"to what extent is the european union’s development policy in india shaped by uk policy?"

7/31/2019 "To what extent is the European Unions development policy in India shaped by UK policy?"

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To what extent is the EuropeanUnions development policy in

India shaped by UK policy?____________________________

Candidate Number: SBFB4

Dissertation submitted in part-fulfilment of the Masters Course in EuropeanPublic Policy M.Sc., UCL, September 2011.


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Abstract

This paper is an exploratory study to assess the importance of the UK and its

development and foreign policies in shaping the EUs own development strategy in

India. Three dimensions for this relationship are examined empirically. Overall levels

of aid from the UK and EU budget are used as a first dimension to this analysis, to

examine any patterns of correlation over time. Secondly, a process tracing study

looks at the bureaucratic decision points and avenue for UK action in the formulation

of the India Strategy Paper. Thirdly, a case study of EU policy implementation in

India considers the possibility of the UK influencing EU policy implementation at

ground level.

This study suggests that the analysis of aid levels points to the importance of

external influences on both the UK and the EU direct aid levels. Secondly, the

importance of the UK at the policy formulation stage is substantially diluted by

bureaucratic process and the increasing relevance and prioritization of India to other

Member States besides the UK. Finally the case study indicates that a high level of

collaboration occurs between development partners, but this is not necessarily

always in favour of the UKs priorities, and compromise is likely to be prevalent on

the part of all donors.


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Introduction

The question of whether the European Union (EU)1 can rise above the policies of its

constituent Member States has long been discussed with regards to EU development

policy, both theoretically and empirically. There has been a clear move over the last

two decades in this direction. In development policy in particular, this transition to

supranational policymaking is something that the UKs Department for International

Development has been keen to monitor. On the whole, DfID welcomes and in many

ways encourage EU involvement a European Union department within DfID was

established since its formation in 1997.

As a Member State with key bilateral interests in India, however, the UK may well be

more inclined to take a stronger stance in determining EU development policy in the

country. Not only is the UK the largest donor of aid to India, but India is regularly the

top recipient of the UKs aid efforts. If the UK sees the EU as a significant partner in

India - and this is a big qualification - it is likely to pursue its policies energetically in a

Brussels context also. This paper aims to examine to what extent the UK can and

does do this.

The first section provides a framework for a range of explanations behind why the UK

would or would not be influential in EU development policy in India. The following

sections cover a brief overview of EU and UK development policy, a discussion of

the dimensions of this study, and a methodological outline. Three empirical studies

then follow: an analysis of trends in UK and EU aid levels; a process tracing study of

1The EU in the context of EU development policy in this paper refers to the development

cooperation financed through the EU institutions, and managed by the Commission. By thisdefinition, it does nottherefore include the bilateral programmes of its constituent MemberStates.


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the EUs development policy formulation process; and a case study of EU

development policy implementation in India.

Explanatory Framework

This section examines both theoretical and non-theoretical explanations that might

explain the UKs influence in EUs development policy in India. The aim is to provide

a contextual background to frame and provide possible explanations for the findings

in the three empirical studies of this paper. It does not aim to provide a

comprehensive overview, however the following is small selection of explanations

and theories drawn from the literature on aid determinants and European integration.

Part I: How might the UK influence the EUs development policy in India?

This section provides three explanations why the UK might have substantial

influence over EU development policy in India, and then examines the application of

Moravcsiks model of liberal intergovernmentalism to this area of study.

Policy harmonization

A key EU guiding principle in its development cooperation is to aim to harmonize

development policy, based upon the 2003 Declaration on Harmonisation. With the

purpose of reducing the administrative burden of different development programmes

on recipient countries, a number of donors have agreed to work towards a

harmonisation of policy. With the UK being the largest donor of aid in India, it would

make sense for the EU to follow DfIDs procedures in many instances, rather than

the other way around.


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Resources: Expertise, experience and existing relations in India

One explanation for the UKs influence in EU development policy in India is fairly

pragmatic. Due to the fact that the UKs development programmes in India are longer

standing and more extensive that those of the EU and than those of any other

Member State, the UK may well take a leading role at both formulation and

implementation levels of the policy making process. The UK also benefits from

greater human resources and budgets. These advantages make it a natural leader in

the EUs development policy in India, but they also feed back to the following

explanation, where information asymmetry is perceived to play an important role.

Intense preferences of the UK and its strong bargaining power in the Council

The most obvious driver for the UKs interest in EU development in India is its strong

political motivation to maintain its historical links and strategic interests in the

country. As a powerful Member State with strong policy preferences in development

cooperation in India, substantial experience and expertise, and as an actor that can

draw upon a prevalent view amongst Member States that cooperation with emerging

markets such as India is of increasing importance, the UK would be expected to hold

significant bargaining power in determining EU policy in this area.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Andrew Moravcsiks theory of liberal intergovernmentalism provides a useful model,

drawn from theories of European integration, to explain the process by which EU

development policy in India is formed according to the above logic. At its simplest,

the theory combines a liberal account of national preference formation with an

intergovernmental logic at the level of EU policy making, where hard bargaining


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power determines policy outcomes. From this perspective, the Member States are

the key actors in the decision making process, but the national leaders make rational

choices in response to the interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative

power of states stemming from asymmetrical interdependence, and the role of the

institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments (Moravcsik, 1998,

p.18). Importantly, the Commission and other supranational actors are seen to be

passive agents in this theory. Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning (2009) argue that

while liberal intergovernmentalism was designed as a broad theory to explain history-

shaping events, it has been shown to be remarkably effective in explaining more

specific processes within the EU.

Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning (2009) expound that a model of three parts

emerges from this theory, which can be used to explain a number of EU policies.

Firstly there is a problem of credible commitments that the delegation of

development policy to EU institutions helps to solve; secondly, there are clear

positive-sum benefits in implementing this policy; and thirdly, there are certain and

intense preferences on the part of the Member State when it comes to a particular

policy (Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning, 2009).

The first proposition - that there is a problem of credible commitments - could be

corroborated in light of the fact that some Member States do not give aid bilaterally to

India at all, or else give very small amounts. The second proposition, of clear

positive-sum benefits, can be seen in light of the global development agenda

priorities. The harmonisation that occurs when funds for development are pooled into

the EU budget is a useful arrangement to promote aid effectiveness.

The problem with the propositions above is that ideas of problems and benefits

need to be understood in the context of the overarching goal: the above propositions


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are only valid if we see development as a generally positive activity for all Member

States to undertake, and if we see aid effectiveness as a key priority for

development.

This leads to the third proposition, which requires certain and intense preferences.

The liberal intergovernmental model is only useful to explain the UKs influence in EU

Development cooperation in India if the UK has strong and clearly defined policy

preferences, and a clear idea of its motivations in pursuing development activity.

In summary, liberal intergovernmentalism provides a good model of how we might

expect the UK to influence the EUs development policy in India, but only if there is a

clear sense of the UKs policy preferences at the aggregate, national level. Even

without liberal intergovernmental theory, however, a simpler model based on just the

UKs intense preferences and its strong bargaining position may explain much of the

influence it holds in this policy area.

Part II: What are the other determinants that might explain the EUs development

policy in India ?

This section examines some competing explanations that may determine EU

development policy in India, other than those that highlight the influence of the UK.

Carbone: The European Commission as Leader

Carbone challenges the primacy of the Member States in EU development decision-

making (2007). Instead, he puts forward certain criteria under which the Commission

can take a leadership role. Firstly, he highlights the important role of an institutional


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entrepreneur these are actors or Directorate Generals2 within the Commission

pushing in the same direction, regardless of their motivations (2007, p. 19). The

second requirement is that the Commission acts as unison there is no internal

conflict between different departments, as this weakens its ability to be assertive in

the Council (2007, p. 19). Thirdly, he posits that in order to overcome the resistance

it is likely to face from Member States, the Commission must take advantage of

policy windows.

Usefully, Carbone, also provides a catalogue of tactics that actors in the Commission

may employ to further their goals (2007). Here I list a small selection of these. Firstly,

the Commission can initiate policies in particular policy windows that are apposite for

their purposes, or create such opportunities through deadline setting or crisis

engineering. In terms of policy formulation the Commission is able to manage the

framework within a particular policy paper is drafted, (termed framing); it also can

deliberately politicize or de-politicise draft documents, often by making the text

impenetrable in terms of the latter; it can engage in forum shopping which involves

finding an opportune avenue through which to launch the document and give it the

best start; finally, the Commission can lobby receptive governments to present their

proposals (Carbone, 1997, pp. 24-9).

Germany as a rival member state to the UK in determining development policy in

India

In terms of trade volume, Germany is the largest trade partner with India, and well

ahead of the UK. During 2009-10, it was India fifth largest trading partner - well

ahead of the UK, which was thirteenth (Department of Commerce, 2011). It is

therefore to be expected that German economic interests will also imbue the policy of

2In addition, the newly formed European External Action Service, or departments within it,

may constitute institutional entrepreneurs also.


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the EU in India the UK is not the only Member State to have strong policy

preferences in the Council.

A new global development agenda

Since the turn of the century, it has been widely acknowledged in the literature that

there has been a qualitative shift in the global development agenda. DG

Development went as far as to claim 'the colonial and post-colonial period are behind

us and a more politically open international environment enables us to lay down the

responsibilities of each partner less ambiguously' (Commission, 1997). The UK also

experienced a sea change in terms of its development approach with the creation of

DfID in 1997, as recounted by Tod (1999), and the Department gradually shifted its

focus on channelling more funds through multilateral avenues. The establishment of

the MDGs has markedly impacted development work of almost every large

development agency in the world since 2000, and therefore this study needs to be

cautious of exogenous factors that explain the development policies of both the EU

andthe UK, without necessarily stating much about the relationship between the two.

Guiding principles of the EUs development policy: Ownership, Alignment,

Complementarity, Coordination and Policy Coherence

The Commissions development cooperation programmes have gone through

several processes of evaluation over the past decade, both internally and externally.

Documents such as the European Consensus of Development (Commission, 2005),

or the Policy Coherence for Development (Commission, 2005a) have laid down

principles of EU development cooperation that influence policy. These principles are

often used to frame different policy documents and to provide a rationale for the

decisions made.


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Many of these principles are drawn from wider debates about aid effectiveness. The

Paris Declaration of 2005, of which the Commission and the UK are signatories,

committed to principles of ownership and alignment, in addition to the principle of

harmonisation. Ownership aims to provide the recipient government a measure of

control and responsibility of the development programmes funded from external aid.

Alignment describes the process where the donor countries readjust their

development towards these recipient country priorities. Both the above wrest

decision-making powers away from the UK and the EU in this study, in favour of the

Government of India. Harmonization, explained above as a possible reason for the

EU to tailor its policies to the UK, also affects the UK. In many joint projects the DfID

is not the largest donor, but the World Bank is, and there is a corresponding shift in

influence.

Complementarity is the EUs principle that the development cooperation it funds

through the EU budget should complement, rather than replace or overlap, with

existing Member State programmes. The underpinning logic to this principle is that of

a division of labour and specialization. In theory this means that the EU cannot be an

appendage of DfIDs programmes in India it must provide some kind of expertise

and value added of its own. The coordination of EU policy between Member States

has been a difficulty of the policy area almost since its inception, and it still remains

one of the biggest challenges to improve EU aid effectiveness (Grilli, 1993, pp.74-

84). Policy coherence is also a highly problematic area, and often is secondary to

other policy considerations, despite its legal basis. Trade, Environment and Security

in particular are policy areas that are expected to display coherence with

developmental concerns (Commission, 2005a, p.5)


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Historical Overview

Britain, as a relative latecomer to the EEC in 1973, also began to negotiate for its

former colonies on the basis of the association principle the initially French

principle to prioritise external relations, including development, with its former

colonies. As a result, most of the initial EEC development programmes occurred in

African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, and development work in

other areas of the world had not fully taken root. The UK attempted to negotiate for

EC ties with its former colonies in South Asia, but was forced to abandon this goal

(Tod, 1999) India was deemed to be non-associable. The first Lom Convention

of 1974-79, signalled the beginning of the end for the associationist policies. Around

the same time, in the UKs renegotiation of the terms of its membership in 1974-5, it

was agreed to divide aid equally between associated and non-associated countries

(Tod, 1999). Although Indias relationship to the EC was non-associable, it clearly

benefitted from the UKs postcolonial interests.

It was only in 1992 that there was a legal mandate for the aid to be provided under

the heading development cooperation to India, and the other countries of the Asian

and Latin American (ALA) countries previously this had been provided in

connection to trade, or as ad-hoc food aid arrangements (Coulon, 2008). It should be

noted that the European Parliament had also insisted on at least token programmes

of support for ALA from the mid-1970s (Hewitt and Whiteman, 2004, p.145). By this

time, the policy of associationism had waned considerably, and priorities were

angling towards poverty eradication.

The EUs development policy in India from 1992 present

Anne Coulon (2009) provides a good summary of how the EUs development

cooperation programmes in India have evolved, from which this overview identifies

three main phases in the post-1992 development policies.


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The final phase began in 2004 with the announcement after the 5 th EU-India Summit,

that the relationship would be labelled a Strategic Partnership. This was the

beginning of a drive towards establishing a much more comprehensive and broad-

based partnership between the two that extended well beyond commercial interests

and development, to areas including security interests and technological

partnerships. The apparent motivation for this was in response to the fast emerging

economy for the EU this merited a two-pronged approach, where development was

still key, but other areas of cooperation were also increasingly coming into play. As

Coulon predicts, and as this study shows, this has very much impacted the EUs

policy in India for the period 2007-13.

UK development policy priorities

Historically, the institutional evolution of UK aid has been often been driven by party

political differences between the Labour and Conservative parties concerning the

scope and purpose of international development. On the whole, Labour has tended

to push for a separate department for foreign aid or development, with its own

Cabinet Minister, whereas the Conservative party had preferred to confer these

responsibilities to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. As a result, there has

been a sequence of switches between the two institutional arrangements since the

1960s. The arrangement since 1997, whereby the Department for International

Development has taken over responsibility in this policy area, has remained relatively

stable despite changes in government, and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat

Coalition has to date continued the broad strategy of the previous Labour

government in this area. Nevertheless, it is clear that domestic politics do have a

significant impact on the UKs development policy.


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DfID was founded in 1997 with poverty elimination as its leading, headline goal. The

department were also strongly focused around International Development Targets a

pre-cursor to the MDGs, and in engaging the broader international community. From

the very beginning, DfID also had a European Union department to facilitate

coordination and influence in Brussels development decision-making. The UK began

relations with Europe on shaky footing, as Clare Shorts famous put-down of the EUs

development work shows.

By the time DFID published a 2006 White Paper, however, the UK seemed to have

warmed slightly to the EU approach: After five years of reform, EC aid is now much

better than it was (DfID, 2006, p.77) This paper, included a number of collaborative

and strategic priorities for its work with Europe. (DfID, 2006, p.78).

On the surface, at least, the UK development policy agenda seems to have shifted

away from Bose and Burnells (1991) label of Between idealism and self interest, to

between idealism and institutionalism. It is clear that the UK wants not just to

contribute toward multilateral development efforts, but also take the lead and

influence them. The element of national interest has not altogether diminished, of

course, as the recent reviews of multilateral development partners such as the EU,

which make assessments based upon UK interests, have shown.

Dimensions of the EUs development policy in India

There are a number of lenses that help to explain processes of EU development

policy at different levels, and the role of the UK within these processes. None of

them, of course, capture the entire picture, and therefore this study is not an exercise

in arguing for one theory or set of theories over another.


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Instead, the theories are useful as descriptive or explanatory models for different

periods, and levels of the EUs development policies in India. Generalizable theories

drawn from studies of European integration, public policy, or from the foreign aid

literature are at times blunt instruments that provide little predictive power when held

against the constantly evolving empirical realities of EU development policy.

Many of the influences on decision-making in this policy area are one-off events such

as the 1994 EU-India Cooperation Agreement or the 2005 European Consensus of

Development. Generalizations across time therefore are rarely useful for establishing

causal mechanisms. The analysis of policy formulation and policy implementation

focuses primarily on the current programming period, 2007-13, though a historical

overview allows us to observe the impact of path-dependencies also. The analysis of

aid levels to India over time does not seek to establish causal mechanisms at a micro

level, but it offers the opportunity to characterise particular periods of EU aid to India,

and to assess the impact of particular events.

In addition, each level of the EU policy-making process has a unique dynamic and

rationale that needs to be differentiated (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). With regards

to EU development in India, at the very least policy formulation (by the

Commission/EEAS) needs to be distinguished from policy implementation. There is

also a strong argument to add another level of agenda-setting by the European

Council, or Council of Ministers or of the Member States themselves. The 2004

Strategic Partnership between India and the EU, for example, was significantly

shaped at high-level Ministerial meetings. Nevertheless, this paper does not examine

this level separately from policy formulation for two reasons. Firstly, decisions made

at this level tend to be set so broadly so that they are open to interpretation and

flexibility further down the decision making line. Secondly, the actors involved in

agenda setting also have a crucial involvement in the policy formulation stage, and


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vice versa it is therefore difficult to establish where exactly a decision might have

been made - much of it may have been made on an informal basis, in any case.

Methodology

There are, of course, many different conceptualisations of policy, both at EU and UK

level, and this leads to a multitude of different approaches in which this study might

be undertaken. This study does not dwell on the conceptual arguments underlying

this research question, but it does rely on three dimensions of both dependent and

independent variables.

One quantitative measure of EU development policy and UK development policy is

the net amount of aid that they provide to India. This data is used to analyse trends in

aid over time (1960-2009) in the first empirical study of this paper. To determine a

correlation between UK aid and EU aid, a simple linear regression is performed, with

a corresponding scatter-plot. To determine the importance of lagged effects between

the two sets of trend data, a cross-correlogram is used.

Aid levels, of course, are not an all-encompassing measure of development policy,

and in this sense these measures are subject to content validity problems. However,

they are useful in providing a concrete basis for comparison at the macro-level, over

time.

Qualitative analysis shows a greater strength in terms of validity, but the

disadvantage is that it is very difficult, as mentioned above to make generalizations

across time, across levels. The qualitative part of this study looks at two different

levels of the decision making process, which I have summarized into broad groups of


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1. policy formulation (in this paper, this is meant to encapsulate preceding and

closely involved EU policy processes of initiation, agenda setting, programming and

identification) and 2. policy implementation. It does not focus expressly on qualitative

shifts over time, except in the historical overview drawn from secondary literature,

The second study focuses on policy formulation at EU level, and seeks to identify

avenues and evidence of UK influence. In practice, the UK has to be proxied by

observing the influence of the Member States, though this approach has deficiencies

that are fully acknowledged. The process tracing method, however, is useful in

examining the feasible constraints and opportunities open to the UK and other

Member States.

Finally, the third study examine a case of EU policy implementation, on the basis of

two interviews conducted with officials at the EU Delegation to India, in New Delhi.

There is, consequently, a clear sampling bias in this study, and in the future it should

be supplemented by conclusions of other interviews with other development partners

in order to draw in some differing perspectives.

Study 1: Analysis of aid flows to India over time

This study examines the dimension of aid levels to India. It compares the volume aid

that the EU has historically given to India with the aid the UK has provided. The aim

is to assess whether there is a clear correlation between volume of aid levels, using

data of overall aid (Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) or of Overseas Aid

(OA) compiled by the World Bank.


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The first graph plots a trend of UK and EU aid levels to India over time, to survey any

major significant shifts. The second graph aims through a fitted line and a regression,

to test for statistically significant correlation between UK and EU aid levels. The final

graph checks if there is a correlation at different time lags between the two sets of

data.

Figure 3

Trends in UK and EU institutions aid levels to India since 1960 shows that until about

2000, the aid levels of the UK were only slightly higher than those of the EU. Over

the past decade, however, there has been a sharp divergence, with the UK aid levels

soaring, while the EU noted only a slight peak. Overall, however, the two lines show

some similarity, especially when compared to other large donors to India (USA,

Germany, and Japan)3. The post-2000 rises in aid level in both trand lines suggest

that both the UK and the EU have responded positively to the MDG agenda.

3 The trend lines for these countries are superimposed on this graph in the Appendix,

Figure 5.


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Figure 4

A fitted-line graph of EU and UK aid to India for each showing a slight correlation

between EU and UK aid levels to India. Each data point represents a particular year

between 1973 and 2009. The regression output for this relationship shows some

statistical significance (Appendix, Figure 6). However, it is unclear whether this graph

is showing any linear relationship at all.


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Figure 5

This cross-correlogram explores the relationship between the two time-series in

Figure 3. It uses the data between 1973, the year of UK accession, and 2009. It

shows any correlations between the UK and EU aid levels are approximately

synchronous (i.e., centred around zero lag). According to this graph, then, the UK aid

levels to India do not always pre-empt the EU budgets sometimes the EU budget

precedes UK shifts. There is unlikely to be therefore, a causal link between aid

levels, despite the slight correlation shown in Figure 4.

This graphs above show that despite relatively similar aid levels until the past decade

by both donors, there is little evidence for a causal relationship. The fitted line graph

shows only a very weak linear relationship, and the cross-correlogram shows that

lagged comparisons do not increase the strength of the correlation either.


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Study 2: Process tracing study

The policy process of the EUs development policy in India is predictably complex.

The first part of this study surveys the actors, institutions and processes involved

prior to policy formulation. The second section draws from this a picture of the

importance of Member States in the decision making process. Unfortunately the

agency of the UK in particular proved difficult to empirically assess in the policy

formulation stage: records of the comitology process within the Commission, in

particular, are not publicly available, and the UK Permanent Representative were

also unwilling to provide interviews on this matter.

Instead, the study looks at the involvement of the Member States in general, through

a process-tracing analysis, and examines how the institutional and decision-making

structures with regards to EU development policy in India affect the Member States

influence over the process.

Part I: Actors, Institutions, and the Policy Process

Actors

The main actors involved in the EU policy-making process for development

cooperation in India are the Commissions DG DEVCO (EuropeAid), the newly

created External Action Service (EEAS)4, and its EU delegation to India, the

Parliament, the (Foreign Policy) Council, the DCI Committee, and the Inter-Service

Quality Support Group (iQSG). The Parliament and the Council are responsible for

4The negotiations of the 2007-13 CSP took place before the creation of the EEAS. At that

time, the policy programming was largely coordinated between the former Directorate-Generals of Development and External Affairs (RELEX). Since then, DG Development hasmerged into DG DEVCO, and DG RELEX has mostly been incorporated into the EEAS.


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setting out the legislative framework of the Development Cooperation Instrument

(DCI). EuropeAid and the EEAS are responsible for the drafting of the Country

Strategy Papers (CSPs, which set out the EUs strategy and priorities for five-year

programme), the Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs, outlining financial

allocations on the basis of the CSP), and the Annual Action Programmes (AAPs,

setting out the specific allocations and identified actions for each year). The iQSG

performs a quality control function for the strategy papers, but also provides

recommendations to ensure harmonization across different departments (EuropeAid

Civil Society Helpdesk, 2010a).

There is, crucially, also a degree of oversight in the formulation of the above three

documents by the DCI Committee, which represents the interests of the Member

States and is often formed of Permanent Representatives and officials from the

domestic departments for Foreign Affairs or Development. It is a management

committee, which means it can block proposals by the Commission/EEAS by

qualified majority. If this occurs, the issue will be referred to the Council, but this

rarely happens in reality, as disputes are likely to be settled informally before the

official votes.

The Parliament also exerts a right of scrutiny over all three documents before their

adoption, which requires the Commission to re-examine a draft if the Parliament

believes the Commission has overstepped its remit. However, the Commission is not

legally obliged then to act on the Parliaments recommendations.

Finally, the EU Delegation in India is the intermediary between the EEAS, the

Government of India, and in-country Development Partners (DPs) such as DfID and

the World Bank. It provides useful input at the formulation stage of policy making,

and is a key actor in identifying co-operation needs. It also oversees and attempts to


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steer the implementations of the policies in India, although ultimately the Indian

Government is expected to take ownership of this.

The Development Cooperation Instrument

In 2006, the Development Cooperation Instrument was created for countries in the

Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. This regulation established the legal basis

and financing instrument for development cooperation for non-ACP countries whose

funds are drawn from the main EU budget, and repealed the former ALA regulation

that served this function.

The DCI divides cooperation into geographic programmes and thematic

programmes, both of which apply to the EUs work in India. Thematic instruments are

structured around areas of co-operation that are considered to be of importance

across regions, and were designed to provide a more coherent strategy at the global

level. Geographic instruments set out strategies and priorities through a regional,

Asia-wide programme, and through a country-level India programme.

The EU-India Country Strategy Paper 2007-13

Under the terms of the DCI regulation, the Commission5 was required to draft a CSP

for the period 2007-13 for each partner country that would benefit from this

instrument, providing the broad scope and focus for co-operation between the two

countries.

5Since the creation of the EEAS in December 2010, the drafting of the CSP will be split

between the Commission and the EEAS. The first three stages of the programming andimplementation cycle (drawing up of CSPs, Allocation of country resources, and drafting

National Indicative Programmes) are now the responsibility of EEAS. The final two, (devisingAnnual Action Plans and Implementation) are the responsibility of EuropeAid (Bond, 2011,p.17).


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With respect to India, this document would have been drafted in collaboration with

the EC Delegation in India, the Government of India and civil society organisations in

the country. For the 2002-06 CSP, however, Wil Hout claims that civil society groups

in India were, in practice, not consulted at all, and the programming was largely

Brussels-based (2007, p.160). It is unclear whether this was entirely remedied for the

2007-13 programming: the European Parliament again critiques the lack of

transparency and thoroughness in engaging civil society groups for the 2007-13 draft

Country Strategy Paper (EP Development Committee, 2007, p.6).

It is also clear from the terms of the DCI that cooperation with the partner country is

intended to occur from the very outset of the process, so as to ensure that the

country or region concerned takes sufficient ownership of the process and to

encourage support for national development strategies, particularly those for

reducing poverty (EP and Council, 2006). As is apparent in the following analysis,

this clause is certainly adhered to in Indias case - the Government of India,

therefore, is a key constraint on the policies of the EUs policy from the outset of CSP

programming.

The draft CSP then goes through a process of review and revision, in cooperation

with the DCI management committee. The comitology procedure here is fairly

opaque, however the input of the DCI committee is a key arena for officials from the

Council to influence the formulation of the document. What does seem to emerge

from the Commissions Comitology Register is that there were two rounds of votes to

pass the India CSP for 2007-13. The first round of votes, on the 15th November 2006

was not conducted under co-decision (Commission, 2006a), and the voting results

for this are unpublished. The second round of votes, some three months on the 1st

February 2007, passed this time under co-decision (Commission, 2007a).


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Official records do not show the process involved in this apparent re-negotiation,

though a complaint issued by the European Parliament after the two rounds of voting

points to two issues that arose in the decision-making process. Firstly, the Chairman

of the Development Committee Josep Borell Fontelles wrote in a letter to the

Commissioners Ferrero-Waldner and Michel in March 2007:

The public announcement of the content of the CSP, even before it is presented to the

DCI Management Committee and the European Parliament, infringes the confidentiality

requirement with which the CSPs are transmitted by the Commission to the Parliament

via the repository register and may create the impression that, regardless of the opinion

of the DCI management committee and the structured dialogue with the European

Parliament, the Commission has already decided to adopt its own draft. (EP

Development Committee, 2007, p.1)

Whilst it was clear that the European Parliament had not been consulted on this

issue, the role of the DCI Management Committee is exceptionally murky. Although

Fontelles writes that the DCI Management Committee had not received a draft of the

CSP before its public announcement, the Comitology Register indicates a committee

had already voted on it at least once. The details of the process are unclear, and it is

not useful to speculate as to the exact negotiation without further evidence.

The ramifications for this research agenda, however, are significant in terms of how

we are to perceive the power of the DCI Committee, and therefore the Member

States, at the initial stages of policy formulation. An interview conducted with an

official at the EU Delegation to India confirms that the Member States are the most

influential in terms of policy formulation during the CSP drafting, though details of the

DCI Management Committees negotiations remain unspecified:


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The EU policy is defined in Brussels in collaboration with the Member States [] its a

joint EU policy which, of course, is a compromise, with the interests of the Member

States. The influence [of the Member States] will come at the time when we devise our

Country Strategy plans for India - this is where the UK will come in with its comments and

relationships with us at the policy level. (Interview, 2011a)

The second issue the parliamentary Development Committee mentioned was an

alteration of the drafts to exclude some content concerning disarmament and WMD,

as this was considered to be outside of the scope of the Country Strategy Paper.

The Commission informed the [Development] [C]ommittee that the only change is the

deletion from the CSP of Annex III (text of the India-EU action plan), for which the

[Development] [C]ommittee had expressed serious doubts on the DCI- compatibility of

many of the activities proposed in it (disarmament, WMD) (EP Development Committee,

2007, p.6).

This, again, is significant if we are to consider the power of the Member states in the

drafting process, as the India-EU Joint Action Plan (JAP) that is referred to above

was a document of the Council. The presence of the Action Plan Implementation as

a substantial portion of the CSP is a strong argument for the Member States taking

substantial leadership in policy formulation. Both the Parliament and the Government

of India took issue with this section of the document: the Indian Government found

the implementation of such policies under the heading of Overseas Development Aid

(ODA) as problematic, as explained below, and the Parliament regarded it as outside

of the remit of the Development Co-operation Instrument. Interests of trade, political

dialogue, security, and scientific and technical co-operation dominate the agenda of

the JAP, and it is clear that the DGs responsible for programming would not have

independently pushed for these policies to constitute a part of the CSP.


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Thematic Programmes and the Asia Strategy Paper

The CSP was drafted alongside the Asia Strategy Paper and various Thematic

Strategy Papers, all of which cover the same period of 2007-13. These areas also

influence the content of the India Country Strategy Paper, and conduct project-based

development programmes in India. However, they have their own separate budget

lines, do not focus solely on EU-India cooperation, and are therefore organised along

different priorities.

The funding in these areas is provided, through calls for proposals, to civil society

actors and NGOs. Priority is given to projects that align with the aims of the

geographical programmes, in order to increase aid effectiveness, or to projects in

areas where there is little scope for the Partner Country government to assume a

level of ownership over the projects, a key feature of policy programmed through the

country-level schemes. The Delegation of India is usually responsibly for

coordinating the different programmes, as they have regular contact with the relevant

in-country stakeholders, and are in the best place to identify opportunities (EuropeAid

Civil Society Helpdesk, 2010b). Crucially, this is policy that is meant to be initiated by

civil society groups, rather than by the Commission, but within the at times strict

parameters set out by each thematic programme. In practice this may lead to only a

handful of civil society groups being eligible to apply, or in some cases a

monopolistic NGO.

The regional programme for Asia focuses on the promotion of regional integration,

policy and know-how based cooperation, and support to uprooted peoples. In terms

of the activities that affect India, these are normally targeted at promoting regional

cooperation in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a


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regional bloc that includes India. The assistance involves trade development

initiatives, a sectoral dialogue facility, and a civil aviation programme. Ostensibly,

such programmes are promoting the EU as a model of regional integration. They are

also very much in line with the priorities outlined in the 2005 JAP, and it seems as

though this document served as the model for the regional papers strategy with

regard to SAARC.

The EU India Strategy Paper and the Joint Action Plan

In the Fifth EU-India summit, held in November 2004 between senior ministers from

both the EU and India, the plan to elevate the EU-India relationship to a Strategic

Partnership was confirmed. From the EU side, those present included members of

the European Council, the former President of the Council of Ministers Romano

Prodi, and the former President of the Commission of the European Commission

Javier Solana. Such Strategic Partnerships have often been lambasted as entirely

lacking in any coherent strategy, but it seems broadly the agreements are meant to

engage the large emerging economies of Brazil, India, Russia, and China, as well as

Mexico and South Africa, through a broad based foreign policy, designed to upgrade

relations to match their growing importance on the world stage.

The complementary document to the Strategic Partnership was released by the

Council of Ministers in September 2005, a Joint Action Plan that specified concrete

steps that would be taken in order to implement the strategic partnership. There are

many areas of action that this paper identifies, only a small portion of which focuses

exclusively on development cooperation. The paper identifies three areas of action

within development cooperation: to operationalise a States Partnership Programme

during 2005; to exchange views on global development; and to evaluate the last

fifteen years of India-EC bilateral cooperation. The last two points of this plan are


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very imprecise, and the first point had already been decided upon in the 2002-6

Country Strategy Paper. Development cooperation was clearly not high on the

agenda for the Strategic Partnership.

Instead, the small paragraph explicitly focusing on development co-operation is

entirely overshadowed by other foreign policy interests that are included in the JAP.

These include: political dialogues on security, multilateralism, regional cooperation,

democracy and human rights; migration; inter-cultural exchanges; economic policy

dialogue and cooperation in 15 sectors (of which development cooperation is just

one). Nevertheless, much of this has found its way into the 2007-13 CSP. As

mentioned above, the inclusion of one of non-proliferation of WMDs was a

contentious inclusion in an early draft of the 2007-13 CSP, but it was removed in the

final version.

The eventual compromise seems to have been to provide scope for implementing

any of the JAP, but it is stated in vague and less contentious terms within the CSP

document. The areas explicitly included are Economic Policy Dialogue in Trade,

Transport, Energy and Environment, Civil Society, Academic and Cultural

Exchanges. Even these areas are far from aligned with the overarching goal of

poverty eradication that is meant to structure the policy, and many of the policies

included do not sit comfortably with ODA criteria, and therefore with the criteria of the

DCI.

But the CSP also makes space for other priorities that lie well outside of the scope of

the CSP, such as security and space cooperation: Financial support will also be

provided to the other sectors of the Action Plan to enable the progressive

development of enhanced cooperation in each of these areas (Commission, 2006,

p.14). Perhaps to address the inclusion of these non-development policy areas, the


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CSP provides for the possibility that such activities would be financed outside of the

DCI, although the sources of financing and the means of delivery are not clearly

explained in the CSP or the [M]IP (EP Development Committee, 2007).

It should also be noted that the inclusion of the Action Implementation Programme in

the CSP was justified through a perceived need to distinguish between an India that

was still mired with problems of poverty and the emerging economy of India. This

explains the two-pronged approach outlined in the document, with section one,

focusing on Social Sector Support oriented towards the Millennium Development

Goals (MDGs), and section two being the Action Plan Implementation.

Financial Allocations and the Multiannual Indicative Programme

The Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) details the financial allocations for the

different sectors of the CSP. It is usually drafted alongside the CSP, and follows the

same bureaucratic procedure as outlined above. During the 2007 to 2010 period, the

budget for the Action Plan Implementation was 80 million Euros out of a total of 180

million available for the whole programme (Commission, 2007, p.2). However, a Mid-

Term Review of the CSP in 2010 indicated that the projects under the Action Plan

had suffered implementation problems

Delays in identifying projects and in signing financing agreements for them are

mainly due to hesitation on the side of the GoI to use ODA funds outside the

social sectors. While line ministries [Member State officials] have often expressed

interest in developing projects with the EC on JAP-related areas, the GoI would

prefer to reallocate funds under priority 2 to activities in the social sectors

(EEAS, 2010, p.9).


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As a result, the funding for the Joint Action Implementation projects was reduced

substantially for the period 2011-13. From the justifications provided in this

document, it seems that the Commission, and now the EEAS also, are effectively

acting as brokers between Member State interests and GoI preferences - there is a

lack of a distinct supranational EC position on these matters.

Annual Action Programmes and Annual Work Programmes

The final stage in the programming of the EUs development policy in India is the

creation of the Annual Action Programmes (AAPs) and the Annual Work

Programmes (AWPs). The former outline the funds to be allocated to particular

programmes by the Commission in any particular budget year. The latter are records

of Calls to Proposals that invite civil society groups and NGOs to apply for grants or

contracts.

The AAPs provide costings and specific action plans, mostly for project and sector

support at country regional or regional level. The AWPs fund projects, the majority of

which stem from thematic instruments.

The Delegation to India can be expected to be the principal actor in drafting the AAP

- the exercise is largely a process of identification of possibilities in-country and

matching them up against the set out priorities and budgets. The scope for making

large decisions, at this stage, is of course, limited.

Many of the projects in the three years of the 2007-13 programme for which AAPs

have been released have been mentioned in the JAP. Despite the Parliaments

complaint that Erasmus Mundus programme is not suitable for DCI funding, for

example, it has been included under the 2008 AAP under this instrument.


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The DCI Committee have released the details of their voting at this stage of policy

making, though the substance of the meetings is not detailed, and the votes rarely

indicate unfavourable opinions of particular Member States. They do sometimes

show abstentions and absences these are largely from the smaller states

presumably due to lower resource levels.

Implementation

The next stage for the policies drafted is implementation, and the Indian Government

by this stage is supposed to take ownership of the projects by this stage, with the

assistance, oversight and steering of the EU Delegation to India. A case study of

implementation is conducted in the third study of this paper.


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Figure 2: The policy documents involved in programming the EU development

policies in India 2007-13.

Development Cooperation

Instrument

Country Strategy Paper

2007-13

Multi-annual Indicative

Programme 2007-10

Annual Action Pro rammes

EU India Strategy Paper

and Joint Action Plan

2010 Mid-Term Review

Multi-annual Indicative

Programme 2011-13

Thematic Programmes

Asia Regional Programme

2007 2008 2010

Social sector support,

Health; Institutional

Capacity Building:

Civil Aviation

Social sector

support,

Education;

Erasmus Mundus

Skills Development

Initiative; Capacity building:

Trade Development;

Renewable Energy, Clean

technologies and Energy

Annual Work

Programmes

Civil Society

Groups,

Agencies and

N.G.O.s

Policy areas where EU

development cooperation in

India cooperation is one of

several other priorities


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Part II: The role of the Member States

The policy process described above seems to corroborate the Cohen and Jaquets

conceptualization of EU development policy, even when we consider its application

to just one country: there is still no such thing as a European development policy,

except as a still politically and institutionally artificial aggregate (2008, p.1).

In the formulation of the CSP 2007-13, there are, at the very least, four broad groups

of policies, each with their own processes, actors and causal mechanisms: the

geographically programmed policies in India, geographically programmed policies at

Asia level, thematically programmed policies, and the policies derived from the Joint

Action Plan. The previous section analysing the dimensions of EU policy in India

identifies different levels and different periods across which a particular rationale or

logic was observable. A third dimension of budget lines can now be added, as each

mode of financing has to face its own set of institutional rules, procedures and

challenges.

Geographic programme policies in India

The geographically programmed development policies in India the first of two priority

areas in the CSP document. They were largely conducted in the spirit of the original

DCI instrument, with the programmes are principally targeted at the MDGs. In terms

of Member State involvement in the DCI Committees, the specific decision-making

processes are unclear.

Both the Health and Education Sector support programmes, constituting 70 to 80

percent of the budget for the India 2007 MIP were continuations, albeit amended, of

previous involvements in these sectors. The EU had previously funded the


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predecessors to both the current healthcare programme (the National Rural Health

Mission/NRHM), and the current education programme (Sarva Shiksha

Abhiyan/SSA). DfID also works on both of these projects. Crucially, however, the EU

was the first to get involved in both programmes. They funded a Sector Investment

Programme (SIP), that preceded NRHM, from as early as 1996; for the SSA

initiative, the Commission was the first donor partner to be approached by the

Government of India.

The allocations for these sectors are substantial portions of the EUs development

budget in India, and the fact that these two projects were not funded by DfID prior to

the EU funding them refutes the proposition that the UK takes a leadership role in the

EUs development strategy in this instance.

The influence of the Member States is not, then, manifest in this budget line. The

policies are instead largely based upon the success of previous support

programmes, which have proven to be successful in many ways.

Joint Action Plan Implementation

The second priority of the CSP, as explained above, is much more politicised that the

first priority, though it also enjoys a substantially smaller portion of the budget. As

mentioned above, the Mid-Term Review confirms the line ministries preferences for

a focus on JAP related areas, but it does not specify any particular Member States.

The security cooperation aspects of the JAP are likely to be relevant to UK interests,

but there is nothing to strongly suggest that the UK in particular has large gains to be

gained from the JAPs inclusion. This is especially the case when compared to

Germany, whose trade interests feature highly in both the JAP and the CSP. The


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inclusion of the Science and Technology Partnership clause in the JAP, and implicitly

in the CSP, points to a clear German policy preference. The German Federal

Ministry of Education and Research website claims that Scientific and Technological

Cooperation (STC) with India is one of the most important strategic goals for the

future of German-Indian relations (BMBF, 2010).

Comparing the power of the line ministries to the power of the Parliament or the

Commission in this example shows the extent of their control in this policy process.

The Commission do, indeed, seem to be a passive actor in these negotiations.

Perhaps their opportunities for finding an apposite policy window according to the

theory of Carbone were limited by the fact that all CSPs financed under the DCI

were to be programmed more or less simultaneously, but it is unclear in any case

that they held any particular policy preference.

The Parliament also comes across as an extremely powerless institution in this

analysis. The Development Committee for Parliament provides the following

statement during its scrutiny exercise: At this stage of the consultation process and

on the basis of the documents received, the Committee on Development has very

serious objections against the Country Strategy Paper and the National Indicative

Programme (EP Development Committee, 2007). Nevertheless it is clear that none

of their recommendations have been taken into consideration in the final version.

The influence of the Member States in the policies introduced through the Action

Plan is again difficult to observe directly, but clearly certain Line Ministries have

pushed for their preferences through to adoption, partially by simply usurping the

CSP document. There is also some suggestion through the complaints of the

Parliament that the legislative procedure was not adhered to in terms of timely


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Parliamentary oversight, though the responsibility for this is not directly attributable to

Member State pressure.

Thematic Programme policies in India

Thematic programmes allow the Member States with much less room for manoeuvre

for the inclusion of different policy areas, partly because each of the instruments has

more specific criteria than geographic programmes. A second reason is that the

thematic programmes are designed to be complementary and subsidiary to

geographic programmes. The principle that thematic programmes should provide

distinctive added value and complement programmes of a geographic nature exerts,

in theory at least, restrictions on thematic programmes make it difficult to finance

external policy objectives (EP and Council, 2006, p.1). In practice, some of the Joint

Action Plan, such as policy dialogue facilities, is financed through thematic

instruments in any case (Commission, 2007, p.14).

Regional Programme policies in India

The Asia regional programme, with regard to its projects in India, also shows some

overlap with the JAPs drive towards regional integration in the SAARC, eg in the

Civil Aviation initiative, though here it is perhaps more due to an alignment of policy

priorities rather than Member State influence over the Asia Strategy Paper.


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Study 3: Case Study of Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (SSA)

Is there any evidence that the EUs involvement in SSA is sidelined by DfID

priorities?

This case study looks at the EUs role in the in-country implementation of its policies,

and how its actions are affected by other actors and development partners (DPs)

such as DfID. It is largely based upon two interviews at the EU Delegation to India in

Delhi, primary and secondary literature.

This case was selected on the basis of available interviewees for questioning,

causing some concern for selection bias. In any case, as emphasised above, it is

difficult to draw generalizations across differing budget lines to a wider level of EU

development policy in India, as they each face differing procedures. However, this

case does have other merits the SSA constitutes a substantial amount of the MIP

2007-13 budget. It also serves as a model for the other sector support programme in

healthcare - not just from the EUs perspective, but for the other DPs and the GoI

also meaning that implementation feasibly occurs along similar patterns of

engagement. In all these two sector support projects constitute at least 70% of the

overall MIP budget (this budget, however does not include thematic and regional

programmes in India).

Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) is a Government of India (GoI) programme, meaning

Education for All, that aims to provide universal primary education in India, and in

doing so help to address four MDGs (to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty;

promote gender equality and empower women; improve maternal health; and

achieve universal primary education) (EEAS, 2010). It is one of the two social sector


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support programmes (the other being healthcare) financed in the 2007-13 CSP, and

it receives approximately 27% of the total CSP budget. The EU works with the

Government of India, and two Development Partners (DPs), the World Bank and the

UKs DfID, so it is a good example to see how the UK might influence EU

development policies when they have to collaborate on the ground.

The UK and to an even greater extent the EU are highly constrained actors at the

policy implementation stage. Whilst both DPs invest a significant amount of

resources in establishing a credible development policy, the final arbiter of whether to

adopt these policies is the Government of India itself, which, of course has its own

set of priorities - as does the World Bank. The World Bank coordinated credit

negotiations in 2004 with the Government of India, on behalf of all three DPs. It also

produces a Project Appraisal Document that is key for all three partners (Ward, 2010,

p. 548)

EU Ambassador to India Daniele Smadja insists that EU involvement in the SSA

extends to more than just signing a cheque to the Government (Eugad, 2010). The

EU does provide policy inputs, which may or may not be taken into account but the

fact remains that these can be easily overlooked by the central and/or State

governments in the end.

The DPs have instigated a bi-annual Joint Review Mission (JRM) that surveys the

work being done through fieldwork and desk reviews. The environment seems to be

genuinely collaborative, with the GoI providing the DPs with all the details of the

projects and substantial amounts of technical information and statistics to conduct

their evaluations (Interview, 2011b). Nevertheless, the interviewee cites a tendency

for the [Indian] Government to say that everything is good. This is where the role of

the DPs is envisaged in this context to be useful to provide critical inputs.


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In terms of resources, however, the EU is at an exceptional disadvantage compared

to DfID and the World Bank. The JRMs are composed of twelve members, six of

which come from the GoI, three from the World Bank, two from DfID, and one from

the EU. In addition to having the fewest number of seats at the table, the Delegation

interviewee explains that the other DPs are often able to bring in special advisors for

different topics area, as and when required. The EU, on the other hand, only has the

resources for one staff member. This is a major disadvantage at the decision making

table, but it is one that is more likely to benefit the World Bank and the GoI, than DfID

if we are concerned with relative influence over the EU.

The general sense from both interviews, however, is that a collaborative approach

seems to have evolved naturally between the DPs, as this has been a project in

which they have all been involved in for some time. Colclough and De suggest a

coordinated approach: The World Bank has led on financial management, and has

also supported environmental safeguards, indigenous populations and education

statistics. DFID has focused upon access and equity issues whilst the EC has

provided support particularly to quality and publicprivate partnerships (2010,

p.503), but the interviewee refutes this entirely (Interview, 2011b). There were

supposedly different areas of expertise in the early years of the programme, but after

a long time working together, there has been a spillover of knowledge.

There are, of course, certain differences in organizational style on the ground. One

interviewee admitted that the World Bank tended to get frustrated with the EUs

lengthy bureaucratic procedures, and therefore preferred to work with DfID, who is

able to act more speedily (Interview, 2011a). Another sticking point between DPs is

the differing interpretations of terms. Despite a consensus on driving towards sector

support, for example, each DP has a different definition of the term. DfID cannot, still


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places controls on sector support funds, and in the case of SSA requires no more

than 30% of disbursements to be spent on civil works. The EU have no such

requirements (Interview, 2011a). In these areas, there is little consensus, but at the

margin, outcomes are likely to be determined by what is possible according to the

institutional guidelines of each DP, rather than which DP has the greatest power over

the others.

From the interviews at the EU Delegation to India, there is a sense that the main

challenges faced by the EU in implementing its policies, both internally with DPs

and externally with the relevant stakeholders, are technical in nature and are

normally resolved consensually. It is likely that, furthermore, that the three DPs

present a largely common front to the GoI and/or the states governments in many

areas, as their combined influence is still relatively small, and all three broadly act

under the same Project Appraisal Document and Results Framework.

In sum, DfID probably does influence the EUs ability to implement it policy

preferences, but 1) strong divergences of opinion are likely to be rare, as the DPs

conduct research in teams together, and cooperation between DPs is highly

developed 2) DfIDs influence on the EUs development programme is by far

overshadowed by that of the World Bank, and, above all, by stakeholder

relationships, relationships with states and relationships with the Government of

India.


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Conclusions

This paper draws the following conclusions from each of the studies. The first

study shows that the Member States were very powerful in the policy

formulation of the last CSP negotiation, and the policies proposed suggest

that they had a large hand in politicizing the CSP 2007-13 to include broad

foreign policy goals that were somewhat removed from the poverty

eradication goal that is set out as an overarching objetive. However, the

agency of the line ministries in general, and of Britain in particular, proved

difficult to assess. German interests were certainly present in the Action Plan

Implementation, but the interests were broadly in favour of both the UK and

Germany. Referring back to the explanatory model, little can be said to

assess the proposition that the UK has the highest bargaining power amongst

the Member States, or to empirically confirm the liberal intergovernmental

model, and further inquiry is required at this level.

The second study shows limited evidence for a causal relationship between

UK aid to India, as an independent variable, and EU aid to India, as a

dependent variable. Despite some evidence for correlation, there is only a

weak relationship, and considering the number of exogenous factors that exist

for both variables this perhaps reflects a spurious result. A broader debate at

the global level, and aid targets set internationally are guiding both

development efforts the graphs confirm this, suggesting that the MDG

agenda has impacted the EU aid levels, and substantially impacted the UK

aid levels to India.


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Thirdly, the case study of the SSA shows that the UK is not really the main

determinant of policy implementation, either other actors, bureaucratic,

technical and resource constraints play a much bigger role in shaping the

EUs implementation of development in India. The process of policy

harmonization here is evident, but DfIDs own policies are subject to this

process as much as the EUs are, in light of greater challenges outside the

relationship between the two partners.

In sum, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that DfID is a key

determinant of EU policy. At the policy formulation stage bureaucratic politics

and institutional constraints are likely to mitigate the influence of the UK.

Furthermore, the increasing economic relevance of India and the new

Strategic Partnership are increasingly weakening the importance of historical

ties the country is becoming a foreign policy priority to an increasing number

of Member States. At the implementation stage, DfID and the EU have

committed to harmonise their aid approach from the outset. As relatively small

actors in a larger project this can be attributed by a drive on the part of both

towards aid effectiveness. Finally a macro-level analysis of overall aid levels

indicates that the external global development discourse cannot be

disregarded. This calls for new pathways of policy influence to be explored.


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Appendix A

Interview Guide Questions

- How do DfID and the EU differ in their priorities in India?

- How receptive are the Government of India to the Development

Partners ideas and inputs?

- What is the role of the JRM in getting the EUs policies across?

- What kinds of difficulties do you experience working with the

Development Partners?

- How do the Development Partners pursue principles of

complementarity and division of labour?

- Is the SSA a model of harmonisation?

- What are the relative resources of the DPs?

- Why did the GoI approach the EU first to fund the SSA?

Transcripts available on request


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Appendix B

Fig 6. A graph of the five major donors to India, and their aid levels since 1960.

____________

Fig 7. Stata output of EU aid through the EC, regressed against four other donors.

The results show a statistically significant correlation between EU and UK aid, but

this remains unclear, as the scatterplot is not clearly indicating linearity.


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