Thesis for master’s seminar in Peace and Conflict studies, 30 credits

Master's Programme in Crisis Management and Peacebuilding, 120 credits

Spring 2020, Umeå university

Abstract

For long the discipline of peace studies have investigated causes of war, rather than

causes of peace, in an African context. In the northern peripheries of Somalia, a nation

ravaged by civil war and conflict, two apparent peace zones have emerged following the

complete state collapse of 1991: Somaliland and Puntland. The study explores whether

or not these two realities of peace can be defined and characterised as Zones of Peace,

or sanctuaries, amidst a civil war. Utilising the analytical tools of Zones of Peace –

hitherto applied on conflictual contexts elsewhere but the Horn of Africa – this study

suggests that both Somaliland and Puntland are, despite the territorial conflict between

them, peace zones granting shelter from the civil war. Suggestively, peace has prevailed

in both Puntland and Somaliland due to Somalia’s deteriorated situation, not in spite of

it. The study concludes that in order to optimise research concerning Somaliland’s and

Puntland’s peace(s), the framework of Zones of Peace can offer in-depth insights on

local everyday milieus. The framework partially explains why these local peace(s) has

lasted despite lacking external attention and allow for thorough comparison between

two homogenous cases. Lastly, both Puntland’s and Somaliland’s inviolability and

durability remain unchallenged and rigorous, possibly because of the civil war’s status

quo, and since the international community’s foci on south- and central Somalia persists.

Keywords: zones of peace, sanctuary, civil wars, causes of peace, Somaliland, Puntland

Table of content

1. Introduction 1

1.1. Purpose and research questions 2

1.2. Limitations and demarcations 3

1.3. Explaining Zones of Peace and sanctuaries in brief 3

1.4. Previous research on Puntland and Somaliland 4

2. Zones of Peace theory and conceptual framework 8

2.1. State (re-)building where there is no state 10

2.2. Zones of Peace amidst armed conflict 11

2.3. The logics behind the creation, inviolability, and durability of a sanctuary 16

3. Comparative method and guidance of framework 18

3.1. Research design 19

3.2. Case selection 20

3.3. Material 21

3.4. Measuring Zones of Peace underlying logics 22

3.4.1. Answering the research questions on inviolability and durability 26

4. Puntland and Somaliland as sanctuaries amid civil war 28

4.1. Conflict background for context 29

4.2. Puntland 30

4.2.1. Type of sanctuary in Puntland 30

4.2.2. Functions of Puntland peace 31

4.2.3. Puntland’s environment 33

4.2.4. Protection offered by Puntland 35

4.3. Somaliland 37

4.3.1. Type of sanctuary in Somaliland 37

4.3.2. Functions of Somaliland peace 38

4.3.3. Somaliland’s environment 40

4.3.4. Protection offered by Somaliland 42

4.4. Comparison 44

4.4.1. Similarities in characteristics, relationships, and role of patrons 44

4.4.2. Differences in characteristics, relationships, and role of patrons 46

5. Analysis 48

5.1. Impenetrable land(s) of lasting peace(s) 52

6. Conclusions 53

6.1. Thriving in a conflictual context 54

6.2. Discussion on theory guidance and future research 55

References 58

Appendices 76

List of abbreviations

AIAI – al-Itihaad al-Islamiya

AMISOM – African Union Mission in Somalia

AU – African Union

BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation

CTC – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

EU – European Union

FGS – Federal Government of Somalia

ICG – International Crisis Group

ICU – Islamic Courts Union

IS – Islamic State

NGO – Non-governmental organisation

NIS – National Intelligence Service

PDRC – Puntland Development Research Center

PIS – Puntland Intelligence Agency

PSF – Puntland Security Force

SNM – Somali National Movement

SSDF – Somali Salvation Democratic Front

TFG – Transitional Federal Government

TNG – Transitional National Government

UN – United Nations

UNITAF – Unified Task Force

UNSOM – United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

US – United States of America

ZoP – Zones of Peace

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1. Introduction

“Following the melt-down of the state in 1991, Somalia became state collapse’s archetype, being

synonymous to the outside world with hunger and lawlessness. UN-sponsored attempts to re-

establish central authority went nowhere. Yet while most of the international political attention

has gone to “national reconciliation conferences” with warlords, several spontaneous bottom-up

processes have begun providing genuine – and increasingly comprehensive – human security to

Somali communities.” (Verhoeven 2009: 406)

The results of the Somali civil war, and of the humanitarian and militarised intervention United

Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), have had long-lasting impacts on the Horn

of Africa. Following the arguably abashing retreat of United Nations (UN) and United States

(US) military personnel in 1995, international peacebuilders and observers have dismissed “the

Somali fiasco […] as an outlier – a case of imperial hubris where there was no peace to keep”

(Jenkins 2013: 9, emphasis added). Whilst acknowledging that Somalia – officially the Federal

Republic of Somalia – has yet to reach a negative peace (see Galtung 1969) for the international

community to keep or build upon, the Horn of Africa nonetheless provides scholars with two

distinguishable examples of traditional and lasting peace(s): Somaliland and Puntland (see

Appendix 1, Figures 1 & 2 for maps).

Although Somalia as a whole is far from nation-wide reconciliation and peace – principally

between the internationally recognised Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the terrorist

group al-Shabaab – two apparent Zones of Peace (ZoP) in the northern parts of the nation seem

to have defied monumental odds in shaping lasting security and peace, in lieu of subsiding to

the civil war. Somaliland and Puntland, betwixt armed clans and Salafistic jihad groups, present

some of the more perplexing observations a student of peace- and conflict may encounter: why

peace during war? Specifically, why peace despite a notably long-lasting and violent civil war.

The two sovereign Somali regions have ostensibly utilised non-violent conflict resolution,

promoted inter-clan reconciliation, and reached significant levels of civilian security against

violence within their own territories – effectively creating inner sanctums of peace. Whereas

central- and southern Somali clans, warlords, and more problematic civilians, have been

involved in a soon to be 30 years long-drawn-out civil war.

Informed by Mitchell’s query, “some form of international interest has helped maintain the

inviolability of some local ZoPs as sanctuaries, but is this a general pattern?” (2007: 24,

emphasis added), this thesis ponders on whether or not the lack of international attention to the

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peacebuilding processes in Somaliland and Puntland can nuance alternative insights on causes

of peace during war. One puzzling remark is apparent, which previous literature has yet to

tackle: can these two empirical observations of peace amid civil war be considered ZoPs, even

if external peacebuilders have not substantially intervened nor assisted in their local processes?

Existing literature does provide invaluable material on each specific case, certainly so within a

larger Somali context (see, especially, Lewis 2008 and Hoehne 2015). This thesis strives to

thoroughly investigate why Somaliland and Puntland have achieved and maintained peace

despite noticeable spoilers and lack of international assistance, or perhaps more intriguingly:

what are their causes of peace? Moreover, what potential lessons there are to be learned for the

framework of Zones of Peace in the midst of armed conflicts elsewhere.

1.1. Purpose and research questions

The over-arching aim of this thesis is to contribute to the theoretical queries on ‘why peace’ by

analysing the characteristics of Somaliland’s and Puntland’s peace(s). The purpose is

specifically to answer why virtually high levels of security and stability have been attained in

the regions, as both have factually maintained peace following the Somali civil war(s) of the

1990s and 2000s. Thus, I will derive whether or not these two cases can be considered ZoP and

compare them. The first research question is formulated in a descriptive manner and addresses

the territories similarities and differences. Whereas the second research question is of a more

analytical nature and explores what traits (or lack thereof) these cases of peace amid war rely

on in order to maintain their integrity and certitude as sanctuaries:

1. How does Somaliland and Puntland conform to the logics of ZoP, can they be

characterised as sanctuaries amid armed conflict? What are their similarities and

differences?

2. Why have Somaliland and Puntland remained inviolable and durable examples of

peace, in lieu of receding into a state of civil war?

I incorporate a ZoP framework which informs the analysis, thereby adding to the pool of

knowledge concerning literature on Zones of Peace. This study compares and evaluates the two

self-governing regions and conclude on why they have achieved peace where a considerably

persistent civil war has continuously raged since the early 1990s. In addition, this thesis will

hopefully provide some material, via the exploration of two hitherto under-studied cases, to the

general queries on causes of peace amid civil war in an African context.

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1.2. Limitations and demarcations

At the time of writing Somaliland is yet to be internationally recognised as a sovereign state.

Somaliland is, however, acknowledged as a relatively more stable part of Somalia than other

remnants of the nation – hence enjoying recognition in practice if not in theory. Somaliland is

thereby included in this thesis analytical endeavour as it provides an exemplary counterpart to

neighbouring Puntland, who enjoy de jure independence from Somali central authority.

Concerning Puntland there are additionally four federal member states – with a myriad of sub-

state administrations – in Somalia (South West State of Somalia, Jubaland, Hirshabelle, and

Galmudug (Appendix 1, Figure 2). These are however not included in the comparison merely

because they have not attained the same levels of peace as Puntland and Somaliland have upheld

since the 1990s – nor have the other federal Somali states achieved the same levels of autonomy

as Somaliland and Puntland (Dill 2012: 292-293).

It should be pointed out that this comparative study equalises the local with several localised

communities and aggregation of peoples. The ‘local’ is not one particular site but rather

encompasses the entirety of both Somalilanders and Puntlanders domains of influence. The

regional/outside, in turn, includes the total topography and societal realm of federal Somalia.

The external – applied interchangeably with the international and global – involves sovereign

states; non-governmental organisations (NGOs); regional organisations; and supranational

entities. To clarify, outsider is conceptualised to depict armed actors on all levels (local,

regional, or global) and will be analytically treated as such. Ergo, the relationship between the

local, outsiders, and global includes the linkage between those residing in the peace zone

(residents), external forces interacting – supportive or refutative – with the zone (patrons), and

those who are posed as a potential threat or possible ally toward the zone (outsiders).

1.3. Explaining Zones of Peace and sanctuaries in brief

According to Hancock & Mitchell (2007) Zones of Peace are defined as social sanctuaries

(geographical or socially construed) wherein people are sheltered from armed conflict based

upon accepted rules of conduct and societal guidelines. Examples of ZoPs are observable all

over the globe, albeit varying in size and scope of their missions. ZoPs may be extra-societal,

i.e. without the geographical territory of those seeking sanctuary; or intra-societal, i.e. in an

explicitly demarcated territory adjacent to armed conflict, attempting to protect all residing

within its spatial and jurisdictional boundaries. Note that the concept of ZoP is not to be

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confused with Kacowicz’s (1995: 265) definition, which classifies “Zones of Peace” as a group

of states deliberately avoiding warfare with one another. A sanctuary may, to some observers,

come across as synonym to ZoP. This is partly true, as both concepts evidently refer to a place

which is held inviolable and protects its residents from harm. Sanctuaries are “designed to

produce negative peace by removing the threat and use of violence through the agreement of

all warring parties” (Hancock 2015: 237). Thereby, a sanctuary per se encompass outsiders and

their conditionalities (e.g. agreed upon rules and relations) against the region, whereas a ZoP

may solely involve the local. This study applies ZoP and sanctuary interchangeably:

conceptually referring to local protection against outside threat of violence or conflict via local-

global/national interactions.

1.4. Previous research on Puntland and Somaliland

Previous literature on peacebuilding processes on the Horn of Africa have in general applied

its analytical foci on international peacebuilding failures and shortcomings, often critiquing the

liberal peace paradigm (see Ahmad 2012; Autesserre 2019; Menkhaus 2007, 2009). Somalia

and the nation’s institutional structures are, and has been for nearly three decades, in a state of

ruin and anarchy – seemingly unable to gain momentum in any shape or form of state building

(Ahmad 2012; Allo 2009; Haldén 2008; Hammond 2013; Menkhaus 2006/07), let alone

peacebuilding (Menkhaus 2009; Wiuff Moe 2016; Njeri 2019; Pham 2011; Silvestri 2019).

Whilst recognising the validity of these observations, there have been some studies devoted to

examining successful attempts at reconciliation, state building, and subsequent peacebuilding,

namely in Somaliland (Johnson & Smaker 2014; Schwoebel 2018; Balthasar 2019; Farah &

Lewis 1997) and in Puntland (Albrecht 2018; Dill 2012; Helander 2005). This larger field of

research is of significance when examining both regions, either separately or comparatively as

this study aims to do.

Indubitably, Somaliland and Puntland are cases of successful, local peace(s) (Hoehne 2015;

Samantar 2009) wherein both regions have achieved substantial societal reconciliation between

former enemies – despite the fact that neither Somaliland nor Puntland have received any

particular assistance from the international community (Lewis 2008: 93). Nor have the two

regions resolved the ‘Puntland–Somaliland border dispute’ where Somaliland has explicitly

seceded away from federal Somalia, and Puntland claims autonomy but continuously endorse

a functioning and unanimous Somali state (Hoehne 2015: 15). Therefore, it remains valid to

highlight that neither Somaliland nor Puntland are utopian cases of peace wherein no conflicts

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takes place, but rather emphasise that both regions have achieved peace within their own

territories despite the border dispute concerning the sub-regions of Sool, Sanaag, and southern

Togdheer (Ayn)1 (Appendix 1, Figure 1). Even more intriguing, both Puntland and Somaliland

remain relatively peaceful despite a long-lasting Somali civil war where there is a high presence

of potential violators toward each zone (e.g. warlords, rival Somali clans, and al-Shabaab). It

has, furthermore, previously been established from a variety of studies that Somaliland is a de

facto independent, albeit not internationally recognised, nation-state where Somalilanders

effectively govern and maintain peace and security themselves (Farah 2001: 138; Johnson &

Smaker 2014: 6-12; Kaplan 2008: 147-149). Puntland, recognised as a de jure autonomous state

of federal Somalia, governs their own institutions, territory, and peacebuilding processes, and

enjoys self-governance away from a centralised Mogadishu administration without substantial

external interferences (Marchal 2010: 10, 25; Johnson & Smaker 2014: 13-17). In addition, the

works by Samson (2015) and Lewis (2008), among others, further strengthens this thesis

assumption that Somaliland should be considered a sovereign unit of analysis, i.e. as a separate

entity away from the state of federal state of Somalia. Whilst simultaneously admitting that the

secessionist state has a shared history with Greater Somalia2, it becomes apparent that

Somalilanders adhere to their own independent principles, procedures, and agendas – with or

without international recognition and support (Nordstrom 2004: 171-172).

Arguably, prior expositions on Somali peacebuilding have approached the northern region in a

state-centric manner, including Hoehne’s seminal work Between Somaliland and Puntland

(2015) which purpose does not go beyond decoupling state building vis-à-vis peacebuilding, in

order to explain Somaliland’s and Puntland’s particularities (2015: 160-162). Hoehne does

make an important contribution to the field of study: while much has been written on

Somaliland, far less literature is available on Puntland – an issue Hoehne mitigates. Important

scholarly editions, among them Hoehne (2015) and Lewis (2008), provide crucial insights on

Somali clans in particular and Somali culture in general, which is deemed invaluable for this

study. One cannot aptly examine either Puntland or Somaliland without embracing Ioan Lewis

social anthropological overview, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, written in 1978 and

revised 2008. Lewis – acknowledging Somaliland’s peacebuilding successes and criticising the

1 These regions claimed their independence in Khatumo state, a proto-state which never received recognition

(Stremlau 2018: 79-80; Hoehne 2007). 2 Greater Somalia is the notion of a united Somalia which encompass all Somali speaking nations in or near the

Horn of Africa, i.e. parts of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya (see Zoppi 2015).

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failures of external interventions in central- and southern Somalia – provides the reader with a

thorough chronology on the entirety of the region (2008: 123-128). Perhaps more relevant for

this thesis intentions, he argues, compellingly, that the international community’s role should

be consultative rather than interfering – e.g. offer support to but not dictate Somaliland’s and

Puntland’s processes (Lewis 2008: xi).

There are relatively few scholarly attempts to analytically compare the two Somali states, even

though both self-governing entities have achieved what the international community has sought

for so long in central- and southern Somalia (ergo non-violent conflict resolutions and power-

sharing agreements). The much-needed but often over-looked separation of state-centric (top-

bottom) approaches and of the local turn in Somali peacebuilding, or bottom-up approaches, is

further merited by Little’s (2003: 167) observation on Somali culture, where “radical

localization is the norm, and even before the state collapse, most meaningful politics were

conducted outside official channels.” Arguably, if linking “most meaningful politics” with local

peace processes, analytical endeavours in African peace literature should thread carefully as

not to intertwine state building and peacebuilding too much, since it may risk undermining an

exposé of the local. One interview study does highlight the need to recognise local agency,

specifically women, as peacebuilders in Somaliland and Puntland. Dini (2009: 36) argues that

recognition of women’s legitimacy and efforts could complement ongoing practices of

peacebuilding in both territories. This observation, among others, make the issue of how

Puntland and Somaliland may be considered, and compared as, ZoPs even more relevant.

In one of the more recent literatures, and in sharp contrast to this thesis assumptions, Silvestri

(2019: 13-14) argues for a continuation of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm in the republic of

Somalia; inclusive and protective of all its citizens, including Somaliland. The author

emphasises Somali unity – through assistance from regional and international actors – and

maintain that the legitimate government of Somalia, in Mogadishu, ought to respect and adhere

to international law and humanitarian values as formulated externally. I do not contest the

reasoning, nor do I make any remarks on the valid concerns of the “very real possibility that

Somalia’s fragile security progress could be undone by mismanagement of the political

situation” (Silvestri 2019: 14). But where Silvestri and others (see Bryden 2004: 31-32; Bryden

& Brickhill 2010: 261; Horton 2019: 24) seemingly promotes a more comprehensive re-run of

the hitherto unsuccessful concept of a central state apparatus equals national peace, this study

aim to explore in-depth the localised, more successful, peace(s) in northern Somalia and what

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insights they may offer. In another recent body of work, Schwoebel (2018) explores Somaliland

and Puntland in-depth, particularly concerning their local state building practices and

peacebuilding successes. Schwoebel pinpoints many of the particularities of Somaliland’s

inherent difficulties in finding national harmony – considering the state peripheral-central clan

dichotomy – and concludes that the legitimacy gained by local actors very much relies on the

traditions of Islam, rather than the successes of multiparty democracy (2018: 218-219). This is

highly relevant when examining Puntland and Somaliland since Islam is the undisputed major

religion and way of life for nearly all Somalis; and has lead both Somaliland and Puntland in a

direction where peacemakers arguably “have had to marry a more contractual-based legitimacy

with an affinity-based legitimacy in order to persuade some clans to accept state authority”

(Hancock & Mitchell 2018: 225).

Lastly, few scholars have offered such insightful observations into peace(s) amid armed conflict

as Nordstrom’s inspiring book Shadows of War (2004). Nordstrom signifies Somaliland as a

“curious inversion” where peace was attained despite the de facto state being engulfed in a

raging civil war. Adding to the critique against the liberal peace paradigm, Nordstrom identifies

that the international community for too long has “insist[ed] on speaking of “Somalia” as if it

were a state, and the battles of Mogadishu as battles for the control of Somalia” (Nordstrom

2004: 172), rather than recognising the particularities of a self-governing island of peace in the

north. Survival is argued to dictate the wants and needs of locals, rather than the amalgamation

with a former state apparatus – and if informal agents of peace manages to create sanctuaries

against violence, the “state” could become superfluous (2004: 172-173). This is an important

observation concerning Puntlanders and Somalilanders everyday milieu, since they would

presumably differ: one wants to rebuild a federalist state regime in Mogadishu, whereas the

other actively seeks to separate from federal Somali authority. In sum, Somaliland and Puntland

are under-explored cases vis-à-vis peacemaking during civil war and despite armed conflict.

The studies that have explored either cases’ peacemaking successes are yet to comprehensively

compare the two, and at the time of writing no ZoP framework has been applied on either

region. The theoretical approach this thesis adopts is far from a simple one, yet highly warranted

as both regions seem to uphold security measures and manages to create peace writ large (to

borrow Hancock’s (2017: 268) notion that peacebuilding initiatives should boost larger societal

benefits). Even in the face of terrorism, climate crises, and localised border contestations,

Puntland and Somaliland seemingly prevail in peacemaking in lieu of plunging back into civil

war.

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2. Zones of Peace theory and conceptual framework

“Peace is not a universal concept that can be transposed identically between different contexts of

conflict. Rather, unique forms of peace arise when the strategies, institutions and norms of

international, largely liberal-democratic peacebuilding interventions collide with the everyday

lives of local actors affected by conflict.” (Richmond & Mitchell 2012: 1)

The most widely used conceptualisation of peace resides within Galtung’s (1969) negative and

positive peace dichotomy. Negative peace becomes apparent in the realm where violence and/or

fear of violence is absent, namely in a protected sanctuary. Positive peace, on the other hand,

is true, lasting, and builds upon justice and fairness for all people within the spatial boundary.

Peace can thereby – more than the mere absence of war and conflict – either be personal and

direct or structural and indirect (see Galtung 1969: 183); and for the sake of conceptualising

ZoP, both the negative and the positive spectrum of peace is adhered to and accepted as

epistemologically feasible. Moreover, in the context of islands of peace amid armed conflicts,

the underlying assumption is that negative peace is initially sought after (e.g. immediate refuge

away from violence), but in due course the desired peace is stipulated as positive (e.g. structural

and collective safety-nets against violence, such as economic growth or strengthened individual

agency).

To reiterate this thesis purpose, and highlight why this undertaking is necessary, there is an

echoing lack of ZoP theory application in the context of African peace(s) amidst civil war; a

context which is warranted for closer examination. The theory of ZoP was formulated and has

been continuously developed in the context of mainly Colombia and the Philippines (Mitchell

& Allen Nan 1997; Mouly et al. 2015, 2016; Idler et al. 2015; Garcia 1997). Concerning other

regions (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa) where sites of sanctuaries remain understudied, scholars have

previously identified the need for a ZoP framework, but retain that they have:

“come across some information about efforts to establish peace zones, weapons free zones or

peace corridors in various African countries suffering from various types of intra-state conflicts

– for example in Sudan and South Sudan, in Somalia, and Nigeria – but details about these efforts

is difficult to discover.” (George Mason University 2017, emphasis added)

Moreover, Africa is quite often presented in a very dismal, ceaselessly warring, context: adding

fundamentally mismatched pieces to the grand puzzle of why peace. Johan Brosché and Kristine

Höglund devote their attention to causes of peace, rather than causes of war, in the cases of

Botswana, Malawi, and Zambia. Their project aims to offer an explanation to “why peace has

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prevailed in these three countries, despite being part of the world’s most volatile continent and

with their neighbours struck by conflict” (Brosché & Höglund 2017). Parallel to their grand

task, this study attempts to answer why peace has been attained in Somaliland and Puntland,

despite both regions’ adjacency to a long-standing failure of a state, via the framework of ZoP.

With the notable exceptions of Höglund’s and Brosché’s ongoing research project ‘Causes of

Peace’ (see Uppsala Universitet n.d.), and Allouche & Jackson (2019) who identifies six

distinct periods of ZoP in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone in West Africa, contemporary and

much needed literature on African ZoPs remain conspicuously absent – where the “logic of

non-violence during conflict is scarcely covered in the African academic literature” (2019: 71).

Moreover, seeing how the international community have not expressed particular interest or

lobbied for large-scale peacebuilding programmes on-site in Somaliland and Puntland (with

very few exceptions), an analyst may similar to Hancock urge for “one potential model for post-

conflict peacebuilding that has hitherto remained below the radar screens of many in the

international peacebuilding community – the local zone of peace” (2017: 260). Assuming that

most ZoPs are by and large characterized by non-combatants who formulate their own

peacebuilding agendas, claims on agency, and push-back against violence (Hancock 2017:

261), Somaliland and Puntland would at first glance fall neatly within the frames of ZoP. But I

digress, this is left for the upcoming analysis.

For analytical clarity, ZoPs are at the onset seeking negative peace but can presumably only

succeed in this endeavour if they strive for positive peace, where global and liberal values

collide and combine with local and traditional norms (cf. Björkdahl & Höglund 2013). The ZoP

framework does acknowledge the importance of agency and autonomy, but it also recognises

the importance of external intervention and patron interest; it emphasises the analytical limits

of territories and spatial boundaries but need not attribute this to a state-centric lens, necessarily

(Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 217-218). According to Richmond & Mitchell (2012: 1) unique

types of peace(s) – more often than not hybrid in nature – evolve when liberal and international

peacebuilding strategies mismatch and create friction with the local, or the everyday, in a

specific context. Highly relevant for this thesis exploration on localised forms of peace

(traditional in nature) are key concepts such as (attained or perceived) agency and unity utilised

by inhabitants residing within a peaceful sanctuary. Furthermore, Richmond & Mitchell’s query

“[h]ow are acceptance, co-optation, resistance and rejection expressed in peace processes?”

(2012: 2) presents itself as a viable question for this undertaking in order to nuance the

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‘everyday’. The above-mentioned interactions between the global-local (see Björkdahl &

Höglund 2013) may aptly be integrated in a deeper analytical node, by coupling encounters and

frictions, to examine what challenges a ZoP may encounter – wherein externally and internally

initiated peacebuilding processes and conflict resolutions may affect Somalilanders and

Puntlanders possibilities to seek or create shelter from violence, and more importantly preserve

the inviolability of their sanctuary.

Note that the concepts of liberal and hybrid peace are well cemented and illustrated in

contemporary literature in the field of peace- and conflict studies. This thesis does not, however,

embark on such a theoretical exercise. A rather substantial amount of studies has coupled

Somaliland’s and Puntland’s relative successes in security and peace with state-centred

theories, which I argue is too insubstantial for this thesis enterprise. Similarly, studies have

attempted to explain and investigate namely Somaliland’s peacebuilding processes by

approaching the analysis with a pseudo-hybrid lens (see Schwoebel 2007, 2018). Alas, as

warranted as Njeri’s (2019: 39) critique is – claiming that “Somaliland is marginally mentioned

within the discourse of hybridity” and where the author “posit this is a result of a state-centric

approach to peacebuilding” – I argue that a preferable approach would be that of ZoPs when

examining Somaliland and Puntland comparatively. In a sense, state-centric lenses and

approaches to peacebuilding have been numerous concerning Somaliland, and to some extent

on Puntland. However, the international community has endorsed few peacebuilding missions

in northern Somalia. Ditto, theoretical explanations conceptualising hybridity risks rendering

buzzwords; not sufficiently explaining Puntlanders and Somalilanders attained levels of peace

and simply avoids decoupling peace- and state building altogether (Balthasar 2015: 28-29). To

reiterate, a ZoP framework may result in a marginally different theoretical (and plausibly

empirical) understanding concerning the general question why peace when war, certainly so in

one of many understudied African contexts.

2.1. State (re-)building where there is no state

As previously mentioned, a number of studies have linked the relative successes of

peacebuilding in northern Somalia to local and traditional efforts at state building (see Duffield

2014). The correlation and intimate relationship between state building and peacebuilding has

largely been assumed as an unquestionable fact in the schools of the social sciences for quite

some time. A more nuanced understanding – beyond state ‘failures’ or ‘successes’ – why peace

occurs is arguably merited (see Brickhill 2010; Call 2008; Suri 2016; Haldén 2008; Njeri 2019).

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As Boege et al. highlights, “there is a need to develop alternative non-state-centric approaches

to governance, the control of violence, peacebuilding, and development” (2009: 14, emphasis

added). This critique is especially striking when investigating how local and traditional methods

may develop mechanisms of conflict resolution that does not warrant violence, consequently

avoiding relapse into war, without a formal state apparatus supporting the peace zone. Thus,

attempts at analysing such pockets of peace may favourably penetrate the veil of state-centred

analyses, and rather investigate the particularities and uniqueness of ZoPs (Campbell &

Peterson 2015: 340).

It is sensible, however, at this juncture to underscore and acknowledge the importance and

actual virtues of state building. The continuous aim of the international community, namely the

UN and AU, in bolstering intra-personal peace and reconciliation between competing Somali

clans and warlords is not without its merits. Assumedly, neither Somaliland nor Puntland could

ever have achieved such levels of security and peace (as to merit them ZoPs which this thesis

assesses) without robust – albeit fundamentally defragmented and localised – (in)formal

institutions absorbing the brunt of the burden which civil war applies (Zoppi 2015; Wiuff Moe

& Simojoki 2013). This thesis undertakes no such analytical task, as it has been done prior to

the onset of this study and scholars of social sciences and IR theorists will most likely continue

detangling the web of hybrid- and traditional forms of peace in par with state-centric approaches

in a similar fashion. It is here assumed that state-centred theories alone cannot explain

peacebuilding processes, nor fully promote it, as it merely engages with an international, or

state building, discourse rather than combining it with the local and informal. Besides, this

combination results, more often than not, in frictions between the global-local (Björkdahl &

Höglund 2013: 289) understandings on how to build lasting peace, i.e. the dichotomous

relationship between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ (Richmond & Mitchell 2012: 4-5).

2.2. Zones of Peace amidst armed conflict

Zones of peace. Indubitably, these three words evoke optimism and hope in most. But what

exactly is a ZoP and what makes them safe? In its cradle the concept of ZoPs stems from

attempts at civilian resistance against armed violence, where local non-combatants intended to

create islands of sanctuary against armed violence within Filipino communities during the

turmoil of the 1980s (Hancock 2018: 28; Hancock 2015: 237). In a contemporary context,

where civil wars are more common than war between states, these peace zones are virtually

12

always created, implemented, and hopefully sustained in reference to an ongoing armed

conflict, as observed by Christopher Mitchell (2007):

“Being “fought over” in recent decades has been reason enough for local people to seek some

form of protection from violence by trying to construct a sanctuary. Being the targets of threats,

unwilling recruitment, ejection, and killing is a major spur to finding or creating a place where

whole communities are safe – even if only temporarily.” (Mitchell 2007: 3)

Inspirational for my analytical endeavour is Idler et al. (2015), where the authors compare

varying outcomes of peace initiatives in two Colombian communities, and subsequently

categorise eight factors into three sub-groups which they argue should be closely examined in

order to analyse a ZoP (2015: 2). Following Allouche & Jackson (2019: 74-77) analytical mode

– who operationalise their ZoP analysis on Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire by Idler’s et al. three

groups – I shall examine what peace(s) my two cases represent, via the three dimensions

concerning the potential for, and continued existence of, ZoPs amid civil war:

1. The first concerns the characteristics of the internal resistance against outside violence, more

specifically this includes the structure and cohesions of Somalilanders and Puntlanders communities

within the peaceful zone. Informing this dimension are e.g. participation (in decision-making),

collective leadership, and internal cohesion vis-à-vis outside, external threats.

2. The second feature to be disentangled is the local’s relationship with armed actors, or the potential

violators of the sanctuary. This component is highly merited seeing how potential ‘spoilers’ to peace

may be related or well-known to the subjects of a peaceful zone. Informing this dimension is e.g. what

defines boundaries and trust in-between residents of a sanctuary, or what potential incentives there are

for both outsiders and locals to violate the safe haven.

3. Thirdly, the role of external actors, i.e. peacebuilders and external interveners who do not reside in the

sanctuary but impose agendas, for better or worse, upon the peaceful zone. This query is informed

mainly by external actors’ peacebuilding programmes, policies, or financial and humanitarian aid

objectives (patronage). Even more relevant concerning agency and autonomy: how locals interpret and

respond to these global-local interactions and encounters.

A noteworthy assumption is that ZoPs are specifically and territorially defined sanctuaries, both

empirical and theoretical (Hancock & Mitchell 2007, 2018; Hancock 2017). Sanctuaries are

difficult to establish during civil wars, whilst non-combatants struggle to escape or find

sanctuary in other geographical spaces – they may need to create one of their own. Bluntly, the

mere prerequisite for a sanctuary denotes that there is a great and valid need for it (Mitchell

2007: 15-16). Generalisations on sanctuaries, or ZoPs, as categories is somewhat problematic,

given the myriad of practices, organisations, and circumstantial specificities. Nevertheless,

13

going forward it should be emphasised that four varying, though interconnected, categories

need to be taken into consideration: (i) the type of sanctuary, (ii) the functions of the sanctuary,

(iii) the environment in which the sanctuary operates, and (iv) what form of protection the

sanctuary offers (Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 189). These categories will assist in deducing

whether or not my chosen cases can be defined as ZoPs.

A ZoP has one primary function: to protect those residing within it from outside violence, or

negative peace as per Galtung’s theorem. However, there are also secondary functions for any

ZoP: to promote economic development, evoke participation in societal functions, strengthen

inclusion, and to formulate and implement justice- and policy reforms (Mitchell & Hancock

2007: 192-193), more in par with Galtung’s concept of positive peace. It may at first seem

paradoxical, as sanctuaries are primarily established to provide protection to those inhabiting

the spatial area which it encompasses. Nevertheless, in order to fulfil its primary function of

negative peace, sanctuaries often seek to strengthen and improve societal, political, and

economic structures – allowing for peace writ large to take hold (see Hancock 2017: 268). In

other words, the strive for positive peace can become a means to an end in itself:

“it would be possible for particular ZoPs to be relatively unsuccessful at providing long-term

safety for their denizens but highly successful at banishing corruption, improving living

conditions, or developing a sense of unity, purpose, and shared identity.” (Mitchell & Hancock

2007: 194)

Notably, Mitchell & Hancock seek, in their widely cited book Zones of Peace (2007), to

distinguish what defines the efficiency of a ZoP, or what Mitchell frames as: “the search for

common factors that help to increase the chances of sanctuaries being effective in offering

protection to those within the spatial and other boundaries of some protected and (hopefully)

inviolable zone” (2007: 3). Additionally, the establishment of a ZoP – when defined by

territorial boundaries – may be one of the more valuable methods a community or society can

adopt when trying to mitigate or remove themselves from a conflict, rather than to resolve it

per se. Thus, protracted and complex armed conflicts are more often than not difficult to

manage long-term; whereas short-term solutions such as a temporary sanctuary can be enacted

fairly immediately (Hancock & Iyer 2007: 29-30), which in turn may provide long-term shelter.

Considering that ZoPs may either be locational – i.e. constructed to protect an area – or

personal, Mitchell (2007: 1) identifies that a zone of personal protection includes “priests or

other “holy” individuals, merchants and traders, doctors and other medical personnel, peasants,

14

women, and children”, ergo prominent persons, categories of people, or inviolable spaces

(hospitals, UN compounds, schools, religious buildings). As this thesis foci on macro units of

analysis, rather than micro, the personal category becomes irrelevant (though merited for other

studies). Rather, the locational or territorial zone of protection are of analytic interest. ZoPs are

often established and maintained within an ongoing violent conflict, or in a post-conflict setting.

The zones duration may be temporary or permanent, and functioning agents of preserving the

sanctuary may be local communities themselves, national and/or regional leadership, or even

international peacebuilders and/or experts (Saulich & Werthes 2020: 42).

Worth mentioning is that the creation of a ZoP can be both top-down, or externally generated,

or alternatively stem from a locally and collectively formulated need for a safe sanctuary

(Mitchell & Allen Nan 1997; Mouly et al. 2015). However, the literature is in accord that the

founding process, and subsequent survival, of a ZoP is far more likely to succeed if the

ownership and control over the process is bottom-up, rather than top-down (Hancock 2018: 28;

Allouche & Jackson 2019: 77; Saulich & Werthes 2020: 32). This is particularly interesting for

this study, considering the relative lack of international attention both Puntland and Somaliland

have received. Whilst recognising that external actors have “limits […] in local conflict

management and prevention” and acknowledging “the fact that local communities are not at the

mercy of external forces” (Saulich & Werthes 2020: 34), it remains prudent to assume that

external assistance, or patronage, is merited for analysis. Evidently, external and international

interventions – or lack thereof – is of import when examining any and all ZoP during armed

conflict and war. Militarised, humanitarian interventions may fortify agitation towards the

‘outsiders’ and embolden resistance, as was the case of UNSOM (see Duffey 2000; Kapteijns

2013). In essence, there may be several risks attached when external peacekeepers and -builders

seek to intervene in local ZoPs:

“neither peacekeeping nor even outright occupation can necessarily provide long-term security

for people living in conflict zones; even further, these external controls on violence often backfire,

cementing divisions between groups and fanning the flames of resistance.” (Hancock & Mitchell

2007: xiv)

On the other hand, external interventions – if appropriately implemented with a legitimate

mandate – may strengthen a local sanctuary’s inviolability (Mitchell 2007: 22; Mitchell &

Hancock 2007: 215-217). External attention to Somaliland and Puntland is arguably needed

then, for them to stand a chance at preserving their statuses as relatively peaceful regions:

15

“The initiatives in the north need to be supported. Such external support, however, needs to

recognize the sensitivity of the recovery process. […] For the time being, external assistance must

supplement rather than overwhelm the kinds of local grassroots initiatives that already exist.”

(Farah 2001:143)

The instinctual urge to dismiss the role of external actors – seeing how they have been more or

less absent since Somaliland’s and Puntland’s claims on secession and autonomy – should

therefore be halted in its tracks: patronage remains a viable analytical factor in order to evaluate

and compare these two cases. Incorporated in this thesis framework is Mitchell & Hancock’s

modelling on the effectiveness of outside patronage (Appendix 2, Figure 4). In addition, the

authors create a typology of sanctuaries to provide a simpler overview of how they may develop

and shift functions over time (Appendix 2, Figure 3). Considering inviolability, ZoPs require

non-interference from potential violators, i.e. the enemy, toward the sanctuary. Assuming that

interactions between the national-local are even conceivable, the varying functions of a

sanctuary can be categorised by analysing each case practices and procedures concerning how

they realize positive peace within the zone, in combination with their relationship to the national

(Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 196-197).

Noteworthy to reiterate: the local units of analysis are Somalilanders and Puntlanders – be they

elites, armed actors, or clients for protection against violence. The outsider refers to national

and/or regional neighbours, e.g. Somali clans and Jihadists. Thus, the relationship between the

ZoP, local ditto outside armed actors, and patrons become indicative for the ZoPs inviolability

and durability. In the introduction I assumed that outsiders may traverse across levels of

adherence, whereas the local or global stays within their realm of influence. This may come

across as an oversimplification, since both global as well as local actors can and so often do

fluctuate between what is to be considered local (communities in the peace zones) and what is

global (organisations or NGO offices). Yet, for the purpose of this comparison, Somalilanders

and Puntlanders relationship with the outsiders, i.e. other Somalis, neighbouring African

nations and UN peacebuilders, is what constitutes the local-outsider and local-global elements.

The categories of analytical enquiries from Allouche & Jackson (2019) simultaneously informs

both the inviolability and durability of a ZoP, albeit varying in size and scope. For example, the

role of external actors in a sanctuary cannot be fully comprehended without extracting some

information on how the sanctuary defies or cooperates with a national government. Nor would

it be possible to obtain any solid information regarding the stated purpose of a sanctuary without

coupling this to an “enemy” endangering the peace, or some other manifest threat to the zone.

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2.3. The logics behind the creation, inviolability, and durability of a sanctuary

Irrefutably, the logics of a ZoP are to protect those residing within the zone against further or

renewed conflict. Seemingly, sanctuaries are often unable to protect their boundaries or

jurisdictions via the usage of force, but then how are ZoPs able to protect the denizens of a

sanctuary? Crudely, it comes down to the outsider, or armed actors, agendas and motives.

Mitchell & Hancock (2007: 203-204) conclude that armed actors may respect the integrity and

inviolability of a ZoP if the region adheres to two fundamentals: lacking incentives for violation

(i.e. few potential gains) and absence of perceivable threats (i.e. few potential risks). Outsiders

are, arguably, more likely to respect the inviolability of a sanctuary if the zone does not harbour

or support opponents to the armed actor; perceived as potential or future threats. If the sanctuary

is sheltering enemies or potentially high value targets (e.g. wealthy individuals, wounded

enemy combatants), and integrating them into the society where outsiders’ enemies, their

supporters, and neutral denizens mix – the risks for violation against the ZoPs inviolability and

integrity become more significant.

Furthermore, ZoPs does not exist within a vacuum: global actors and organisations play a

crucial role in examining apparent peace zones amid war, where the aforementioned global-

local interactions, or frictional encounters between external actors and Somalilanders and

Puntlanders are produced and/or reproduced. Depicted in Table 1, informed by Björkdahl &

Höglund (2013), are the frictional encounters and local’s response to the global-local

interactions which may occur – and these will be investigated to nuance the outcomes on

Somaliland’s and Puntland’s functions as peace zones. The local response toward global and

liberal values envisages how peace is created and primarily governed. The external impact on

Somaliland’s and Puntland’s visions of peace informs what outcomes these encounters have

had on the peace processes, at large. First, what (potential) external patrons promotes becomes

highly relevant: grassroot ownership and individual agency, or the elite’s narratives. Basically,

who sways influence over the continuation of the ZoP, and who are excluded? Second, the local

response toward potential frictions, which inadvertently affect the outcomes of peace processes,

may further dictate the external patron’s iteration at influencing the sanctuary – thus creating a

feedback loop (Björkdahl & Höglund 2013: 297-298). Noteworthy is that this feedback loop

may (re)create new realities within the sanctuary, and consequently stipulate new issues or

challenges for the zones’ inviolability and continued survival (2013: 296), making the frictions

between global proposals and local responses of value for the analysis on why peace has lasted.

17

Table 1. Global-local interaction in peacebuilding (Björkdahl & Höglund 2013: 297).

To summarize, there are ten interconnected criteria, or logics, which inform the potential

success or failure of a ZoP, i.e. informing the type and function of a sanctuary, environment

where it operates, and what protection it offers (Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 212-213, 218).

Notably, not every logic has to be fulfilled in order for a ZoP to occur and thrive - but needless

to say it alleviates and assist the regions’ inviolability and durability:

1. Levels of internal unity concerning the sanctuary’s purpose, and effectiveness of non-violent conflict

resolution mechanisms for dealing with divisions and disagreements within the sanctuary.

2. Scope and variation of development programmes beyond those projects involved in safe-guarding the

sanctuary from armed actors (positive peace as means to maintain negative peace).

3. Effectiveness of the leadership and width of preparations for the sanctuary’s continuation if violated.

4. Territorial and spatial demarcation and sets of boundaries.

5. Spatial remoteness from or adjacency to armed conflicts and civil strife.

6. Impartial and neutral conduct from the sanctuary toward outsiders.

7. Legal and/or ethical basis and motivation for the existence of the sanctuary.

8. Threats posed by the sanctuary against local armed actors or outsiders, and presence of valuable

resources, notables, or strategic properties that may incentivise violation.

9. External actors’ agenda in providing patronage, protection, or support to the sanctuary.

10. Levels of credible sanctions against violators of the sanctuary.

Hence a sanctuary can be (i) identified, (ii) compared against other zones, and additionally (iii)

evaluated based on its properties (inviolability and durability). In sum, this study will analyse

what defines Somaliland’s and Puntland’s peace processes internally, the regions relationship

with armed actors and outsiders, and to what extent these peace processes have been influenced

or devised by external actors. This approach allows for a focus on both the creation of the zones,

and additionally on the inviolability and durability of each peace zone. I define ZoPs – or

sanctuaries – analytically by four categories (Hancock & Mitchell 2007), and measure in

18

chapter 3.4 their inviolability and durability by cross-referencing Allouche & Jackson (2019)

and Björkdahl & Höglund (2013). To recap the research questions, the framework will be

utilised in order to (1) determine whether or not Somaliland and Puntland can be characterised

as ZoPs – how do they differ and what similarities do they share? And (2) conclude how both

regions have attained internal peace despite the Somali civil war – why have they remained

durable and inviolable safe-havens?

3. Comparative method and guidance of framework

This thesis is conducted as a qualitative and comparative analysis with a macro lens, informed

by a variety of material much due to the inaccessibility of first-hand sources and accounts on

site. The query whether or not Somaliland and Puntland can be described as ZoPs is interesting,

yet not unproblematic to assess without direct access to each region. The framework is,

however, formulated in such a way that a desk study is feasible through analysis of qualitative

secondary sources. Interviews, for example, may not necessarily be the best approach, as noted

by Höglund & Öberg (2011: 3): surveys and interviews are commonly used techniques for

information gathering, yet viable alternatives such as desk studies are readily available. As the

topic of interest for this thesis are sanctuaries and their logics, informing terms concerning the

theoretical and methodological approach requires rigid conceptualisation and operationalisation

– i.e. variables need to be defined and measurable – prior to the analysis (Höglund & Öberg

2011: 185).

Hence, this thesis adopts a theory-guided and comparative approach to decide whether or not

the regions may be defined as sanctuaries, and what their respective causes of peace potentially

are. Moreover, considering matters of ontology and epistemology, I assume that ZoPs are “an

external reality which exists independently of people's beliefs or understanding about it” (Snape

& Spencer 2003: 11). Thereby, peace zones may exist with or without third-party

acknowledgement and labelling, albeit that these factors assumedly influence the zones

inviolability and durability. Alternatively, as a ZoPs existence necessitates some levels of

legitimacy, they may aptly be considered constructed external realities: a sanctuary is, after all,

not a natural phenomenon but created. I assume that the analysis will provide this thesis with

intersubjective results, ergo if “several reports confirm a statement then it can be considered

true as a representation of a socially constructed reality” (Snape & Spencer 2003: 14).

Therefore, this theory-guided exercise may, primarily, shed some light on the application – or

efficiency – of ZoP theory on as mentioned earlier understudied African cases.

19

Prior to the methodological review of this paper, some key acknowledgments have to be made,

informed by Bhattacherjee (2012: 94-95), as this comparative case study sets out to: (i) explain

why and how Somaliland and Puntland have achieved peace where war rages; (ii) examine

multiple units of analysis, i.e. local, national, regional, and global actors in a macro perspective;

(iii) perform a multiple case analysis in order to enable comparison; (iv) the sites chosen for

this comparative case study are the Puntland and Somaliland regions, sharing as aforementioned

numerous similarities; and lastly (v) the material collected is extracted via secondary sources

including, but not limited to, previous research, reports, news articles, and policy papers – ergo

the technique of document analysis is partly applied.

3.1. Research design

Seeing how this is a theory-guided effort with a comparative disposition, the framework of ZoP

remains instructive for formulating a research design and delineate my field of inquiry. The

choice of cases allows for comparison within the cultural and state context of Somalia, where

pre-existing in-depth knowledge on Somaliland and Puntland is required of the researcher

(Höglund 2011: 117). The administrative units and armed actors for analysis are at times fluid,

which necessitates caution and analytical transparency on my part (see chapter 1.2).

Nonetheless, the scientific rigor required in peace- and conflict studies in general, and on

analytically complex cases specifically, is adhered to as envisaged in Table 2. Rihoux & Marx

(2013) seminal and informing work implies that potentially explanatory factors (cf. Table 2)

may produce an intriguing phenomenon, or in this thesis the outcome of sanctuary and peace

in the midst of civil war. This thesis also assumes that varying conditions, i.e. the logics of ZoP,

may result in the same outcome which needs to be explained, i.e. the inviolability and durability

of a sanctuary. Moreover, “depending on the context, a given condition may very well have a

different impact on the outcome” (Rihoux & Marx 2013: 168), indicating that if –

hypothetically – Puntland and Somaliland share similar conditions, the outcome of relative

peace is not necessarily causal but requires a more nuanced depiction on what their differences

and similarities are.

Thereby, the purpose of this comparative study is to conclude on whether or not Somaliland

and Puntland conform to the logics of ZoP, and subsequently answer why the regions have

maintained peace instead of receding into civil war. As Höglund (2011: 115) denotes: a

comparison between two entities may be sufficient for such an endeavour, at least for the single

researcher since the specific field of research require vast knowledge and understanding of the

20

local context. The observable phenomena further strengthen the choice of (only) comparing

two cases of peace amid conflict, as mentioned earlier: Puntland and Somaliland are two

extraordinary discrepancies in an otherwise conflict-ridden context. What is yet to be

satisfactory answered beyond state-centred explanations is the why. The research design for this

comparative study has three particular issues – beyond the conceptualisation of ZoP in the

previous chapter – that need to be addressed prior to the analytical effort: first the selection of

cases; second sorting through the material and decipher how it may answer my research

questions; and third the operationalisation to enable measurement of potential explanatory

factors (Höglund 2011: 116).

3.2. Case selection

In order to analyse and compare Puntland and Somaliland as peaceful phenomena – ostensibly

similar yet different – this thesis applies what Höglund (2011: 116) defines as an appropriate

frame of comparison. The frame entail, first, that various outcomes may be identified in each

case, whereas both peace zones have experienced (roughly) similar levels of violence prior to

the sanctuary’s creation. Secondly, case homogeneity must be met: both cases may be compared

because they share similarities in the procedures that allows protection and creates peace (2011:

116). Therefore, I attempt to discover linkages and connections between my two cases, further

strengthened by Ritchie et al. (2003: 248) who highlights that this is a common approach in

qualitative and comparative analyses – as linkages may occur between both highly similar ditto

fundamentally different cases. For my purpose, both the thematic, or otherwise observable,

similarities and differences are of interest. Notably, when addressing the issue of case selection,

I assume that a single case may be examined as numerous events, or what Levy (2008: 2) coins

“spatially and temporally bounded set of events”. The theoretical framework adheres to this

assumption, as it covers both clearly defined temporal and spatial limitations; the entirety of

Puntland’s and Somaliland’s strive toward internal and lasting peace will be analysed following

the Somali state collapse of 1991 where Somaliland and Puntland are acknowledged as two

Somali administrative entities roughly spatially equal.

Considering that this thesis is theory-guided, rather than inductive or hypothesis-generating, it

entails that the analysis becomes idiographic, with the “aim to explain and/or interpret a single

historical episode rather than to generalize beyond the data” (Levy 2008: 4). The idiographic

lens (1991-) thus becomes applicable regarding Puntland’s and Somaliland’s formation as

relative peaceful regions in adjacency to the continued civil war of Somalia in general.

21

However, caution should be raised concerning the potential generalisation of this thesis: there

are obvious difficulties in generalising vastly different realities on the ground and produce some

concrete statements considering the usage of ZoP theory, if not on sanctuaries differences and

similarities. Nevertheless, this comparative approach allows for in-depth insights on each case

simultaneously to some levels of generalisation (Rihoux & Marx 2013: 168), albeit more

theoretical than empirical per se.

To reiterate, Somaliland and Puntland are apt to be examined via this comparative approach,

rather than against other non-African geographical and cultural contexts. Somaliland and

Puntland have, albeit varying in scope, largely separated themselves from the rivalry clan

politics and violent conflicts of central- and southern Somalia. There are other examples of

secessionist elements and autonomous claims in other parts of the country, but these entities

have not realized their claims to the same extent as Somaliland and Puntland have – nor are

there equally substantial levels of peace and security in the remainder of Somalia. The

generalisation that may occur should therefore be framed in regard to the theory of ZoP, but

only in parts and with caution on empirical observations of ‘why peace’ elsewhere. In sum, a

potentially different approach, considering the usage of the ZoP framework, could have

incorporated a comparison between previously identified ZoPs – e.g. local Colombian or

Filipino communities – and one or both of the two chosen cases. Alas, this study does not

embark on such an investigative journey, as previously denoted: the choice of understanding

causes of peace rather than war is underexplored, certainly so concerning sanctuaries against

violence amidst civil war in a general African context. Furthermore, the two cases share

religious, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity as the populations are predominantly Somali

nationals (Ismail 2010; Samatar 2001; Prunier 1996) – making them ideal for comparison.

3.3. Material

The upcoming analysis revolves around a vast array of secondary source material, including

news articles; reports by NGOs and other organisations; Somaliland’s and Puntland’s

constitutions; and most extensively utilised previous research, published by peer-reviewed

scholars who have often conducted on-site studies in either region. Most sources are in

electronic print, with the exception of various books, which is a widely used form of empirics

gathering in peace research (Dulić 2011: 36). Furthermore, the usage of printed sources, albeit

secondary in nature, offers the analysist certain opportunities to perform triangulation on the

material, i.e. collecting information and verifying the results from several independent sources

22

(2011: 39). Alas, as marked out by Dulić (2011: 36-37), published information readily available

on the internet is not without its problems, even if it alleviates triangulation; the authenticity of

a source may be hard to verify. This is taken into consideration, as all sources besides prior

research (e.g. documents, reports, and news articles) are treated with caution considering data

veracity.

Dozens of peer-reviewed scholarly articles and books compose the majority of material that

will be analysed, but some examples of other utilised sources include Interpeace, Pillars of

Peace, Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC), UN accounts, International Crisis

Group (ICG) reports; agreements and negotiated settlements between Puntland, Somaliland,

and Somalia retrieved from UN databases; and news publications from Reuters, the British

Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and the Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel (CTC). In

addition, concerning the reliability – or the replicability and preciseness of analysis – and

validity – or the accuracy of material being analysed – of this thesis, I acknowledge the fact that

a perfect measurement cannot be developed in full (Sundberg & Harbom 2011: 98-100). As

noted by Levy (2008: 12), if either compared case evidently are examples of ZoPs – and

subsequently follows the set of logics presumed – it would increase the confidence for ZoP

theory, however incrementally. I argue, furthermore, that the framework may sufficiently

balance between what is considered too ‘narrow’ or too ‘broad’ as it explicitly guides my effort

on what is of theoretical interest: the generated assumptions of theory-guiding studies allows

for some flexibility, as the framework guides the analysis rather than the empirics.

3.4. Measuring Zones of Peace underlying logics

In order to conclude if Somaliland and Puntland may be typified as ZoPs I will first determine

how to characterise them and second unearth their levels of inviolability and durability, where

the complete list of analytical questions is provided in Table 2. First, as previously mentioned

in the theory section, types of sanctuaries can either be locational or personal (see Appendix

2, Figure 3) but are for this study presumed locational. The usage of ZoP often indicate, as

previously mentioned, a geographical aspect of clear delineation (Mitchell 2007: 2), as per case

the two Somali regions offer. The locational, or spatial, type of sanctuary can be two-folded:

intra- or extra-societal. The intra-societal sanctuary is situated within clarified jurisdictional

and geographical boundaries, located in proximity to or amongst the threats (i.e. outsiders)

against those that reside within the ZoP. The extra-societal sanctuary is where geographical and

jurisdictional boundaries are clearly demarcated yet located at a distance from the threat against

23

those sheltered in the sanctuary (Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 190). Thereby, this thesis will

examine whether the two cases are examples of intra- or extra-locational ZoPs. Furthermore, if

they exhibit traits as intra-societal sanctuaries, the issue of longevity becomes relevant: is the

sanctuary (i) traditional, i.e. has the zone lasted a long period of time and offers protection to a

wide range of peoples; or is the zone (ii) constructed, created fairly recently and/or ad hoc to

meet specific threats aroused from immediate dangers and hazards, e.g. a nearby battle

(Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 191). Furthermore, who founded the sanctuary and how the peace

zone is legally or ethically motivated are indicative concerning how the ZoP may be perceived

by armed actors and outsiders residing without the sanctuary.

Second, the varying functions of a sanctuary need to be identified. Peace writ large, applied in

this thesis synonymously to positive peace, entails peace on a societal-level; contributing to

larger, collective, goals that involve each and every one residing within the sanctuary (Chigas

& Woodrow 2009; Hancock 2017). Connecting the functions of the sanctuary, Puntland’s and

Somaliland’s levels of attained negative peace – and more importantly strive toward peace writ

large, or positive peace – needs to be measured by extracting information concerning what

makes the regions distinctly peaceful in context of civil war. Enlightened by Abdi (2012: 60-

61), the zones levels of democratic participation and claims on monopoly of power informs the

over-arching collective vision of peace (i.e. goals which involve the entire zone to maintain

inviolability and durability). As noted in chapter 2.2, a ZoP cannot stay durable nor inviolable

without a strive towards positive peace, and to measure this I will investigate each zones’

commitments to community-based reconciliation efforts and non-conflictual settlements – both

factor’s indicative for the aim to keep a negative peace (Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 192-193).

Moreover, the leadership can be either collective or elitist, informative for the zones’ levels of

unity and cohesion and subsequently whether or not denizens abide by the formulated rules of

conduct for the ZoP. Additionally, ZoPs may combine efforts of local peacebuilding with

processes at the national level: indicative for this is whether or not there is mutual recognition

of legitimacy, and if there is a functioning relationship with the outsider (e.g. negotiations prior

to coercion). Concerning the local response to global values, as noted in chapter 2.3, Table 1,

where if the local response is compliance, the sanctuary is characterised by submission to

international agencies values and principles. If the response is adoption, the sanctuary willingly

adopts global values and functions in order to attain more positive peace. If adapted, the

sanctuary intertwines global norms with traditional values, e.g. hybrid governance. Co-opted

sanctuaries strategically soften their traditional principles in order to maintain patronage or

24

external protection. If the sanctuary resist or even reject global discourses on internal peace

processes, the zones will be highly characterised by exclusion of foreign, even national,

peacebuilders and their methods.

The third feature which requires closer inspection is the environment which sanctuaries

operate. This presents a conundrum: how do we conceptualise the environment, or context, of

a specific peace-zone? Classifying environments, when identifying a type of sanctuary, further

complicates generalisation on ZoPs as it has less to do with the sanctuary itself, and rather in

what situation the ZoP functions (Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 197). All, if not most, ZoPs are

either created in response to – or in prevention of – a context of civil war.

“Of all the environments within which it is difficult to establish and maintain any form of

sanctuary, that imposed by a civil war is perhaps the most difficult and offers the most problems

to the long-term maintenance of inviolability for the sanctuary and for the security of those inside

it.” (Mitchell 2007: 15, emphasis added)

One way in-which contexts can be analysed, on a macrolevel, is where the environment varies

over time: (i) before violence erupts, or conflict formation and escalation; (ii) during ongoing

violence, i.e. war, pre-negotiations, cease fires, and negotiations; and lastly (iii) after the

violence stops, or implementation of agreements, post-conflict processes, and hopefully long-

term peacebuilding (Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 198). Thus, the temporal position (short- or

long-term) of a ZoP is of import for the analysis when determining the likelihood of a

sanctuary’s durability; it essentially tracks changes over time (Hancock & Iyer 2007) and

feature obstacles against and opportunities for peace. To determine if a peaceful area amid war

can be characterised as a durable ZoP – withstanding shocks in a changing environment – one

should examine in which one out of five environments the sanctuary was created and continues

to exist in (Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 202):

➢ In a region stably and firmly under national or external control who constitute a threat to the locals.

➢ In a region stably and firmly under control of an outsider who tries to overthrow the local.

➢ In a region of contestation where several armed outsiders dispute over strategic and territorial control.

➢ In a region of contestation over strategic and territorial control where several (local) armed actors compete

with each other.

➢ In a region where one set of (local or outside) armed actors have lost control and a new set of (local or

outside) actors solidify control.

25

In the last two environments, sanctuaries hope to operate parallel with the armed actor in modus

vivendi, whereas the other three contexts will probably present other challenges for the

sanctuary as the ‘enemy’ is an outside force. However, frictionless relations with armed actors,

insiders or outsiders, is never assured – but ZoPs can be founded and even bolster under such

circumstances (Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 203). Even more vital for these queries are the levels

of patron influence over outsiders and ability to deter violation of a zone (see Appendix 2,

Figure 4) as noted by Mitchell & Hancock (2007: 217).

The fourth, and final, condition to analyse in order to categorise a peaceful region as a ZoP or

not is to detangle what form of protection the sanctuary offers. The inviolability of a sanctuary

is dependent on who or what is protected within its boundaries. As noted earlier in Chapter 2,

incentives or perceived threats within the peace zone may entice or merit outside violation. On

the other hand, the risk of violation depends not just on who resides within the zone, but also

on what they are doing and advocating whilst there. The perceived impartiality or stated

neutrality of a ZoP and those residing within its boundaries becomes vastly important to

examine, e.g. by nuancing what the sanctuary’s denizens can and cannot say or do. Whether or

not the residents, perhaps former combatants or vocal political opponents, acknowledge and

respect these requirements might differ in-between inhabitants: albeit refuge from violence has

been offered, former atrocities and old rivalries does not necessarily fade away, presumably so

not on the peripheries of war and calamity which serves as a reminder to the causes of war. As

contemplated by Mitchell & Hancock (2007: 204-205), the principles of abstention – things the

inhabitants will refrain from doing in order not to offend outsiders or armed actors – and

impartiality – equivalent and unbiased treatment of all outsiders (adversaries or not) and armed

actors – informs the levels of neutrality. These rules of the game may be discovered by

examining the regions’ declared norms, guidelines, and responsibilities targeting the residents

of the sanctuary. These are more often than not formulated in both acceptable and non-

acceptable behaviours on non-interference and renunciation of violence, and former conflictual

behaviour is often requested to be discontinued (2007: 208). Perhaps most aptly summarised:

“Protection is afforded through the existence of certain – usually accepted – norms or rules or

through the anticipation of various forms of sanction that would result from a violation of those

rules.” (Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 212)

Thereby, three factors should be examined in order to determine a sanctuary’s chances to offer

protection and maintain neutrality, factors regarding both external and internal actors: (i) the

26

existence of tangible sanctions against violators of the inviable zone (global-outside); (ii) the

existence of explicit and accepted rules about outsider’s behaviour towards the sanctuary

(outside-local); and (iii) the existence of rules concerning occupants behaviour both towards

others in the sanctuary and towards armed actors in the ZoPs environment (local-outside).

Moreover, the effectiveness of patronage and what influence patrons have over occupants’

prospects to remain safe and secure from harm informs the protection offered by a ZoP. Patrons

can, argued by Mitchell & Hancock (2007: 216-217) exercise varying degrees of effective

influence on the ZoPs inviolability by either strengthening ties between the sanctuary and

outsiders (e.g. global-local interactions), or by threatening with sanctions to induce severe

punishments on both outside and local violators of the sanctuary (see Appendix 2, Figure 4).

3.4.1. Answering the research questions on inviolability and durability

In order to analyse the internal characteristics of assumed ZoPs, their relationship with

outsiders, and the role of external actors, this study attempts to measure several parameters of

inviolability and durability – among them the elusive concept of agency. Hancock (2015: 242)

highlights that agency informs a ZoPs levels of cohesion and sense of participation in internal

decision-making processes – affecting, in a positive relationship, the likelihood for sanctuary

survival. The levels of agency a sanctuary’s denizens have will be extrapolated from the zone’s

characteristics and, perhaps even more telling, how the local responds and reacts to externally

formulated visions for the ZoPs peacemaking procedures (global-local interactions). Thereby,

a cluster of agencies can be identified which is usually defined by “a shared set of norms and

values” (Björkdahl & Höglund 2013: 298) – or what will here be examined as the guidelines

for conduct and behaviour toward outsiders and external actors. Furthermore, concerning the

zones durability, the framework will denote the context wherein the zone exists and

continuously has for the entirety of the period examined. Attempts by scholars to decipher why

peace in the midst of war should refrain from underestimating this crucial factor, as armed

conflict may continue uninterrupted (certainly in Somalia’s case) despite relative successes in

peacebuilding and non-conflict resolutions. To reiterate, Zones of Peace as sanctuaries are

created and maintained in response to outside violence and war.

Lastly, this study assumes 1) that what merits these zones existence as legitimate is formulated

within via the leadership and attained agency, or without by external actors who seek to offer

durable and inviolable protection to those in need. 2) whether or not outsiders recognize the

zone as a justifiable sanctuary is informative for the local-outside relationship(s). And 3) the

27

global-local encounters and frictions, however sparse they have arguably been in each case,

remain informing for the continued inviolability and durability of Puntland and Somaliland as

durable peace zones. To answer the first question, if Somaliland and Puntland can be

characterised as ZoPs and to categorise their similarities and differences, the framework will

be utilised to determine the type, functions, environment, and form of protection offered by

Puntland and Somaliland. In order to answer the second research question, why both regions’

maintain peace, the framework will guide the analysis of the material and identify to what extent

Somaliland and Puntland are inviolable and durable examples of peace and why both have

refrained from partaking in the Somali civil war. In conclusion, the theoretical framework and

queries which guide the upcoming analysis on the material is capsuled in Table 2 next. The

coupling of theoretical considerations into measurable queries are informed by Hancock &

Mitchell (2007); Allouche & Jackson (2019); and Björkdahl & Höglund (2013).

Table 2. Analytical inquiries informing the creation, inviolability, and durability of Puntland and Somaliland.

ZoP as a

sanctuary

Type of

sanctuary

Functions of

the sanctuary

Environment

where the

Form of

protection

Local

characteristics

Who was the zone

created for?

What is the stated

purpose?

How are

inhabitants

perceiving unity?

How does the

zone promote

peace writ large?

What are the

functions of the

zone’s leadership?

How is the zone

prepared to

continue if

violated?

When was the

peace zone

founded?

Who previously

controlled and

now controls the

region?

How is the zone

prepared to

sanction

violations?

What are the

guidelines, or code

of conduct, for the

peace zone?

Local-outside

relations

How is the peace

zone ethically or

legally motivated?

How are the peace

zones relations

with outsiders

defined?

Is there mutual

recognition and

negotiation among

all actors?

How is the zone

situated in relation

to armed conflict?

Is the zone

territorially

defined?

How is neutrality

expressed in the

zone?

What potential

threats or

incentives for

violation are

present?

Role of

external actors

Who founded the

zone?

What values,

norms, and

practices are

promoted by

global actors?

How does the

local respond to

these encounters?

How do patrons

exercise influence

over outsiders?

How is the

relationship

defined between

the peace zone and

patrons?

How does external

actors promote

strengthened ties

between the zone

and outsiders?

What external

sanctions are

signalled?

Sources: Hancock & Mitchell 2007; Allouche & Jackson 2019; Björkdahl & Höglund 2013.

28

4. Puntland and Somaliland as sanctuaries amid civil war

First and foremost, there are numerous clans and sub-clans in both Puntland and Somaliland,

least to say on the entirety of the Horn of Africa. Figure 2 below refers to the chosen clan

identification and configuration of this study, i.e. I do not dwell deeper on genealogy and clan

history than deemed necessary. At times, clan affiliations may come across as strikingly

complex. In order to remedy this, take note that the clanship of Harti and Darood pertains

namely to the Puntland State of Somalia – whereas Isaaq mainly adheres to the Republic of

Somaliland (Lewis 2008: 5). Caution is advised prior to the investigation, as in concert with

Hoehne (2015: 8): “Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland are contested ideas, and the use of any

one of those names can evoke an emotional response among the people of those territories.” I

will not conclude on normative remarks concerning the regions’ clan affiliations or legitimacy;

I rather seek to investigate both regions as ZoPs and compare them via the guidance of the

theoretical considerations formerly discussed.

Figure 2. Main descendant clan families and groups in northern Somalia (Lewis 2008: 109; Hoehne 2015: 20).

The intricacies of Somali clanship do complicate the issue of where exactly the peace zone

delimits its responsibilities and for whom. The abovementioned clans are only part of a larger

constellation but facilitated in this study as the main political and armed clans of northern

Somalia (cf. Gundel 2009). In the upcoming section, a brief historical context is provided.

Thereafter the empirical review is compiled, where I in addition compare the findings of each

case. Lastly, the ZoP analysis is performed in chapter 5 prior to the conclusions and discussion.

Arabian Ancestry (Samaale)

Somalia

DaroodSomaliland and Puntland

Harti

Puntland and Somalia

Majeerteen

Puntland

Dhulbahante

Puntland and Somaliland

Warsangeli

Puntland and Somaliland

Irrir

Somaliland and Puntland

Dir

Somaliland

IsaaqSomaliland

Hawiye

Somalia

29

4.1. Conflict background for context

“The Somalis were as tough as nails. A legend told how when the warriors of a certain clan

discovered they had no enemies to fight, they divided up their ranks and killed each other for

sport.” (Hartley 2003, 187)

Albeit at times an arguably exaggerated narrative, former war correspondent Aidan Hartley

manages to depict the intricacies of the Somali civil war – a conflict that is still not resolved –

quite sufficiently. The civil war is deeply characterised by armed Somali clans’ rivalry, or in-

between the Samaale3 lineage, and furthered by African Union (AU) peacekeepers, the US so

called War on Terror, and Salafistic Jihadism. Seemingly, peacekeeping operations – Unified

Task Force (UNITAF) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – have struggled in

their missions to assist and install a democratically elected Somali federal government in the

capital Mogadishu ever since the complete state collapse of 1991, when former dictator Siyad

Barre was ousted. This is where the story ends for many observers who attempt to detangle the

highly intricate and hard-to-grasp realities on the potentials for peace in Somalia.4 However,

both Somaliland and Puntland in the northern parts appear as contrary examples of sustained

and prolific areas where clans and the average individual enjoy certain levels of human security

and safety. As noted earlier in this study, the two regions have managed to exceed expectations

from external observers, which suggests that there are lessons to be learned from northern

Somalia. Moving forward, some reminders are worth mentioning: both regions previously

participated in – and to some extent still contribute to – the civil war and armed conflicts

between parties in southern- and central Somalia. Additionally, Somaliland and Puntland are

engaged in a border dispute concerning the landlock territories of Sanaag, Sool, and Togdheer

(Appendix 1, Figure 1). Yet, non-violent conflict resolution and negotiations is widely used in

each region, both offering protection to their denizens from the civil war rather than

participating in it. An attempt at explaining both Somaliland and Puntland as potentially Zones

of Peace, wherein sanctuary is provided against the civil war, involves a macro analysis in

which the amassed micro units of analysis are compressed and compartmentalised into one –

e.g. Puntland, which is a Somali federal state ditto a sovereign unit of analysis.

3 In Somali tradition the oldest forefathers of most Somali clans with an Arabic lineage (Lewis 1999: 12). 4 For additional reading on the Somali civil war, see for example Ismail 2010; Samatar 2001; Prunier 1996;

Hussein 1992; Le Sage 2002; Elmi & Barise 2006; Loubser & Solomon 2014; Lederach 2011; Adebajo 2003;

Poole 2005; Menkhaus 2006/2007, 2016, 2018; Samuels 2007/2008; Marten 2006/2007.

30

4.2. Puntland

The Puntland State of Somalia, located in the northeast of Somalia and bordering Ethiopia to

the east, was liberated from the despot Barre’s forces in 1991 by the paramilitary organisation

Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) (Lewis 2008: 100). Puntland’s raison d'être is

mainly to provide security within its border, and to decentralise Mogadishu’s influence over

Somalia’s federal states (Gaas & Walls 2014; Mohamed & Mohamed 2015) in order to achieve

nation-wide peace and reconciliation between warring clans and groups.

4.2.1. Type of sanctuary in Puntland

Puntland claimed its autonomy mainly to consolidate independence for the Harti and Darood

clan confederation, of which Majeerteen is the main sub-clan. The peace zone also encompasses

the territories of Sool and Sanaag, inhabited by sub-clans Dhulbahante and Warsangeli but

contested by Somaliland (Marchal 2010: 10, 26). The creation of the zone attracted several sub-

clan affiliates of Harti and Darood, as the political base of Puntland – even prior to the federalist

claim of 1998 – rested upon ‘Harti solidarity’ (Hoehne 2015). In addition, parts of Dhulbahante

and Warsangeli sub-clans supported the Majeerteen in the war against Siyad Barre prior to the

Somali state collapse in 1991. Elements from the two sub-clans have on occasion sought to

distance themselves from the secessionist Republic of Somaliland, where the Isaaq clan reign

supreme, in order to fulfil the aims of a federal unified Somalia, more in par with Puntland’s

purpose (Hoehne 2015: 56). Thereby, the federal Somali state of Puntland was founded in 1998

explicitly for the benefits and usage of the ‘Puntland people’ and to assist their southern Somali

brethren (Gaas & Walls 2014), where a Puntland citizenship is attested from the district a

denizen resides in, i.e. within the defined borders stated by the charter (Puntland Constitution

2001: art 5.1). In sum, Majeerteen (Harti) is the largest clan federation, and comprise the

majority of residents within Puntland’s borders; whereas Dhulbahante and Warsangeli

majorities inhabit the contested regions of Sool and Sanaag (Battera 2003: 230).

One of the first reports on the formation of an autonomous administration in Puntland were

announced 24 July 1998 by Reuters, stating that “political and clan leaders in northeast Somalia

have elected a president in an attempt to form an administration” (Reuters News 1998). These

political clan leaders were Majeerteen, who dominated the SSDF – supplanted by Puntland

Security Force (PSF) in 2001, which exerts military control over the territories of contemporary

Puntland (Hoehne 2015: 19, 56). Puntland, primarily motivated as a clan confederation between

31

Harti and Darood wherein most if not all sub-clans acknowledge and support the Majeerteen

military and political legitimacy (see Marchal 2010), purposefully aim to unite former warring

clans under one administration. Internal discord and conflicts between the clans have

nonetheless occurred, substantially between Islamic militant groups and security forces (Battera

2003; Hammond 2013). Notably, the Puntland regional government strived to becoming a

Somali federal state early on after its establishment, announcing “that the state is precluded

from seceding from Somalia” (BBC 1998) which indicates that internal unity concerning the

zones legitimacy did not merely rest on Darood clans perception, but from external actors and

national Somalis as well. Puntland promotes its existence as legitimate by acting consort to

federal Somalia, thus the legal basis for existence becomes irrefutable (Dill 2012). The federal

state of Puntland will likely continue existing in its current form, as the Somali state exerts high

levels of autonomy and self-sufficiency.

4.2.2. Functions of Puntland peace

“Garowe is eager to attract the Dhulbahante and Warsangeeli [sic] as Harti brothers by granting

them a clan-balanced share in the government, and by adhering to the vision of a united (but

federal) Somalia.” (Hoehne 2006: 410)

The political and clan leadership of Puntland – based in the capital Garowe – is characterised

by Majeerteen political hegemony, receiving support from the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli

clans. The leadership is elitist and rests mainly on central clan figures with kinship to the

Darood/Harti lineage (Hagmann & Hoehne 2009). Puntland may therefore be considered an

autonomous, peaceful Somali zone where the leadership is relatively focused on clan leaders

and elders (aka Isimos, see Samantar 2009: 6). As has been accredited in the claim for autonomy

1998: Puntland exists as a sub-unit of (con)federal Somalia (Doornbos 2006: 188), yet

Majeerteen and clan leaders may – according to the Puntland Constitution (2001: art 2.4) –

exert independent control over the federal state in the name of national unification. The

leadership characteristics are thereby namely based on traditional elders and major clan leaders

authority, where steps towards democratisation has been underway for the entirety of

Puntland’s existence, but where the region has failed to incorporate thorough collective

leadership and where the elites’ legitimacy remains “shaky” at best (Dill 2012: 284). Ergo,

Puntland “at its initiation seemed to enjoy the support of a majority of the population”

(Doornbos 2006: 189) but has since its creation become “characterised by a lack of organized

pressure on the government and an absence of credible leadership and political maturity” (Ali

32

et al. 2015: 36), indicating that internal cohesion may be high whereas control over the region

is reserved for traditional elders and Majeerteen clan leaders. Seemingly, Puntland’s relations

with outsiders is influenced by the border contestation with Somaliland (Hoehne 2015; Lewis

2008) and with its active fight against al-Shabaab (ICG 2014). A relatively more constructive

and cooperative relationship can be identified toward south- and central Somalia, albeit not

without frictions as Puntlanders have, at times, perceived the FGS (formerly TNG/TFG) to limit

and undermine Puntland’s authority (Marchal 2010: 30; Johnson 2009: 51). Nonetheless,

numerous agreements have been struck between Mogadishu and Garowe, where both parties

aim to “strengthen the Unity and Sovereignty of the Somali State” and “should establish [a]

permanent working relationship” (Galkayo Agreement 2009: art. 1, 15). Hence, Puntland and

Mogadishu have not always seen eye-to-eye on issues pertaining administrative and territorial

claims on the borderlands between the two (Suri 2016: 57); but has nonetheless maintained the

modes of negotiations in lieu of conflict.

Puntland has previously pledged international donors and UN offices that the region would

transition from the clan-based and traditional system toward a multiparty democratic model

(Ali et al. 2015: 32-33). Yet, as “clan loyalty supersedes formal loyalties to government and to

other institutions”, the clan system “constitutes a significant handicap to moving ahead with

democratization in Puntland” (Ali et al. 2015: 33). Thus, Puntland seemingly co-opts external

norms and practices; values that are by and large formulated by UN institutions and significant

donor countries such as Ethiopia and the US (Leonard & Samantar 2011: 575). The global

agenda is branded by concerns in the face of potential political fallouts between Puntland and

Somaliland if the international community were to acknowledge Sool and Sanaag as either

Puntland’s or Somaliland’s jurisdiction (Johnson 2008). The response from Puntland, in turn,

emphasise that external actors do not fully understand Puntland’s purpose and goals: “the

international community wanted to help us [...] but in the face of the establishment of the

Puntland State, they refused to support us” (Johnson 2008: 44). The outcomes of these

interactions are tangible to this day, as Puntland does not receive sizeable external patronage

beside the sporadic Ethiopian support (Cannon & Rossiter 2017). Puntland authorities aim to

“ensure fair distribution of aid and assistance received in the name of Somalia” (Garowe

Agreement 2014: art 4), where southern- and central Somalia is argued as the place where

assistance is most needed. The federal state maintains that complete decentralisation will lead

to power-sharing between Mogadishu and Puntland (Gaas & Walls 2014) but remains evidently

quiet concerning power-sharing in-between Harti and Darood sub-clans within Puntland. The

33

dominant characteristics of Puntland as a peace zone are local and traditional, suggesting some

resistance toward at what is perceived as absent external assistance (Johnson & Smaker 2014:

13). The global-local encounters are characterised by both Puntland’s and external actors’

promotion of a unified Somali statehood, but where “the international community has treated

Puntland mainly as an asset for state reconstruction” (Dill 2012: 286).

Puntland’s mechanisms for non-violent conflict resolution is in practice completely built upon

the xeer system – a traditional, customary legal system that draws inspiration from mainly

Islamic Sharia law and Isimo authority. Modern judiciaries are uncommon and not always

utilised for conflict resolution between conflicting parties; the rural parts of Puntland does not

have courts but refers to xeer-models which more often than not provide justice via the means

of elder agreements and settlements (Lifos 2012: 7-8). Thereby, non-violent conflict resolution

mechanisms are utilised, yet rests on elites’ and clan leaders’ agenda, as observed in the Lifos

(2012: 7) report: “the administration of Puntland is weak and corrupt and the people turn

primarily to the clans for protection and redress.” Lastly, Puntland’s preparedness to continue

if violated remains rigid regarding its military abilities: al-Shabaab have a continuous presence

– especially in the contested borderlands – yet Puntland seems well-equipped to maintain

security and territorial integrity in and around its capital Garowe, and vital port towns such as

Berbera and Boosaaso (Salah & Taylor 1999: 9). In addition, southern- and central Somali

clans and armed actors have few – if any – incentives for violating the territory of Puntland.

Most likely, the main threat Puntland poses against outsiders is, again, connected to the border

contestation with neighbouring Somaliland: the uneasy security situation continues to breed

and enforce militant Jihadist who coordinate attacks against targets throughout the region (BBC

2019, 2020; Reuters News 2018).

4.2.3. Puntland’s environment

Puntland was founded following a conference 1998 held by traditional clan elders in the capital

of Garowe, specifically encompassing clans that shared a common ancestry in the region of

north-east Somalia, i.e. Garowe, Bari, and Galkayo (Reuters News 1998). Elders of Harti sub-

clans, ergo Majeerteen, led extensive talks with other clans and dubbed the new administrative

area ‘Puntland State of Somalia’. This was managed during a massive influx of Darood refugees

from collapsed Mogadishu, where the SSDF offered safety and secured control over the borders

of Puntland state during the ongoing civil war of southern- and central Somalia (Johnson 2008).

Thereby, Puntland’s security forces and military has retained control over the region ever since

34

its creation, but remain in active conflict against armed actors – e.g. al-Shabaab, pirates, and

secessionist warlords – which has deteriorated the security situation (Albrecht 2018: 224;

Anzalone 2018: 13; Hammond 2013: 190). Hence, Puntland – founded during an ongoing civil

war – exists in a region of contestation between local armed forces competing over strategic

and territorial control. Furthermore, the region is wedged in-between Somaliland and the

remainder of Somalia, abutting the civil war but participating in a territorial struggle, suggesting

spatial adjacency to conflict. Puntland does not define itself as an independent entity away from

Somalia, but rather as an autonomous part of Somalia – yet defines Puntland or the “Land of

Punt” in relation to Harti and Majeerteen unity (Bradbury & Healy 2010: 12).

The federal state has defined and internationally recognised demarcations toward Galmudug

federal state in the south; neighbouring Ethiopia to the south-west, and Somaliland to the north-

west (Appendix 1, Figure 2). Concerning global-local interactions, Puntlanders experience “a

major source of frustration […] that [external] aid coordination takes place in Nairobi, not

Somalia” (Salah & Taylor 1999: 5). Potential patron influence on Puntland’s internal peace

processes do not focus on recognition of independence, but rather on international recognition

of and assistance to a (what Puntlanders perceive as) legitimate Mogadishu government

(Johnson & Smaker 2014). Therefore, Puntland’s relationship with the global community is

largely characterised by the shared trait of recognising a Mogadishu government (Battera 2003:

227), and where global actors have in unison with Puntland authorities mainly invested in

security (Johnson & Smaker 2014; Suri 2016). Additionally, the patronage influence over

potential violators remain low in Puntland – namely because the zone has no patron per se.

Considering the close affiliation Puntland has to southern- and central Somalia, and aptly on its

unification, patrons influence – namely US, UN, the European Union (EU), and Ethiopia – may

be viewed as low: where the international community has, for long, sought to rebuild a central

Somali state which indeed Garowe acknowledges. On the other hand, patrons’ ability to sway

influence over potential violators of Puntland remain low, in such sense that pirates roam the

Gulf and al-Shabaab maintain a presence in Puntland and lingers as a credible threat to the

peace. Furthermore, “Al-Shabaab’s reemergence [sic] in Puntland […] comes after the rise of

a 200- to 300-man strong Islamic State-aligned faction” (Anzalone 2018: 13), indicating that a

growing threat of the Islamic State (IS) has grown parallel to al-Shabaab – although the group

still constitutes the more dire security concern to date as combined with the problems of clan

support toward piracy and illegal fishing (Dagne 2009; Rudloff & Weber 2011).

35

4.2.4. Protection offered by Puntland

“A solution to the security threat requires the Puntland government to institute reforms that would

make it more transparent and inclusive of all clans living within the region.” (ICG 2009: 1)

In Puntland, protection is largely offered via the clan system – ergo Puntland’s federal

government have been assigned the monopoly of violence – and early on the SSDF was the

main guarantor of protection against external threats (Ali et al. 2015: 16; Johnson & Smaker

2014: 13). Moreover, Puntland’s purpose is two-folded on a local and national scale regarding

security: protecting the local and expanding security functions within Puntland on the one hand,

and the protection of Harti/Majeerteen clan interests in Mogadishu on the other (Johnson &

Smaker 2014: 14). As an authority on security, the PFS relies on the intelligence work between

Puntland Intelligence Services (PIS) collaboration with US and Ethiopia in the War on Terror

(Marchal 2010: 35-36). Ethiopia and US may aptly be described as patrons of Puntland since

both states support Puntland security apparatus with financing and logistics in the conflict

against al-Shabaab. Nonetheless, beyond the occasional policy briefing from NGOs and UN

(see Johnson 2008, 2009; ICG 2009, 2018), patronage remains sparse in Puntland – especially

in the contested regions of Sool and Sanaag where neither Puntland nor Somaliland have

allocated resources to or promoted their respective claims internationally (Marchal 2010: 26).

The guidelines, or code of conduct, in Puntland, e.g. xeer rule of law as previously noted, rests

primarily on the coupling of peacebuilding and clan legitimacy. In other words, negotiations

and settlements, laws and taxation, and judiciary processes rely on intraclan-based cooperation

and mediation between Harti/Darood leaders and Isimos (Albrecht 2018; Samantar 2009). Thus,

the “rules of the game” are clearly set and abided by – considering that the region is ethnically

homogenous and peace processes community-driven (Johnson 2008: 55). On the other hand,

Puntland’s “civil leadership yields to the military power” and “the silence and impotence of the

civil leadership are even more striking” (Battera 2003: 231). Puntland was largely spared the

violence of civil war beginning the early 1990s, notwithstanding the armed conflict with al-

Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), an Islamist armed group initially allied to the SSDF (see Ingiriis

2018b). Alas, neutrality has never been explicitly sought after in Puntland’s case, considering

that the grand purpose is to unify a federal Somalia including the secessionist state of

Somaliland (Hoehne 2009: 262).

36

There are few incentives for violating the territory of Puntland, the region relies mostly on trade

from agriculture and camel husbandry (Hoehne 2015), where the ports of Berbera and Boosaaso

may be economically and strategically enticing, namely for al-Shabaab and pirates (Anzalone

2018; Percy & Shortland 2013). Threats posed by Puntland are, arguably, the Harti/Darood-led

government’s claims on Sool and Sanaag, which Somaliland embrace in its self-declared state.

Puntland’s own ability to sanction potential violators of the zone, i.e. militant Jihadists, armed

actors from across the Sool and Sanaag borders, and pirates, are considerably low. Ethiopia as

a patron, on the other hand, signals higher capabilities to sanction armed actors who may

potentially threaten Puntland – maybe because of the threat al-Shabaab poses as the

organisation maintains “a strong foothold in [Puntland]” (Ingiriis 2018a: 523), indicating some

degree of Ethiopian influence on outsiders as Puntland remains inviolable. However, external

patronage and influence is deemed indirect and weak concerning patron ability to facilitate ties

between Puntland and outsiders: the majority of diplomacy, talks, and patronage goes directly

via Mogadishu, surpassing Garowe in the north-east. In addition, the influential AMISOM

operations against al-Shabaab are not conducted in Puntland, but solely in central- and south

Somalia (Keating & Abshir 2018: 7). Puntland faces some challenges to its durability as a

peaceful Somali federal state: weak institutional capacities, continued reliance on clannism,

limited resources, and border disputes (Ali et al. 2015: 64). However, the inviolability of

Puntland remains high and unchallenged in the parts which Puntlanders control.

In summary, the findings suggest that Puntland expresses forms of intra-societal protection

with locational (structural) qualities, as the sanctuary was created for the benefit of

Harti/Darood clans during the civil war. Puntland offers protection for the entirety of the region,

including the contested sub-territories Sool and Sanaag. The zone was initiated and is

maintained with traditional logics for peace; formulated by Puntlanders themselves.

Table 3. Summarized review of Puntland.

Puntland Characteristics and attributes

Type of sanctuary Locational and traditional; created by and for Harti/Darood; some

conflicts concerning the purpose of the zone; legal basis defined

Functions of sanctuary Clan-elite leadership; co-optation in global-local encounters; few

aspirations toward peace writ large; significant levels of recognition;

likely to survive if violated

Environment of sanctuary Founded during civil war; local’s control the zone; adjacent to

conflict; territorial demarcation based on clan affiliation; low levels

of global-local cooperation beside War on Terror; weak patron-

client relationship

Protection offered by sanctuary Low neutrality in conflicts; low ability to sanction; low/medium

effectiveness of outside patronage; low levels of threats presented

and few incentives for violation

37

4.3. Somaliland

The self-declared Republic of Somaliland, situated in-between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti,

was liberated from Barre’s forces in 1991 by the domestic Somali National Movement (SNM)

and attained nation-wide reconciliation between clans following several peace conferences in

1993 (Lewis 2008: 93). Somaliland’s raison d'être is principally to receive international

recognition as a sovereign, self-relying state; all-inclusive of its citizens in order to establish

peace and democratic progress (cf. Ministry of National Planning & Development 2011).

4.3.1. Type of sanctuary in Somaliland

“[T]he Somaliland nation is a family that has everything in common, such as religion, culture,

customs and language; and whose members are no different from each other and are ready to

build together a state in which everyone has equal status.” (Somaliland Constitution 2001:

preamble)

The Somaliland peace- and reconciliation processes were initiated for the benefit of national

Somalilanders, and “maintained by the will of the people who have the control over the

politicians” as noted by Hassan-Kayd et al. (2017: 11). The self-declared sovereign state owes

its independence due to the SNM – led by a majority of Isaaq elders and traditional clan leaders

– influential agenda in the 1991 Grand Conference of Northern Clans where the northern clans

withdrew from federal Somalia (Bradbury & Healy 2010: 11). Somaliland’s constitution

acknowledges that the republic could not have asserted itself as an independent state prior to

the “campaign led by the patriotic organisation, the SNM” ensuring that “[…] the nation can

enjoy a governmental system which meets its needs” (Somaliland Constitution 2001:

preamble). Thus, Somaliland was founded for the benefits of all northern clans – Dir, Darood,

Dhulbahante, Warsangeli etc. – whereas the initiative was led by SNM, primarily drawing

support and legitimacy from the populous Isaaq sub-clan (Hoehne 2015: 40-41; Kaplan 2008:

148). Sub-clans adhering to neighbouring territories, i.e. Sool, Sanaag, and partly Puntland,

remain divided considering whether or not they should support the secessionist claims of

Somaliland, or abide to a unified federal Somalia which would incorporate Somaliland in the

Somali state (Mohamed 2017). The internal cohesion of Somalilanders remain strong, albeit

that the zone has struggled with banditry, unruly armed clans, and warlordism during its initial

years of independence 1991-1993 (Farah & Lewis 1997). The solution adopted, beyond the sole

declaration of independence in 1991, came during the critical turning point of 1993s Conference

on National Reconciliation (Boroma Conference) wherein the committees of clan elders (aka

38

Guurti) agreed to cease in-fighting, by signing a peace charter, between the numerous northern

clans and aimed to create a democratic Somaliland republic. Thus, a Somaliland peace zone

was formed largely due to traditional and local mechanisms of reconciliation and cooperation,

where the Isaaq eased up on political and military supremacy (Lewis 2008: 93-95; Farah 2001;

Malito 2017: 295). Predominantly between 1991-1997 Somalilanders held – in stark contrast

to southern- and central Somalia’s frequent shortcomings – numerous and fruitful inter-clan

conferences “that promoted reconciliation, facilitated disarmament, and established political

and administrative structures” (Johnson 2009: 13) where “however fundamentally adversaries

disagreed with each other, they remained willing to talk when the opportunity was offered and

perceived as urgent” (Walls 2009: 387). Somaliland’s basis of existence is not legally defined

– yet uncontested externally beside FGS and Puntland opposition against the self-declared state

(see Mesfin 2009) and substantially ethically motivated (Eggers 2007; Huliaras 2002).

4.3.2. Functions of Somaliland peace

Somaliland’s strive toward positive peace – or societal progress – is linked to the aftermath of

the Boroma Conference. The leadership is hubristic, resting of traditional elders’ and clan

leaders’ legitimacy in parallel with democratically elected representatives, providing functions

of bicameral legislature (Lewis 2008: 94; Balthasar 2013: 218). Revenues from trade are,

especially from the port town of Berbera, distributed fairly even throughout Somaliland. An

issue that the elders were to solve, initially, concerned the access to grazing lands and routes of

trade – where the Guurti, or traditional elders, “personally supervised the return of land to those

who had been displaced during the war” (Lewis 2008: 95). The democratically elected, semi-

elitist leadership of Somaliland, however unanimous today, did exhibit some internal frictions

in the early 1990s: the SNM movement – which constituted the foremost source of legitimacy

– focused mainly on securing the territory of Somaliland prior to declaring independence,

creating tensions and discord within the ranks of SNM. Somali unification, akin to Puntland’s

ideals, was even included in the early manifesto of SNM (Hoehne 2015: 40-41).

Somaliland is yet to be recognised by the international community as a sovereign de jure nation-

state. The region does, however, enjoy some international donor support, including financial

aid from the UN, AU (Caplin 2009; Shillinger 2005; Pegg & Kolstø 2015), and EU (ICG 2015).

Seeing how the Isaaq still dominates Somaliland’s military, negotiations between clans within

the zone rests mainly on the reality that there are no other viable alternatives for non-Isaaq clans

in the region (Balthasar 2019: 462). Many Somalilanders consider themselves, furthermore, as

39

“one large ethnic clan, dividing into numerous sub-clans and families” (Samson 2015: 33).

Somaliland’s relations with outsiders may be characterised by internal clan cohesion within

Somaliland, which in turn, at times, exacerbates the tense relationship with neighbouring

Puntland as mainly the Darood sub-clans Dhulbahante and Warsangeli reside in the contested

territories, and are divided among themselves as to which realm they belong: federal Somalia

(Puntland), secessionist Somaliland, or independent from both, e.g. Khatumo state (Hoehne

2015; Lewis 2008; ICG 2009). Nevertheless, Somaliland exhibits relatively frictionless

relations with surrounding states – and the international community at large – than the self-

declared region does with its counter-parts FGS and Puntland.

Somaliland’s mechanisms for non-violent conflict resolution is, similar to Somali territories

elsewhere, largely based on a xeer system of customary committees, consisting of Guurtis. Not

uncommonly in rural parts is the implementation of mags: groups in which “members […] act

as guarantors of the good behaviour of fellow members on pain [sic] of having to share the

burden of compensation” (Walls 2009: 374). The mag – or blood payments – rests on traditional

sets of rules, where elders act as mediators in negotiations or settlements, and have the authority

to enact the agreed upon outcome, be it in favour or not for the collective (2009: 374-375).

Somaliland customary law is, in addition, on an institutional level intertwined with Sharia, and

the national rule of law “shall be grounded on and shall not be contrary to Islamic Sharia” and

“shall fulfil Sharia principles” (Somaliland Constitution 2001: art 5.2-3). Somaliland’s rule of

law governs the societal behaviour to a large extent, but “[a]lthough Islam plays a major role in

the lives of a socially conservative people, it is subordinate or complementary to clannism in

shaping their outlook” (Kaplan 2008: 145-146). Thereby, clan loyalty and hierarchies matter a

great deal, even if courts and a professional judiciary have gained relatively strong traction in

the zone – the status quo of Isaaq domination persists (ICG 2015) albeit with societal

legitimacy.

Somaliland’s ability to continue existing as a sheltered region against conflict is deemed strong,

principally because of Isaaq military power. Central- and south Somalia constitutes no apparent

threat to the Somaliland republic, certainly not for as long as Mogadishu lingers in a state of

civil war. The Somaliland peace is construed against the backdrop of turmoil in the south, an if

the “violence in Somalia ends, the political, economic, and ideational basis upon which

Somaliland is built will be overturned” (Phillips 2019: 687). The threat al-Shabaab constitutes

presents some security challenges for the government – where the Somaliland Armed Forces

40

have proven invaluable in the fight against the militant Islamic organisation (Horton 2019).

Additionally, as the Somaliland authorities exercise control over its main territories but not

entirely over the borderlands with Puntland, both al-Shabaab and IS considers the sub-regions

of Sool and Sanaag as “the soft underbelly of Somaliland” (Horton 2019: 23). In the

borderlands, the Somaliland government struggles to provide safety not only for its acclaimed

denizens, but for international personnel and NGOs as well. Global-local encounters are sparse

yet effectual where they occur: e.g. Ethiopia has long, similar to its relationship with Puntland,

influenced and in parts supported the sovereign Somaliland state – likely due to Ethiopia’s

access to the port of Berbera (Ingiriis 2018b: 2045), connecting the land-locked country to the

Gulf of Aden. Nevertheless, international attention is scarce, and the self-declared state have

no explicit external patrons (Pegg & Kolstø 2014: 193). Somaliland adopts liberal values via

the hybrid form of the bicameral system (Renders & Terlinden 2010: 730-731), yet rejects some

values as clannism remains important where ”[c]ollective rules are obeyed on the local level

due to numerous kinship structures related to blood” (Samson 2015: 34).

4.3.3. Somaliland’s environment

“[Somaliland] neither ‘inherited’ nor established boundaries protected by international law. From

the start, the desire to establish an independent, internationally recognized state required a

demonstration of (a) distinctness from the rest of Somalia and (b) unity and territorial control.”

(Renders & Terlinden 2010: 725)

The Republic of Somaliland was founded in May 1991 in Burco, following numerous clan

conferences, which resulted in a declaration of independence and a cessation of armed conflict

between northern clans who in the 1980s supported opposing sides in the civil war against Siyad

Barre (Hoehne 2015; Lewis 2008). Somaliland was formed in an ad hoc attempt to distance

itself from federal Somalia, which prior to the ousting of Barres despotic rule had subjugated

and persecuted the Isaaq clans throughout the 1980s – notably in 1988 when Barres forces

mercilessly shelled the now capital city of Hargeisa (see Kaplan 2008). Tensions between

Somalilanders and southern Somalis were apparent prior to Somaliland’s declaration of

independence, as Isaaqs’ had been politically and economically marginalised throughout the

period of Barres reign (Hersi 2018: 7; Ingiriis 2016: 239). Somaliland encompasses the

administrative regions set up by the British Protectorate prior to 19605, who mapped out the

5 Somaliland was prior to Somali independence in 1960 British Somaliland, see Lewis (2008: 33-36).

41

colonial borders. As Somalilanders gained independence from colonial rule 1960, they

incorporated into a unified Somali state – a union now shattered (Eggers 2007). Somalilanders,

starkly contesting Puntland’s claims on Sool and Sanaag, clearly demarcates the Somaliland

territory “between Latitude 8’ to 11’ 30’ north of the equator and Longitude 42’ 45 to 49’ East”

(Somaliland Constitution 2001: art 2.1), over-lapping the contested borderlands with Puntland

(see Appendix 1, Figure 1). Somaliland persists as a self-declared, de facto sovereign state in

highly conflictual surroundings: it covers some distance from central- and south Somalia, but

Puntland acts as a buffer zone and obstacle to Somaliland unification as both remain in a

territorial dispute on the border regions of Sool and Sanaag. Somaliland was furthermore

founded parallel to, if not before, the onset of civil war and complete state collapse in

Mogadishu, where the SNM exerted unhindered control of the region, militarily. The SNM did

not, however, enact a one-party system or military leadership, but evoked Guurtis traditional

power-sharing agreements and adhered to their decisions (Pegg & Kolstø 2015: 195). More

specifically framed in Somaliland’s constitution, adopted 2001 but building mainly on the

Boroma Conference: in the political system “it is unlawful for any political party to be based

on regionalism or clannism” (Somaliland Constitution 2001: art 9.3). Thereby, the major Isaaq

clan and affiliated sub-clans do exercise military control over the zone, yet political pluralism

and separation of power is imposed and utilised. Nonetheless, clan affiliation persists as the

major component of influence on Somaliland’s political system and peacebuilding procedures

– particularly regarding Somalilanders ability to govern those who govern:

“The Guurti has played a vital role in the democratization process by approving electoral laws,

mediating political stakeholders in times of crisis, and creating an enabling environment of peace

during elections. Tradition, therefore, has been indispensable to Somaliland’s post-war

democratization.” (Hersi 2015: 87, emphasis added)

Notably, Somaliland’s relationship with global and regional patrons and aid organisations is

characterised by the lack of recognition and an international focus on Mogadishu. The lack of

de jure acknowledgement seems, however, not to hinder progress towards a secure and peaceful

environment for Somaliland – but rather strengthen Somalilanders claim on legitimacy (Pegg

& Kolstø 2015: 201; Jhazbhay 2008: 200). For example, having its own national currency, an

increase in international assistance could risk “[undermining] the relationships of financial

accountability that have played such a large role in Somaliland’s success” (Eubank 2010: 21).

Thereby, the global-local relations are characterised by forms of compromises and concessions:

Somaliland, at times, resist values and norms that appear to oppose its sovereignty yet adopts

42

ideals that make the self-declared state a viable and dynamic partner in other regards (Tadesse

2017; Nyadera et al. 2019). Somaliland receives no explicit patronage, but Ethiopia, EU, and

UN bodies exhibits strong and direct relations with the unrecognised state, as it exceeds in

providing stability and security for its denizens – without external interference by neither the

UN nor the AU (cf. Nordstrom 2004: 171-173).

4.3.4. Protection offered by Somaliland

In many cases, sub-clans consider themselves ‘Somalilanders’ prior to Isaaq or Dhulbahante

specifically, indicating extensive internal cohesion and unanimity (Renders & Terlinden 2010).

Thus, Somalilanders do not expect to declare themselves impartial concerning whether or not

other Somali’s should be incorporated in their sovereign state, as noted in the constitution: any

Somali who on their father’s side is a descendent to a clan residing within the 1960 borders

shall attain a citizenship (Somaliland Constitution 2001: art 4.1). What strong cohesiveness the

many residing clans seemingly have, it remains noteworthy to remember that “Somaliland’s

integrity can be challenged and its claims to sovereignty undermined simple [sic] by the active

opposition of a single clan-particularly among the non-Issaq [sic] clans” (Bryden & Farah 2000:

30). The traditional peace processes are deemed to not have been impartial, but rather politically

contested where negotiations and conflict resolution mechanisms took place locally before

implemented nationally (Malito 2017: 292). After the Boroma talks the oft-praised Guurtis

became partisan toward the state – partly because of their mediatory role and constituting the

second chamber in the national parliament – and hence lost their acclaimed neutrality,

especially toward outsiders (Renders 2012: 140; Balthasar 2013: 230). Incentives for violation

of the region are deemed high, considering that both Puntland and Mogadishu strive for

complete national unification. Yet Somalilanders do not necessarily constitute a threat toward

outsiders, per se. Puntland authorities rather argue that the root to the dire security situation

between the regions lie in the fact that Somaliland has withdrawn from a federal solution (Gaas

& Walls 2014).

Particularly the US and Ethiopia have previously cooperated with what was formerly known as

Somaliland’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), consisting of formal and informal networks

throughout Somaliland in the fight against al-Shabaab (Horton 2019; Suri 2016). Alas, the

majority of external forces combatting Islamist militants have amassed in central- and southern

Somalia, specifically Mogadishu (cf. Bruton 2009), where the war on terror have had the

“consequence of polarising and radicalising [insurgents]” (Malito 2015: 1879) such as al-

43

Shabaab and IS, rather than weaken them; certainly in the northern borderlands where their

supporters remain evasive and constitute a threat to both Puntland and Somaliland (Hoehne

2015: 135). Seemingly, external (potential) patrons do not provide any particular measures of

potential sanctions against violators against the region – Somalilanders largely lack external

support and funds (Dill 2012: 291-292) but remain nonetheless resilient against the influences

of militant Islamism, extremism, and Jihadism (Jhazbhay 2008: 199; Bryden 2003: 35).

Ethiopia do maintain an unofficial yet highly visceral presence in Hargeisa, where “the

existence – officially or unofficially – of Somaliland has variously been supported and used by

Ethiopia since 1991 to further Ethiopian interests in the region” (Cannon & Rossiter 2017: 12).

Thus, Ethiopian national interests are influential on Somaliland’s relationship with its

neighbours – ranging from Djibouti to the north, Mogadishu in the south, and Puntland in-

between. To summarize, Somaliland’s inviolability remains significantly high and the zone’s

durability strong. Yet, the same logics that allowed for bottom-up reconciliation and non-

violent conflict resolution run the risk of exacerbating tensions from sub-clans in the

borderlands with Puntland. Clannism and its subsequent “segmentary lineage system” highlight

the “insurmountable incompatibility between traditional Somali/Islamic and Western political

and juridical systems” (Schwoebel 2018: 218-219).

Thus, Somaliland exhibits traits of locational and intra-societal protection of its denizens, as

the zone seceded from federal Somalia in order to become an independent state. The sanctuary

was formed prior to the civil war and claims the contested sub-territories Sool and Sanaag.

Moreover, the zone was constructed in situ and is maintained primarily by the Isaaq clan.

Table 4. Summarized review of Somaliland.

Somaliland Characteristics and attributes

Type of sanctuary Locational and ad hoc; created by SNM for northern clans; notable

levels of unanimity concerning the purpose of the zone; ethical basis

defined

Functions of sanctuary Largely collective leadership; co-opting global values; significant

strive towards peace writ large; no recognition; highly likely to

survive if violated

Environment of sanctuary Founded prior to civil war; local’s control the zone; peripheral to

conflict; territorial demarcation rests on colonial history; low levels

of global-local cooperation beside War on Terror; weak patron-

client relationship

Protection offered by sanctuary Clear abstention from civil war but active in border dispute; low

ability to sanction; partly effective external patronage, yet largely

absent; some incentives for violation and higher threat level toward

the remainder of Somalia

44

4.4. Comparison

“While Somaliland was established as a successor to the British Protectorate, Puntland emerged

as the administration for all Harti clans in the north-east. Somaliland, therefore, is based on a

territorial logic and Puntland on a genealogical logic.” (Hoehne 2015: 21)

Somaliland’s sovereign claims are principally engrained in the British Protectorate system –

where Somaliland was a under British rule and the rest of Somalia having been under Italian

colonial rule – integrated with fundamental clan structures of traditional governance,

peacebuilding, and conflict resolutions. Puntland, in contrast, impose that the Darood majorities

of north-eastern Somalia belong to the unified and federal Somalia, including Somaliland, thus

refraining from acknowledging the former colonial boundaries. Depicted later in Table 5 is a

visual summary on the comparison between Puntland and Somaliland as (potential) ZoPs,

where the findings indicate that Somaliland exhibits stronger internal unity along the lines of

sovereignty, managing local peace by seceding and avoiding a context of civil war. Puntland

offers protection via national unification, directing local peace processes in a larger context of

conflict. As will be disclosed, the two cases do not necessarily follow the same logics as

peaceful zones amidst war, but rather formulate their mission, or purpose, in contrast and

competition against their counter-parts – or in other words each other. The main difference

between the two peaceful zones resides in the fact Somalilanders motivates their claims on Sool

and Sanaag based on former colonial boundaries, whereas Puntland accentuate its legitimacy

over the borderlands as it being a part of the larger Somali state and closely affiliated clan-wise.

4.4.1. Similarities in characteristics, relationships, and role of patrons

Indubitably, the main similarity shared between Puntland and Somaliland as peaceful zones in

a conflictual context are the as aforementioned assumed cultural, ethical, linguistic, and

religious homogeneity (see Ismail 2010). Furthermore, a key aspect that connect the two zones

is unique for the Horn of Africa specifically: the threat of al-Shabaab and militant Islamists is

the first and foremost potential threat to peace in each region, and for as long as the zones’

squabble over territorial claims in Sool and Sanaag, the borderlands remain breeding grounds

for future uncertainties (Hoehne 2015) where “al-Shabaab is likely to seek control of

Somaliland and Puntland by military means” (Dagne 2009: 102). The legacy of the territorial

dispute between the two regions share similarities on both sides: it is perceived on both fronts

as a legacy of European colonialism prior to 1960 and of the Somali state collapse in 1991,

45

wherein Puntland partly mimicked Somaliland’s setup – albeit not claiming sovereignty – in

order to secure the peace (Hoehne 2009: 274). Additionally, both Puntland and Somaliland

advocate the crucial role traditional authority plays in successful peacebuilding and conflict

resolution (Pham 2011: 141-142). To some extent, both Hargeisa and Garowe rely heavily on

assistance and aid from NGOs (Johnson & Smaker 2014: 18) but remain self-sufficient entities

which are often over-looked by the international aid community (Eubank 2012; Beloff 2013).

Both zones draw inspiration from international discourse and strive toward participatory

democracy and seek societal changes in comparison to the rest of Somalia. Their peacebuilding

models and modes for conflict resolution are respectively formulated to ensure internal

cohesion and to promote non-violent co-existence (Balthasar 2019; Marchal 2010). Wherein

Puntland’s and Somaliland’s conflict resolution mechanisms – i.e. systems of customary xeer

and mag contracts – have provided certain levels of “justice and social cohesions”, it have

dualistically come into “conflict with both international human rights standards and Islamic

Sharia law” (Gundel 2006: iii). Thus, both regions share a key characteristic in such way that

neither region adopts global values and norms but co-opts and maintain traditional and local

values primarily.

In summary, Puntland and Somaliland share several similarities prior to their foundation, ditto

post-withdrawal from the civil war. Both majorities of clans (Darood and Isaaq) were targeted

by the despotic regime of Siyad Barre; the SSDF and SNM movements respectively liberated

the territories from outsiders and jointly advocated reconciliation in-between clans; peace has

been attained factually despite the unpredictable milieus; and traditional leaders and clannism

has played a crucial part in maintaining and securing the peace (Samantar 2009; Lewis 2008;

Hoehne 2015). Connecting back to Allouche & Jackson’s (2019) categories (page 12),

Puntland’s and Somaliland’s shared internal characteristics against outside violence are mainly

that both regions have clearly denoted and defined purposes for their existence: the civil war

which devastated both regions, albeit in varying capacities, cannot return and spoil the peace

which has been attained. Furthermore, their relationship with armed actors is characterised by

mistrust and continued aggression from both sides, i.e. both regions claim control over the

disputed territories and struggles against namely al-Shabaab. Lastly, the role of external actors

is, in both regions, non-significant as the international community – generally and with few

exceptions – have not intervened nor aided either region in their quests to reach internal peace

and stability. The one key external patron which have provided some assistance to both regions

is Ethiopia, who has financially and at times militarily supported both Somali regions, but

46

which remain impartial vis-à-vis the border dispute: “[t]hus Ethiopia is forced to support two

client entities which are in conflict with each other” (Mesfin 2009: 9).

4.4.2. Differences in characteristics, relationships, and role of patrons

“The major substantial difference between Puntland and Somaliland is linked to the principle of

the future annexation with or independence from the rest of Somalia.” (Samantar 2009: 10)

Supported by the findings, the main differences are that of belonging: Somalilanders largely

regard themselves as Somalilanders, whereas Puntlanders consider themselves Harti or Darood

rather than Puntlanders, per se (Johnson & Smaker 2014: 14; Hoehne 2009: 265). Culturally,

then, the entirety of Puntland is relatively more cohesive in regard to clan exclusivity and

genealogical logics of rule between the numerous Majeerteen and Darood allies (Jhazbhay

2009: 64). Somaliland does, moreover, exhibited some extra-societal qualities as the foundation

of the sovereign state – and successive security provided by SNM – allowed for Somali

expatriates to return to the region (Pham 2013: 30). Whereas Puntland was explicitly created

for Harti’s and Darood’s and retaining that the region was a crucial part of a future Somali

federation “[…] tied its destiny (through common clanship) to the dysfunctional wreck of

Somalia” (Lewis 2008: 107). Thereby, the two regions vary on the prospect of a future federal

Somali state, and has since their respective creations. One major difference between the two

regions foundation “was their relation [sic] with Somalia, and by implication with the

international community engaged in the Somali peace process” (Dill 2012: 289). Ergo,

Somaliland wants to be integrated into the global scene, but on completely different terms than

formulated by Puntland, Somalia, and the international community.

Concerning the differences in internal characteristics against outside violence, Somali piracy

becomes an apt indicator. Puntland have struggled in tackling the issues of piracy in the Gulf

of Aden (see Middleton 2008) – wherein some observers argue that Puntlanders rely financially

on piracy in their waters (Rudloff & Weber 2011; ICG 2009). Somaliland, on the other hand,

have imprisoned and focused on ending (implicated Puntland supported) piracy near its naval

territories (Reuters News 2008, 2011, 2012), actions which have resulted in further tensions

between the two zones. Additionally, each regions’ relationship with armed actors diverges as

Puntlanders recognise and cooperate with the central authority in Mogadishu, but

Somalilanders maintain an evasive stance toward the Somali government FGS. Moreover, in

Somaliland former enemy combatants reconciled with each other because of the successful

47

mediation via traditional elders (Ahmad 2012: 327-328), whereas Puntland have experienced

power struggles in-between Harti and Darood clans (Marchal 2010). Concerning the role of

external actors, Puntland have received, albeit incrementally, some more attention from the

international community concerning programmes aimed at improving security. Partly because

Puntland is a de jure part of central- and southern Somalia, where the UN has spent much more

time and resources, and partly because Puntland has legitimate security concerns considering

the presence of al-Shabaab and pirates in the area. Alas, the few interventions made by

international agencies in Puntland have “affected but did not fundamentally alter how security

as a whole is organised and enforced in the region” (Albrecht 2018: 230). In Somaliland’s case,

the role external actors play are as crucial trading partners where outsiders, desirably, recognise

the state. But, concerning the lack of international recognition, a “growing fatigue” has occurred

for Somalilanders: the issue of perceived stagnation “is reinforced by concern over the shortage

of territorial guarantees and protection that it can call upon as an unrecognized territory”

(Ibrahim & Terlinden 2010: 79). Arguably, Somaliland sovereignty is an issue most (potential)

patrons refrain from tackling head on, certainly EU and US who rather avoid the issue and refer

to the mandates of AU, Ethiopia, and Mogadishu (see Pegg & Kolstø 2015: 197-198).

Table 5. Summarised comparison between Puntland and Somaliland.

Underlying logics Puntland Somaliland Internal cohesion and purpose Clearly defined purpose, weaker

unity concerning its fulfilment.

Clearly defined purpose, stronger

unity concerning its fulfilment.

Conflict resolution mechanisms Weaker structures for non-

violent conflict resolutions.

Stronger structures for non-

violent conflict resolutions.

Effectiveness of leadership Effective but clan-focused

leadership structures, some

public support.

Effective and collective

leadership structures, strong

public support.

Territorial demarcation Distinctly defined and

recognised yet contested.

Distinctly defined yet contested

and largely unrecognised.

Presence in relation to conflict Spatial adjacency in relation to

territorial conflict and civil war.

Spatial remoteness from civil

war, adjacent to land dispute.

Code of conduct toward outsider Not abstaining conflicts with

outsiders, and no stated

neutrality towards militant

Islamists and Somalilanders.

Abstaining the civil war, but no

stated neutrality towards militant

Islamists and Puntlanders.

Motivation for existence Legal basis combined with

genealogical rationale, and

officially recognised

Ethical basis combined with

former colonial rationale, but not

officially recognised

Threats and/or incentives Few incentives or present threats

toward outsiders.

Some incentives or present

threats toward outsiders.

External patronage Very low external patronage and

external influence over outsiders.

Low external patronage, low

external influence over outsiders.

Sanctions against violators Few available sanctions

externally, some local capacities.

Few available sanctions

externally, more local capacities.

48

5. Analysis

Drawing upon the inquiries previously stated in Table 2, I will connect the findings to the four

categories which define and inform a ZoP inviolability and durability: (i) type of sanctuary,

informing inviolability; (ii) functions of the sanctuary, concerning durability; (iii) the

environment, also informing durability; and (iv) form of protection offered, affecting

inviolability. First, both Somaliland and Puntland exhibits forms of intra-societal protection

against outside violence – indicating that the regions are locational peace zones as assumed

earlier in chapter 3.4. Both zones have explicit visions of peace through local and traditional

means for reconciliation – abstaining from an historical despotic and authoritarian leadership

which led to the Somali civil war. The way forward is arguably decentralisation for Puntland,

and secession for Somaliland, according to the two regions clashing ambitions. The internal

unity is notably high, especially in Somaliland where “instead of mimicking a Western-style

top-down system of governance” the region “has been forced by its isolation to build a state

enmeshed in its surrounding society” (Kaplan 2008: 154-155). Puntland, on the other hand, is

cohesive concerning a unified Somali state (Johnson 2008) – but not necessarily unanimous on

who should unify Somalia (ICG 2009). Both zones’ underlying logics dwell in traditional and

local sets of values of conflict resolution and reconciliation processes – certainly in the case of

Somaliland where locals see their peacebuilding successes as something they “own”, rather

than “owe” the international community. Equally true in the case of Puntland, where

international attention has been scarce: the peace attained rests on clan loyalty and genealogical

unity, rather than externally formulated practices of grassroot inclusiveness in decision-making.

Neither Somaliland nor Puntland were created by external actors, and their respective processes

toward societal peace gained legitimacy because of the absence of foreign intervention (Ahmad

2012: 328). Somaliland exhibits higher levels of peace writ large than Puntland: mainly

because of the de facto state’s claims on democratic advances, more in par with a model of

bicameral democracy. However, Somaliland clearly defines that the number of political parties

in the republic “shall not exceed three” (Somaliland Constitution 2001: art 9.2), indicative for

a concentration of power in the hands of few political parties hence refuting multipartyism.

Second, the primary function of both zones is to secure the territorial integrity of each region.

Somaliland and Puntland underpin their claims on the contested borderlands of Sool and Sanaag

with internally formulated legitimacy, and are yet to reach some form of settlement, let alone

non-conflictual mode of negotiations. Puntland aspires toward more security and stability,

49

arguably because of the high concentration of militant Islamists within its area of influence.

Somaliland, in comparison, focuses on creating a prosperous democratic nation for all its

citizens – but maintain that in order to provide societal growth and advancements, the republic’s

sovereignty must not be challenged. Neither zone seem explicitly prepared for a violation of

their territories, on the other hand neither zone presents any tangible threats against, or

incentives for, violation by armed outsiders beyond the territorial dispute between themselves.

Namely al-Shabaab seeks to topple the Mogadishu based FGS and establish an Islamic emirate

in its stead; and has conducted terror attacks on both Puntland and Somaliland infrastructure

and civilians as part of the larger mission (see Harnisch 2010). Yet, neither zone presents a

threat per se for the Salafistic organisation but rather as obstacles toward the end-goal of

creating a zealous Sharia-based Somali caliphate. Incentives for violating, or more specifically

penetrating Hargeisa and Garowe, are regarded as relatively few for al-Shabaab.

Third, the environment in which both Somaliland and Puntland operate as peace zones is

principally a conflictual one: between each other, sporadically, and more commonly against

militant Jihadists. Both zones have relatively good ties, and cooperates where befittingly, with

global and external actors. Neither region have, however, enjoyed the full support – nor

acknowledgment in Somaliland’s case – by external actors’ such as the UN, US, or Ethiopia;

but rather co-opted and at times even rejected norms and values concerning their innate

processes toward peace (Johnson & Smaker 2014). First and foremost, the environments of

Somaliland and Puntland, as peaceful locales, is unquestionably branded by the border

contestation between the two. Despite recusing themselves from the civil war in the 1990s, “the

end of wars very rarely, if ever, marks a definitive break with past patterns of violence” (Berdal

2012: 309). Ergo, the border dispute between Somaliland and Puntland could be considered as

a continuation of politics in a clan-rooted tradition (Hoehne 2009: 266-268; Mesfin 2009: 10-

11; Hoehne 2006: 410). A potential resolution to the conflict may involve the Dhulbahante and

Warsangeli sub-clans choosing which region they belong to, themselves, whereas Puntlanders

“would like to see Somaliland stay with Somalia” (Gaas & Walls 2014: 5). The disputes between

Somaliland and Puntland can additionally be traced to the two regions vastly differing outlooks

on a unified Somalia (Schwoebel 2018: 213) which has allowed al-Shabaab to gain a foothold

in the ungoverned border regions. Thereby, some observable difficulties in the oft-praised

peacebuilding processes of Somaliland and Puntland arise, where elites narratives are frequently

contested against the peripheral clan-based movements, and localised conflicts over resources

and land in the border territories have a spill-over effect all the way up to Hargeisa and Garowe

50

authorities (Schwoebel 2018: 215-216). Perhaps federalism is not necessarily the right answer

for nation-wide peace in Somalia, let alone for the cessation of conflict between two otherwise

peaceful regions. It is difficult to foresee what actualised federal unity would entail for Puntland

and Somaliland respectively (Lewis 2008: 108; Schlee 2010: 166). A unified Somalia, including

Somaliland, would not necessarily strengthen each zones’ inviolability and durability but rather

jeopardise it. Moreover, and somewhat perplexing since both regions provide high levels of

safety, UN and international agencies primarily work outside of Puntland and Somaliland

(Almansa 2015) – suggestively adding to the disbelief in external actors’ ability to shape policies

and advance an external agenda.

Fourth, the protection offered by Somaliland and Puntland is provided namely for those

residing within each respective territory and away from the civil war which characterises

central- and southern Somalia. However diversely the two examples of Somali peace seek to

accomplish security and distance from the civil war, they have undoubtedly set out unique paths

for themselves to traverse. The rules of the game, or societal codes of conduct which functions

as guiding beacons for each zones’ residents, are largely incorporated in other key, societal

mechanisms – such as cooperation and talks with the business communities – enabling societal

inclusiveness and bottom-up participation in decision-making (Ibrahim & Terlinden 2010: 76;

Ali et al. 2015: 18), reaching beyond the oft-central grasp wielded by Guurtis or Isimos.

Concerning the two sub-clans Dhulbahante and Warsangeli, and their relationship with

Somaliland and Puntland respectively, the Warsangeli have succeeded to a larger extent in

conducting conflict-free negotiations and cooperation compared to the Dhulbahante (Hoehne

2015: 123). Some groups within the sub-clans acknowledge the legitimacy of secessionist

Somaliland, whereas others maintain that Somalia should be united, supporting Puntland’s

claims on Sool and Sanaag. There are – beyond the contested borderlands – few threats

presented against outsiders, nor are there tangible incentives for violation beside namely al-

Shabaab’s vision to unify the Horn of Africa into a caliphate. Al-Shabaab’s efforts are,

moreover, focused on central Somalia; the Jihadi organisation aims to contain Mogadishu and

enact Sharia rule of law, similar to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)6 quest which evoked an

Ethiopian military intervention in 2006. Previous military interventions in Somalia, including

AMISOM and UNITAF, have left residues of conflict throughout the nation. Thus, Somaliland

6 For additional reading on the connection between ICU and al-Shabaab, see Boon-Kuo et al. (2015); Barnes &

Hassan (2007); Roque (2009); and Mwangi (2012).

51

and Puntland have been exempted from the most direct consequences of the civil war but have

been burdened by a continuing external pressure to function and uphold peace, preferably in

par with outsiders’ security interests (Albrecht 2018). Thereby, external (potential) patrons have

seemingly demoted and weakened Puntland’s and Somaliland’s ties with outsiders, rather than

strengthened and promoted them (cf. Appendix 2, Figure 4). Oddly enough, absent international

assistance has strengthened the internal legitimacy and claims on agency for Somalilanders and

Puntlanders – but a ceaseless call for stability from without the territories has arguably affected

the two zones’ ability to negotiate with national and international outsiders.

Lastly, in accordance with the theoretical framework, neutrality and abstention has an assumed

key role for ZoPs. Neither Somaliland nor Puntland expresses any form of explicit neutrality

toward armed actors, e.g. al-Shabaab or more importantly against each other. Skirmishes

between Puntland and Somaliland forces have occurred periodically throughout the last

decades. However, both zones maintain that they refrain from participating in the Somali civil

war, certainly Somalilanders who have no claims on territories southbound of Sool and Sanaag.

Puntland provides the FGS and Somali armed forces with information, and more actively with

fighters to the federal army (Robinson 2019: 217). Connecting back to the logics of ZoPs, can

Puntland and Somaliland be considered sanctuaries if they do not abstain warfare? The short

answer is yes: in par with Mitchell & Hancock’s (2007: 205) reasoning, “[…] it is difficult for

a sanctuary to withdraw completely from what is going on around it”. Neutrality does not

automatically mean that the zone cannot defend itself, nor protect its assets or interests. More

commonly for ZoPs elsewhere, there is an external patron who defends the interest and

inviolability of a sanctuary, but on the Horn of Africa there are no apparent, stronger states or

international agencies readily providing patronage (with the arguable exception of Ethiopia,

who occasionally supports both regions). Thus, traditional sets of values and mechanisms for

conflict resolution functions well, since in “Puntland and Somaliland there is relative calm, built

upon sub-clan agreements with each other, with the exception of the fighting in the border zone

between them” (Robinson 2019: 211). Plausibly, the reason behind the border contestation is

parallelly the strongest argument both can formulate for existing: legitimate claims over Sool

and Sanaag based on former British Protectorate in Somaliland’s case, and shared clan identity

and history for Puntland – neither argument can be easily dismissed (see Bradbury & Healy

2010). Returning to the framework (chapter 2.3), both regions do – in parts – adhere to Mitchell

& Hancock’s (2007) ten logics despite the ‘Puntland-Somaliland dispute’. Additionally, both

respond to global-local frictions by co-opting external values (cf. Björkdahl & Höglund 2013).

52

5.1. Impenetrable land(s) of lasting peace(s)

Lastly, both Puntland and Somaliland may be considered successful peace(s): Puntland can be

summarised as follows: it (1) comprises residents with some cohesive unity; (2) aspires toward

federal democracy; (3) has an effective – albeit elitist – recognised leadership; (4) defines clear

boundaries, based on clan affiliation, however contested; (5) is spatially adjacent to the civil

war; (6) does not define neutrality or impartial conduct; (7) has clear legal basis for existence;

(8) presents few incentives or threats toward outsiders; (9) have no substantial external patron;

and (10) has few measures to evoke sanctions if violated. The inviolability and durability of

Puntland remains rather robust and secure. First and foremost because the federal autonomous

state wields agency concerning what a future, peaceful, Somalia could be. Impartial treatment

and declared neutrality is lacking in the case of Puntland, where for example “[t]he PIS is very

powerful, acts with impunity, detains perceived state enemies – particularly Islamist militants

– and routinely tortures” (ICG 2009: 14), suggesting that Puntland mainly evoke security prior

to peace writ large or non-conflictual demeanours with potential violators – regardless whether

local or external. Puntland’s legitimacy rests on the undisputed role the zone has received as a

stable and exemplary Somali federal state: promoting Somali unification in accordance with

the international community’s aspirations for the failed state.

Somaliland is characterised as follows: it (1) consist of Somalilanders who adhere to national

unification albeit facilitated by clan supremacy; (2) aspires toward sovereignty and international

recognition; (3) has an effective and relatively collective leadership, however unrecognised; (4)

has defined yet contested boundaries based on former colonial borders; (5) is spatially remote

from the civil war; (6) evokes non-participation concerning the Somali civil war, yet battles

militant Islamists and sporadically Puntland; (7) claims ethical basis for existence; (8) exhibits

some incentives and threats toward outsiders; (9) has slight external patronage but ineffectual

influence over outsiders; and lastly (10) has some capabilities to evoke sanctions if violated.

The inviolability and durability of Somaliland is therefore considered high and permanent. The

self-declared state enjoys practical recognition as a peaceful and stable part of the Horn of

Africa, uncontested as a success by most. In addition, considering that Somaliland is socially

organised based on clans, it may have “helped render Somaliland significantly less vulnerable

to jihadist threats than much of the rest of Somalia” (Amble & Meleagrou-Hitchens 2014: 538).

Somaliland represents a rather unique case of peace amid war, as the region even relative to

Puntland has managed to maintain non-violent conflict resolutions between former enemies and

53

reconciled locals under one cause: secession. Seemingly, “Somaliland’s experience reveals the

coconstitution [sic] of war and peace with unusual clarity: the absence of war is sustained by

its presence” (Phillips 2019: 689). Nevertheless, caution is advised, as “Somaliland is by no

means a “finished product” within the larger context of reconciliation along the Somali coast”

(Jhazbhay 2009: 74). Somaliland’s peace seemingly depends on the continuation of conflict;

far from instructive for nation-wide peace as previous research suggests (Idler et al. 2015: 12).

6. Conclusions

“Given the nature of civil wars and their attendant violence, the establishment of a successful

sanctuary, peace territory, or peace community would appear a hopeless task [...] However, there

is clearly much variation in the success of efforts to maintain the inviolability of a sanctuary

during a civil war and in the durability of these initiatives.” (Mitchell 2007: 16)

At the onset of this study, I inquired whether or not Somaliland and Puntland could be classified

as ZoPs, or sanctuaries, amidst the Somali civil war. Furthermore, I contemplated if Hancock

& Mitchell’s seminal theoretical understanding on causes for peace could help explain why the

two Somali regions continuously enjoy peace and security in a remarkably violent and complex

conflict situation. Indubitably, both Puntland and Somaliland remain as prime examples of

durable and inviolable state-like entities – but are they examples of sanctuaries? Recalling the

questions which were formulated at the onset of this study, the answers are briefly summed up:

• Somaliland shows strong affirmation of peace writ large and may be considered as a ZoP. The region has

achieved notable peace amid a conflictual context and offers sanctuary for those who acknowledge

Somaliland’s claim as a sovereign state.

• Puntland show less encouragement of peace writ large but is nonetheless considered an ZoP. The region

has achieved relative security and peace, in spite of its adjacency toward civil war, and provide sanctuary

primarily for Harti and Darood (sub)clans.

o The main difference between the two self-sufficient peace entities draws attention toward their

respective intents and raison d'être: secession on the one hand, unification on the other.

• Somaliland have achieved lasting peace due to traditional and local mechanisms for reconciliation and non-

violent conflict resolutions. Somalilanders claim sovereignty and exhibits strong internal cohesion

concerning its territorial and political demarcations.

• Puntland have achieved local levels of societal peace and security, particularly relative to the remainder of

Somalia. The peacebuilding procedures rely on clan supremacy and coherency, where Puntland,

internationally recognised as an autonomous federal state, claims territory based on genealogical rationale.

o Notably, each zones’ inviolability and durability does not necessitate external involvement; global

and international interferences in northern Somalia rather risk undermining what peace there is.

54

6.1. Thriving in a conflictual context

The findings, and subsequent analysis, suggests that Somaliland and Puntland share key

characteristics of ZoPs, and that both may be considered as ZoPs amid civil war, as per the

theoretical framework. ZoPs are, as previously noted in the theory section, maintained in

relation to an ongoing armed conflict which amplifies their exceptionality. In this regard, both

regions meet the criterion of ZoP, reinforced by their unambiguously demarcated territorial

borders. Both regions exhibit a strive toward positive peace in order to maintain a negative

peace, but Somaliland seem to advance further in their endeavour. Both local leaderships,

however successful in managing and reconciling former enemies, is highly clan-dependent and

both regions delimit the potential for multipartyism and local capacities to self-governance (i.e.

Sool and Sanaag). Noteworthy, the initial successes of the SNM and SSDF in securing the

territories post-war had its peacemaking merits (Hesse 2010: 73; 77), but security arguably is,

as a standalone logic, insufficient to promote a “vision of peace writ large”. Patronage is scarce

and ineffectual considering patron’s potential to strengthen relations between the zones’ and

outsiders. Patrons’ relationship is, moreover, weak and indirect with both peace zones.

Nonetheless, as observed in contemporary ZoP research: the logic behind local sanctuaries refer

to their ability to reduce violence, in addition the “concept emphasises a distinctive element of

autonomous agency where locals use their capabilities to make decisions and to actively

influence the course of their joint action” (Saulich & Werthes 2020: 33). Concerning the border

contestation, both regions maintain an – what I would refer to as – uneasy understanding:

Somaliland solidify internal legitimacy in contrast to Puntland’s federalist aspirations for

Somalia; vice versa Puntland retain legitimacy when claiming national unification compared to

Somaliland’s goal of secession from Somalia. Moreover, neither region would, presumably,

remain inviolable and durable peace zones amid conflict if southern- and central Somalia

(emphasis Mogadishu) were not in a state of turmoil and incertitude.

Somaliland’s classification as a ZoP rests on the region’s aforementioned strive toward peace

writ large: e.g. a surge in women’s participation in conflict management, incessant non-violent

conflict management practices, and democratic elections and a rather tangible national currency

(i.e. local characteristics). The results indicate that the self-declared state have the ability to

enact a sanctuary against outside violence and threats, even if external patronage remains absent

and the local has no explicit neutral conduct toward armed outsiders. Somaliland’s armed forces

are aptly equipped and capable to protect the region and provide security – despite the presence

55

of potential spoilers to peace such as al-Shabaab and warlords. However, military hegemony

and Isaaq supremacy suggest that outsiders’ conditionalities go unanswered and indicate that

Somaliland have no plans on withdrawing their claim as a sovereign state. Lacking impartial

conduct toward outsiders, undefined neutrality toward armed actors, and low to none external

patronage could potentially contest the conclusion that Somaliland may be considered a peace

zone – but does on the other hand imply that the self-declared state has managed to secure

internal peace because of an amassed national pride and military control over its territories.

Puntland’s depiction as a ZoP relies on the precise opposite: non-secession and unification of

a federal Somali state. Quite admirably, the federal State of Puntland have asserted that national

unification and decentralisation down to sub-state level is the answer for achieving nation-wide

reconciliation. The political leadership, elitist and in the hands of the few, is indicative for the

peacebuilding processes Puntland has enacted: evidently durable, however uneasy at times in

its resolve. Outward recognition of Puntland’s legality is largely uncontested, endorsing Harti

and Darood clan leaders claim to power. The internal consensus concerning individualistic

leadership styles in Puntland – or in Somalia at large as was the case of Col. Yusuf Ahmed, a

founder of not only Puntland but the TFG in 2004 as well (see Lewis 2008; Johnson & Smaker

2014) – has been disputed in-between clans. Lacking impartial conduct towards outsiders,

undefined neutrality toward armed actors, very low levels of patronage, and divisions reflecting

the leadership may undermine Puntland’s character as a ZoP. However, Puntland’s factual hold

over its territory and influence over Mogadishu suggests that the federal state endure as an

inviolable and durable peace zone – notably because of Majeerteen clan dominion in traditional

peacebuilding conducted. Additionally, Puntland has been widely acknowledged as and retain

a status of the sole functioning Somali state – reinforcing Puntland as a ZoP seeing how external

actors have played no significant role but support Puntland’s aspirations of Somali unification.

6.2. Discussion on theory guidance and future research

In summary, peace has prevailed in both Somaliland and Puntland much due to the recollection

of what should not happen again. The despotic regime of Siyad Barre and misconduct of

UNSOM and UNITAF troops dwell deep in the shared Somali memory, and both self-serving

regions arguably formulate their peacebuilding processes in contrary to the causes of civil war

following the 1980s and 1990s. The two ZoPs share a grand goal of lasting and unchallenged

peace – but nonetheless varies on the trajectory: Somaliland seeks secession and independence,

whereas Puntland rather integrate closely with Somalia but emphasise autonomy and territorial

56

integrity. The two apparent peace zones, however not completely satisfactorily explained via

the theoretical framework, do adhere to most logics of sanctuary against conflict. The few

observed global-local encounters affirm what was previously noted: Puntland and Somaliland

have attained and more importantly maintains peaceful means for conflict resolution in lieu of

plunging back into the Somali civil war: plausibly because there are no international interests

nor agendas to alter the locals’ visions of peace. Solving the border contestation between the

two would, therefore, not necessarily solve the issues of Somali peace at large – but could rather

risk undermine the locally attained peace(s), respectively. A shared trait between Somaliland

and Puntland, regarding the local unanimity, connects both regions’ (perceived) claims on the

borderlands. Remove or fulfil eithers aspiration in Sool and Sanaag, and the international

community’s efforts will be understood as biased. At the time of writing, both cases seemingly

co-opt some global values and norms in regard to each zones’ ability to build a solid and lasting

foundation upon which their denizens may continue living in relative harmony and safety (i.e.

aspiring positive peace to sustain a negative peace). Concerning the aforementioned urge to

disconnect state building and peacebuilding in order to detangle the intricacies of Puntland and

Somaliland, and assist them in their aim toward peace, Andre Le Sage argued early (2002) that:

“International peace-building efforts must take into account the realities of non-state power that

now prevail in Somalia. Ten years after the collapse of the Siad [sic] Barre regime, Somali

political leaders and businessmen have institutionalised a new dynamic of social support,

political control and wealth accumulation that underpin local governance initiatives.” (Le Sage

2002: 133)

As mentioned earlier, the framework of ZoP may favourably be applied in order to nuance local

intricacies and peacebuilding processes – especially in a conflictual context. Alas, some key

assumptions proved irrelevant when comparing the two chosen cases for this study: neutrality

and impartial conduct of outsider armed forces are understood as guarantors of the inviolability

and durability of a peace zone (Mitchell 2007; Idler et al. 2015). Meanwhile, Somaliland and

Puntland exhibit no explicit, nor implicit it seems, concerns on how potential violators might

view and interact with them as peaceful phenomenon. This study complements the field of

research concerning Zones of Peace in such a way that the framework might be insufficient as

to explain why peace endures even when a civil war persists. The framework was highly

effectual when subtracting complex information meticulously, combining several elements into

a larger picture – yet the two analysed cases of peace(s) leave much for the imagination relating

to Hancock’s (2007) desired model of local ZoPs. The on-going (external) liberal peacebuilding

57

paradigm in south- and central Somalia could, potentially, take heed of what the role for

external actors ought to be, plausibly in accordance with previous research (see Lewis 2008;

Nordstrom 2004; Dini 2009): consultative and with minimum interference in order to

strengthen local agency and legitimacy. This normative remark should, nonetheless, be

interpreted cautiously – Somalia’s civil war have left a nation in shambles, and hundreds of

thousands if not millions of civilians have been affected throughout the last three decades. The

oft-criticised humanitarian-military missions have, indisputably, helped mitigate some of the

more dire consequences in northern Somalia where the peaceful zones have received some

international assistance and aid. Again, the framework of ZoP shed some light on key

characteristics within Somaliland and Puntland, but the theory’s applicability and explanatory

capabilities on the remainder of Somalia is uncertain, at least for the time being. If Puntland

and Somaliland are characterised as sanctuaries, what knowledge can be stated on other cases

of peace amid war elsewhere? Allouche & Jackson (2019: 86) suggest that African ZoPs are

less “institutionalised” and far more reliant on sole peacebuilding agents, whereas this study

suggest otherwise: Somaliland’s and Puntland’s peace(s) depend on societal agency, transferred

to a select few (e.g. Guurtis and Isimos) operating under the scrutiny of its denizens. Although

neither case fully abides by the logics of ZoP, both remain unchallenged and robust examples

of peace amidst a particularly complex armed conflict. The theoretical framework proved

somewhat insufficient to explain why both peace(s) seemingly rely on the continuation of civil

war in central- and south Somalia. Presumably, nation-wide peace would entail more prolific

local peacebuilding processes in northern Somalia, yet the results suggest that both Puntland’s

and Somaliland’s acclaimed successes in peacebuilding rests mainly on lacking international,

regional, and even national, attention towards these Zones of Peace.

58

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Appendix 1. Maps

Figure 1. Map of Somaliland and Puntland (University of Texas Libraries 2020).

Sanaag, Sool, and partly Togdheer are territories where both Puntland and Somaliland are in dispute over who has

the rightful and legitimate claim over the areas. Moreover, there have been localised attempts in each sub-region

to secede away from both Puntland and Somaliland, yet so far, the areas and their administrative capitals’

Ceerigaabo and Laascaanood are under de facto control by either Somaliland, Puntland, or both. (Mahmood 2019)

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Figure 2. Situational map including Somalia’s five federal member states (Sidorov 2020).

The South West State of Somalia (1) encompasses territory between Ethiopian Ogaden region to the north-west;

Jubaland in the south-west; Hirshabelle to the north-east; and the Somali Sea to the south-east.

Jubaland (2) is comprised of sub-regions bordering Kenya to the west and South West State of Somalia to the

east. Hirshabelle (3) encompasses two sub-regions between the South West State of Somalia and Galmudug to

the east. Galmudug (4) borders Puntland (5) to the north.

1

2

3

4

5

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Appendix 2. Figures Zones of Peace (2007)

Figure 3. Typology of sanctuary (Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 191)

Inviolability

Locational protection (a sanctuary) Personal protection

extra-societal intra-societal individuals categories communities

traditional constructed

in situ to enable return

Sanctuaries may be indirect (personal protection) or direct and structural (locational protection). Personal

protection involves with individuals, categories (of individuals), or single communities. Locational protection, or

a sanctuary as defined by the authors, encompass either extra-societal boundaries (beyond the ZoP) or intra-societal

boundaries (within the inviolable area). Intra-societal may either be traditional (locally created, or bottom-up) or

constructed in situ or temporary to enable return of residents (externally formed, or top-down).

Figure 4. Effectiveness of outside patronage (Mitchell & Hancock 2007: 217)

HIGH

WEAK AND STRONG AND

INDIRECT DIRECT

LOW

Where the ‘weak and indirect’ and ‘strong and direct’ axis identifies the weakness/strength of ties between local

organizers of the sanctuary and external patrons. And the ‘high’ and ‘low’ axis displays the degree of patron’s

influence on potentially threatening parties (available sanctions, dependencies, and vulnerabilities).