy for its own planning effortsof not preparing any particular station design untilboth the missions such a station would carry outand the capabilities needed to implement thosemissions were identified.29 In January, Pedersen, inresponse to foreign inquiries about how best toproceed, had suggested to potential station partners that they adopt a similar approach.

The response was not long in coming. On May 1,1982, Japan announced its intent to establish aSpace Station Task Force reporting to the top-level

Space Activities Commission as its link to the NASAstation planning effort; that task force would involveother Japanese organizations as well as the JapaneseNational Space Development Agency (NASDA) inputting together a plan for Japanese involvement inthe station.30 A mission requirement study was its initial activity.31 Top-level endorsement of the Japaneseeffort was provided during a June 1982 meeting inWashington between NASA Administrator Beggs

and Minister Nakagawa of Japans Science andTechnology Agency.

On June 17, NASA Administrator Beggs met inParis with ESA Director General Erik Quistgaard.Among the products of the meeting was an understanding that ESA wil l fund, manage, and conduct

understanding noted that ESA and conduct a second stuEuropean contracts, to investigarchitectural and implementatthose requirements identified inand Japan and Canada beganhardware contributions as well aments. In addition, both FrancItalian team were studying, indfuture hardware concepts for a program that could also form tEuropean cooperation. This wanoted Pedersen in his August sdum to John Hodge, because

ties; they have to justify spendon a space station not only on ption utilization but on potential well. Nevertheless, urged Pedelet the emphasis on requiremen

Mission Requirements Studies

In August 1982, NASA awar

to U.S. aerospace firms to conduparallel requirements analysis stwas to combine the results of and those being carried out by phelp make the case that a statio

Pedersen addressed the


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conducted individually with each contractorbecause NASA does not want the studies to contaminate one another. For this reason, he said, thereviews will be restricted to NASA personnel.However, immediately following these reviews,NASA would invite foreign space agency representatives to hear a NASA summary of the U.S.mid-term results and to present a mid-term statusreport on their own studies. The final review of theU.S. studies in February and March 1983 would beopen, said Pedersen, and he invited the foreignstudy teams to attend and to present their finalresults at the same time. Final written reportswould be exchanged among all study contractors,U.S. and foreign, in April. In adopting thisapproach, NASA was hoping to keep not only U.S.but also foreign study teams isolated from eachother in the early stages of their efforts. In that way,the thinking went, NASA and the sponsoring non-U.S. space agencies would get the benefit of theindependent ideas of all contractors, rather thanhave the various U.S. and non-U.S. study teamsunduly influence one another.35

Pedersen also announced that NASA would welcome at any time visits of foreign space agencyrepresentatives to NASA Headquarters (but not toNASA field centers) to discuss space station planning. He characterized as premature any discussion on potential foreign hardware contributionsand modes of cooperation beyond the Phase A

planning period.

36

There were several reasons for NASA deciding todeal only with representatives of foreign governments, and not individuals from non-U.S. industry.37For one thing, it was industrial contacts that wereperceived as the most likely source of technologytransfer. Also, from the start of station planning,NASA wanted to discourage the notion of interna

tional teaming during the design and developmentphases of the program. In the post-Apollo period,U.S. and European industries had teamed to studycooperative possibilities. While such transnationalindustrial teams, with each firm funded by its owngovernment, ultimately did not emerge in the post-Apollo period, NASA believed that this could have

maintain Headquarters control ovdimensions of the program.

Several aspects of NASAs pwere troubling to potential partnEurope. The principles for coopby Pedersen seemed to reflect tmanaging partner approach thtional. Europe believed that itsduring the 1970s had earned future cooperative undertakingsrepresentatives of foreign industings with NASA and the prohibto field centers to discuss statannoying. NASAs EuropeaRichard Barnes, who was sensceptions, cabled a cautionary min early September 1982:

The history of the post-Apollo Udialogue, as well as more recensuggests that there will be manya NASA action, taken for legitimprogrammatic reasons, will be pEuropeans as evidence of NASin European involvement. And owho want to see European spacproceed in a direction independare already looking for such evidthem as little opportunity as pos

However, the undertone of skregarding NASAs seriousness abicant space station cooperation nor did it extend to other potenDuring the rest of 1982 and emission requirements studiesUnited States, Europe, Canada, tion, the general concept for thknown as distributed archit

from studies by NASA and its coticularly congenial to internatiothis concept, the space station wgle, large facility, but rather a cotrusses, and platforms to carry station missions. This made it epartner to contribute a separate


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agencies. The main purpose of the symposium wasto get everyone interested in the station programexposed to the most up-to-date information. In hiskeynote address, Administrator Beggs noted that thepurpose of developing a space station is, of course,to maintain our leadership. But such leadershipwould be through cooperation, he suggested, sayingthat the space station lends itself uniquely tointernational cooperation. If we can attract thatinternational cooperation, then other nations wil l becooperating with us in the resources that theyspend, rather than competing with us. 39

Summarizing NASAs view of the internationaldimensions of space station planning to date,Kenneth Pedersen noted that:

[W]e all recognize that the very scope andcomplexity of the space station process tends tosuggest that foreign participation, if it takes place,is going to entail fairly sizeable financial andpolitical commitments on their part. . . . I believethat when and if the time comes that we have theopportunity to proceed full steam ahead withthe space station, they and their countries aregoing to be in a better position as a result of this[early involvement in NASAs planning] activityto know what their interests are, to know whattheir level of participation might be, and in whatareas that participation might be most mutuallybeneficial.40

While his assessment of thetional involvement was positivadded a caution. He noted thaaware throughout this space stado not have an approved proghave not wanted to create unnecranted expectations that wouhaunt us. . . . We at NASA andhave been working wi th us haveand candid with one another asof the state of play, the currrespect to the decision-making we believed a realistic schedule

In mid-1983, this caveat wPresident Reagan in April had dicy-making body for space, the Group (Space), to prepare over ommendation on whether he sspace station program and incluthe fiscal year 1985 budget.42 NAallies within the U.S. governmestation; the interagency processthe hoped-for endorsement of thof potential international coopestation was not being addressedthe U.S. government; the focusfundamental policy issue of whbe a space station program at a


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Making theMaking the

Space Station InternationalSpace Station International

Resistance to International Involvement

Surfaces

By mid-1983, it had become clear to those leadingNASAs effort to gain support for the space stationamong other government agencies that the potentialfor international involvement was not a strong sellingpoint. From the start, Pedersen and others had recognized that the possibili ty of technology transfer associated with such involvement would be of concern tothe national security community and to administrationappointees at DOD. However, they were surprised todiscover that the individuals within the Department ofState overseeing the foreign policy aspects of scienceand technology were not enthusiastic about the potential of international cooperation in the space stationprogram to serve broader, foreign policy objectives.

The technology transfer issue first surfaced in termsof 1982 requests by U.S. firms carrying out the spacestation mission requirements studies to exchangeinformation with their European counterparts.Approval of these requests required the issuance of aTechnical Data Exchange Agreement under the provisions of the Munitions Control Act, which was admin

istered by the Department of State. DOD was alsoclosely involved in the approval process.

To lay the basis for the anticipated approval ofthese requests and to make sure that concernedoffices within DOD and the State Department wereaware of the overall context of planning for interna

late 1982 by appealing to higherState Department and DOD. Talkfor a meeting with DOD noted:

There is no need to transfer technology at this point. . . funding sensitive technologydetails, fabrication or procuinformation.

In the RFP [Request for Propmission requirements studiewe did not envision sensitivtransfer, we wanted to makeNASA contract award did napproval for any technologystated in the RFP that U.S. cfollow normal export contro

. . . We understand that severaexchange basic mission needssystems information have not despite more than four month

Some concerns have been eDOD that consideration of tnow is premature: The U.S. has no comm

station program; The U.S. has no policy

international involveme

T th I O bit Th O i i f I t ti l P ti i ti


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At this meeting of the White House Cabinet Council of Commerce and Trade on December 1, 1983, approval

development was the major agenda item. Key personnel in attendance are: Budget Director David Stockman (Vice President George Bush (fourth from left), Science Advisor George Keyworth (center), President Ronald Re

right), Secretary of Commerce Malcom Baldridge (third from right), Presidential Advisor Ed Meese (fourth from

the National Security Council (near door). (White House photo C18695-11).

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy RichardPerle and his deputy, Stephen Bryen, had been successful in wresting export control responsibilityaway from DeLauer.45 Both Perle and Bryen wereknown as hard-liners on technology transfer;having them involved in approving internationalinvolvement in the space station did not bode well.

On November 3, 1982, NASA appealed for helpto the Under Secretary of State for SecurityAssistance and Science and Technology, William

issuance of export licenses. Neight mission requirementsDecember 14, noting that concases within the export contrbecome an extended processcern being that since a space snot yet been given a new start, ture to have any formal arrangeindustry. Given this situation, that in the short time remainreport is due in February 1983, w



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the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and theCarter administrations White House Office ofScience and Technology Policy. She was thus verysensitive to the concerns of the national security community and their potential for posing an insuperablebarrier to NASAs plans. Her sensitivities were viewedas excessive by long-time advocates of cooperationwithin NASA, and this became a source of some tension between the Space Station Task Force and theOffice of International Affairs as the station decisionprocess unfolded in 1983.49

The AprilDecember 1983 period was recognized as critical by both advocates of the space station overall and those who wanted the station to beinternational. Recognizing that strong advocacy ofthe latter could jeopardize getting approval to goahead with the station at all, during this period,those heading NASAs interactions with the WhiteHouse and other agencies chose not to emphasizethe international potentials of the program. Thisapproach troubled some of the members of theSpace Station Task Force, but it was seen as a tactical necessity by Beggs, Pedersen, and Finarelli.50

The Space Station Decision Process and

International Cooperation

NASAs first attempt to gain President Reagansapproval for the space station had come in mid1982. An interagency study of space policy, whichbegan in late 1981 under the leadership of theWhite House Office of Science and TechnologyPolicy, was nearing completion, and RonaldReagan was being asked to approve a new statement of national space policy. In addition, Reaganhad agreed to attend the landing of the fourthSpace Shuttle mission in California on July 4; thiswould provide an occasion for a presidential statement on space policy. In attempting to convincethe White House to announce station approval aspart of its new space policy on the occasion of theShuttle landing, NASA Administrator Beggs wrotePresidential Advisor Edwin Meese in late May. Hiscase for the station stressed its use as both a labo-rato-ry and an operations base. He noted the challenge to U.S. space leadership from Soviet,

of the station at this early point ful; his advisors thought such amature. Thus, Reagans July 4 splanding said only that we musto the future by . . . establishing presence in space. 52 The statiomentioned.

Perhaps the most important National Space Policy announcthe transfer of leadership respooping space policy within the Rtion from the Office of SciencPolicy to the National Security Cdirective established a Senior (SIG) on Space, chaired by thPresident for National Security a forum to all Federal agenciviews, to review and advise on to national space policy, and toly and rapid referral of space pPresident for decisions as necestation became one of the early(Space) agenda.

Responsible for space policyNational Security Council staff aRye, an Air Force colonel whspace issues within the Pentadetailed to the White House. Pentagon, Rye had been the Aitive at the NASA space station in November 1981, and by 198personally convinced that it wasal interest to develop a space staat variance with the Air Force pvery skeptical of the value of huwhich was centered on makingresponsive to DOD requirementnew NASA initiatives were began ally in the White House proNASA during the 19821984 pting Reagans approval for the smaking international participatiof the station ini tiative.

Following its inability to ga



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son activities with potential partners, so that therewas a basis for collaborative action should a station program with international involvement beapproved.

In support of this strategy, the task force formeda unit called the Concept Development Group. Itstask was to integrate the results of field center studies, the eight industry studies of space stationrequirements, and any input from potential international partners. The chair of the group wasLuther Powell of the Marshall Space Flight Center,who had had extensive experience in cooperationwith Europe during the Spacelab program.International representatives participated in theactivities of the Concept Development Group andwere involved in many of the studies of requirements and of systems and subsystems carried outduring 1982 and 1983.

In the fall of 1982, SIG (Space) formed a workinggroup on the space station. This group was chaired byNASAs John Hodge, and it consisted of representatives from the State Department, DOD, theDepartment of Commerce, the CIA, and the ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency. Individuals fromthe Office of Management and Budget and the Officeof Science and Technology Policy participated asobservers. That group first met in October 1982, andit laid out a schedule that called for a report to SIG(Space) on policy options for the space station no laterthan November 1983.55

It did not take long to discover that there wassubstantial skepticism among some members ofthe working group regarding the wisdom of international participation in the station; this skepticismreflected the general attitudes of those at the policy level in DOD and the State Department. Thediscussion at the groups second meeting onNovember 22 turned to the issue of StateDepartment approval of exchanges of requirements data between U.S. and European firms carrying out mission analysis studies (as discussedearlier). The State Department representative notedthat approval was being delayed even thoughthere do not appear to be any objections to the

chair of SIG (Space), sign the term

The directive by Reagan that sthe formal SIG (Space) study ofsigned on April 11, 1983, callepolicy implications, including artions, of a manned Space Stationicy issues for examination; internwas not explicitly mentioned.57James Beggs had met with Rearranged by Rye. The purposeReagan of issues involved in the dto develop a station. The briReagan noted that the space statopportunity for international coowas only one of seven benefits ifrom the station program.58

As the study process procspring, it became clear that the group had become bogged ddetails and multiple options anproduce a policy paper suitablconsideration. Recognizing thissmaller group to develop such amember of the group was Peggytinued the approach of downptional aspects of the program; not totally appreciated by HodgSpace Station Task Force, who alsed her taking over the NASA ledeliberations on the station. Wmay have been the most influeNASA staffers in pushing for mation international and Kenneth conceptualizer of NASAs approaeration, Finarellis tactical effo1983January 1984 period werethe domestic basis for the station

In August, the SIG (Space) prooptions paper for President Reaprogram; however, the opponewould not agree to sending thepresidential decision. Given Readdressing nonconsensus recoeffectively blocked a presidenti



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likely to emerge from the group.

Given this situation, Rye decided to seek othermeans of gaining presidential approval. During theSeptemberNovember 1983 period, NASAs assessment of the prospects for gaining White House permission to move ahead with its highest priorityproject were very pessimistic, even through theagency had included start-up funds for the project inits fiscal year 1985 budget submission.61

Ultimately, NASAs second approach to gainingspace station approvalconvincing Reagan and hisadvisors of the merits of the programbore fruit. Still,international considerations did not play a visiblerole. President Reagan, through an October 4National Security Council memorandum, requestedNASA to identify its priorities in meeting the goal ofspace leadership that had been set in the 1982National Space Policy statement. In his reply, JamesBeggs said that he was absolutely convinced that aspace station is the next bold step in space. . . . It isan essential piece of our long range plan to reap thefull commercial and scientific benefits of space.Nowhere in the response were the benefits of international cooperation mentioned.62

Reagans decision to approve the space station wasfinally made in early December. Wanting to involve abroader range of agencies in the discussions than justthe members of SIG (Space), thereby outflanking station opponents in that body, Rye and another stationsupporter on the White House staff, Cabinet SecretaryCraig Fuller, scheduled a December 1 meeting of theCabinet Council on Commerce and Trade to discussthe station in Reagans presence. The model of thespace station that NASA prepared for the meeting didnot show any foreign contributions to the project.

The meeting went well, and a few days later, NASAlearned that President Reagan had given his blessingto the station. However, the issue of whether thespace station should be an international effort was notaddressed.

Adding the International Element

national participation with the antion approval.

NASA was ready to seizePedersen and Hodge had met a1983 to identify the policy issuaddressed for NASA to proceedparticipation, once presidential ation program was obtained. In randum, Pedersen had noted the

1. What space station compoeligible for cooperation?

Discussion . . . NASA still needswhether certain elements, whileinterface, may still be elements should build.

2. Foreign Involvement in Pha

Discussion . . . Should NASA unBs on all space station elementspace agencies fund independenB studies on space station elemthey have a particular interest? Sentertain Joint Phase B studies?does NASA begin to drive indivparticular ele-ments, or should wmultiple approaches by all so thfall out?

3. Guidelines for international

Discussion . . . To what extent destablish de facto minimum conin terms of funding or in elemen

4. Study Agreements, MOUs, an

Discussion . . . Phase B study agbe desirable from the viewpointand NASA for several reasons: aprovide the framework for informand industry-to-industry relationthey could strengthen foreign spposition . . . for funding and sup



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20 g g p

flight of foreign personnel. Of course, formulasfor these would have to be worked out so thatthe benefits match the size of the contributions.. . . In addition, I think NASA should considerinternational cooperation on the operation of the

space station, as NASA and ESA have agreed todo on the Space Telescope, and consider howthat should be factored into the equation.

5. Technology Transfer and DOD Concerns

Discussion . . . Prior to Phase B, NASA needs todevelop a set of ground rules for bothHeadquarters and the Centers on information

exchange with our foreign partners. These willnot only be useful for reference for NASAemployees, but will also demonstrate to theexport control community that NASA is aware ofthe current technology transfer concerns, anddoing something about them.63

At some point in the fall of 1983, the foreignpolicy potential of the space station had come tothe attention of individuals in the Office of theUnder Secretary for Political Affairs and the Bureauof European and Canadian Affairs of the StateDepartment. There was more receptivity to thatpotential among these individuals than there hadbeen from the science and technology elements ofthe State Department. As plans for announcing thespace station in the 1984 State of the Unionaddress moved forward, Finarelli at NASA andState Department officials Thomas Niles andArnold Kanter were actively discussing the benefitsof station cooperation in the context of broader foreign policy concerns.

These discussions, and the recognition that theissue of international cooperation had to beaddressed in some way before approval of thespace station program was announced byPresident Reagan, led to a January 18 meeting convened by the chair of SIG (Space), Special Assistantto the President for National Security Affairs RobertMcFarlane, and his deputy, Admiral JohnPoindexter. Attending the meeting were NASAAdministrator James Beggs, Under Secretary of

itals to extend the presidential iThe text of the invitation as it wState of the Union address was the evening of January 18 andmeeting participants the next d

interagency meetings or policy the cooperative proposal, nor ament of the risks associated cooperation. This was a decisioicy officials, not a ratification of issue of international participatrately raised with President Recame in the form of overall apprtext.64

Before he made the State of Reagan sent a personal messHelmut Kohl of the Federal RepPresident Francois Mitterrand Minister Margaret Thatcher of thPrime Minister Bettino CraxMinister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Minister Pierre Trudeau of Cana

During my State of the Union adWednesday, January 25, I will bUnited States intention to procedevelopment of a manned Spaceprogram. It is my hope that we con this project. To develop this cI have asked James M. Beggs, tof the National Aeronautics and Administration (NASA), to act asemissary and meet with senior ogovernment in the near future.65

Thus when Ronald Reagan wenJanuary 25, 1984, and invited othticipate in the space station pannounced, that presidential invitatprise to the leaders of those counStates hoped to engage in the stat

Extending the Invitation

The first step in arranging the Beggs was to develop terms of



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were issued by the Presidents Special Assistant for of a permanently manned spNational Security Affairs, Robert McFarlane, who was emphasis on expected capabalso chairman of SIG (Space). McFarlane wrote Beggs design, anticipated availabiliton February 25, saying that the President would like with the Presidents overall cfor you to travel as soon as possible to appropriate for- commercial space program.

eign capitals as his personal emissary and meet withsenior officials to discuss potential international Assess the extent of foreign incooperation in the space station, with the objective participation. The assessmentbeing to agree upon a framework for collaboration level of overall interest, the exon this program which could be announced at the be achieved, and the foreign rLondon Summit in June 1984. 67 The idea of includ contributions that might be foing station cooperation as an agenda item on theannual seven-nation economic summit had come During the discussions with ffrom Peggy Finarelli and Thomas Niles and had been the Administrator should avoembraced by those within the State Department commitments regarding interresponsible for summit planning.68 cooperation until other U.S. g

agencies have had the oppoThe terms of reference for the trip specified that in the implications.69

his discussions with foreign officials, Beggs should: Explain NASAs current plans for development



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The original plans for the Beggs trip called for theuse of commercial airlines. Vice President GeorgeBush, who had offered quiet support for the international initiative all along, suggested to the NASAAdministrator that he request the use of one of the Air

Force planes available to the White House; Bush indicated that he would support such a request.70Accordingly, on February 19, Beggs wrote WhiteHouse Chief of Staff James Baker requesting the use ofa government airplane, arguing that it was justifiedand appropriate because of the Presidents directinstruction, the extremely tight timetable, and theimportance which space station has assumed hereand abroad as a central feature of this

Administrations leadership program. 71

The plane was provided by the White House, andBeggs and an entourage that included Gil Rye fromthe National Security Council staff, Phil Culbertson,John Hodge, Ken Pedersen, Peggy Finarelli, and LynWigbels from NASA, and Mark Platt and MichaelMichalik from the State Department left Washingtonon March 3. They traveled to London, Bonn, Rome,and Paris and flew directly from Paris to Tokyo, returning to Washington on March 13. After a few dayshome, the group visited Ottawa. At each stop, Beggsformally reiterated Reagans invitation to considerparticipation in the U.S. space station program, andhe tried to respond to questions and concerns.

At every stop, Beggs and his group met with spaceofficials and with the highest ranking nonspace officials available, as follows:

Londonwith the minister of state for industryand information technology and the scienceadvisor (Prime Minister Thatcher and the foreign secretary were meeting outside of Londonwith French President Mitterrand)

Bonnwith the minister for research and technology and the under secretary of the foreignministry (Prime Minister Kohl and the foreignminister were in Washington)

Romewith Prime Minister Craxi, the science minister, and the head of the National

Keidanren, the influentJapanese industries.)

Ottawawith the ministerand technology, the scien

president of the National R

One issue in every discussion wof the contribution for which NBeggs had asked Ken Pedersen inmate of what a reasonable expPedersens response noted thattributed approximately 12 percedeveloping the Space Transportat

it was reasonable to expect simitributions from these countries tonoted that the German estimate fstation contribution was $1.5 bill iwas considering a station contrcost roughly the same as the $had spent on the Space Shuttle system. Pedersen thought that it istic to expect Japans contributiEurope, but he noted that the presJapan was considering would c$500 million to develop given trelated [research and developme

Upon his return from Europewrote to Secretary of State Georg16, which summarized his assesdate. He told the Shultz that:

The reaction so far to the Presidinternational cooperation has bepositive and openly appreciativepositive in the sense that our prmoving quickly, or have alreadypoli tical decisions to participatereactions clearly show appreciaforeign policy benefits that will and collaborative cooperation ovisible and imaginative project.7

On the basis of the March tthat Italy, Germany, and Japaalready made the political de



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After his round of visits to foreign capitals wasover, James Beggs wrote a letter to each country hehad visited to summarize his understandings, clarify issues that had been raised, and lay out the nextsteps. He reiterated the basic U.S. position that:

President Reagan has committed the U.S. tobuilding an $8B fully functional space station tobe operational by the early 1990s, but has also setthe stage for working together to develop a moreexpansive international space station with evengreater benefits and capabilities for all to use.Thus, we are inviting your Government to take aclose look at our plans and concepts and then,

based on your long-term interests and goals, sharewith us your ideas for cooperation that willexpand the capabilities of the space station.75

In person and in writing, the now extended an invitation for ipation in the space station. Sucbeen escalated from a possibilityspace agencies to a highly vis

U.S. president. In the months States would discover whetheaccepting that invi tation could b



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The PartnersThe Partners

Accept the InvitationAccept the Invitation

Introduction

In the first months of 1984, the hope of theUnited States was that its invitation to participatein the space station program would be quicklyaccepted, at least in principle, by political leadersin Europe, Japan, and Canada. It was also hopedthat detailed negotiations on the terms and condi

tions of that participation could then commence,leading to the signing of initial cooperative agreements by the end of 1984. The terms of referencefor the trip of James Beggs directed him to seekagreement on a framework for collaboration onthe space station, which could be announced atthe London summit in June 1984.76 Such earlyagreement was not feasible, however; it took untilthe first months of 1985 for the poli tical foundationfor the station partnership to be established. Thissection describes the steps that led to European,Japanese, and Canadian acceptance of the U.S.invitation to consider engaging themselves withthe space station program.

Early Agreement Sought

The idea of including the station invitation as anagenda item for the London Economic summitarose out of conversations between NASAs PeggyFinarelli and Thomas Niles of the StateDepartments Bureau of European-CanadianAffairs, after the basic decision to invite international participation in the station had already been

kicking a proposal of the magnitstation up to the Head of State/Gthrough the Summit process, is oway to get a decision.77

At a January 30 planningLondon Economic Summit, P

approved the notion of asking oipants to issue a statement indicparticipate in the space station pof summit preparations in the UnAllen Wallis, Under SecretaEconomic Affairs. He and his other six summit countries Sherpas. The Sherpas met on Fseemed open to the idea of hpartners declare that they agcooperate in the development space station, demonstrating thcontinue to use outer space forand for the benefit of mankind.

The results of the NASA Adtrip, however, suggested that have to be done if any agreereached in time for the summit. that he had come to understathat: the Summit declaration important to NASAs counterpacies in these other countries. Tothe political underpinnings nece



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One was technology transfer. In his follow-up letter to those he had met on his trip, Beggs recognized that technology transfer has been anincreasing concern on all our parts in the past fewyears, and we will need to work together to make

sure we are protecting our mutual technologybases in this partnership. 80 The other issue of general concern was the extent of U.S. militaryinvolvement in the space station. Here, the U.S.position had been carefully crafted to reflect bothanticipated foreign sensitivities and to be acceptable within the U.S. government. Beggs told potential partners that:

The U.S. space station program is a civil programwhich will be funded entirely out of NASAsbudget, with no national security funds used. . . .The space station that the President directedNASA to build is a civil space station. Of course,like the shuttle, the space station will beavailable to users. If there are any nationalsecurity users, like national and internationalusers, they will be able to use the facility. As

provided in the Outer Space Treaty, however, allactivity on the space station will be limited topeaceful, nonaggressive functions.81

Beggs also reported that our principal allies aremoving quickly, or have already moved, to takepolitical decisions to participate. 82 This may haveoverstated the situation somewhat. On one hand,having the invitation to participate come from theU.S. President and be extended to other heads ofgovernment had changed the stakes. The precedingtwo years of discussions at the technical level, andthe biases toward collaboration that had emergedfrom those discussions, were transformed into anissue high on the policy agenda. No ally wanted tobe in a position, without compelling reasons, torefuse President Reagans public invitation. On theother hand, all three potential partnersJapan,Canada, and Europewere in the midst of theirown internal debates over the future direction oftheir space efforts. Accepting the U.S. invitation,even in principle, implied that a significant share oftheir space budgets over the coming decade wouldhave to be channeled into a partnership with the

As a followup to the Beggs ttion for the summit, Gil Rye, PRobert Freitag made an April triing with both space agency ofSherpas. Their discussions reinfo

some in Europe would be cautiocommitment to cooperation at also found that the smaller memwhich were not part of the sumconcerned about a summit deccommit them to additional conThere was limited enthusiasm posal in some of these states, industries did not see the pros

business in the undertaking anministries, almost always oppospace budgets, had more infladvocates in smaller ESA memb

The potential for internationthe U.S. space station was aPresident Reagans agenda for hwith each of the other six lead

Economic Summit, which took pissue was not discussed duringsessions of the summit leadersemerged from one of those mleaders encountered a large mthat (unlike the model that NASthe White House the preceding ed representations of potentiations; this was a carefully stagPresident Reagan to discuss hisipate. NASAs Langley Researcpared the detailed station modsummit delegation (including GFinarelli) had carried to Londominutes of lively discussion andnity ensued as the summit around the model.

The summit communiqu wasguage, saying (in its final substant

We believe that manned space skind of programme that providetechnological development lead



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The London Economic Summit of June 79, 1984, during which the space station was a major topic of discus

President Reagan (United States), Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom), Foreign Minister Graf v

(Germany), and Prime Minister Yasuhi ro Nakasone (Japan). (NASA photo).

While this statement was less of an endorsementthan had been proposed to the summit Sherpas inFebruary, the noncommittal language of the communiqu accurately reflected the state of affairs inJune 1984.85 Even so, it was an endorsement of thestation concept and thanked Ronald Reagan for hisinvitation. The inclusion of station cooperation onthe agenda for the 1985 summit was particularlysignificant. It was intended to encourage speedydecision-making in Europe, Japan, and Canada,because any delays or breakdowns in discussionsover acceptance of President Reagans invitationwould have to be reported back to the summitleaders at their next get-together. Although moretime would be needed to find ways in which the

been engaging in informal disUnited States regarding possible eration since January 1982. Howtheir own space plans, they certable to count on the station gaunambiguous approval of the Rethat was communicated by incthe program in Reagans State of tPresident Reagans approval of invitation to participate changemajor way. Europe and its majospaceFrance, West GermanyItalyas well as other potential making their own plans and dtheir own interests, and the role



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station activity would require a major increase inspace-related expenditures and thus a reappraisalof national priorities.

To some, it might appear that the U.S. would be

called upon to provide guarantees and acceptdependence in excess of what Europes share ofthe common burden will be worth. But theimbalance is the other way: Any substantialEuropean involvement in a U.S.-led space stationprogram would absorb so much of the spacebudget that Europe would forfeit the ability tocreate a similar but independent capability.86

The invitation by Reagan to participate in thespace station program had been a true leadershipinitiative; it was now up to the potential partners asto whether they chose to follow the U.S. lead.

Europe Charts Its Future in Space87

Much had changed in Europe since the post-Apollo agreement to develop Spacelab as part of

the U.S. Space Transportation System. Europeancommitment to the German- and Italian-ledSpacelab program had been part of a packagedeal among countries interested in space. Otherelements of that deal were multilateral funding ofa French-led program to develop an independentlauncher for Europe, Ariane, and a British-led program to develop a maritime communications satellite. In addition, eleven European nations had

agreed to create a single organization to manageprograms in science, applications, and infrastructure development. By the time the U.S. invitationfor space station participation was extended,Spacelab had had a successful first flight aboardthe Space Shuttle. Ariane was in service and successfully launching both government and commercial payloads, and the maritime satellite was inoperation, serving as the initial basis for theINMARSAT organization. ESA had developed intoan effective means of combining the resources ofmember states to support programs that not one ofthem was able to carry out on a unilateral basis;ESA programs combined with national efforts hadled to the emergence of a vigorous space industri

gram was part of these consideraIndeed, as long ago as 1976, bU.S. space station studies, theorganizations Board of Directrepresentatives from i ts member

that ESA should examine the qwith a possible participation by EStation programme. 88

In February 1982, NASA AdBeggs and ESA Director Genediscussed potential NASA-ESA station program; each directadvanced planning (Ivan Beke

Jacques Collet for ESA) to workplanning gained momentum.89 Bance, a detailed plan for NASAand joint activity regarding staquickly developed; Europe waopportunity to be involved in thalmost from its inception.90 By JNASA had agreed on an approwould carry out two sets of sp

studies. One, to be called EuAspects of a U.S. Manned Spabe conducted in parallel to U.Sments studies; other ESA studiethe architectural and implemenof European requirementsthatmade sense for Europe to conprogram. In September 1982, contract for the utilization stud

aerospace research establishmetiated four contracts with Eregarding potential hardware co

These initial steps in Europeastation participation were takenESA member-state approvaTransportation Systems Long-Programme (STSLTPP) that wouall context for charting Europesarea of launch and in-orbit systehad been approved in principle bin June 1982.91 It was intended states the elements necessary fon the selection of a long-term



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by means of in-orbit infrastructures developed independently or by cooperation with NASA in thefuture U.S. space station activities. 92

While staff members of ESA may have wel

comed the possibility of continued cooperationwith the United States, their attitude was not universally shared in Europe. It proved difficult to getmember-state commitment to the STSLTPP, in largepart because of skepticism in some countriesregarding the wisdom of continuing intimate cooperation with the United States. NASA EuropeanRepresentative Richard Barnes reported inDecember 1982 that the ESA Council had again

deferred, this time for a month, the deadline formember states adherence to the . . . STSLTPPwhich includes funding for Ariane 5 and SpaceStation studies. So far only Sweden, Belgium,Denmark, and Germany have formally signed up,with Germany the only strong supporter of SpaceStation studies. 93

In the weeks following the December ESA Council

meeting, advocates of at least examining cooperationwere able to gather the support needed for carryingout the STSLTPP. France agreed to support the studyprogram on December 22, Italy on January 6, 1983,and the United Kingdom on January 14. With the fourmajor ESA members signed on, study efforts wereable to go forward during 1983 and 1984.Commenting on the adoption of the program, theleading French newspaper, Le Figaro, noted:

The old continent is preparing its space activity forthe next century: we will undoubtedly have thenour space-men, orbital infrastructure and maybe,also a mini-shuttle to fly on our own. At least thatswhat ESAwho is initiating an importantengineering program in this regard and has alreadysigned the first industrial study contractthinks.Hopefully, we wil l know between now and 1985.

At the same time we will know who will influencethis long-term policy: Germany who favorscomplete cooperation with NASA, or France, morefavorable to independent solutions.

At the moment, two philosophies are possible. On

Thus, the main task is to convincpartners of the value of those exin order to succeed, France will resolve its own contradictions: Sbelieve that the space exploitati

reality by the end of the centuryhuman presence, which is counoutlook on both the American anAs long as such opinions carry wit wil l certainly be difficult to clainfluence ESAs decisions.94

Not all early thinking about spation was carried out within th

Another focus for considering contributions to the U.S. spacfrom studies carried out by GInterest within the two countrieshardware as the basis for futuback to the late 1970s. Advoccooperation with the United within Germany, sought an appreserve the option of coopera

ESA or outside of it. In 1983,MBB/ERNO, and the Italian firthe respective supervision of DFCNR (the national research agenItalian space plan), began intenseeither in conjunction with the U.as an independent Europeancomplex, of an orbital infrastruSpacelab-derived pressurized m

platforms, support modules, anThe name given to this orbColumbus; the program was countries as a German/Italian elead role in Europes space statio

The French space agency,dtudes Spatiales (CNES), andspace industry also were stud

efforts in the early 1980s. Onewas a new high-thrust rocket eHM60, designed to use liquid hoxygen as fuels; such an enginedevelop a new generation of thdesignated Ariane 5. In other stu



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A late 1984 graphic on the rationale for building the space station. (NASA photo HQ S84-2032A(3)).

skeptical of the importance of human spaceflightactivities, this attitude shifted 180 degrees following President Francois Mitterrands decision to

accept a Soviet invitation to fly a Frenchmanaboard the Soviet Salyut space station. That flighttook place in June 1982. France from this time onincreasingly argued that independent Europeancapabilities in all areas of space activities, including human access to orbit, were essential; the term

engine. These proposals were ple by the ESA Council on June authorized to attempt to gain m

cial commitments for preparatoa final decision to proceed, on tthe large cryogenic HM60 enginstation related programme baseby the German and Italian deleggramme will be defined with a v



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closely with the NASA space station planners to stayabreast of U.S. activity, now that the space stationhad received President Reagans approval.) Otherinputs into this plan came from the results of theSTSLTPP and from the planning activities of other

offices within ESA concerned with science andapplications programs. That long-range plan wasready for initial consideration by ESA member countries in November. The introduction to the plannoted the need to find the right balance between:

1. Science and applicationsbetween culturaland economic rewards

2. Payloads and launchers/in-orbi t infrastruc-turebetween ends and means

3. Launcher development and manned spaceflightbetween major technologicalavenues, that of propulsion and that ofhuman-in-orbit

4. Manned space systems and automated space

systemsbetween humans and robots

5. ESA program and national programbetween centralized and decentralizedactivities

6. Purely European program and cooperativeones, in particular with the United Statesbetween achieving space autonomy and

undertaking large-scale programs and theiroperation

The ESA executive alerted member states thatthe present scope of the overall ESA programmewill have to be enlarged, making it necessary toincrease the funding at an average rate of 12 percent a year over 5 years. 99

The plan recommended that Europe develop anew launcher, Ariane 5, based on the HM60engine, to become operational by the end of 1995.It noted that the U.S. space station was a majorstep in space capability which Europe cannotafford to ignore and recommended until about

and ambitious programme for tderived from a shared vision ofspace. 100

Developing Political Support foCooperation

In fact, the elements of suchbeen emerging in Europe durinESA Council decision to approColumbus preparatory programowed a new package deal to gdecade in space. While studies and national space agencies def

ware elements of the next genespace capabilities and of potentributions to the U.S. space stadiscussions among the leadingtriesparticularly France, GerKingdom, and Italywere leadon how those elements could bacceptable fashion. A key to thaddition to agreement on the ha

be included, was developing anhow various ESA member statamong themselves the costs, aindustrial involvement, in the vthe ESA plan.

The major difference of vieresolved in these discussions long-standing French preferenc

on improved launch systems anthat stressed European autonomand Italian preference for both ment of human spaceflight capaclose cooperation with the Undevelopment. Another considerapreference for ESA to undertakgrams that produced tangible bresearch or exploration-oriented a

the smaller ESA member stateswas a program with enough diveallow meaningful opportunities foindustrial participation. These dhad been accommodated in the that had guided European spa


l d f th d f J 1985 Thi th fi t It l d t ll t t B it


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uled for the end of January 1985. This was the firstEuropean space meeting at the ministerial levelsince the 1973 gathering that had created ESA andapproved the Ariane and Spacelab programs. Thepurpose of the January 1985 meeting was to con

sider the long-range plan proposed by ESA. In thecourse of putting together that plan, there hadbeen close consultation among the ESA DirectorGeneral101 and senior members of the ESA executive staff and policy-level officials within the governments of ESA member states. The Europeanaerospace industri

together in orbit the origins of international cooperation in the space station

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