ThinkingGloballyandActingLocally:

TheEU’sGlobalStrategyandImplicationsforCounterterrorismandPreventingViolentExtremism—

FoodforThought1

Abstract

ThisthinkpieceassessestheGlobalStrategyontheEuropeanUnion'sForeignandSecurityPolicy(EUGS)andpresentsideasonhowtheEUGShelpstheEUtoaddressterrorismandpreventandcounterviolentextremismwithitspartners.ItprovidesthebackgroundofthedevelopmentoftheGlobalStrategyanditsassessmentofthecurrentthreatlandscapebeforeexploringtheGlobalStrategy’spotentialforhelpingtheEUtoenhanceand sustain its efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and counter terrorism, including byleveragingitsdiplomaticandcapacity-buildingcomparativeadvantagesanddeepeningitscooperationwithpartners such as the United Nations. With emphasis on ensuringmore efficient and coherent EU externalaction, thepiece concludeswith some reflections on the crucial issue of implementing theEUGSand somerecommendationsfortheEUtoconsiderinthenearandmediumterm.

ExecutiveSummaryTheGlobal Strategyon theEuropeanUnion's Foreign and SecurityPolicy (EUGS)wasreleased in June 2016 after a year-long process which was directed by the HighRepresentativeof theUnion forForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicy. Informedby inputfrom EU Member States and EU institutions as well as think tanks and civil societyorganisations, the EUGS begins by highlighting concerns about terrorism and otherthreats that have increased on European soil and beyond over the past decade. TheEUGSalsolooksatopportunitiesthatlieaheadtoprefaceitsvisionfortheEUtotapitspotential and use the tools it has at its disposal to address five key priorities: 1.) thesecurity of the Union; 2.) state and societal resilience to the East and South; 3.) anintegrated approach to conflicts; 4.) cooperative regional orders; and 5.) globalgovernanceforthe21stcentury.This think piece examines how the EUGS can add value to the EU’s efforts oncounterterrorism and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). It notesthattheconceptofresilienceisattheheartofP/CVEandtheEUGSplacesapremiumonpromotingresiliencetopreventconflict,improvegovernance,andprovideabulwarkforcommunitiestoresistradicalisationandrecruitmentfromviolentextremists.Noting that the EU has already developed and implemented a variety ofcounterterrorismandP/CVE-specificprojectsaroundtheworld,thisthinkpieceassertsthatEUGSshouldbuilduponexistingeffortsratherthanstartfromscratch.

1ByAlistairMillar,ExecutiveDirectoroftheGlobalCenteronCooperativeSecurity,amemberoftheEUfundedCT-MORSEConsortium(http://ct-morse.eu/).

LinkingtheEUGS’svisionwiththeSustainableDevelopmentGoalsisalsodiscussed.TheGlobalStrategyprovidesanopportunitytolearnmoreabouthowtheinvestmentinthefundamentalelementsofgoodgovernancecanbeappliedinaconcertedwaytoaddressthedriversofviolentextremismaswellashowtheEUGScouldalsohelptoencourageamore rigorous assessment about howviolent extremism is undermining developmentandgoodgovernancewithdatafromthefield.Opportunities for using strategic engagement in the field and with partners throughdiplomaticchannelsisexaminedalongwiththeimportanceofaligningfuturecapacity-buildingeffortswiththebreadthofscopeofferedintheEUGS.With emphasis on ensuringmore efficient and coherent EU external action, the thinkpiece concludes by assessing the essential elements required for implementing theGlobalStrategy,notingtheimportanceofnotonlydevotingsufficientresources,butalsoensuringthatthereisenoughmomentumtosustainimplementationoverthelongterm.ThisisfollowedbysixcorerecommendationsfortheEUtoconsidertomakeuseoftheEUGS and maximise the impact of its P/CVE and CT programming, ranging fromenhancingearlywarningofconflictstoinvestingmoreintheEU’sdiplomaticpresenceandstrategiccommunicationsreach.IntroductionOn 28 June 2016 the Global Strategy on the European Union's Foreign and SecurityPolicy(EUGS)waspresentedtotheEuropeanCouncilbytheHighRepresentativeoftheUnion for ForeignAffairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission.Withthe title Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, the document takes anexpansive view, using the term “Global” to cover not only geography but also thebreadthofpoliciesandinstrumentstheEUhasathandtosupporttheGlobalStrategy’simplementation;and itpresentsanupdatedapproach toguide theEuropeanUnion inthefaceofanarrayofcomplexandevolvingchallengesandthreats.While the Global Strategy traverses a number of critical security and foreign policyissues,2thefocusofthisthinkpieceistopresentideasonhowtheEUGShelpstheEUtoaddress terrorism and prevent violent extremism with its partners. This think pieceexaminesthetoolsoutlinedintheGlobalStrategy—fromdiplomacyanddevelopmenttostrategic communications and security cooperation, among others—that can all bebroughttobearinconjunctionwithexistingEUinstrumentsinordertomoreeffectivelyenhancecommunity resilienceandhelppreventandcounterviolentextremism insideand outside the EU. The next section addresses some of the core opportunities andchallenges that lie ahead as the process of implementing the EUGS takes shape. ItconcludeswithsomerecommendationsfortheEUtoconsidergoingforward.

2TheseissuesincludeconsiderationofwhatitsignalsforthefutureofEUenlargementpolicy,relationswithRussia,orsharingtheburdenofdefencespending.

BackgroundontheEUGlobalStrategyThe need for a new strategy on security and foreign policy was raised as a priorityobjective by Federica Mogherini even before she assumed her position as HighRepresentative in the autumn of 2014.3By then, there was no doubt that Europe’ssituationhadchangedsignificantlysince2003whentheEUadoptedits firstEuropeanSecurityStrategy(ESS).AlthoughtheEUdididentifyterrorismasathreat,theESSwaswrittenbeforethe“ArabSpring”;beforetheIslamicStateofIraqandtheLevant(ISIL)became apparent after a splitwith al-Qaida in April 2013; and before ISIL-influencedattacks beyond the battlefields of Syria, Iraq, and Libya,which resulted in a palpableincreaseinradicalisationandterroristattacksinEurope.4In 2003 theEESbeganwith this sentence: “Europehas never been so prosperous, sosecurenorsofree.”5Bycontrast,theEUGSpaintsableakerpicture,acknowledgingthatthe“Unionisunderthreat,”andthat“[w]eliveintimesofexistentialcrisis,withinandbeyond the European Union.”6It confronts the reality that there has been a markeddeteriorationinthethreatlandscapeoverthepastdecade.Large-scaleattacksonpublictransportationinSpainandtheUnitedKingdombyal-QaidaandmorerecentattacksinFrance,Belgium,andGermanyinspiredbyordirectedbyISILillustratetheseverityofthesituation.7AshasbeennotedbyEuropol,“theEUiscurrentlywitnessinganupwardtrend in the scale, frequency and impact of terrorist attacks in the jurisdictions ofMemberStates”andamajorcontributingfactorhasbeenacorrespondingspikeinthenumberof foreign terrorist fighters travelling to,andreturning from,conflictzones intheMiddleEastandelsewherewiththeintentofsupportingorcommittingatrocities.8Atthesametime,theEUGSacknowledgesthateconomicvolatilityandincreasesinmassmigrationhaveaddedtothepressuresontheEU.Allofthesefactorsmakethesecuritysituationevenmorecomplex.

3SeeNathalieTocci,“TheMakingoftheEUGlobalStrategy,”ContemporarySecurityPolicy37,no.3(2016):461,http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1232559.4AbuBakral-Baghdadiannouncedal-QaidaoperationsinSyriaandchangedthegroup’snametotheIslamicStateofIraqandtheLevant(ISIL)inApril2013.SeeStanfordUniversity,“MappingMilitantOrganizations:TheIslamicState,”updated4April2016,http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1.5EuropeanCouncil,ASecureEuropeinBetterWorld:EuropeanSecurityStrategy,12December2003,https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.6EuropeanUnion,SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope,June2016,p.7,https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world.7Forexample,attacksinMadrid(March,2004),London(July,2005),andParis(January,2015)werecarriedoutbyal-Qaidaanditsaffiliates.AttacksinTours(December,2014),Paris(November2015),Brussels(May,2014andMarch,2016),Nice(July,2016),andBerlin(December,2016),werecarriedoutbyindividualsbelievedtobeassociatedorinspiredwithISIL.ThislistisnotexhaustiveandotherattackshavealsooccurredinEuropeinthelastdecadewithoutknown/specifiedlinkstoal-QaidaorISIL.SeeUniversityofMaryland,NationalConsortiumfortheStudyandResponsestoTerrorism,“GlobalTerrorismDatabase,”accessed1February2017,http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.8EuropolEuropeanCounterTerrorismCentre,ChangesinModusOperandiofIslamicState(IS)Revisited,November2016,p.14,https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/islamic-state-changing-terror-tactics-to-maintain-threat-in-europe.

Withtheseconcernsontheforefrontoftheiragenda,theEuropeanCouncilprovidedthemandateforthedevelopmentofthenewGlobalStrategyinJune2015,9emphasizingthecontinuedimportanceofcounteringterrorismasakeypriority.10Overthecourseoftheyear that followed, drafting the EUGS was informed by a process that “was alwayssupposed to be as if not more important than the product itself,” with the finisheddocumentacknowledginginputfromEUMemberStatesandinstitutionsaswellasthinktanks and civil society organisations with a combination of written comments andfeedbackfromoverfiftyeventsacrosstheEU.11PreventingandCounteringViolentExtremismThroughout the document, the EUGS continually highlights the need for amultidimensional approach that is essential for preventing as well as countering thethreatofviolentextremism.Forinstance,theEUGShighlightsfivekeypriorities:1.)thesecurity of the Union; 2.) state and societal resilience to the East and South; 3.) anintegrated approach to conflicts; 4.) cooperative regional orders; and 5.) globalgovernanceforthe21stcentury.EachoftheseprioritiesarerelevanttoP/CVEeffortsandtheconnectiontotheseeffortsisunderscoredinoneoftheGlobalStrategy’scoremessages:“[t]heEUwillliveuptoitsvalues internally andexternally: this is the strongest antidotewehaveagainstviolentextremism.” 12 Indeed, as Sinan Ülgen, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe hasexplained, “for Europe, human security issues are being transformed into homelandsecurityissues.Europemuststrategizepolicies,formulateresponsesanddeveloptoolstotackleinternalandexternalhumansecurityissues.”13ThispointhasalsobeenechoedasevidencesurfacesincaseswhereindividualsreturnfromconflictsintheMiddleEasttocommitterroristactsinEurope,underlininginternalandexternaldimensionsoftheacutesecurityproblemsthatEUisfacing.14TheEUGScallsforanintegratedapproachwithfocusonallstagesofconflictandlevelsof governance (from the local to international). This brings a wider focus than thecomprehensiveapproachthatisalreadyguidingEUsupporttothirdcountries,suchas9EuropeanCouncil,CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,“EuropeanCouncil,25-26/06/2015,”(25and26June2015),http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/06/25-26/.10ItisworthnotingthattheEuropeanCouncilreferredinthisregardtoitsearlierConclusionsofFebruary2015,wheretheCouncildecidedinthewakeoftheCharlieHebdoattacksinFrancethemonthbefore,“tostepup,asamatterofurgency,itsexternalactiononcounteringterrorisminparticularintheMediterranean,theMiddleEast,includingYemen,andNorthAfrica,inparticularalsoLibya,andtheSahel.Counter-terrorism(CT)willbemainstreamedfullyintoEUforeignpolicy.”SeeEuropeanCouncil,CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,“Councilconclusionsoncounter-terrorism,”9February2015,http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/.11Tocci,“TheMakingoftheEUGlobalStrategy,”463,465.12EuropeanUnion,SharedVision,CommonAction,p.21.13SinanÜlgen,“EUGlobalStrategy:ATransformedSecurityLandscape,”CarnegieEurope,1February2016,http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/02/01/eu-global-strategy-transformed-security-landscape-pub-62711.14GillesdeKerchove,“ReportontheImplementationoftheEUCounter-TerrorismStrategy,”CounciloftheEuropeanUnionDocument13981/14,senttoEUCounter-TerrorismDelegationson10October2014.Copyonfilewiththeauthor.

Somalia, to address sustainable development, peace and security, in a fragile contextusing a variety of different funding instruments.15Moving from the comprehensiveapproachtothenewEUGSvisionofanintegratedapproachwillbeaddressedinthelastsectionof thispaper, focusedon implementation,notingbothcountryandregionalaswell as thematic strategieswillneed tobedeveloped inamore systematicmanner toallowfutureactionstobeappliedtoalllevelsofconflictandgovernance.CounterterrorismTheEUGSdevotesaspecificsectiontothetopicof“counterterrorism”.Itincludeshardersecurity measures that relate to intelligence sharing and cyber security as well aspreventiveefforts,notingthattheEU“willdeepenworkoneducation,communication,culture,youthandsporttocounterviolentextremism.”Furthermore,theEUGSexplainsthat“[TheEU]willworkoncounter-radicalisationbybroadeningourpartnershipswithcivil society, social actors, the private sector and the victims of terrorism, as well asthrough inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue.”16This sentiment builds upon theEU’s Counterterrorism Strategy (EUCTS) of 2005, which presents four pillars ascomplementary strands of action (Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond) with crosscuttingcontributionsfromahostofactorswithintheEUanditsMemberStates.17Inthedecade thathaselapsed since theEUCTSwasdrafted, it is still relevant in so far as itshowsthecontinuedimportanceofworkingacrossallfourpillars.However,thethreathasevolvedandtheEUGScontainsanadditionalemphasisoncombininginternationaland external policies in a “more joined-up” approach, calling “for tighter institutionallinksbetweenourexternalactionandtheinternalareaoffreedom,securityandjustice”aswellasstrengtheningthenecessaryconnectionsbetweensecurityanddevelopmentpolicies.18

When lookingaheadto thetaskof implementation, theEUGSpointsout that itwillbenecessary to “reviseexisting sectoral strategies, aswell asdeviseand implementnewthematicorgeographicstrategiesinlinewiththepoliticalprioritiesofthisStrategy.”19It is important toupdate theEUCTS so that it takes stockof the current threat and isinformed by lessons that have emerged in the field and among researchers andpractitioners, including the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), founded withsupport fromtheEuropeanCommission in2011,bringing inseveral thousandexpertsand front-line practitioners from all over Europe.20While it is clear that the evidence

15NationalIndicativeProgrammefortheFederalRepublicofSomalia2014-2020availableonlineat:https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/nip-somalia-20140619_en.pdf16EuropeanUnion,SharedVision,CommonAction,p.21.17CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,TheEuropeanUnionCounter-TerrorismStrategy,14469/4/05Rev.4,30November2005,http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204.18EuropeanUnion,SharedVision,CommonAction,p.50.19EuropeanUnion,SharedVision,CommonAction,p.51.20EuropeanCommissionMigrationandHomeAffairs,“RadicalisationAwarenessNetwork(RAN),”n.d.,https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en.

basethatinformsP/CVEisstillnotfullydeveloped,theworkthattheEUhasfundedinthe field, combinedwith other research, does provide a stronger basis fromwhich toreformulate a counterterrorism strategy that ismore up to date and in linewith thejoined-upapproacharticulatedintheEUGS.FurthermoreinkeepingwithEUGSvisionofanintegratedapproachitwouldbeusefultotakestockofexistingstrategiestoseenotonlyhowtheycanbeupdated,butalsowherethereismissinggeographiccoverage.Forexample there are regional and country strategies/Action Plans for Syria/IraqCT/ForeignFightersstrategy,EUPakistanCT/securitystrategy,Saheldevelopmentandsecuritystrategy21andEUHornofAfrica/YemenCounterTerrorismActionPlans.Areasof North Central and South Africa are not covered by such Strategies. Also themanyexistingplansneedtobeupdatedto focusonchanges in thethreatenvironment.Thisreview should also align the strategieswith the integrated approach in theEUGlobalStrategyentailingamoregranularexaminationof the stagesof conflict from latent toemergingandpostconflictsituationsalongwithassessmentsoflocal,national,regionaland international dynamics. In the realm of P/CVE and counterterrorism, this wouldhelp to informhowresources canbeapplied to support tailoredpreventionefforts insome situations and counterterrorismmeasures (such as customs and border controlcapacitybuilding)orcommunityresilience(forexampleinpostconflictsituations).TheEUGSalsoplacesapremiumonpromotingandstrengtheningresilience,whichisattheheartofP/CVE.Infact,thedocumentmentionstheword“resilience”34times,andtiestheconcepttotheabilityof“statesandsocietiestoreform,thuswithstandingandrecovering from internal and external crises—benefits us and countries in oursurroundingregions,sowing theseeds forsustainablegrowthandvibrantsocieties.”22ThereisparticularemphasisintheEUGSonpromotingresilienceintheeastandsouthofEurope,“stretchingintoCentralAsiaandsouthdowntocentralAfrica,”anditisworthnotingthata“wholeofsociety”approachisadvocatedsothattheEUengageswithandsupports “notonlystate institutions”butall individuals inamanner that isconsistentwiththeethosoftheSDGs.23

LookingatthegeographicfocusintheEUGSthatiseastandsouthofEurope,theEUhasalreadydevelopedand implementedavarietyof counterterrorismandP/CVE specificprojects in Central Asia24the Euro-Med region,25the Middle East and North Africa

21EEAS“StrategyforSecurityandDevelopmentintheSahel”availableonlineat:http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf22EuropeanUnion,SharedVision,CommonAction,p.23.23EuropeanUnion,SharedVision,CommonAction,p.23.24ForexampletheUnitedNationsRegionalCentreforPreventiveDiplomacyforCentralAsiareceivessupportfromtheEUunderitsIcSP(Art.3)for“comprehensiveimplementationoftheJointPlanofActionforCentralAsiaundertheUnitedNationsGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategy.”25TheGlobalCenteronCooperativeSecurity,withsupportfromtheEUunderitsIcSP(Art.5)implementedaprojectwiththeInstituteforSecurityStudiesandtheInternationalInstituteforJusticeandtheRuleofLaw(IIJ)intheEuro-Medregionfocusedonbuildingcapacityofseniorjudicialofficialstoengageincounterterrorismcasesinarule-of-lawconsistentandeffectivemanner.SeeMelissaLefasandJunkoNozawa,“DeliveringJustice:ViewsfromSupremeCourtsintheEuro-MedRegiononCounteringTerrorism,”December2016,http://www.globalcenter.org/publications/delivering-justice-views-from-supreme-courts-on-countering-terrorism/.

region,26theHornofAfrica,27aswellasprogrammingwithaglobal28geographicremit.ThisapproachwillallowtheEUtobuilduponexistingeffortsinawaythatalignswiththe EUGS without starting from scratch. The EUGS provides an opportunity to buildupon,alignand identifywhere theCTandP/CVEelementsof theEUGS intersectwithexistingregionalsecuritystrategies.

Furthermore, linking the Strategy’s vision with the SDGs provides an opportunity tolearnmoreabout:a.)howinvestmentsinthefundamentalelementsofgoodgovernancecan be applied in a concerted way to address the drivers of violent extremism andviolencemorebroadly,andb.)howtheEUGScouldalsohelptoencouragetheEUaswellas other partners such as the World Bank and UNDP to undertake a more rigorousassessment with data from the field to highlight the ways violent extremism isunderminingdevelopmentandgoodgovernance.TheUNSecretary-General’sPVE“Planof Action to Prevent Violent Extremism” offers some general observations about thisproblem, noting that “violent extremists are also disrupting the day-to-day work ofdevelopment actors,”29 but more specific and systematic evidence of how violentextremism hinders development, would help to further highlight the negative impactthatviolentextremismishavingonEUcooperationaroundtheworld.LinkagewiththeUnitedNationstofurtherP/CVEandCTObjectivesThe connection with the EUGS and efforts initiated at the global level is evident, forexample, with the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006) and themorerecentPVE“PlanofAction”fromtheUNSecretary-General(2015),bothofwhichhighlight the importance of a holistic approach to preventing violent extremism,withthe latterencouragingallUNmemberstates todevelop theirownPVEplansofactionandbuildtheircapacitytoaddresstheconditionsconducivetothespreadofterrorismandpreventtheradicalizationandrecruitmentofviolentextremists.AttheUNGeneralAssemblyinJuly2016theEUhighlightedtherecentreleaseoftheEUGSandnotedthelinkages with the United Nations’ strategic efforts and that both are “united in ourefforts to create a strong front against all forms andmanifestations of terrorism andviolentextremism.”30

26Forexample,anactionhasbeenformulatedfortheimplementationofcapacitybuildingoftheLeagueofArabStates,CTTechnicalAssistanceFacility,withpilotprojectsinselectedcountries,whichaimstobuildeffective,rule-of-lawcompliantcriminaljusticesystemsagainstterrorisminMENAregion.ThissupportedbytheIcSP(Art5.)27Forexample,theEUfundstheStrengtheningResiliencetoViolenceandExtremism(STRIVE)projectintheHornofAfricaunderIcSP(Art5),implementedbytheRoyalUnitedServicesInstitute.Theprojectaimstodevelopbestpracticestoimplementandmonitorprogrammesthathavedemonstrableimpactonstrengtheningresilienceagainstextremismandviolence.FormoreinformationaboutthisandotherSTRIVE-relatedprojectsseeEuropeanCommission,STRIVEforDevelopment,2015,http://ct-morse.eu/strive-for-development-strengthening-resilience-to-violence-and-extremism-2/.28TheseincludeGlobalSTRIVEprojectsfundedunderIcSP(Art5)andimplementedbytheGlobalCommunityEngagementandResilienceFund(GCERF)andtheHedayahInternationalCentreofExcellenceforCounteringViolentExtremism.29UNGeneralAssembly,PlanofActiontoPreventViolentExtremism:ReportoftheSecretary-General,A/70/674,24December2015,para.17.30JoëlleJenny,“StatementonbehalfoftheEuropeanUnionanditsMemberStates”(speech,NewYork,1June2016),http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-statement-united-nations-general-assembly-un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy/.

Acrucial linkbetweentheEUGSandtheUN’scounterterrorismandPVEefforts lies inthe important area of capacity building. UN norms continue to provide importantguidanceanddirection toUNmemberstates,butmorework isneeded toensure thatthosenorms translate into concrete actions on the ground.TheEUGS explicitly statesthat when it comes to supporting resilience in its surrounding regions the EU “willcooperatewithotherinternationalplayers,coordinatingourworkoncapacity-buildingwith the UN . . . in particular.” By citing an array of PVE-relevant priorities including“deepeningworkoneducation, culture andyouth to fosterpluralism, coexistence andrespect,” 31 the EUGS provides a blueprint for engaging with UN actors beyondcounterterrorism-specific entities, such as the Counterterrorism Implementation TaskForce(CTITF).TheEUcanleveragelongstandingpartnershipsandrelationshipswithanarrayofUNentitiesworkingon issues thatalignwith thecoreobjectivesof theEUGS(supporting fulfilment of the SDGs worldwide, global governance, conflict resolution,regional cooperation, inter alia) providing important links that are relevant topreventingviolentextremismwithouttheneedtoputaPVE,CVE,orcounterterrorismlabelon thecontinuation(ordeeper investment in) thatworkgoing forward. Inotherwords,theEUGSprovidesaframeworkfrombuildingontheEU’sworkwiththeUNthatis understood as furthering the objective of preventing violent extremism withoutlabellingitassuch.StrategicDiplomacy

Whetherworkingwith theUNor throughothermultilateral orbilateral partnerships,theEUGSemphasisestheimportanceofengagement,highlightingthat“theUnioncannotpullupadrawbridgetowardoffexternalthreats.Retreatfromtheworldonlydeprivesusof theopportunities that a connectedworldpresents.”32Thepresenceof some140EU Delegations around the world and the dialogues the EU convene regularly withgovernments and intergovernmentalorganisationsprovides theEUwith theability topromote internationally its Strategic vision and the values it embodies. Calling forinvestment in people on the ground, the EUGS calls for its Delegations to be betterequipped “with the necessary expertise, including on sectoral issues.”33 More EUinvestment todevelop localexpertiseoncountering terrorismcouldbeincreasedinthisregard,especiallybyincludingmoreexpertswhocouldspendtimeinthirdcountries.Theseexpertsshouldbewellversedinthereformofciviliansecurityagencies(suchaspoliceandintelligence services). They should also have a wider understanding of the strategicimperative of prevention so that expertise helps develop local capacity on communitypolicingandcivilianearlywarningforexampleareincludedandgivensufficientemphasistobuildtrustwithcommunitiesandaidP/CVEeffortsaswell.

31EuropeanUnion,SharedVision,CommonAction,p.26.32EuropeanUnion,SharedVision,CommonAction,p.17.33EuropeanUnion,SharedVision,CommonAction,p.48.

It also provides an opportunity to take up another point highlighted in theEUGS andwork with nongovernmental organisations and communities. With communityengagement and resilience at the core of any effective P/CVE Strategy, a number ofgovernmentsoutsidetheEUareseverelylimitingthespaceforcivilsocietytooperate.Undue interference by authorities in countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, and othersunderminestheimplementationofkeyelementsoftheEUGS.

In fact, across the globe, trends for civil society-led programming and advocacy,includingonP/CVEarebleak.Wearewitnessingsomeofthemostseveregovernmentcrackdownsoncivilsocietyinageneration.Akeyproblemisthatcivilsocietyisstillnotbeinggivenenoughofarolewhenitcomesto:a)harnessingthepowerofcommunitiesto prevent violent extremism at the local level; b) influencing national, regional, andmultilateral strategies, policies, andprograms to address the threat; or c) engaging inhonest, safe discourse with states and international actors about policies andprogrammesthatfomentorfeedintoextremism,ratherthanamelioratingconditions.Inaddition,thereisclearindicationthatsomestatesareusingthePVEagendaitselftofurther limit the efforts of the independent civil society sector. This iscounterproductive, as a vibrant and independent civil society sector that providesopportunity for interactionsbetween and amongdiversepopulations, and a space forconstructivecriticalengagementwiththestate,isanessentialpillarofprevention.Too many states continue to view the challenge of violent extremism exclusivelythroughasecuritylensandthusasonethatshouldbeaddressedexclusivelybynationalgovernment actors, and principally the security sector. Despite the rhetoric inmultilateral venues like the United Nations, national governments are too oftenreluctant to provide community actors the legal andpolitical space tomaximize theircontributions tobuilding localresilienceagainstviolentextremismandother formsofviolence.Morefundamentally,toomanygovernmentsaremistrustfulofcivilsocietyandactivelyrestricttheirabilitytooperateindependently,ifatall.

TheEUshoulduseitsdiplomaticpresenceanditspoliticaldialoguesmoreoftentoraiseconcernsaboutoppressionofandundueinterferencewithcivilsociety.TheEUcanalsouseitspresencetosupporttheearlywarningofthreatscoupledwithassessmentsthatcaninformactiontotakemeasuresthatcanpreventviolentextremism.Thesemeasuresinclude but are not limited to, allocating small grants, setting up pilot projects orreallocating resources to ensure that the most pressing concerns in vulnerablecommunitiesareaddressedasapriority.Inaddition,theEUshouldprioritizeitssupportforeffortstoallowcivilsocietytobetterorganizethemselvesontherangeofP/CVEissuesandadvocateinnational,regionalandglobal settings for “whole of society” approaches to address violent extremism, inparticular at the local level. Such approaches will not be effective if they are notadequately informed by the perspectives of diverse local actors and if the space forindependent civil society activism continues to shrink. To this end, the EU shouldconsiderexpandingitssupport–bothpoliticalandfinancial–toinitiativesdesignedto

allowforstructuredandsystematic interactionbetweencivilsocietyandgovernmentsonarangeofP/CVEissues,increasedcollaborationandcooperationamongcivilsocietyorganizationsworkingintheP/CVEspace(manyofwhichareEU-funded,buttendnotto look tocollaboratewitheachother),andcivil societyvoicesandperspectives tobeheardmore regularly inmultilateral policy and programming discussions around theP/CVEagenda.CapacityBuildingTheEUhasavastarrayof instruments that it canuse to support theaforementionedinterventions, based on early warning information. The Instrument contributing toStability and Peace (IcSP) is the mechanism that is used most often to supportcounterterrorismandP/CVE-specificprogramming,butEUGSwidensthescopetoallowmore liberal use of other funds—including for example the EuropeanNeighbourhoodInstrument(ENI)toinjector increasesupportforpoliceandjusticesectorreformandgood governance; the European Development Fund (EDF); or the DevelopmentCooperationInstrument(DCI)aswellastheEUEmergencyTrustFundforAfrica.The door has recently been opened further with a decision by the DevelopmentAssistance Committee34(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD). Financial support from donors for certain PVE actions is nowexplicitlyeligibleasOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)whenitisappliedtospecific,non-coerciveactions,suchas“education,activitiesthatsupporttheruleoflaw,workingwith civil society groups specifically toprevent radicalisation,building the capacityofsecurityandjusticesystems.”35GoingforwardthisdecisionbytheDACfacilitatesmorefinancial support for PVE and it also helps the EU and other donors gather data onP/CVE relevant programming and gain a better understanding of how they arecontributingtoP/CVEeffortswithoutduplicatingthoseefforts—andmostimportantly,without feeling compelled to put a counterterrorism or P/CVE label on actions thatwouldsufferfromanyproclaimedassociationwithsecurityobjectives.36PolicydevelopmentandcoherenceOneoftheforemostexpertsonstrategy,RichardRumletattheUniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles,makesacompellingcasetosupporthisargumentthatthekeyelementsofagoodstrategyarethreefold.Itmustcontain:(1)adiagnosisthatdefinesorexplainsthenatureofthechallenge,(2)aguiding-policyfordealingwiththechallenge,and(3)aset

34OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD),“DACHighLevelMeetingCommunique,”19February2016,http://www.oecd.org/dac/DAC-HLM-Communique-2016.pdf.35OECD,“DACHighLevelMeetingCommunique,”para.C25.36TheOECDdisseminatesdatabythemeand/orbycountrythatprovidesindicatorsandinsightsonhowdevelopmentaidassistanceisbeingimplementedandwhatimpactitishaving.Seeforexample:https://data.oecd.org/.

of coherent-actions that aredesigned to carryout the guiding-policy.”37Howdoes theEUGSstanduptothistest?First, as isnoted in the introduction, theEUGSoffersa soberandrealisticviewof theproblemsthattheEUisfacingwhenitcomestoforeignandsecuritypolicy,especiallyintheareaofpreventingandcounteringviolentextremism.Second,guidanceisofferedbyway of clear guiding principles in the EUGS (unity, engagement, responsibility, andpartnership). These are followed by a set of priorities that range from security(including counterterrorism) to strategic communications. All of these are succinctlyarticulated and provide enough direction to follow when it comes to promotingresilience,takinganintegratedandjoined-upapproach,aswellasworkingwithawidearray of governmental and nongovernmental partners.While guidance is sufficient inthisregard,theissueofcoherenceislessobviousoraccessible.Althoughthecatalogueof existing thematic and geographic engagement by the EU is too vast to include in asingleaccessibledocument,theEUGSwouldbenefitfromsomespecificexamplesof,andreferences to, existing strategies and instruments that are being used to address thesecuritychallengesthatprovidethebackdropfortheEUGS.How,forexample,doestheEU grapple with multifaceted problems that are influenced by hard security threats,suchasterrorisminconjunctionwithradicalisationandthepressuresofmigrationthatallcombinetofeedextremistnarrativesandpresentavexingchallengetopractitionersand policymakers? The answer to this question is by no means straightforward, buthaving more examples of lessons learned or brief case studies as practical exampleswouldhelp.Implementation

The third element of Rumlet’s good strategy (coherent actions), is always the mostdifficulttoputinplaceandthenmeasure.Essentiallythisreferstoimplementationandits attendant impact.The final sectionof theEUGS is titled “FromVision toAction.” Itstarts with the importance of being credible. This is particularly important whenimplementingP/CVEprogramming.Workingwithcivilsocietypartners,asisadvocatedintheEUGS,helpstoprovidealinktocommunitiesthatoftenraiselesssuspicionthaninteractingwithgovernmentalagencies.InNovember2016theCounciloftheEuropeanUnionreceivedanImplementationPlanon Security andDefence as a proposal from theHighRepresentative of theUnion forForeign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission, andHead of theEuropeanDefenceAgency. The plan provides useful guidancewith directrelevance to the subject of this paperwith its focus on the need to improve the EU’s“abilitytorespondearlyandeffectivelytoconflictsandcrises.”Itnotesthat“civilianormilitaryexpertscanreinforcetheEUDelegation’scapacityofanalysisandinteractioninastatewheretherearerisksofviolence,instabilityorhybridthreats.”PlacingexpertsinDelegationsaroundtheworldwithintelligencegatheringandanalysisexperiencewouldnotonlyhelptobuildcapacity,itwouldhelptheEUtoemployanintegratedapproach.

37RichardRumlet,GoodStrategy/BadStrategy:TheDifferenceandWhyitMatters(NewYork:RandomHouse,2011).

More in-depth informationabout thenatureand levelofconflict invariousstageswillhelptomorefinelytailorfundingtoensurethatresourcesaredeliveredinaccordancewiththatinformation.ThequalityofthatinformationwouldalsobeimprovediftheEUinvested more in local early warning mechanisms with a civil society component38,allowing for information fromgrassroots, community-level sources toprovide amorelocalized and complete picture of the potential for violent conflict. The proposed EUincreased investment in earlywarningwouldnotonlyhelp to improvehowEU fundsare spent, it would also help local communities to help them identify early-warningindicatorsinpreventingviolenceandtocomeupwithinitiativesthatcouldhelptobuildtrustbetweensecurityforcesandlocalcommunities.

When it comes to addressing the threat from an external as well as an internalperspective (in accordancewith the visionoutlined in theEUGS), the challenge is notjust howmuchmoney is available for counterterrorismandP/CVEprogramming, butunderstandinghowcurrentfundsarebeingusedacrossalltherelevantEUinstruments.Thisshouldalsobeaccompaniedbyanassessmentofwherethemoneyhasledtorealimpactontheground.TheEuropeanCommissiondevelopeda“MappingandStudyonCounterterrorism Activities”39 with the purpose of providing an “overview of theactivities in the fieldofcounterterrorismby theEuropeanUnionexternallywithin thethree domains of capacity building of law enforcement and judiciary, countering thefinancingofterrorism,andcounteringviolentextremism,”itoffersasolidbasistobuilduponsothat it isalignedwiththeEUGS.Themappingwasadaptedto incorporatethebroaderscopeoftheEUGSandgobeyondtoprovideacatalogueandanassessmentofEU-funded programmes that are P/CVE-specific and P/CVE-relevant. The assessmentcouldregularlyupdatedunderCT-MORSE40anditwouldaimtodevelopamorerigorousandcontext-specificsetofindicatorsformonitoringandevaluatingexistingprojectsaswellasdeterminingwherefuturefundscouldbeneededtoensuremeasurable impactandreturnoninvestment.Momentumisalesstangibleelementthanmoneyandthereforemoredifficulttotrack,butitisessentialtoensurethattheEUGSiscarriedwithoutsufferingthefateoftheEES,which, according to SvenBiscop, “drove the agenda of the EU’s CommonForeign andSecurityPolicy(CFSP) foraboutayearor two—then its impact fizzledout.”41KeepingtheEUGSanditscoreprioritiesontheagendaforyearstocomewillbeessentialinsideandoutsideofBrussels,withEUDelegations,specialrepresentatives,EUMemberStates,aswellaspartnerssuchasproject implementers,allhavingan importantroletoplay.

38Withamorerobustcivilsocietycomponentthatcurrentearlywarningmechanisms,suchasECOWARNandCEWARNinWestandEastAfricaRespectively.39Copyonfilewiththeauthor40CTMORSEisaprojectthataimstostrengthentheglobaldelivery,coordinationandcoherenceamongthevariousCTprojectsfinancedbytheEuropeanUnion,aswellastoreinforcetheEUengagementwithintheGlobalCounterTerrorismForumframework.CTMORSEhasfivekeyresultareas:Monitoring;CoherenceandCoordination;RecommendationstotheEU;Expertanalysisandawarenessraising;andVisibility.TheprojectisimplementedbyaconsortiumincludingtheInstituteforSecurityStudies,theGlobalCenteronCooperativeSecurity,theInternationalCounter-TerrorismsCentre-TheHague;andtheGlobalInitiativeagainstTransnationalOrgnisedCrime.TheCT-Morsewebsiteis:http://ct-morse.eu/41EuropeanUnionandInstituteforSecurityStudies,TowardsanEUGlobalStrategy,p.15.

TheinitiativearticulatedintheEUGStoregularlyreviewandupdateitwillhelptokeepthevisionoftheEUGSrelevant.Demonstrating impact and added value is also essential. This can be done by takingstock of achievements, highlighting concrete examples of good practices, and mostimportantly, bymakingbetteruseof oneof the core elements identified in theEUGS:strategiccommunications.TheEUshould investmore indeliberatelyandsystematicallybroadcastingaroundtheworldtheworkitisdoingasoneentity,ratherthanasaconstellationofdifferentsilos.As noted, the EUGS explains that the “EU will live up to its values internally andexternally:thisisthestrongestantidotewehaveagainstviolentextremism.”42ThatwillonlyringtrueifpeopleinsideandoutsidetheEUareawarethatprincipledengagementisactuallyhappening.Furthermore,thetaskofimplementingtheEUGSisincreasinglyimportantastheTrumpAdministrationintheUnitedStatesofAmerica(andpossiblyotheralliesinthefuture)israpidlyenactingpoliciesthatcontradictEUvaluessuchastoleranceandinclusion,andquestionthevalueofglobalinstitutionsthatadvocateagainstmeasuressuchastheuseoftorturethatunderminehumanrights.TheEUhasanimportantroletoplayandithasthetoolsitneeds.TheEUGSprovidesastrategicvisionthatisrealisticaboutthethreatyet mindful of the need to prevent it—by understanding underlying conditions andfactorsthatcontributetoit—inaholisticway.Thechallengeaheadwillbeimplementingit.Recommendations

1. Invest more in early warning information to support implementation of

EUGS’s integratedapproach.TheEUshouldgathermorein-depthinformationabout the nature and level of conflict in various stages. Thiswill help tomorefinely tailor funding to ensure that resources are delivered in accordancewiththat information.Investingmoreinlocalearlywarningmechanismswithacivilsociety component would allow for information from grassroots, community-level sources toprovideamore localizedandcompletepictureof thepotentialforviolentconflictandassessstagesofconflict.TheEUwouldthereforemakeaninvestmentthatwouldnotonlyhelptoimprovehowEUfundsarespent,itwouldalso help local communities to identify early-warning indicators in preventingviolenceand to comeupwith initiatives that couldhelp tobuild trustbetweensecurityforcesandlocalcommunities.

2. Take stock of current EU Strategies that are relevant to CT and PVE, toascertain where there are geographic gaps and where the threat haschanged. This will help to build upon the EUGS’ own suggestion that current

42EuropeanUnion,SharedVision,CommonAction,p.21.

Strategies should aligned with the EUGS and it would increase the level ofgeographic coverage.The stock takingwouldbe informedby lessons thathaveemerged in the field and among researchers andpractitioners and so that it ismore up to date and in line with the joined-up and integrated approacharticulatedintheEUGS.

3. Take stockandanalyse the impactofP/CVErelevantprojects.Thisshouldbuild upon the mapping of counterterrorism projects undertaken by theEuropeanCommission.TheassessmentcouldbedevelopedunderCT-Morseanditwouldaimtodevelopamorerigorousandcontext-specificsetofindicatorsformonitoringandevaluatingexistingprojectsaswellasdeterminingwherefuturefundscouldbeneededtoensuremeasurableimpactandreturnoninvestment.

4. MakeuseoftheEU’sdiplomaticpresenceanditspoliticaldialoguestoraiseconcernswithgovernmentsinthirdcountriesthatareseverelylimitingthespaceforcivilsocietytooperate.

5. Invest more in strategic communications, with a dedicated effort towardhighlighting concrete examples of goodpractice onP/CVEprogramming in thecontextofimplementingtheEUGS.Thiswouldusetheinformationdevelopedintheaforementionedstocktakingworkaswellasdataprovidedinreal-timefromdelegations in the field. At the same time, the EUGS helps to provide a usefulframework that links development and security together as complementaryefforts,fortheEUtocommunicateinternallyandexternallywhenengagingwithexternalpartners.

6. Prioritize its support for efforts to allow civil society to better organize

themselves better on the range of P/CVE issues and advocate in national,regionalandglobalsettingsfor“wholeofsociety”approachestoaddressviolentextremism,inparticularatthelocallevel.