Threats to Space CapabilitiesThreats to Space Capabilities

Space Security & Defense ConferenceSpace Security & Defense Conference

June 2008June 2008

UNCLASSIFIED

Randy JonesRandy JonesAssociate Technical DirectorAssociate Technical Director

Missile & Space Intelligence CenterMissile & Space Intelligence Center

UNCLASSIFIED

OutlineOutline

Motivation for development of counterMotivation for development of counter--space capabilitiesspace capabilities

MeansMeans•• Historical developmentsHistorical developments•• Technologies and potential weaponsTechnologies and potential weapons

Assessments & ProjectionsAssessments & Projections

SummarySummary

UNCLASSIFIED

MotivationMotivation

Military ImpactMilitary Impact•• Intelligence, Surveillance & ReconnaissanceIntelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance•• CommunicationsCommunications•• Positioning, Navigation, TimingPositioning, Navigation, Timing•• Missile Defense and other Missile Defense and other ““usersusers””

Primarily the domain of nearPrimarily the domain of near--peer statespeer states

Economic ImpactEconomic Impact

Potential for rogue nations & terrorist groupsPotential for rogue nations & terrorist groups

UNCLASSIFIED

Historical Developments Historical Developments –– FSU MissilesFSU Missiles

Air Defense

Tactical Missile Defense

UNCLASSIFIED

Historical Developments Historical Developments –– FSU MissilesFSU Missiles

Strategic Missile & Space Defense

UNCLASSIFIED

Historical Developments Historical Developments –– FSU MissilesFSU Missiles

Ballistic Missiles Space Launch Vehicles

UNCLASSIFIED

Historical Developments Historical Developments –– Chinese MissilesChinese Missiles

Air Defense

ASATJan 2007 Test

MIT

UNCLASSIFIED

MeansMeans

InfrastructureInfrastructureAttackAttack

Jammers Jammers GPS, SATCOM, GPS, SATCOM, ……

Nuclear Nuclear DetonationDetonation

(and non(and non--Nuclear Nuclear EMP)EMP)

OrbitalOrbitalThreatsThreats

DirectDirect--Ascent Ascent ASAT MissileASAT Missile

LasersLasers -- BlindingBlinding-- DamageDamage

DisruptiveDisruptiveDestructiveDestructive

UNCLASSIFIED

Space Object Surveillance and IdentificationSpace Object Surveillance and Identification

Robust SOSI capability:Robust SOSI capability:

•• Not a technological hurdle, but expensiveNot a technological hurdle, but expensive

•• Mostly a Mostly a ““nearnear--peer statespeer states”” issueissue

Accuracy requirement dependent on disrupt Accuracy requirement dependent on disrupt or destruct mechanismor destruct mechanism

•• Accuracy needed for KKV, laserAccuracy needed for KKV, laser

•• Not as important for RF jamming, nuclear ASATNot as important for RF jamming, nuclear ASAT

•• SOSI information can be found in open source SOSI information can be found in open source or acquired from other statesor acquired from other states

UNCLASSIFIED

Assessment Assessment –– NearNear--Peer StatesPeer States

Have the technical basis to develop robust Have the technical basis to develop robust countercounter--space capabilitiesspace capabilities

Performing R&D toward development and Performing R&D toward development and potential fielding of robust counterpotential fielding of robust counter--space space capabilitiescapabilities

•• Both disruptive and destructive capabilitiesBoth disruptive and destructive capabilities

•• Exploring multiple technologiesExploring multiple technologiesKineticKinetic

Directed Energy WeaponsDirected Energy Weapons

RF JammingRF Jamming

Space Object Surveillance and IdentificationSpace Object Surveillance and Identification

UNCLASSIFIED

NearNear--Peer Reactions to US ActivityPeer Reactions to US Activity

Believe US is developing:Believe US is developing:

•• GroundGround--based directbased direct--ascent ASAT missilesascent ASAT missiles““Behind the claim about dangers that this Behind the claim about dangers that this satellite constituted, [the Americans] were satellite constituted, [the Americans] were testing their ASAT weaponry.testing their ASAT weaponry.”” (RS reaction)(RS reaction)

•• ASAT lasersASAT lasersBelieve US technology has reached the level to Believe US technology has reached the level to support weapons requirementssupport weapons requirements

•• RFRF Jamming / RF WeaponsJamming / RF WeaponsTo disrupt and/or destroy satellite To disrupt and/or destroy satellite communications systems and other electronicscommunications systems and other electronics

““It is certain that other countries will speed It is certain that other countries will speed up R&D of their own antisatellite techniques up R&D of their own antisatellite techniques and tactics and tactics …”…” Chinese journal sponsored by ChinaChinese journal sponsored by China’’s s official news agency Xinhuaofficial news agency Xinhua

UNCLASSIFIED

Projections Projections –– NearNear--Peer StatesPeer States

2010 20202015

RF JammingRF Jamming

DisruptiveDisruptive

All All AltitudesAltitudesDestructiveDestructive

Orbital ASATOrbital ASAT

High Energy LaserHigh Energy Laser

DirectDirect--Ascent ASATAscent ASAT

Laser Laser -- Sensor BlindingSensor Blinding

UNCLASSIFIED

NearNear--Peer Employment of CPeer Employment of C--S CapabilitiesS Capabilities

Intent difficult to assess, but:Intent difficult to assess, but:

•• Unlikely to use nuclear ASAT options during Unlikely to use nuclear ASAT options during conventional conflictconventional conflict

Detrimental to their own essential space Detrimental to their own essential space capabilitiescapabilities

•• Hesitant to initiate use of destructive Hesitant to initiate use of destructive capabilitiescapabilities

But probably willing under appropriate But probably willing under appropriate conditionsconditions

•• Heavy use of disruptive techniques should be Heavy use of disruptive techniques should be expected in future conflictsexpected in future conflicts

UNCLASSIFIED

Rogue Nation / Terrorist PossibilitiesRogue Nation / Terrorist Possibilities

DisruptiveDisruptive•• RF JammingRF Jamming (Now)(Now)•• Low energy lasersLow energy lasers (Future)(Future)

DestructiveDestructive•• Nuclear ASAT capability?Nuclear ASAT capability?

Less concern about collateral damageLess concern about collateral damageLess requirement for accurate SOSILess requirement for accurate SOSI

++Missile-Deliverable NuclearWeapons

MissileMissile--Deliverable Deliverable NuclearNuclearWeaponsWeapons

Space Launch or

BallisticMissile

Expertise

Space Launch Space Launch or or

BallisticBallisticMissile Missile

ExpertiseExpertise

UNCLASSIFIED

Foreign Ballistic Missile Programs Foreign Ballistic Missile Programs

UNCLASSIFIED

SummarySummary

Use of space will be challenged in future conflictsUse of space will be challenged in future conflicts

NearNear--Peer StatesPeer States

•• Disruptive capability nowDisruptive capability now

•• Destructive capability by 2015Destructive capability by 2015

•• Robust disruptive and destructive capability by 2020Robust disruptive and destructive capability by 2020

•• CounterCounter--space tactics likely influenced by their own space tactics likely influenced by their own space dependenciesspace dependencies

Rogue Nation / TerroristsRogue Nation / Terrorists

•• Some disruptive capability nowSome disruptive capability now

•• Robust disruptive capability by 2020Robust disruptive capability by 2020

•• Fewer space equities could lead to potential for Fewer space equities could lead to potential for nuclear ASAT missilesnuclear ASAT missiles