THESIS/RESEARCH REPORT APPROVAL PAGE

I have examined the dissertation/research report entitled

HOW THE TWO MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY (AKP AND CHP)

HAVE MODIFIED THEIR APPROACH TOWARDS TURKEY’S EUROPEAN

UNION MEMBERSHIP DURING THE PERIOD 2002-2012?

presented by

DERİN ŞENERDEM

and hereby certify that it is worthy of acceptance.

01/02/2013

Stathis Kouvelakis

KING’S COLLEGE LONDON

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Table  of  Contents  

 

Acknowledgement  ................................................................................................................  3  Introduction  ............................................................................................................................  4  

Theory  and  Methods  ............................................................................................................  7  

Literature  Review  .................................................................................................................  7  AKP  and  the  European  Union  ...................................................................................................................  9  CHP  and  the  European  Union  ................................................................................................................  17  

Elections  Discourse  Analysis  ..........................................................................................  21  2002  General  Elections  .............................................................................................................................  21  2007  General  Elections  .............................................................................................................................  23  2011  General  Elections  .............................................................................................................................  26  

Turning  Points  for  Each  Party  ........................................................................................  28  Conclusion  .............................................................................................................................  29  Bibliography  ..................................................................................................................................  31  

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Acknowledgement   I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the Jean Monnet Scholarship financed by the European Union for funding and the Ministry of European Union Affairs of the Republic of Turkey for coordinating my studies at King’s College London. I also would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Stathis Kouvelakis for supervision and help he provided during the preparation of this dissertation. I would like to dedicate this study to my family (most specifically my mother) and my friends who have extended me endless moral support during the preparation of this dissertation, which has been invaluable to me. My special thanks are due to Deniz Üsten and Martin Krebs in providing me their valuable opinions in enhancing my study.

 

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Introduction  

The goal of full membership to the European Union is widely accepted as a national

interest that is ‘above politics’ in Turkey. It has been an effort that has its roots in the

Ankara Agreement of 1963 and nearly 50 years of this adventure has never seen various

governing parties of different political inclinations having the courage of backing down

from this elusive objective. No other country has been kept outside of the door as long

as Turkey, while each side to the affair had its fair share of disappointments in one

another over the years. Turkish political parties meanwhile at times have used their

approach to the EU membership as a pillar in connecting with the electorate regarding

their politics, while still none of the Euro-sceptics have acted impulsively after coming

to power.

The parties under spotlight here, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development

Party, AKP) and Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP) have been

the two parties at the forefront of Turkish politics during the last decade.

Retrospectively, the 2002 elections have become a turning point in Turkish political

history as it marked the beginning of a nearly 10-year and still ongoing governance

tenure for the AKP, which will have the record as the longest lasting government in

Turkey’s multi-party period, by the end the of year 2012. Furthermore, AKP has

managed another impressive feat of leading in three general elections during this period

while raising its votes in each one of them: 34.3% in 2002, 46.6% in 2007, and 49.8%

in 2011. (Turkish Institution of Statistics, 2012)

The presence of such a dominant political force meant that Turks had found an answer

to a major problem it faced in domestic politics, namely political instability.

Involuntarily contributing in solving this problem, the CHP has consistently found itself

as the main opposition party, similarly raising its votes in the three elections during the

period under inspection: 19.4% in 2002, 20.9% in 2007,and 26% in 2011 (Turkish

Institution of Statistics, 2012). In other words, both parties have consistently and

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increasingly accounted for more than half of the votes casted in Turkish elections for

the last decade. Other parties such as the extreme rightist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi

(Nationalist Action Party, MHP), the centre-left Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic

Leftist Party, DSP) and the parties of Kurdish representatives who have conducted

ethnically conscious and leftist politics (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP and its

successor Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, Peace and Democracy Party, BDP) have also

found chances to be represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye

Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM) during the period under inspection. However, these

parties are generally perceived to represent marginal positions in comparison to the two

major blocks in Turkish politics and that their role in influencing political phenomena is

considered minor at best.

Therefore, AKP and CHP are expected to cast the greatest influence over major issues

in Turkish politics, which includes the EU membership effort. The 2002 elections saw

the EU accession as a major campaigning issue, where each party voiced their approach

on this issue and where AKP rode the popular wave of expectation by being a strong

advocate for membership. Several scholars studying Turkish politics have even gone as

far as claiming that AKP tied its political survival to the EU pillar and that it paid off in

the short term, which will be elaborated further later on. AKP’s reformist zeal in the

spirit of EU standards has given it the chance to set itself apart from the Islamist

political tradition it owed its roots to. Meanwhile, CHP’s growing Euro-scepticism

during this period drew interest into what seemed as a contradictory move to their

overall ownership of the Kemalist rhetoric, which emphasized, among others, a future

for Turkey in the West.

The 2002 – 2005 phase marked the ‘golden age’ (Öniş, 2010, p. 363), where long

awaited reforms were put in place and official accession talks were started. The period

of 2005 – 2012 however saw an increasingly declining interest in the matter, which will

be explained further in more detail. The reforms have considerably slowed down since

2005 and AKP ceased to show the same level of commitment to the issue (Avcı, 2011,

p. 409). At the same time, CHP’s mentality followed a different path, being Euro-

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sceptic through 2002 – 2010 and later going through a makeover where it embraced a

more social-democratic attitude and softened its stand on the EU accordingly.

This study will look into the 2002 – 2012 period where Turkey experienced strong

political stability, presence of two dominant political movements, a ‘golden age’ with

the European Union, and yet another disappointment phase that saw the two parties

shifting their approaches. Thanks to the influence these parties have in Turkish politics,

numerous studies were contributed to the literature on the matter. However, given that

CHP’s shift and the latest elections in Turkey are very recent, the author feels that the

literature can benefit from a contribution that takes CHP’s transformation into account

and places it in contrast to AKP in a chronological manner, regarding Turkey’s thorny

road to EU accession. The study will argue under the hypothesis that AKP came to

power while identifying itself with the EU membership and centre-right (taking

Christian Democrats as counterparts in Europe) political tradition, only to adopt a more

pragmatic approach later on during 2005 – 2012 where the EU membership was

reduced to a mere strategic partnership. On the other hand, the hypothesis regarding the

opposition party will be that the CHP saw itself acting overly nationalistic in

contradiction to its supposedly social democrat position for the majority of the period

(2002 – 2010), while later embracing the social democrat position and extending more

support to the EU process.

The study will initially outline the methods to be used in reaching the goal outlined. The

following parts will include a selection of relevant literature on the matter, categorized

accordingly with the two parties in question. This section shall aim to provide the reader

with an understanding of the events that led these aforementioned shifts in approaches.

This will be followed by the actual analysis of the available elections manifestos from

each party regarding their discourses, to draw conclusions and test the hypotheses

stated. Judging by the result of this analysis, the study will point out the turning points

in both parties’ approach and test them with the hypotheses outlined. Finally,

concluding remarks will be made with an addition of immediate future prospects of how

the current situation may change.

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Theory  and  Methods  

In addition to the analysis of secondary and primary sources, a discourse analysis of

party manifestos prior to the three elections in this period (2002, 2007, 2011) will be

employed. Therefore, this will be a research of qualitative nature. They provide a

perspective from the political parties’ angle, which is necessary to understand the

essence of their discourse. Despite this strength, one glaring weakness of this approach

is that parties do not necessarily stick to the manifestos they announce prior to the

elections. Therefore, the ideas and concepts declared in the manifestos must be followed

through to see whether they have adopted the measures previously declared. This would

require news articles and academic articles supporting the claims made out from

studying the party manifestos, which will be provided in the literature review.

Nevertheless, adopting a qualitative approach of taking the party manifestos as a

roadmap while following through the actions on the news is well suited to answer this

research question. Interviews will not be made use of, since the author does not have

access to individuals influential in this process.

Literature  Review  

In order to understand on what grounds the two major parties change their approaches

today, one needs to briefly examine the roots of Turkish interest in the European

project. The history goes deeper than the existing republic of today, where the elites of

Ottoman Empire, equated modernization with Westernization in 1839’s Tanzimat

Fermanı (Administrative Reforms Declaration) (Özbudun, 1984). The establishment of

the Republic under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s rule further strengthened this view.

Following the World War II, this new project of Europe, consistent with westernization

goals, has drawn attention from the political figures of the time. Prime Ministers of

different political roots, Adnan Menderes (1950-1960) and İsmet İnönü (1961-65) have

voiced the desire to join not simply because of financial reasons but also because of

European Economic Community’s political potential. (Pahre & Uçaray-Mangıtlı, 2009,

p. 359) Thus came Turkey’s first application in 1959, which led to the Association

Agreement (Ankara Agreement) of 1963, which promised an eventual full membership.

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As of 2012, Turkey is still in the accession phase with one chapter completed (Science

and Research), 14 chapters opened (Avcı, 2011, p. 412), eight chapters blocked by the

council regarding the Additional Protocol on Cyprus, and thus overall 34 still waiting to

be completed out of 35 available. (European Commission, 2012) For the sake of

providing a perspective, it is worth noting that Turkey and Croatia have started EU

negotiations at the same time, where Croatia has completed all of the negotiations at the

same time interval Turkey completed only one chapter. Moreover, accession

negotiations were partially frozen in 2006, due to Austria voicing a wide spread belief

that Turkey may be better off as a ‘privileged partner’. (Redmond, 2007, pp. 305-6)

One rhetoric that is frequently voiced on the Turkish camp is that ‘not only the

destination but also the journey matters’ – i.e. the European Union accession process

has been a modernizing force that is considered necessary regardless of its end result.

(Glyptis, 2005, p. 402) AKP Leader and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has

even coined the term ‘Ankara Criteria’, in reference to the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ of the

EU, noting that Turkey must fulfill these reforms for its own good regardless of the end

result (Öniş, 2010, p. 8). Politicians at times use this rhetoric to state that even though

the goal seems far off and the efforts seem fruitless, in fact they serve to a higher

purpose that is ultimately for Turkey’s goal of improving its democracy. Indeed, it

should be stated that Euro-sceptic and pro-EU circles in Turkey all agree to the point

that Turkey’s future must be in Europe; it is the question about EU’s intentions that

these circles disagree. (Oguzlu, 2008, p. 11) Despite this belief, looking at the level of

rule of law, Noutcheva & Aydın-Düzgit argue that EU membership candidacy has not

necessarily been a major factor in advancement, when looking at the candidate countries

Turkey and Croatia, and a non-candidate country, Albania. Furthermore, a more

interesting observation comes in the form of suggesting that when EU incentives for

reform are in line with the ruling parties’ domestic interests, then there is substantive

progress in this particular area. (Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012, p. 61) If this is not

the case, then the reform only happens in a partial capacity, or does not happen at all. A

similar approach is voiced elsewhere by McDonald that external anchors make the

carried out reforms more credible by the conditional agreements governments sign.

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(McDonald, 2011, p. 528) The conditionality factor promises a return for an effort

towards previously set goals. Therefore, these external anchors help developing public

support and create strong constituencies in return. These have some correspondence for

AKP in Turkey’s case, given that the external anchor has helped creating such a strong

public support for substantive progress and yet later provided an experience of

disappointment regarding conditionality.

AKP  and  the  European  Union  

The AKP won the 3 November 2002 elections by a margin that enabled them to govern

by a single party government. Turkey had indeed gone through some harsh times before

the aforementioned election; an otherwise normal traffic accident saw members of the

‘deep state’ visibly acting together in 1996, the country suffered a devastating

earthquake in August 1999 and a major domestic economic crisis hit the country in

2001. Soli Özel notes that these were the very events that made the EU membership

process seem genuinely necessary, even if people were having a hard time convincing

themselves whether or not it was going to happen (Özel, 2003, p. 91). The need for a

deeper rule of law, better governance for responding to crises, and an overall need for

more reliability on state institutions made the EU accession process seem something

more than it is. Therefore, Erdoğan was quick to ride this tide during the 2002 elections

when AKP first came to power, linking its political survival to the EU process. (Patton,

2007, p.342) This is one reason why he made a point of visiting every EU capital before

the 2003 EU enlargement summit within a year of coming to power. (Özel, 2003, p. 91)

Watching their parent party Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP) being ousted from the

government in 28 February 1997 (a soft coup d’etat that removed RP from power with

an ultimatum), and being closed down, the newly established AKP made a resolve on

establishing a discourse that serves both their Islamist political roots and the ultimate

goal of governing at least a full term after winning the election – a feat that Refah came

close to achieving. Refah belonged to a genuinely Euro-sceptic political movement that

opposed globalization in addition to Westernization. This branch of politics called the

‘National View’ (Milli Görüş) RP belonged to, believed the ‘above politics’

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Westernization goal has been working for the Christianisation of Turkish society. This

view suggests that while the material developments taking place in the West should be

implemented, the moral developments on the other hand are opposing the very pillars of

the Turkish morality and family values. (Celep, 2011, p. 427)

In differentiating themselves from RP’s anti-Western and anti-EU stance, AKP’s

discourse embraced globalization and stated that Turkey must adapt with this global

trend through accelerating integration with the EU (Cinar, 2006, pp. 474-75). There are

several reasons of pragmatic nature for AKP to take such a stance. Primarily, supporting

the EU membership would stop AKP from sharing the same fate as RP, at least

immediately. This move signaled a major break away from the political tradition they

belonged to. However, this move also enabled them to strike a balance between

retaining their Islamist voters and earning new liberal minded voters. Unlike RP, AKP

did not declare to take Kemalism head on by establishing an alternative ideology like

Milli Görüş, but instead went for the EU project that is ‘above-politics’ in Turkey

(Cinar, 2006, p. 471). Meanwhile, they aimed to satisfy their electoral base by

advancing the Islamic lifestyle RP promised to deliver, with the advocacy for

democratic freedoms in an EU spirit. In other words, the AKP refrained from discussing

these issues under the ‘religious issues’ topic and being framed as a religion party,

instead looked to build consensus with the secular establishment by suggesting that

further democratization is necessary to advance their voters’ needs and requests.

Eylemer &Taş note that this has been a great transformation for the religious right in

Turkey, as the AKP linked the religious freedoms as part of a greater process of

democratization, and they managed to do this by defining themselves ‘conservative

democrats’. (Taş & Eylemer, 2007, p. 571)

It has been a striking feature of Turkish politics that the standard left-right cleavage

regarding parties has not corresponded in the traditional manner to the West European

counterparts. Öniş states that in Turkey, it has been the right of centre parties and also

Islamist parties that have looked into matters of social justice and the position of the

poor in society, whereas this is traditionally the role of social democratic/leftist branch

of politics. AKP, being a party of Islamist origin and one that positioned itself to the

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right of centre, does qualify for this description. Meanwhile, the CHP has embodied the

‘centre-periphery paradigm’, where the state elites’ and secularists’ party CHP has

remained at the ‘centre’ while in the recent years, AKP represented the ‘periphery’,

meaning the bulk of the society. (Öniş, 2007, pp. 248-49) Furthermore, despite the

conservative position of AKP, again it has been this party that took the ‘globalist’

position by supporting Europeanization through EU membership in contrast to CHP’s

‘defensive nationalist’ position. Globalist position in this sense presumes that

globalization advances the society and provides opportunities for material improvement.

(Öniş, 2007, pp. 248-49)

Özel stated in 2003 that AKP has a ‘historic task and opportunity’ to transform Turkey

into a genuine liberal democracy, and that AKP has a genuine drive for EU accession as

there is a matter of enlightened self-interest out of it. (Özel, 2003, p. 93) Nevertheless,

academic studies published ever since point out to a different reality. Cinar noted later

in 2006 that developments on the headscarf issue have alienated AKP in their desire to

link the EU membership goal to fixing the practice of secularism by improving

democracy and pluralism. The European Court of Human Rights had approved the

standing ban on wearing headscarf on university premises, in addition to the EU

progress reports remaining silent on the matter. This has been a disappointment on

AKP’s side. (Öniş, 2007, 254) This meant that the support for Islamic identity AKP

looked for from the EU was overturned, which hampered their drive for the membership

process. (Cinar, 2006, p. 482) M. J. Patton notes in 2007 that AKP has failed to keep the

momentum they generated when they first came to power, as national and international

observers realized that the reformism took a hit first in 2005 and even more so in 2006.

(Patton, 2007, p. 340)

There are several reasons why AKP saw it necessary to back down from the pace of

reforms for their own good. Initially, the Cyprus issue caused a serious deterioration of

the relationship between Turkey and the EU. AKP had extended support to the Annan

Plan that aimed to unify the two distinct constituents of the island, where the Turkish

Cypriot side voted in favor of this plan. This has been a major shift in Turkey’s policy

towards Cyprus, which should be credited to the AKP government. However, the

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Greek Cypriot side was not convinced, voted against, and still got accepted to the

European Union, which has been disappointing for the Turkish government. This

problem persisted when the EU demanded Turkey to open the airports and seaports to

Republic of Cyprus’ vessels and Turkey asked the same of EU for the Northern part of

the island. The EU refrained from complying with the AKP government’s

conditionality, and being put in a position of such compromises by the EU was

politically problematic for AKP domestically. On the one hand, the conditionality of the

Additional Protocol signed on 30 July 2005 required these actions from the Turkish

side. However, Turkey had not seen the conditionality applied to the Republic of

Cyprus in uniting the island, which made the opposition press harder on AKP. In

addition to Cyprus issues, the Kurdish insurgency movement Partiya Karkaren

Kurdistane (The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK) ended the 1999 – 2004 unilateral

ceasefire and started armed rebellion once again in 2005. This was also another factor

that was forcing AKP’s hand in a climate where nationalist sentiments were running at a

high level. (Avcı, 2011, p. 412)

By the time accession negotiations began in October 2005, the EU had lost its position

as a transformative power, Eralp notes, as conditionality overweighed the positive

incentives of membership. (Eralp, 2009, p. 163) Cyprus issue turned into a political cost

paid by the government and this was followed by the decision of the EU to put

accession talks on hold in December 2006. In addition to Cyprus, statements of

exclusionist nature by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas

Sarkozy also provided material to the nationalist opposition in Turkey.(Yilmaz, 2011, p.

193-94) Merkel and Sarkozy’s move was met by harsh criticisms by the opposition, as

AKP was labeled as following ‘submissive policies’.(Ulusoy, 2008, p. 59) Unlike the

previous coalition government of Mesut Yilmaz in 1997, AKP did not approach these

developments on an emotional basis but rather noted that it will continue the

reformation despite EU’s blocking excuses. AKP in the government however opted to

take a slower approach to the process from that point onwards. Eralp further notes that

following 2006, Turkey entered a period of elections where general, local and

presidential elections took place, which only fueled the political polarization and thus

took its toll on the EU process. (Eralp, 2009, p. 164) From this point on, scholars have

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noted that the post-2004 period required more effort from the EU side, as AKP had been

paying political costs domestically with increasing political polarization (Avcı, 2011, p.

412) and could have used a helping hand by the EU during this period. (Ulusoy, 2008,

p. 71) Indeed, Prime Minister Erdoğan has even stated by 2009 that Turkey was to

‘keep doing their homework’ even though numerous obstacles were placed in front of

them. (Radikal, 4 May 2009)

Building up on the previously mentioned political costs the AKP faced, Johansson-

Nogues & Jonasson provide an identity perspective to the issue. In their study they

argue that the 2002 – 2004 period has been a productive one, because this period had

not seen the EU accession efforts clashing with the national identity. The ‘deepening’ of

the democracy in Turkey was related to issues like better governance and improvement

in administration, which were not sensitive issues identity-wise. Also, rather more

complicated issues like Kurdish rights and military’s position in politics were coincided

at a period where political polarization was low and issues were available to be

elaborated. The first action by the AKP that left the EU wondering came in 2004, when

AKP proposed a law that would criminalize adultery. (Glyptis, 2005, p. 415) Such an

act was opposite of the spirit of EU reforms and came right after Enlargement

Commissioner Günther Verheugen’s approval to start Turkey’s negotiation process.

AKP’s response to the backlash has been that the EU must not interfere with Turkey’s

domestic affairs. The bill was finally dropped after much domestic opposition, but this

initiative by AKP fueled the opposition in arguing that AKP had a ‘hidden agenda’.

Therefore, McDonald’s point of AKP originally being a identity based party with a

constituency and ideology, rather than a centre party holds true, given that the more it

acts like a centre party in terms of its political spectrum, the more it has been challenged

by its undeniable Islamic constituency. This has led AKP to play a more ‘hard ball’

game against their rivals especially during their second term when they were pushed by

their conservative electorate base. (McDonald, 2011, p. 534-35) Following 2005, the

social and political contestation had grown and AKP began to touch upon issues that

made the electorate uneasy due to their identity. (Johansson-Nogués & Jonasson, 2011,

pp. 118-119) The Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (insulting Turkishness) was a

topic of debate in 2005 where it was not cancelled or modified sufficiently to satisfy EU

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standards and the 2008 attempt of AKP on removing the headscarf ban can be

considered as examples for this point. Moreover, while defining themselves as

conservative democrats modeled after European Christian Democrat parties, AKP has

had troubles in forging links with the politically similar positioned Christian

Democratic parties of Europe, as such parties have not been warm to the idea of Turkish

accession.(Öniş, 2007, p. 250) This is also due to the fact that no matter how AKP tries

to consciously position itself, it has been seen over years of governance that it remained

true to its Islamist conservative constituency.

The headscarf move and the lack of move regarding Article 301 by AKP are defined by

Öniş in 2010 as a conscious choice made by the party. The party came away victorious

from the 2007 elections with a larger support than before, and saw that their power was

rising while the need for EU membership had been declining. The proposal made after

the election regarding a new constitution was very much in the EU reform spirit,

although the government did not see through with this. Rather, the government went for

the religious freedoms card, the way they should have pursued the new constitution

initiative for the sake of improving the accession talks. (Öniş, 2010, Contesting for

Turkey's Political 'Centre': Domestic Politics, Identity Conflicts and the Controversy

Over EU Membership, p.366-67) (Öniş, 2010,Contesting for the ''Center'': Domestic

Politics, Identity Conflicts and the ControversyOver EU Membership in Turkey

Working Paper No: 2 EU/2/2010, pp. 8-9)

Also, Foreign Minister and chief foreign policy strategist of AKP, Ahmet Davutoğlu,

who took the Ministry seat in 2009 is not known for having a deep commitment to the

EU as much as other influential figures like former Foreign Minister and current

President Abdullah Gul, who is another prominent figure in AKP. (Chislett, 2009, p. 10)

As Turkey increased its ties with the Middle East during the second half of the decade,

it has taken place under the influence of Davutoğlu. He stated that the EU should no

longer be an institution to confirm Turkey’s European/Western identity, but instead as

an instrument that contributes to Turkey’s global power. (Oguzlu, 2008, p. 11) This is a

critical statement by a key figure, which should denote a turning point in AKP’s

approach to the EU from a transformative process to a mere pragmatic partnership. It

15

has been a distinctive feature of the AKP government from previous governments that it

has emphasized the Islamic and Middle Eastern characteristics and the Ottoman heritage

of Turkey. The motivation behind this has been to forge an understanding in the region

that would benefit Turkey’s security concerns and increase Turkey’s leverage in its

dealings with the West.(Oguzlu, 2008, pp. 13-4) Oğuzlu therefore notes during AKP’s

second term that Turkey’s approach towards the West has been more pragmatic than

ideational during AKP’s tenure in power.

Nevertheless, although the process has been put on a backburner for a good period of

time, another reason AKP never backed down from it is the closure case it faced in

2008. Despite carefully segregating itself from the political Islamist Refah Party’s roots,

the closure threat has been very much real for AKP during this period. Therefore, the

democratization process has become necessary for the party’s own survival (once again)

as well as for Turkey’s overall improvement in governance. (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 56)

Although by 2005 AKP found that the EU was no longer functioning as an opportunity

provider in terms of achieving their goals (Duran, 2007, pp. 81-89), the closure case of

2008 has been a reminder as to how valuable the EU process may be for the AKP.

The 2010 working paper authored by Ziya Öniş also begs to differ from Özel’s initial

2003 analysis of ‘historic task and opportunity’, stating that AKP’s commitment to the

goal of full membership has weakened over the years. He also states that although AKP

has tried to move to the ‘centre’ over its course in government, it still has its roots in

Islamist politics. AKP realized that several decisions of the European Court of Human

Rights have decreased its room for political maneuver and as a party concerned with

‘religious freedoms’, this has raised concerns among them. In addition to preferring to

address the headscarf instead of constitution, the government chose to go for

strengthening the civilian rule over the military’s influence, which is again in line with

EU’s demands from Turkey, but ultimately pursues the interests of the government as

the military stood in opposition to them. (Öniş, 2010, pp. 8-9) Also, the 2010

constitutional referendum has raised doubts, as the first election of the members for the

Constitutional Court according to the amendment saw a block list of names prepared by

the government winning the seats.(Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 70-1)

16

This inclination towards conservative politics has been observed further by McDonald

in 2011, where it is noted, that during the 2002 and 2004 general and local elections

period, AKP and its broader electoral base came into a power balance that benefited

both sides. After 2006 however, the AKP shifted their ideology towards serving their

more conservative base, rather than acting as globalist reformers. (McDonald, 2011, p.

537) The democratization from that point on has been accepted in the sense of more

religious freedoms for the conservative constituent, which was evident in Prime

Minister Erdoğan’s ambitions towards the role of Turkish women by suggesting that

Turkish women should produce 3 children each in order to sustain Turkey’s young

population advantage and that women’s headscarves should be allowed more in public.

Such concerns have been further raised in latest academic material published in the

more recent years. Cengiz & Hoffmann note that AKP has started a process that focuses

on power centralization, which endangers democracy and rule of law; efforts that

undoubtedly undermine the EU accession plans. (Hoffmann & Cengiz, 2012, p. 256)

Furthermore, it is noted that during the latest 2011 elections, the political parties have

acted shy about making references either negative or positive about the EU accession

process. This is most visible for AKP’s case, as the election manifesto of 2011 is noted

to include EU in only 2 of the 160 pages. The manifesto does not provide reasons about

claiming AKP has backed down from accession and it does not elaborate further about

how the party plans to move forward regarding this issue at hand.

Building up on Cengiz & Hoffmann’s points, Avcı notes that AKP has reverted to

‘passive activism’ in its behavior towards the EU, meaning that they look to deliver the

minimum just to stay in the game for a little longer. (Avcı, 2011, p. 419) The AKP

looks to be committed to the full membership goal on the paper, even if this is simply at

the verbal level. However, since AKP has not seen the benefits from conditionality in

the later years, the payoffs for pushing the membership has diminished for them, which

caused the process to take a back seat.

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While the negotiations have been going on, skeptic voices as to why Turkey should still

continue the integration effort have been increased in proportion with the fall of public

support. Pahre & Uçaray-Mangıtlı argue that Turkey’s high levels of nationalism may

result in a slow integration process, and that some of Turkey’s foreign policy interests –

such as those in Middle East – are in contrast with those of the EU mainstream.(Pahre

& Uçaray-Mangıtlı, 2009, p.364) However, such a view is open for debate, as other

scholars have found this not contradictory to the EU anchor. Düzgit and Tocci state that

following a multi-faceted policy can only benefit Turkey in the EU process, as this

policy would act as complementary to Turkey’s EU policy.(Düzgit & Tocci, 2009)

Keyman meanwhile states that the EU anchor also benefits Turkey in the new foreign

policy goals it has developed, as the presence of the EU on Turkey’s side provides

another dimension to Turkey’s soft power.(Keyman, 2009)

CHP  and  the  European  Union  

The 2002 elections saw a complete overhaul of the Grand National Assembly of

Turkey. All of the parties previously elected in the 1999 elections were unable to secure

seats in the assembly (failing to exceed the 10% election threshold), which saw the

brand new AKP making a flash entry to the political scene as a single party government,

while the Republic’s founder and the oldest party CHP taking the main opposition

position. While AKP represented the new branch of the Islamic movement in Turkish

politics, CHP represented the Kemalist elite and the Republic’s ‘old guard’.

It is therefore expected of the CHP to own the Western oriented modernization project

that is EU membership. However, other dynamics at work has made this matter more

complicated. While CHP was not a party to the conflict during the 28 February 1997

process, its overall position in Turkish politics and the pool it chooses its personnel

from, allows them to be classified along with the initiators of the process. This was one

reason why the CHP has been wary of AKP’s governance, as this was a party that came

from the same tradition that the 28 February process was aimed to ‘address’. Such

skepticism has gone to levels where priorities on CHP’s agenda were also questioned if

AKP too raised the same issues, such as AKP’s call for preparation of a new

18

constitution to replace the 1982 Constitution left behind by the military junta. (Cinar,

2006, p. 480)

This further classifies CHP along with the EU-sceptic bloc, which consists of those who

believed the EU membership process has been causing too many compromises on

Turkey’s part. Despite CHP’s overall Kemalist Western modernization mentality, the

supporters of the 28 February process were transferred into the Euro-sceptic group.

(Patton, 2007, p. 341) Patton in 2007 classifies the CHP along with the ultra-nationalist

MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – Nationalist Action Party), in that they share a very

similar nationalist view and block the reform movement. (Patton, 2007, p. 346)

This is a curious case as to how a party that is a member to the Socialist International

can conduct a policy on a staunch nationalist sentiment. However, given the ‘old guard’

position of the party, the CHP has dominantly perceived the EU process almost as a

‘distracting’ force that empowered the Kurdish nationalists and religious conservatives

under the guise of democratization. (Öniş, 2010, p. 13) Therefore, while there is a

general perception of EU process as ‘above-politics’ and the goal of all Turkish

constituents, the CHP downgraded the process to politics and chose to take sides.

Moreover, CHP’s support for the April 2007 e-intervention to the government by the

military (issuing a coup d’etat threat from Turkish Military’s website) caused reactions

such as CHP being ready to sacrifice democracy for the Kemalist values it was holding

dearly. (Özdalga, 2008) This stance eventually led to a loss of votes in 2009 local

elections for CHP. (Johansson-Nogués & Jonasson, 2011, p. 126)

The specific mix of Euro-scepticism and nationalism that CHP harbored during this

period can be described as ulusalcılık, which could be translated to English by “neo-

nationalism”. This blend maintains a different ring to it than nationalism, in the sense

that classical nationalism in Turkey had Islamic connotations, while ulusalcılık has a

stronger emphasis on secularism and Turkishness in its place. (Yilmaz, 2011, p. 185)

Yilmaz states that this notion was fed by not only Euro-scepticism but also by anti-

Americanism and West-scepticism in general. The historical underlying reason for this

belief is called the ‘Sevres Syndrome’; referring to the Treaty of Sevres (10 August

19

1920), which saw victorious WWI Allied powers carving up the remaining lands of the

Ottoman Empire. This treaty was replaced by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which gave

birth to modern day Turkey, but the feelings associated with Sevres are still alive and

feeding the nationalist rhetoric in Turkey. CHP used such feelings of resentment to ride

the ulusalcılık wave in opposing AKP especially during Deniz Baykal’s period as Party

Chairman until May 2010. One reason for this is that by October 2005, the EU

accession negotiations had started and thus the EU flag was taken by the conservative

AKP.

With opinion polls showing that CHP did not have a chance of standing victorious in

the nearest elections, CHP then consistently took the soft Euro-sceptic approach.

(Yilmaz, 2011, p. 196) In other words, this was the consciously designated political

strategy by Baykal to conduct the policies of CHP. This was described by Öniş as the

‘defensive nationalist’ position in contrast to AKP’s ‘globalist position’; this branch has

by far pursued politics based on fear of losing national sovereignty because of eroding

borders caused by globalization. Europeanization is considered within the same breath

with globalization, and that the benefits are outweighed by the potential risks. (Öniş,

2007, p. 251) Identity-wise, Baykal-led CHP accused the AKP for tearing the unitary

character of Turkey and looking to enhance its Islamist goals under the guise of being

pro-European. Their most basic claim has been that AKP softened the military and other

related significant institutions of the secular state, in order to further their goals of an

Islamic Turkish state and society. (Yilmaz, 2011, p. 196)

It has been mentioned before that the pro-EU and Euro-sceptic camps do not disagree

on Turkey’s place in Europe but rather disagree on the concessions to be made for it.

Celep builds on this point by arguing that CHP’s reaction against the EU process and

AKP has not been a matter of clashing mentalities, but one regarding having a position

of opposition for such a long period of time (Celep, 2011, p. 424), a point that is

reiterated by Yilmaz in 2011 as well.(Yilmaz, 2011, p. 196) Indeed, CHP believed that

AKP was simply using the accession process as a means to initiate its socially

conservative goals and that they failed to look after Turkey’s national interests (most

notably in respect to the Cyprus issue). This actually positions CHP specifically against

20

AKP, more than against the EU. Borrowing from Taggart & Sczerbiak’s (Taggart &

Szczerbiak, 2008) definitions of Euro-scepticism where the notion is classified in Hard

and Soft versions, Celep classifies CHP as soft Euro-sceptics in this manner, a

description that Öniş also agrees to. (Öniş, 2007, p. 250) Moreover, this soft Euro-

scepticism most usually surfaced in issues related to the Kurdish issue, Cyprus and

rights of minorities over the years. (Öniş, 2007, p. 249) Policy disagreements with AKP

rather than simply opposing EU membership, has defined CHP’s approach over the

years. Celep goes as far as stating that CHP’s discourse was constructed as a response to

AKP’s agenda, rather than an as independent effort. (Celep, 2011, p. 428) However, his

study concludes with an expectation for change, suggesting that the new Chairman

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is expected to bring a change on matters regarding EU along with

other various issues, given that he regards the membership as a ‘project of civilization’.

(Celep, 2011, p. 431)

There is a logical basis for having the belief that new leading figures in CHP can change

the party’s outlook. Even in 2007 when the Baykal led CHP was backing the hard

ulusalcılık position, a survey conducted in Turkish middle class sees 57% of CHP

voters supporting the EU membership bid (only one point below national average) and

39% opposing it (seven points above national average), while 63% of CHP supporters

feel that they had benefited from EU-led reforms. This means that CHP can shift to a

pro-EU position without giving up so much from its electoral constituency, which

possibly cannot be said for classically nationalist parties such as MHP. (Yilmaz, 2011,

p. 204)

Indeed, before holding the Chairman position, Kılıçdaroğlu made his first speech that

fell out his party’s position in early 2010, where he suggested a general amnesty

regarding the Kurdish rebels. The then-leader Deniz Baykal made it clear that

Kılıçdaroğlu’s opinions were entitled to himself and not to the party, but Kılıçdaroğlu’s

rhetoric from Turkey’s Kemalist party signaled a change that is overdue in that political

tradition of Turkey. (Johansson-Nogués & Jonasson, 2011, p. 122)

21

Elections  Discourse  Analysis  

2002  General  Elections  

AKP’s 2002 elections manifesto (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, 2002) sees the party

describing itself as conservative, and later adding that it is reformist and contemporary

at the same time. Furthermore, it is noted that AKP sees full membership to the EU as a

natural result of Turkey’s modernization. The fulfillment of the EU criteria are noted as

necessary reforms that signal a leap forward for the state and society of Turkey,

regardless of them being linked with the EU. Those opposing this unification with

Europe are accused of acting ideological in issues of national sovereignty, security and

benefits. In AKP’s 2002 elections manifesto, there is one segment that clarifies AKP’s

position regarding their break-away from the Islamic parties past as a centre-right

conservative democrat party and their commitment to the full EU membership: “The ideological attitudes of the anti-EU segments of the population with regard to the national sovereignty, national security, national interest, national and regional culture hinder the realization of the Copenhagen criteria. Our party subscribes to the view that these concepts, which seek to maintain the bureaucratic and statist tradition, should be replaced with a democratic, civil, and pluralist understanding that ascribes a higher value to law that protects the individual and emphasizes public participation.”(Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, 2002, pp. 8-9)

This is another segregation of AKP from others in terms of signaling pragmatism in its

approach. A majority of the manifesto is dedicated to the economic measures to be

taken during governance, which is not surprising given Turkey’s economic struggles at

the time. Foreign policy section meanwhile promises to fulfill the EU membership

criteria as soon as possible and refrain from having the agenda blocked with superficial

problems. Furthermore, a solution like the Belgian system – a complex but nevertheless

appropriate system for governing two different groups of constituents – is proposed for

the Cyprus issue, which was later followed with support for the Annan Plan. While

AKP does not signal the multi-faceted foreign policy it strived to follow during later

years at this point, a point of emphasis is made on relations with Islamic countries and

Organization of the Islamic Conference. It is also noted that the Party believes regional

22

security depends on economic development, which requires Turkey to build trust and

consistency in the region. (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, 2002)

CHP’s 2002 elections manifesto on the other hand sees the party addressing the

previous governments’ incapabilities, and stresses the need for a more accountable

government under the guidance of Ataturk’s secular democratic Turkey model. In

comparison to AKP, CHP employs more data from past governments’ failures and

corruption. There is an undeniable emphasis on secularism issue as the party states: “Secularism is the foundation of republic, democracy, national unity, domestic peace, essence of a contemporary and modern state, institutionalization of emphaty, guarantee of religious and conscience freedoms, prerequisite of change, modernization and science.”(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 2002, p. 50)

This statement is the embodiment of CHP’s reliance on secularism rhetoric in its

policies. The party goes on to note later that a new constitution is necessary, freedoms

should be extended and judicial reforms must be carried out. These issues are not linked

to the EU membership aspect in the manifesto. The EU membership is rather seen as an

undeniable end result of Ataturk’s Turkey model, where Turkey is stated to be the only

country that has been able to maintain a market economy, pluralist democracy along

with the religion of Islam; and that EU membership shall serve Turkey in its inherent

role as the bridge between the West and the East.

CHP’s 2002 party programme identifies the EU membership goal with defending

Atatürk’s ‘Turkey Model’, while AKP leader Erdoğan states the membership goal is the

embodiment of Ataturk’s ‘reaching the level of contemporary civilizations’ goal. There

is a slight difference between the two approaches. In defending Atatürk’s ‘Turkey

Model’, CHP feels bound to stick by all of the rules set by Atatürk, which may cause

contradictions. Bagdonas note that Turkey joining the EU causes a deviation from

another Atatürk principle; full independence. In today’s globalized world, the term ‘full

independence’ is somewhat outdated, and yet Euro-sceptic interpretations of Atatürk’s

vision hold this defensive view. This view state that the EU membership is originally

against that goal of reaching contemporary civilizations, given that the EU of today

represents the Allied Forces that proposed the Sevres Treaty. (Bagdonas, 2008, pp. 102-

103) This is also a dilemma that the Turkish military establishment shares with CHP,

23

which again puts them into the same basket in the electorate’s views. (Öniş, 2007, p.

251)

This clearly differentiates AKP’s approach to the EU issue from CHP as democracy

was set as the ultimate goal to be achieved and the EU membership as a strategy for

achieving it, while CHP saw the EU membership as an end goal and experienced that

this is one that maintains an inherent problematic in their approach. However, AKP’s

approach is not considered sincere by the CHP and it’s securitization views, as the CHP

leader Baykal called the electorate to rally around Kemalist and Republican values to

prevent AKP’s desecuritizing approach. (Bagdonas, 2008, p. 110)

AKP meanwhile made it clear in the 2002 election manifesto that the Copenhagen

Criteria’s economic and democratic standards were necessary for Turkey, regardless of

the end goal of full membership.(Avcı, 2011, p. 414) AKP mentions in the 2002

manifesto that EU membership will be the driving force for solving various problems in

Turkish politics, from Cyprus issue to Greek-Turkish relations, from judicial system

deficiencies to basic rights.(Carkoglu, 2003, p. 191) Therefore, AKP had set the roots of

the ‘Ankara Criteria’ rhetoric back in 2002. Retrospectively, this points to a consistency

on AKP’s part. Meanwhile, CHP also mentioned such issues as linked to the EU

membership goal, but rather focused on the membership aspect. Regardless, given the

period’s greatest problem has been the recent domestic economic crisis in Turkey, both

manifestos have based their foundation on the economics issues. Moreover, it should be

noted that most notably the headscarf issue was not a key issue on the agenda during the

2002 elections for AKP. It was during its second term that AKP pushed the headscarf

issue higher on the agenda then a more pressing issue like the new constitution. During

the 2002 campaign, AKP opted to go for a more populist road of economic equality and

refrained from its later surfacing conservative politics. (Carkoglu, 2002, p. 37)

2007  General  Elections  

Balkır notes that during the 2007 elections, AKP’s focus has been on three key issues:

economic liberalization, democratic consolidation and Turkey’s accession to the EU.

24

(Balkır, 2007, p. 420) Furthermore, these issues are not independent from one another,

as AKP needs democratic consolidation to prevent the Turkish military from repeating

its tendencies of intervening its politics (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 67), in order to satisfy the

new bourgeoisie AKP formed with its economic liberalization attempts. Meanwhile the

EU is useful for legitimizing the reform attempts of AKP during politically polarized

periods against the opposition. (Balkır, 2007, p. 420) However, even this has not been

enough to place the EU in a greater scale in the party manifestos than simply the foreign

policy sections. Still, the manifesto claims that even though the negotiation talks are

stalled, the reforms that were found necessary would be undertaken. (Adalet ve

Kalkınma Partisi, 2007)

The 2007 manifesto of AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 2007) introduces the new

constitution initiative as a major topic on the agenda. While EU membership is not

linked in this description, ‘individual rights’ is an issue that is emphasized in this

declaration. While the economy has been a major issue in the previous manifesto, 2007

sees AKP looking to put equal emphasis on various issues on the agenda (social justice,

health, domestic security etc.). Moreover, given that AKP has entered the elections as

the latest winners, this manifesto sees them mentioning their successes over the first

term of governance more, in comparison to promises to the future in this area.

The majority of the manifesto is very much domestic oriented in comparison to 2002.

Issues regarding local governance, employment, transportation and health are forming

the backbone of AKP’s 2007 manifesto. Foreign policy comes later in the line, where

the need for a multi-dimensional foreign policy is stressed. Freedom and security are

two notions that are frequently used in this part. The start of accession talks with EU is

represented as a success on the government’s part, but future plans regarding EU has

taken a back seat. Following the Cyprus disappointment, the Turkish Cypriots’ welfare

has taken priority on this manifesto in defense to the nationalist opposition. The EU

dimension of foreign policy is only mentioned after remarks about the Turkic countries,

Iraq, Cyprus and Middle East. A mere one page explanation of EU membership is

described by noting that Turkey-EU relations are to be considered part of global and

regional peace and stability, and that it is a means of enhancing global cooperation.

25

Furthermore, it is stated that the process shall be considered as a reconstruction process

where economic, political, social and judicial standards of Turkey will be raised.

Remarks about completion of negotiation talks or expected membership date are not

provided in the manifesto. Carkoglu notes that the EU membership card in 2002

elections was not the tiebreaker for the political parties, instead the economic reforms

were. (Carkoglu, 2002, p. 38) Realization of this may have been a reason why AKP did

not push the EU membership as a main topic during 2007 elections.

CHP’s 2007 manifesto (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 2007) meanwhile starts off with a

reaction the PKK insurgency and emphasizing the need for security, followed by

promises to protect the modern secular republic, which is then followed by promises to

protect Turkey’s rights, interests and honor in its foreign relations. This is in line with

previously mentioned suggestions about CHP’s increasing nationalist (ulsalcılık)

rhetoric. The EU goal meanwhile is set as full membership within the principal

boundaries of nation state and secular state. ‘Equal cooperation’ and ‘independence’

draw the red lines of CHP in its rhetoric and the Prime Minister is criticized to comply

with EU’s 2004 Progress Report even though free movement of persons, agricultural

subsidies and regional development funds issues have experienced limitations

specifically for Turkey. CHP promises to protect the full membership goal (in response

to the ‘privileged partnership’ suggestion) and not succumb to the political insistences

from the EU. On other issues, CHP finds AKP unsuccessful in dealing with corruption

and also believe the economy is not conducted properly. The reforms proposed in

various areas of domestic policy however are kept independent of the EU process in this

manifesto, unlike AKP.

The latest party programme of CHP was declared in 2008, which shall be mentioned

here for the sake of chronological consistency. In this statement, the relations with the

EU section falls under the foreign policy main topic. It is stated that the full

membership goal is a natural extension of Atatürk’s modernization revolution, and that

the party will not accept anything less than full membership; in response to the

‘privileged partnership’ debate voiced in 2006. (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 2008, p. 124)

One aspect that attracts attention in CHP’s claim is that if some of the EU Member

26

States shall decide to exclude Turkey on geographical or cultural differences and

degrade Turkey’s bid to less than full membership, then the CHP will look to reconsider

existing commitments to the EU, starting with Customs Union. (Cumhuriyet Halk

Partisi, 2008, p. 125) While CHP has acted soft Euro-sceptic and looked less

enthusiastic, this is the first statement that resembles taking a step back in accession.

This is yet another example of CHP’s specifically membership oriented approach to the

EU, in contrast to AKP’s reformist approach.

2011  General  Elections  

 

The first impression that strikes the reader in AKP’s 2011 election manifesto is that it

has a triumphant tone in general. Democratization is one of the foremost items of pride

on this manifesto, where it is noted that ‘one of the reasons of AK Parti’s existence is

fulfilling Turkey’s democracy deficit’ (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 2011, p. 9) AKP

prides itself for being the catalyst for the normalization of Turkey’s democracy. On the

other hand, there is again a promise for a new constitution in 2011 manifesto, where it is

noted that the new parliament’s primary duty will be the preparation of a new

constitution. The September 12, 2010 Constitutional Referendum had seen a major

modification of the 1982 Constitution of Turkey, however with the support towards

changing the constitution during the referendum, the AKP believed it is high time to

draft a new constitution from scratch. Improvement for judicial system and ensuring

security measures not to clash with personal freedoms are also matters on the manifesto.

Meanwhile, the EU issue is again addressed under the foreign policy section of this

manifesto. AKP underlines that the foreign policy vision of Turkey has changed over

the years, and claim that foreign policy is normalized just as domestic politics have

been during AKP governance. Full membership to the EU meanwhile has been

described as a ‘strategic goal’ (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 2011, p. 151). Nine years

later after their first elections, it is no longer claimed by the AKP that EU membership

is part of Atatürk’s vision for Turkey or that Turkey has its place in Europe. On the

contrary, the manifesto notes that Turkey’s membership has strategic importance for the

future of Europe, and that a Europe that denied Turkey will be one that has fallen

27

behind the 21st century. (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 2011, p. 151-52) At this point, the

EU is depicted as the camp that causes the problems, and that AKP believes Turkey has

achieved democratization under their watch since the Copenhagen Criteria is no longer

mentioned. Later, the manifesto touches upon other subjects like relations with the

Balkans, Russia, Africa, East and South East Asia etc. with relatively same amount of

emphasis with EU. Therefore, there is indeed a breakaway from past thinking regarding

the EU on AKP’s side. The AKP feels that it has outgrown the EU goals since the party

believes Turkey has reached an advanced level of democracy thanks to them, and that

the EU has proven unreliable in keeping their promises. Neither the Copenhagen

Criteria is held at a high regard nor promises are made for Turkey’s membership by

AKP’s 2011 manifesto.

The CHP on the other hand entered to this election with a new Chairman, Kemal

Kılıçdaroğlu, who was elected to this position in May 2010. The major breakaway for

CHP in the 2011 elections pamphlet was the emphasis on personal liberties of citizens.

Whereas the past CHP manifestos had seen secularism as the main idea delivered to the

electorate, the latest pamphlet saw rights and liberties at the forefront, and secularism

being first noticed on the 18th page. (Uysal, 2011, p. 135) This is heartening for

Turkey’s EU process, given that this has been a major indication that CHP stopped to

oppose AKP on grounds of secularism. In other words, CHP no longer opposes the

process on ideological grounds like the AKP has blamed the opposition over the years.

While AKP had declared democracy and freedoms as the end goal and the EU

membership as a strategy since their first elections in 2002, CHP seems also to have

joined this path by the 2011 elections.

CHP agrees with AKP on the need for a new constitution in their 2011 manifesto,

calling for a democratic, inclusionary preparation phase. Meanwhile the foreign policy

section sees CHP calling for a ‘foreign policy based on peace, democracy and

development’. (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 2011, p. 121) This manifesto notes that the EU

membership process is blocked because of AKP’s mistakes and the negative approaches

of European conservative parties in power. The EU process is described as a social

transformation project that will help Turkey’s democratization and prepare its economy

28

for the contemporary age. Furthermore, CHP calls for cooperation with European like-

minded social democrat parties in order to make Turkey’s membership possible and

together prepare projects for Europe’s future. Also, while AKP refrained from

mentioning the Copenhagen Criteria in its latest manifesto, CHP states that it will work

to cease the legitimate concerns that Turkey is moving away from fulfilling the Criteria.

In other words, whereas AKP believes it has succeeded in democratization over its 9

years of governance and that Copenhagen Criteria no longer applies to Turkey, CHP

states that this is hardly the case.

Turning  Points  for  Each  Party  

In the light of the analyses provided previously, it is appropriate to note that AKP’s

turning point first came in 2007. Even though the accession talks began during their

first tenure in government, the political costs of Cyprus and resurfacing Kurdish

insurgency fueling nationalism, AKP chose to let the EU accession take a back seat on

the agenda. It is noted that AKP always had a more pragmatic approach in comparison

to CHP, given that AKP criticized those who approached the issue ideologically.

However, the first indications of resentment were seen by 2007 elections. Even though

EU accession was still a major topic by then, AKP started to shift its foreign policy

goals to other regions and started employing the ‘Ankara Criteria’ rhetoric. During the

period 2007-2011, AKP may not have picked up the EU accession issue again were it

not for the closure case it faced. Expectedly, after this threat was averted, the interest in

the matter continuously declined. By 2011, AKP had declared itself as the normalizing

reformer of Turkish democracy, and that the democratization goal is almost completed.

The EU accession is now depicted as a mere strategic partnership where the EU had just

as much gain from the process as Turkey did. This is in line with the first hypothesis

proposed at the beginning of this study.

The CHP on the other hand consistently focused on the full membership end goal and

not the substance of the reform process. The Baykal-led CHP consistently played the

secularism card against AKP, and as AKP succeeded in starting the accession process in

October 2005, CHP took an opposition side to the accession since this became a project

29

owned by AKP. The compromises made by AKP fueled CHP’s nationalist opposition

during this period. Therefore, there is more consistency from 2002 to 2007 elections in

CHP’s rhetoric. CHP even went as far as considering existing cooperation with the EU

by 2008. The turning point for CHP came through a change in Chairman position in

2010, where the party strived to thoroughly embrace the social democratic position. In

this transition, the ideological, secularist rhetoric came to be replaced by a call for

personal rights and freedoms, which in turn embraced the EU accession and

Copenhagen Criteria. This transformation is also in line with the second hypothesis

proposed at the beginning of this study.

Conclusion  

Alexander Bürgin’s 2010 study presents political elites interviewed regarding the EU

membership in 2010. Bürgin states that 19 of the 20 party officials from AKP, MHP

and CHP are supportive of Turkey’s EU membership bid, while the level of support

varies among members. Moreover, with 18 of 20 interviewees believing that Turkey

had become an important regional player with latest developments, the support for EU

still holds true, and majority of the interviewees believe that the two tracks (Turkey’s

West and East policies) can complement one another. The interviewees also had an

impression of being kept outside of the door, rather than falling short of performing

necessary reforms. They look forward to a newer generation of politicians who will

follow a more strategic approach, and that this would also help improve the overall

Turkish domestic view on EU membership. Finally, the interviewees consider EU

membership as a civilization project more than an economical one, stating that Turkey’s

membership would be a peace project. (Bürgin, 2010, pp. 432-434)

The EU has been an influential actor in triggering reforms in various aspects of

democracy, thanks to the accession conditionality it holds. However, over the years the

EU took a backseat in the process as domestic groups in Turkey made very plural and

highly polarized interpretations of the reform process and its implementation. As the

EU conditionality clashed with the collective Turkish Self, EU became a peripheral

actor to Turkey’s reform process. (Johansson-Nogués & Jonasson, 2011, p. 127) A

30

sincere ‘deepened’ democratic governance effort requires internal effort and consensus

building rather than exogenous intervention in Turkey’s case. Therefore, a new Turkish

identity synthesis must be born out of this consolidation effort.

The underlying reason for this lack of deepened democratic governance is that different

groups and constituents in Turkish society have only expected results that served their

own ends. AKP looked to Europeanization in order to push for religious freedom rights

and in order to protect their religiously conservative nomenclatura, while CHP’s

supporters looked at the EU process as keeping Turkey’s West-oriented tendency and

character in order to keep the religious movements at bay. Neither the full membership

goal nor arguably democratization has been achieved to the maximum extent as of

2012. This, in turn, has disappointed both groups as neither of them were satisfied with

the results so far. (Öniş, 2010, p. 361)

With AKP securing yet another term in governance, CHP failing to convince the

electorate about its renewed image and still remaining in opposition, the outlook

regarding the EU accession seems to be stable for this government’s tenure in power.

With the Republic of Cyprus taking the EU Council Presidency seat for the second half

of 2012, the already limited talks have now again stopped as Turkey refuses to

recognize Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, given the recent economic woes of the EU,

neither of the two parties found it useful to employ the EU in their rhetoric. The AKP

already believes that it is conducting democratization to the fullest and that they enjoy

having the opportunity to control the momentum of the process. This serves their

pragmatic logic and the demands of its electorate base. The CHP meanwhile has less

room for maneuver as it remained in opposition for nearly a decade now and the recent

economic troubles also bother them in pushing for the EU accession. Therefore, the two

parties’ positions as of 2012 seem stable and consistent for the near future and no

immediate further shifts in approaches are expected.

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