Kenyon Observerthe

April 11, 2012

Should America Promote Democracy Abroad?

Kenyon’s oldest UndergradUate Political and cUltUral Magazine

Exculsive Online Content: kenyonobserver.wordpress.com

Coverage of the Center for American Democracy’s Spring 2012 Conference

Kenyon Observerthe

April 11, 2012

The Kenyon ObserverApril 11, 2012

From the Editors

tess waggoner Should, How, Why, Can? Questions Surrounding This Weekend’s Conference

interview

A Panelist’s ExperienceInterview with Melinda Haring

interview

Bringing Ideas Together Interview with Prof. Tom Karako

jon green

What If We Disagree With the Will of the People? The Paradox of Exporting Democracy in the American Interest

richard pera

American Priorities Where and How Should We Pro-mote Democracy?

james neimeister

A Principled Approach to Democracy PromotionThe Importance of Values

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The Kenyon Observer is a student-run publication that is distributed biweekly on the campus of Kenyon College. The opinions expressed within this publication belong only to the writers and do not necessarily reflect the opin-ions of the Observer staff or that of Kenyon College.

The Kenyon Observer will accept submissions and letters-to-the-editor, but reserves the right to edit for length and clarity. All submissions must be received at least a week prior to publication.

Submit to the Observer at tko@kenyon.edu.

Cover Art Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons Quotes Compiled by Ryan Baker

Editors-in-Chief Jonathan Green and Gabriel Rom

Managing EditorSarah Kahwash

Web EditorAlexander Variano

Featured Contributors James Neimeister, Richard Pera,

Tess Waggoner

Contributors Ryan Baker, Tommy Brown, Jacob Fass, Matt Hershey, Megan Shaw,

Jacob Smith, Yoni Wilkenfield

Layout/Design Wilfred Ahrens

Illustrator Nick Nazmi

Faculty Advisor Pamela K. Jensen

“I’ve never written a political song. Songs can’t save the world.” Bob Dylan

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Dear Prospective Reader,

The Kenyon Observer is pleased to bring you our first themed issue since our revival, which is focused on the Center for the Study of American Democracy’s upcoming conference. In keeping with the spirit of the conference, we posed to our writers the question,“should America promote democracy abroad?”

In this themed issue, Tess Waggoner frames the questions surrounding this weeks proceedings, Jon Green highlights key differences between simple and liberal democracy which make democracy promo-tion and the American interest incongruent, Richard Pera argues that the real question is not if, but how America should promote democracy abroad and James Neimeister states the importance of maintaining our principles if we do intend to export our governmental system elsewhere. We also have the privilege of featuring interviews with Melinda Haring, Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project and partici-pant in this week’s conference, as well as Professor Tom Karako, director of the Center for the Study of American Democracy.

Our goal continues to be the presentation of a publication that disagrees with itself without fighting with itself. If we are successful, the commentary provided here will demonstrate the variety of answers to the question posed by the upcoming CSAD conference. We hope to start a vibrant conversation about American democracy promotion on our pages and look forward to continuing it in the coming days at the CSAD conference.

As always, we invite letters and full-length submissions either in response to content in this issue or on other topics of interest.

Your Editors,

Gabriel Rom and Jonathan GreenEditors-in-Chief, The Kenyon Observer

FROM THE EDITORS

This week, the Center for the Study of American Democracy will hold its bi-annual conference. This year’s topic is sure to raise innumerable compelling questions about America and its role in the world. The conference title itself is structured as a question, “should America promote democracy abroad?” and it is exactly that ques-tion that we should be asking. Before we begin exploring the “hows” of what is labeled democracy promotion (in all its various forms, from military intervention to eco-nomic aid) we must ask if we “should.”

We cannot address ‘‘how’’ honestly until we have ex-plored the inextricably linked “should” and “why” first. These questions are similar and often conflated, but it is important to distinguish between them. The complexity and scope of the “how” question draws us in. Some of us may go into careers that seek to address, and/or actively engage in the possible answers to “how.” Though obvi-ously related, “should” is a different question and it re-quires a different mindset and approach. Asking “should” requires stepping outside the heavily politicized rheto-ric of “exceptionalism” and asking real, hard questions about what America is, what it represents and what its international role can and should be. It requires an ex-amination of intention, one that may be particularly un-comfortable for the general public or idealistic liberal arts students.

To engage the process honestly requires locating one-self in relation to the questions and places you are ex-

amining. Ideally this should occur both internally (“Who am I? What factors comprise my identity relative to oth-ers? In what ways and in what areas do I possess relative power or privilege?”) and against others engaging in the discourse. For example, of the presenters at this week-end’s conference, there will be 19 male presenters and 5 female presenters. The ratio of those with and without European ancestry is similar. How does this compare to the global population: who are themselves the subject of the conference? And what, if anything, does this suggest about the process of democracy promotion relative to those its policies affect? If we are interested in promot-ing democracy, then it should follow that those who are affected by policies are also consulted in the formation of said policies.

After that assessment, the questions we are asking need to be broken down further: What do we mean by promote? What do we mean by democracy? Then, re-garding the question of intention that underpins the “should” question: Are we actually interested in sup-porting democracy or are we interested in advancing our interests? In my experience, possible answers to that question vary depending on who is answering them. On a populist level, Americans would like to envision some mutually beneficial intertwining of the two. But on the ground implementation of these ideals is never quite so neat. The Obama Administration’s virtual silence regard-ing the violent crackdown by Bahraini and Saudi ruling

Should, How, Why, Can?

TESS WAGGONER

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QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THIS WEEKEND’S CONFERENCE

“A single question can be more influential than a thousand statements.” Bo Bennett

classes on non-violent demonstrations in Bahrain has had everything to do with our vision of regional stability and the Fifth Naval fleet in Manama, and very little to do with the violence and ruthlessness being inflicted by the re-gime or the legitimacy of the democratic aspirations of the Bahraini people.

Examples like the uprising in Bahrain complicate mat-ters further. They make it clear that when we ask if, why and how America should promote democracy abroad, the question of “can” arises as well. America is a nation who was founded with this simple but profound Declaration: “When in the Course of human events it becomes neces-sary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God en-title them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.”

How can America’s self-projected image as the shin-ing beacon of freedom and democracy hold water when we selectively support various democratic and non-demo-cratic regimes based on national interest rather than prin-ciple? In the last year, global citizens in places like Egypt and Nigeria, marching peacefully to decry the corruption of their regimes, have been met with “Made in America” tear gas canisters and tanks financed by our Congress. In-cidents like these not only embarrass the United States but damage its credibility. One important lesson that may

emerge from America’s evolving role in the Arab uprisings is one of humility. At least as many people have died from U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan in the last decade as died on September 11. Meanwhile, three to four times that num-ber have died while opposing Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad in the last year. In reconciling ideology and reality, the Obama Administration has, at least internally, been forced to acknowledge that the status quo is untenable. External support of stability over genuine democracy will no longer be acceptable to a region whose people have been harassed, monitored, arrested, beaten, tortured and killed in the name of self-rule. I believe America should construct a foreign policy that respects the autonomy, self-determination and agency of all peoples, as well as the governments that serve them secondarily. Does what is called “democracy promotion” actually achieve this?

The questions of can, how, should and why America promotes democracy abroad are not simple. Balancing the nuances and pressures of individual conflicts, while maintaining a moral standard that upholds the value and dignity of all people is a daunting task. This weekend presents an incredible opportunity for Kenyon students to unpack and re-examine the processes, structures and policies that shape international politics and their relation to them. The theoretical and tangible implications of the construction of American exceptionalism, the idealist-versus-realist debate and America’s historical legacy are vast, and speak to a personal and collective representation of what America is and can be.

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TKO

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“What shapes our lives are the questions we ask, refuse to ask, or never think to ask.” Sam Keen

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“Timid men prefer the calm of despotism to the tempestuous sea of liberty. ” Jefferson

Leading up to her participation in this week’s conference, Melinda Haring talks elections, corruption and Eastern European political dynamics with the Oberserver’s editorial staff.

Melinda Haring Adjunct Fellow, American Security Project

For the full-length interview please visit our blog at kenyonoberserver.wordpress.com. The views expressed are those of Melinda Haring and may or may not represent those of her current or form employers.

TKO: As an election observer, what are you allowed to do if you witness fraud?

MH: As a short-term election observer, you and your partner write a report on each polling station that you visit. A short-term international election observer visits about a dozen polling sta-tions on Election Day. If the fraud is serious — you see some-one presenting multiple identification cards to receive multiple ballots, there is evidence of ballot box stuffing, there are many identical signatures on the voters’ list — you write a special form and call your long-term election observer and this feedback goes into a final report that is given to the host government and the

press. Observers may ask election officials questions but they cannot interfere in the process. When I’ve seen many ballots folded together and rammed into a ballot box, I have asked local officials for an explanation. Many times the mere presence of an international election observer prevents fraud. At a polling station in Almaty, Kazakhstan in 2010, I saw one woman try to present three IDs to receive three ballots. The election officials refused and told her to come back after the observers had left.

More generally, election observation missions compile re-ports from their short and long-term election observers. Long-term observers spend more than a week in-country and speak with nongovernmental organizations, government officials, election officials, voters and political parties to gain a fuller pic-ture of the electoral environment.

An election isn’t a one-off event. Of course the results of an election are what make the headlines, but in terms of assessing whether an election meets international standards, examining the candidate registration process, the political party registration process, the election law and legal framework and whether op-position political parties had access to the media are just as (if not more) important than observing an actual election. An elec-tion can be technically sound but still unfree and unfair because candidates have been unlawfully disqualified before the election, for example. TKO: How important is it for our democracy promotion efforts to combat what we would identify as “political cor-ruption”? Would such efforts disrupt our relationships with such governments?

A Panelist’s Experience

JON GREEN and GABRIEL ROM

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MH: I’m not convinced that democracy promotion programs seeking to curb corruption are effective. Curbing corruption requires political will at the highest levels. Within the Eurasia region, Georgia most successfully curbed everyday corrup-tion. Traffic police notoriously enriched their paltry salaries by extracting bribes from drivers. Journalist C.J. Chivers has written that traffic police are “nearly universally regarded as an especially low form of social parasite, an opinion that holds true from Moscow to Samarkand [Uzbekistan].” In 2004, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili sacked 13,000 traf-fic police officers and replaced them with a new, lean police force of 1,300. He made it clear that he wouldn’t tolerate cor-ruption, and increased new police officers’ salaries, put them in Western uniforms and bought a fleet of Volkswagens to replace the old Ladas. Year after year, Georgia receives rave re-views on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

I don’t want to go too far in praising Saakashvili’s govern-ment because there are credible cases of businesses being raided for political reasons and some of the more plugged-in analysts I know will grant that while the government has curbed everyday corruption, it hasn’t tackled high-end corrup-tion. That may be true, but Georgia today continues to attract foreign direct investment and is an attractive place to do busi-ness. In short, I would not spend our few assistance dollars on programs to curb corruption in the former Soviet Union. “Re-educating” judges, attorneys and bureaucrats is just plain silly. Judges, attorneys and bureaucrats operate within systems with strong incentives; until the incentive structure is changed — in Georgia, you will lose your job if you take bribes — bat-tling corruption is a waste of time. TKO: What do you think the recent Russian elections say about the prospects of democracy there? MH: The recent parliamentary and presidential elections themselves do not say much about the prospects of democ-racy in Russia, but the people’s response to the obviously falsified elections does. The unexpected street protests – the December 24, 2011 protest may have been the largest in post-Soviet Russia since 1991 – tell us that middle-class educated Russians are no longer willing to trade economic and social freedom for political freedom. They’re sick and tired of perva-sive corruption. They want to live in a country where officials can’t slap a blue light on the top of their car and drag race on the Ring Road in Moscow. They want to live in a normal, European country with real politics. They don’t want to be disrespected either.

In November 2011 when Vladimir Putin announced that he and Dmitry Medvedev would be switching roles and that

this plan had been in the works for a long time it infuriated many Russians. Russians in their late 20’s and 30’s realized that if Putin came back to the power for another 12 years, they would have only known the Putin regime for all of their youth. For many, this was unacceptable. I’m encouraged by the protests, although it may take a while for Putin, Inc. to crumble and it may not be a gentle transition. TKO: What lessons from Eastern Europe’s post-Soviet transition to democracy would you highlight as most usefully applicable to the Arab Spring? MH: A transition doesn’t necessarily lead to a more democrat-ic society. Most of the countries of the former Soviet Union went through a transition, but it certainly wasn’t to democracy. The experience of the former Soviet states has chastened my optimism for democratic transitions in North Africa, espe-cially in Egypt. It’s far more difficult than expected.TKO

Voting by candlelight in a small village outside of Taskala, Kazakhstan. In January 2012, Melinda Haring observed Kazakhstan’s parliamentary elections as a short-term election observer with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institu-tions and Human Rights.

This interview been edited for length and clarity. Photos courtesy of Melinda Haring.

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JON GREEN AND GABRIEL ROM

Professor Karako provides some background on the theme and mechanics of this week’s conference.

Tom Karako Director of the Center for the Study of American De-

mocracy and Assistant Professor of Political Science

TKO: Is the theme of this conference uniquely American? TK: Almost by definition, the promotion of democracy is not merely an American issue. Nor was the United States the first to actively promote democracy abroad. Nonetheless, the U.S. has played a significant and lead-ing role in its advance, especially since the Second World War. Several of the conference panelists will consider the question of democracy promotion from the per-spective of the formation of U.S. foreign policy. The topic of this year’s conference lies behind many of the most important foreign policy issues of the day — in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Russia and China. TKO: Walk us through the process of lining up speakers for this conference.

TK: We went out and looked for the best. It has been a pleasure reaching out to the “who’s who” of the par-ticular subfield that democracy promotion represents, and I think the lineup represents a distinguished and

diverse range of opinion. Kenyon’s reputation for hav-ing a beautiful campus may also have been responsible for helping to attract some of the speakers. TKO: When did you start planning for this confer-ence? TK: The biennial conference is one of several com-ponents of the Center’s programming. Two years ago, in 2010, the conference was held on a more domestic topic — the future of political parties. This year, it is a foreign policy issue. One question in selecting this year’s topic was whether it would both be timely and also facilitate a sort of all-campus discussion lending itself to some deeper issues, and I think it does that. The topic of the conference was selected in a general way in the summer of 2011, when the Arab Spring was under way. The planning itself began later that fall. The timeliness of the topic, however, allowed it to come to-gether easily. TKO: What does the decision to promote democ-racy abroad hinge on? TK: The underpinnings of successful democracies are many: the character of past regimes and of the peo-ple, culture, economics, respect for the rule of law, an enlightened and robust civil society and so forth. The decision to employ democracy promotion as an instru-ment of U.S. foreign policy, however, must take into account both the conditions and character of the in-tended recipient and serious attention to whether and how it is actually in America’s national security interest to pursue such a course.

Various policy formulations of this are found in the national security strategies of every president from Reagan to Obama.

Bringing Ideas Together

This interview has been edited for length and clarity. Photos courtesy of kenyon.edu.

TKO

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JON GREEN

Americans hear “democracy” and think of a very specific type of democracy. In the American lexicon, the word alludes to the Bill of Rights, comfortable living standards and come-dians’ right to make fun of the government without fear of reprisal. But when American leaders talk about promoting democ-racy abroad, the Ameri-can people, or perhaps the leaders themselves, fall into the trap of believing that democracy abroad can and will look just like democracy at home.

Liberalism within an international relations framework holds that democracies are passive to-ward one another. The logic states that, between two democratic regimes, shared values and the incentive to trade raise the costs of conflict to prohibitive levels, making violence irrational. But Liberalism assumes that every free society wants certain social and economic rights, and that those rights naturally

arise from democratic governments. But what hap-pens when a democratic society denies its citizens the rights that liberal societies like ours take for

granted?The Arab Spring in-

volved countries that are democratizing in ways that conflict with American val-ues and interests. Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak led an un-democratic regime, but he consistently supported American interests by main-taining peace with Israel,

even when it was unpopular with many Egyptians. With Mubarak out of power in Egypt, the Middle East could become further destabilized if the Egyp-tian people are not interested in maintaining peace in the region.

As Israel’s ally, America could easily be drawn into a war with a democratic Egypt if the peace that Mubarak helped keep breaks down. Liberal democ-racies are expected to welcome and promote new

What If We Disagree With the Will of the People?

“If you’re not free to choose wrongly and irresponsibly, you are not free at all.” Jacob Hornburger

What haPPens When a deM-ocratic society denies its citizens the rights that liberal societies taKe for granted?

THE PARADOX OF EXPORTING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAN INTEREST

democratic regimes, but should America promote this democratic shift? Should Israel?

Illiberal democracy is also problematic for Ameri-can interests because plebiscitary leaders can claim popular mandates in faux-democratic regimes. For example, Vladmir Putin has recently secured ostensi-bly liberal democratic power through what appear to be illiberal, undemocratic means in Russia, creating the image of democratic legitimacy where none like-ly exists. This allows him to claim rule by the people while destroying Russian citizens’ faith in democracy because they recognize the absurdity of such a claim.

Why bother to vote if Putin is casting your bal-lot? Promoting democracy at any cost in a country where democracy will take an illiberal form under-mines liberal democratic interests, because establish-ing real democratic traditions in the future becomes more difficult.

With that in mind, it appears that advocates of exporting liberal democracy focus too much on “de-mocracy” and not enough on “liberal.” American and international interests are better served by pro-moting the free flow of people, products and ideas across and within borders, regardless of the methods by which leaders are selected. Certainly democratic regimes meet these conditions more often than non-democracies, but thinking that democracy alone is a sufficient prerequisite could produce more harm than good in the long term.

As America exits Iraq and Afghanistan, it should consider the regimes it leaves behind. Both countries may be ready for democratic rule, but do they share America’s liberal values? Even if they are able to hold free and fair elections, are they seriously ready to institutionalize and implement freedom of reli-gion, expression or the press? It is easy to topple a weak regime, hold an election, declare our mission accomplished and leave. It is harder to recognize that elections might produce a regime that will not gov-ern as we want it to, which could make the whole endeavor a waste of time or worse as far as American interests are concerned.

It follows, then, that to truly satisfy liberal demo-cratic interests, those who wish to promote liberal democracy abroad must be willing to impose liberal values through undemocratic means. The United States could ensure that Iraq and Afghanistan each adopt a bill of rights and set up robust democratic institutions in an American fashion, but it would re-quire ignoring both Americans’ calls to end the oc-

cupation of the countries and the right of citizens of the occupied countries to govern themselves. It takes more than a few election cycles to establish liberal traditions and institutions, which are vital compo-nents of a true liberal democracy, but a few election cycles is the longest amount of time citizens of a liberal democracy will tolerate armed occupation of a foreign land. A well-functioning liberal democracy

will not invest the necessary time, resources and lives it takes to occupy a country for a long enough time to establish these traditions and institutions; citizens of liberal democracies don’t — and shouldn’t — have the stomach for it.

The notion of the proposition itself is problem-atic: how can one country legitimately impose free-dom on another, especially if it expects that freedom to be expressed in popular elections? Imposition of liberal values on illiberal countries will undoubtedly be met with backlash. Such an imposition would put the occupying nation in the precarious position of imposing liberal values, knowing that such values may be abandoned shortly after it leaves. The only way to guarantee liberal values in these lands is to permanently take away their sovereignty through an-nexation, a decidedly undemocratic course of action.

It is only in the American interest to promote de-mocracy abroad if the resulting democracies share our liberal values. Since America cannot promote lib-eral values in illiberal societies without using undem-ocratic and tyrannical means, it is therefore impos-sible to promote democracy in the American interest in these instances.

It is easy to assume that citizens of undemocratic regimes pine for a society that looks exactly like ours. But if we follow this line of thinking, we doom our-selves to quagmire after quagmire of tyrannical oc-cupation and imperialism, all of which undermine the very values we claim to be promoting. TKO

“Men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted all other alternatives.” Abba Eban

it taKes More than a feW election cycles to estab-lish liberal traditions and institUtions, Which are vi-tal coMPonents of a trUe liberal deMocracy.

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RICHARD PERA

The theme of the upcoming conference hosted by the Center for the Study of American Democ-racy poses the question, “should America promote democracy abroad?” I believe we should. If you agree, the next question is, “how?”

Promoting democ-racy overseas does not start with free elections; it starts with recognition of absolute rights held by all men and women. For Americans, these rights are affirmed in the Dec-laration of Independence and fulfilled in the Con-stitution. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are recognized as natural rights because they exist at birth and are neither ap-proved nor earned.

In the American model, inalienable rights come from God and are based on the concept of free will, although other countries may derive natural rights from secular sources. No government can grant these individual rights and no government can re-voke them. These individual rights must be rec-

ognized before collective rights (e.g. free elections) can be seriously considered.

In a perfect world, the international community would be comprised of democratic national gov-ernments. Acceptance of democracy may change

a nation’s behavior, but it is unlikely to change its fun-damental national interest. Democracies are more likely to negotiate and trade and less likely to pursue armed conflict, but unique de-terminants like geography, language and minorities re-main. China, for example, has a number of minority

nations that Beijing controls through oppression. If China were democratic, its foreign policy would still be influenced by its treatment of these minori-ties.

Moreover, a democratic world does not mean that every democratic government would agree with the United States; a newly democratic Iraq disagrees with the American position on Israel. While dem-ocratic nations disagree with each other on policy

What Do We Do Once We Decide to Take Action?

“My definition of a free society is a society where it is safe to be unpopular.” Adlai Stevenson Jr.

ProMoting deMocracy over-seas does not start With free elections, it starts With recognition of abso-lUte rights held by all.

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issues, they are linked by shared values that engen-der mutual respect. For example, while many Ameri-cans find French policies and attitudes frustrating, the democratic natures of both countries create an underlying notion of cooperation in at least some respect. Promoting democracy overseas does not necessarily create a pro-American world, but it does reorient the foundation of international relation-ships from suspicion and doubt to assurance and trust.

While the U.S. should encourage democratiza-tion everywhere, we must recognize that each nation is unique. For purpose of generalization, however, non-democratic states may be viewed according to their level of economic development. More eco-nomically advanced nations are likely wealthier and more technologically advanced. As a result, they may be less predisposed to democratic change and hence U.S. encouragement.

In this group, China comes to mind again. While the Communist Party has relaxed economic controls

in the past two decades, it still wields violence with an iron fist. As such, substantial American encour-agement of democratic uprisings would be counter-productive, fostering more oppression and making democratization less likely. Instead, the U.S. should quietly encourage China’s long but peaceful march toward democracy. Whether over the next two years or two decades, the Chinese population has the po-tential to develop economic and political expecta-tions leading to inexorable change. If they are lucky, a populist reformer will emerge as a catalyst, as has been the case in the past. Gorbachev grew up as a hard-line Soviet but opened the door to democracy; King Juan Carlos of Spain was another visionary who rejected four decades of Franco-style fascism in favor of parliamentary democracy.

Developing countries, on the other hand, are a different story. I am not talking about abjectly poor countries whose main priority should be to provide its population with the bare essentials. In those poor countries, political development should be lim-ited to the creation of things like an effective food distribution network, rather than creation of an ef-fective legislature. It is also important to note that the support of these nations often falls outside of American national interest. In developing countries that have established institutions and a functioning economy, the U.S. could and should play a more ac-tive role.

The potential for democratization in developing countries is far higher than those previously dis-cussed. Unlike poorer nations, developing countries enjoy relatively stable political institutions that can be altered to fit the democratic ideal. Furthermore, they tend to support a large enough population and cover significant territory to provide the potential for economic development. This alone might be reason enough to attract Western economic and po-litical investment.

These kinds of states are found on nearly ev-ery continent. The government of Myanmar, for example, is currently transitioning from a military dictatorship to a quasi-democracy, largely due to American political influence. With the maturity of democratic institutions, the hope is for the South-east Asian nation’s economy to grow in similar fash-ion. Other non-democratic developing states that could blossom into liberal democracies include Ven-ezuela (poised for political change post-Chavez), Cuba (post-Castro), Syria (post-Assad), Zimbabwe (post-Mugabe). And we have already begun to wit-ness democratic change through the Arab Spring, most notably in post-Gaddafi Libya.

It should be noted that the Obama administra-tion and the Clinton State Department have done admirable work in careful promotion of democracy, particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring. How-ever, the administration should continue to operate its foreign policy with great caution; the removal of scoundrels is not tantamount to establishing demo-cratic government. Political development takes time and nurture, much like a new tree sprouting from a single seed. Only the first chapters of the Tunisian, Libyan and Egyptian democracies have been written. Seeds have been planted. Hopefully with water and sunlight from the U.S., democracy will take root. TKO

“If you’re not criticized, you may not be doing much” Donald Rumsfeld

aMerican encoUrageMent of deMocratic UPrisings WoUld be coUnterProdUc-tive ... instead, the U.s. shoUld encoUrage china’s March toWard deMocracy.

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From its foundation, America was an exceptional nation. It was the first modern liberal democratic state, its constitution guaranteeing the rights of its citizens based on the principles of liberalism — the idea that people should be permitted to act freely so long as their actions do not infringe on the rights of others. In such a way, liberalism allows for a pluralistic society in which all kinds of people can coexist with one another, and in as tightly interconnected a world as we live in today such a society is essential to ensure the vibrancy and vitality of humankind. Moreover, such a world is best served by democratic governments broadly represent-ing their people. As the most powerful nation on Earth and the first such contemporary society, America’s role in the world should naturally be that of an advocate and protector of liberal democracy.

But America’s role in promoting the values of liber-alism has been problematic at times. Some have abused the concept of American exceptionalism in arguing that America can do whatever it wishes on the world stage simply because it is America. Those who believe this should remember that abusing America’s privileged status, if it can be called as such, ruins its reputation and squanders its resources. In the past, America has exercised its authority in the form of economic, po-

litical and military means, sometimes justly and other times less so. In the future, America should continue to be active on the world stage, but its actions should be based on the values and principles that underlie Amer-ica’s exceptional nature.

When it comes to democracy promotion, the Unit-ed States has always utilized economic means liber-ally to strengthen the position of democracy in the world. Considering that all modern democracies have market-based economies, the U.S. naturally promotes the adoption of market economies in non-democratic countries and developing democracies. And yet a mar-ket economy alone does not a democracy make. Ag-gressively promoting market liberalizations can have a devastating effect on a transitioning economy and be counterproductive to democracy promotion. In Russia during the nineties, for example, foreign experts from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund suggested an array of “shock therapy” methods, im-mediately releasing trade and price controls, privatiz-ing massive state companies and eliminating currency protections. The results were disastrous, making Russia wildly unstable for a full decade. The resulting hyper-inflation, corruption and previously unthinkable levels of crime set the stage for President Vladimir Putin’s

JAMES NEIMEISTER

A Principled Approach to Democracy Promotion

THE IMPORTANCE OF VALUES

“No amount of political freedom will satisfy the hungry masses.” Vladimir Lenin

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rise to unrivaled power in the 2000’s. Pushing for policies that stimulate short-term in-

vestment but do nothing to develop the economy in the long term tend to hinder democracy promotion. When lobbying organizations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce push foreign governments to knock down trade regulations in order to provide fast, easy profits for multinational corporations, only to pull their mon-ey out when the bubble bursts or when their lobbying efforts are more successful in some other poor country, their actions are antithetical to promoting development and democracy. In short, America should utilize eco-nomic means in the way of promoting democracy only in so far as it provides meaningful improvements in the economic life of the people of the country in question. Economic development should be focused on promot-ing the financial literacy and infrastructure necessary to create an economy in which ordinary people can have access to the capital they need to launch projects of their own design. Under such a state of affairs, people would be more willing and able to participate in their

own governance, appreciate the rights of others and take on more responsibilities. Allowing big business to ravage developing economies does nothing to develop the kind of economy that can support a liberal demo-cratic state.

Finally, the U.S. has historically used military force to promote democracy abroad. This is by far the most problematic method of democracy promotion. After all, it is quite puzzling to consider how one might force people to voluntarily accept an open democratic form of society by the barrel of the gun. It is understood that in some cases governments have used force to put down democratic uprisings and that, if it can con-ceivably prevent violence against the people, the U.S. should intervene. But in many such cases the regime in question is a regime which the U.S. has previously supported: Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and even Moammar Gaddafi had at some point

been in bed with the U.S. So before asking whether America should intervene in such countries, it would

be better to ask whether America should have support-ed them in the first place. All three of the aforemen-tioned leaders had at one point proven themselves of use to the U.S.’s strategic interests. Yet what interests does the U.S. have that should under any circumstances be given precedence over its interest in bringing forth a free and democratic world? There must be no such interests, because that would be entirely contrary to the mission of the U.S. in the world to serve dictatorships and military regimes. In Egypt, though, the U.S. man-aged to use its military leverage in another way by with-drawing its military support for the Mubarak regime, an action that emboldened the rebels. It is not to be forgotten that, as one of the world’s largest producers of arms, the U.S. has the power to withhold its support for regimes that contradict liberal democratic values. This is a considerable power.

Naturally, the U.S. finds itself in a difficult position balancing its roles as the most powerful country in the world, the world’s largest economy and the world’s old-est democracy. The world may be changing, and the U.S. may yet see its role in the world change. Never-theless, it is more important than ever to stay true to those values that have characterized it from the very beginning. In promoting democracy abroad, the U.S. must pursue policies that promote continual, qualita-tive improvements in the lives of people throughout the world. Moreover, as democracy continues to de-velop in countries vastly different from Europe and North America, we must be willing to be sensitive to the particularities of other cultures and accepting of the fact that democracy in other countries may have different priorities and values than our own. This will signal the triumph of liberalism and democracy — when the world may find itself at once fully integrated and fully divergent. TKO

yet What interests does the United states have that shoUld be given Precedence over its in-terest in bringing forth a free and deMocractic World?

alloWing big bUsiness to rav-age develoPing econoMies does nothing to develoP the Kind of econoMy that can sUPPort a liberal deMocratic state.

“Those who stand for nothing fall for anything.” Alexander Hamilton

CSAD Conference Schedule of EventsNote: All events are located in the Community Foundation Theater, Gund Gallery, unless otherwise noted.

Reprinted wih permission of the Center for the Study of American Democracy

Thursday, April 12

Friday, April 13

Saturday, April 14

5:30 p.m. Evening Reception (Fischman Lobby, Gund Gallery)

7:00 p.m. Keynote Address George L. Ohrstrom Jr. Lecturship on Democracy: Zalmay Khalizad, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations (Rosse Hall)

9:30 a.m. Morning Remarks Elliott Abrams, Council on Foreign Relations and former White House official Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Harvard Kennedy School of Government

10:30 a.m. Morning Panel: Assessing the Arab Spring and Democracy in the Middle East John Agresto, Board of Trustees of the American University of Iraq James Zogby, Arab American Institute Danya Greenfield, Atlantic Council Karan Bhatia, Senior Counsel & Vice President of General Electric

1:30 p.m. Afternoon Remarks Judy Woodruff, Bloomberg News, PBS News Hour Al Hunt, Bloomberg News

2:45 p.m. Afternoon Panel 1: Is Democracy Promotion in America’s Interest? Scott Carpenter, Principal, Google Ideas Charles Kesler, Claremont McKenna College Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies Tony Smith, Tufts University

4:30 p.m. Afternoon Panel 2: Democracy Promotion Beyond the Middle East Morton H. Halperin, Open Society Institute Nadia Diuk, Vice President, National Endowment for Democracy Adam Przeworski, New York University John D. Sullivan, Center for International Private Enterprise

5:45 p.m. Evening Reception (Fisschman Lobby, Gund Gallery)

9:00 a.m. Morning Panel: The Mechanics of Democracy Promotion David Kramer, President of Freedom House Barrie Freeman, National Democratic Institute Melinda Haring, American Security Project Jamila Raqib, The Albert Einstein Institution Tom Garrett, International Republican Institute

11:30 a.m. Closing Address: Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University