to - apps.dtic.mil · ojl 0 3 / ^rui 6.7, 1. forwarded as inclosure is operational report - lessons...

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION CHANGESTO:FROM:

LIMITATION CHANGESTO:

FROM:

AUTHORITY

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AD393839

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved for public release; distribution isunlimited.

Code 9: DTIC Classified Users Only. ControllingDoD Organization: Office of the Assistant Chiefof Staff for Force Development, Washington, DC20330. 1 Jun 1967.

28 FEB 1979, DoDD 5200.10; PER OAG D/A ltr 29Apr 1980

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION CHANGESTO:

FROM:

AUTHORITY

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AD393839

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

28 feb 1970, DoDD 5200.10

_ • . . . - w.

SECDRITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to eaeh page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST he marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS. TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than 1n connection with a defi- nitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or In any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data 1s not to be regarded by Implication or otherwise as In any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented Invention that may in any way be related thereto.

SECRET OFFICE OF

(li'/?Fe{r(o7

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310

INWLYWmTO

AGAM-P (M) (23 Miy 67) FOR OT

flprraff—n1 "rrtTt -Lessons Learned, j^ U Field Force Vietnam Artillery if L\^ T

),

V

r*m«-1967

SEE DISTRIBUTION

OJL

0 3 / ^rui 6.7,

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field?force Vietnam Artillery for quarterly period ending 31 January 196?/ Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of

\AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Com- mandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted

S,. for use in developing training material.

LlJ

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 I

1 Incl as

^^// 6. JtadJi»«- ~* KENNETH G. WICKHAM

Major General, USA The Adjutant General

o°-

DISTRIBUTION: Commanding General V_><.

US Army Combat Development Command US Continental Army Command

Commandants US Army Command and General Staff College US Army War College US Army Air Defense School US Army Artillery and Missile School US Army Armor School US Army Chemical Corps School US Army Engineer School US Army Military Police School US Army Infantry School US Army Intelligence School US Army Medical Field Service School

(JDöT-FD-tffä11,

&SC

RBGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE

(Continued on page 2)

^ftOTRO C70ott

SECRET

> (>

■

SECRET ;

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd) { US Army Ordnance School y US Army Quartermaster School US Army Security Agency School , US Army Transportation School US Army Signal School US Army Special Warfare School US Army Civil Affairs School

Copies furnished: Research Analysis Corporation Security Officer

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Office, Chief of Staff, IX) Amy Deputy Chief• of Staff national Aeronautic! * Space Administration, Office of Defense Affaire Southeast Asia Porcea, OBD (SA) Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Joint Action Control Office

■ TTi! n

w.

2

SECRET

'

SECRET jBFFORCEV

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS II FELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY APO SAN FRANCISCO 96266

14 FEB1967

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED QUARTERLY FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 136?

(RCS CSFOR-65MU) V

PI. ~ - ' ' I 'v ~ i..

*31U

POROTRO 610011

«•graded UNCLASSIFIED Mparattd from clauifitd document,

SECRET DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS, DOD DIR 5200.10 P9 Uf \ R9

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

teotlon Z - Sigaifioant Organisation AotlTltles«

▲• (IOO0) idndLiastrntion/Perectinel,

1.

9|V ^

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, II Hold lore« Tietnan Artillery it organised undo» 101 6-501B with «a authorised and assigned strength m of 31 January oo follows*

AUTHORIZED ASSUMED

sn a sä as a a 54 2 159 58 2 174*

* The indicated oreretrength io duo to transient personnel during a rotational period»

28

GADS

OFF WO BM OFT WD

7 0 27 5 0

5« Casualties during tho poriod inolndot

Killed in notion 0

Diod of battle wound« 0

Wounded in notion 0

Missing in notion 0

Ion-battle death« 0

Ion-battle casualti«« 0

4* Personnel Managonant»

HQ, II JfOBCB? Artillery 81 Section continued to perfom edninietratlTo functions fbr tho headquarter« and to nonitor personnel

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 81*313

'


action« for the headquarter« battery. The 5th Battalion (AV)(SP), 2d Artillery was placed under the operational command of thie headquarter«. Thi« aotion «lightly increeaed the administrative dutie« of the «eotlon. Initial orientation and aasiytance «a« given to the battalion in the area« of publication«, BbR, award« and decoration«, «peoial services •at a activities. Caaualty report« and efficiency rating« fron Mt» .^. alion are now ohcnneled through this «eotlon*

5« He«t and Hecuperatlon Program.

Iho following out of country BfcR trip« were taken by mem- ber« of thi« headquarter« t

LOCATIQB MOT BBC JAB

Bangkok 2 4 10

Hong Kong 1 2 2

Tokyo 1 2 0

Taipei 1 0 0

Penang 0 2 0

Hawaii 1 2 5

Thi« ieadquarter«' BAR program operate« within the allo- cation« given to II FFQRCE7.

6. Morale.

The morale of the organization continue« to be outstanding.

7« Award« and Decoration«.

the period. The following award« and decorations were presented dut?w;\

Bronx« Star Medal

Air Medal

Army Commendation Medal

Good Conduct Medal

3

1

4


FOR OMCIAt USE ONIY

i 8. Discipline. Law sad Order«

the following judicial and non-judicial actions ware eon-» duotod during this reporting period:

Article 1$ 2

Sway (tourt-Hartial 0

Social Ontrt-liertlal 2

General Court-Martiel 0

9« Safety.

The battery sustained three vehicle accidents during this period, all of which were minor«

10. Civil Affaire.

During this reporting period the Staff Chemical Officer continued to perform additional duties an the 35. fhe unit civic action program continued, with additional food and clothing diatributed U> the pmool and orphanage at the nearby hamlet of HOsTAI Til GDI. ftrtoontly, the headquarters, in conjunction with attached unite» began eponeoring ola*aee in apoken ftigiMsh la the hamlet* All unite fur* »<i*h?4 lnjtrn.«■•*•;* v'jrt ng one fc"'*r classes in the hamlet daily» •soirty of Ui*4i.i elsaeee* *;ioh have at with ooiieüerable enthusieaa from the citlsens erf Butt AI VAR C0If have been given thus fax and are attended daily ly ^pi.rojrinately 230 Vietnamese, fhe Medical Clvlo Action Program (KtiUUAlOf initiated by this headquartara la September Vj6d9 continued during thie reporting period» The program consistJ of twice-weekly visits to ifiSAI VAI 001 by medically qualified per* fiittihki to pi»7ido »ece&ssry medical care to Vietnamese civilians» A total of eighteen vielte have been conducted and an average of 150 patiente are treated at each vielt« Both groupe under operational command of this headquartara have established and support sa emergetlo program basically in the area of KBDCAP, furnishing material for self~ help programs» community relations» Knglish-Vietnamese and Vietnamese- anglish language classes and supporting schools and orphanages in their areas. In addition the 23d Artillery Group has aa active program in the construction of a refugee village«

11. Public Information Program»

Publio information activities continue under the direction of the SI Section« During this period several articles submitted by this headquarters appeared la various civilisn and military periodicals

3


SECRET published in Vietnam« Additionally, the Cannoneer« a newspaper pub- liehed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, published several article» concerning the activities of II FfORCOT Artillery.

12* Change of QmgmgAm

Brigadier General V« 0« Grlttenbsrger, Jr., «ho had been transferred to the American embassy in SAIGOI for a special assignment, returned to II BORGE? Artillery and assuaed ooaasnd on 10 Januar/« Oolonel George R. Allin, Jr., «ho ooaaanded since 7 Septeaber 1966, beoaae the Deputy Goosander*

B. (S) Opormttons/lhtelligonoe«

1. (C) General.

Operations and intelligence activities of the headquarters during this period included nony of the aaae projscts reported in the previous Operational Report as «ell as initiation of several new projects. She plea for stationing of II IfGRGaY Artillery units «aa revised in light of changes la the troop program and the taotloal situation« Refinements «ere aade In the headquarters' aerial visual reoon- naisanoe program» Assistance to AR7X in artillery employment continued to ooamend much of the headquarters • attention«

2« (S) Han for Stationing of Artillery Unite«

a« During this reporting period the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Separate) beoaae operational, with its base camp located at LOW BUH. The 9th Infantry Division established bass oaaps at BEAR CAT, and at D0«G TAM in the I? Corps Taotloal Zone« A majer W maneuver unit was stationed at DAU TIE» for the first time when th* 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division displaced to that location from BEAR GAT. As additional maneuver units arrived, end new artillery units came to II IfQRGEV Artillery, the stationing plan of II fPOBCET Artillery wa& revised. The current plan is at Inolosure 1« Range capabilities of 175mm $m units disposed In aooordanoe with the stationing plan are shown at Inclosurs 2« Unit locations referred to are depicted on the asp at Inoios» :e 2«

b« During this reporting period four additional artillery Battalions beeeme operational under II flCRCEY artillery«

(1) After completing staging at PHÖ LOI, the 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (7/9th Arty) (tOJnn T) moved to a base camp at BEAR CAT, closing sad becoming operational on 13 lovenber« One or more of its firing batteries have been on operational missions out of

SECRET

SECRET 7

baa* oaap ever einoe that date* The battalion ma aaeiajaed to the 34th Artillery Group.

(2) ill pereonnel of tat 1ft Battalion, 63* Artillery (l/85d Arty) (8" SP) arrived la oountry IQT 1 Boveaber; however, the battalion^ equipment did not arrive until 1 Beoeaber* Burin« November the peraonnal «ere located In a etagiag area at LOW BIIB, although a portion of the battalion moved to BUI BAT. near BA RIA, on 22 Bovanber to prepare a baaa camp. Shortly after the equipment vaa unloaded, half of the 8" hovltie*s were oonverted to 175«» put forming a ooapoalte 8"/ 175»» battalion, ma battalion, vhloh vaa aneigne* to the 54th Artil- lery Group, beoaae operational on 12-16 December at three looatlone, with the headquarters end one xIring battery at BOX BAT, one firing äattery at SAR CA9 and one firing battery at XDAB LOC.

(5) The advance party of the 2d Battalion, 11th Ar- tillery (2/l1th Arty) (155» *) arrived by air on 30 Hovember, vhlle the aaln body arrived at VUHG TAB by ahlp on 15 Beccaber. The battalion vaa etaged at PHU LOI, beooalng operational on 27 Beoeaber under the 23d Artillery Group* One firing battery relocated on that date to GO BAU HA. Oü 2 January one firing battery aoved to a baae oaap at BAB TiatG.

(4) The 5th Battalion (Automatic Weapons) (Self- propelled), 2d Artillery (Reinforced) (5/2d Arty), originally programmed for deployment in II CTZ, van diverted to II FFORCB? by COHUSHACV in SEGRKT message MACJ)22f DTG 1814252 Hov 66, subject: 5th AV Bn (SP), 2d Arty (iteinf) (U). The unit1 a advance party, having arrived at QU1 HHON in the II Corpa Zone on 16 Roveaber, flev to BISH HOA on 22 November, unit equipment and peraonnal were diverted at aea to III CTZ and the aaln body arrived by ship at YUNG TAU on 27 Roveaber* The 54th Artillery Group eponaored the 5/2d Arty« The battalion beoaae operational on 27 Beoeaber under the operational command of II FWttCEV Artillery. Paragraph 5 belov contalna a dlaouaalon of the employment of the primary veapone of the 5/2d Arty«

o. Concerning tks plan for future etationlng of II JTORCEV Artillery unite, Iacloeure 1, the folloving polnta ehould be notedr

(1) A plan for atatloning heavy artillery at BKei IUC vaa dlaeuaaed in Section I, paragraph B2h of the previous Opera* tlonal Report* Work on a position at BEB LUC nan been delayed because of other ooamltments of engineer reaouroea In III CTZ. It la hoped that the position at BEB LUC vlll be prepared for occupation in April. If ao, It vlll be oocupled temporarily by a battery from another location until more heavy artillery arrives •

SECRET

SECRET 1

(2) Duo to continuing operations of the 1st Infantry Division near QUA» LOIf in the extreme northern portion of III CTZ, a deolelon van made to station a heavy battery at that looation to extend artillery coverage. Btry A, 6/27th Arty (8"/l75um SP) will displace to QUA! LOI in February.

(3) In order to extend artillery coverage into War Zone C, Btry B, 3/32d Arty (8"/t75o* SP) will aove fron LAI «HE in Feb- ruary to SÜOI DA Special forces Camp, 16 kiloaeters northeast of TAT BTBH. 'Hie coverage from SUOI DA «ill still include the important MJCHBLH Plantation area.

(4) The planned arrival of the 7th Battalion, 8th ety) (8" Artillery (7/8th Arty) (8" SP) in June 1967 will permit extension of

heavy artillery coverage in several directions* It is planned to con- vert the firing batteries of this battalion to three composite 8rt/l75mn batteries* In conjunction with restationlng of current heavy batteries» new ooverage will be provided at Half TAB in the eastern portion of III CTZ, at MIO TAN, a brigade base camp of the 9th Infantry Division near MT WO in IV CTZ, and at BW LUC*

3* (C) Air Defense Weapons in a Ground Support Bole*

During this reporting period the 5th Battalion (Automatic Weapons) (Self-propelled), 2d Artillery (Reinforced) ($/2d Arty) began operations in III CTZ. The battalion is organised imder TQB 44-85?* Upon activation at Port Biles, Texas, the battalion «as reinforced by the attachment of Battery D, 7let Artillery, an M55 caliber «50 machine gun battery organised under TOB 44-85T. After arriving in BVV the 24 machine gun squads of the machine gun battery were attached to the four firing batteries of the 5/2d Artyy two sections each to Batteries A and 3 and one section each to Batteries C and D. Upon becoming operationalt operational control of one firing battery was passed to the 1st Divi- sion sad one to the 25th Division» later all four batteries participated in Operation CBDAB FALLS* Thus far the H42 twin 40am and K55 caliber •50 machine gun aeotlons have been employed both as maneuver elements and as firs support element e* Both weapons have been used extensively for convoy esoort and security. The quad *50 has proved to be parti- cularly effective in providing close-in defense of installations auch as field CPU, artillery fire support bases and forward supply complexes* In numerous oases the quad «50 machine gun has\been dismounted from its 2§ ton truck mount and hellllftsd into forward areas to provide additional support to front line infantry units* The mobility of the twim 40sm has been exploited by employing the weapon in missions such as road clearing and securing and using It to support mobile men- ewer elements euch as mechanised infantry and armored cavalry. Some

SECRET

SECRET have need the weapon la the indirect fix» sol« by iategretlag

it lato unsattiamlai pmgrsaa end laaaaaalag and interdicting fin in — amjlojaeat taoaalansa «UX so doubt stabilise after WM vertone techniques have bean itriiil «ft analysed* Several «Mb IWIM irt no* being condnotod. The wmtimlmm should beoone available la UM very near future. At «bis point, lamlontions are that the j/aft Arty «am best be utilised la the ground support sola by aalateJnlag tat firing batteries aaftar oparatioaal control of or attaobaft to tbo of tbo anjor aoaouror el<

4* (8) Aircraft for Artillery Unite.

a« Aa poiatod oat la Section I9 paragraph B3 aat Sootioa II, Port 2, paragraph B of tbo Operational Beport for tbo poriod ending 31 October 1966, tbo aood for aircraft tc aapport artillery oporatiooo la urgent. During thia period, there woo little relief la thio problea area; aa a natter of fact the requirement booaat even greater dae to the arrival of additional artillery unite.

b. The 54th Artillery Group now baa three operational b»„trotte (l/ßX Arty, 2/35th Arty and 7/9th Arty), fiKperlence in Vie «nan has shown that three 0-1 typo aircraft per group headquarters arid :-no 0-1 •« per artillery battalion are required to provide adequate a*;;*«*! »»ue^c 11-. . tula -roup and ita battalion« bare no organic aircraft* The only observation aircraft support available ia aircraft fur- n««h*i rrt-r- II ?S"(lCW Fixed Wing Conpaniea on a aisalon baala. Thia groan in ?* .?*. the lev, i . f tbrce 0-1 aircraft per d^f i'u. Lii&Lt wi '..-. . v ü*i ^..rafi re^.-xd lor a group with three hatbiUona £» /ic^ou'

o, *ba ?*A frtillary Grsnp haa nine 0-1 aircraft, but reu>ij&*ftiia tor those aseets becane greater when the group's lo.utb tail-A 5 on »'«-»/na» Arty) becwae operational without organic aircraft.

a. In addition to the two groups, two other unite (HHB, 8th CAJ0/2$tb Arty and 5/2d Arty) are operational without aircrew These unita do net require observation aircraft, but cannot perform their ni salons properly in Viet nan without helicopter aupport«

e. The 2)d Artillery Group haa five OH-13 helicopter a» with an average availability of three per day* This group is required by tnls headquarters to furnish One OH-13 daily, on a mission baala, to the 34th Artillery Group, leaving only two helicopters to perform the myriad coaraid, control, reoonnalaaance, courier and logistical support functions of a group headquarters and four battalions.

SECRET

1

SECRET f. II FF0RC8V normally furnishes two TH-1 helloopters

ouch day OB a mleeion basis to II FIORCBV Artillery, ft»«« two helicopters «ut be used to support ft group headquarters «1th thro* artillery battalions, an automatic vaapona battalion and tho headquarters of n target acqulaitlon battalion« Thla support la obviously inadequate, and results in ft serious deterioration of ton oosmmnders* ability to influence the notion« of the vldeapread unite for union they «re reeponaible an veil en inadequate reconnaissance, delay» In survey operntiona and unevoidable odmlnietrative and logistical pcoblene.

g. This problem of adequate aviation support hen been cited In ell previous Operational Reports submitted by this hendquar- terni until adequate aircraft are provided fully effective artillery operations cannot be achieved« As stated previously, these require-

dt« «re as follows:

/*

(1) force Artillery Headquarters (also supports separate battalions and batteries)s Four UH-1's, three 0-1 's.

(2) Croup Headquarters: Three 0-1'e, two OH-IJ'a and one U-6.

(5) Artillery Battalion: Two 0-1 «8 and one OH-13 for each battalion.

5* (c) Visual Aerial Reoonnalssanoe (VR).

a. Visual aerial reconnaissance continued to be tho best method of gathering intelligence and locating targets of opportunity in Vietnam* Although the potential effectiveness of Vfi was not fully realised due to a critical shortage of aircraft, the II FPORCEV Artillery VR Program did obtain highly important results.

b. Under the II FfORGEV Visual Reconnaissance Program, II RDRCnV Artillery is assigned VR responsibility of areas within range of heavy artillery but outside the Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) of US units* Shis assignment of VR missions gives II HQRGEV Artillery responsibility for some 13,000 square kilometers in III CTZ, oonpared to en «vesmge of 1,600 square kilometers for a division*

o* In executing the VR program, artillery groups are assigned VR responsibility for speoifio sseas based on the bass camp positions of their artillery and their aircraft assets* Groups further sub-divide their areas down to battalions.

8

SECRET

SECRET dU To the extant possible, tha MM «IT observer flies

tli« sams «r«ft day aftar day. tola haa the obvious sdvsntage of allowim* tha observer to become completely fMillar with a specifio area, aai la» eraaeee hia ability to dotoot changes la movsmsmt patterae. Ohtacrart are briefad aad debriefad foe each nleelom. iraaa anew other Intelli- gence eouroce ladioata potaatlaX anony activity «ra daaljaatad far tienlar attention. Spat reporte on laportaat sightings arm and* Intelligence ohajmele aad a complete fl «apart of all «*a**«^g» far a 24-hour pariod it forwarded through intelligsnoe ohaanals to reach XI IKftC&T 02 Air dally.

a. In fitoaaaar, which ana tba f Irat month 1» vmleh II ffORCBT Artillery had two grouse and eavan artillarjr battalion* operational, a total of 616 intelligence sighting* «are raportad by artlllary observers and 192 of thaaa aara attaofcad with artlllary aa targets of opportunity«

6. (s) Reoulrsacnts for Additional Countaraortar Radar Satt.

a. In Section I, paragraph B4 of tha prarloaa Operational Report, tha effective use of aortara ay the VC and the limitation on effectiveness of the AN/MPQ-4A due to ita narrow aaotor of scan ware cited. Information was alec furnished on a plan to provide adequate oountexmor- tar radar coverage by utilising three aeta at each oritioal location auch t'.n airfield, hat''. 1vipe and logistical complexes. Thirty-seven counter- aoriar radar detachcunta ware required to implement this program» and this requirement waa included In tha Ü3ABY troop Program«

... ii November \Jic9 dua to an action imposing a iixiop oeili.4 io£ «.leu*«*, tha Departmsnt of the Army daletad thaaa det&uhmenta from tht* Troop Program« They can be reinstated In tha pro« gram only if space* can ba obtained by deleting other requirements»

c. A recent study has bean mada of mortar attacks on base cawps where tfci Ali/toPQ-4A waa operational. In a total of 15 euch attacks» the u»±iiu A ditions ware located aad effective suppreaeive fire delivered in b instances, la tha other 5 attacks» either tha at- tack ended before the set waa properly vectored, or a decision waa made to fire a preplanned artillery countermortar program which completely saturated the radar onope, preventing further search.

d. Tha need for the countermortar radar detachments which vere formerly in the ?x<oop Program still exists. It doss not appear proper to recommend the trade-off of essential artillery battalions to pro» vide the spaces for these detachments. If tha current review of the ovet* all force structure should develop additional spaces, a high priority should be given to reinstating the required ft countermortar radar detachments into the troop Program. A total of 333 personnel are required for these detachneulu«

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

7. (c) Aggjgtgsg isJSEL*

Siace boooming operational la Hfl almost a yesr ago, this ]

headquarters has maintained a continuing program designed to aaaiat tha Army of Viatnaa la Improving tha enployment of it« artillery. Durlag j thla raporting pariod several project« hare bean completed la furtner- aaoe of tale program:

(

a. One of tha «ore success*ul projects has been coordi- nating the use of artillery fixe to support isolated outposts normally aaaned by Rofioaal Jbrce/Popular Force (HF/PF) personnel« Assistance «ma proTlded by this headquarters at a number of outposts during this reporting period:

(1) Officere from this headquarters conducted classes , oa observed fix« procedures for 42 HF/iF personnel repre^aitlag various outpoeta in LOOT KHAIH during the pariod 4-6 December»

(2) Pro» 8-12 January representatives of this head« quarters provided instruction to HF/PF personnel naming outposts la three separate sab-sectors of LOK AB Province*

(3) Bventually this instruction will be offered throughout the sub-sectors la each of the provinces la III CffZ sad will aeaaurably increase the effectiveness of these outposts*

b. Section I, paragraph 5b(3) of the last Operational Report discussed II FPORCE? Artillery's assistance prograa la relation i to the Capital Military Diatrict (CUD). The following additional assistance «as provided the GMD during this period: i

(1) Position area survey for most permanent AHHf artillery positions within the CM) was completed by US survey teams from the 23d Artillery Group* Survey control was also established at an alternate position for the oountermortsr radar located at fAl SOU «HOT.'

(2) At the request of the Senior Advisor, CMDf sad the Provost Marshal. TAI 301 MOT Air Bass, instruction was girm la observed firs procedures to Air Polios manning the watch towers at the Air Base*

(3) On six separate occasions units of II HORCHT Artillery ware deployed la the CMD to support ground operations sad the defense of key installations.

o* This headquarters has consistently urged ACT! units to avail themselves of US artillery support* One of ths most sffsctive

10

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET )1wstsmoso of «ach support occurred «hen a light «A aodlua battery

deployed during the period 3 Paoaator - 12 January to - - «—■ All 1AM 81 la fee m of ID flat «d TO XUf providing oeearity for a rlee harv+eting operation«

do Paragraph 3o(3)(d) of the last report deeorlbed the WI assignment of «i offio«r to CMD to met ee m Artillery idvioor «til such time oo a psrmmnsat position could bo authorised, During this im- porting period, thlo headquarters continued to provide aa officer la tale empecity until 10 December «hen a permanent pooitloa «aa «etherised mad filled by tour.

o. Ihla hesdouarters ooatlaaoo to laoorporoU AHi quest« into Ito Hkl program. Am en example, during thin period f Ire woo dellTered on the number of targets shown at the request of CM) aid Rung Sot apodal Zone (BSSZ)t

DECWIEB JAHTttBT

CMD 14 6? 83

R3SZ 198 109 161

f. t jn lev vial to to ARVH Division and Corps hoadquartora war* p.ii« \. cj.^iri.Tti and staff officers of thlo hoadquartora to keep tttafceni. 'if ••?-., its>L:e»-if. of ARVH artillery, problems encountered and to

' * 4-:- - :Lx'£A£2£i £ 2J nterdiction (Hfcl) Program»

♦i i uiudy of VC activity In the areas «here heavy art 11- ..Utiunol confirmed the effectiveness of the Ufcl

ti'U»try «as stationed In a new area, an analysis was , j Uiculavly troll use, new fortifications9 radio ti at- is" visual reconnaissance sightings«

'•<d be™ in position for a comparatively short ., , .tic Harassment and Interdiction Program, YC

,t*r ,w- capability of the weapons deere&oed, and in- ■::*c«iß just outside of mart sum range.

i ai.tition to providing evidence of the effeetive- i i ..JWJ ii*T program, these studies «ore used for other

■i.i i- fcibrc-tosly useful In planning for the deployment in-ry units. For Immediate tactical uss, «hen suffi-

^ available to indicate considsrable VC activity in a nev area, aitiller.-; «as temporarily displaced to positions «here these new areas cou'a i.e attacked with Hfcl fires«

11

1;;; J, ■ . rr..^., , f 1 :«.

1^.'*. 1 . • \J 4 i «•,'..'• • X*! . .

if.r .- tifc,, ' * * activilw /i.uhi.i creaa^ «S •. *•' "•

nes cf a • a- purpvu.fce. Ik«jf of incww? Aj ai't

cient d*;''< «A« |

SECRET

SECRET o» Boring this reporting period, UM system of planing

the major portion of tho daily »I Program on too areas of greateet VC if activity MM continued. While tbio method dooo not place fin OB oll areas of possible fC activity, it dooo exploit tho fall velum of avail- oolo intelligence by placing sore firoo on areas in which it io ooot probablo tho VC will bo operating*

d. While it io ofton difficult to accurately aooooo tho total casualtiee inflicted by »I firing, thora io little doubt of ito overall effectiveness. Prisoners of War and personnel voluntarily re- turning to gOYernnent control (Chieu Hoi'a) frequently cite unexpected artillery fire and air otrikoa ao what they fear ooot« The following two instance! of eaaualtleo inflicted by Hal firoo indicate how devas- tating euch fires nay bos

(1) On 7 January 1967, Capital Military District (CMD) requested that II FPORCEV Arty include a part of tho PIMBAPFLB Plantation, vicinity XS 6369, in our Harassing sad Interdiction Pro- gran for that night. Mine suspect areas (bunkers, base camp, tunnel entrances) were selected and eighteen rounds of 175*» were fired by Btry A, 2d En, 32* Arty. A VC who was captured 250900H Jan 67 vicinity XS 720046 revealed that 60 nonbsrs of his oonpany (4th Co, 6th Bn, 163 legt) were Jcillsd on 7 Jon 67 vicinity XS 630908 by artillsry fire.

(2) On 26 January 1967, tho 3d Bn, 34th Arty conducted an AI progran vicinity XS 3447* On 3 February 1967, an AHVa* element at MilG TUOHG reported that a wounded VC PW led AHVI elenente to the bodies of 30 VC vicinity XS 343476. The PW stated that the VC were at a nesting in a hut on 26 January 1967 when artillery fell on then.

9. (C) Programs to Increase the Accuracy of Artillery.

II FPORCEV Artillsry programs to increase tho accuracy of artillery discussed in Section I, paragraph B7 of tho previous Operational Report continued during this period. These prograna continued to be concerned primarily with meteorology, survey and calibration.

m. frtllfrory ymJUstio ffotoorolog (Mgfro).

A comparative metro analysis among the bass camps mt CtJ CHI, TAT KUH, 00 BAU HA and BAU TIBTG was conducted during this period to determine the need for metro stations at all these locations. Data provided by the stations at CO CHI and TAY NHH proved to be in- conpstiblsf however, data provided at GO BAU HA and BAU TIKVG were compatible. Therefore, it was decided to maintain stations at TAT

12

i

i

SECRET

CONFOBiflAl

im9 mil turn snd Gü cei.

£ b.. Calibration of Artillery Hg—.

During this reporting parted 196 of 426 OB and 24 of 136 ARVI artillery pieces «no calibrated. The inoreased toss* of oon- bat operations has created A need for »ore frequent onllbratlon of artillery places,

o.

During this reporting period considerable farther progress has boon aido in the program of extending artillery oontrol 1A the Corps area. She sap at Inolosnro 3 illustrates the survey oontrol now established in XXI CfZ. ftir*-ordcr oontrol bee bow established at BBAB CAT, XDAI UK", sad LOWJ (HAD by the 66th Eagr Oo (topo) (Dorps), third sad fourth nact control has been established la FHÜOC TOT Sector by 1 Australian Unli Faroe (1 ATT) at VW W, BA HA, TO» «AD sad 99C «ABE sad edditi survey control points (SCP) hare boon estr ülshsd at in- temediat* .U«? b*tv~an these locations in the coarse of the traverses« lburth-ord<~ r^tral h.13 ba<s« eotablished by 8th TAB/?5th Arty at FHTOC ▼HE, BBfli -*m m.bilOf TAB AI, QUAI LOI9 BO» «JAB, BAM ?Alf 00 BAU HA. DAD TIBWJ, ?-3i KM), V0 DAT, TAHH LHH9 PuTO» LAM, MBB QQAB, ftJC TOWO. GURAY» TA" «IT», THAI 31, SUOI DA, BAO «AIt BAD DQit UM BOB and TRIWG LAP. Additional fourth-order oontrol has boon established at OX Al by the lr<- Tnf^try Division Artillery and at TRUBG UP by the 2$th Infantry Biv talon »rtlUory^ Survey oontrol is now available at all bass oasps; iUus, the first objective of .placing all heavy artillery batteries en n common grid has been acoonplished. US/TWItt* nedlue end light srtillary pt*sllluind at say of the locations to which survey oontrol has b<~~" av*. p*»* may fire on the sane grid* «Survey oontrol has been extend** to the near vicinity of 14 nediua and 54 lie** AJCTi artillery platoon*. A plan has been developed and coordinated whereby the AHTO artillery battalions will revitalise their fifth-order survey capability snd ti« their platoons into the grid* Srtension of oontrol to the near vicinity of four nediun snd 26 light ASH srtillery platoons Should be aocospllsbad by .Tuns 1967« A continuing goal is to saturate the corps sone with survey control points which would be readily available to units on operation.

10. (c) Application of Pfaotograsnstry to Survey»

a« Mm stated in Section I, paragraph 9o above» there has been considerable progress in establishing artillery survey oontrol to

15

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

earn» position ama. The major surrey problem areas remain a lack of ot ntrol points both for position areas on operations snd target srsn control. Obstacle« to satisfying these requlremsnts ere the inadequacy of food storting control, look of good ground observation, frequent die- plsoensnts, snd the necessity of utilising lazge forces to provide security for survey operations*

b. Ins USARV engineer has propossd a tost be node of the feasibility of using the photogrnanstrio proosss to provide the necee- ssry basic control. In essence, this proosss involves using recent re- oonnaisssnes photography, oonparing it to the very accurate asp photography of the sane area, and selecting points union ars identifiable both on the reconnaissance photos snd on the ground for which coordinates can be furnished» The engineers belisvs they can furnish the coordinates to these points to approxinatsly fourth-order accuracy, and not less than fifth-order accuracy» It is evident that if a large density of such points can be made available in a planned area of operations that th« artillery survey problen can be greatly reduced. Using selected points near position areas, the position area survey can be oom- pleted by a abort traverse« Other identifiable points can bs used for registration points.

o« The test of this concept will be nade in February 1967* Reconnaissance photography of a planned area of operation has been obtained, control points selected, and the engineers have furnished photograanstrioally computed coordinates of these points. Prior to the actual operation, fie ^curacy of sons oi toese points will be verified by conventional survey methods, snd registrations snd transfers «ill be fired* If Misse preliminary tests prove successful, the entire concept «ill be fully tested on a major operation«

11. (C) Safeguarding aircraft from Friandly Artillery firms.

a« Section X, paragraph 9d of t*e previous Operational Report presentsd a discussion of a propossd II IfQBGE? regulation eon- esrnlng the protection of aircraft from friendly artillery fires» Äs proposed regulation van published on 18 lovsmber 1966 aa II J10BCET Regulation 389-2, subjscti ^sfsguerding Aircraft from Artillery Piree", a oopy of which is attached at Inolosurs 4» Basically, the regulation serves to replace the old air oorridor system with a network of Artil- lery Waning Control Centers (AVCC) which broadcast advisories on artillery fires to aircraft upon request« Chsngs 1 to this regulation was published in Decsnber snd clarifies certain rssponsibilitiss of the AVCC9o« A oopy of ths change is also at Inolosurs 4*

CONHDEhmAl

CONFIDENTIAL

h. Following an announoonsnt by the Federal Aviation Agency In early January that there would be a large volume of aircraft flying daily In an air corridor between a control toner located in XÖAH LOG and the BIEH HOA and TAN SON HHUT Air Bases, thia headquartere conducted a etudy to determine whether additional neaauree were neeeeaary to protect theae aircraft fron friendly artillery* Aa a reeult of the study, 'the following propoaala were published on 30 January aa Change 2 to II ySWCHt Regulation 385-2, (Inoloeure 4>

(1) The BIBtf HOA air corridor will be extended east- ward to u distant of ten nautical alle a* Artillery unite firing into thia corridor will clear with BOW? IAI Sensitive Area AVCG which in turn will coordinate with Air Traffic Control at BX» HOA Air Base.

(2) Additional air oorridora with a width of four nautical ailee will be established between XL7AN IOC and the end of the BIER HOA air ©on idor and between the end of the BIEH HOA air corridor and the boundary of *he Capital Military District. All artillery firea in theae oorridora which reach an altitude of 7?000 feet or higher muet be reported to Taris Control at ?AV SON NHUT. Paria Control la charged with further oooidi,*; t.on to iiisur* t\ proper notification ia broadcast.

12. (c) i'g'Klline of Artillery Weapons*

Tha following chart depiota the average daily deadline rates for the various artillery weapons of II FFORCEV Artillery during thia reporting period:

WEAPON NOVEMBER DEcaoai JANUARY

M107 (175BU SP) # loji 7*

M10? O^am SP) 18^ % *

M110 (8» SP) 195* # #

H114A1 055*» T) .- % 10*

a. Th* deadline t»te for the 11107 ia considered to be within tolerable limits« During December several weapons were dead- lined for short periods due to numerous traversing and elevating final drive fairjKea*

b. Th* nigh uriadliKe rate for the M109 howitser in the month of Hove»v^r is attributed to one battery which returned to OPC'QN II 19ÜBCBY Artillery dtesr a A day attachment to a major maneuver unit.

if

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

During those 51 da;ys the battery tired over 12,000 rounda, .wed over ;oo milea and displaced 16 times ill the last 17 daya or ita attaehllent.

e. The daily deadline rate tor the M110 duri.Dg thia reporting period remained at about 1 .1 weapons per dq. DuriDg BoYeaber n l"FFRCEV Artillery had eight weapons vhile in Deoeaber and January 6ixteen veapona were eansidered. The higher rate in Novellber ia therefore attributable to a lover density.

d. The II FFORCEV Artillery's first 155ma towed battalion became operational on 27 Deceaber. Therefore the deadline rate ~or the M114A1. for that JaOnth represents only a tour d~ period. The h14:~ deadline rate far January vas caused by spindle and spindle plug failures, recoil seals 8.IId firing jaeka. These veapooa were issued to this ~ttalion directly trom depot atter an extended period ot storage. It is possible that this storage led to the high deadline rate. Repair parts ~or the M114A 1 ware rapidly obtained, boveve:t:, and the deadline problem an the weapon proved to be only a temporai'y one.

i3. (c) Communieationa.

,,

e.. The II HURCEV Artillery CoiiiiDUDioationa Section continued ita mission of supplying units with required VHP, ·:!M aDd lM co• JRUDioationa. VHF coutinues to be the moat important oollllUJlioaticma liwt between this and subordinate units aa well aa to ARVH headquarters located in III CTZ. This ooarie of c:>mmunication baa proven to be the 110st depend&.ble Hhtll in~. tL~: · ccmmnal:::;il. ion 1:; required. All C(ilDYillini.:lition ie utilized for the trans:nis~ion of IDOst clasr:·Jitied inforaation betveen this headquarters and the 23d and 54th Artillery Groups. PM communication is ua~ pri~~&rily aa back-up since VHF haa proven to be highly reliable.

b. Communications security and eoonom;y of oola'Uil!eations resouroea were stressed during this period. To economize on oo•unieations resources, electrical transmieaiona were held to the •il!SWWI during the period and brevity ot uaeftgea wae stressed.

o. Direct maintenanoe support for the AB/GRC-46 radio equiJDtWlt i.mproTed conaidel.'ably during tb~,a reporting period. The deadline rate had been averagiDg betveen 305' end 3~ vaekl7. Reomtly thia deadline rate haa Bhovn a gradual iaprovelleDt. .A.s this reportinc period closes, the deadline rate is approxia&tely 1~, ~•.~~..cesenti.Dg the lowest deadline rate achieved at this head.qu&rtera 1n the past eight .ontha.

d. During this report!.DB period, approxiMtely thr&e thoumand doO\liHnts (SECRE'l', CONJ'IDEBTIAL, JOR OPPICIAL USE ORY and

16

CONFIDENTIAL

CQNFttÄNTIAl

u¥OASSIFIH>) were processed by this hnadquartare1 Message Center. This repreeentc an increase of 2% over the number of meeeagee processed during the preceding three month period. The increase is attributed primarily to the addition of ecveral now mit« to H F1DRCKV Artillery and to tho increased tonpo of combat operation» •

Section XI, Part 1 - Obeervation/Lceeons Learned.

Meteorological Supplies

Itemi Supply of apare parti and expendables for meteorological sections,

Discuoaloni the »apply situation in the area of artillery meteorologl- oal equipment ia now very good in the ZU Corps area« However» it hae required the eupply ayaten fron 60 to 90 days to catch up to the need» of the Inoreaaing number of neteorological aeotiona deployed in the Corpa Zone« In tho interim period a alight ahortage of both electronic repair pert» and expendables waa experienced« Items such aa drive no- tore, ecaaner part», aolayna and drive belts were noat difficult to obtain.

Obeorvatlont Meteorological sections deploying to RVH should Insure that the section1 e authorised stockage of apare parts ia complete before de- parting OOVUS. The authoriiad atockage ia normally sufficient to carry the section through the 60-90 day period required by the supply system to oat oh up to the section's needs.

FM Frequenciee

Itemi Availability of FM ftequenciee within Hie III Corpa Tactical Zone.

Discussion; Almost all Hi frequencies are Issued on a shared basis within the III Corpa Tactical Zone. This is due to the shortsge of FM frequencies available to the US in this zone. As many aa seven or eight units' sometimes share the same frequency resulting in a great deal of interference. By thorough coordination it ia often possible to reduce the problem by trading assigned frequencies with units operating outside transmitting range. Oocaaionally unite can reduce interference by using alternate frequencies. In oaaea where sharing of frequencies cannot be avoided, atriot radio discipline is essential.

Leeaon Learnedt By trading assigned frequencies and using assigned alternate frequenoieo, the snarl wg of FM-frequencies by several unite can be minimised. In oaaea where anaring of frequencies cannot be avoided, in- . terferenoe can be held within acceptable limits by practicing strict radio discipline.

17

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET Section n9 Paart 2 - ReocmmaniUtlone«

A« (A) fcT-8 Installation Kita«

Installation kits for the KY«8 »crabbier devioe designed for use with the ANARC-12 radio hare not been issusd to this or subordinate artillery unite« Requisition« have been eubnitted and validated but there are no installation kite in-country« The uae of the KM would greatly increase the apeed with which targeting data oould be proceaaed since information up to and including SBCRBF could be transmitted utilising IM oommunlcetiona«

>o

That the installation kite for the Cf-8 scraabler device be aade available to unite in Vietnam aa a natter of priority«

B« (S) Countemortar Radar Seta«

In Section I, paragraph 6, the need for 37 countemortar radar detaohaenta was explained« These detachments were previously approved and included in the U8ABRT Troop Program« but have recently been deleted because of the troop ceiling imposed on military personnel in SVI« A total of 333 personnel are required for these detaehaenta«

RBCOmEgDATIOHi

That if the current review of the overall force structure should develop additional specss, a high priority should be given to reinstating the required 37 oountermortar radar detachments into the troop program«

C« (S) Aircraft for Artllliuy Units*

In Section I» paragraph 4» the critical need for additional aircraft for II IfCRCaT Artillery was cited. The full potential of the artillery in III CTZ will not be realised until adequate aircraft support is provided«

That, aa a matter of high priority, all reasonable efforts be made to provide II nüRCSY Artillery with aircraft on the following basis:

(1) force Artillery Headquarteras Jour UH-11 a, three 0-1'e.

18

SECRET

SECRET

ußS Ü-6. (2) 6x019 Headquarters! Three 0-1 «a, two OB-13's «id

(3) Artillery Bettalioni TMO 0-1'a and one CH-1}.

D. (U) Schooling of lowly - Commissioned Offloors.

In Section II, Faxt 2f Paragraph A of the last Operation«! Report it was reooanended that all newly-commissioned officer», with the exception of OCS graduates, attend a basic field artillery course prior to assignment to field artillery units* This recommendation la reiterated and la considered sore Important in view of new field artillery techniquee being devised in Vietnam. In addition to aehooling in artillery procedure« coamon to conventional warfare, it la important that techniquee peculiar to counterguerrilla warfare be taught.

That procedures unique to or habitually practiced in Vietnam be stressed in the Artillery Officers Basic Course, la particular« the method of employment of the 64OO mil firi** chert and all attendant FDC/'*3 pn- ceduree should be preeented aa the usual situation in gunnery courses.

K. (U) 155cm Howitzer firing P»dftatalg.

In Vietnam a 64OO mil capability must be maintained by the artillery at all times. Due to the weight of the 153mm towed howitzer, problems hare sometimes been experienced in meeting timely support requirements« Moat 135am towed unite have devised a firing pedestal which pernits sapid shifting of the piece in any direction and hence maken sanier the task of dellYexiirf? tisWK- fire. A firing rudestpi dewlw» was depicted in the January 1967 issue of Artillery Trends. The use of the firing pedestal has increased the overall effectiveness of the 155mm towed units significantly.

HEOOMWaPATIOI:

That a type firing pedestal for the 155mm howitzer be devised and issued to all 155mm howitzer battalions before deployment from C0MÜS to RVN. unit* should be permitted sufficient time to train adequately on using the device.

?• (U) Maintenance of Distance Measuring Equipment MC-8.

The electronic distance Measuring Equipment (DME) R:-8 is authorised for issue en the ba9is of six instruments per headquarters

19

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED and headquarters battery of the division artillerice and UM target acquisition battalion (TAB). Only alnlaua operator maintenance is authorised fox thm lnstruauats. Instruments with serious deflclen- oles must be taanM 1B for repair to direct support maintenance facui- ties. It hu boon found that In-country dlxoet support and dopot sain- tonanoo faoUitloa do not have tho capability to repair tho mora aorioua falluroa that aay occur la thin equipment. Tho alternative 1B tho paat haa boon evacuation out of country to Okinawa or CORDS, but tho loot tlae iBtolTad haa ▼ariod from three to eleven nontha until tho equip- aent is returned. It haa also been found that the telluroBster, a aiailar typo of electronic DMB issued to a TAB unit 1B lieu of four MC-8's, appears to bo aore rugged and less prone to serious failures«

In order to solve this problem the following steps should be taken:

1« The direct support and depot aalntenance facilities in country should be expanded to include the capability for repair of electronic 2MB in terse of trained personnel, adequate repair parts tad test equip- Bent*

2. ▲ float should be established that would permit iSBsdiate ex- change of defective instruments* In the interim, a rapid method of evaouatiun should bo established directly to the factory or maintenance facility in OQMUS that haa the capability to repair those instruaenta in a timely Banner«

3« Consideration should bo given to replacement of tho MC-8 with the telluroBeter am a temporary solution.

G. (V) leed for Heliotrope.

The heliotrope is a airror device used by topographic engineer companies with a third-order accuracy capability to observe angular Mea- surements over long distances by reflecting brilliant flashes of sun- light from a distant station. The common experience of artillery fourth- order survey units in III CTZ to date has been to Bake observations in excess of fifteen kiloaetera, the limit of the optical power of their organic angle-measuring T2 Theodolites when sighting na a distant station aarked by a tripod-supported colored panel. Artillery survey units are not authorised the heliotrope In their TOB. However, field expe- dient heliotropes have been fabricated from 9*7 inch shaving airrors with great effectiveness. Anglo Bssaureaenta have been aade over distances up to seventy kUoasters by this Beans.

20

UNCLASSIFIED

*3 CONHOENTlAl

Tho heliotrop! should bo an it«« of issue to artillery survey units la Vietnam on tho bull of thro* instruments per survey section.

H. (u) SurvsorinsT Towers*

In a groat portion of III CTZ tho terrain la flat and linos of sight ere interrupted by dense tropical vegetation. Neither fourth- order artillery survey units nor tho third-order topographic «rtf~t™» company are authorised tho Tower Erection Set, Topographic, a survey- ing tower one hundred three foot high which would oonsidorsbly enhance their capability to extend survey control in delta and plain terrain.

Tho Tower Ärection Sot9 Topographic should bo issued to artillery survey sections of division artillery and target acquisition battalion headquarter« batteries and to tho topographic engineer company on the basis of throe towers per section.

I. (C) Limitations of the K42 rwin 40—»

Tho terrain in III GTZ and the techniques of maneuver employed in Vietnam create a uniquely limiting environment for the utilization of the M42. Because of tho heavy jungle canopy and undergrowth in many parts of in CTZ9 not only tho movement but the firing capability of the H42 is seriously impaired. Since tho round employed 1-. ptJr.l dctsiwtlüifc« it cannot bo fired through foliage doss to tho gun without extreme czew safety hazard, and cannot have substantial effect on any target screened by foliage. When clear fields of fire are available, supported tactical commanders are sometimes reluctant to allow the M42 to fire because th* convergent schemes of maneuver habitually practiced in Vietnam, couple! with the flat trajectory and long range of tho M42, will often place friendly troops in tho field of fire.

HBCOtMEBDiTIOgi

That a 40am round be developed for tu a «442 »'hi oh is capable of penetrating dense foliage* In tho absence of development of such a round, serious consideration must bo given to the limitations of the M42 prior to further deployment of the weapon in Vietnam*

n

CONFIDENTIAL

I

*

Hi o LÜ CO

9

S 9

$

6 9

s

!

1 O

5

00

s <D

! 5 §

CO

*•

s

tr\\0

e BI

%

r .00

JO

s

%

do

f

el

S I

f I

el

«I

&

m

s

I

s CM

CM

5

f s CM

o _

es

O

P

CM

S o

l" ESE^r

1

cv

e

4»

CM

m

& 4*

3 a

1.

Sei

t or o LÜ (f)

4

H. I *5

Its

SO

St

I s

»

et

e B

I

i a

s

si A S>

I

fi

3

el

f s

m

•9

c CO

5 a»

I

3

k

t !

I 1

I •

i

!

1

I 1

i I i

I ft

I i

I 1

I I

a 9

ft

?*»

1

I

el

i*

23

tu Cd O ÜJ

O

9

I O

5 M

S

a

5 g

CO

f 5 IT»

0« CO

I

I •»» in

fr as

%

i

e o _

? 00

If "l

*

I Ä CM

Mi

I CM

t CM

s CM

f

I

s *

5 KP

HO O

• m

f 5 CM

I *1

af

>»

MD 10

«I

« CO

co

1 >>

XX

CM <^x

es

\ß.

>fe

♦Jt- CQ^>

9"

CO

CO

vO

2

f 4»

frl St

m Z n <o

£

tj O üJ

g

**• CO

it

s^ '4)

r- ►; A 9 5 A »•-•* e- . t- t~ H 'Vk >. 5 ^. s •> ^ • s r» i

•H * CD u> ^ CO SS <.. ♦»

N«* «w* CM O.

>-• 3 .> C >» >t o >» m

l< * 4* 4» * i •r\

5t •

."3 u •<

! C8»

js. 4 et 3. * *

•> X •k

0.1 (2^3 ft. & A ^ • e A r-

*•• ■"" *" — A •■ s #-% ,^ ä a 1 I i*- e*- «» H

1 f ■ 1

tu *"* 4» A s •*•

lA

a: o CM

t 3

A

CM

•» A-*

'i Lü \ »J

C/) '1 i? •

i j A

A •"

«^ r^t <^^ ••% S3 1 1

>>

1 e- «n •■ e— 'S-* A

4» ^ >» c if\ so 4» <0 J* > s %—*

CM 3 >% 55 s

>»

4»

n 41

& CM 5 A

9

n i

1

CJ»

it &

i •

■k

$ A

£1 »tos

A r

M 3 1 a

9 H 8 to s 3

a

**

o Lü

sä

*r

\ i i

oioocf mo ooo «MA IX MlJV CHHISSV1DM

fiyASlMI «VIA C IV OaOVtfONMOfl

«: =$35Ä

11 FFORCEV Keg JtfS-Z

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam

APO San Francisco 96266

CHANGE 2 >0 January VJ&f REGULATION NUMBER 385-2

SAFETY

SAFEGUARDING AIRCRAFT FROM AR ULLKR Y FlftES

Regulation Number 385-2. this headquarter«, dated 18 November 19£o, is changed as follows: * * * *

5. PROCEDURES:

a. Artillery.

(5) (Added) To further protect aircraft in the B1EN HOA and TAN SON NHUT areas from friendly artillery fire, the following air corridor is hereby established:

Leg 1:

(a) Coordinates: The area bounded by XT880150. XT880110, YT100150, YT100110, YT200167, and YT200093.

(b) Restriction: DONG NAI Sensitive Area AWCC will coordinate all artillery fire within leg 1 of the air corridor with Air Traffic Control, BIEN HOA Air Base. Artillery units desiring to fire into, through, or out of leg 1 at any maximum ordinate will first obtain clear- ance to fire from the DONG NAI Sensitive Area AWCC.

Leg 2:

(a) Coordinates: The area bounded by YT200167, YT200093, YT460167, and YT460093.

(b) Restriction: Artillery fire is not restricted in leg 2 of the air corridor when the maximum ordinate of the trajectory

2t ^ ?CG NO. ..^iLfZaS rid 4 CBWH* Sr"'f

xt

Ch ?, Heg No 3tfV2, II FTORCEV AFO San Franzi ceo 06?f/>, dtd 30 Jan (ft iCont)

18 below *even thoismH (7000) lent, AM artillery hred :rHo, *htoi«#;h. or out ot leg 4!, w#»S a maximum ordinate of seven I hem nan*! '?#W>G) iv.t.l or above within the corridor will be reported to Pa» is Control 'IAN .SON NHU'I Air Bast* by the lastest means available prior *o !ir;ne «j.sing f.*.e prescribed forma?, ir para 6k, below.

3f

Leg *:

(a) Coordinates: TV «re*, bounded on '.he noufhweini by the CMD boundary and on the northwest, nor'.hi'a»!. avJ -ovlheas' ' y a line joining XT«rf7C4S, YT108109, YT27?09 ar I YT'V ?:'C'2

'l. Re strict ion: Same as leg '

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL. JAMES H DYSON Colonel, CS Chief of Sraif

Colonel, AGC Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: 6 - COMUSMACV

15 - CG, 7th Air Force 10 - CG, USARV 15 - CG, I FFORCEV 25 - CG, 1st Inf Div 25 - CG, 9th Inf Div 25 - CG, 25th Inf Div 35 - CG, 1st Avn Bde 15 - CG, 173d Abn Bde

6 - Crhdr, 1 ATF 25 - CO, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div 25 - CO, 12th Avn Gp 15 - CO, 23d Arty Gp

»1

s Hi ,', Hop No Jft-P, II FFORCKV ATO l*n Pmnclsoo '.*.-*>>, rif.d jo Jo. ,, .'.,»«)

|H CO Shh Ativ Gj> I* CO, Ulli ACH .!»» • IIKA. Ill (nips

•> .SA, IV Corps / CO, M<| SiK lin

CO, tlSlh Air Conimandn Wing CO, USlh Air Trailic Company

10 CO. M «i CO, u

II Fl OK i"

CKV

> G?. 1 Ct« > (M ) CIS » AG I Kngr

1 Sig y Surg

•4 Avn f)» .0 Any

t Hi ov

JO

U FFORCEV Reg 385-2 C-l

4*1 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY i&& /£cPTCt**p ' Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam


CHANGE 1 REGULATION NUMBER 385-2 19 December 1966

SAFETY

SAFEGUARDING AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRES

Regulation Number 385-2, this headquarters, dated 18 November 1966, is changed as follows:

5. PROCEDURES

a. Artillery.

(4) (Added) Fires originating in an AWCC area of responsibility which pass through or impact in another AWCC area of responsibility will'be broadcast by all Artillery Warning Control Centers concerned. It is the responsibility of the AWCC in whose area the fires originate to provide advisories to those Artillery Warning Control Centers affected so that they may include the information in their advisories to aircraft. Artil- lery information will be passed in accordance with the format shown in para 5a(1), above.

6. RESPONSIBILITIES:

j. (Deleted)

Inclosure 1, II FFORCEV Reg 385-2 (Change): Extend the western boundary of the XUAN LOC AWCC area of responsibility further west to a line between YT3209 and YS3276.

31

3*

Change 1 Reg No 385-2, HQ, U FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266, (Cont)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL: JAMES H. DYSON Colonel, GS Chief of Staff

Colonel, AGC Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: 6 - COMUSMACV

15 ~ CG, 7th Air Force 10 - CG, USARV 15 - CG, I FFORCEV 25N- CG, lstlnf Div 25 - CG, 25th Inf Div 35 - CG, 1st Avn Bde 15 - CG, 173d Abn Bde

6 - Cmdr, 1 ATF 25 ~ CO, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div 25 - CO, 12th Avn Gp 15 - CO, 23d Arty Gp 15 ~ CO, 54th Arty Gp 15 - CO, 11th ACR 25 - DSA, HI Corps

5 - SA, IV Corps 2 - CO, 53d Sig Bn

10 - CO, 315th Air Commando Wing 5 - CO, 125th Air Traffic Company

H FFORCEV 1 - SCk> 2 - Engr 2 - G2 2 -Sig 6 - G3 2 - Surg 2 - G4 4 - Avn Det (Prov) 2 - G5 30 - Arty 3 - A(

•

^ U FFORCEV Reg No 385-2

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam


REGULATION 18 November 1966 NUMBER 385-2«

SAFETY

SAFEGUARDING AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRES

1. REFERENCE:

a. Secret message, HQUSMACV, 03604, 040859Z Feb 66, subject: Safeguarding Aircraft from Heavy Artillery Fires (U).

b. Unclassified message, HQUSMACV, 43921, 020638Z Oct 66, subject: Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fire.

2. PURPOSE: This directive establishes procedures to be followed by elements of this command to minimize the hazard to aircraft from friendly artillery in III Corps Tactical Zone.

3. GENERAL:

a. The objective of the procedures prescribed herein is to provide aviators with immediate, accurate information concerning all artillery firing which might endanger aircraft.

b. For purposes of this directive, the term "Artillery" includes mortars.

c. The procedures, frequencies and call signs prescribed by this directive are unclassified.

* This regulation supersedes II FFORCEV Reg 385-2, 23 July 66.

3J

yu

Reg No 385-2, HQ II FFORCEV APO San Francisco 96266, IS Nor 66 (Cont)

4. CONCEPT; This directive establishes Artillery Warning Control Centers (AWCC) which aircraft may contact for current information regard- ing artillery fires. The AWCC are located at frequently visited places in the III Corps Tactical Zone (in CTZ) and maintain dato on artüle. firing of US, ARVN, and FWMAF units. Artillery units will notify the appropriate AWCC of any fires affecting mat agency's area of responsibility using procedures prescribed by this directive.

5. PROCEDURES:

a. Artillery.

(1) Artillery information will be reported to the appropriate AWCC as soon as practicable. Artillery Warning Control Centers established by major subordinate units will serve as sources of US, ARVN, and FWMAF artillery information for specific areas of responsibility (Inclosure 1) and/or areas of operations (AO). Artillery units will report all artillery firings to the appropriate AWCC in the following format:

"CORSAIR CONTROL Artillery firing from vicinity (nearest town) on azimuth (azimuth of fire in degrees) maximum ordinate feet. Range (to nearest mile).,f

The above information will not be passed in the clear to the AWCC in excess of fifteen minutes prior to actual firing.

(2) This procedure will permit the agencies to route aircraft, when necessary, around artillery fires occurring inside the agency's area of responsibility. When a pilot declares an emergency flight condition (i. e. "Med Evac", "May Day", etc.) and requests suspension of fires, the AWCC will direct suspension of those fires interfering with the flight.

(3) To better provide prompt artillery firing advisories and relieve radio traffic congestion at the primary AWCC, commanders, if they desire, may establish AWCC subcenters within the area of responsibility of the primary AWCC. The subcenters will broadcast advisories utilizing the call sign and frequency used by the primary AWCC. Sub- centers will be further identified by the location in which they are established,

(?)Sva>. &£ £****.

L

«H Reg No 385-2, HQ II FFORCEV APO San Francisco 96266, 18 Nov 66 (Cont)

(i. e. Square Lobster, GO DAU HA),

b. Aviation.

(1) The Artillery Warning Control Centers (AWCC) are established for use by aircraft to obtain information of artillery firings in the III CTZ affecting their flight plans. Aircraft operating in the vicinity of any one of the AWCC will contact it on the designated unclassified frequency for current artillery information in accordance with the format shown in paragraph 5a(l), above.

(2) The aviator entering an AWCC area of responsibility will request information of artillery firing and make known his inten- tion to operate in the vicinity of a specific AWCC. Upon receiving the pilot's request, the AWCC will, if necessary, route the pilot around any artillery fires affecting his flight. Should the pilot declare an emergency flight condition, the ground station will, on request, take action to suspend those fires interfering with the flight.

(3) Capital Center will be provided with AWCC call signs and frequencies, and aviators may contact that agency for such information, if necessary.

6. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. The 1st US Infantry Division will establish Artillery Warn- ing Control Centers at FHU LOI, PHUOC VINH, and LAI KHE. The AWCC will establish communications with US and FWMAF artillery and will coordinate with ARVN artillery in order to provide as much artillery firing information as possible within their areas of responsibility. The areas of responsibility, frequencies, and call signs for the 1st US Infantry Division1 s AWCC are set forth in Inclosure 1.

b. The 3d Brigade, 4th US Infantry Division, will establish an Artillery Warning Control Center at BEAR CAT. The AWCC will establish communications with US and FWMAF artillery and will coordinate with ARVN artillery in order to provide as much artillery firing information as possible within its area of responsibility. The area of responsibility, frequency, and call sign for the Brigade's AWCC is set forth in Inclosure 1.

»r

Reg No 385-2, HQ II FFORCEV APO San Francisco 96266. 18 NOT 66 (Cont)

c. The 25th US Infantry Division will establish Artillery Warn- ing Control Centers at CU CHI and TAY NINH. The AWCC will establish communications with US and FWMAF artillery and will coordinate with ARVN artillery in order to provide as much artillery firing information as possible within their areas of responsibility. The areas of responsibility, frequencies» and call signs for the 25th US Infantry Division's AWCC are set forth in Inclosure 1.

d. The 1st Australian Task Force will establish an Artillery Warning Control Center in the vicinity of BA RIA. The AWCC will establish communications with US and FWMAF artillery and will coordinate with ARVN artillery in order to provide as much artillery firing information as possible within its area of responsibility, "he area of responsibility, frequency, and call sign for the 1st Aus ..an Task Force's AWCC is set forth in Inclosure 1.

e. The Deputy Senior Advisor, in Corps Tactical Zone, will establish Artillery Warning Control Centers at XUAN LOC, TAN AN, and BIEN HOA (DONG NAI Sensitive Area). The AWCC will establish communications with US, ARVN, and FWMAF artillery and will have information of artillery fires within their areas of responsibility. The areas of responsibility, frequencies, and call signs for XUAN LOC, TAN AN, and the DONG NAI Sensitive Area are set forth in Inclosure 1.

f. Artillery Warning Control Centers will furnish the following information and assistance to pilots upon request or when deemed necessary:

(1) Information concerning artillery fires in the AWCC's area of responsibility.

(2) Suspend fires interfering with any flight declared by the pilot as being flown under an emergency condition.

(3) Inform pilots of the establishment of AWCC sub centers in TAORs and/or AOs to include frequencies and call signs.

(4) In addition, DONG NAI Sensitive Area AWCC will provide artillery firing information to Air Traffic Control, BIEN HOA Air Force Base.

it

# Reg No 385-2. HQ II FFORCEV APO San Francisco 962 S6, 18 NOT 66 (Cont)

g. Each commander assigned an AO for a specific operation will designate an agency or element of his command to receive reports of artillery firings in the AO and provide notification to pilots utilizing the appropriate frequency and call sign of his primary area of artillery warning responsibility.

h. Incoming units assigned a TAOR or AO will establish an AWCC as soon as practicable to provide pertinent information as prescribed by this regulation. New AWCC, all changes in call signs and/ or frequencies, and any other important information pertinent to AWCC will be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: FSCE, by the most ex- peditious means. FSCE, this headquarters, will forward changes to 12th Avn Gp which will publish and forward NOTAMS to all aviation units in III CTZ as well as those agencies which have a "need to know" as deter- mined by the Aviation Officer, II FFORCEV.

i. Subordinate commanders will thoroughly brief their pilots on the provisions set forth in this directive in order to minimize the hazard to aircraft from friendly artillery fires.

ji fTnrnirmninrn nlines TAtTtn nr AO iinnliiiiin 1 1i|lg ssnliln for Air Force Aircraft will be equipped will) TIHF rmPoa in addition to FM or will coordinate wjfb Ihn 1 h lit il An Control Party at such iiii In Ills j\\ insiiil1 Ihiil in hlh iy warnings are available to USAF air-

&*

k. An agency or element of each major unit headquarters will report to the Control and Reporting Center (CRC)(PARIS CONTROL) all preplanned 8" and 175mm fires of artillery units physically located in their TAORs or AOs. II FFORCEV Artillery will report those heavy artillery warnings connected with H&I programs scheduled by this headquarters. The report will include the effective times, locations of firing units, target locations, and maximum ordinates. All agencies will use the 1:250, 000 UTM grid as a standard format when forwarding heavy artillery fire schedules to PARIS CONTROL. Sample format for reporting heavy artillery fires follows:

57

ff Reg No 385-2, HQ II FFORCEV APO San Francisco 96266, 18 Nov 66 (Cont)

"a. Effective 1600 to 1700 Local

b. From XT 1700 to XT1800

c. Maximum ordinate 15,000 Feet"

FSCE this headquarters, will receive from subordinate units and trans- mit heavy artillery warning reports for all targets of an immediate nature when direct communications between the unit and PARIS CONTROL does not exist or are temporarily inoperative. Immediate warnings are those which result from the appearance of unexpected targets, and, as such, cannot be planned in advance. Warnings of this nature may not be transmitted in the clear more than 15 minutes prior to firing.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

j

OFFICIAL: JAMES H. DYSON j Colonel, GS Chief of Staff !

VERNONR. RIDER Colonel, AGC Adjutant General

1 Incl as

DISTRIBUTION:

6 - COMUSMACV 15 - CG, 7th Air Force 10 - CG, USARV 15 - CG, I FFORCEV 25 - CG, 1st Inf Div 25 - CG, 25th Inf Div

IS

** Reg No 385-2, HQ U FFORCEV APO San Francisco 96266, 18 Nov 66 (Cont)

35 - CG, 1st Avn Bde 15 - CG, 173d Abn Bde

6 - Cmdr, 1 ATF 25 - CO, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div 25 - CO, 12th Avn Gp 15 - CO, 23d Arty Gp 15 - CO, 54th Arty Gp 15 - CO, llthACR 25 - DSA, HI Corps

5 - SA, IV Corps 2 - CO, 53d Sig Bn

10 -CO, 315 Air Commando Wing 5 - CO, 125th Air Traffic Company

II FFORCEV 1 - SGS 2 - G2 6 - G3 2 - G4 2 - G5 3 - AG 2 - Engr 2 -Sig 2 - Surg 4 - Avn Det (Prov)

30 - Arty

37

+7

FHBdWNÖ P4X BUNK - WT FIIMSD.

II ??QRC*V 5-332/1-67

SECm ft) ATOBC-H (14 Feb 67) 1st lud SUBJECTS Operational Beport for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Januar/

1967t Btporta Control Symbol CSFQH-65

Si» HQ II Field Ibree Vietnam, AR) San Francisco 96266 7 APR 18"

TOi Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Sept of the Amy, Washington, D.C. 20310

1« The Operational fisport-Lessons Learned for Beriod Aiding 31 Januar/ 1967 submitted b/ U Field Force Vietnam Artillery is comprehensive, well prepared and contains valuable lessons; »any of which are applicable throughout the theater«

2, This headquarters has thoroughly reviewed subject report and concurs with the comments and recommendations contained therein.

FOB THE COM&NDHRs

1 Incl IAMBS A. ULVBB&

Aast. 10

Rcgracled ^CLASSIFIED

Wh.n Separated From Cüf^DüT Classified Incloiui» WLWllL I

*

to - apps.dtic.mil · ojl 0 3 / ^rui 6.7, 1. forwarded as inclosure is operational report - lessons...

Documents