third supplement the londod. cyprus. one company british battalion. e. british somaliland. h.q. and...

Wumb, 37609 2997

THIRD SUPPLEMENTTO

The London GazetteOf TUESDAY the nth of JUNE, 1946 *

byRegistered as a newspaper

OPERATIONS IN

THURSDAY, 13 JUNE, 1946

The

THE MIDDLE EAST FROMNOVEMBER, 1940.

War Office,May, 1946

AUGUST, 1939 TO

The following Despatch was submitted to theSecretary of State for War on 10thDecember, 1940, by GENERAL SIRARCHIBALD P. WAVELL, K.C.B.,C.M.G., M.C., Commander-in-Chief, in theMiddle East.1. This despatch covers the period from

the formation of the Middle East Command inAugust, 1939, to the middle of November,1940, when the war with Italy had lastedapproximately 5 months.

2. The Middle East Command, with a staffof five officers, was formed at the beginningof August, 1939, as a planning staff for theMiddRe East. Its original Charter is givenas Appendix A. General HeadquartersMiddle East now comprises over 225 gradedstaff officers, exclusive of attached officers andnon-graded officers.

September, 1939, to April, 1940.3. On the outbreak of war with Germany

on 3rd September, 1939, the Middle East Com-mand assumed operational control over thetroops in Egypt, Palestine, Sudan and Cyprus.It was responsible for military plans in BritishSomaliland, but did not assume full opera-tional control of this theatre till I3th January,1940. The garrison of these countries atthe outbreak of war consisted of the follow-ing:—

A. Egypt. '(i) 7th Armoured Division—

Two Armoured Brigades (each of tworegts. only).

One Armoured Car Regiment.One Motor Battalion,

(ii) 4th Indian Division—One Regiment of Artillery.One Infantry Brigade,

(iii) R.A. Group—7th Medium Regiment.3rd Regiment R.H.A. (A.T.).4th Regiment R.H.A.3ist Field Regiment R.A.

(iv) Eight British Infantry Battalions.

B. Palestine.(i) 8th Division—

Two Brigades—each of three BritishBattalions.

No artillery.(ii) Two British Cavalry Regiments. .. •(iii) Four additional British Battalions

(less one Company of one Battalion inCyprus).

C. Sudan.(i) Three British Battalions.(ii) Sudan Defence Force consisting of 20

Companies in all, of which the greater partwere employed on internal security over thevast area of the Sudan.

D. Cyprus.One Company British Battalion.

E. British Somaliland.H.Q. and three Companies of Camel

Corps.The fighting forces in the Middle. East thus

included no complete formation of any kind.There were in all twenty-one battalions ofinfantry, but only 64 field guns. There wereonly 48 A/T guns and 8 A.A. guns.

4. The Egyptian Army comprised:One Light Tank Regiment,One Light Car Regiment,One Horsed Cavalry Regiment,One 2-pdr. Anti-Tank Battery,Two Fortress Anti-Tank Batteries,Two Anti-Aircraft Regiments,One Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment,Two Searchlight Regiments,

. Four Heavy Coast Defence Batteries,Nine Regular Battalions,Nine Reserve Battalions,Two Machine Gun Battalions,Eight Light Car Squadrons (Frontier

Force),and was in many respects much betterequipped than most of the British forces. ButEgypt did not declare war on Germany and

2998 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 13 JUNE, 1946

the amount of support to be counted on fromthe Egyptian Army was problematical.

5. Since Italy did not enter the war withher ally Germany, the Middle East was notimmediately engaged in operations. Duringthe first months of the war I was concernedlargely with establishing relations with theneighbouring French Commanders in Syria, inNorth Africa and in French Somaliland, andlater with the military authorities in Turkeyafter that country signed the Treaty of Allianceon igth October, 1939. I also visited Aden,Iraq, the Sudan and British Somaliland.

The winter of 1939/1940 was mainly occu-pied with threejcornered discussions betweenthe French in Syria, the Turks and ourselves onthe means of implementing the military clausesof the Treaty with Turkey. Conferences tookplace at Ankara in October, 1939, in Cairo inFebruary, 1940, at Aleppo in March, and atBeirut and Haifa in May. A plan was drawnup for assistance to the Turks in Thrace ifattacked 'by Germany. This plan was, how-ever, conditional on Italy remaining neutral.

6. In December I paid a short visit to Eng-land to discuss -the problems of the -Middle Eastwith the C.I.G.S. General Weygand fromSyria was in Paris at the same time and aninter-allied conference on Middle East problemswas held in Paris.

7. A conference was also held in March withthe Chief of the General Staff India and otherrepresentatives on a plan for .the landing of aforce at Basra in case of necessity.

8. Preparations against the eventuality ofItaly's joining in the war were impeded by thedesire of His Majesty's Government to donothing which might impair the existing rela-tions with that country. I was not even per-mitted to set up a proper Intelligence service inItalian territory, or to get in touch with patriotchiefs in Abyssinia.

9. During this time the responsibilities of theMiddle East Command were growing rapidly.It soon became obvious that operational controlcould not be exercised without at least somecontrol over administration, and the Commandgradually ibegan to assume a considerablemeasure of administrative responsibility. Com-plete administrative responsibility was assumedin June, 1940. The Command also had towatch closely the political situation in Egypt,Palestine, Iraq and the neighbouring countries,and the work of the Middle East IntelligenceCentre was considerably enlarged. It was alsonecessary'to form a number of Training Estab-lishments.

10. The only reinforcements received in theMiddle East between September, 1939, andMarch, 1940, were:

5th Indian Infantry Brigade, which arrivedin Egypt on 4th October, 1939;

2nd Battalion Durham Light Infantry,which arrived in Egypt from China on 3istJanuary, 1940;

1st Cavalry Division (Horsed), which com-pleted arrival in Palestine on 24th March,1940. It was incomplete in training andequipment.

i6th Australian Infantry Brigade and aportion of divisional troops of 6th AustralianDivision, who arrived in Palestine in themiddle of February.

4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade withsome divisional troops of the New ZealandDivision arrived in Egypt at the same time.

These Dominion contingents were magnifi-cent material, but were only partially trainedand equipped.

the Secretary of State for War, Mr. AnthonyEden, paid a special visit to Egypt to greet thearrival of these contingents.

11. On 3rd February, 1940, the East AfricanCommand, which had previously been directlyunder the War Office, was placed under MiddleEast for operational control, though administra-tion remained under the War Office.

In March I visited the East African Com-mand and then went on to South Africa andSouthern Rhodesia for discussions with theGovernments and Military Authorities of thosecountries. The Union Government decided tosend a 'Brigade and an Air Force contingent toKenya. These actually reached Kenya duringJune. Their quality was extremely high, andthey are proving themselves excellent troops.

12. At the end of April a valuable reinforce-ment of 24 officers and 666 men had been re-ceived from Southern 'Rhodesia. These wereposted to various arms and units in which theyformed, as far as possible, separate sub-units.The quality of the personnel was high and aconsiderable number have since received com-missions. Southern Rhodesia had already, inSeptember, '1939, sent a number of officers andN.C.Os. to reinforce the Camel Corps in BritishSomaliland. These were of great value.

13. Other British Colonies are also -repre-sented in the Middle East. Malta has suppliedan efficient A.A. battery which forms part ofthe defences of Alexandria, and many 'Malteseare serving in the R.A.S.C. and technical units.

Cyprus has made a very considerable mili-tary effort. A Cyprus Regiment has beenformed which includes an infantry battalion,Pioneer companies and Pack Transport com-panies. Some of these, which served with dis-tinction in France, have now returned to theMiddle East. A number of Cypriots have alsoenlisted as drivers in the R.A.S.C. and aredoing good service.

Mauritius has sent a valuable draft of 100tradesmen for the R.A.O.C.

The British Mandated Territory of Palestinehas also contributed a large number of men,both Arabs and Jews, for service with theBritish forces, either as combatant companies orin various Services. A Palestinian PioneerCompany served in France, where its workearned high praise, and has now returned to theMiddle East.

May to June, 194014. Meanwhile our relations with Italy were

deteriorating, and during May, as a result ofthe success of the German attack on France, itbecame obvious that Italy was likely to enterthe war. On 10th June Italy declared wai.'

The military situation ait the time of theentry of Italy into the war was as follows:There were estimated to be over 215,000Italian troops in Libya and over 200,000 inItalian East Africa. Egypt, Sudan, Kenya,and British Somaliland, which had frontierswith these countries, became at once liable toattack. Their garrisons at the time of Italy'sentry into the war were as follows: —

Egypt.(a) 7th Armoured Division—comprising:

4th Armoured Brigade / each °/ tw°1regi-

7th Armoured Brifade 1 ™*ts« °?lv .1 I P^ty equipped.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 13 JUNE, 1946 2999

Support Group (two Battalions).3rd R.H.A. (Anti-tank regiment), and4th R.H.A.

(&) 4th Indian Division—comprising:Two Regiments of Artillery.Two mixed Infantry Brigades (5th and

nth).(c) Part of New Zealand Division—com-

prising :One Cavalry Regiment (less one

squadron).One Field Regiment New Zealand Artil-

lery.Three Infantry Battalions.One Machine Gun Battalion (incomplete

in training and equipment).(d) Fourteen British Infantry Battalions.

7th Medium Regiment-R. A.3ist Field Regiment R.A.

Total about 36,000.Sudan (with 1,000 miles of frontier with

Italian East Africa).Three British Battalions andSudan Defence Force.

Total about 9,000.Kenya (with over 700 miles of frontier with

Italian East Africa).Two East African Brigades.Two Light Batteries.

Total about 8,500.(Two Brigades from West Africa had been

ordered to Kenya and arrived during July.)British Somaliland.

H.Q. and five Companies SomalilandCamel Corps.

One King's African Rifles Battalion.Total about 1,475.

Palestine, Aden Protectorate and Cypruswere also liable to attack. Their garrisonswere:

Palestine.ist Cavalry Division (incomplete in train-

ing and equipment).Two British Cavalry Regiments.One Brigade of three British Infantry Bat-

talions.Two British Battalions.6th Australian Division—comprising:

Two Brigades.Two Artillery Regiments.Divisional Recce Unit (incomplete in

training and equipment).Total about 27,500.

Aden.Two Indian Battalions.

Total about 2,500.Cyprus.

One British Battalion.Total about 800.

15. Very little equipment had been sent tothe Middle East and no single unit or formationwas fully equipped. The're was a dangerouslack of A.A. guns, A.Tk. guns and otherartillery.

16. The enemy also had a very considerablenumerical advantage in the air. This wascountered by the superior technical qualities ofour machines and by the higher training andmorale of the pilots of the', R.A.F. andS'.A.A.F., who quickly established an ascend-ancy over the Italians which they have main-tained ever since.

i^. The shortest'-route by which the MiddleEast could be reinforced \ through the Mediter-ranean, now became too precarious; over. 7,000badly rieede'd reinforcements which were ready

for despatch in May, and of whom some wereactually waiting at Marseilles, were held up anddid not reach the Middle East till the end ofAugust. It was even uncertain whether thelong sea route via the Cape might not alsobe rendered unsafe by the action of the enemyair forces and naval forces in Italian East Africaoperating in the narrow waters of the Red Sea.Alternative routes via Basra1, Baghdad, Haifaand via Mombasa and the Nile Valley werereconnoitred. Up to date', however, convoyshave used the Red Sea route without loss,in spite of enemy attacks.

18. The position on the Western Frontier ofEgypt was that our foremost defended positionswere at Mersa Matruh, over 200 miles west ofAlexandria and about 120 miles from theEgyptian frontier with Libya. There was arailway and road as far as Matruh and a good •metalled road from Matruh to Sidi Barrani,about 50 miles from the frontier. BetweenSidi Barrani and the frontier there was nogood road. The small harbour of Sollum onthe frontier offered no facilities for the supplyof a force and had no water supply. It wastherefore impossible to maintain any large num-ber of troops on the frontier, even had theybeen available, and our policy had alwaysbeen to allow the enemy to advance on ourdefences at Matruh before meeting him in anyforce.

It was" decided, however, to place a smallcovering force on the frontier; and I orderedthat this force should, as soon as possible afterthe outbreak of war, attack the Italian frontierposts.

19. In the Sudan it was obviously impos-sible, with the very small force available, tocover the long and vulnerable frontier, but Idirected that small mobile forces should occupythe principal places on the frontier until attackedby superior forces. Although these small forcescould obviously not resist any attack' which thegreatly superior Italian forces could make, Iconsidered it desirable that they should fighta delaying action against the enemy rather thanabandon the frontier posts without any fightingat all, as had been the previous policy.

The small mobile forces of the Sudan DefenceForce made several most successful raids on theItalian frontier posts in the earlier days of thewar, and when finally attacked at Kassala on4th July and at Gallabat on 6th July by greatlysuperior Italian forces fought successful delay-ing actions and inflicted heavy loss on theenemy, who did not follow up his success inspite of the great disparity in numbers.

20. In Kenya a similar policy of holding thefrontier posts for as long as possible was fol-lowed. The principal engagement took placeat Moyale, where a company of the King'sAfrican Rifles held the small fort on the Britishside of the frontier for several- weeks againstan Italian force which amounted to about abrigade. It was not until a second Italianbrigade was brought up that it was decided towithdraw the Company, which was successfullydone on I5th July, although the enemy had bythis time practically surrounded the post.

21. Enemy propaganda exaggerated thesesmall successes', obtained by sheer force of num-bers, so" loudly that .they succeeded in causingthem to (be accepted in some "quarters as Britishdefeats.

22. Such preparations as possible had beenmade with a view to assisting the patriot leaders


in Abyssinia on the outbreak of war with Italy.For the reasons stated in paragraph 8 above,our preparations had been considerably" ham-pered, but a number of arms had been collectedand a Mission had been formed to get in touchwith the patriots as soon as possible. TheEmperor, His Majesty Haile Selassie, arrived inthe Sudan, with .the object of providing a focusfor the rising. Arrangements were made forhim to be accommodated at Khartoum until itshould be possible for him to enter Abyssinia.

23. Meanwhile, on T7th June, the FrenchGovernment had asked for armistice terms,which they accepted on 22nd June. It was atfirst hoped that the French Colonies and Over-sea territories would continue the struggle; butGeneral Nogues in North Africa, after a littlehesitation, decided to obey the orders to capitu-late, and his example was followed shortly after-wards by General Mittelhauser in Syria, whoonly a few days earlier had declared to me atBeirut his unalterable determination to continuethe straggle. General 'Legentilhomme at Jibutiheld out for nearly a month longer.

The collapse of the French in North Africameant that the Italians could employ the wholeweight of their large ground and air forces inLibya against the Western frontier of Egypt.The defection of Syria meant that Palestine nolonger had a secure and friendly northern flankand that the French force of three divisionswhich had constituted the general reserve of theMiddle East for assistance to Turkey or Greece,or for the defence of Egypt if required, couldno longer be counted on.

A certain number of officers and men fromSyria, including the greater part of a Colonialbattalion which had, at the request of theFrench, been stationed at Cyprus, joined theBritish forces and were formed into a mobilebattalion which is now engaged on the 'WesternFrontier of Egypt.

A Polish force of some 4,000 men, which hadbeen formed and was under training by theFrench in Syria, came to Palestine and joinedthe British Forces.

A note on the foreign contingents which havejoined the Forces in the Middle East is given inAppendix B.

24. Thus before the end of July it becameobvious that unless reinforcements in men andmaterial were sent to the Middle East forthwith,there was grave danger of our being unable towithstand the enemy's attacks. I receivedorders to visit England to discuss the situationwith the military authorities and the War Cabi-net. As a result of the discussions reinforce-ments were despatched to the Middle East. Thegreater part of the forces available who weresufficiently equipped and trained were moved tothe Western Desert. This included a New Zea-land Brigade Group and later an Australian.Brigade Group.

Italian Attack on Somaliland. 25. Meanwhile in French Somaliland General

Legentilhomme had found himself unable, inspite of his gallant efforts, to induce the Colonyto continue to fight. The Italians were thusenabled to concentrate the whole weight of theirvery numerous forces in the East of Italian EastAfrica against British Somaliland, which theyinvaded early in August. The operations,which resulted in the temporary loss of BritishSomaliland, have already been described in adespatch dated isth September, 1940.

Operations on Western Frontier of Egypt.June-November, 1940.

26. The force sent to the Western frontier ofEgypt was the 7th 'Armoured Division less onearmoured brigade. Actually the troops to pro-ceed to the frontier were the 7th Hussars, a lighttank regiment of the 4th Armoured Brigade;the nth Hussars, armoured car regiment; theist King's Royal Rifle Corps and 2nd RifleBrigade, motor battalions; and two regimentsof Royal Horse Artillery, one of which wasan anti-tank regiment with 37 mm. Boforsguns for which only a limited supply ofammunition was available. The 6th RoyalTank Regiment, the second regiment of the 4thArmoured Brigade, was kept in divisionalreserve. The 4th Armoured Brigade had nothird regiment, and all its units were muchbelow establishment.

27. Just east of the Egyptian frontier anescarpment several hundred feet high runs fromSollum south-eastwards for about 30 miles, andis passable to mechanised vehicles only at a fewplaces. At Sollum itself the road up. theescarpment is steep with a number of hairpinbends. South and west of the escarpment theground is generally easily passable by all typesof mechanised vehicles. Between the escarp-ment and the sea the going is more difficultand movement is generally confined to certaintracks.

Our force on the frontier was operating ata distance of 120 miles from the railhead atMatruh which made the administrative pro-blem an extremely difficult one and limited thenumber of troops that could be employed.

28. On the night of n/i2th June the nthHussars crossed the frontier and captured adetachment of two Italian officers and 59 otherranks. On I4th June the enemy's two frontierforts at Capuzzo and Maddalena were attackedand captured by the 7th Hussars, nth Hussarsand a company of the King's Royal RifleCorps, about 220 prisoners being captured.

29. On i6th June a most successful actionwas fought by the 7th Hussars and nthHussars supported by a troop of " J " Bat-tery R.H.A. nine miles north of Sidi Omar.Twelve enemy tanks were destroyed, and a con-siderable number of the enemy killed and about160 prisoners taken. Three guns and a numberof lorries were also captured or destroyed. Onthe same day a troop of the nth Hussars inter-cepted a convoy on the Tobruk-Bardia road,destroyed 30 lorries and captured a number ofprisoners, including a general officer.

Several other successful patrol actions werefought during the next few weeks. An opera-tion to capture the Jerabub Oasis was plannedfor the beginning of July, but abandoned owingto great heat. Meanwhile large enemy forces,amounting to at least two divisions, had•advanced towards the frontier. An enemybrigade reoccupied the ruins of Fort Capuzzo,which had been destroyed, and advancedtowards Sollum, but was repulsed. Theenemy's position • at Fort Capuzzo was madeextremely uncomfortable for him. His forcewas continually shelled by our artillery, andtransport bringing up supplies from Bardia wasconstantly attacked or shelled, with the resultthat the enemy undoubtedly suffered extremelyheavy casualties both in men and in vehicles.

By the middle of July the enemy had twodivisions, and elements of two more, on the


Egyptian frontier; but our small force continuedto dominate the situation and to inflict con-siderable casualties.

30. During the remainder of July operationscontinued on the same lines. The enemycontinued to suffer heavy casualties butgradually moved forward his camps and estab-lished a force of at least four divisions withineasy reach of the Egyptian frontier. Duringthis period the 8th Hussars relieved the 7thHussars, who went back for a rest, and H.Q.of the 7th Armoured Brigade relieved H.Q..4th Armoured Brigade. All vehicles werebeginning to show considerable signs of wear,and replacement was difficult owing to thedistance from railhead and the almost entireabsence of spares in Egypt for the armouredfighting vehicles. For this reason about theend oi July I gave instructions that trackvehicles should be withdrawn from the frontierfor overhaul and rent, as I was afraid thatotherwise when the enemy advanced ourarmoured fighting vehicles would be verylargely out of action. Of 306 tanks on theWar Establishment 200 were normally avail-able with units, the remainder being underrepair in workshops. There was no reserve oftanks to meet war wastage.

31. After the withdrawal of the ArmouredBrigade the frontier was held by a forceunder the command of the Support Group ofthe Armoured Division, consisting of the 3rdColdstream Guards from the Matruh garrison,the ist K.R.R.C., 2nd Rifle Brigade, nthHussars, one squadron ist Royal Tank Regi-ment and two batteries of Royal Horse Artil-lery (one of anti-tank guns, one of 18-25 pdrs.).A section of the 7th Medium Regiment was alsobrought forward to harass the enemy. Thissmall force was distributed over a front ofsome 60 miles from Sollum to Fort Maddalena.The troops continued the same policy of activepatrolling, but the enemy's numbers were nowvery much increased, his artillery wasnumerous and active and the opportunities foreffective action were fewer. Nevertheless thissmall force continued to inflict heavy casualtieson the enemy with practically no loss to itself,and to hold in check a force of four or fivedivisions for a further six weeks. A skilfuluse was made of dummy tanks to deceive theenemy.

32. By loth September it became obviousthat an enemy advance across the frontier wasimminent. All preparations had already beenmade for the withdrawal of our frontier forceand the first stage of this was now put intoexecution. On I3th September the enemyadvance began, a large force being deployedunder heavy artillery preparation against theescarpment above Sollum, which had for sometime past been held only by a platoon andhad by now been evacuated. At the same timetime another enemy column advanced on theHalf ay a Pass down the escarpment towardsSollum. Both these columns were engaged byour artillery, which inflicted considerable losseson them.

It had been uncertain whether the enemywould make his main advance along the coastroad, or would attempt a wide movement southof the escarpment. There is some reason tobelieve that the latter may have been theenemy's original intention, but in the event hisadvance was made on a narrow front along

the coast road with two divisions in the frontline and two in support, and one more and aMobile Force (Maletti Group) in close reserve.He was supported by a numerous artillery andby about 200 light and medium -tanks.

The part of our covering force which wasnorth of the escarpment and on which thisattack fell consisted of the 3rd ColdstreamGuards, one battery 3rd Royal Horse Artilleryand one section of the 7th Medium Regiment.It was subsequently supported by a detach-ment of the ist K.R.R.C. and a company of theFrench battalion.* The remainder of ourcovering force was south of the escarpment toprovide against an enemy movement from thatflank. The ist Royal Tank Regiment, whichwas south of the escarpment, was moved to thenorthern flank when the direction of the enemyadvance became evident, but for various reasonsarrived too late to take any part in the actionsduring the withdrawal.

33. For four days, from I3th September to16th September, our small force withdrew alongthe coast road from Sollum to the east of Sid!Barrani. The enemy reached Sidi Barrani,which is merely a collection of a few houses anda landing ground, on i6th September and therehalted.

Although the enemy had large numbers ofmedium and light tanks with his forward troopsand the leading infantry was in M.T., his ad-vance was slow and unenterprising. He madelittle attempt to use his immensely superiornumbers or his mobility to outflank and over-whelm our small force. His artillery was boldlyused, even in front of the leading infantry, buttheir fire, though reasonably accurate, was in-effective. His tanks were mainly used for theprotection of the infantry columns, and only onone occasion, on i6th September, was anyattempt made to use them to outflank ourtroops; and even on .this occasion their timidityand hesitation lost them an opportunity.

34. The withdrawal of our small force waseffected with admirable skill, and there is nodoubt whatever that very serious losses wereinflicted on the enemy, both by the artillery,which was boldly and effectively handled, and,whenever opportunity offered, by machine gunand small arms fire. Our own losses wereunder 50 men and a small number of vehicles.

The greatest possible credit is due to BrigadierW. H. E. Gott, M.C., commanding the SupportGroup, and to Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Campbell,M.C., commanding the Artillery, for the cooland efficient way in which this withdrawal wascarried out, also to the troops for their endur-ance and tactical skill.

Since their advance to Sidi Barrani the enemyhas remained practically stationary for the lasttwo months. Small mobile columns formedfrom the 7th Armoured Division have continu-ally engaged and harassed the enemy in thesame manner as on the frontier and with similarsuccess. The enemy has, in the same way ason the frontier, placed his troops in a numberof defended camps with all round perimeters,from Maktila on the coast, 10 to 15 miles east ofSidi -Barrani, to Sof af i on the escarpment south-west of Sidi 'Barrani. He is undoubtedly suffer-ing considerable administrative difficulties andit is at present uncertain whether he will con-tinue his advance.

* See Appendix B.


35. I wish to draw special attention to thework of the small covering force on the WesternFrontier of Egypt during the period from theoutbreak of war with Italy in June to the middleof September, when the Italian advance haltedat Sidi Barrani. For over three months in hardand difficult climatic conditions this force notonly held in check an Italian force many timesits superior in numbers, but established a defi-nite ascendency over it, penetrating well intoenemy territory, taking the offensive wheneverthe least opportunity offered, and inflicting veryheavy losses at trifling cost to itself. The pub-lished Italian casualties in Libya for the periodwere approximately 3,500, while our total casu-alties were just over 150. Over 700 prisonerswere taken, and a considerable number of guns,tanks and lorries were captured or destroyed.

Major-general ffli. O'Moore Creagh, M.C.,Commander of the 7th Armoured Division,directed these operations with admirable skilland initiative, and was ably seconded by hisbrigade and regimental commanders. Of theunits which took part, the nth Hussars, theArmoured Car Regiment, was continuously inthe front line, and usually behind that of theenemy, during the whole period; its tireless anddaring search for information and constantharassing of the enemy showed a spirit andefficiency worthy of the best traditions of thisfine regiment. The light tank'regiments, firstthe 7th Hussars, later relieved by the 8thHussars, showed a similar eagerness to takeopportunities and skill to make the most ofthem, while the ist and 6th Royal Tank Regi-ments backed up the light tank regiments mostefficiently when required. The batteries of theR.H.A. were handled with great dash and mosteffectively; they unquestionably made them-selves feared by the enemy and inflicted heavylosses on them. The engineer work of the Forcewas effectively carried out by 2nd CheshireField Squadron, which had been borrowed fromthe ist Cavalry Division. Finally, the infantrybattalions in or attached to the Support Group,the 3rd Coldstream Guards, 1st BattalionK.R.R.C. and the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade,provided a solid backing of fire power when re-quired, were readily mobile, and gained a com-plete mastery of the debateable area betweenthemselves and the enemy by active nightpatrolling.Operations in the Sudan. October-November,

1940.36. Soon after the arrival of Indian reinforce-

ments in the Sudan I instructed 'Major-GeneralW. Platt, C.B., D.S.O., to make plans forminor offensive operations as soon as he coulddo so, and indicated the recapture of thefrontier post of Gallabat as a suitable objective.A plan was accordingly prepared by Major-General L. M. Heath, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.,M.C., commanding .the 5th Indian Division, foran operation against the Italian troops in theGallabat-Metemma area, to be carried out bythe loth Indian Brigade and a squadron of the6th Royal Tank Regiment, which had been sentto the Sudan early in September when an enemyadvance from the Kassala area with armouredfighting vehicles appeared possible.

37. The two frontier posts of Gallabat andMetemma, the former in the Sudan and thelatter in Italian East Africa, face one anotheracross a khor (ravine) ia a valley about twomiles wide. Both posts are on forward slopes

and have behind them higher features.Gallabat had, as already related in para. 19,been occupied by the Italians since July. TheItalian troops in the Gallabat-Metemma areaconsisted, at the time that the attack wasplanned, of five Colonial Battalions with abattery, a machine-gun battalion, an anti-tankplatoon, and a number of irregulars, totallingabout 5,300 men.

38. The operation was originally intended totake place on 8th November, but at the endof October information was received of a largeconvoy from Gondar approaching the Metemmaarea. Air action was taken to delay the marchof this column but was only partially successful.It was therefore decided to advance the dateof the attack to 6th November in the hope offorestalling the arrival of the reinforcements.

39. The operation, although it resulted in ourretaking Gallabat and inflicting very heavylosses on the enemy, was not as successful ashad been hoped owing to certain factors whichcould not be foreseen.

The first of these was the breakdown, mainlyfrom mechanical causes, of all the tanks exceptone light tank during the capture of Gallabat.The chief causes of the breakdown weredamage to the tracks by the rough ground, orby enemy mines. The second factor was atemporary loss of command of the air due tosix of our fighter aircraft being .shot down ina combat with the enemy.

40. Gallabat was captured early on 6thNovember by the 3rd Garhwal Rifles and thesquadron of the Royal Tank Regiment with lewcasualties, one enemy colonial battalion beingpractically destroyed. The further advance onMetemma had, however, to be postponed owingto the breakdown of the tanks. The enemypositions at Metemma were very heavily wiredand defended by a large number of machineguns, and without tank support it was con-sidered inadvisable to attempt their capture.The further advance was therefore postponedtill the afternoon when it was hoped that someof the tanks would be repaired.

41. During the morning, however, the enemygained control of the air and developed anextremely heavy bombing attack on our for-ward troops, the Garhwal Rifles who had cap-tured Gallabat and the ist Essex Regimentwho were in process of relieving them. Therewas little cover and the ground was too rockyto dig shelter trenches. Both battalionssuffered heavy casualties and their morale wastemporarily affected. Also the workshop lorryof the Tank squadron was destroyed by a bomband three fitters were wounded, which greatlyhampered the task of repairing the tanks.

42. The Brigade Commander thereforedecided that he must cancel the attack onMetemma, and that in view of the enemy'scontinued command of the air and the targetoffered by Gallabat it would be necessary towithdraw the somewhat shaken troops fromthat area.

A withdrawal was therefore made to thehigh ground west of Gallabat on the eveningof 7th November.

43. Gallabat has since been reoccupied as anoutpost position, the main position beingestablished on the high ground to the westof it. The enemy fort at Metemma has beenpractically destroyed and rendered untenableby artillery fife and he has also withdrawn


his troops to the high ground to the east.Minor actions still continue between the mainpositions.

44. I should like to call special attention tothe behaviour of the personnel of " B "Squadron of the 6th Royal Tank Regiment inthis action. The attack on Gallabat was madewith great dash and the way in which themen of the squadron stuck to their task oftrying to get their tanks which were brokendown into action again under extremely heavybombing was admirable.

45. Our losses on 6th and 7th Novemberin killed, wounded and (missing were 86 Britishand 88 Indian, of which only about 20 wereincurred in the original attack and most of theremainder were" due to air bombing. The actionshowed again how necessary protection againstair attack is for all forward troops. Owing tothe general shortage of anti-aircraft guns in theMiddle East, none were available for the sup-port of the loth Brigade, and after our fighteraircraft had been put out of action the enemybombers were unopposed.

46. It is known that casualties of well over600 were inflicted on the enemy. Two gunsand much material were captured in GallabatFort.

47. During the month of October and thefirst half of November our mobile troops inthe Kassala sector fought many successfulpatrol actions and inflicted heavy losses on theenemy at small cost to themselves. The largestof these small engagements was in the areanorth of Kassala, in which over 300 of theenemy were taken prisoner.

Occupation of Crete—November, 1940.48. On 28th October, Italy made an unpro-

voked attack on Greece. To enable moreeffective control of the Aegean to be exercisedby the Navy, it was decided to establish anaval base at Suda Bay at the north-westernend of Crete. With the full approval of theGreek Government, the British forces in theMiddle East assumed responsibility for thedefence of Crete. The ist battalion York andLancaster Regiment, some A.A. artillery anda Field Company were despatched on 3istOctober to Suda Bay. On i7th Novemberanother battalion, 2nd The Black Watch, wassent.

Visit of Secretary of State.49. At the end of October the Secretary of

State for War, Mr. Anthony Eden, paid avisit to the Middle East, in the course of.which he went to the Western Desert, Palestine,Trans-Jordan, and the Sudan, and saw many ofthe troops. His visit was of the greatest valuefor the discussion of future plans and was asource of much encouragement to the troops.At Khartoum he met General Smuts who hadflown up from South Africa to visit the EastAfrican front.

Summary.50. From the above brief account of events

it can be seen that the Middle East Commandhas passed through three stages during theperiod of-some 15 months under review. Thefirst period, from the outbreak of war 'withGermany till Italy entered the war in June,1940, was one of comparative inactivity. Plansin the Middle East were directed mainly to-. wards the support of Turkey against a Germanadvance in S.E. Europe. Italy was assumed

to be neutral and if she did enter the war couldbe neutralised by the French forces. Littleequipment of any kind was received duringthis period and the reinforcements sent -(istCavalry Division and the Australian and NewZealand contingents) were not equipped formodern war and were only partially trained.

Therefore the second stage, after the entry ofItaly into the war and the collapse of France,was one of considerable danger, during whichthe frontiers of Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya, andBritish Somaliland were threatened by vastlysuperior forces, and the communications be-tween the United Kingdom and the Middle Eastwere long and doubtful. That the Italians failedto take advantage of their opportunities wasdue (firstly to our Air Force, who in spite ofinferior numbers everywhere took and kept theinitiative; and to the stout action of the smallcovering forces in Egypt, Sudan and EastAfrica; and finally to the enemy's lack ofpreparation or desire for hard fighting. Wethus escaped these dangerous months with theloss only of British Somaliland—where oursmall garrison of a few battalions was drivento withdraw, after a short but gallant resist-ance, by an Italian force of seven brigadegroups—and a few unimportant frontier postsin the Sudan and Kenya. During this periodall available equipment and troops were beingretained in the United Kingdom against thethreat of invasion; and it was not until thesecond half of September that reinforcementsin men and material began to reach the MiddleEast in any quantity.

The third stage has now begun, when thedefence of our positions in the Middle Eastis reasonably assured and offensive operationsare being planned and undertaken.

51. The Middle East Command has to keepin close touch with the political situation in thecountries included in the Command, particu-larly in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq. The workof the Middle East Intelligence Centre, underthe able direction of Colonel W. J. Cawthorn,has been of the greatest value in this respect.The situation in Egypt has often been difficult,since it is the main base of operations for theMiddle East, yet the country is not at war, andhas still large numbers of enemy subjects atlarge. Close touch with the Embassy is main-tained by weekly meetings of the Ambassadorand the Commander-in-Chief, while theEmbassy staff, the staff of HeadquartersBritish Troops in Egypt, and my staff are indaily consultation on matters of common in-terest. There has been no serious differenceof opinion on any matter of importance.

Co-operation of other Services.52. I desire to acknowledge the indebtedness

of the Middle East Command to the work ofthe Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, the RedSea and the Indian Ocean. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral SirAndrew B. Cunningham, K.C.B., D.S.O., hasalways afforded the Army the closest supportboth in planning and in actual operations.

The work of H.M. ships in the East IndiesCommand under Vice-Admiral R. Leatham,C.B., in bringing the convoys for the MiddleEast across the Indian Ocean and through theRed Sea without the loss of a ship has earnedthe gratitude and admiration of the large num-bers from all parts of the Empire who have


thus appreciated the power and efficiency of theRoyal Navy. I have already spoken of thework of the Royal Navy in the operations inSomaliland in the despatch dealing with thatcampaign.

53. It would be difficult to speak too highlyof the work of the Royal Air Force in theMiddle East and of their support of the Armyto the limit of their capacity. Both the originalA.O.C.-in-C., Air Chief Marshal Sir WilliamMitchell, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.,A.F.C., and his successor, Air Chief MarshalSir Arthur Longmore, K.C.B., D.S.O., haveco-operated wholeheartedly in combining theoperations of the Army and the Air Force tothe best advantage; and the relations betweenthe two Services, at G.H.Q. and in the variousCommands, have been always close and cordial.

It has become more obvious with everyphase of the war in the Middle East both thatthe development and reinforcement of theR.A.F. must keep pace with the growth of theground forces, which it has not done up todate, and that co-operation between the groundand air forces in all stages of any operation needthe closest study.

54. Co-operation in planning between thethree Services is maintained by the Joint Plan-ning Staff, whose work has been uniformlyexcellent. They have never failed to producean agreed solution of any problem put to them.

55. I desire to express my gratitude to theCommander-in-Chief in India, General' SirRobert Cassels, G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., and tothe Army in India for the manner in whichrequests for assistance in units, officers ormaterial have invariably been met to the limitof India's capacity. The Indian' troops sent tothe Middle East are well maintaining their highreputation in the camp and in the field.

56. The co-operation of the Egyptian Armyin the defence of Egypt has been- hampered bythe lack of a definite policy by the EgyptianGovernment, who have never quite decided thepoint at which resistance to the enemy by theEgyptian Army should begin. For some timeEgyptian units-formed part of the garrison ofMatruh, and an Egyptian A.A. unit did excel-lent work in defending Matruh against airattack though frequently subjected to heavybombing.

At present part of the Egyptian FrontierForce is defending the Siwa Oasis, and anEgyptian Mobile Force, under Prince IsmailDaoud, is in readiness to support the garrisonof Siwa. Egyptian A.A. and C.D. units areassisting in the defence of the Fleet Base atAlexandria; the Egyptian Army provides aforce for the defence of Wadi Haifa againstpossible enemy raids, and guards vulnerablepoints in the Delta.

Appreciation of Services.57. I should like to call particular attention

to the services of Lieuteriant-General Sir H. M.Wilson, K.C.B., D.S.O., G.O.C.-in-C. B'ritishTroops in Egypt. He has had a very oneroustask in providing for the defence of Egyptwith inadequate resources, in fitting for warthe troops sent to his Command, in organisingthe expansion of the base in Egypt, in securingthe co-operation of the Egyptian Army, andin dealing with many difficult and delicateproblems in the relations between the forces inEgypt and the Egyptian Government and

people. His sound knowledge and imperturb-able common sense have enabled him to dealeffectively with all these problems and he hasobtained the confidence and liking of the Egyp-tians with whom he has had to work. It islargely due to his direction that the smallBritish .force in the Western Desert has soeffectively delayed and checked the Italianadvance.

58. Major-General W. Platt, C.B., D.S.O.,has commanded the troops in the Sudanthroughout the period with marked efficiency.He kept his head during the dangerous periodwhen the Sudan was exposed to the attack ofgreatly superior Italian forces and used hisslender resources to the best effect to meet thedanger. With the arrival of reinforcementshe has initiated offensive action against theenemy whenever possible, though still inferiorin numbers.

59. Lieutenant-Generals M. G. H. Barker,K.C.B., D.S.O., G. J. Giffard, C.B., D.S.O.,and P. Neame, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., have insuccession held the command in Palestine. Iconsider that all three have shown ability andtact in dealing with the military and politicalproblems of the country.

60. Major-General D. P. Dickinson, D.S.O.,O.B.E., M.C., did most valuable work in theearly part of the war in organising our wareffort in East Africa under difficult conditions.

61. I have been fortunate in my staff anddesire to place on record my appreciation oftheir work, their willingness and their efficiency.In particular, I owe a deep debt of thanks toMajor-General A. F. Smith, D.S.O., M.C.,Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who hasbeen the chief General Staff Officer of theMiddle East Command since its;beginning. Hehas shown himself an admirable staff officerin every way, and his personality and unfail-ing cheerfulness has made its influence feltthroughout the staff and has impressed themany foreign officers with whorri he has hadto deal.

Major-General B. O. Hutchison, C.B.E.,Deputy Quarter-Master General, joined MiddleEast in October, 1939, as principal administra-tive officer and has directed the expansion ofits administrative responsibilities ever since.His capacity for hard work, organizing abilityand foresight have been most marked. He isan outstanding administrative staff officer.

APPENDIX A.Army Council Instructions to the General

Officer Commanding-in-Chief in the MiddleEast.1. You are appointed General Officer Com-

manding-in-chief in the Middle East.2. The area over which your command

extends in peace comprises: —Egypt.The Sudan.Palestine and Trans-Jordan..Cyprus.

3. In these areas you will exercise generalcontrol over all British land forces in mattersof high policy in peace and will, in particular,be responsible for the review and co-ordina-tion of war plans for reinforcements in emer-gency, including, the distribution of availableland forces and material between these areas.


4. In addition you will be responsible forthe preparation o± all war plans, in co-opera-tion with the local military or air force com-manders, for the employment of land forcesin British Somaliland, Aden, Iraq, and theshores of the Persian Gulf.

5. In carrying out these tasks you will whereappropriate consult and co-operate with theNaval Cpmmander-in-Chief, Mediterranean,the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East IndiesStation, the Commander-in-Chief in India, theInspector General, African Colonial Forces, andthe Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in theMiddle East.

6. You will maintain close touch with KisMajesty's Ambassador in Egypt; His Majesty'sAmbassador in Iraq; the Governor General inthe Sudan; the High Commissioner for Pales-tine and Trans-Jordan; the Governors ofCyprus, Aden and British Somaliland; and thePolitical Resident in the Persian Gulf.

7. The policy of His Majesty's Governmentwith regard to the Egyptian Forces is thatthey shall be developed into efficient modernforces capable of co-operating with the Britishforces in the defence of Egypt. You will main-tain close touch with His Majesty's Ambas-sador in Egypt, the Head of the British MilitaryMisson, and the Egyptian General Staff in allmatters of high policy affecting the developmentand employment in war of the Egyptian Army,with due regard to. the existing responsibilitiesof the General Officer Commanding-in-chief,Egypt in such matters as local defence, co-operation between British and Egyptian troops,and training. You will delegate to the GeneralOfficer Commanding-in-chief, The BritishTroops in Egypt, such matters as are, in youropinion, best arranged by him direct with theappropriate Egyptian authorities and, subjectto the" agreement of the Egyptian Governmentat the time, command of the Egyptian Armyin war.

The agreement of the Egyptian Governmentto place the Egyptian Army under the com-mand of the General Officer Commanding-in-chief in Egypt will be obtained by HisMajesty's Ambassador through whose inter-mediation all requests to the Egyptian Govern-ment will be made.

8. You should bear in mind that HisMajesty's Ambassador must retain in all cir-cumstances his existing position vis-a-vis theEgyptian Government. This does not excludedirect communication between the GeneralOfficer Commanding-in-chief, British Troopsin Egypt, and the Egyptian authorities onroutine matters agreed by His Majesty's Ambas-sador.

The same considerations will apply as regardsyour relations with His Majesty's DiplomaticRepresentatives in the other countries includedin the area over which your command willextend in war. In the case of Iraq, this willnot preclude direct communication with theInspector General of the Iraq Army on suchmatters as may be agreed by His Majesty'sAmbassador to Iraq.

9. You will visit all areas which are includedin war in your Command (vide paragraph 14below) to study local situations and informyourself of local problems.

10. Subject to the direction of the Chiefs ofStaff, and of the War Office in respect of theland forces, you are responsible, in conjunction

with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Medi-terranean, the Naval Commander-in-Chief,East Indies Station, and the Air Officer Com-manding-in-chief, Middle East, for co-ordinat-ing the British war plans with the war plansof Allies of His Majesty's Government in theNear and Middle East and North Africa.

This will involve at present co-ordinationwith the French military authorities in NorthAfrica, Syria and French Somaliland; theTurkish General Staff; and possibly ultimatelythe Greek and Roumanian General Staffs.

You will arrange to exchange visits withthese authorities as may be required.

11. To assist you in these tasks you willbe provided with a staff for your own use. Ofthis Staff, the Senior General Staff Officer willalso be a member of the Joint Planning Stafffor the Middle East, which will include theChief Staff Officers of the Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean, and the Air Officer Command-ing-in-chief, Middle East.

The Joint Planning Staff will be responsiblefor the inter-service co-operation of all warplans as may be directed by the Commandersconcerned, namely, the Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean, the Commander-in-Chief, EastIndies, the Air Officer Commanding-in-chief,Middle East and yourself.

12. Your requirements as regards intelligencewill be provided by the Middle East IntelligenceCentre, which is being established in Cairo.

13. Your headquarters will be located atCairo.

14. Should war break out the area of yourCommand will be extended to include all mili-tary forces in British Somaliland, Aden, Iraqand the shores of the Persian Gulf, with theexception of those which are normally underthe control of the Royal Air Force.

15. Your tasks in war are to co-ordinate (inconsultation with the Air Officer Commanding-in-chief, Middle East, for matters affecting Iraqand Aden) the action of the land forces in theareas under your command and the distribu-tion of available resources between them. Youwill be guided by the policy for the conductof operations which will be communicated toyou from time to time.

You will co-ordinate the operations of theforces under your command with the operationsof the various allied forces in the areas men-tioned in paragraph 10.

For this purpose you will work in direct co-operation with allied military commandersconcerned.

By Command of the Army Council.H. J. Creedy.

The War Office,24th July, 1939.

APPENDIX " B."Co-operation of Allies.

On 28th June, 1940, General Mittelhauser,the Commander-in-Chief of the French Forcesin the Middle East, decided to accept the Ger-man terms. Jn consequence a number of Frenchsub-units and individual French soldiers imme-diately made their way into Palestine to jointhe British forces. In addition, the Polish Car-pathian Brigade which had been serving withthe French in Syria, and a large party of Czechswho had been awaiting onward passage toFrance, decided to continue the. struggle. These


formed the nucleus of the various Allied Con-tingents in the Middle East, details of whichare given below:

(a) French.After a short stay in Palestine, it was

decided to bring the French contingent toMoascar. There they have been reorganisedinto:

(i) A motorised infantry battalion,(ii) A squadron of Spahis.(iii) A training depot.

One Company of the Infantry Battalion wasput under the command of 7th ArmouredDivision on 8th September, 1940, and hastaken its part in operations in the WesternDesert. The remainder of the battalion wassent to Daba on 23rd October, 1940, for furthertraining before joining the (first Company.

The Spahis were sent to the Sudan a weeklater, and it is hoped that they will shortly beengaged in active operations on the Abyssinianfrontier. !

In Cairo there is a very active FrenchNational Committee under the presidency ofBaron de Benoist. The Chief of the CabinetMilitaire is Commandant des Essars, who hasvery ably carried out the responsible duties ofGeneral de Gaulle's military representative inthe Middle East. He has recently beenappointed Chief of Staff to General Catroux,the new Delegate General of Free France inthe Middle East. Commandant des Essars isin close touch with the situation in Greece(where there is a strong French Committee), inSyria and in French Equatorial Africa.

(b) Polish.The Polish Brigade was originally stationed

at Latrun in Palestine, but early in October itwas moved to Egypt to take up a defensiveposition on the Western outskirts of Alexandria.A reserve Depot was left at Latrun and herenew arrivals from the Balkans are equippedand trained before joining the Brigade.

The flow of recruits from the Balkans fluctu-ates with the political situation; according to arecent estimate by the Military Attache atAnkara, the maximum rate we can expect atpresent is 100 per week. The Brigade is stillover 1,000 under strength in other ranks, buthas a surplus of officers. It has now beendecided (at General Kopanski's suggestion) toform these surplus officers into an Officers'Legion for garrison duties in Alexandria. Ithas also been decided that the Brigade shouldultimately be organised on a British W.E.—asand when equipment becomes available.

(c) Czechoslovak.The Czechoslovak contingent is stationed at

Gedera in Palestine; it consists of an Infantry

Battalion (on British W.E.), a training depotand a small contingent headquarters. Atpresent there are some 35 surplus officers, butthe contingent is nearly 600 under strength inother ranks.

The chief source of supply for Czech volun-teers is S.E. Europe. Owing to German pressureand to the fact that there are no Czech legationsin the Balkan countries, the Military Attache1

Ankara considers that the maximum flow fromthe Balkans and Russia will not exceed 100per month. There are at present over 600potential Czech volunteers in Russia; but owingto financial difficulties few have as yet arrived.

General Gak, the Chief of the CzechoslovakMilitary Mission in the Middle East, arrived inAugust, and he and his staff are responsible forco-ordinating the recruiting of Czech volunteersfrom Egypt, Palestine, Iran and the Balkans.(d) Spanish.

There is no separate Spanish contingent.Spanish volunteers, who are ex-members of theFrench Foreign Legion, are accepted for train-ing at the Free French Depot. When a partyof twenty-five has been collected, they aredrafted into a Commando after formal enlist-ment and attestation into the British Army.There are at present some fifty Spanish volun-teers serving with 50 (ME) Commando.(e) Belgians.

Owing to the comparatively small size of theBelgian communities in Egypt and elsewhere inthe Middle East, and to the fact that many menwere already serving with the Belgian Armyprior to the French collapse, it was not possibleto form a separate Belgian contingent. Indi-viduals with special qualifications, however,have been accepted for service in the BritishArmy—notably as officers in the British ArabForce. Recently a small party of Belgianvolunteers left to join the Belgian forces in theU.K. It was decided, for the present, not toaccept offers of service from Belgian units orindividuals in the Congo, as they could besthelp the common cause by maintaining thesituation in Central Africa.(f) Greeks.

Negotiations are now in progress with theGreek authorities for the raising and trainingof units of the Greek Army in Egypt. It isproposed to form as soon as possible technicalunits initially for service with the British Army.In addition, it is proposed to organise a train-ing depot with a view to the ultimate formationof a Greek Brigade Group, when more equip-ment is available. The Greek Government isprepared to send a liaison mission of 15 officersand 20 cadets to assist in training. ColonelOeconnomopoulos has already arrived as ChiefLiaison Officer.

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