thwarting the modern terrorist at hotels and special events · the mumbai attack india’s 26/11...

Thwarting the Modern Terrorist at Hotels and Special Events

Agenda

Introduction

Attacks on Special Events

Attacks on Hotels

Diagnosis of Tactics Utilized

Mitigation Strategies

Questions

Closing

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016

Special Event Attacks

Bataclan Theater – Paris, France

Cricket Team Lahore, Pakistan

San Bernardino

Nice, France

• Multiple Attackers

• Military Tactics Used

• Attacked security & LEO

• Employee/Contractor –

insider knowledge

• High Caliber weapons

used

• Suicide vests

• Vehicles

• Explosives


Impact on Special Events

Anticipate changes to meeting and event

industry

More destination research and

communications regarding risk

More attendee screening

Provide more employee training

Updating procedures and contingency plans

Adding more security staff

Working with local and federal law

enforcement

Developing new security plans

Predict no changes14%

27%

5%

15%

9%

19%

5%

15%

44%

MPI Meetings Outlook, Winter 2016AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016

Impact on Economy and Business Revenues

Egypt 2013 – 11% of countries

GDP tied to tourism

2014 – tourism reported

slumps of almost 31%, industry

earnings only $5.9bn.

Sinai hotel occupancy has

plummeted and as of January

2016 it is estimated to cost

$230-$300 million per month to

the economy 0

5000000

10000000

15000000

20000000

2010 2011 2012 2013

Egypt Tourism


The Mumbai Attack

India’s 26/11

One of the best planned terrorist attacks - audacious and ambitious

Multiple attacks at different locations prevented authorities from developing an overall assessment of the situation

The first “active shooter” type terrorist attack

Precise planning, detailed reconnaissance and thorough preparation both physical and mental

Terrorist reconnaissance done in late 2007 – consistent with other large scale terrorist operations

Terrorist planners stayed in the hotel during their recce and took a guided tour through the hotel, videoing the tour

Terrorists entered at the famous Leopold Café and moved to the rear entrance of the Taj

Walked through the grounds and ground floor of the hotel

Then swiftly moved to the upper floors causing confusion and delaying rescue operations

Suicide attackers who were able to operate effectively over an extended period of time

Heavily armed – assault rifles, machine guns, pistols, hand grenades, improvised explosive devices.

Additional supplies were placed around the hotel


Multiple Attacks


Taj Mahal

Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, Mumbai, India

26 November 2008, approx. 8:30pm

NSA 7 dinner in the Souk Restaurant on

the 25th floor

Approx. 30 fellow diners in the

restaurant – Americans, Europeans and

Indian elite


Overview

Heard a commotion advised that a fight had broken out

between two rival gangs

NSA team and diners received word that the hotel was

under attack by terrorists

Nobody was responding so Bob assumed leadership role

The restaurant was not safe – surrounded by windows

Found a supply of ‘weapons’ in the kitchen so armed with

meat cleavers and carving knives

Informed that terrorists were making their way to the top

of the hotel

No defence and nowhere to goAT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016

Reaction

NSA 7 found a conference venue on the same floor that could be secured

Established a ‘holding area’ and moved the restaurant patrons there

Already 120 people there – we were now 150 people

Barricaded the doors

Brought up the elevator and jammed it open

Took out the lights near the entrance

Positioned near each entry point

NSA team member in the ceiling

Addressed the group after every explosion or noise or at 20 min intervals

See the attackers / hear shots and explosions / see and hear activity at the

nearby Trident hotel

Stayed in “holding area” for 5 ½ hours

Moved the group down 25 floors as a fire had broken out below that was

moving towards the holding area

One floor at a time over 1 ½ hours until a safe route out was found AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016

Run

Group not under actual attack in the restaurant

We believed that the terrorists were heading towards us

Left the secured area only when the threat of fire became

imminent

Move slowly down 25 flights of stairs – took about 2 ½

hours

It took 7 ½ hours to get out

150 people were rescued


Hide

Terrorists were shooting anyone they could see

We were relatively safe - out of sight and they didn’t

know we were there

Occasionally spotted some of them but had no idea how

many there were

Sophisticated, well-planned attack on multiple venues

Found a hiding place and secured the area


Fight

We were armed with ‘weapons’

‘Element of surprise’ should a terrorist locate us

We were ready to fight

We had a fighting chance


Lessons Learned

Communications

2 people called 3 numbers

continuously / hotel lobby, security

manager and the Mumbai police

Getting info from our own people in

India as well as in South Africa

Pros and Cons of Broadcast

Information received was invaluable

BIGGEST CHALLENGE WAS TO

REMAIN UPDATED

Control

Who’s in charge?


Analysis of Attack Strategies

Armed assailants– Small team tactics used to storm

facilities, creating panic, driving evacuations to secondary attacks

Multi-stage bombing attacks & personnel flow during evacuation– Use of suicide vests as last resort

weapons

– Placement of VBIED near evacuation locations


Emerging

Strategies

Use of Drone to carry

payload of explosives or

chem/bio into unsuspecting

crowd at event or venue

Weaponization of

chemical/biological

materials

Re-emergence of “Sniper

Attacks”

Nice, France vehicles used

as weapons

Targeting of senior

executives in their homes –

i.e. cripple Marriott by

executing the leaders



"Layers of security” – beyond the building perimeter

Lessons from Marriott

Alternate or backup CCTV rooms

Maps or 3D walk-through models of the hotel

Train your staff to recognize surveillance and limit how much information is public.

Surveillance Detection Strategies

Protective Intelligence

Trained and Practiced Threat Assessment Programs



Thorough searches at entry points to the location

Where possible, create buffer / reaction zones

Communications - crisis communication strategy and

information management plan

Leadership

Communication training of all hotel staff

Train all staff in evacuation skills and crisis management

Empower staff to handle crises

Appoint key reaction staff on each floor

Ongoing drills and training

Plan for emergenciesAT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016

Back to Basics – Event Security

Assess

Plan

Secure

ClearPost

Credential

Open

Dynamics of event

security are changing

Basics still apply


Ask Us a Question

Thank you for attending.

Bob Nicholls

Director

Nicholls Steyn and Associates

[email protected]

+27 (11) 462-7540

www.nicholls-steyn.com

Chuck Tobin

Chairman & President

AT-RISK International

[email protected]

+1-561-998-0064

www.at-riskinternational.com

thwarting the modern terrorist at hotels and special events · the mumbai attack india’s 26/11...

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