theory of international politics - kenneth waltz

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Contents

Chapter 1 Laws and Theories 1Chapter 2 ReductionistTheories 18Chapter 3 Systemic Approaches and Theories 38Chapter 4 Reductionist and Systemic Theories 60Chapter 5 Political Structures 79Chapter (6 Anarchic Orders and Balancesof Power 102Chapter 7 Structural Causes and Economic Effects 129Chapter 8 Structural Causes and Military Effects 161Chapter 9 The Management of International Affairs 194Appendix 211Bibliography 223Index 241

1LaW's and Theories

I write this book with t hree a ims in mind: f ir st , to examine theories of inter -national politics and approaches to the subject matter that make some claim tobeing theoretically important; second, to construct a theory of international pol-itics that remedies the defects of present theories; and third, to examine someapplications of th e theory constructed. The required preliminary to the accom-plishment of these tasks is to say what theories are and to state the requirementsfor testing them.

IStudents of international politics use the term II theory" freely, often to cover anywork that departs from mere description and seldom to refer only to work tha tmeets philosophy-of-science standards. The aims I intend to pursue require thatdefinitions of the key terms theory and law be carefully chosen. Whereas twodefinitions of theory vie for acceptance, a s imple def init ion of law is widelyaccepted. Laws establish relat ions between variables, variables being conceptst ha t can take different values. If a, then b, where a s tands for one or moreindependent variables and b stands for the dependent variable : Inform, this is thestatement of a law. If the relat ion between a and b is invariant , the law is abso-lute . If the relation is highly constant, though no t invariant, the law would readl ike this: I f a, then b with probability x. A law is based not simply on a relationthat has been found, but on one that has been found repeatedly. Repetition givesrise to the expectation that if I f ind a in the future, then with specified probabilityI wil l a lso f ind b. In the natural sciences even probabilistic laws contain a strongimputation of necessi ty. In the socia l sciences to say that persons of specifiedincome vote Democratic with a cer ta in probability is to make a law-like state-ment. Theword like implies a lesser sense of necessity. Still, the statement wouldnot be at all l ike a law unless the relation hadso often and so reliably been found


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2Reductionist Theories

Among the depressing features of international-political studies is the small gainin explanatory power that has come from the large amount of work done i nrecent decades. Nothing seems to accumulate , not even criticism. Instead, thesame sorts of summary and superficial criticisms are made over and over again,and the same sorts of errors are repeated. Rather than add to the number of surveys available, I shall concentrate attention in the critical portion of this work ona few theoriesillustrating different approaches. Doing so will incline our thoughtsmore toward the possibilities and limitations of different types of theory and lesstoward the strengths and weaknesses of particular theorists.

ITheories of international politics c an be sor te d out in a number o f ways. Elsewhere I have distinguished explanations of international politics, and especiallyefforts to locate thecauses ofwar and to define the conditions of peace, accordingto the level at which causes are located-whether in man, the state, or the statesystem (1954, 1959) . A sti ll s impler division may be made, one that separatestheories according to whether they are reductionist or systemic. Theories of international politics that concentrate causes at the individual or national level arereductionist; theories that conceive of causes operating at the intemationallevelas well are systemic. In Chapter 2, I shall focus on reductionist theories.

With a reductionist approach, the whole is understood by knowing theattributes and the interactions of its parts . The effort to explain the behavior of agroup through psychological study of its members is a reductionist approach, asis the effort to understand international politics by studying national bureaucratsand bureaucracies. Perhaps the classic reductionist case was the once widespreadeffort to understand organisms by disassembling them and applying physical andchemical knowledge and methods in the examination of their parts. Essential to

Reductionist Theories 19

the reductionist approach, then, is that the whole shall be known through thestudy of its parts. It also often happens that the reductionist finds himself usingthe methods of other disciplines in order to apprehend his own subject matter. Apriori, one cannot say whether reduction will suffice. The question of adequacyhas to be answered through examining the matter to be explained an d by observing the results achieved.

T he one time r ag e f or r educ ti on among biologists may have been unfortunate. * One can nevertheless understand how the success and attendant prestigeof physics and chemistry made the reductionist path enticing. In our field, thereductionist urge must derive more f rom failures of work done at the inter national-political level t ha n f rom the successes of o ther possibly pertinent disciplines. Many have t ri ed to explain international-political event s i n t erms ofpsychological factors or social-psychological phenomena or national politicaland economic characteristics. In at least s ome o f these cases, the possibly germane factors are explained by theories of somewhat more power than theories ofinternational politics have been able to generate. In no case, however , are thosenonpolitical theories strong enough to provide reliable explanations or predictions.

The posi tive temptat ion to reduce is weak, yet in international politics theurge to reduce has been prominent. This urge can be further explaIned by addinga pract ical r eason to the theoretical reason j us t given. I t must often seem thatnational decisions and actions account for mos t of wha t happerrs in t he world.How can explanations at the international-political level rival in importance amajor power 'sanswers to such questions as these: Should it spend more or less ondefense? Should it make nuclearw eapons or not? Should it stand fast and fight orretreat and seek peace? National decisions an d activities seem to b e o f overwhelming importance. This pract ical condition, together with the fai lure ofinternational-political theories to provide either convincing explanations or serviceable guidance for research, has provided adequate temptation to pursuereductionist approaches.The economic theory of imperialism developed by Hobson and Lenin is thebest of such approaches. t By "best" I mean no t necessarily correct bu t rathermost impressive as theory. The theory is elegant and powerful. Simply stated an dincorporating only a few el emen ts , it c la ims to explain the mos t impor tant o finternational-political events-not merely imperialism bu t also most, if no t all,modern wars-and even to ind icate the condi tions tha t would permit peace toprevail. The theory offers explanations and, unlike most theories in the social

*Alfred North Whitehead at least thought so (1925, p. 60).tHobson's and Lenin's theories are not identical, bu t they are highly similar and largelycompatible.


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3SystelDic Approachesand Theories

Skepticism about the adequacy of reductionist theories does not tell us what sortof systems theory might serve better. Explaining international politics in nonpolitical terms does no t require reducing international to national politics. One mustcarefully distinguish between reduction from system to unit level and explanationof political outcomes, whether national or international, by reference to someother system. Karl Marx tried to explain the politics of nations by their economics. Immanuel Wallerstein tries to explain national and international politicsby the effects "the capitalistworld-economy" has on them (September 1974). Oneuseful point is thereby suggested, although it is a point that Wallerstein stronglyrejects: namely, that different national and international systems coexist andinteract. The interstate system is no t the only international system that one mayconceive of. Wallerstein shows in many interesting ways how the world economic system affects national and international politics. But claiming that economics affects politics is no denial of the claim that politicsaffects economics andthat some political outcomes have political causes. Wallerstein argues that Jlin thenineteenth and twentieth centuries there has been only one world-system in existence, the capitalist world-economy" (p. 390). The argument confuses theorywith reality and identifies a model of a theory with the real world, errors identif ied in Chapter 1. An international-political theory serves primarily to explaininternational-politicaloutcomes. It also tells us something about the foreign policies of states and about their economic and other interactions. But saying that atheory about international economics tells us something about politics, and that atheory about international politics tells us something about economi.cs, does no tmean that one such theory can subst i tu te for the other. In tel ling us somethingabout livingbeings, chemistry does no t displace biology.

A systems theory of international politics is needed, bu t can one be con structed? Alan C. Isaak argues that political science has no theories and no theoretical concepts (1969, p. 68). The preceding discussion may have strengthened

Systemic Approaches and Theories 39

that argument by considering only economic and social theories, theories thatclaim to explain political outcomes without the use of political concepts or variables. "If capitalism, then imperialism" is a purported economic l aw o f politics, alaw that various economic theories of imperialism seek to explain. Can \-V'e findpolitical laws of politics and political theories to explain them1 Those who haveessayed systems theories of international politics implicitly claim tha t we can , fora theory of international politics is systemic only if i t f inds par t of the explanationof outcomes at the international-political level.

This chapter examines approaches to internat ional politics t ha t a re bothpolitical and systemic. What is a systems approach? One way to answer thequestion is to compare analytic with systemic approaches. The analytic method,preeminently the method of classical physics and because of it s immense successoften thought of as the method of science, requires reducing the enti ty to i ts discrete parts and examining their properties and connections. The whole is understood by studying its elements in their relative simplicity and by observing th erelations between them. By controlled experiments, the relation between eachpai r o f variables is separately examined. After similarly examining other pairs,the factors are combined in an equation in which they appear as variables in thestatement of a causal law. The elements, disjoined and understood i n t he ir s implicity, are combined or aggregated to remake the whole, with times and massesadded as scalars and the relations among their distances and forces added according to the vector laws of addition (see, e.g ., Rapoport 1968, and Rapoport andHorvath 1959).

This is t he analytic method. It works, and works wonderfully, where relations among several factors c an be resolved into relations between pairs of variables while "other things are held equal" and where the assumption c an be madethat perturbing influences not included in the variables are small. Because analytic procedure is simpler, i t i s preferred to a systems approach. But analysis is no talways sufficient. It will be sufficient only where systems-level effects are absentor are weak enough to be ignored . It will be insufficient, and a systems approachwill be needed, if outcomes are affected no t only by the properties and interconnections of variables bu t also by the way in which they are organized.

If the organization of units affects their behavior and their interactions, thenone cannot predict outcomes or understand them merely by knowing the characteristics, purposes, and interactions of the system's units. The failure of the reductionist theories considered in Chapter 2 gives us some reason to believe that a systems approach is needed. Where similarity of outcomes prevails despite changesin the agents that seem to p roduce t hem, one is l ed to suspect that analyticapproaches will fail. Something works as a constraint on the agents or is interposed between them and the outcomes their actions con tr ibute to. In interna tional politics, systems-level forces seem to be a t work. We might therefore try


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4Reductionist andSystemic TheoriesChapters 2 and 3 are highly critical. Criticism is a negative task that is supposedto have positive payoffs. To gain them, I sha ll i n thi s chapter first reflect on thetheoretical defects revealed in previous pages and then saywhat a systems theoryof international politics comprises and what it can and cannot accomplish.

IIn one way or another, theories of international politics, whether reductionist orsystemic, deal with events at all levels, from thesubnational to the supranational.Theories are reductionist or systemic, no t according to what they deal with, bu taccording to how they arrange their materials. Reductionist th"eories explaininternational outcomes through elements and combinations of elements locatedat national or subnationallevels. That internal forces produce external outcomesis the claim of such theories. N ... X is their pattern. The international sys-tem, ifconceived ofa t all , is t aken tobe merely an outcome.

A reductionist theory is a theory about the behavior of parts. Once thetheory that explains the behav io r o f the par ts is fashioned, no further effort isrequired. According to the theor ies of imperialism examined in Chapter 2, forexample, international outcomes are simply the s um o f the results produced bythe separate states, and the behavior of each of them is explained through itsinternal characteristics. Hobson's theory, taken as a general one, is a theoryabout the workings of national economies. Giyen certain conditions, i t explainswhy demand slackens, why production falls, and wh y resources are underemployed. From a knowledge of how capitalist economies work, Hobsonbelieved he could infer the external behavior of capitalist states. He made theerror of predicting outcomes from attributes. To t ry to do that amounts to overlooking the difference between these two statements: "He is a troublemaker." "Hemakes trouble." The second s tatement does not follow f rom the first one if the

Reductionist and Systemic Theories 61

attributes of actors do no t uniquely determine outcomes. Just as peacemakersmay fai l to make peace, so troublemakers may fail to make trouble. From attributes one cannot predict outcomes if outcomes depend on the situations of theactors as well as on their attributes.Few, it seems, can consistently escape from the belief that intemationalpolitical outcomes are determined, rather than merely'affected, by what states arelike. Hobson's error has been made by almost everyone, at least f rom the n ineteenth century onward. In the earlier history of modem great-power politics, allof the states were monarchies, an d most of them absolute ones. Was the powerpolitical game played because of international-political imperatives or simplybecause authoritarian states are power-minded? If the answer to the latter par t o fthe question were "yes ," then profound national changes would transform international politics. Such changes began to take place in Europe and America moststrikingly in 1789. For some, democracy became the form of the s tate that wouldmake the world a peaceful one; for others, later, i t was socialism that would turnthe trick. Not simply wa r an d peace, moreover, bu t international politics in general was to be understood through study of the states and thestatesmen, the elitesand the bureaucracies, the subnational and the transnational actors whose behaviors and interactions form the substance of international affairs.

Political scientists, whether traditional or modem in orientation, reify theirsystems by reducing them to their interacting parts. For two reasons, the lumpingof historically minded tradi t ional is ts and scientifically oriented moderniststogether may seem odd. First, the difference in the methods they use obscures thesimilarity of their methodology, that is, of the logic their inquiries follow.Second, their different descriptions of the objects of their inquiries reinforce theimpression that the difference of methods is a difference of methodology. Traditionalists emphasize the structural distinction between domestic an d internationalpolitics, a distinction that modernists usually deny. The distinction turns on thedifference between politics conducted in a condition of settled rules and politicsconducted in a condition of anarchy. Raymond Aron, for example, finds the distinctive quality of international politics in lithe absence of a tribunal or policeforce, the right to resort to force, the plurality of autonomous centers of decision,the alternation and continual interplay between peace and war" (1967, p. 192).With this view, contrast J. David Singer's examination of the descriptive,explanatory, and predictive potentialities of two different levels of analysis: thenationaland the international (1961). In his examination, he fails even to mentionthe contextual difference between organized politics within states and formallyunorganized politics among them. If the contextual difference is overlooked ordenied, then the qualitative difference of internal an d external politics disappearsor neverwas. And that is indeed the conclusion that modernists reach. The differ-ence between the global system and its subsystems is said to lie no t in the anarchy


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78 Chapter 4


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or if the government controls prices. Perfect competition, complete collusion,absolute control: These different causes produce identical results. From uniformity of outcomes onecannot infer that the attributes and the interactions of thepar ts o f a sys tem have remained constant . Structure may determine outcomesaside from changes at the level of the units and aside f rom the disappearance ofsome of them and the emergence of others. Different "causes" may produce thesame effects; the same "causes" may have different consequences. Unless oneknows how a realm isorganized, onecan hardly tell thecauses from the effects.

The effect of an organization may predominate over the attributes and theinteractions of the elements within it. A system that is independent of initial conditions is said to display equifinali ty. If i t does, lithe system is then its own bestexplanation, and the study of its present organization the appropriate methodology" (Watzlawick, et al., 1967, p. 129; cf. p. 32). If structure influenceswithout determining, then one mus t ask how and to what extent the structure of arealm accounts for outcomes a nd how and to what extent the units account foroutcomes. Structure has t o be studied in its own right as do units. To claim t o b efollowing a systems approach or to be constructing a systems theory requires oneto show how system and unit levels can be distinctly defined. Failure to mark andpreserve the distinction between structure, on the one hand, and units and processes, on the other, makes i t impossible to disentangle causes of different sortsan d to distinguish between causes and effects. Blurring the distinction betweenthe different levels of a system has, I believe, been the major impediment t o t hedevelopment of theories about international politics. The next chapter showshow to define political structures in a way that makes the construction of a systems theory possible.

5Political Structures

We learned in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 that international-political outcomes c a n n ~ tbe explained reductively. We found in Chapter 3 that even avowedly s y ~ t e m l capproaches mingle and confuse systems-level with unit-level causes. R e f l e c t 1 ~ g ontheories that follow the general-systems model, we concluded at once that International politics does no t fit the model closely enough to make the model use fu land tha t only through some sor t of systems theory can international politics beunderstood. To be a success, such a theory has to show how international politicscan be conceived of as a domain dist inct from the economic, social, and o therinternational domains t ha t one may conceive of. To mark international-politicalsystems off from other internat ional systems, and to distinguish systems-levelfrom unit-level forces, requires showing how political structures are generateda nd how they affect, and are affected by , the uni ts o f the system. How can weconceive of international politics as a distinct system1 What is i t that intervenesbetween interacting units and the results that their acts and interactions ~ r o d u c e 1To answer these questions, this chapter first examines the concept of SOCIal structure and then defines structure as a concept appropriate for national and for international politics.

IA system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. The structure is thesystem-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a w ~ o l e .The problem, unsolved by the systems theorists considered in ~ a p t e r ~ IS tocontrive a defini tion of structure free of the attributes and the InteractIons ofunits. Definitions of structure must leave aside, or abstract from, the characteristics o f un it s their behavior, an d their interactions. Why must those obviouslyimportant ~ a t t e r s be omitted1 They mus t be omitted so that we can distinquishbetween variables at the level of the units and variables at the level of the system.


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6 Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power 103


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Anarchic Structures andBalances of Power

Two tasks remain: f irst , to examine the characteristics of ana rchy and theexpectations about outcomes associated with ana rchic realms; s ec ond, toexamine the ways in which expectations vary as the structure of an anarchic system changes through changes in the distribution of capabilities across nations.The second task, undertaken in Chapters 7, 8, and 9, requires comparing different international systems. The first, which I now turn t o, is best accomplished bydrawing some comparisons between behavior and outcomes in anarchic and hierarchic realms.

I1. VIOLENCE AT HOME AND ABROADThe state among s ta tes, i t is often said, conducts i ts affai rs in the broodingshadow of violence. Because some states may at any t ime use force , all s ta te smust be prepared to do so-or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorousneighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a s ta te of war. This ismeant no t inthe sense that war constantly occurs bu t in thesense that, with each statedecidingfor itselfwhether or not to use force, warmay at any time break out. Whether inthe family , the community, or the wor ld a t large, con tact without a t leastoccasional conflict is inconceivable; and the hope that in the absence of an agentto manage or to manipulate confl ic ting par ties the use of force wil l always beavoided cannot be realistically entertained. Among men as among states,anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence ofviolence.

The threat of violence and the recurrent use of force are said to distinguishinternational from national a ffai rs . But in the history of the world surely mostrulers have had to bear i n mind t ha t their subjects might use force to resist or

overthrow them. If the absence of government is associated wit h t he t hr ea t o fviolence, so also is i ts presence. A haphazard list of national tragedies illustratesthe point all too well. The most destruct ive wars of the hundred years followingthe defeat of Napoleon took place not among states bu t within them. Estimates ofdeaths in China's Taiping Rebellion, which began in 1851 and las ted 13 years,range as high as 20 mil l ion. In the American Civil War some 600 thousand peoplelos t their l ives . In more recent history, forced collectivization and Stalin's purgeseliminated five million Russians, and Hitler exterminated six mil lion Jews. Insome Latin American countries , coups d 'eta ts and rebellions have been normalfeatures of national l ife. Between 1948 and 1957, for example, 200 thousandColombians were killed in civil strife. In the middle 19705 most inhabitants of IdiAmin's Uganda must have fel t their l ives becoming nasty, brutish, and short,quite as in Thomas Hobbes's state of nature. If such cases constitute aberrations,t he y a re uncomfortably common one s. We easily lose sight of the fact thatstruggles to achieve and maintain power, to establish order , and to contrive akind of justicewithin states, may be bloodier than wars among them.

If anarchy is identified with chaos, destruction, and death, then the distinction between anarchy and government does not tell us much. Which is more precarious: the life of a state among states, or of a government in relation to its subjects? The answer varies with time and place. Among some states at some times,the actual or expected occurrence of violence is low. Within some states at sometimes, the actual or expected occurrence of violence is high. The use of force, orthe constant fear of i ts use , are no t sufficient grounds for distinguishing international from domestic affairs . If the possible and the actual use of force markboth national and in ternat ional orders, then no durable distinction between thetwo realms can be drawn in terms of the use or the nonuse of force . No humanorder is proof against violence.

To discover qualitative differences between internal and external affairs on emust look for a criterion other than the occurrence of violence. The distinctionbetween international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or thenonuse of force bu t in their different structures. But if the dangers of beingviolently attacked are greater , say, in taking an evening stroll through downtownDet ro it than they are in picnicking along the French and German border, whatpractical difference does the difference of s truc tu re make? Nationally asinternationally, contact generates conflict and a t times issuesin violence. Th e difference between national and international politics lies not i n the use of force bu tin the different modes of organization for doing something about it. A government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the r ight to useforce-that is, to apply a variety of sanctions to control the use of force by itssubjects . I f some use private force, others may appeal to the government. Agovernment has no monopoly on the use of force, as is all too evident. An effec-


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160 Chapter 7

compared to those of chess. Neither game can be successfully played unless thechessboard is accurately described.So far I have shown that smaller are better than larger numbers, at least for

8Structural Causes and


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those states at the top. Defining the concept, and examining the economics, ofinterdependence didnot establish just which small number is best ofal l. We couldnot answer that question because economic interdependence varies with the sizeof great powers and thei r size does not correlate perfectly with their number. Inthe nex t chapter, examination of mil it ary int erdependence l eads to an exactanswer.

Military Effects

Chapter 7 showed why smaller is better. To say that few are better than many isnot to say t ha t two is b est o f all. The s tabi li ty of pairs-of corporations, ofpol it ical part ies, of marriage partners-has often been appreciated. Althoughmost students of international politics probably bel ieve tha t sys tems of manygreat powerswould be unstable, they resist the widespread notion that two is thebest of small numbers. Are they right t o do so ? For the sake of stabil ity, peace, orwhatever, should we prefer a wor ld of two great powers o r a world of several ormore? Chapter 8 wil l show why two is t he b es t o f small numbers . We reachedsome conclusions, but not tha t one , by considering economic interdependence.Problems of national security in multi- and bipolar worlds do clearly show theadvantages of having two great powers, and only two, in thesystem.

ITo establish the virtues of two-party systems requires comparing systems of dif-ferent number. Because the previous chapter was concerned only with systemsofsmall and of still smaller numbers, we d id no t have to consider differences madeby having two, three, four, or more principal parties in a system. We mus t do sonow. By what criteria do we determine t ha t a n i n t e ~ a t i o n a l - p o l i t i c a l systemchanges, and conversely, by wha t criteria do we say tha t a system is stable?Political scientists often lump different effects under the heading of stability. I didthis in 1964 and 1967 essays, using stability to include also peacefulness and theeffective management of international affairs, which are the respective concernsof this chapter and the next one. I t is important, I now believe, to keep differenteffects separateso thatwe can accuratelylocate their causes.

Anarchic systems are transformed only by changes in organizing principleand by consequential changes in the number of their principal parties. To saythatan international-political system is stable means two things: first, that it remains


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9The ManagelDent of

The Management of International Affairs 195

Weak states operate on narrow margins. Inopportune acts, flawed policies, andmistimed moves may have fatal results. In contrast, strong states can be inattentive; they can a fford not to learn; they can do t he same dumb things over again.More sensibly, t hey can react slowly and wai t to see whether the apparentlyt hrea tening act s of other s a re t ru ly so. They can be indifferent to most threats


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International Affairs

If power does no t reliably bring control, what does it do for you? Four things,primarily. First, power provides the means of maintaining one's autonomy in theface of force that others wield. Second, greater power permits wider ranges ofaction, while leaving the outcomes of action uncertain. These two advantages wehave discussed. The next two require elaboration.

Third, the more powerful enjoy wider margins of safety in dealing with theless powerful and have mor e t o s ay about which games will be played and how.Duncan and Schnore have defined power in eco logica l terms as lithe ability ofone cluster of activities or niches to set the condi tions under which others mustfunction" (1959, p. 139). Dependent parties have some effect on independentones, bu t thela t ter have more effect on the former. The weak lead perilous lives.As Chrysler's chairman, John Riccardo, remarked: "We've got to be right. Thesmaller you are , the more right you've got to be" (Salpukas, March 7, 1976, III,p. 1). General Motors can lose money on this model or that one, or on all ofthem, for qui te a long time. Chrysler, if i t d oe s so, goe s bankrupt. Be they corporations or states, tho se who ar e wea k a nd hard pressed have to be careful.Thus with the following words Nguyen Van Thieu rejected the agreement forending the wa r in Vietnam that Kissinger, the ally, and Le Duc Tho , t he enemy,had made in October of 1972:

You are a giant , Dr. Kissinger. So you can probably afford theluxuryof beingeasy in this agreement. I cannot. A bad agreement means nothing to you. Whatis the loss of South Vietnam if you looka t the world's map1 Just a speck. Theloss of South Vietnam may even be good for you. It may be good to containChina, good for your world strategy. Buta little Vietnamesedoesn'tplay with astrategicmap of the world. For us, i t i sn 't a ques tionof choosing betweenMoscow and Peking. It is a question of choosing between lifeand death (quoted inStoessinger 1976, p. 68).

because only a few threats, if carried through, can damage them gravely. Theycan hold back until the ambiguity of events is resolved without fearing that themoment for effective action will be lost.Fourth, great power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and theability t o a ct for i ts sake. For them management becomes both worthwhile andpossible. To show how and why managerial tasks are performed internationallyis the subject of this chapter. In self-help systems, as we know competing partiesconsider relat ive gains more important than absolute ones. Absolute gainsbecome more important as competition lessens. Two conditions make it possiblefor the United States and the Soviet Union to be concerned less with scoring relative gains and more with making absolute ones . The f ir st is the stability of twoparty balances, a stability reinforced by second-strike nuclear weapons. Where afirst-strike capability is almost as difficult to imagine as to achieve, gains an dlosses need not be so carefully counted. The second condition is the distancebetween the two at the top and the next most power ful s ta tes, a distance thatremoves the danger of third sta tescatching up. The United States gained relatively when OPEC multiplied oil prices by five between 1973 and 1977 (cf. above,pp. 153-55). The other noncommunis t industria l countries suffered more thanwe did. At t imes itwas hinted that , for this reason, the UnitedStates more readilyacquiesced in OPEC's act ions . In the past, with many competing powers, onemight have credi ted the aspersion, but not now. In a self-help sys tem, when thegreat-power balance is stable and when the distribution of national capabilities isseverely skewed, concern for absolute gains may replace worries about relativeones. Those who areunduly favored can lead in, or lend themselves to , collectiveefforts even though others gain disproportionately from them.

In this chapter, I first show how managing is done internationally despite thedifficulties, and then consider three tasks that the managers may per form. Weshall, as usual , notice how tasks are differently performed as the number of theirperformers varies.

IIn the relations of states, with competition unregulated, wa r occasionally occurs.Although in one o f its aspects war is a means of adjustment within the international system, the occurrence of wa r is often mistakenly taken to indicate that the


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theory of international politics - kenneth waltz

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