Three Mile Island accident 1

Three Mile Island accident

After the accident president Jimmy Carter touredthe TMI-2 control room with (left to right) HaroldDenton, Governor Dick Thornburgh, and JamesFloyd, supervisor of TMI-2 operations, on July

9th, 1979.

President Jimmy Carter leaving Three Mile Islandfor Middletown, Pennsylvania, April 1, 1979.

The Three Mile Island accident was a partial nuclear meltdownwhich occurred in one of the two United States Three Mile Islandnuclear reactors in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, on March 28, 1979.It was the worst accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power planthistory.[1] The partial meltdown resulted in the release of smallamounts of radioactive gases and radioactive iodine into theenvironment. Epidemiology studies have not linked a single cancerwith the accident.[][2][3][4]

The power plant was named after the island on which it was situated,[5]

and was owned and operated by General Public Utilities andMetropolitan Edison (Met Ed). The reactor involved in the accident,Unit 2, was a pressurized water reactor manufactured by Babcock &Wilcox.

The accident began at 4 a.m. on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, withfailures in the non-nuclear secondary system, followed by a stuck-openpilot-operated relief valve (PORV) in the primary system, whichallowed large amounts of nuclear reactor coolant to escape. Themechanical failures were compounded by the initial failure of plantoperators to recognize the situation as a loss-of-coolant accident due toinadequate training and human factors, such as human-computerinteraction design oversights relating to ambiguous control roomindicators in the power plant's user interface. In particular, a hiddenindicator light led to an operator manually overriding the automaticemergency cooling system of the reactor because the operatormistakenly believed that there was too much coolant water present inthe reactor and causing the steam pressure release.[6] The scope andcomplexity of the accident became clear over the course of five days, as employees of Met Ed, Pennsylvania stateofficials, and members of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) tried to understand the problem,communicate the situation to the press and local community, decide whether the accident required an emergencyevacuation, and ultimately end the crisis. The NRC's authorization of the release of 40,000 gallons (about150,000 liters) of radioactive waste water directly in the Susquehanna River led to a loss of credibility with the pressand community.[6]

In the end the reactor was brought under control, although full details of the accident were not revealed until muchlater, following extensive investigations by both a presidential commission and the NRC. The Kemeny CommissionReport concluded that "there will either be no case of cancer or the number of cases will be so small that it will neverbe possible to detect them. The same conclusion applies to the other possible health effects".[7] Severalepidemiological studies in the years since the accident have supported the conclusion that radiation released from theaccident had no perceptible effect on cancer incidence in residents near the plant, though these findings are contestedby one team of researchers.[8] Cleanup started in August 1979 and officially ended in December 1993, with a totalcleanup cost of about $1 billion.[] The incident was rated a five on the seven-point International Nuclear Event Scale:Accident With Wider Consequences.[9][10]

Communications from officials during the initial phases of the accident were confusing.[11] There was an evacuation of 140,000 pregnant women and pre-school age children from the area.[12][13][14] The accident crystallized

Three Mile Island accident 2

anti-nuclear safety concerns among activists and the general public, resulted in new regulations for the nuclearindustry, and has been cited as a contributor to the decline of new reactor construction that was already underway inthe 1970s.[15] Public reaction to the event was probably influenced by The China Syndrome, a movie which hadrecently been released and which depicts an accident at a nuclear reactor.[16]

Accident

Stuck valve

Simplified schematic diagram of the TMI-2 plant[]

In the nighttime hours preceding theincident, the TMI-2 reactor wasrunning at 97% of full power, whilethe companion TMI-1 reactor was shutdown for refueling.[17] The chain ofevents leading to the partial coremeltdown began at 4 am EST onMarch 28, 1979, in TMI-2's secondaryloop, one of the three mainwater/steam loops in a pressurizedwater reactor.

Workers were cleaning a blockage inone of the eight condensate polishers(sophisticated filters cleaning thesecondary loop water), when, forreasons still unknown, the pumps feeding the polishers stopped. When a bypass valve did not open, water stoppedflowing to the secondary's main feedwater pumps, which also shut down. With the steam generators no longerreceiving water, they stopped and the reactor performed an emergency shutdown (SCRAM). Within eight seconds,control rods were inserted into the core to halt the nuclear chain reaction but the reactor continued to generate decayheat and, because steam was no longer being used by the turbine, heat was no longer being removed from thereactor's primary water loop.[18]

Once the secondary feedwater pumps stopped, three auxiliary pumps activated automatically. However, because thevalves had been closed for routine maintenance, the system was unable to pump any water. The closure of thesevalves was a violation of a key NRC rule, according to which the reactor must be shut down if all auxiliary feedpumps are closed for maintenance. This failure was later singled out by NRC officials as a key one, without whichthe course of events would have been very different.[19]

Due to the loss of heat removal from the primary loop and the failure of the auxiliary system to activate, the primaryloop pressure began to increase, triggering the pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) at the top of the pressurizer—apressure active-regulator tank—to open automatically. The relief valve should have closed again when the excesspressure had been released, and electric power to the solenoid of the pilot was automatically cut, but the relief valvestuck open due to a mechanical fault. The open valve permitted coolant water to escape from the primary system,and was the principal mechanical cause of the true coolant-loss meltdown crisis that followed.[20]

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Human factors – confusion over valve statusCritical human factors and user interface engineering problems were revealed in the investigation of the reactorcontrol system's user interface. Despite the valve being stuck open, a light on the control panel indicated that thevalve was closed. In fact the light did not indicate the position of the valve, only the status of the solenoid, thusgiving false evidence of a closed valve.[21] As a result the operators did not correctly diagnose the problem forseveral hours.[22]

The design of the PORV indicator light was fundamentally flawed, because it implied that the PORV was shut whenit went dark.Wikipedia:Please clarifyTalk:Three Mile Island accident#Human Factors When everything wasoperating correctly this was true, and the operators became habituated to rely on it. However, when things wentwrong and the main relief valve stuck open, the unlighted lamp was actually misleading the operators by implyingthat the valve was shut. This caused the operators considerable confusion, because the pressure, temperature andcoolant levels in the primary circuit, so far as they could observe them via their instruments, were not behaving asthey would have done if the PORV was shut as they were convinced it was. This confusion contributed to theseverity of the accident because the operators were unable to break out of a cycle of assumptions that conflicted withwhat their instruments were telling them. It was not until a fresh shift came in who did not have the mind-set of thefirst shift of operators that the problem was correctly diagnosed. By this time, major damage had occurred.The operators had not been trained to understand the ambiguous nature of the PORV indicator and to look foralternative confirmation that the main relief valve was closed. There was a temperature indicator downstream of thePORV in the tail pipe between the PORV and the pressurizer that could have told them the valve was stuck open, byshowing that the temperature in the tail pipe remained higher than it should have been had the PORV been shut. Thistemperature indicator, however, was not part of the "safety grade" suite of indicators designed to be used after anincident, and the operators had not been trained to use it. Its location on the back of the desk also meant that it waseffectively out of sight of the operators.[citation needed]

Consequences of stuck valveAs the pressure in the primary system continued to decrease, reactor coolant continued to flow, but it was boilinginside the core. First, small bubbles of steam formed and immediately collapsed, known as nucleate boiling. As thesystem pressure decreased further, steam pockets began to form in the reactor coolant. This departure from nucleateboiling caused steam voids in coolant channels, blocking the flow of liquid coolant and greatly increasing the fuelplate temperature. Even though some coolant volume was being lost through the open PORV, the volume of thesesteam voids increased much more quickly, resulting in a rising overall water level inside the pressurizer. Because ofthe lack of a dedicated instrument to measure the level of water in the core, operators judged the level of water in thecore solely by the level in the pressurizer. Since it was high, they assumed that the core was properly covered withcoolant, unaware that because of steam forming in the reactor vessel, the indicator provided misleading readings.[23]

Indications of high water levels contributed to the confusion, as operators were concerned about the reactor "goingsolid," which in training they had been instructed to never allow. This confusion was a key contributor to the initialfailure to recognize the accident as a loss-of-coolant accident, and led operators to turn off the emergency corecooling pumps, which had automatically started after the PORV stuck and core coolant loss began, due to fears thesystem was being overfilled.[24]

With the PORV still open, the quench tank that collected the discharge from the PORV overfilled, causing thecontainment building sump to fill and sound an alarm at 4:11 am. This alarm, along with higher than normaltemperatures on the PORV discharge line and unusually high containment building temperatures and pressures, wereclear indications that there was an ongoing loss-of-coolant accident, but these indications were initially ignored byoperators.[25] At 4:15, the quench tank relief diaphragm ruptured, and radioactive coolant began to leak out into thegeneral containment building. This radioactive coolant was pumped from the containment building sump to anauxiliary building, outside the main containment, until the sump pumps were stopped at 4:39 am[26]

Three Mile Island accident 4

After almost 80 minutes of slow temperature rise, the primary loop's four main pumps began to cavitate as a steambubble/water mixture, rather than water, passed through them. The pumps were shut down, and it was believed thatnatural circulation would continue the water movement. Steam in the system prevented flow through the core, and asthe water stopped circulating it was converted to steam in increasing amounts. About 130 minutes after the firstmalfunction, the top of the reactor core was exposed and the intense heat caused a reaction to occur between thesteam forming in the reactor core and the Zircaloy nuclear fuel rod cladding, yielding zirconium dioxide, hydrogen,and additional heat. This fiery reaction burned off the nuclear fuel rod cladding, the hot plume of reacting steam andzirconium damaged the fuel pellets which released more radioactivity to the reactor coolant and produced hydrogengas that is believed to have caused a small explosion in the containment building later that afternoon.[27]

NRC image of graphic TMI-2 core end-state configuration

At 6 am, there was a shift change in the control room. Anew arrival noticed that the temperature in the PORVtail pipe and the holding tanks was excessive and used abackup valve—called a block valve—to shut off thecoolant venting via the PORV, but around 32,000 USgal (120,000 l) of coolant had already leaked from theprimary loop.[28] It was not until 165 minutes after thestart of the problem that radiation alarms activated ascontaminated water reached detectors; by that time, theradiation levels in the primary coolant water werearound 300 times expected levels, and the plant wasseriously contaminated.

Emergency declared

At 6:56 am, a plant supervisor declared a siteemergency, and less than 30 minutes later stationmanager Gary Miller announced a general emergency,defined as having the "potential for serious radiologicalconsequences" to the general public.[29] MetropolitanEdison notified the Pennsylvania EmergencyManagement Agency (PEMA), which in turn contactedstate and local agencies, Governor Richard L.Thornburgh and lieutenant governor William ScrantonIII, to whom Thornburgh assigned responsibility for

collecting and reporting on information about the accident.[30] The uncertainty of operators at the plant was reflectedin fragmentary, ambiguous, or contradictory statements made by Met Ed to government agencies and to the press,particularly about the possibility and severity of off-site radiation releases. Scranton held a press conference in whichhe was reassuring, yet confusing, about this possibility, stating that though there had been a "small release ofradiation...no increase in normal radiation levels" had been detected. These were contradicted by another official,and by statements from Met Ed, who both claimed that no radiation had been released.[31] In fact, readings frominstruments at the plant and off-site detectors had detected radiation releases, albeit at levels that were unlikely tothreaten public health as long as they were temporary, and providing that containment of the then highlycontaminated reactor was maintained.[32]

Angry that Met Ed had not informed them before conducting a steam venting from the plant, and convinced that the company was downplaying the severity of the accident, state officials turned to the NRC.[33] After receiving word of the accident from Met Ed, the NRC had activated its emergency response headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland and sent staff members to Three Mile Island. NRC chairman Joseph Hendrie and commissioner Victor Gilinsky[34]

Three Mile Island accident 5

initially viewed the accident, in the words of NRC historian Samuel Walker, as a "cause for concern but notalarm".[35] Gilinsky briefed reporters and members of Congress on the situation and informed White House staff,and at 10 am met with two other commissioners. However, the NRC faced the same problems in obtaining accurateinformation as the state, and was further hampered by being organizationally ill-prepared to deal with emergencies,as it lacked a clear command structure and the authority to tell the utility what to do, or to order an evacuation of thelocal area.[36]

In a 2009 article, Gilinsky wrote that it took five weeks to learn that "the reactor operators had measured fueltemperatures near the melting point".[] He further wrote: "We didn't learn for years—until the reactor vessel wasphysically opened—that by the time the plant operator called the NRC at about 8 am, roughly ½ of the uranium fuelhad already melted."[]

It was still not clear to the control room staff that the primary loop water levels were low and that over half of thecore was exposed. A group of workers took manual readings from the thermocouples and obtained a sample ofprimary loop water. Seven hours into the emergency, new water was pumped into the primary loop and the backuprelief valve was opened to reduce pressure so that the loop could be filled with water. After 16 hours, the primaryloop pumps were turned on once again, and the core temperature began to fall. A large part of the core had melted,and the system was still dangerously radioactive.On the third day following the accident, a hydrogen bubble was discovered in the dome of the pressure vessel, andbecame the focus of concern. A hydrogen explosion might not only breach the pressure vessel, but, depending on itsmagnitude, might compromise the integrity of the containment vessel leading to large scale release of radioactivematerial. However, it was determined that there was no oxygen present in the pressure vessel, a prerequisite forhydrogen to burn or explode. Immediate steps were taken to reduce the hydrogen bubble, and by the following day itwas significantly smaller. Over the next week, steam and hydrogen were removed from the reactor using a catalyticrecombiner and, controversially, by venting straight to the atmosphere.

Radioactive material releaseOnce the first line of containment is breached during a reactor plant accident, there is a possibility that the fuel or thefission products held inside can be released into the environment. Although the zirconium fuel cladding has beenbreached in other nuclear reactors without generating a release to the environment, at TMI-2 operators permittedfission products to leave the other containment barriers.[citation needed] This occurred when the cladding was damagedwhile the PORV was still stuck open. Fission products were released into the reactor coolant. Since the PORV wasstuck open and the loss of coolant accident was still in progress, primary coolant with fission products and/or fuelwas released, and ultimately ended up in the auxiliary building. This auxiliary building was outside the containmentboundary.This was evidenced by the radiation alarms that eventually sounded. However, since very little of the fissionproducts released were solids at room temperature, very little radiological contamination was reported in theenvironment. No significant level of radiation was attributed to the TMI-2 accident outside of the TMI-2 facility.According to the Rogovin report, the vast majority of the radioisotopes released were the noble gases xenon andkrypton. The report stated, "During the course of the accident, approximately 2.5 million curies of radioactive noblegases and 15 curies of radioiodines were released." This resulted in an average dose of 1.4 mrem to the two millionpeople near the plant. The report compared this with the additional 80 mrem per year received from living in a highaltitude city such as Denver.[37] As further comparison, you receive 3.2 mrem from a chest X-Ray – more than twicethe average dose of those received near the plant.[38]

Within hours of the accident the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began daily sampling of the environment at the three stations closest to the plant. By April 1, continuous monitoring at 11 stations was established and was expanded to 31 stations two days later. An inter-agency analysis concluded that the accident did not raise radioactivity far enough above background levels to cause even one additional cancer death among the

Three Mile Island accident 6

people in the area. The EPA found no contamination in water, soil, sediment or plant samples.[39]

Researchers at nearby Dickinson College—which had radiation monitoring equipment sensitive enough to detectChinese atmospheric atomic weapons testing—collected soil samples from the area for the ensuing two weeks anddetected no elevated levels of radioactivity, except after rainfalls (likely due to natural radon plate out, not theaccident).[40] Also, white-tailed deer tongues harvested over 50 mi (80 km) from the reactor subsequent to theaccident were found to have significantly higher levels of Cs-137 than in deer in the counties immediatelysurrounding the power plant. Even then, the elevated levels were still below those seen in deer in other parts of thecountry during the height of atmospheric weapons testing.[41] Had there been elevated releases of radioactivity,increased levels of Iodine-131 and Cesium-137 would have been expected to be detected in cattle and goat's milksamples. Yet elevated levels were not found.[42] A later scientific study noted that the official emission figures wereconsistent with available dosimeter data,[43] though others have noted the incompleteness of this data, particularly forreleases early on.[44]

According to the official figures, as compiled by the 1979 Kemeny Commission from Metropolitan Edison and NRCdata, a maximum of 480 petabecquerels (13 million curies) of radioactive noble gases (primarily xenon) werereleased by the event.[45] However, these noble gases were considered relatively harmless,[46] and only481–629 GBq (13–17 curies) of thyroid cancer-causing iodine-131 were released.[45] Total releases according tothese figures were a relatively small proportion of the estimated 370 E Bq (10 billion curies) in the reactor.[46] It waslater found that about ½ the core had melted, and the cladding around 90% of the fuel rods had failed,[][47] with 5 ft(1.5 m) of the core gone, and around 20 short tons (18 t) of uranium flowing to the bottom head of the pressurevessel, forming a mass of corium.[48] The reactor vessel—the second level of containment after thecladding—maintained integrity and contained the damaged fuel with nearly all of the radioactive isotopes in thecore.[]

Anti-nuclear political groups disputed the Kemeny Commission's findings, claiming that independent measurementsprovided evidence of radiation levels up to five times higher than normal in locations hundreds of miles downwindfrom TMI.[] Randall Thompson, a health physics technician employed to monitor radioactive emissions at TMI afterthe accident, said "I think the numbers on the NRC's website are off by a factor of 100 to 1,000,".[46][49]

Some other insiders, including Arnie Gundersen, a former nuclear industry executive who is now an expert witnessin nuclear safety issues,[50][51] make the same claim; Gundersen offers evidence, based on pressure monitoring data,for a hydrogen explosion shortly before 2 pm on March 28, 1979, which would have provided the means for a highdose of radiation to occur.[46] Gundersen cites affidavits from four reactor operators according to which the plantmanager was aware of a dramatic pressure spike, after which the internal pressure dropped to outside pressure.Gundersen also notes that the control room shook and doors were blown off hinges. However official NRC reportsrefer merely to a "hydrogen burn."[46] The Kemeny Commission referred to "a burn or an explosion that causedpressure to increase by 28 pounds per square inch in the containment building".[52] The Washington Post reportedthat "At about 2 pm, with pressure almost down to the point where the huge cooling pumps could be brought intoplay, a small hydrogen explosion jolted the reactor."[53]

Aftermath

Voluntary evacuationTwenty-eight hours after the accident began, William Scranton III, the lieutenant governor, appeared at a newsbriefing to say that Metropolitan Edison, the plant's owner, had assured the state that "everything is undercontrol".[13] Later that day, Scranton changed his statement, saying that the situation was "more complex than thecompany first led us to believe".[13] There were conflicting statements about radiation releases.[54] Schools wereclosed and residents were urged to stay indoors. Farmers were told to keep their animals under cover and on storedfeed.[13][54]

Three Mile Island accident 7

Governor Dick Thornburgh, on the advice of NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie, advised the evacuation "of pregnantwomen and pre-school age children...within a five-mile radius of the Three Mile Island facility." The evacuationzone was extended to a 20 mile radius on Friday March 30.[12] Within days, 140,000 people had left the area.[13][14][]

More than half of the 663,500 population[55] within the 20-mile radius remained in that area.[12] According to asurvey conducted in April 1979, 98% of the evacuees had returned to their homes within three weeks.[12]

Post-TMI surveys have shown that less than 50% of the American public were satisfied with the way the accidentwas handled by Pennsylvania State officials and the NRC, and people surveyed were even less pleased with theutility (General Public Utilities) and the plant designer.[56]

InvestigationsSeveral state and federal government agencies mounted investigations into the crisis, the most prominent of whichwas the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, created by Jimmy Carter in April 1979.[57]

The commission consisted of a panel of twelve people, specifically chosen for their lack of strong pro- oranti-nuclear views, and headed by chairman John G. Kemeny, president of Dartmouth College. It was instructed toproduce a final report within six months, and after public hearings, depositions, and document collection, released acompleted study on October 31, 1979.[58] The investigation strongly criticized Babcock and Wilcox, Met Ed, GPU,and the NRC for lapses in quality assurance and maintenance, inadequate operator training, lack of communicationof important safety information, poor management, and complacency, but avoided drawing conclusions about thefuture of the nuclear industry.[59] The heaviest criticism from the Kemeny Commission concluded that "fundamentalchanges were necessary in the organization, procedures, practices 'and above all – in the attitudes' of the NRC [andthe nuclear industry.]"[60] Kemeny said that the actions taken by the operators were "inappropriate" but that theworkers "were operating under procedures that they were required to follow, and our review and study of thoseindicates that the procedures were inadequate" and that the control room "was greatly inadequate for managing anaccident."[61]

The Kemeny Commission noted that Babcock and Wilcox's PORV valve had previously failed on 11 occasions, nineof them in the open position, allowing coolant to escape. More disturbing, however, was the fact that the initialcausal sequence of events at TMI had been duplicated 18 months earlier at another Babcock and Wilcox reactor, theDavis-Besse Nuclear Power Station owned at that time by Toledo Edison. The only difference was that the operatorsat Davis-Besse identified the valve failure after 20 minutes, where at TMI it took 80 minutes; and the Davis-Bessefacility was operating at 9% power, against TMI's 97%. Although Babcock engineers recognised the problem, thecompany failed to clearly notify its customers of the valve issue.[62]

Upon his return to Dartmouth, Kemeny addressed Dartmouth college students. When asked what caused themeltdown, he replied that the proximate cause would probably never be known. The Government Affairs VicePresident confirmed that the Metropolitan Edison Company, which operated the company, had shortly beforereceived a warning from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that Babcock and Wilcox reactor valves werevulnerable to failure under certain conditions. He said he had sent it on to the Vice President of Engineering, whoconfirmed that he had read it. Shortly after that, the two men met at the water cooler where the Government AffairsVP asked the Engineering VP a question. The Government Affairs VP remembered the question as "Is there aproblem here?" The Engineering VP thought the question was "Have you solved the problem?" Both VPs agreed thatthe answer was "no". One walked away believing that the problem was solved. The other believed that he hadinformed his bosses that there was a problem. The issue was never resolved. Kemeny told the students that hebelieved it never would be. The proximate cause of the meltdown remains unknown and no proof of negligence wasever uncovered.The Pennsylvania House of Representatives conducted its own investigation, which focused on the need to improveevacuation procedures.

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In 1985, a television camera was used to see the interior of the damaged reactor. In 1986, core samples and samplesof debris were obtained from the corium layers on the bottom of the reactor vessel and analyzed.[63]

Effect on nuclear power industry

Global history of the use of nuclear power. The Three Mile Island accident is oneof the factors cited for the decline of new reactor construction.

According to the IAEA, the Three MileIsland accident was a significant turningpoint in the global development of nuclearpower.[64] From 1963–1979, the number ofreactors under construction globallyincreased every year except 1971 and 1978.However, following the event, the numberof reactors under construction in the U.S.declined every year from 1980–1998.[citation

needed] Many similar Babcock and Wilcoxreactors on order were canceled; in total,51 U.S. nuclear reactors were canceled from1980–1984.[65]

The 1979 TMI accident did not, however,initiate the demise of the U.S. nuclear powerindustry. As a result of post-oil-shockanalysis and conclusions of overcapacity,40 planned nuclear power plants had already been canceled between 1973 and 1979. Until 2012,[66] no U.S. nuclearpower plant had been authorized to begin construction since the year before TMI. Nonetheless, at the time of theTMI incident, 129 nuclear power plants had been approved; of those, only 53 (which were not already operating)were completed. Federal requirements became more stringent, local opposition became more strident, andconstruction times were significantly lengthened to correct safety issues and design deficiencies.[citation needed]

Globally, the cessation of increase in nuclear power plant construction came with the more catastrophic Chernobyldisaster in 1986 (see graph).

Cleanup

A clean-up crew working to remove radiation atThree Mile Island.

Three Mile Island Unit 2 was too badly damaged and contaminated toresume operations; the reactor was gradually deactivated andpermanently closed. TMI-2 had been online only 13 months but nowhad a ruined reactor vessel and a containment building that was unsafeto walk in. Cleanup started in August 1979 and officially ended inDecember 1993, with a total cleanup cost of about $1 billion.[]

Benjamin K. Sovacool, in his 2007 preliminary assessment of majorenergy accidents, estimated that the TMI accident caused a total of$2.4 billion in property damages.[67]

Initially, efforts focused on the cleanup and decontamination of thesite, especially the defueling of the damaged reactor. Starting in 1985,almost 100 short tons (91 t) of radioactive fuel was removed from thesite. The first major phase of the cleanup was completed in 1990, when

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workers finished shipping 150 short tons (140 t) of radioactive wreckage to Idaho for storage at the Department ofEnergy's National Engineering Laboratory. However, the contaminated cooling water that leaked into thecontainment building had seeped into the building's concrete, leaving the radioactive residue impractical to remove.In 1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced that, although it was possible to further decontaminate theUnit 2 site, the remaining radioactivity had been sufficiently contained as to pose no threat to public health andsafety. Accordingly, further cleanup efforts were deferred to allow for decay of the radiation levels and to takeadvantage of the potential economic benefits of retiring both Unit 1 and Unit 2 together.[]

Health effects and epidemiologyIn the aftermath of the accident, investigations focused on the amount of radiation released by the accident. In totalapproximately 2.5 million curies of radioactive gases, and approximately 15 curies of iodine-131 was released intothe environment.[68] According to the American Nuclear Society, using the official radiation emission figures, "Theaverage radiation dose to people living within ten miles of the plant was eight millirem, and no more than100 millirem to any single individual. Eight millirem is about equal to a chest X-ray, and 100 millirem is about athird of the average background level of radiation received by US residents in a year."[][69]

Based on these emission figures, early scientific publications, according to Mangano, on the health effects of thefallout estimated one or two additional cancer deaths in the 10 mi (16 km) area around TMI.[] Disease rates in areasfurther than 10 miles from the plant were never examined.[] Local activism in the 1980s, based on anecdotal reportsof negative health effects, led to scientific studies being commissioned. A variety of epidemiology studies haveconcluded that the accident has had no observable long term health effects.[70][][71]

The Radiation and Public Health Project, an organization with little credibility amongst epidemiologists,[72] citedcalculations by its member Joseph Mangano—who has authored 19 medical journal articles and a book on Low LevelRadiation and Immune Disease—that reported a spike in infant mortality in the downwind communities two yearsafter the accident.[][73] Anecdotal evidence also records effects on the region's wildlife.[] For example, according toone anti-nuclear activist, Harvey Wasserman, the fallout caused "a plague of death and disease among the area's wildanimals and farm livestock", including a sharp fall in the reproductive rate of the region's horses and cows, reflectedin statistics from Pennsylvania's Department of Agriculture, though the Department denies a link with TMI.[74]

Activism and legal action

Anti-nuclear protest at Harrisburg in1979, following the Three Mile

Island Accident.

The TMI accident enhanced the credibility of anti-nuclear groups, who hadpredicted an accident,[75] and triggered protests around the world.[76]

Members of the American public, concerned about the release of radioactive gasfrom the TMI accident, staged numerous anti-nuclear demonstrations across thecountry in the following months. The largest demonstration was held in NewYork City in September 1979 and involved 200,000 people, with speeches givenby Jane Fonda and Ralph Nader.[77][78][79] The New York rally was held inconjunction with a series of nightly “No Nukes” concerts given at MadisonSquare Garden from September 19–23 by Musicians United for Safe Energy. Inthe previous May, an estimated 65,000 people—including California GovernorJerry Brown—attended a march and rally against nuclear power in Washington,D.C.[78]

In 1981, citizens' groups succeeded in a class action suit against TMI, winning$25 million in an out-of-court settlement. Part of this money was used to found

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the TMI Public Health Fund.[80] In 1983, a federal grand jury indicted Metropolitan Edison on criminal charges forthe falsification of safety test results prior to the accident.[81] Under a plea-bargaining agreement, Met Ed pleadedguilty to one count of falsifying records and no contest to six other charges, four of which were dropped, and agreedto pay a $45,000 fine and set up a $1 million account to help with emergency planning in the area surrounding theplant.[82]

According to Eric Epstein, chair of Three Mile Island Alert, the TMI plant operator and its insurers paid at least$82 million in publicly documented compensation to residents for "loss of business revenue, evacuation expensesand health claims".[83] Also according to Harvey Wasserman, hundreds of out-of-court settlements have beenreached with alleged victims of the fallout, with a total of $15m paid out to parents of children born with birthdefects.[84] However, a class action lawsuit alleging that the accident caused detrimental health effects was rejectedby Harrisburg U.S. District Court Judge Sylvia Rambo. The appeal of the decision in front of U.S. Third CircuitCourt of Appeals also failed.[]

Lessons learnedThe Three Mile Island accident inspired Charles Perrow's Normal Accident Theory, in which an accident occurs,resulting from an unanticipated interaction of multiple failures in a complex system. TMI was an example of thistype of accident because it was "unexpected, incomprehensible, uncontrollable and unavoidable".[85]

Perrow concluded that the failure at Three Mile Island was a consequence of the system's immensecomplexity. Such modern high-risk systems, he realized, were prone to failures however well they weremanaged. It was inevitable that they would eventually suffer what he termed a 'normal accident'.Therefore, he suggested, we might do better to contemplate a radical redesign, or if that was notpossible, to abandon such technology entirely.[]

"Normal" accidents, or system accidents, are so-called by Perrow because such accidents are inevitable in extremelycomplex systems. Given the characteristic of the system involved, multiple failures which interact with each otherwill occur, despite efforts to avoid them.[86] Such events appear trivial to begin with before cascading through thesystem in unpredictable ways to cause a large event with severe consequences.[]

Normal Accidents contributed key concepts to a set of intellectual developments in the 1980s thatrevolutionized the conception of safety and risk. It made the case for examining technological failures asthe product of highly interacting systems, and highlighted organizational and management factors as themain causes of failures. Technological disasters could no longer be ascribed to isolated equipmentmalfunction, operator error or acts of God.[]

The China SyndromeThe accident at the plant occurred twelve days after the release of the movie The China Syndrome. The film featuresJack Lemmon as a supervisor at a nuclear plant who uncovers evidence of a potential nuclear catastrophe and JaneFonda as a television news reporter at a California television station. In the film, a major nuclear plant crisis takesplace while Fonda's character and her cameraman (Michael Douglas) are at the plant producing a series on nuclearpower. Fonda and Lemmon proceed to raise awareness regarding the unsafe conditions at the plant.After the release of the film, Fonda began lobbying against nuclear power. In an attempt to counter her efforts,Edward Teller, a nuclear physicist and long-time government science adviser nicknamed the "father of the hydrogenbomb", personally lobbied in favor of nuclear power.[87] Edward Teller suffered a heart attack from the stress ofcountering the increase in anti-nuclear hysteria that followed the film, and because of this, he often quipped that hewas the only person whose health was affected by the TMI incident.[88]

Three Mile Island accident 11

Current status

Viewed from the west, Three Mile Island currently uses only one nucleargenerating station, TMI-1, which is on the left. TMI-2, to the right, has not beenused since the accident. Note that this is a pre-accident photo taken when TMI-2

was in operation.

Unit 1 had its license temporarily suspendedfollowing the incident at Unit 2. Althoughthe citizens of the three countiessurrounding the site voted by a margin of3:1 to retire Unit 1 permanently,[citation

needed] it was permitted to resume operationsin 1985. General Public UtilitiesCorporation, the plant's owner, formedGeneral Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation(GPUN) as a new subsidiary to own andoperate the company's nuclear facilities,including Three Mile Island. The plant hadpreviously been operated by MetropolitanEdison Company (Met-Ed), one of GPU'sregional utility operating companies. In1996, General Public Utilities shortened itsname to GPU Inc. Three Mile Island Unit 1

was sold to AmerGen Energy Corporation, a joint venture between Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO), andBritish Energy, in 1998. In 2000, PECO merged with Unicom Corporation to form Exelon Corporation, whichacquired British Energy's share of AmerGen in 2003. Today, AmerGen LLC is a fully owned subsidiary of ExelonGeneration and owns TMI Unit 1, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, and Clinton Power Station. These threeunits, in addition to Exelon's other nuclear units, are operated by Exelon Nuclear Inc., an Exelon subsidiary.[citation

needed]

General Public Utilities was legally obliged to continue to maintain and monitor the site, and therefore retainedownership of Unit 2 when Unit 1 was sold to AmerGen in 1998. GPU Inc. was acquired by FirstEnergy Corporationin 2001, and subsequently dissolved. FirstEnergy then contracted out the maintenance and administration of Unit 2to AmerGen. Unit 2 has been administered by Exelon Nuclear since 2003, when Exelon Nuclear's parent company,Exelon, bought out the remaining shares of AmerGen, inheriting FirstEnergy's maintenance contract. Unit 2continues to be licensed and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a condition known as PostDefueling Monitored Storage (PDMS).[89]

Today, the TMI-2 reactor is permanently shut down with the reactor coolant system drained, the radioactive waterdecontaminated and evaporated, radioactive waste shipped off-site, reactor fuel and core debris shipped off-site to aDepartment of Energy facility, and the remainder of the site is being monitored. The owner says it will keep thefacility in long-term, monitored storage until the operating license for the TMI-1 plant expires at which time bothplants will be decommissioned.[] In 2009, the NRC granted a license extension which means the TMI-1 reactor mayoperate until April 19, 2034.[90][]

Timeline

Three Mile Island accident 12

Date Event

1968–1970 Construction

April 1974 Reactor-1 online

Feb 1978 Reactor-2 online

March1979

TMI-2 accident occurred. Containment coolant and unknown amounts of radioactive contamination released into environment.

April 1979 Containment steam vented to the atmosphere in order to stabilize the core.

July 1980 Approximately 1,591 TBq (43,000 curies) of krypton were vented from the reactor building.

July 1980 The first manned entry into the reactor building took place.

Nov. 1980 An Advisory Panel for the Decontamination of TMI-2, composed of citizens, scientists, and State and local officials, held its firstmeeting in Harrisburg, PA.

July 1984 The reactor vessel head (top) was removed.

Oct. 1985 Defueling began.

July 1986 The off-site shipment of reactor core debris began.

Aug. 1988 GPU submitted a request for a proposal to amend the TMI-2 license to a "possession-only" license and to allow the facility to enterlong-term monitoring storage.

Jan. 1990 Defueling was completed.

July 1990 GPU submitted its funding plan for placing $229 million in escrow for radiological decommissioning of the plant.

Jan. 1991 The evaporation of accident-generated water began.

April 1991 NRC published a notice of opportunity for a hearing on GPU's request for a license amendment.

Feb. 1992 NRC issued a safety evaluation report and granted the license amendment.

Aug. 1993 The processing of accident-generated water was completed involving 2.23 million gallons.

Sept. 1993 NRC issued a possession-only license.

Sept. 1993 The Advisory Panel for Decontamination of TMI-2 held its last meeting.

Dec. 1993 Post-Defueling Monitoring Storage began.

Oct. 2009 TMI-1 license extended from April 2014 until 2034.

References[1] Nuclear Regulatory Commission – Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident (http:/ / www. nrc. gov/ reading-rm/ doc-collections/

fact-sheets/ 3mile-isle. html)[2] http:/ / www. ncbi. nlm. nih. gov/ pubmed/ 18300710 RJ Levin (2008), "Incidence of thyroid cancer in residents surrounding the three mile

island nuclear facility", Laryngoscope 118 (4), pp. 618-628 "Thyroid cancer incidence has not increased in Dauphin County, the county inwhich TMI is located. York County demonstrated a trend toward increasing thyroid cancer incidence beginning in 1995, approximately 15years after the TMI accident. Lancaster County showed a significant increase in thyroid cancer incidence beginning in 1990. These findings,however, do not provide a causal link to the TMI accident."

[4] http:/ / www. uvm. edu/ ~vlrs/ Energy/ NuclearPower. pdf[6] Minutes to Meltdown: Three Mile Island (http:/ / channel. nationalgeographic. com/ episode/ minutes-to-meltdown-three-mile-island-1092/

Overviewixzz1H5xu6iP2) – National Geographic[7][7] Kemeny, p. 12[8] Walker, pp. 234–237[12] Susan Cutter and Barnes, Evacuation behavior and Three Mile Island (http:/ / www. crid. or. cr/ digitalizacion/ pdf/ eng/ doc540/

doc540-contenido. pdf), Disasters, vol.6, 1982, p 116-124.[13] A Decade Later, TMI's Legacy Is Mistrust (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-srv/ national/ longterm/ tmi/ stories/ decade032889.

htm) The Washington Post, March 28, 1989, p. A01.[14] People & Events: Dick Thornburgh (http:/ / www. pbs. org/ wgbh/ amex/ three/ peopleevents/ pandeAMEX97. html)

Three Mile Island accident 13

[15] Michael Levi on Nuclear Policy, in video "Tea with the Economist", 1:55–2:10, on http:/ / audiovideo. economist. com/ , retrieved April 6th2011, 3.24pm.

[17][17] Walker, p. 71[18] Walker, pp. 72–73[19] The Washington Post, A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-srv/ national/ longterm/ tmi/ stories/ ch1.

htm)[20] Walker, pp. 73–74[22] Rogovin, pp. 14–15.[23][23] Kemeny, p. 94[24] Rogovin, p. 16, Walker, pp. 76–77[25] Kemeny, p. 96; Rogovin, pp. 17–18[26][26] Kemeny, p. 96[27][27] Kemeny, p. 99[28][28] Rogovin, p. 19; Walker, p. 78[29][29] Walker, p. 79[30] Walker, pp. 80–81[31] Walker, pp. 80–84[32] Walker, pp. 84–86[33][33] Walker, p. 87[34] NRC: Victor Gilinsky (http:/ / www. nrc. gov/ about-nrc/ organization/ commission/ former-commissioners/ gilinsky. html)[35][35] Walker p. 89[36] Walker, pp. 90–91[37][37] Rogovin, pp. 25,153.[38] http:/ / www. physics. isu. edu/ radinf/ risk. htm[39] EPA's Role At Three Mile Island | EPA History | US EPA (http:/ / www. epa. gov/ history/ topics/ tmi/ 02. htm). Epa.gov. Retrieved on

March 17, 2011.[40] 3 (http:/ / www. threemileisland. org/ science/ pdfs/ what_dickinson_found. pdf). (PDF). Retrieved on March 17, 2011.[42] http:/ / www. threemileisland. org/ downloads/ 210. pdf[43] Hatch et al. (1997), Comments on "A Re-Evaluation of Cancer Incidence Near the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant" (http:/ / www.

pubmedcentral. nih. gov/ pagerender. fcgi?artid=1469856& pageindex=1), Environmental Health Perspectives, 105(1)[44] Reply to comments on "A reevaluation of cancer incidence near the Three Mile Island" (http:/ / www. pubmedcentral. nih. gov/

articlerender. fcgi?artid=1469992). Pubmedcentral.nih.gov (January 21, 2011). Retrieved on March 17, 2011.[45][45] Walker pp. 231[46] Sue Sturgis (2009) "FOOLING WITH DISASTER? Startling revelations about Three Mile Island disaster raise doubts over nuclear plant

safety" (http:/ / www. southernstudies. org/ 2009/ 04/ post-4. html), Facing South: Online Magazine of the Institute for Southern Studies, April2009

[47][47] Kemeny, p. 30[48] McEvily Jr., AJ and Le May, I. (2002), "The accident at Three Mile Island", Materials science research international, vol. 8(1) pp. 1 -8[49] Thompson and Bear (1995), TMI Assessment (Part 2) (http:/ / www. southernstudies. org/ images/ sitepieces/ ThompsonTMIassessment.

pdf)[50] Video: TMI and Community Health (http:/ / www. tmia. com/ march26) – Gundersen 30th anniversary testimony for the Pennsylvania

Legislature[51] Who We Are | Fairewinds Associates, Inc (http:/ / fairewinds. com/ content/ who-we-are). Fairewinds.com. Retrieved on March 17, 2011.[52] Kemeny, John G., (Chairman, 1979), President's Commission: The Need For Change: The Legacy Of TMI (http:/ / www. threemileisland.

org/ downloads/ / 188. pdf)[53] The Washington Post The Tough Fight to Confine the Damage (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-srv/ national/ longterm/ tmi/ stories/

ch4. htm)[54] Stephanie Cooke (2009). In Mortal Hands: A Cautionary History of the Nuclear Age, Black Inc., p. 294.[55][55] 1975 estimate.[56] Office of Technology Assessment. (1984). Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power (http:/ / www. princeton. edu/ ~ota/ disk3/ 1984/ 8421/

842111. PDF) p. 231.[57] Walker, pp. 209–210[58][58] Walker, p. 210[59] Walker, pp. 211–212[60][60] Kemeney Commission report to the President Overview, Overall Conclusion, 1st paragraph.[61] "Three Mile Island, 1979 Year in Review." (http:/ / www. upi. com/ Audio/ Year_in_Review/ Events-of-1979/ Three-Mile-Island/

12311692377023-3/ )[62] Hopkins, A. (2001), "Was Three Mile Island a 'normal accident'?", Journal of contingencies and crisis management, vol:9 iss:2 pg:65 -72

Three Mile Island accident 14

[63] "Examination of relocated fuel debris adjacent to the lower head of the TMI-2 reactor vessel" (http:/ / www. osti. gov/ bridge/ product.biblio. jsp?osti_id=10140801)

[65] Cancelled Nuclear Units Ordered in the United States (http:/ / www. homestead. com/ clonemaster/ files/ Cancel. htm)[67] Benjamin K. Sovacool. The costs of failure: A preliminary assessment of major energy accidents, 1907–2007, Energy Policy 36 (2008), p.

1807.[68][68] Rogovin, pp. 153.[71][71] RJ Levin (2008), "Incidence of thyroid cancer in residents surrounding the three mile island nuclear facility", Laryngoscope 118 (4), pp.

618-628 "These findings, however, do not provide a causal link to the TMI accident."[72] http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2003/ 11/ 11/ nyregion/ baby-teeth-test-fallout-long-shot-search-for-nuclear-peril-molars-cuspids. html[74] Harvey Wasserman, CounterPunch, March 24, 2009, People Died at Three Mile Island (http:/ / www. counterpunch. org/

wasserman03242009. html)[75] Luther J. Carter "Political Fallout from Three Mile Island", Science, 204, April 13, 1979, p. 154.[76] Mark Hertsgaard (1983). Nuclear Inc. The Men and Money Behind Nuclear Energy, Pantheon Books, New York, p. 95 & 97.[77] Interest Group Politics In America (http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=YSdz4Cxqnx4C& pg=PA149& lpg=PA149& dq=nevada+

test+ site+ protest+ demonstration& source=bl& ots=nTFbGvuIvV& sig=mHTTpB0YnZiCNoxaM8u772e8Lj4& hl=en&ei=F0GzSfmmNMnUkAWxo_XJBA& sa=X& oi=book_result& resnum=5& ct=result#PPA149,M1) p. 149.

[78] Social Protest and Policy Change (http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=Kn6YhNtyVigC& pg=PA45& lpg=PA45& dq="three+ mile+island"+ anti-nuclear+ protests+ demonstrations& source=web& ots=rnr4LRrarL& sig=QboiWwnO5UIRJxIGqFuwOQq9nvQ& hl=en&sa=X& oi=book_result& resnum=9& ct=result#PPA45,M1) p. 45.

[80] Gayle Greene The Woman Who Knew Too Much: Alice Stewart (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=PdkJo5yerGYC& pg=PA178&lpg=PA178& dq="Alice+ Stewart"+ + + "three+ mile+ island"& source=bl& ots=kzKByb-M2Y& sig=VvkRzrozouHw50bF60rl9xjkiG4&hl=en& ei=6MvJSaOMF4mMtgfpnoWgAw& sa=X& oi=book_result& resnum=1& ct=result#PPA178,M1)

[83] Three Mile Island: 30 years of what if ... (http:/ / www. pittsburghlive. com/ x/ pittsburghtrib/ news/ multimedia/ s_617234. html) PittsburghTribune Review, March 22, 2009.

[84] Harvey Wasserman, April 1, 2009, CounterPunch, Cracking the Media Silence on Three Mile Island (http:/ / www. counterpunch. org/wasserman04012009. html)

[85] Perrow, C. (1982), ‘The President’s Commission and the Normal Accident’, in Sils, D., Wolf, C. and Shelanski, V. (Eds), Accident at ThreeMile Island: The Human Dimensions, Westview, Boulder, pp.173–184.

[86] Perrow, Charles. Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies New York: Basic Books, 1984. p.5[88] http:/ / en. wikiquote. org/ wiki/ Edward_Teller

Bibliography• Kemeny, John G. (October 1979). Report of The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island:

The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (http:/ / www. threemileisland. org/ downloads/ 188. pdf). Washington,D.C.: The Commission. ISBN 0-935758-00-3.

• Rogovin, Mitchell (1980). Three Mile Island: A report to the Commissioners and to the Public, Volume I (http:/ /www. threemileisland. org/ downloads/ 354. pdf). Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Special Inquiry Group.

• Walker, J. Samuel (2004). Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press. ISBN 0-520-23940-7. ( Google Books (http:/ / books. google. com/books?id=0EDwbQF5k24C& dq="three+ mile+ island"+ + + books& printsec=frontcover& source=bn& hl=en&ei=U9PLSbDxG4WEtwfz3qTaCQ& sa=X& oi=book_result& resnum=7#PPP9,M1))

• Ford, Daniel (1982). Three Mile Island: Thirty Minutes to Meltdown. Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-006048-5.• Osif, Bonnie A., Anthony Baratta, Thomas W. Conkling (2004). TMI 25 Years Later: The Three Mile Island

Nuclear Power Plant Accident and Its Impact. Conkling. ISBN 0-271-02383-X.• Dick Thornburgh (2010). Where the Evidence Leads. University of Pittsburgh Press. ISBN 13:978-0-8229-6112-3

Check |isbn= value (help).

Three Mile Island accident 15

External links• TMI web page from the US Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (http:/ / www. eia. doe.

gov/ cneaf/ nuclear/ page/ at_a_glance/ reactors/ threemileisland. html)• "Three Mile Island 1979 Emergency" (http:/ / www. threemileisland. org/ ) – website about the accident, with

many reports and other documents relating to the accident, created by nearby Dickinson College• Step-By-Step (http:/ / www. pbs. org/ wgbh/ amex/ three/ sfeature/ tmihow. html) account of the accident with

illustrations from pbs.org• Three Mile Island Alert (http:/ / www. tmia. com), the watchdog group that warned the public for nearly two

years that reactor #2 was dangerously faulty.[citation needed] What's wrong with the "fact sheet" (http:/ / www. tmia.com/ node/ 164) purports to correct errors in the NRC report.

• EFMR (http:/ / www. efmr. org/ ) citizens radiation monitoring group for the Three Mile Island and Peach Bottomnuclear plants

• Annotated bibliography for Three Mile Island from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (http:/ / alsos.wlu. edu/ qsearch. aspx?browse=places/ Three+ Mile+ Island,+ Pennsylvania)

• Video (http:/ / www. library. pitt. edu/ thornburgh/ collection/ series19. html#tmi) and audio (http:/ / www.library. pitt. edu/ thornburgh/ collection/ series20. html#tmi) relating to the Three Mile Island accident, from theDick Thornburgh Papers (http:/ / www. library. pitt. edu/ thornburgh/ index. html) at University of Pittsburgh.

• Killing Our Own (http:/ / www. ratical. org/ radiation/ KillingOurOwn/ KOO. pdf) a review of subsequentcasualties by Harvey Wasserman and Norman Solomon with Robert Alveraez and Eleanore Walters

• Three Mile Island – Failure Of Science Or Spin?, Science Daily (http:/ / www. sciencedaily. com/ releases/ 2007/01/ 070129152941. htm)

• 1979 – Three Mile Island (http:/ / www. wcbs880. com/ topic/ play_window. php?audioType=Episode&audioId=871710) A report from Steve Holt of WCBS Newsradio 880 (WCBS-AM New York) Part of WCBS880's celebration of 40 years of newsradio.

• Crisis at Three Mile Island (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-srv/ national/ longterm/ tmi/ whathappened.htm) by The Washington Post

• Inside TMI – The Three Mile Island Accident, Moment by Moment (http:/ / insidetmi. com) by Scott Johnson• Dick Thornburgh Papers at the Archives Service Center, University of Pittsburgh Series XI. Governor of

Pennsylvania, Subseries 7. Three Mile Island (TMI) (http:/ / digital. library. pitt. edu/ cgi-bin/ f/ findaid/findaid-idx?c=ascead;view=reslist;subview=standard;didno=US-PPiU-ais199830-11;focusrgn=C02;cc=ascead;byte=15477384)

Coordinates: 40.153293°N 76.72534°W

Article Sources and Contributors 16

Article Sources and ContributorsThree Mile Island accident  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=555211053  Contributors: 102orion, 21655, 28421u2232nfenfcenc, 2D, 3Easy, 4johnny, 57r575rff, ABF, ACSE,ASC 2011, Aarchiba, AastraPhone, Abdull, Abog, Accurrent, Acdx, Acroterion, AdiOltean, Aerion, Afpskierx, Agonizing Fury, Agw00, Ahoerstemeier, Ajcampanella, Al Gore For President,Alan Au, Alan Liefting, Alansohn, Alchemist Jack, Aleksandar Šušnjar, Alex Ji LT-21, AlexH555, Alistair1978, Allmightyduck, Alter70, Amaury, Andruil, Anyeverybody, Anynobody, Aphilo,Aquillion, AraH, Arcayne, ArnoldReinhold, Asams10, Asauers, Aselfcallednowhere, Astolmar, Athene cunicularia, Atomicgurl00, Aufrex, AustinKnight, Avriette, Axl, Azathar, Azumanga1,BOBBYSTOWE69, Bababadger, Badger Drink, Bakapupil, Barek, Barek-public, Barrylb, BassFace50, Bastiaquinas, Bcharles, Bender235, Beta16, Bgpaulus, Bicycle repairman, Bidgee,Bigjimr, Bigred2989, Bihco, Binabik80, Bleakcomb, Blubbaloo, Bobblewik, Bobby122, Bondegezou, Bongwarrior, BorgHunter, Boundarylayer, Branden, Brian0918, Brianmaersk, Brothejr,BruceDLimber, Btphelps, BuzyBody, Bwithh, Byelf2007, CO, Cadmium, Cakeofages, Calimo, CambridgeBayWeather, CanadianLinuxUser, Canterwoodboy, CapitalSasha, Carnildo, Caspian,Cassowary, Cde3, CecilWard, CenozoicEra, Cf. Hay, Cgingold, ChNPP, Chashak, ChrisGualtieri, CiTrusD, Ciphers, Ckruschke, Cleared as filed, Cliffb, CommonsDelinker, Coneslayer,Conortodd, Coralmizu, CowboySpartan, Crazymonkey1123, Crd721, Crenner, Cuye, D6, DRTllbrg, DV8 2XL, Dabomb87, Dan100, DandyDan2007, Daniel Quinlan, Danjewell, Danlaycock,Dasbrick, David Shay, Dawn Bard, Dblecros, Defender of torch, Dennyboy34, Deor, DerHexer, Derek Ross, Desert Tripper, Dhartung, Dhlstrm, Dhp1080, Dipankan001, Dirkbb, Discospinster,Djr xi, Dlohcierekim, Dmanc2, Dmn, DogNewTricks, Dogosaurus, Dominus, Dough4872, Dpbsmith, Dragons flight, Drakkenfyre, Drappel, Drcarasco, Driftwood87, Drpickem, E23, ERobson,Eaglewatched, Ed!, Edi45, Edward, Ektar, Elagerstrom, ElationAviation, Elb2000, Electron9, Elevatordisco, Eliashedberg, Enterprise Eric, Enviroboy, Epbr123, Epolk, Erik Carson, Erudy,Esw01407, Evercat, Excirial, Existing Company, F3nyx, FT2, Fastfission, Ferroequus, Fireswordfight, Fireworks, Fluffernutter, Fractisrob, Fragglet, Frank Lofaro 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Joffan, Johan Lont, John, John Nixon, Johnathan Smithberg, Johnfos, Jonathan Hall, JonathanDP81, Jusdafax,Jusjih, Jwdrake, KJS77, KPS123, Karenjb27, Kaszeta, Kayz911, Kbh3rd, Kchishol1970, Kd4dcy, Ke4roh, Keilana, Kevinbasil, Kgrr, Killiondude, Kilo-Lima, Kjoonlee, Koalasprint, Kolbasz,Korey.hite, Kostmo, Koyaanis Qatsi, Kralizec!, Krea, Kricke, Krm500, Kuru, Kwertii, Kylewhalensgay, L Kensington, LAX, Lambiam, Lamjus, Lanephil, Larry Doolittle, Laxdude97, Layla27,Lcolson, LeRoi, Leehach, Legitsource, Leoboudv, Leuko, Lightmouse, Limulus, Loafsta, Look2See1, Lordsigma12345, Loren.wilton, LostLeviathan, Lugia2453, LukusAreulius, Luna Santin,Lunchscale, Lupin, Lwnf360, MER-C, Macserv, Madhero88, Magus732, Magzy T, Maheshkumaryadav, Mahlon, Marek69, Master of Puppets, Mastertmf, Materialscientist, Matt T2, MatthewYeager, Maury Markowitz, Mav, Maximus Rex, Mbecker, Mboverload, Meelar, Megiddo1013, Mellery, Mholzner, Michael Hardy, Michael Snow, Michaelpgoad, Mikesheffler, 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Image Sources, Licenses and ContributorsFile:Carter TMI-2.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Carter_TMI-2.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: John G. Kemeny et alImage:Carter_leaving_Three_Mile_Island.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Carter_leaving_Three_Mile_Island.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors:President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile IslandImage:Tmi-2 schematic.svg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Tmi-2_schematic.svg  License: unknown  Contributors: US-Gov, traced by User:Andrew c, labeled byUser:StanneredImage:Graphic TMI-2 Core End-State Configuration.png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Graphic_TMI-2_Core_End-State_Configuration.png  License: PublicDomain  Contributors: Graphic_TMI-2_Core_End-State_Configuration.jpg: NRC derivative work: Das steinerne Herz (talk)Image:Nuclear Power History.png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Nuclear_Power_History.png  License: unknown  Contributors: Dragons flight, JamesEG,Joey-das-WBF, Josette, Santosga, Tetris L, Tosaka, 2 anonymous editsFile:TMI cleanup-2.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:TMI_cleanup-2.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: John G. Kemeny et alImage:Anti-nuke rally in Harrisburg USA.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Anti-nuke_rally_in_Harrisburg_USA.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors:unknown, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)Image:Three Mile Island nuclear power plant.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Three_Mile_Island_nuclear_power_plant.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors:unknown

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