ThirdPointLLC390ParkAvenueNewYork,NY10022Tel2127153880

October21,2014

ThirdQuarter2014InvestorLetterReviewandOutlookTheThirdQuarterwasmoderatelyvolatileforthemarketsandThirdPointsportfolio.Inaquarter inwhich itwasdifficult togain traction, Julys lossesoffsetAugustsgains,whileSeptember was essentially flat. Equities produced profits, mortgages continued theirimpressive outperformance, and credit suffered primarily from losses in a singleinvestment, Banco Espirito Santo. Throughout the Quarter, we continued to optimizepositionsizestoincreaseportfolioconcentration,whichhasbeenakeyfocusthisyear.Wealso took advantage of stronger tapes to exit or reduce positions including AIG, Hertz,Softbank,LNG,LNGAU,andSony,whichisdiscussedinmoredetailbelow.BeforeOctober,bothmarketcorrectionsandralliesbackhadbeenquickanddramaticthisyear. We feared that therehadbeenaparadigmshiftuntil the last fewdays,but itnowseemsthemarketmaybecontinuingthisestablishedpattern.Pinpointingthecauseoftheinitial sharp market movement downward is conjecture at best. Daniel Kahneman, theNobel Laureate Economist and expert in heuristics, has written extensively about thedangersofourtendencytoattributecausationtoassociatedevents.Keepinghisresearchinmind,wecaveatourexplanationsforOctoberscorrectionandvolatility.In early October, a confluence of events transpired in relatively short order, includingweaker economic data, political uncertainty, a potential global plague, and bureaucraticmeddling,which caused fear to spike, sentiment todecline, and investors todeleverage.Themonthgotoff toanespecially rockystart forhedge fundswhenacourtdismissedaclaiminconnectionwiththeFannieMae/FreddieMacGSEcomplex.Manyinvestorswereoversized in this tradeandtheir forcedsellingkickedoff thederiskingcycle. Next,oilprices declined sharply and many funds who had large positions in E&P companiessuffered enormous losses. Then last week, AbbVie halted its announced inversiontransactionwithShire,inflictinggreatpainonthearbitragecommunity.Opaquelyblamingmysterious meetings with the Treasury Department, AbbVie walked away from anentirelylawfuldealthatithadtoutedasenormouslyaccretiveandstrategicasrecentlyastwoweeksago, incurringasubstantial$1.6billionbreakupfee. Arationalconclusion isthat instead of a legislative solution that might require comprehensive tax reform, thisAdministration has decided to unilaterally curb inversions using whatever means areavailable. Needlesstosay,thisregulatoryuncertainty(alongwithpriordetoursfromthe

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ruleoflaw)willbeawetblanketontopofinvestorsuntiltransparencyandalevelplayingfieldarerestoredtothemarkets.Amidstthisunwind,ouranalysisshowedusthatwhilesomefearwaswarranted,somewasexaggerated,andsowetookstepstomitigatevolatilityandsimultaneouslytakeadvantageof the market mayhem. Over the past week, after initially reducing our exposures, werealigned our portfolio by lifting hedges, taking on new positions, and reestablishinginvestmentsincompanieswehadpreviouslyexitedatmuchhigherprices.Going forward, we expect that the US will remain the best place to invest, creditopportunitieswill stay slim, and large cap opportunitieswith a constructivist anglewillbecomemorepromising.Althoughconsensushasshiftedtolowergrowth,slowerinflation,modest rates, and continuedmonetary expansion, we think themarketswill resume anoverallupwardtrajectoryintheUSthroughyearend.Amidstthisvolatilityandperformancedispersion,westrugglewithourinstinctthatitisagoodtimetoshortstockswiththerealityofthepastfewyearsofshortsellingcarnage.Wewereintriguedby investment legendJulianRobertsonsrecentcommentsthat,wehadafield day before anyone knew anything about shorting. Itwas almost a license to steal.Nowadaysitsalicensetogethosed.Thereisnodoubtthatthecomplexitiesaroundsinglename short selling have increased massively following 2008 partly as a function ofgovernmentregulationandintervention,partlyduetonegativerebatesbeingthenormbutwehaveslowlybeengettingbackintotheshallowendofthepool.QuarterlyResultsSetforthbelowareourresultsthroughSeptember30thandfortheyear2014:

ThirdPointOffshoreFundLtd. S&P500

2014ThirdQuarterPerformance* 0.1% 1.1%2014YeartoDatePerformance* 6.0% 8.3%AnnualizedReturnSinceInception** 17.5% 7.5%*ThroughSeptember30,2014.** Returnfrominception,December1996forTPOffshoreFundLtd.andS&P500.SelectPortfolioPositionsEquityPosition:AmgenSinceitsfoundingin1980,Amgen(thecompany)hasbeenapioneerinthebiotechnologyindustry,successfullydiscovering,developing,andmarketingtherapeuticagentsthathavemeaningfullyimpactedhumanhealth.From1989to2002,Amgengrewfiverevolutionarybiologic drugs into billion dollar blockbuster products in oncology, nephrology, and

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inflammation.Today,Amgenisa$105billionmarketcapcompanywithannualrevenuesofnearly$20billionandannualnetincomeofover$5billion.Consideringthistrackrecord,Amgenslongtermunderperformancerelativetoitsbiotechpeers is surprising. The company has a compelling mix of longduration, highmarginmature products likeNeulasta andEnbrel, and a number of exciting high growth assets,includingrecentlylaunchedblockbusterslikeProliaandXgevaalongwithinnovativelatestagepipelineassetslikeevolocumab.Yet,usingnearlyanyvaluationmetric,theCompanytrades at a substantial discount to peers. Amgen even trades at a discount to the USpharmaceutical sector, despite superior revenue and earnings growth rates. Amgenscurrentdiscounttofairvaluationandthelackofstructuralhurdlestoclosingthisgapmake it an attractive investment opportunity. Third Point is now one of the companyslargestshareholders.Amgen has all the hallmarks of a hidden value situation, one of our favorite investmentthemes. Thecompanydoesnot receivepropercredit from investors foreither thecashgenerative potential of itsmature products or the coming financial impact of its growthassets. In the mature products segment, we believe revenues will be sustainable andconcerns about potential erosion are overstated. With respect to Amgens pipeline, webelievethemarketunderappreciateshowdisruptivesomeofitsnewproductswillbe.Ourconviction about the companys growth pipeline has been bolstered by our discussionswithThirdPoints newly created Scientific andMedicalAdvisoryBoard (SMAB) led byrenownedoncologistDr.DavidAgus.Dr.Agushashelpedusassembleaworldclassteamofscientistsandphysicianstoassistinourevaluationoftherapeuticcompaniesandtheirclinicalassets.1We believe the obscured fundamental value and investor skepticism that have led toAmgens valuation discount can be easily unlocked. Throughout our due diligence anddiscussionswithsellsideanalystsandotherinvestors,itbecameclearthatthemarkethaspenalizedAmgenforseveralkeyreasons:1)itshistoricallackofR&Dproductivity;2)morethan a decade of flat operatingmargins; and 3) the suspension of its share repurchaseprogramin2013followingits$9billionacquisitionofOnyxPharmaceuticals.First,onR&Dproductivity,ouranalysesconfirmthatAmgensR&Deffortshavebeenmorecostlyandlessefficientthanthoseofitsbiotechpeers.Despiteinvestingacumulative$32billioninR&Dsince2002,over75%ofAmgenscurrentrevenuesstillcomefromproducts 1OtherSMABmembersincludeDr.GeoffGinsberg,thefoundingDirectoroftheCenterforGenomicMedicineatDukeUniversity,andDr.DavidParkinson,aformerpharmaceuticalandbiotechexecutiveandtheformerchairmanoftheFDAsBiologicsAdvisoryCommittee.

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introducedbeforethatyear.Amgenalsoappearstospendsignificantlymoremoneyonitslatestagepipelineassetsthananyofitsbiotechpeersbothinabsolutetermsandrelativetothenumberofdevelopmentprojects.Giventhissparseoutputversustoinvestment,webelieve improvements are needed in Amgens R&D evaluation process, a hypothesissupportedbymembersofourSMAB.Second,themarkethasrightfullypunishedAmgenforhavingflatoperatingmarginssince2002despitea3x increase inrevenues,a failureweattributetoexcessivespending. Forstarters,thebloatedcoststructure istroublinggiventhatAmgencompetes inspecializedtherapeutic areas which require small, highly focused sales and marketing efforts, andgenerates the majority of its revenues from just a few wellestablished, popular drugs.Anotherpuzzleisthatwhilethebiotechnologyindustryhasseensubstantialimprovementsinmanufacturingefficiency,Amgenhasnotdemonstratedanyoftheobviouseconomiesofscale(e.g.,procurement,sourcing)thatshouldhavebeenrealized. Againstthisbackdrop,the companys lack of operating margin leverage over this period is doubly surprising.Given its revenue growth, we are convinced that Amgen should have seen meaningfuloperatingmarginexpansionsince2002,ashortcomingwhichwebelievemanagementhasnow acknowledged. We believe recent efforts to trim costs do not even scratch thepotentialopportunity.Third,in2013,Amgensmanagementmadeaquestionablecapitalallocationdecision:thecompanypurchasedOnyxPharmaceuticalsata40%+premiumfor$9billionincashwhilehaltingitsownsharerepurchaseprogram.Atthetime,thecompanysaidthatitsbuybackwouldremainhalteduntil2016.Basedoncorporatefilings,duringthedealnegotiations,Amgen had concerns aboutOnyxs lead compound, Kyprolis, and renegotiated to reducetheprice.Sincetheacquisitionclosed,AmgenhasdisclosedthatwhiletheASPIREtrialforKyprolismetitsclinicalendpoints,itssisterFOCUStrialfailedtoshowclinicalbenefitandintroduced potential concerns over renaladverse events. Instead of theOnyx purchase,Amgen could have accretively repurchased over 10% of its shares outstanding, at thedepressed valuation of just 4x sales. Beyond Onyx, we questionwhether the return onAmgens$17billioninM&Aspendingsince2002(ontopoftheaforementioned$32billioninR&Dspending)hasbeeneconomicallyjustified,bothinabsolutetermsandalsorelativeto other transactions in the sector. We are challenged to identify any homerunacquisitionsand,whilestillearly,believe thatmostof these transactionswill turnout toshowmediocrereturns.We believe that Amgenmanagement can directly address all three sources of legitimateinvestor frustration and, basedonourdiscussions todatewithmanagement,webelievethat theywill. While we applauded Amgens first steps in July to target the companysinflated cost structure by rationalizing its US facilities footprint and creating centers of

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R&D excellence in San Francisco and Boston, we believemuchmore can and should bedone.ImmediateactionsAmgencantaketocreateshareholdervalueinclude:1)FocusingitsR&Defforts;2)Providing longtermmarginguidancedemonstratingacommitmenttoreducingabloatedcoststructure;and3)Creatingclarityonadditionalshareholderreturns.We have also asked the company to seriously consider a more radical option, one firstproposed by Geoffrey Porges at Sanford Bernstein. It is wellestablished that disparatebusiness units generally benefit from operating separately due to distinct corporatecultures, superior efficiencies, and a greater focus for employees andmanagement alike.GiventhediversenatureofitsassetscashgenerativeMatureProductsandR&DintensiveGrowth Products we believe that Amgen could benefit from a separation into distinctoperating units with separate financial statements and should seriously considerseparating into two companies (e.g., a MatureCo and a GrowthCo). Internally, eachbusinesswouldhavedifferentpriorities:MatureCowouldfocusonefficiencyandcashflow,whileGrowthCowouldemphasizeproductdevelopmentandinnovation. Externally,eachbusiness would be valued with different metrics: MatureCo on a dividend yield andGrowthCo on a peerbased sales or earnings multiple. Our own extensive diligencesuggests thatabreakupofAmgen is feasibleand thatpurportedconstraints suchas taxstrategyandsupplychainmanagementcanbemanaged.AseparationofAmgenintoMatureCoandGrowthCowouldlikelybeverywellreceivedbyinvestors.WeexpectthatMatureCowouldreceiveavaluationbasedonitsdividendyieldwhile GrowthCo would be valued, like peers, on a high growth multiple on earnings,reflectiveof theburgeoningpipeline. Importantly,however,webelieve thataseparationwouldnotjustbegoodforshareholders,butthatitisamoreeffectivewayofrunningeachbusiness. In particular, we believe that the benefits to GrowthCo would be the mostmeaningful: talent retention, more rapid decision making, and ultimately, accelerateddevelopmentofnew therapies to improvecountless lives. WeurgeAmgenmanagementandacommitteeofindependentdirectorstoconducttheirownindepthevaluationofthisstrategicoptionandsharetheirfindingswithinvestors.We believe there are threeways towin in Amgen, depending on the pathmanagementtakesfromhere.IfAmgenissimplyvaluedatoneturnbelowitspharmaceuticalpeersat17x earnings a changewe expect to be driven bymanagements current restructuringplansthestockshouldbeworth$189persharebytheendof2016.IfAmgenfullyseizestheopportunitiesoutlinedinourrecommendationstofocusitsR&D,announcestructuralexpense reductions, and accelerate capital deployment, we believe 2017 EPS will reach$12.82(versusconsensusof$11.12currently),implyingasharepriceof$218onthesamemultiple. We see themost upside, however, in the scenario where Amgen strategicallyseparatesintotwostandalonebusiness,aswehaveencouragedmanagementtoconsider.

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Intwoyears,weexpectthatsuchaseparationcouldcreatealmost$249pershareintotalvalue,over80%upsidetothecurrentshareprice.CEOBobBradwayandhisteamhavebeenopenmindedandreceptivetoourideastodateandwefirmlybelievethatthecompanyisataninflectionpoint.ThecompanysupcomingAnalystDaypresentsanexcellentchanceforAmgenmanagementtotakeboldactionandprovide clear direction for the company, its investors, and its employees. We hope tomaintain our constructive dialogue with management as the company moves towardsclosingitsvaluationgap.EquityPosition:eBayWe established a significant position in eBay during the Third Quarter. While eBayschallengeswerewellmappedincludingmultipleyearsofminimalvaluegrowth,aweakexecutiontrackrecord,andhighemployeeturnoverwesensedithadarrivedatacriticalinflectionpointandgainednewfocus.AmeetingwithCEOJohnDonahoethissummerleftusimpressedbyhisprocessdrivenapproachtooptimizingthebusiness.WewerepleasedwhenMr.Donahoeannounced inSeptember thateBaywouldsplit intotwobyspinningoffitsPayPalunit. OurworkonAlibabasince2011hadpersuadedusofthepowerofthemarketplacemodelinecommerceandourworkonAliPayconvincedusthatPayPalwasanincrediblywellpositionedglobalbrandwiththepotentialtobecomealeading player in mobile payments. Following the spinoff, eBay/PayPal will offer twoappealinggrowth,relativevalue,andcapitalreturnprofilesforinvestors.eBay/MarketplaceseBayisoneoftheworldsten largestretailers,withstrongmargins, limitedcapex,globalreach, and consistenthighsingle to lowdoubledigit growth. While eBays sales growthmay appear underwhelming when compared to Alibaba or Amazon, the company isgrowing sales23x faster than theHomeShoppingNetwork (which tradesat10x2015EEBITDA) and WalMart (which trades at 8x 2015E EBITDA), and enjoys a much moreattractivemarginandfreecashflowprofile.While eBaywill invest in branding efforts during the balance of this year,we anticipatefavorable comparisons to drive renewedmomentum in 2015. We are also intrigued byefforts toemphasizestructureddata inways thatwillbenefit consumerengagementandmerchant visibility. Finally, eBay is highly cashgenerative and has relatively limitedcapitalneeds.Ithasshownaninterestinbuyingbackitsstockandawillingnesstotakeondebttodoso.WiththesplitofeBayandPayPal,webelieveeBayscapitalreturnstrategywill be more pronounced and structurally, new eBay would be positioned to buy back

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roughlyathirdofitsfloatwithintwoandahalfyears(andalmosthalfitsfloatwithin4to5years).WebelievecoreeBaycouldbeworthmorethandoubleitsimpliedpresplitvalue,assuminghighsingledigit toplinegrowth,modestmargin improvement,andaconsistentbuybackpolicy. PayPalPayPal is a highgrowth business with significant opportunities to expand its existingmarket and margins while pursuing new paths in financial services for consumers andmerchants. With significant scale and an attractive funding mix, PayPal generates highincremental margins on payment volume increases which it can use to fund sustainedgrowth.Apples entry into the payments space dampened investors enthusiasm for PayPal,creatinganinterestingentrypoint.WethinkthemarketismissingthefactthatApplePayisprimarilyanofflinemobilesolutionfocusedonthePointofSale(POS)opportunitywhichrepresents a small fraction of PayPals current business. When we break down theapplicability of ApplePay to PayPals business mix, we find that ApplyPay will competedirectlywithonly1.52%ofPayPalstotalpaymentvolume(TPV).We believe that Apples entry into themobile payments space could ironically be a netpositiveforPayPal. Mobilepaymentshavebeenthenextbigthingforalmostfiveyearsbut have failed to ramp. In part, this is because one needs buyin from financialinstitutions, merchants, and consumers in order for a payment technology to gainacceptance. With no pressure to catalyze a decision, the different incentives of thesegroupshavenotproventobesufficientlyalignedtoovercometheirinertiaandcometoanagreement. MCX,Google, andPayPal nowneedpartners to competewithApple andwethinkmultiplewin/windealsexist. PayPalscurrentPOSbusinessisdeminimis,allowingthecompanytopricedisruptivelywhilecreatingsubstantialvalue.Finally,PayPalsvaluewillbebetterreflectedinasmaller,morenimbleentity.PayPalhastheoptiontogoitalone,selltooneofmanypotentiallyinterestedparties,ortoopenitselfuptopartnershipswithotherkeyonlineplayers(e.g.Google,Facebook,Amazon,Alibaba,Apple)andbecomeaneutral,onlinepaymentsnetwork(essentiallybecomingtheVisaoftheInternet).ThemarketiscurrentlyvaluingPayPalatapproximately11.5x14.5xx2015EPS(assumingan89xEBITDAmultiple foreBay)whichseemstoocheapforacompanygrowingsales20%withsignificantstrategicoptionalityandastrongchancetoshapethefutureofpayments.

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EquityPosition:AlibabaInourQuarterlyLettertwoandahalfyearsago,wearguedtheCaseforAlibaba.Atthetime, Alibaba held a leadingmarket position that itwas just beginning tomonetize (thecompanyhadlessthan$75millioninLTMearnings). Today,theCompanyhascontinueditsexponentialgrowth,demonstratedsignificantmarginleverage,andisexpectedtoearnover $5 billion this fiscal year. Our enthusiasm for the Alibaba story has underpinnedmultiple investments at Third Point and now that the company is public, we haveestablishedasignificantdirectinvestmentinAlibabashares.Third Point has met with management several times and is confident that Alibaba cangenerate longterm value in its core markets and compete in new ones, making it acompellingpotentialmultiyearinvestment.Thecompanyhasasubstantialnetworkeffectthatcreatesseveral largemoatsarounditsbusiness,generatingsignificantfreecashflowfor reinvestment and expansion as well as an unrivaled amount of data on Chineseconsumers. Wesee continuedendmarketgrowth inChinese consumer spendingandecommerce (as well as global ecommerce) and continue to believe that Alibaba hasconsiderableadditionalmonetizationpotential.ThesuccessofAlibabasIPOshowsthatwearenotaloneinourviewthatthecompanyispositionedasChinasecommercejuggernaut. Alibabasmetricsshouldappealtogrowth,GARP,andvalueinvestors.WearemostfocusedonAlibabasmultiplehiddenassetsthatrepresentunderappreciatedsourcesofvalue,including:Aliyun/AlibabaCloudComputingisAlibabasInfrastructureasaService(IaaS)business(effectivelytheAWSofChina).TheunitcanleveragetherobustinfrastructureAlibabahasinplace tohandle spikes indemandaround the11/11salesholiday (whichhas~9x thetrafficoftheaverageday).SinceAlibabaonlyuses12%ofitspeakcapacityonanaverageday, the company can lease out its infrastructure to other businesses at extremelycompetitivecosts. OurresearchsuggeststhatAlibabahasthebestIaaSplatforminChinaand competitors are ceding themarket to them. Gartner suggests that thiswill be a $5billionRMBmarketinthreeyearsanditisAlibabastolose.China Smart Logistics is Alibabas logistics JV (Alibaba holds 48%). The Companyslogistic partners delivered 6.1 billion packages in China for the twelve months ended6/30/14. Thiswas38%morepackages thanUPSdeliveredglobally in that timeperiod.Courierbusinessesarecompetitive inChinaandpackagescanbedeliveredforanywherefrom~522RMB. Taking the lowest delivery priceswe have heard, applying that to 6.1billion parcels and growing the unit numbers 30% annually suggests that the deliveryportionofAlibabaslogisticecosystemwillbea$17billionbusinessin5years. Applyingthismathtoaveragedeliverypricessuggestsa$33billionbusiness.Oncewarehousingandlogisticsisaddedin,theindustrycouldbecloserto$50billionannually.Ourbeliefisthat

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whileAlibabadoesntwanttoenterthecourierbusinessdirectly,theywouldworkthroughtheJVtohelptheecosystemmanagedatatomakelogisticsmoreefficientandintelligent.Itisnthardtoimaginethisbecomingamultibilliondollarincomestreamovertime.AliPay is an escrow payment service the company developed to ensure users felt safetransactingontheplatform.AlibabahasindirectexposuretoAliPayviaits33%interestinAnt Financial, which also includes merchant finance, insurance and consumer financebusinesses.AliPayhasgrownintooneofthemostimportantfinancialcompaniesinChinaandhasover300millionusers(twicethenumberofPayPal)and190millionmobileusers.The average Alipay user transacts over 80 times per year. While almost 80% oftransactionsonAlibabaarepaid forviaAlipay,Alibabaonly represents30%ofAliPay sbusiness. AliPayrunstheirAlibabavolumesatzeromarginandmakesmoneyontheoffAlibabaportion. Thisportion isgrowing faster than theAlibabaportionof thebusiness,allowingrevenuetogrowfaster thanTPVandprofits togrowfaster thanrevenue. Ifweapply Visas TPVmultiple to AliPay, it would imply the unit is worth $80 billion and isalmost10%ofthecompanyscurrentvaluation.TheChinesepaymentsmarketisevolvingquickly and the regulatory environment can be fluid but AliPay is one of the mostinnovative companies in China and is structured to be very nimble. Bank of AmericaMerrillLynchestimatesAliPaywillearnover$2billionin2017andarguesfora$60billionvaluation for theunit(oranNPVof$7perAlibabashare). LocalbrokershavemadethecasethatAliPaycouldbea$200billionUSDbusinessbytheendofthedecade.ThecommonfactorinallthreehiddenassetsisthattheyareunderappreciatedrelativetoAlibabascorefreecashflowmachinebecausetheyareonlybeginningtomakemoney.Wehave seenAlibabas pattern for growingbusinesses andbelieve that they are inclined tofocus on share over profits until they reach enormous scale. Once a business achievesubiquity,profitscanrampveryquickly. WebelievethatAlibabas$200billionenterprisevalue(adjusted forpublicstakes)suggestswearegettingvaluablecalloptions inAliyun,ChinaSmartLogisticsandAliPay/AntFinancialforfree.EquityPositionExit:SonyInMay of 2013, Third Point announced a significant stake in Sony and suggested to thecompanysCEO,KazuoHirai,thatheshouldseriouslyconsiderspinningout1520%ofthecompanys undervalued, Americanbased Entertainment business. At the time, weexplained that partially listing the Entertainment segment would have three positiveeffects: 1) highlighting its profitability; 2) increasing investor transparency, therebyallowing themarket toproperlybenchmark the companyagainst its globalmediapeers;and3)incentivizingEntertainmentsmanagementtorunthecompanymoreefficientlybyengagingincostcuttingandlayingoutclearearningstargets.

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While,regrettably,theCompanyrejectedourpartialspinoutsuggestion,theymadesomechangesthatwereconsistentwithourgoals.IntheEntertainmentbusinessinparticular,Sonyhascutcosts,improveditsdialoguewithinvestors,andundertakenkeymanagementchanges. In Electronics, Mr. Hirais team deserves credit for transitioning away frompersonal computers this year and improving television profitability in 2015. They havealsoimprovedinvestortransparency.Still,theyhavealongwaytogoandwecontinuetobelieve that more urgency will be necessary to definitively turn around the companysfortunes.Akeytenetforusinmakingconstructivistinvestmentsisourmarginofsafety.Whileweare most focused on the potential upside available to shareholders if managementundertakeschanges,weareunlikelytomakeasignificantinvestmentinasituationwhereconstructivistdriven change is the chief catalystunlesswe seeminimaldownside. Sonywasexactlythetypeofinvestmentwheretherisk/rewardratiowasskewedinourfavor.Thankstothisinvestmentprinciple,despiteenduringprofitwarningsnearlyeveryquarterwewereinvested,incurringworsenewsaboutElectronicsthanweexpected,andsufferingfrom market disappointment at the pace of Japanese macroeconomic reforms, we stillmanagedtogeneratenearlya20%returnonthisinvestmentbeforeexiting.Sincerely,ThirdPointLLC_____________________TheinformationcontainedhereinisbeingprovidedtotheinvestorsinThirdPointOffshoreFund,Ltd.(OffshoreFund),ThirdPointUltraLtd.(Ultra),ThirdPointPartnersL.P.,andThirdPointPartnersQualifiedL.P. (collectively, theFunds)and itsmanagedaccounts.TheOffshoreFundandUltraarefeederfundstotheThirdPointOffshoreMasterFundL.P.andThirdPointUltraMasterFundL.P.,respectively,inamasterfeederstructure.ThirdPointLLC(ThirdPoint)anSECregisteredinvestmentadviser,istheInvestmentManagertotheFundsandmanagedaccounts.All performance results are based on the NAV of fee paying investors only and are presented net of management fees, brokerage commissions,administrative expenses, and accrued performance allocation, if any, and include the reinvestment of all dividends, interest, and capital gains. Whileperformanceallocationsareaccruedmonthly,theyaredeductedfrominvestorbalancesonlyannually(quarterlyforThirdPointUltra)oruponwithdrawal.The performance results represent fundlevel returns, and are not an estimate of any specific investors actual performance, whichmay bemateriallydifferentfromsuchperformancedependingonnumerousfactors. Allperformanceresultsareestimatesandshouldnotberegardedasfinaluntilauditedfinancialstatementsareissued.TheperformancedatapresentedrepresentsthatofThirdPointOffshoreFundLtd.AllP&Lorperformanceresultsarebasedonthenetassetvalueoffeepayinginvestorsonlyandarepresentednetofmanagementfees,brokeragecommissions,administrativeexpenses,andaccruedperformanceallocation,ifany,andincludethereinvestmentofalldividends,interest,andcapitalgains.Theperformanceaboverepresentsfundlevelreturns,andisnotanestimateofanyspecificinvestorsactualperformance,whichmaybemateriallydifferentfromsuchperformancedependingonnumerousfactors.Allperformanceresultsareestimatesandshouldnotberegardedasfinaluntilauditedfinancialstatementsareissued.ExposuredatarepresentsthatofThirdPointOffshoreMasterFundL.P.WhiletheperformancesoftheFundshavebeencomparedherewiththeperformanceofawellknownandwidelyrecognizedindex,theindexhasnotbeenselectedtorepresentanappropriatebenchmarkfortheFundswhoseholdings,performanceandvolatilitymaydiffersignificantlyfromthesecuritiesthatcomprisetheindex.Investorscannotinvestdirectlyinanindex(althoughonecaninvestinanindexfunddesignedtocloselytracksuchindex).Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. All information provided herein is for informational purposes only and should not bedeemedasarecommendationtobuyorsellsecurities.Allinvestmentsinvolveriskincludingthelossofprincipal.ThistransmissionisconfidentialandmaynotberedistributedwithouttheexpresswrittenconsentofThirdPointLLCanddoesnotconstituteanoffertosellorthesolicitationofanoffertopurchase

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any security or investment product. Any such offer or solicitation may only be made by means of delivery of an approved confidential offeringmemorandum.Specific companies or securities shown in this presentation are meant to demonstrate Third Points investment style and the types of industries andinstrumentsinwhichweinvestandarenotselectedbasedonpastperformance.TheanalysesandconclusionsofThirdPointcontainedinthispresentationincludecertainstatements,assumptions,estimatesandprojectionsthatreflectvariousassumptionsbyThirdPointconcerninganticipatedresultsthatareinherentlysubjecttosignificanteconomic,competitive,andotheruncertaintiesandcontingenciesandhavebeenincludedsolelyforillustrativepurposes.No representations, express or implied, aremade as to the accuracyor completeness of such statements, assumptions, estimates orprojectionsorwithrespecttoanyothermaterialsherein.Informationprovidedherein,orotherwiseprovidedwithrespecttoapotentialinvestmentintheFunds,mayconstitutenonpublicinformationregardingThirdPointOffshoreInvestorsLimited,afeederfundlistedontheLondonStockExchange,andaccordinglydealingortradinginthesharesofthatfundonthebasisofsuchinformationmayviolatesecuritieslawsintheUnitedKingdomandelsewhere.