tianjin explosion – a chemist’s view - fpa australia · • tianjin was a large but preventable...

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TIANJIN EXPLOSION – A CHEMIST’S VIEW

Dr John AllumRegional DirectorHawkins and Associates (formerly HFS-Asia)


HAWKINS AND ASSOCIATES


HAWKINS INTERNATIONAL OFFICES

Dr John Allum

Dr Chun Chan

Ms Jessica Ng

Dr Sophie Parsons

Ms Yvonne Tung

Hong Kong Singapore

Dubai

Dr David Rose

Dr Nick Coogan

Dr Chris Wareham

Graham Cooper

Corporate Providerof Expert Services


UK TEAM(SLIGHTLY BIGGER)


OUTLINE

Corporate Providerof Expert Services

The Incident

Warehouse storage and shipping risks

Compliance and Issues


THE EXPLOSION (1)

• 2251 hours, 12 August, a fire was discovered at Ruihai International Logistics

• 1st explosion at 2334 (~45 min later)

• 2nd explosion 30 seconds later


THE NATURE OF THE EXPLOSIONS


CHEMICALS STORED AT WAREHOUSE

Chemical Quantity Class Nitrocellulose 496 4.1 Flammable solid / self-

reactive substance

Ammonium Nitrate 800 5.1 Oxidizing substance

Potassium nitrate 1046 5.1 Oxidizing substance

Sodium cyanide 360 6.1 Toxic substance

Total quantity of DG stored at the warehouse and immediate area

~ 4,800 mt at logistics areaA further 11,400 mt in the warehouses

1 – 9


THE EXPLOSION (2)

• 173 deaths, 8 missing, and 797 non-fatal injuries

• Cause of fire – nitrocellulose (NC)

• Cause of explosion – ammonium nitrate (AN)• According to a BAM report (German research institute on explosives),

equivalent to about 450 tons of TNT


SIMILAR LARGE SCALE EXPLOSIONS

• Oppau Germany – 1921, 4500 tonnes of AN exploded causing damage more than 30 km away

• Texas City Disaster – 1947, the SS Grandcamp, loaded with 7,700 mt of ammonium nitrate, exploded in port

• Toulouse – 2001, 300 tonnes of ammonium nitrate exploded

• Plus…


THE AFFECTED ZONES


THE AFTERMATH


HAWKINS (HFS-ASIA)

Contamination assessment


DEBRIS FROM THE EXPLOSION VISIBLE AT ALL TIERS


PHOTOIONISATION DETECTOR AND CYANIDE DETECTOR USED BEFORE SAMPLING


WIPE SAMPLING FOR POLYAROMATIC HYDROCARBONS AND CYANIDE

Adhesive templates used for swab samples


THE IMPORTANCE OF CHAIN OF CUSTODY


WHAT WENT WRONG

• A nitrocellulose fire – Hawkins investigate at least 2 – 3 of these incidents a year ( a known hazard)

• Storage of AN close to flammable materials

• Difficult to stop happening again without strong compliance and training


PROBLEMS WITH THE CODES

• There are problems in IMDG codes, but in general good

• However, shippers, manufacturers and logistics companies sometimes seek out and abuse grey areas in the codes


EXAMPLES OF PROBLEMS

• 4.3 cargoes (emit flammable gases when wet) are tested with distilled water

• Ship’s stores – not governed by the code• IMDG cargoes shipped as bulk cargo i.e. not in containers

(ferrosilicon)• Charcoals and 4.1 cargoes• Expandable polystyrene beads, as below


EXPANDABLE POLYSTYRENE (EPS) BEADS

IMDG UN 2211• Pentane – Flammable gas

• LEL of 1.4% and a UEL of 7.8%

• Heavier than air gas likely to accumulate in low-lying areas


EXPANDABLE POLYSTYRENE (EPS) BEADS

Class 9 cargo – miscellaneous DG cargoPacking group 3Special provisions: 207 & 965


FLEXIBLE INTERMEDIATE BULK CONTAINER (FIBC) PACKAGING


IMDG CODE


ONLINE ADVICE FROM A REPUTABLE CHEMICAL COMPANY


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION


THE OUTCOME


SUMMARY

• Tianjin was a large but preventable incident.

• There were significant storage issues on site, typical of many industrial fires/ explosions

• Lessons can be learnt from the incident need all sections of the DG goods industry to be involved. Manufacturer, Logistics and Storage, shippers, insurers, IMO and Local Governments. Training, resources, along with strong encouragement and enforcement


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tianjin explosion – a chemist’s view - fpa australia · • tianjin was a large but preventable...

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