thomas nagel, “death” (1979) - ubc...

9
Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC Christina Hendricks

Upload: hoangnga

Post on 21-Sep-2018

220 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) - UBC Blogsblogs.ubc.ca/phil102/files/2015/02/Nagel-Death-102-F15.pdf · Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC Christina Hendricks

Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979)

PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC

Christina Hendricks

Page 2: Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) - UBC Blogsblogs.ubc.ca/phil102/files/2015/02/Nagel-Death-102-F15.pdf · Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC Christina Hendricks

Even if there is nothing after death, is death still a bad thing for the one who dies?

Isn’t it obvious that it is? Why even ask the question?

Page 3: Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) - UBC Blogsblogs.ubc.ca/phil102/files/2015/02/Nagel-Death-102-F15.pdf · Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC Christina Hendricks

Epicurus & Lucretius Death can only be bad for a person if they can experience it as bad.

BAD for that person

Page 4: Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) - UBC Blogsblogs.ubc.ca/phil102/files/2015/02/Nagel-Death-102-F15.pdf · Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC Christina Hendricks

Nagel’s argument Conclusion: Death is bad for the person who has died. What did you get from his article as to his argument for this?

(Outline it on the board)

Page 5: Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) - UBC Blogsblogs.ubc.ca/phil102/files/2015/02/Nagel-Death-102-F15.pdf · Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC Christina Hendricks

Objections 1.  How can we say the dead person has “lost”

anything once they’re dead? They no longer exist.

Reply: think of persons as extended temporally: a combination of their history, their present state, and their future possibilities

Icon  by  Harold  Weaver,  from  the  Noun  Project  

Makes sense of the bad of betrayal?

Page 6: Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) - UBC Blogsblogs.ubc.ca/phil102/files/2015/02/Nagel-Death-102-F15.pdf · Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC Christina Hendricks

Objections 2. If death is bad for the person who dies, then

why isn’t the time before birth also bad for him/her? (or is it?)

Reply: If born earlier, wouldn’t be the same person, so couldn’t be bad for him/her.  

Time  1  

Time  2  

Can’t  be  Person  A  

Person  A  

Icon  by  CreaAve  Stall,  from  The  Noun  Project  

Page 7: Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) - UBC Blogsblogs.ubc.ca/phil102/files/2015/02/Nagel-Death-102-F15.pdf · Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC Christina Hendricks

Objections 3. Must we take the loss of life as always a bad thing, because a loss of future possibilities, since we are naturally mortal?

Reply: From perspective within our lives, it would be good to have more, even if we recognize (from outside) that we can’t; so loss is still bad.

Icon  by  Harold  Weaver,  from  the  Noun  Project  

Page 8: Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) - UBC Blogsblogs.ubc.ca/phil102/files/2015/02/Nagel-Death-102-F15.pdf · Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC Christina Hendricks

Summary Death is bad for the person who dies b/c it’s a loss to that person of future possibilities of a good thing (life).

Page 9: Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) - UBC Blogsblogs.ubc.ca/phil102/files/2015/02/Nagel-Death-102-F15.pdf · Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979) PHIL 102, Fall 2015 UBC Christina Hendricks

Putting it all together Fill out the outline of Nagel’s argument (on other screen)