tiberius, valerie- a prudential virtue

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Perspective: A Prudential Virtue

Author(s): Valerie TiberiusSource: American Philosophical Quarterly , Vol. 39, No. 4 (Oct., 2002), pp. 305-324

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American Philosophical Quarterly

Volume 39, Number 4, October 2002

PERSPECTIVE: A PRUDENTIAL VIRTUE

Valerie Tiberius

-L/o prudence and morality coincide? To

answer this question, philosophers have

tended to focus on the moral virtues and

to ask whether they are in a person's inter?

est. The focus is, therefore, on the question,

is developing and exercising the moral

virtues good for the person who does it?

Many contemporary philosophers are in?

clined to be skeptical about finding a

positive answer.1 This skepticism is fueled,

in part, by the lack of a substantive account

of prudence that does not simply build

moral virtue in at the outset. A rich and

detailed account of the virtues whose point

is to promote (or to constitute) one's own

good is, therefore, an important first step

in establishing that prudence and morality

do coincide. Furthermore, an account of

the prudential virtues is an important con?

tribution to our understanding of individual

well-being or prudence itself.2

A study of the prudential virtues is cru?

cial for understanding both the relationship

between prudence and morality and the

nature of prudence. This paper begins such

a study by providing an account of one

prudential virtue, the virtue of perspective.

In section 1, two examples of perspective

are provided in order to give an intuitive

sense of the nature of the virtue and the

conditions under which we attribute it to

others. Sections 2 and 3 contain an account

of perspective as a prudential virtue. A

prudential virtue, we shall say, is a char?

acter trait?a set of dispositions to think,

feel, and act in certain ways?whose end

is the agent's own good.3 Section 4 con?

tains a discussion of the ways in which per?

spective as characterized does indeed

promote the agent's own good.

Finally, it will be argued in section 5 that

perspective is a quality that tends to make

the people who have it better moral agents.

The aim in this last section of the paper is

to show that the person with perspective

will be more inclined to value certain moral

ends and more able to act on the moral

commitments she has. Admittedly, the ap?

proach taken in this paper cannot establish

the coincidence of morality and prudence

until we have a complete picture of the

prudentially virtuous agent. In providing

an account of one virtue and its relation?

ship to morality, the more immediate aim

is to enrich our understanding of what a

prudentially good life is for beings like us.

3 05




306 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

1. Examples

In her advice column, Tell Me About

It, Carolyn Hax recently advised one of

her readers to get some perspective. The

reader had written to Carolyn complain?

ing bitterly about the pain and suffering

she was enduring after being dumped by

her boyfriend. The relationship with this

boyfriend had lasted only about three

months. Carolyn did not think the woman's

complaints were entirely unfounded, but

rather that they were out of proportion to

the value this relationship could have for

her, given its short duration. Carolyn sug?

gested that the letter writer take up some

volunteer work for a worthy cause as a way

both to meet other people and to help her

gain some perspective.

Phrases such as get some perspective

are probably familiar to most people.4 We

do advise people to do this, and it seems

that there is some wisdom in this advice.

Part of the wisdom is that there are things

not worth worrying about, and that to ex?

pend time and energy worrying about such

things leads only to unhappiness. The per?

son who is emotionally devastated by

something that is not actually all that im?

portant lacks perspective. For her to gain

perspective, it seems, would be for her to

develop a better sense of what is worth

worrying about, and an ability to bring her

thoughts, feelings, and actions into accor?

dance with this better sense.

A more complex example is to be found

in Barbara Kingsolver's The Poisonwood

Bible. Leah Price is one of four daughters

who was taken to the Congo by her fierce

missionary father. While in the Congo,

Leah's youngest sister is bitten by a snake

and dies. The day that Leah's sister dies

happens to be the same day that the newly

elected leader of the Congo is murdered,

an event that has very tragic consequences

for the Congolese people. Later, Leah

marries a Congolese revolutionary. On the

day that Leah mourns her sister's death,

her husband, Anatole, mourns his country's

loss of independence and the thousands of

people who have been taken political pris?

oner, beaten, and killed. Leah reflects on

the differences between their griefs and she

remembers an incident from the village in

which her father was a missionary.

I can recall, years ago, watching Rachel

[Leah's older sister] cry real tears over a burn

hole in her green dress while, just outside

our door, completely naked children withered

from the holes burning in their empty stom?

achs, and I seriously wondered if Rachel's

heart were the size of a thimble. I suppose

that's how he [her husband Anatole] sees me

today. Any other day I might pray ... to lose

my self-will in the service of greater glory.

But January 17, in my selfish heart, is Ruth

May's only.5

Most readers will be inclined to think, with

Leah, that Rachel is completely lacking in

perspective: clothes are not valuable

enough to warrant distress even at the best

of times. Leah, however, does have per?

spective. Leah recognizes that her sister's

death is worth grieving and she allows her?

self to grieve. At the same time, she sees

that she must not lose herself in grief to

such a degree that she cannot appreciate

or be motivated to act on other value com?

mitments she has, such as the commitment

to the cause of the Congolese people.

2. Perspective

When we advise people to get perspec?

tive we are usually advising them to get

perspective on some particular thing or

things they value. Carolyn advises her

reader to get perspective on the relation?

ship she had with her boyfriend. Had Leah

advised her sister Rachel to get some per?

spective, she would have wanted Rachel

to gain perspective on the value of her




PERSPECTIVE: A PRUDENTIAL VIRTUE / 307

dress. Leah seems to have perspective on

her love for her sister and her commitment

to the Congolese cause. Having perspec?

tive is something we do with respect to

commitments we have.

Part of what it is to be committed to

something, or to find it valuable, is to be

disposed to think and feel in certain ways

in various circumstances.6 To be commit?

ted to a friend is to care about her well

being, to want to spend time with her, to

feel angry when she is wronged, and to take

her into account in one's plans. To be com?

mitted to one's career is to want to suc?

ceed in it, to give it weight in one's plans,

to feel anxious when it is threatened and

proud when one gets a raise or promotion.

The thoughts, feelings, and dispositions

that make up one's commitment play a vi?

tal role in planning and action. We plan to

act in accordance with our value commit?

ments and we succeed in acting in accor?

dance with these plans when we are

motivated by the desires or other motiva?

tional states that are constitutive of the

value commitments.

Having a perspective on some value com?

mitment, we can say, is a matter of that

commitment's playing a particular practi?

cal role in one's life. To take a new

perspective on a value commitment is to

change that practical role. For example, if

the lovelorn writer to the advice column

were to take a different perspective on her

failed relationship, she would no longer be

inclined to write letters to advice colum?

nists nor to wallow in her own misery.

Taking different perspectives, that is,

changing one's perspective, on a value

commitment is possible because of fluc?

tuation in the components of a commitment

and the interaction between different com?

mitments. Although one might remain

committed to something one values, the

various thoughts, feelings, and dispositions

to action that make up a particular value

commitment do not remain constant. Varia?

tions in the intensity, duration, and vivacity

of our thoughts and feelings, and the im?

mediacy and gravity of relevant action

seem to be part of normal life.

One cause of these variations is the in?

teraction between different value commit?

ments. The dispositions that make up our

commitments are expressed in different

ways and have different roles in planning

and action depending, in part, on the other

attitudes we have. For example, consider

Matt's disposition to feel disappointed

when he fails to get a deserved promotion,

which is part of his commitment to his ca?

reer. This disappointment will be expressed

and experienced in different ways, depend?

ing on other facts about him. Because Matt

has normal moral convictions, he does not

express his disappointment by murdering

his boss or sabotaging the career of the

person who did get the promotion. Simi?

larly, the character of the experience of

disappointment can change because of

other attitudes Matt has. If on the same day

he gets the bad news about his job Matt

also learns that the lump in his neck is a

benign cyst rather than cancer, the disap?

pointment about his career might be much

less intense than it would otherwise be.

The fact that a particular commitment is

located in a web of commitments and val?

ues means that we can try to alter our

thoughts and feelings, and thereby to

change the role they will play in planning

and action, by shifting our attention in such

a way that the force of the original com?

mitment diminishes. When we want to, and

(sometimes) with some effort, we can fo?

cus intensely on a particular commitment

so that our thoughts and feelings are only

about that commitment, we can calm the

effect of these thoughts and feelings on us

by turning our attention to other things, or

we can reject the commitment altogether.7





2.1. Perspective and Prudential Good

What we seem to be recommending

when we advise someone to get perspec?

tive is to bring her thoughts and feelings

in line with what really is important. Per?

spective as a virtue would seem to require

having the right perspective on one's com?

mitments, the right dispositions to thought,

feeling, and action in the right strength.

That is, perspective seems to consist in tak?

ing our commitments to be no more and

no less important than they really are.8 But

we might mean different things by what

is really important. In order to distinguish,

we need to consider the theoretical work that

the virtue of perspective is meant to do.

A philosophical account of a prudential

virtue must show that the dispositions and

skills that constitute the virtue contribute,

non-accidentally, to the agent's own good.

In order to characterize perspective as a

prudential virtue, then, we need to make

some assumptions about the good for a

person or well-being. Fortunately, it is not

necessary to provide a complete account

of the good for a person; two assumptions

about this notion will serve the purposes

of this paper without ruling out different

ways of filling in the details of such an

account. First, we will assume that the

good for a person requires the pursuit of

reflective values. It is quite plausible to

claim that the good for you requires achiev?

ing certain ends that have value to you, or

to your life. But, when we set out to pur?

sue our own good, we typically do not take

whatever ends we happen to have to deter?

mine what is good for us; rather, we tend

to think that the good that is worth pursu?

ing is constituted by a more refined set of

ends. Reflective values are this refined set

of ends. Second, let us assume that a

person's good requires that she not be per?

sistently miserable, or suffer pointless

distress. An argument for these assump?

tions would be beyond the scope of this

paper, but it is to be hoped that they are

broad and attractive enough to garner wide

agreement and to characterize (at least in

part) a conception of the good that most

people will recognize as a compelling and

familiar goal.9

The first assumption is the crucial one for

the characterization of perspective as a pru?

dential virtue; therefore, it will be helpful

to elaborate on the notion of reflective val?

ues employed in this assumption. Reflective

values are the commitments we choose in a

reflective moment when our attention is

focused on evaluating how important vari?

ous things should be to us. The idea is that

in a reflective moment we are not caught

up in the dispositions particular to one com?

mitment, and therefore these dispositions to

think and feel do not have us under their

sway. In a reflective moment we see things

as they are without being swept away or

blinded by powerful patterns of beliefs,

ideological convictions, and emotions. This

is not to say that in a reflective moment we

are completely detached or disengaged from

our values. The point is that in a reflective

moment our attention is turned to evaluat?

ing or reflecting on the commitments we

have, rather than on acting for the sake of

those commitments.

Notice that reflective values are subjec?

tive in the sense that the appropriate

ordering of values for a person depends,

at least in part, on the attitudes of the per?

son doing the reflecting. Reflection

operates against the background of a

person's prior commitments. Therefore,

some people, upon reflection, will judge

that traveling the world is as important as

their careers, while others will judge that

their careers are much more important

than anything except their families. Dif?

ferent reflective judgments about the

importance of various commitments will

yield different standards for appropriate

related dispositions.





One might object to the claim that pur?

suit of reflective values is part of a person's

good because one thinks that the second

order attitudes that result from reflection

are not reliable indicators of what is good

for us. Such objections have been made to

a variety of theories that attempt to under?

stand normative notions in terms of second

order attitudes.10 Some of the concern

about the gap between what is good and

what is reflectively endorsed is due to the

particular notion of reflection that is as?

sumed by the normative theories. The as?

sumption made here about a person's good,

however, does not imply any particular

account of the nature of reflection. Reflec?

tion, for the purposes of this paper is what?

ever process is appropriate for refining and

improving our initial commitments. Given

the apparent unreliability of vivid reflec?

tion on the facts and the susceptibility of

judgment to ideological pressures, appro?

priate reflection will probably include

thinking carefully about which facts one

ought to consider and giving special atten?

tion to emotional cues.11

Still, it is true that the process of reflec?

tion is subjective in the sense that people

with different initial commitments can

reach different sets of reflective values;

reflection is not guaranteed to arrive at

particular objective values.12 Some con?

cerns about the gap between reflective

values and objective values, therefore, re?

main. In the remainder of this section it will

be argued that, despite this concern, there

is good reason to accept the assumption that

pursuit of reflective values is a component

of prudential value or well-being.

First, we have not assumed that pursuit of

reflective values is the only component of

well-being, nor that well-being is entirely

subjective. Given this allowance of other,

objective components of well-being, it

should be noted that the assumption that pur?

suit of reflective values is part of well-being

would be accepted by many objective theo?

rists. Martha Nussbaum, for example, takes

practical reasoning and reflection to be one

of the most important human functions, the

capacity for which is a component of flour?

ishing.13 One can hold that there are ob?

jective values and that well-being requires

pursuit of these values, then, without re?

jecting the claim that reflective values are

also part of well-being.

Second, it is difficult to deny that pur?

suit of some ends or other is necessary for

well-being. If we accept this assumption,

but reject reflective values as relevant to

well-being, the alternative is to claim that

only the pursuit of objectively valuable ends

is constitutive of well-being. This is an un?

desirable move for the following reasons.

First, the subjective nature of the concept

of well-being provides a prima facie rea?

son for accepting the claim that the ends

that partly constitute well-being are relative

to subjects. According to L. W. Sumner,

What distinguishes welfare from all other

modes of value is its reference to the propri?

etors of the life in question: although your life

may be going well in many respects, it is pru?

dentially valuable only if it is going well for

you. This subject-relativity is an essential fea?

ture of our ordinary concept of welfare.14

The need to justify the claim that perspec?

tive is good for the person who has it, that

is, good from her own point of view, pro?

vides some reason to accept a subjective

characterization of the ends that are part

of a person's well-being.

Second, the assumption that well-being

requires the pursuit of objective values

makes for a less desirable starting point

than we have if we assume only a subjec?

tive account of well-being. On the assump?

tion that we must pursue objective values

to achieve well-being, we could establish

that prudential virtues are essential to

well-being by direct appeal to these val?

ues. The challenge here would not be in





establishing the relationship between pru?

dential virtue and well-being; rather it

would be in proving the claims about ob?

jective values in the first place. Since

claims about objective values are contro?

versial and difficult to establish, we do

better to argue that prudential virtues are

essential to living well without assuming

any claims about objective values.

Further, establishing a link between moral

agency and prudential virtue is more sig?

nificant if we begin with a subjective

conception of well-being and reflective val?

ues. Objective accounts of well-being that

take friendship or community or civic in?

volvement to be components of well-being

can argue for the coincidence of prudence

and morality on the basis of these values.

The connection to morality is less obvious

for subjective accounts of well-being, but

if such a link can be established it will be

significant because of the close relationship

between subjective well-being and motiva?

tion. Part of the interest of an argument that

provides prudential reasons for moral be?

havior is that it can provide reasons to be

moral that are widely shared. If well-being

is characterized so that it requires the pur?

suit of objective values, then the prudential

reasons to pursue one's own well-being will

not be shared by those who have no interest

in the objective values in question.

Of course there is a sense in which the

person with perspective cannot be entirely

confined to her own limited, subjective

point of view because she must have a cer?

tain kind of sympathy with the experiences

of others. We will turn to this point in the

next section.

2.2. Perspective Defined

With these assumptions about a person's

good in hand, we can now return to our

discussion of the nature of perspective. If

we take a person's good to include the pur?

suit of reflective values, and we conceive

of the prudential value of our commitments

as determined, at least in large part, by re?

flection, then we can see that the right

perspective to have is the one that is com?

patible with one's reflective judgment

about the actual importance or value of

one's projects and commitments. When we

take perspective to be a prudential virtue,

to advise a person to get perspective is to

advise her to bring her thoughts and feel?

ings in line with her reflective values,

rather than reacting to her circumstances

by succumbing to the most powerful

thoughts or feelings of the moment. Our

reflective values entail standards of appro?

priateness for our attitudes, choices, and

actions. The advice that one ought to have

perspective amounts to the recommenda?

tion that one conform one's attitudes,

actions, and choices to what is appropri?

ate given one's reflective values.

If the ultimate goal for the person of per?

spective is to achieve this kind of align?

ment, we can see that having perspective

for normal human beings will require hav?

ing certain skills and abilities that help to

bring us to this ideal state. First, because

the person with perspective must have re?

flective values, she must have the ability

to reflect on her values and make judg?

ments about how they are to be organized.15

Without this, there is no appropriate role

for her thoughts and feelings to play.

Second, because acquiring perspective

occurs in the context of the temptation to

become absorbed by something trivial, the

virtuous person must be capable of sym?

pathizing with the experiences of others at

least to the minimal extent that would al?

low her to be reminded of her own reflec?

tive values. The person with the virtue of

perspective must be open to experiences that

remove temptations to lose perspective. To

have such experiences, a person must be

capable of taking threats to someone else's

important interests to remind her of her





own. In the case of Rachel, one reason we

want to say that she lacks perspective is

that she fails to take the suffering of chil?

dren outside her door to remind her of what

is important to her. Similarly, we are in?

clined to think that Leah does have per?

spective, in part, because she recognizes

the significance of other people's experi?

ences. Perspective may not require com?

passion or empathy, but it does seem to

require sympathy enough to identify the

values that are at stake in others' experi?

ences. This minimal sympathy, as we

might call it, allows the person of perspec?

tive to remember her own important val?

ues and therefore to see that she is

succumbing to the temptation of obsession

with the trivial.

Third, the person with perspective has the

ability to shape her attitudes in response

to what she learns from the above experi?

ence. She can shift her attention away from

what does not matter and, importantly, she

can actively appreciate those things that

she really does value. Having the appro?

priate attitudes does not simply mean re?

fraining from becoming engrossed in

inappropriate reactions, it also means ex?

periencing the thoughts and feelings ap?

propriate to finding valuable what one

thinks is important on reflection. The per?

son with perspective, therefore, will not be

passionless or perpetually moderate; it is

frequently appropriate to be wrapped up

in a project, emotionally charged and ex?

cited.16 The virtue of perspective, then,

consists in the ability to reflect on one's

values, to learn from the experience of oth?

ers when one's attitudes are inappropriate,

and to bring one's attitudes and actions into

line with one's reflective values.

To say that a particular constellation of

dispositions is a virtue is to say that it is

reliably correlated with well-being or pru?

dential value.17 Given human tendencies to

obsess about immediate but relatively

trivial concerns and our receptiveness to

the experience of others as relevant evi?

dence, perspective the virtue is best

characterized as including the above three

mechanisms for achieving appropriate at?

titudes and actions. We should say, then,

that the virtue of perspective consists in

these three abilities aimed at bringing one's

attitudes and actions into line with one's

reflective judgment.

3. Refining the Account of

Perspective

The person with perspective has appro?

priate attitudes, given the standards she

endorses, toward the objects of her value

commitments. We might think that the

standards people would endorse if they

reflected on the matter would form a fairly

inclusive ordinal ranking of possible ex?

periences in terms of the appropriateness

of various emotional responses. The tor?

ture or painful death of our loved ones

would be at the top of the list, holes in our

clothes and hangnails would be much

closer to the bottom. While it is true that

our standards for the appropriateness of the

thoughts and feelings that constitute our

value commitments do constitute a rank?

ing of some sort, things are not as simple

as the above description suggests.

It does seem that, if we were to set about

to create such a ranking, there are many

occurrences that we would judge more

worthy of despair, grief, fear, etc. than the

experiences toward which we typically feel

these emotions. If we reflect vividly on the

variety of experiences to which people

around the world are subject?starvation,

torture, severe oppression?our own anxi?

eties about our careers, vacation plans,

taxes, and such like, often pale in compari?

son. We do very often gain perspective on

one of our own problems by thinking about

how lucky we really are relative to the state

of most of the world's population.





Nevertheless, it would be wrong to as?

sume that we can or should be able to

construct an ordinal ranking of the impor?

tance of all possible events or experiences.

This is because making sharp distinctions

between these events can impoverish our

own value commitments by preventing us

from honoring them in the required way.

For example, if a person were to judge that

it is far worse to be the victim of torture

than it is to be diagnosed with an often

curable form of cancer, she would also

judge that the perspective she ought to take

on her friend's cancer diagnosis is one ac?

cording to which she does not react very

strongly because, after all, things could be

much worse. But to take this perspective

does not seem to be a good thing for her to

do if she loves her friend. To react to the

diagnosis of a friend's possibly fatal ill?

ness by proclaiming that things could be

worse does not seem to leave room for the

appropriate fear, sympathy, and compas?

sion that are required by real friendship in

this case. If achieving one's own good re?

quires not only having good experiences

and feelings, but also valuing important

things to one's fullest ability, and if valu?

ing entails the disposition to feel negative

emotions when what one values is threat?

ened, then the correct judgments about

appropriate emotional responses must take

this into consideration.

A person with perspective certainly must

make comparative judgments about the

appropriateness of emotional responses.

But she need not make judgments that

would result in an inclusive ordinal rank?

ing. The person with perspective need only

make rough divisions among different

events or experiences. She must group

these events according to their relevance

to similar, not identical, degrees of value.

Events that make a profound difference to

the quality of one's life will be at the top

of the ranking, and the measure of profun?

dity will, by necessity, be rather imprecise.

Further, she must allow herself to experi?

ence the thoughts and feelings required by

her own value commitments, provided that

these values are ones she really thinks are

important, without diminishing her com?

mitment to other similarly important

values. A return to the example of Leah

Price will help us better understand these

complexities.

On the one hand, there is a sense in which

Leah believes her grief is less appropriate

than the grief her husband, Anatole, feels

for his people. But on the other hand, de?

spite the fact that she has labeled her

emotion selfish, there is a certain right?

eousness in her attitude. If she really

thought she was behaving wrongly, we

would expect her to feel ashamed of her

reaction, but she does not. Rather, she ap?

pears defiant and even a little bit proud.

In truth, Leah makes two different value

judgments from two different points of

view. From her own point of view she

judges that her sister's death is of profound

importance to her. Leah cared deeply about

her sister and therefore her grief is entirely

appropriate. But from another point of

view?the point of view of the world, or

of morality?Leah judges that the tragedy

of the Congolese people is more important

than the death of her sister. She judges that

the suffering of thousands is more impor?

tant from a global point of view and this is

a point of view with which she herself iden?

tifies. But the fact that the suffering of the

Congolese matters more according to the

impartial morality Leah endorses does not

imply that her sister's death is not really

very important to her. The facts about the

world that Leah recognizes do not make

her value her sister any less.

Given all of Leah's value commitments,

she is concerned to express her grief in





such a way that she honors her love for her

sister without losing her ability to sympa?

thize with the plight of others. Leah's

virtue is displayed in two facts about her:

first, that she allows herself to experience

grief over her sister's death, thus honoring

that commitment, but she does not allow

this grief to overshadow and prevent the

appreciation of other value commitments;

and second, that both of the values she is

responding to are really, on reflection, im?

portant to her. Leah's commitment to her

sister and her commitment to the Congo?

lese cause surely differ in terms of their

appeal to other people, but they are simi?

lar in terms of the depth of commitment

and the bearing on her happiness. To have

the virtue of perspective, then, Leah is not

required to rank the importance of her sis?

ter and the Congolese cause. For Leah,

these values might both be in the category

of values of the highest importance.

Which perspective Leah takes, and when

she changes her perspective will depend

on many things: how her attitudes will

manifest themselves, how her grief will

affect other people, what the expression of

these attitudes will mean in the context,

and the effects that allowing herself to re?

spond in a particular way will have on her

self-respect or on her ability to continue

to pursue her goals. The virtue of perspec?

tive requires judgment and discernment to

understand and account for these details

and it includes a disposition to act in ac?

cordance with the judgments one makes.

Here we find that the virtue of perspec?

tive manifests features of the traditional

conception of virtue. According to Aristotle,

We can be afraid, e.g., or be confident, or

have appetites, or get angry, or feel pity, in

general have pleasure or pain, both too much

and too little, and in both ways not well; but

[having these feelings] at the right times,

about the right things, toward the right

people, for the right end, and in the right way,

is the intermediate and best condition, and

this is proper to virtue.18

On the Aristotelian conception of virtue,

virtuous agents must use their own power

of judgment to ascertain the right time and

place for their emotions.19 So, too, with the

virtue of perspective?it seems that agents

will have to have the capacity to take into

account the many details of their circum?

stances in order to make the required

judgments. This judgment will not be ar?

bitrary, of course. A person's judgments

about what constitutes having perspective

should be guided by her reflective values.

At this point we should consider an ob?

jection to the account of perspective here

defended. One might observe that, given

the notion of perspective above, according

to which a person has perspective if she

responds in accordance with subjective

standards of appropriateness, even Rachel

might count as having perspective if her

green dress happens to be what is most

important to her on reflection. Given the

account of perspective defended here, it

seems that Rachel would count as having

perspective if, even in a reflective moment,

she cannot be made to see the relative

unimportance of her green dress. This will

seem quite unintuitive: first, because there

seems to be something seriously wrong

with Rachel's reaction to the hole in her

dress; and second, because Rachel seems

to be a paradigmatic case of someone who

lacks perspective. Given these two claims,

why should we accept an account of per?

spective that allows someone like Rachel

to have it?

The primary reasons to accept an account

of perspective according to which Rachel

might have it are the same reasons that we

should accept an account of well-being that

requires the pursuit of subject-relative, re?

flective values. If we make perspective





dependent on an appreciation of the objec?

tively correct values, we loosen our grasp

on the subjectivity of well-being. In so

doing we invite unnecessary skepticism by

resting the argument that virtue is essen?

tial for well-being on a defense of particu?

lar objective values. We also run the risk

of proposing an account of well-being and

prudential virtue that many people are not

motivated to pursue.

There is more we can say about Rachel,

however, to explain our reactions to her

behavior. First, regarding the claim that

there is something wrong with Rachel's

reaction to her dress, we can still criticize

her, from the moral point of view, for hav?

ing the wrong values. Moreover, Rachel

might very well lack other prudential and

moral virtues. She certainly lacks deep

compassion that would allow her to grasp

what is important to other people from

their own points of view. The fact that her

own values are trivial and shallow implies

that she lacks imagination and mental culti?

vation. That she has all these shortcomings

should make us less uncomfortable with the

possibility that she has perspective: she is

not a paradigm of virtue by any means.

The claim that Rachel seems a paradigm

case of someone who lacks perspective is

more difficult to explain on the current

account of perspective, of course. The first

thing to notice here is that Rachel does not

have perspective if she is entirely unreflec

tive. The virtue of perspective presupposes

a reflective set of values with which one's

attitudes can be consistent. Reflective val?

ues are the values one would endorse in a

reflective moment. But if Rachel is inca?

pable of the kind of reflection needed here,

then she cannot have perspective. It is plau?

sible to say that some people?and Rachel

is a likely candidate?are incapable of this

kind of reflection. We might conclude that

Rachel is such a person if it is the case that

she cannot distance herself from her cur?

rent concerns, or entertain and consider

criticisms of her values. Second, given the

role of sympathy in perspective, if Rachel

is to count as having perspective, it cannot

be the case that she values the satisfaction

of her own basic needs and simply does

not take the hunger of others to be at all

relevant to her own reflective values. Such

a person would lack perspective because

she lacks the main capacity by which she

can be reminded of her own reflective val?

ues in times of temptation. The Rachel

under consideration here would have to

find the condition of her clothes more valu?

able than the satisfaction of her own basic

needs on reflection.

So, the objector would have to be think?

ing of a Rachel who has the wrong values,

who is capable of sympathizing with

threats to those values in the experience

of others, and who is reflective. But this

person is an unusual character. First, it is

unusual to find people who are reflective

and yet care more about clothes than their

own basic needs. Second, it is unusual to

find people who can sympathize with oth?

ers enough to take their experiences as

reminders of their own reflective values,

and yet who do not appreciate in the slight?

est that the others care most about entirely

different things. The capacity for minimal

sympathy is not easily contained: once we

appreciate others' experience enough to see

its relevance to our own decisions, the

natural tendency is to begin to see and ap?

preciate what the others value, rather than

just seeing their experiences through the

framework of our own values.

It does follow from the present account

that someone who is reflective and mini?

mally sympathetic would count as having

perspective even if she has the wrong val?

ues, as long as her thoughts and feelings are

appropriate given these mistaken values.





The point of the preceding discussion has

been to show that this implication of the

account of perspective is not as problem?

atic as it may seem.

4. The Value of Perspective

Perspective includes the ability to reflect

on one's values, the capacity for minimal

sympathy, and the disposition to have one's

values play an appropriate practical role

given the judgments arrived at in this re?

flection. What can be said in defense of

the claim that perspective is a prudential

virtue? In other words, how does perspec?

tive promote a person's good?

First, if a person's good requires, in part,

that she pursue values that she would en?

dorse in a reflective moment, we can see

that perspective is a constitutive part of a

person's good, and an inherently valuable

quality. Perspective includes the ability to

reflect on your values and to bring your

thoughts, feelings, and dispositions to ac?

tion into accordance with these reflections.

Insofar as a person has the virtue of per?

spective, then, she is disposed to act in

accordance with her reflective values. In

effect, the case for thinking that perspec?

tive has this kind of value was made in the

first half of the paper because we brought

considerations about well-being to bear on

our characterization of perspective as a

prudential virtue.

Second, perspective has an instrumental

role in bringing about a person's good. This

claim is the focus of the current section. It

will be helpful to begin thinking about this

question by considering Philippa Foot's

characterization of a virtue in terms of a

corrective for common human weak?

nesses.20 There are three weaknesses that

perspective helps to overcome: first, the

tendency to become distressed for a pro?

longed period when things we care about

are threatened; second, the fragile nature

of our ability to appreciate the good; and,

third, the tendency in deliberation to be

overly influenced by violent emotional re?

sponses or vivid but ungrounded thoughts

that are out of proportion to the actual

value of that to which we are reacting.

These weaknesses and the ways in which

perspective corrects for them to promote

our good will be discussed in the remain?

der of this section.

4.1. Preventing Unnecessary Distress

The Stoics noticed that people are made

miserable when the things we value are

threatened. We suffer painfully when we

lose our health, when our friends and loved

ones are sick or hurt, or our reputations are

tarnished. The Stoics' advice was to care

very little about anything except that over

which we have control: our character.

While we might think that the Stoics' no?

tion of what really matters was too lim?

ited, we can appreciate their advice if we

reflect on the fact that we are made miser?

able by our attachments to things that do

not matter as well as our attachments to

things that do. We frequently become over?

wrought and unhappy when our projects

are not going smoothly, even when we

know that these particular projects are not

as important to us as other things we value

that are not threatened. If perspective is,

in part, the disposition to respond in pro?

portion to the value one attaches to one's

commitments in a reflective moment, then

perspective can prevent some of the mis?

ery we have over things that do not matter.

Another lesson to be learned from the

ideal of the Stoic sage is that our natural

tendencies to form attachments and re?

spond emotionally do not always corre?

spond to our reflective judgments of what

is important. The Stoic sage is an ideal

because he or she really does care about

things in proportion to the value they have.

This is something that needs to be





achieved; it is not the natural state for most

people. Part of the problem here is that we

care too much about things that do not

matter (money, power, external goods),

and, as we have discussed, we are disposed

to become miserable when these things are

lost or threatened. But this is not the end

of the story. Just as the non-Stoic tends to

fail to appreciate the value of her own char?

acter, so too we tend to fail to appreciate

the value of the things that we judge on

reflection to be most important. This brings

us to the second way in which perspective

compensates for human weaknesses to pro?

mote our good.

4.2. Encouraging Appreciation

When you ask people what really mat?

ters they say that the things that are truly

important are things such as their friends,

their health and the health of those they

love, some measure of success in their cho?

sen projects, and doing something that

makes the world a better place.21 But then

if we observe the practice of these same

people, we find that their behavior and their

emotional responses do not correspond to

their judgments that these are the things

that really matter. Health, although most

of us would list it as something that really

matters, is something we do not even no?

tice until it is in jeopardy. Many of us are

prone to take for granted the values that we

are succeeding in realizing; we get caught

up in other things and we do not take the

time to appreciate the value of friendship,

health, or the successes we have had.

There seems to be a human tendency to

worry about the things that are not going

smoothly, and to ignore the things that are.

Of course, this kind of tendency makes a

certain amount of sense. After all, if we

were to ignore the things that really need

our attention we would certainly be frus?

trated in our pursuits. But this tendency

makes our ability to appreciate the value

that is available to us somewhat fragile.

Consider the fact that when one spends a

long time not appreciating the good in

things, one can become depressed and un?

able to find anything pleasant, fun,

stimulating, or in some other way worthy

of a positive response. The capacity to find

value in the world is one that must be cul?

tivated and used, or else it is at risk of

deteriorating.

Since having perspective requires appre?

ciating the value that we find, the person

with the virtue of perspective has, to some

extent, overcome the weakness in her abil?

ity to appreciate value. Overcoming this

weakness requires making an effort to turn

one's attention to things that are not de?

manding that attention. It requires, in other

words, a commitment to appreciating

value. The connection to our good is not

difficult to see: finding and appreciating

good things, in general, makes people

happy and prevents misery.

At this point we can notice the way in

which the virtue of perspective is like a

skill because the ability to appreciate value

is an ability that one can cultivate. To see

this we must think about why it is that some

values do not demand our attention, and

require an active effort on our part to ap?

preciate them. First, as already mentioned,

these values are by hypothesis ones that

are not threatened: nothing dramatic is

happening to them that would command

our attention. Second, it is also true that

many of these values are subtle, and re?

quire some training to appreciate. For

instance, the aesthetic value of some kinds

of natural beauty is quiet and delicate; it

is not as imposing as the aesthetic value of

a dramatic film, nor as entertaining as the

value of enjoying fine wine with a good

friend. The value of a peaceful moment, a

painting, a long walk, or the sensation of

one's health are what we might call quiet





values insofar as they do not demand

strong responses.

The ancients thought that virtues were

similar to skills in two respects: both re?

quire practice and habituation, and both

require intellectual grasp, or some level

of understanding what it is that you are

doing in exercising your skill. 22 Unobtru?

sive or quiet values take skill to appre?

ciate in the sense that we can train

ourselves to appreciate them. We can prac?

tice achieving the peace of mind that en?

ables us to appreciate a walk in the woods.

We can cultivate the habit of noticing the

value of a peaceful moment rather than

allowing the moment to be filled up with

mental clutter. It is not as plain that appre?

ciating value requires understanding of

what one is doing, but there is a compari?

son to be made here too, at least with re?

spect to certain kinds of values. Notice that

we can deepen our appreciation of the

kinds of quiet values mentioned above by

learning about the value in question. We

can develop a greater appreciation for

works of art, for example, when we know

something about the art form. Although we

can appreciate the value of nature without

knowing much about it, we might think that

some knowledge of the ecosystem we en?

counter can help to sustain our apprecia?

tion and keep us from becoming bored or

indifferent.

The skill of appreciating quiet values and

the commitment to appreciating the value

that is available can promote a person's

good in several ways. First, appreciating

the value of nature, for example, can add

to our happiness and deflect misery pre?

cisely because of its relative serenity. If,

as Mill thought, we need a balance of tran

quility and excitement in our lives, then

achieving some serenity by appreciating

the value of nature might be an important

part of our good.23 Furthermore, these quiet

values are often available to appreciate

when other things are not. A person who

has the ability to value what is around her,

and to take pleasure in the more perma?

nent features of her environment, is less

likely to be miserable and unhappy than

those who do not have these skills. Finally,

the ability to appreciate and the commit?

ment to find value can overcome the

psychological inertia that makes us con?

tinue worrying about what we do not have

rather than cherishing what we do.

4.3. Aiding Deliberation

The emphasis on serenity and calm ap?

preciation of nature (or any subtle value,

for that matter) that is part of the virtue of

perspective recalls the advice that is often

given to practical reasoners to deliberate

in a calm, cool moment. This brings us to

the third way in which the virtue of per?

spective conduces to a person's good by

compensating for a weakness. Having per?

spective can help us to deliberate better

about our own good.

Why is the common wisdom that we can

make better decisions in a calm, cool mo?

ment? Making good decisions, whether

these decision are moral or prudential, re?

quires (among other things) appreciating

the facts, and giving each consideration the

right amount of weight. When moral phi?

losophers invoke the notion of a cool

reflective moment they seem to be trying

to compensate for fleeting and violent pas?

sions that can distract our conscience, or

our faculty of reason, from what facts are

relevant, and what importance the various

facts actually have.24 Butler's point in in?

voking this notion is not that we make our

best decisions when we feel no emotions

or sentiments at all. On the contrary, But?

ler thinks we need to be guided by cool

self-love and benevolence.25 Butler's point

is that there are passions that distort or




318/ AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

conceal the facts about what is really at

stake in our choices.

We can see, then, how perspective would

aid us in making better decisions. The per?

son with perspective has emotional re?

sponses that are in proportion given her hi?

erarchy of values. This means that the

psychological forces that sometimes dis?

tort our sense of what is important are, in?

stead, counteracted by perspective. The

person with perspective is not misled by

inappropriate emotions or distracted by

disturbing thoughts because her emotional

responses are appropriate to the various

values that are at stake in her choice. For

example, consider a graduate student who

is distraught because he has received some

insulting and vituperative comments from

one of his professors. In the midst of feel?

ing most hurt by the comments, and most

insecure about his own abilities, he con?

siders whether he ought to stay in gradu?

ate school. Most of us who have encoun?

tered such a student have advised the student

to postpone deliberating about major life

choices until the immediate sting of the ex?

perience subsides. We do this because we

do not think that one set of nasty comments

warrants the student's response, and we

think that the student's perception of the

facts is distorted by his immediate, inflated

reaction.26 Violent passions, as Butler re?

alized, can lead us astray from correct

judgments about our own good, just as they

can lead us morally astray. The person with

perspective is disposed to recognize that

nasty comments from one person are not

worth the kind of despair that would move

him to reevaluate a major decision.

One might think that a person could

achieve these three benefits of perspective

without actually possessing the virtue, or

that one could, unluckily, fail to achieve

them despite possessing the virtue. This is

true, but it is not an objection to the present

account. First of all, we can point out that

perspective is inherently valuable for the

living of a life in pursuit of reflective val?

ues, independent of its likely effects. And

secondly, a defense of the virtues should

not be required to establish that each vir?

tue is necessary and sufficient for flour?

ishing. This puts the bar too high. As

Rosalind Hursthouse puts it,

[T]he claim is not that possession of the vir?

tues guarantees that one will flourish. The

claim is that they are the only reliable bet?

even though, it is agreed, I might be unlucky

and, precisely because of my virtue, wind up

dying early or with my life marred or ruined.27

To establish that a particular trait is a vir?

tue we must establish that it is reliably

correlated with well-being or flourishing

and that, therefore, it is a trait we all have

reason to cultivate from the point of view

of reflection on the development of our

own characters.

5. Perspective and Morality

The argument thus far was intended to

establish that perspective is a prudential

virtue in the sense that possessing it helps

one achieve one's own good. Because of

their very nature, it is easy to see why pru?

dential virtues are the kinds of virtues

people have an interest in developing.

Since most people are concerned about

their own good, most people have a reason

to develop the virtue of perspective. As we

begin to draw a connection between pru?

dential virtues and moral behavior, it is

important to start with reasonable expec?

tations for what can be accomplished. We

should not hope to establish that pruden?

tial virtue necessarily entails moral

behavior, nor should we hope to establish

that the virtue of perspective in particular

has implications for all kinds of moral

agency. Grand conclusions will have to





await a full account of the prudential vir?

tues and their relationship to morality. In

the meantime, what we can hope for here

is to show that people with the virtue of

perspective have dispositions that make it

more likely that they will be moral in some

respect. Perspective does play this role in

three ways.

First, a person who has perspective tends

to act in accordance with her own judg?

ments about what matters and therefore,

likely, with her moral judgments. This is

so because her emotions conform to her

judgments about what matters, and actions

are (at least in part) motivated by emotions

and feelings. Further, such a person is able

to make discerning judgments about the

relative merits of her values. Now consider

that most people do rank moral values high

in their hierarchies of values, when they

are being reflective. If the person with per?

spective tends to act in accordance with

these reflective judgments, then she will

be disposed not to sacrifice moral values

for the sake of other things she judges to

have less value. The person with perspec?

tive has a vivid sense of the importance of

her own moral commitments, and, insofar

as these commitments do figure promi?

nently in her own set of values, they have

more influence on her behavior than they

will for the person who is committed to

morality but who tends to get carried away

by the concerns of the moment.

In this way, the person with perspective

is disposed to avoid unreflective actions.

This is significant because it seems that in

many cases immoral action is the result of

acting on motives that are inconsistent with

one's judgments of appropriateness, or

motives that would be inconsistent with

these judgments if one made them at all.

Immoral actions, in other words, often re?

sult from rash decisions and facile judg?

ments about appropriate responses. To see

that this is so, consider that often when

people lie, cheat, or break promises it is

because they are narrowly focused on the

troublesome spots they are in, and they give

no thought to their commitment to treat?

ing others well, or even to the long term

consequences for their own interests of the

immoral action. Or, consider people who

ignore their friends, or their children, for

the sake of attaining financial security un?

til they reach the point at which they have

time to step back and think about what

there is of value in their lives. Mid-life and

existential crises often seem to happen to

those who have sacrificed what they really

would find important, on reflection, for the

sake of pursuing goals that demand their

immediate attention.

Second, the person with perspective has

the ability and the incentive to appreciate

moral values. Such a person cultivates her

ability to find value in the world by appre?

ciating the value that is available rather

than letting her emotional landscape be

dominated by the negative emotional re?

sponses to assaults on some of the things

she values. Now certain moral values are

more reliable objects of our commitment

than, for example, money or power. Money,

power, fame, reputation and, to some ex?

tent, success in our careers are very much

at the mercy of forces beyond our control.

Threats to our possession of these things

are frequent and somewhat unpredictable.

Finding value in our own character, or in

moral actions such as helping others, is

much less risky. Acting morally and de?

veloping moral virtues gives us a sense of

pride and the approval of our community,

and the commitment to morality is typi?

cally less subject to bad fortune than is the

commitment to getting rich or becoming

famous or powerful.28

Furthermore, the capacity for minimal

sympathy that is part of perspective will





incline its possessor to find the interests

and concerns of others to be important. As

was suggested in the discussion of Rachel,

the capacity for sympathy is not easily con?

fined to taking away a reminder of one's

own reflective values. Once one appreci?

ates that another person is experiencing a

threat to an important value, it is difficult

not to have compassion for that person, to

want this threat to stop and to be willing

to act for this reason. Sympathetic appre?

ciation of other people's experiences is

needed for perspective because it forces us

to see beyond our present concerns and,

frequently, causes us to see that our prob?

lems are actually quite trivial in compari?

son with what is at stake in the concerns

of others. But once we see that another

person has bigger problems, and we are

committed to the values at stake in that

other's situation, it is difficult to stop the

progression from minimal sympathy to

compassion and action. A person who lacks

this aspect of perspective is unlikely to

perceive when others are experiencing cri?

ses or threats to their interests, nor is she

likely to appreciate others' circumstances

as relevant to her own life at all. For this

reason, the person with perspective is,

other things equal, a better moral agent

than the person who lacks it.

Finally, the person with the virtue of per?

spective has a skill that is also necessary

for moral deliberation, namely, the ability

to reflect and make judgments without be?

ing overcome by her current concerns. If

we take the ideal point of view for moral

deliberation to be the impartial point of

view, then it is easy to see how the person

with perspective will be a better moral de

liberator. She is capable of considering

what is best without having her delibera?

tion determined by her own short term

self-interest and she is disposed to act in

accordance with this reflection. This does

not guarantee, of course, that she will be

completely impartial; however, at least one

common source of partiality?short term

self-interest?will be diminished in the

person with perspective. Even if we reject

the view that the moral point of view is

impartial, we can still agree that perspec?

tive is useful for moral deliberation. If the

ideal moral point of view is characterized

by attachments to particular others, the

ability to abstract from current short term

self-interest is necessary for giving those

particular attachments their due.

Having perspective does not guarantee

that the person with perspective will al?

ways act morally. However, those with

perspective tend to be free from some com?

mon motives for neglecting moral duties

and good deeds and they tend to be well

suited to engage in the kind of reasoning

that is required by morality. If perspective

is a virtue we have reason to cultivate in?

sofar as we are interested in our own good,

then most of us will have reason to culti?

vate it, and this means that those of us with

some commitment to morality will also

have reasons to avoid the moral pitfalls

mentioned above. Moreover, because of

her commitment to appreciating available

value and her capacity for minimal sym?

pathy, the person with perspective will be

more likely to endorse certain moral val?

ues in the first place.

One might object that perspective does

not give us moral reasons at all, but rather

that it only gives us a reason to develop

traits that happen to produce moral behav?

ior in people who have moral commit?

ments.29 This would not be quite fair. Some

of the particular reasons we will discover

when we take on the project of developing

perspective will be reasons to act morally.

For example, imagine that Rachel does

have some common moral concerns and

that her sister persuades her to get some





perspective. One thing she will find her?

self with reason to do is to reflect on what

really matters to her and to pay more at?

tention to it. This in turn might give her a

reason to pay more attention to the needs

of her family. In this case it would be natu?

ral to say that Rachel has a reason to act

better, morally speaking, by taking her

family's needs into account, that arises di?

rectly from the reason she has to develop

perspective.

Moreover, if it is correct that minimal

sympathy is not easily constrained and that

the person who acknowledges the experi?

ences of others will also tend to care about

those others, then perspective can do more

than merely produce moral behavior. The

virtue of perspective, according to this line

of argument, is conducive to having com?

mitments to moral ends. These commit?

ments, in turn, provide their own reasons

for action. In the case of Leah, her coming

to care about the interests of others would

give her reasons to promote their good and

these reasons would not be narrowly self

interested.

6. Conclusion

The virtue of perspective consists in

three abilities: the ability to reflect on your

values, the ability to learn from the expe?

riences of others, and the ability to bring

your thoughts, feelings and dispositions

into accord with these reflections. Accord?

ing to the argument provided above,

perspective thus defined helps us to achieve

good lives.

The goal of this paper has been to illu?

minate the kind of reflective life that is

good for human beings. It has also been

argued that there are reasons to think that

the conflict between morality and prudence

will be diminished in a person with per?

spective. If this argument is correct, then

an investigation of the prudential virtues

and the way that they complement each

other is a promising way to build a bridge

between morality and prudence.30

University of Minnesota

NOTES

1. See for example, Brad Hooker, Does Moral Virtue Constitute a Benefit to the Agent? in How

Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp.

141-155; L. W. Sumner, Is Virtue Its Own Reward? in Virtue and Vice, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul,

Fred D. Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 18-36;

and Thomas Hurka, The Three Faces of Flourishing, in Human Flourishing, ed. Ellen Frankel

Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.

44-71. Philippa Foot recommends at least taking seriously skepticism about the claim that jus?

tice is in one's self-interest and she objects to the tendency of modern moral philosophy to reject

this claim and yet to continue to see justice as a virtue. See her Moral Beliefs, in Foot, Virtues

and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), pp. 125-131.

2. For the purposes of this paper, no distinction will be made between well-being, prudential

value, and the good for a person.

3. This characterization of prudential virtues is in agreement with Julia Driver's characterization

of prudential virtues as character traits that produce good consequences for oneself. Julia Driver,

The Virtues and Human Nature, in Roger Crisp, editor, op. cit., p. 113, fn. 4. The characteriza?

tion assumed in this paper is not intended as a complete theory of virtue, but rather as a working

account that includes at least some necessary conditions. This rough account does, of course,

rely on the notion of a good for an agent. To provide a complete philosophical account of the





good for an agent is far beyond the scope of this paper, as is the task of relating and comparing

the concept of the agent's own good to the concepts of happiness, self-interest, and well

being.

4. There might be other ways of putting the same point, or of giving the same kind of advice. For

example, don't sweat the small stuff is closely related.

5. Barbara Kingsolver, The Poisonwood Bible (New York: HarperCollins Books, 1998), p. 430.

6. No particular thesis about the nature of value is assumed here. Rather, what is intended is the

psychological claim that we typically respond emotionally in these ways to what we value. Ac?

cording to some philosophers, valuing something is simply responding emotionally to it. This is

a stronger claim than the one assumed in this paper. For this stronger view see Elizabeth Ander?

son, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993); and

Gerald F. Gaus, Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory (Cambridge: Cam?

bridge University Press, 1990).

7. This is not to say that we can always change all of our dispositions toward some person or

project we once held dear. Emotional dispositions, for instance, can persist despite our wishing

they would not. Nevertheless, we can usually change the ways these dispositions are expressed in

action, and we can often cause them to lessen over time.

8. There is, then, a mean to be reached in attaining perspective on a particular commitment. It is

not obviously helpful, however, to characterize perspective itself as a mean. One might say that

perspective is the mean between obsession and indifference, but this seems to make perspective

into a static state according to which there is one correct attitude to take toward any and every

commitment. As will become more clear in the following sections, this is not how perspective

ought to be understood.

9. In its defense, the partial characterization of a person's good employed here is compatible

with many different accounts of the good for a person. The assumption that the pursuit of a set of

reflective values is (at least) necessary for the good sits very easily with informed or idealized

desire accounts of a person's good. For such accounts see James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Mean?

ing, Measure and Moral Importance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Peter Railton, Moral

Realism, in Moral Discourse and Practice, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 137-163; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cam?

bridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 395-433. It is also

compatible with other subjective accounts such as L. W. Sumner's account of welfare in his

Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). The assumption made here

would also find agreement among those who defend objective list theories that include autonomy

or reflection as one of the objective goods that makes up the good life for a person. For example,

see Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). The second as?

sumption, that the good for a person requires that she not be persistently miserable, distressed or

suffering, is also compatible with the theories above, although the informed desire accounts of a

person's good would take this claim to be contingent on the fact that people desire not to be

miserable.

10. See for example, Gary Watson's discussion of Frankfurt's account of free will in Free Agency,

in his Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 96-110. For an innovative critical

discussion of second order desire accounts of praiseworthiness and accountability, see Nomy

Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, Praise, Blame and the Whole Self, Philosophical Studies, vol.

93, no. 2 (1999), pp. 161-188. For criticisms of second-order-desire theories of value see Allan

Gibbard, A Noncognitivistic Analysis of Rationality in Action, in Social Theory and Practice,





vol. 9, nos. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1983), pp. 199-221; and Thomas E. Hill, Darwall on Practical

Reason, Ethics, vol. 96 (April 1986), pp. 604-619.

11. For an account of appropriate reflection developed along these lines, see Valerie Tiberius,

Full Information and Ideal Deliberation, Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 31, no. 3 (September

1997), pp. 329-338.

12. Objective values here are ends that are good for a person independently of her attitudes

toward them.

13. Women and Human Development, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 79

83. See also footnote 9.

14. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, p. 42.

15. It might be that one could respond appropriately just by luck, without making such judg?

ments. But this would not be paradigmatic of the virtue of perspective since virtues are not supposed

to lead to their good outcomes merely due to luck.

16. Sometimes it may even be appropriate to get carried away. The author is grateful to Cara

Nine for helpful discussion on this point.

17. See Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 172.

18. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Com?

pany, 1985), 1106M5-25.

19. Martha Nussbaum emphasizes this point in The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian

Conception of Private and Public Rationality in Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and

Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 54-105. Nussbaum and other

Aristotelians make the further claim that the discernment of the virtuous person cannot be cap?

tured by talking about universal rules or principles. This further claim is not assumed here; the

point is simply that having the virtue of perspective will require the ability to make judgments on

the basis of a fine appreciation of a complex set of facts.

20. See Foot, Virtues and Vices in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy,

pp. 1-18.

21. This is not a compete list, of course, but these things are likely to be on most people's lists.

Even among philosophers with various theoretical commitments, there is substantial agreement

about what matters. See for example, Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism, and James Griffin, op. cit.

22. See Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.

66-70. As Annas points out, different philosophical schools disagreed about how closely virtues

resembled skills. The Stoics thought the virtues simply were a type of skill, while Aristotle thought

that the virtues were like skills in some respects but unlike them in others.

23. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1979), p. 13.

24. See, for example, Bishop Joseph Butler, Sermon 1 Upon Human Nature in Five Sermons,

ed. Stephen Darwall (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983); Stephen Darwall, Im?

partial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 93-98; and David Falk, Hume

on Practical Reason, in his Ought, Reasons and Morality: The Collected Papers ofW. D. Falk

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 153-154.

25. Bishop Butler characterizes conscience as the ability to reflect coolly upon one's actions,

which corrects for our tendency to focus on consequences to ourselves. See Butler, op. cit., p. 30.





26. Notice that it is not always our emotions that lead us astray in this way. We could imagine a

similar student who responds with (appropriate) anger at the professor, but who dismisses his

anger as inappropriate because he has constructed an elaborate system of (unwarranted) beliefs

about his lack of ability.

27. Rosalind Hursthouse, op.cit., p. 172.

28. This is not to say that whether one can live up to one's commitment to morality and find value

in acting well is not at all subject to fortune. There might be what Williams has called moral

luck. The point here is simply that our commitment to morality is less subject to luck than other

commitments we have, and that, therefore, morality is a more reliable source for appreciating

value than some of these other commitments. See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck in his Moral

Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 20-39.

29. This objection is due to Michelle Mason.

30. For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper the author would like to thank Julia

Annas, Tom Christiano, Lori Gruen, Sarah Holtman, Michelle Mason, Elijah Millgram, Patricia

Ross, David Schmidtz, J. D. Walker, C. Kenneth Waters, and audiences at the Central Division

meeting of the American Philosophical Association (April 2000), and the Department of Philoso?

phy at the University of Arizona, and two anonymous referees for American Philosophy Quarterly.

tiberius, valerie- a prudential virtue

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