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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agenciesand their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 14 MAY 1968.Other requests shall be referred to Office ofthe Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC20310.

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CONFIDENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY orncK or THE ACXJUTANT OKNCRAI-

WASHINOTON. D.C. 10910

LY mrniTo AGAM-P (M) (10 Jul 68) FOR OT RD 682136 17 July 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - LtMOnt Learned, H««dqu*rt«ri, 268th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION a.x.s LrdasxulüL.i; -• ... w. . L

1

1. Subject report la forwarded for review end evaluation in eccordence with paregreph 3b, AR 923-13. Evaluetlone end corrective actiona should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reporta Branch, within 90 deye of recalpt of covering letter.

2. Infometlon contained In this report la provided to inaure appro- priate benefits in the future fron leasone learned during current operetlone end may be adapted for uae in developing training materiy

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ABMY:

I Incl is

DISTRIBUTION: Cnramandlng Generals

US Continental Army Command US Army Combat Developments C(TOmand

Commandants US Army Command and General Staff College US Array Armor School US Army Artillery and Missile School US Array Aviation School US Array Infantry School

KENNETH G. WICKHAM Major General, USA The Adjutant General

AUG161968

Copies furnished: Office, Chief of Staff, US Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff Chief of Engineers Chief of Research and Development Assistant Chiefs of Staff Defense Documentation Center Commanding Officers

US Army Logistics, Docirlne Systems & Readiness Agency US Army Limited War Laboratory 268th Combat Aviation Bn

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified Inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

$ ' COHflOMTMi

D1PA1THWT DT THE UMT H£ASQaAirr£asf 24öri OOMUT AVIATIOK BATTALION

AFO S*n rranelse* 96316

AVGD-B-SC U May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 268th CAB for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65-(Rl)(ü)

See Distribution

l^C)Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.(0)

(C) a. During this reporting period the unit participated In four major combat operations in support of the Capital ROK Infantry Division (CRID) and the 9th ROK Infantry Division (WHRID). These operations were as follows:

(1) On 9 February 1968, the 268th CAB provided aviation support for three battalions of the 26th ROK Infantry Regiment, GRID. Twenty- .--ur UH-1 troop carrier helicopters and four CH-47 helicopters were employed to Insert seven rifle*' companies, one reoen company, one artillery battery, two Battalion TAC CP' 8 and one Regimental TAG CP into six landing zones,

(2) On 28 Februaiy 1968, the 268th CAB employed thirty-two ÜH-1 troop carrier helicopters and six GH-47 helicopters in support cf the 26th ROK Infantry Regiment, GRID. Eight rifle companies, four Battalion TAC GP's, one 4*2 mortar platoon and two 106 mm recoiless rifle sections were inserted into six landing zone*.

(3) On 16 April the 268th CAB provided aviation support for an opera- tion conducted by the 28th ROK Infantry Regiment, WHIMD. Thirty ÜH-1 helicopters and six CH-47 helicopters were employed to insert thirteen rifle companies, three battalion TAC GP's and one artillery battery into thirteen landing acnes*

Jfe* or RD CONFIDENTIAL 682136

DOWNGIADD AT 3 YEAIIMTIIVAIS. Kcussn» Ami 12 YIAIS.

DOD DM 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGD-E-SC U May 1968 SUBJECT: Operational Koport of Hoadquarter», 268th CAB for Period Ending

30 April 196«, RCS CSFOR-65-(Rl) (ü)

(4) On 20 April 1968 the 268th CAB provided aviation support for a Division (-) combat assault conducted by the GRID. The 268th CAB employed twenty-four UH-1 Helicopters and twelve CH-47 helleoptois to Insert twenty- two rifle companies and eight Battalion TAC CP'c Into twenty-three landing zones.

(C) b. In addition to the above operations« which ware executed under control of the CO 268th CAB, numerous company size operations were con- ducted by the subordinate units of the battalion. These operations were controlled by the CO of the unit providing the tactical airlift.

(C) c. All operations conducted during thie reporting period conformed to nonnal combat procedures prescribed by the CO 26dth CAB, and within the guidance provided in the Operations Manual, 1st Aviation Brigade. No significant changes in policy or procedures were incorporated.

(C) d. With the onset of TBT the enemy displayed a significant change in his combat tactics. This is reflected by the fact that he became increasingly oolder and aggressive, attacking in force during daylight hours as well as at night. He appeared to be willing to accept greater losses in personnel and equipment to achieve Ills objectives. However, since the end of the TUT period the enemy has seemingly become more reluctant to engage either HCK Division in any large force. On several occasions the GRID received reports from Vietnamese villagers that enemy personnel had entered the village and demanded supplies for a large force nerby. Investigators produced n -gative results. It was determined by the G2, GRID, that this was a concentrated effort by the eneray to confuse friendly forces regarding strength and deployment.

(C) e. Training wittiln the battalion is a continuous j rocess. Because of the tactical commitment It is difficult to conduct regularly scheduled, formal classes. As a result, many classes are conducted at night, and extensive on the job training is conducted. Flight training and standardi- zation is accomplished by assiyiing newer flight personnel to fly with the more experienced aircraft commanders.

(C) f. The exact number of days the unit particlpatei in combat operations is unknown. However, the magnitude of the unit's combat operational com- mitment is exemplified by the seventy-el^ht combat assault missions in which the 134th AHC alone participated.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIWNYUL

AVGD-1-3C 14 May 1966 SUBJKTt Opn»ti»BAl Report «f JlmftqpuuUrm, 266th CAB for Perl«! Aiding

30 April 196«, RCS CaP0R-(5-(lD(V)

IQ f. Prebl«M oeiifrented, eelotlone «ad recn—■iiflatlena,

(1) 311ng iMdst

e. Ie r«duuc elroreft hlade tia» end to «nhanc« IHgbt «ad «wund a&fttjr* «xteoelTe UM «f sl49Ka ^ cargo transport has bean Incorporated. However, it «M neted thai ttoo «upperted HOKA DiTisiono were not proficient In load preparatiMM and sling lirting procedure«. To correct this sit- uation classes wore presented to 0-4« 3-4 and resupply point personnel« A narked luprovenant In sling load operation has resulted,

(2) Ibpolioed r« supply pointst

"if*} a. Because of debris and loeee eqoipwnt in the resupply points, the uattaliun experienced an exoesslse nunber of blade strikes« To eliminate this dangerous and costly problea, tea&s coaposed of unit operations of- ficers« liaison officers, safety effleers and 0-4 representatives from the supported units« visited all the resupply points for the purpose of making corrections and providing guidance.

(3) Kisunderstanding due to language barrier betwsen US and third country forces«

a« Misunderstardlnc often ecsur* bat «eon OS aviation pereennel end the supported ROKA forces. In ait eifert to relievo this situation SMis- graphed sheets with tranalatlooo ef key phrases wore distributed to the pilots. This action-proved quite sixosafbl. Howovsr, cwainication by radio is In ooet casae virtually iapossible«

b. To further promote good rolatlene and eliminate misunderstanding between US and third country personnel, teams ccaposed of the liaison officers and representatives of the supporting aviation units providad instruction to SOKA forces regarding the limit it lens and peculiarities of the helicopter.

(4) Lack of effective security procedures in the PZ.

a. HOKA forces normally organixe a tactical pickup zone as if it were a secure area. A security force surrounding the PZ is seldom employed. Recomriendatlons to provide a security force nare generally gone unheeded. However, efforts to correct this situation oontinuo under the 266th CAB sponsorship«

CONFIDENTIAL

coffirontti

AVOD-S-SC 14 May 1968 SUBJECT: Operatioiud lia^rt of H«*4iu*rt«rB, 26öth CAB for Period Zndlne

30 April 196ft, RCS OSPOn-65-(Rl)(0)

(5) TWBOUtMl 3hort&£,eBt

a. Peraonnel shortages in key MDSj le, aviaters, 67W20, 45J20, 05C20, and 71320 continue to rlst. This unit strives to alleviate this situa- tion by distribution of resources and OJT. However, the situation is critical in the areas listed above. Experienced personnel are being replaced by personnel with Mini— training «ad eTperlenoe» Tfoh inspec- ters, 67W, are arrlviog at the units with no axpei.«nee with the type air- craft assigned to the units. OJT moä 8-4 eeortosy ▼ieitl'are only partially effective arJ the Baintooaneo effort continues to «offer. The lack of lualifiod »tor naintonaneo and unit «apply poreonao> naterially effects these vital areas« Asoistaneo visits by 8-A representatives have partially relieved this problaB, but the effect of a lack of qualified personnel in the jibove areas reaains obvious.

b. The 268th CAB is authoriso* by TOO two offioor* aal thirteen enlisted son in the pathfinder plitoon. At proawt no officers and inly seven enlisted MO are assigned. The platoen is presently ceananded by an fit*« This situation imposes a coneiderable problaai In erganising LZ's and PZ's during ooabat operations*

c. A request for additional liaison offloors to bo assigned to the battalion was approved by the CO., 17th CiC. Thsse liaison officers will enable the 268th CAB to iaprove oeerdinatlon «ad to provide even «ore responsivo aviation support. Irtahlishlm liaioon at regij—ntal level will greatly assist the operation of the Battalion Movoaent Control Center. Due to a shortage of officers qoAlified for MM duty« no liaison officers have« as yet, boon assignsd to a MD8A reglnental heedquartero.

(6) Transfer of aircraft t

a. The transfer and receipt of UH-1 helicopters oontinuos to bo a problem. The aircraft are to bo picked up four hours after the unit is notified that they are ready for issue. The pickup points are wide- spread over SVN and transportation to the pickup point is often quite difficult to acquire. In SOBO instanoes «hen crows report to pick up the aircraft they find that it hM boon iseued to another unit through a misunderstanding. Ceaeiunioatiano failure seeaw to bo the prinary con- tributing factor in this situation.

(U) h. There wore no changes to the unit nission during this reporting period.

(C) l. There were no changes to the unit organisation during this period.

4

CONFIDENTML

COHFIOMTUL

AVGD-i-ac U itaj i9ie SöBJKTi Operational Baport of RMfi^urUr*« 266th GAB for Ported Aidinc

30 April 196«, RCS CSKIU6^(Rl) (ff)

(C) J. Poraonnol .chao|o« within tho cenund group and principal staff wore as fellows,

(1) Battalion Conmndor. ITC Wayne B. Sargent, 061761, roplacod LTC Donald I. Mulligan, 079000. Iff active dates 4 April 1968.

(2) Battalion Executive Officer. Major Richard I. Gillingham, 079299, replaced LTC Horace A. Boni, 01M6977. Effective date: 21 April 1968.

(3) S-l. 1 LT Bruce H. White, 05337829, replaced CPT Robert R. Toung, 04046588. Effective date: 4 April 1968.

(4) S-2. MAJ Curtis S. Crouch Jr., 080222, as signed S-2. Effective date: 1 May 1968.

(5) S-3. MAJ Bobby J. Naddox, 082767« replaced MAJ Ronald H. Qaeiy, 082322. Effective date: 1 March 1968.

(6) CO 48th AMD. MAJ Jerry L. Fleming, 075355« replaced MAJ John Fordhanu Effective date: 11 February 1968.

(7) CO 129th AHC. MAJ Ronald H. Bnery, 072322, replaced MAJ Curtis S. Crouch Jr., 080222. Effective date: 1 March 1968.

(0) k. Unit Strengths as of 30 April 1968.

(1) Military

SnhoHinate Unit

HHC 25FCAB 342 ASD 433 Mod. Det.

48 AHC 390 Trans. Det. 279 Slg. Det. 286 Mod. Det.

129 AHC 394 Trans. Det. 296 Slg. Det.

Officer Auth 0/H 21

1 1

15 1 1 1

15 1 1

21 1 2

12 0 1 1

19 1 0

WO Auth 0/H

2 3 0 0

52 1 0 0

52 1 0

2 0

39 1 0 0

37 1 1

■I Auth Oßi ~W 119

20 27 9 8

152 70

6 9

152 70

9

U6 48

6 9

150 62

5

Total Auth 0/H 109 143

21 10

219 72

7 10

219 72 10

30 10

199 49

7 10

206 64 6

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL S

MOD-MO SUBJBCTt Operational Raport of Haadquartara, 26dth CAB for Farlod Ending

30 April 1968, RCa CSPO!l-65-(R1) (ü)

(1) Kilitary (Con't)

Subordlnata

134 AHC 618 Trans, Dat. 832 Sig. Dot,

Offioar Auth O/H

1 1 0 1

MD

SI 0 0

EN

70 8

O/H 143 60 8

Total Auth O/H 219^ w

72 61 9 9

335 AHC 166 Trans, Det, 234 Sig. Dot,

15 1 0

14 1 1

52 48 1 0

152 70

8

164 61

7

219 226 72 63

9 8

180 ASHC 403 Trans. Dat.

12 1

12 1

24 14 1

U8 80

133 58

184 159 82 60

268 CAB 103 97 241 180 1271 1216 1615 1493

(0) 1. Aircraft Status ir of 30 April 1968 (Sea Tab l).

CO) m. Operational Results as of 30 April 1968 (See Tab 2).

2^C)Sectlon 2, Lessons Learned; Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

aJQ4)Personnel - None.

b«(if)Operatlons

(1) Observations A recent night "TAG E% which involved extraction of the 173rd

Brigade (IRRP), In contact. Indicated the necessity for standardized procedures in the Insertion and extraction of Long Range Recon Patrols.

(2) Evaluation Insertion and extraction of LRRPs under confcat conditions require

close coordination between the aviation element and the IRRP to insure success. Improper procedures can result in aircraft being exposed to ground fire for prolonged periods of tims and increase« the possibility that the LRRP will be discovered and engaged by an eneny force.

(3) Recommendations It is reco/mended that an SOP for insertion and extraction of

LRRPs be established, (See inclosure 3 for SOP established for the 268th CAB and the 173rd Airborne Brigade),

6.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVOD-MO U May 1968 SDBJKTt Op«Ntl«Ml Report of UM ' >iu^t*r«, 266th CAB for Period Ending

30 April vto, acs caFOÄ-65-(»i){»)

(A) Obsonratlen During ■ortar and rocket attaoka on Phu Kiep AAP It was oboorvod

that crow» of the axiwd hollcopter reaction foroo «or« unable to move to the aircraft idtheut exposing thMMolvoe to the mmy fire.

(5) Evaluation A Boons by which araod helloeptero crowo can roach tholr aircraft

quickly and in relative safety should bo Inoerporatod.

(6) Hecomnendation The amsd helicopter reaction force should bo positioned away

fron the prlas target area and ooaaunloations established between the force and the headquarters having authority to launch the force. The reaction force should be propositioned nightly and placed on a five minute standby,

(U) c. Training - None

(0) d. Intelligence • None

(ü) e. Logistics - None

(U) f • Organisation - None

(U) g. Other - None

3 Ind 1. Tab 1 2. Tab 2 3. Tab 3

WSTRIBUTIONI 1 cy THRU»

THRU« THRU: THRI: TO:

2 cy THRU: Jpi

2 cy TO: 3 cy TO: 2 cy TO:

17th CAG IFTORCBV 1st Avn Bds USARPAC ACSFOR DA 17th CAG ACSFOR DA USARPAC USARV 1st Avn Dde

CONFIDENTIAL

II CONFIDENTIAL

AVGD-SC (U iky t^) l«t Ind SUBJECTt OpunMammX Report of HMdquarters, 2b6th GAL for Period Ending

30 Iprll 1968, RCS CSFOR-65-(Rl) (D)

HoadquArtw«, 17th Combat Arlatlon Oroup, AH) 96240 24 May 1968

TO: Coamanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam, APO 96350

1* (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters > 268th Combat Aviation Battalion,

2. (C) The following comments and recominendatlons on Section I and II are submitted for review and/or approval. ^

a. Reference item concerning personnel shortages in M06 05C20, Section I, para 1, g, (5), a, page 4« Concur* It is recognized that the 268th CAB is presently short six 05C20>s. Other battalions of the 17th CAG are also short this M06 and separate action has been initiated through personnel channels to effect priority of assignment in this MOS.

b. Reference item concerning Transfer of Aircraft, Section I, para 1» g» (6): Concur. Four hours is a target which was set up during the TET Offensive in order to get aircraft off 6f fields where security was marginal. Experience has Indicated that twenty-four to forty-eight hours between notification and pick-up is more realistic.

c. Reference item concerning Insertion and extraction of Long Range Recon Patrols, Section II, b, (1): Concur. It is recommended that each aviation unit worK out SOP's concerning (IHR?) operations with patrol units they habitually support. Proper procedures and understanding between units will greatly enhance the success of the operation.

d* Reference Reaction Time for Armed Helicopter crew reaction force. Section II, b, (4): Concur. Every unit must develop SOP's to react in the fastest possible time to launch an effective reaction force during an Installation attack.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/#A*~l ILD M. 'G00CH

1LT, AGC Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-OC-ÜT (14 May 68) 2d Ind SUBJECTt Operational Report o^ Headquarters, 26eth CAB for Period

Aiding 30 April 1960, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, AFO 96350 4 JUN 1968

TOt Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 9630?

Concur.

FOR THE CCMMANDEK:

p^^^CU^^

i! Copy furnished: 17th Cbt Avn Op

RCtBERT C. GABBARD I IT; A DC ASS? ADJUTANT GENERAL

1

13 ,'

AVBA-C (14 M«y 6S) 3d Ind SUBJECT! Operational Report of Headquarter», aftftth CAB for Period

fedln* 30 April 1966« ECS CSPa-65 (H) (U)

*ad«nart«., let Aviation Bri«ede, A» %3tti JUN 1 6 1968

TBEUt Caaa«idliig General, United IM^ee Arny Vietnan, AT.Ni AVHOC-OST, AM 96375 OoMMnder in Chief, United States An^ Pacific, ATTII: GPCP-C/T, APO 96558

TOt Aeeietaat Chief of Staff for Faroe Development, Departwnt of the Arv, Waehington, D.O. 90310

1. (U) Thi» headquarters hae reriewtd the report, conaidere it to be adequate, and ccncors with the content* as indoraed.

2. (U) The following additional ooment la oanaidcred pertinent:

Paragraph tg(6), page 4. It la the desire of the let Aviation Brigade that aircraft be trwaferred aa repidly aa possible to niniaiae the iocs of the flying tlaa tea to tka aircraft awaiting i>ick-up. Ae a result the let Aviation Brigade policy la that unite hate 34 hours to pick up aircraft from a loelng unit. Motificatioai la generally made by telephone or radio to expedite the transacticn.

FOt TS OCMttNltt!

1LT, ACC ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

10

If

AVHGC-DST (U May 68) 4th Ind (U) CPT Amold/dla/LBN U85 SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarterst 268th CAB for Period Ending

30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65-(Rl)

HKADQUARTHiS, US ARKY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 8 IHN 1988

TO: Commander In Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 268th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2, Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA Captain. Af.C

Cv furn- Assistant Adjnlanl (ieneial HQ ist Avn Bde HQ 268th CAB

11

IT

GPOP'OT (14 My 68) (U) Sth ln4 •UBJICIi QpMstlOMl import of M, 26%th Cbt Avn la for Ptrled Ending

SO April IfM, IC8 CgFtfl-65 (U)

■Q, U8 Any. Pacific, APO Ma Prauelsee 9*558 JW 1381

TOi AaalsUat Chief of Staff far Porea Pavalopaant, DaparCMot of th« Axwy, Wthlafton, D. C. 20310

This hcadquartara has avaluatad aubjact report aad focwardiag iadoraa- ■•nta aad concur« ia tha report as Indorsed.

FOt THI COMOKDEE IN CHIEF:

&^/~

CL SHORH CFT, AGC AMI AO

12

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Tab 1

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17

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s s s « B 8 f! fi

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I

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lljl B fi I 8

•^ M

^H <»

« 8 S 2 S « J 15 s fifi r

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p a p a f g S Ü s S

p ? .* I § a w § S 3

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H» H O Ui 0»

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Tab 2

IH

CONnDINTIAL

WAXmm OF THE ARM! HEADQQARTBS, 26iTR OOHBiT AVIATION BATTALION

APO San frmncldco 96316

AVGD-S-aC 15 May 1966

aUBJaCTx 9t*adardli«tlon of URP In««rtl»n/Bxtractlon Procedures (ü)

Conraandlnf Genorel 173rd Airborne Brigade

ATTN: Deputy Coonander APO 96316

(C) 1» The recent night TAC "E", which InwlTed extraction of the 173rd Brigade (lilRP), In contact. Indicated the neeeesity for clonev atandardlzation pro» cedures between the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion and your Brigade.

(C) 2, The sequence of events on this night extraction was:

a. TAC "E" declared by 4/503rd Infantry shortly after darkj 'RPP's in contact in eastern sector of Boiling; weather 300 feet ceiling and .2/4 oils visibility (variable less).

b. Gunships launched within five minutes after declaration of TAC "E"; gunships on station in vicinity of LHRP's ten minutes later; Gunships un- able to locate LRRP's exact position due to low visibility, no light signals from the ground. Inability to home on FH radio signals and lack of under- standing between gun pilot lead and LRRP leaders attempt to vector aircraft.

c. Slicks and slick flare ship launched within 30 minutes after dec- laration of TAC "E"; slicks on station in vicinity of ULTP» s ten minutes later; slicks nable to locate UlRP's due to the same pro'-lems as In 2b. Gunships, slicks and flare ship on station for 50 minutes dropping total load of flares, flying in a search pattern with running lights, search- lights and landing lights on up to the point of critical fuel,

d. LliRP's finally located by slick flight lead hovering at 20 feet and 20 knots with landing and searchlights on, se_rching all open areas for a possible PZ. Flight lead drew fire on extraction due to the excessive search ana tenuous flight situation.

(C) 3. Coordination with the S-3, 4/503rd Infantry was conducted the following day and the following SOP was established between the 266th Combat A/iation Paltalion and the 4/503rd Infantry»

THD3 CONFIDENTIAL

'T CONFIDENTIAL

AVGD-1-aC 1A HMJ 1968 SUBJECT: SUnUnUsatlon of UOf Til—itlnn/^it liiillnn Procedures

a« In a« far M po««lblof tho saw aircraft crow, flight lead and ym- ahip cover that Inserta la responaible for extraction.

b. The ft for jflannad extractions trill be recoimed by flight lead dur'dc; daylight hour« and after dark,, when tactically feasible.

e. Exact PZ loeatlen and required PZ time mist be given by the troops to be extractod,

d. XHRTground FM radio mat bo utilised by fli-ht lead to ^uide his fUJit.

e. Steering instructions fron the liiRP leader must be in roltftlooahi,.' lu the aircraft flight path and given in terminology i.e., "turn left, rtop turn, continue present heading, turn right, stop turn, turn li^ht 90 degrees." Clock uethod of direction is too confusing to a pilct in flight, part it >- lorly undsr laarglnal conditions.

f. .i.b t!ie L'iSP position is ccmprondsed by a flight of helicopters in ...v iumediate vicinity, ground Illumination of various types nwst be ns^d by troops to be extracted in order that gunships can support by fire and slicks can Identify exact F.:.

g. Troops to be extracted aust form a circle in the PZ and provide final protective fire outbound from the Pi aa the flight is on approach« Hot only «ill this firs aappress the mm*, tarnt it mill assist la ooaetlj defining the PZ. PVuther, fuships «111 bo aldsd in Irisntiflsstten of the fWendly posi- tion permitting II*VT<'M gonship eevmr«

h. After troops are on board, all available weapons, aust bo used to suppress the enmqy aa the flight is on takeoff.

(0) 4. It ia hoped that the above procedures will be an initial stop toward more prof eealonal support by ttas a60th Canhat Aviation Battalion to your Brigads.

Tata 3 WATNE B. S&BGBT LTC, Infantry

CONFIDENTIAL

,

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OACSFOR, DA, W«»hlngton, D.C. 20310

E NOONT TITLI Operational Reports - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 268th Combat Aviation Battalion

a«. rtLroNT tccuniTV CLAIIIFICATION

Confidential a».

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rimim^SM^mWt^ ********** MmtUMa te^ I Ffih -.m Anr ftft Cp, 268th Combat Aviation Battalion / ' . •

wmr OAT« 14 May 1968

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N/A

i«. DltTniaUTIOH (TAtCMINT

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682136

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N/A

U. •VeMtOHIN« MILITAMV ACTIVITY

OACSFOR. DA, Waehlngton, D.C. 20310

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17

DD /r.,1473 UNCLASSIFlEn