The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 9 | Issue 51 | Number 1 | Article ID 3665 | Dec 18, 2011

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Theatre of War and Prospects for Peace on the KoreanPeninsula on the Anniversary of the Yeonpyeong Incident　　延坪島事件一周年にあたり、朝鮮半島における戦域と平和への見込み

Tim Beal

Theatre of War and Prospects forPeace on the Korean Peninsula onthe Anniversary of the YeonpyeongIncident

Tim Beal

Keywords: Yeonpyeong Incident; Lee Myung-bak; South Korea; North Korea; Militarybuildup; US containment of China; Collapse

Russian dolls

23rd November 2011 was the first anniversaryof the artillery exchange between the twoKoreas around the island of Yeonpyeong off thewest coast of Korea. The artillery battle in 2010was the first such since the Korean Wararmistice and brought the peninsula to a stateof heightened tension.1 With the Lee Myung-bak administration mulling an invasion of theNorth in the event of a collapse of the DPRK, alocal conflict could easily explode into war. Thelast year has seen a lopsided arms race withSouth Korea dramatically increasing its militarycapabilities on a scale the North cannot match.The South Korean military are under American‘wartime’ control, and since for technicalreasons as well they cannot engage in warwithout US support, the Americans would beautomatically involved in any war. A US-ROKinvasion of the DPRK would almost certainlyforce China to intervene, as it did in 1950. Asecond Sino-US war would have calamitous,consequences.

South Korean sailors on exercises in theW e s t S e a ( S o u r c e(http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/506749.html))

But things are not quite as they seem. Whilstthe dangers are real, the portrayal of what hasbeen happening is based on layers ofdeception. Just as the 2010 incident was notthe result of an unprovoked, surprise attack asSouth Korea claims, so too the massivecommemorative exercises of 2011 were really amatter of theatre, designed to raise tension butnot, at this stage, precipitate conflict andcertainly not, as was claimed, to deter anattack from North Korea. However, likeRussian dolls, rhetoric and gestures on theKorean peninsula take place within the contextof US-China contestation. The theatre of war inKorea (“We wi l l deter North Koreanaggression”) nestles inside a theatre of peace(“The United States is not bent on containingChina”).2 The rhetoric of this theatre of peace isas deceptive as that of the theatre of war and

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whilst there is not space here to go into detailsabout US strategy, it is clear that Lee Myung-bak’s Nordpolitik is only acceptable toWashington because it is compatible with, andreinforces, the containment of China, of whichtension over North Korea is an integralpart.3 However, crucial as this US-Chinacontext is, Korean politics have their ownspecific dynamic, and that is the focus of thisarticle.

Anniversary of a battle

Deception and knowledge, as the ancientChinese strategist Sun Zi pointed out, is at theheart of war. Know yourself, know your enemy,deceive and destroy. These arts were much inevidence in recent theatrical displays aroundthe island of Yeonpyeong, off the west coast ofKorea.

23rd November 2011 marked the 1st anniversaryof the Yeonpyeong Incident, an artillery duelbetween the two Koreas which was the firstsince the Korean War, and which, manybelieve, brought the peninsula perilously closeto war. However, what happened on 23November, in 2011 and in 2010, was not quitewhat it seemed.

Smoke from artillery fire YeonpyeongIsland, 23 November 2010 (source(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/asia/24korea.html?_r=1&hp))

There are two main conduits of informationabout events on the Korean peninsula. One isNorth Korea’s official, state news agency,Korea Central News Agency (KCNA),headquartered in Pyongyang. KCNA wouldmake Goebbels sigh; it is pretty hopeless as ap r o p a g a n d a m e d i u m . I t s ( E n g l i s hlanguage)releases are usually uninformativeand wooden. Sometimes when it reproducescommuniqués from the Foreign Ministry thearguments are lucid and coherent, butstatements from the military tend to be floweryand blustering.

The other conduit is Yonhap News Agency,South Korea’s official voice, headquartered inSeoul. It too is government controlled thoughnewspapers that use its services are too politeto point that out. Yonhap is much betterresourced than KCNA and its English is good.Its articles are professional and informative. Ittells a much better story. However, that doesnot mean it tells a more accurate story. Indeedits description of the Yeonpyeong Incident, andits anniversary, are deeply deceptive. As is itscoverage of the Cheonan Incident of 2010. TheSouth Korean naval ship Cheonan sank, killing46 of its crew. The issues remain controversial,but it probably having detonated a SouthKorean mine. This was falsely blamed on NorthKorea and the government went as far, it wouldappear, of fabricating evidence.4 The Cheonanand Yeonpyeong incidents were majorpropaganda issues for the Lee Myung-bakgovernment in Seoul, and Yonhap is the vehicleby which the government line is articulated anddisseminated. Scratch an article in the SouthKorean press, or most of the internationalmedia, and you will usually find Yonhapprovided the original.

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South Korean F-15K. This outperforms anyN o r t h K o r e a n f i g h t e r ( s o u r c e(http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/11/29/2011112900516.html))

But this is a business of more than lies anddeception, though they figure strongly. It isalso about the names of islands being renderedinto English in a number of different variants,about a sea called both the Yellow Sea and theWest Sea, about the NLL, the MDL, and yes, ’the West Sea Special Zone for Peace andCooperation’. In other words what is needed isa bit of background to what is quite acomplicated situation.

The contested boundary in the West Sea

Yeonpyeong (Yonphyong is the North’s Englishversion) is one of the four main islands held bySouth Korea off the North Korean coast. Theseislands were occupied by the United Statesduring the Korean War and after the armisticewas signed in 1953 they were handed over tothe South Koreans. The US, worrying thatSouth Korean president Syngman Rhee wouldreignite the fighting (he opposed the armisticeand wanted the Americans to continue the warand reunite Korea under his control),unilaterally established the Northern Limit Line(NLL). This demarcation line, instead ofextending the ceasefire land on land in astraight line out to sea, curved up the NorthKorea coast and embraced the offshore islands(Fig 1).5The North Koreans subsequently

proposed their own l ine, the MilitaryDemarcation Line (MDL) which did, in effect,extend the demilitarised zone (DMZ) in astraight line out to sea, separating the twosides.6 The two lines placed the islands ondifferent sides of the line.

Fig 1. Sea of contention: the NLL,MDL, andthe DMZ. Source: Beal, Tim. Crisis in Korea:America, China, and the Risk of War. London:Pluto, 2011.

The Northern Limit Line is a problem. It is notaccepted by North Korea and it cuts off theirfishing boats from rich crab grounds. It has nolegal basis, as has been admitted in private bythe Americans, including Henry Kissinger.7

After the Yeonpyeong incident of 2010 manycommentators, including the staunchly pro-American International Crisis Group, arguedthat it should be abandoned and replaced by aline acceptable to both North and South.8 TheNorth’s Military Demarcation Line is anobvious choice, but a problem remains. TheNorth does not contest the South’s control ofthe offshore islands and it has suggested thesolution to be lanes of access (Fig 2).

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Fig 2. The NLL (A), MDL (B), and lanes ofa c c e s s ( s o u r c e(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Korean_maritime_border.svg))

One important point to note is that the Northconsiders the waters surrounding these islands,down as far as the MDL, to be theirs. This wasa key issue in the 2010 confrontation.

When the South’s Roh Moo-hyun and theNorth’s Kim Jong Il met for a summit inOctober 2007 they agreed, amongst otherthings, to set up ‘The West Sea Special Zonefor Peace and Cooperation’.9 This was scrappedby Lee Myung-bak when he came into office thefollowing year. If there were joint managementof fishing and transportation in this area (it isthe gateway to the Northern port of Haeju) andthe area was demilitarised, the likelihood of aserious clash would be radically reduced. Thiswas obviously not part of Lee’s game plan. Itseems that he wanted clashes as part of hisstrategy to produce a crisis that would lead to acollapse of North Korea and its takeover by theSouth. If the area had been demilitarised, theartillery incident of November 2010 would nothave taken place. However, far fromdemilitarising the area, Lee continued and evenexpanded the military presence on the offshoreislands, and this expansion was greatlyincreased after November 2010.10

Falsehoods and spin

The South Korean version of the YeonpyeongIncident contains at least two importantinaccuracies. One is a deliberate falsehood, andthe other more a matter of spin.

Firstly the falsehood. It is claimed that theNorth Korean shelling on 23 November was a‘surprise’. This has been reiterated so oftenthat even liberal newspapers such as theHankyoreh repeat it. Thus we read, in 2011,that:

North Korea’s surprise artillery attack on Nov.23, 2010, brought major changes to thethinking and routine of military personnelstationed on Yeonpyeong Island. K9 artillerycompany members alternate over three shifts aday at artillery installations. The barracks isjust 150 to 200 meters away, but they eat andsleep by the artillery in order to be able to fireback within five minutes in the event of a NorthKorean provocation. The situation is difficult,but no one complains. The prevailing view isthat they were taken unaware once before, andthey need to respond comprehensively ifanother opportunity arises.11

Reading this one would get the impression thatthe South Korean soldiers were calmly goingabout their daily routines on 23 Novemberwhen out of the blue the North Koreans openedfire. Not so. The North was reacting to a ‘livefire’ exercise conducted by ROK marines onYeonpyeong. It had issued a number ofwarnings prior to the exercise, including ap h o n e c a l l o n t h e m o r n i n g o f 2 3November.12 We do not know how explicit theNorth’s warnings were, although it did threatena ‘resolute physical counter-strike’.13 Theexercise at Yeonpyeong happened at the sametime as, but was not officially part of, a massiveSouth Korean military exercise called Hoguk(defending the country). This involved:

… some 70,000 troops, 50 warships, 500warplanes, and 600 tanks in the areas of Seoul,

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surrounding provinces and the West Sea. Thewar game included large-scale aerial and navaldrills, including landing operations in the WestSea.14

S o u t h K o r e a n s o l d i e r s o nm a n o e u v r e s ( s o u r c e(http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/08/113_92506.html))

The US was also scheduled to be involved inthe exercise.15 Of particular concern to NorthKorea was the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit(MEU) which is charged with seizing nuclearassets in the event of an invasion of the North.16

However, whilst Hoguk certainly raisedtensions (as it was presumably intended to) itwas not directly linked to the North Koreanaction. This was related specifically to the livefire exercises and their implications forsovereignty in the waters around Yeonpyeong.

If live shells are fired from the islet, they arebound to drop inside the territorial waters ofthe DPRK side no matter in which directionthey are fired because of such geographicalfeatures.

The ulterior aim sought by the enemy is tocreate the impression that the DPRK siderecognized the waters off the islet as their"territorial waters", in case that there was nophysical counter-action on the part of the

former.

Herein lies the crafty and vicious nature of theenemy's provocation.

The army of the DPRK took such a self-defensive measure as making a promptpowerful strike at the artillery positions fromwhich the enemy fired the shells as it does notmake an empty talk.[Emphasis added]17

This appears to have been the first time thatSouth Korea had conducted live fire exercisesin this area, so for North Korea it was a testcase.18 It was clearly a provocation, by theSouth but to what degree they anticipated theconsequences is unknown. Did they think thatthe North would not react , therebystrengthening their territorial claims? Did theyjust blunder into it, not heeding warnings andn o t p a s s i n g t h o s e u p t h e c h a i n o fcommand?19 Or did they welcome the prospectof a clash in order to stoke up tension andperhaps precipitate a crisis? We don’t know,but we can be sure that South Korea was notthe victim of an unprovoked, surprise attack asit has portrayed itself. North Korea could wellbe accused of over-reacting, or perhapswalking into a trap, though it should beremembered that many more Northerners thanSoutherners have been killed by enemy fire inthese waters over the years.20

A re-enactment in 2011 of the 1950 Inchonlandings by which the US outflanked NorthKorean forces and took Seoul.Similar

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landings are a feature of contemporary US-South Korean military exercises. (source(http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/09/115_94842.html))

The other misrepresentation was over ‘civiliancasualties’. President Lee Myung-bak, forinstance, in an address to the nation expressedoutrage over the North's ruthless attack onc iv i l i ans , ca l l ing i t an " inhumane"crime’.21 Much was made of ‘civilian casualties’– ‘Along with the two young Marines, twocivilians were killed in the first North Koreanattack on South Korean territory since the1950-53 Korean War’.22 The reality was thatthese two unfortunate civi l ians werecontractors working on the military base, andamong the 18 wounded on the island that day,only three were civilians.23 Indeed the SouthKorean government refused to recognise thedead contractors as ‘men of national merit whosacrificed themselves’, a quasi-militarydesignation requested by their families; deadcivilians make better PR.24 We do not know howmany casualties the North suffered in theexchange of fire, or whether civilians were hitby the South Korean counter-attack.25

That was November 2010. Things were notwhat they seemed, certainly not as they wereportrayed by the South Korean government, itsYonhap news agency, and accepted by most ofthe international media. The Wikipedia entry on‘Bombardment of Yeonpyeong’ has a long list ofgovernments around the world most of whomseem to have accepted the South Korean line.26

Anniversary commemorations

Forward now to 2011 and the anniversarywhich was marked on both side of the border indistinctly different ways. There were reports ofKim Jong Il visiting an army unit – the‘Command of KPA Large Combined Unit 233 inthe western sector of the front’ – presumably inthe vicinity of Yeonpyeong.27 The message was

that we will retaliate if attacked, but there donot appear to have been any military exercises,or demonstrations in Pyongyang.

Kim Jong Il inspecting the North KoreanPeople’s Army’s 789 Unit ( source(http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/11/116_99735.html))

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) issued abombastic statement:

They [South Korean military] should be mindfulthat If they dare to impair the dignity of theDPRK again and fire one bullet or shell towardits inviolable territorial waters, sky and land,the deluge of fire on Yonphyong [Yeonpyeong]Island will lead to that in Chongwadae and thesea of fire in Chongwadae to the deluge of firesweeping away the stronghold of the group oftraitors.28

Chongwadae is the presidential office of SouthKorea, situated in Seoul.

One perhaps should not get too exercised aboutthe ethics of all of this. After all, the Americansdo this every day, assassinating political

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leaders around the wor ld in what i seuphemistically called ‘high value targeting’.29

In practical terms it is a different matter. TheAmericans have drones which are accurateenough to engulf a few family members,colleagues, and unfortunate villagers in thedeluge of fire, whereas if North Korea reallyshelled Chongwadae that would mean attackingSeoul. And the US uses its drones in countrieswhich cannot retaliate, whereas an attack onSeoul would mean war.

But the statement should not be taken literally.It was a rhetorical flourish akin to a Maori hakabefore an All Blacks rugby game. This was apiece of theatre responding to what washappening on the other side of the borderwhich was also designed to frighten, excite,and impress whilst at the same time making itknown that it was just theatre.

The Yeonpyeong incident in 2010 provided abig boost for the South Korean government.Many people, especially the young and bettereducated, had remained very sceptical aboutthe government’s version of the Cheonanincident.30 The ruling party had also done badlyin the June 2010 elections despite (or becauseof) the Cheonan fabrication.31 The Yeonpyeongincident did much to restore the government’sstanding as there was a lot of public anger atwhat was perceived to be an unprovokedattack.32 Indeed, there were reports that somechanged their mind over Cheonan afterYeonpyeong.33

A US Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile(JASSM). South Korea is scheduled to buy170 of these stealth cruise missiles in2 0 1 2 ( s o u r c e(http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/12/116_100261.htm))

It was inevitable that the government wouldseek to capitalise on the anniversary. And didthey ever.

SKorea flaunts firepower year afterNKorean attack

South Korean attack helicopters screamedthrough the skies above the Koreas' disputedYellow Sea waters Wednesday in a display ofpower exactly a year after North Korealaunched a deadly artillery attack on a front-line island……

Wednesday's drills involving aircraft, rocketlaunchers and artillery guns took place offBaengnyeong Island, another front-lineterritory near the disputed maritime border,and were meant to send a strong message toNorth Korean rivals stationed within sight justmiles (kilometers) away.

The exercises represent far greater firepowerthan the South Korean military mounted lastyear…34

Massive Military Drill Marks YeonpyeongAttack Anniversary

South Korea is holding a massive military drillon Wednesday involving cutting-edge F-15Kfighter jets and K-9 long-range artillery piecesto mark North Korea’s shelling of YeonpyeongIsland a year ago.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on Tuesday said theexercise will be held "under real conditions" todeal with North Korean provocations. TheF-15K fighter jets will train firing SLAM-ER air-to-ground missiles with a range of 278 km

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capable of knocking out targets in North Korea.…

Marines stationed on the island will follow theirnew directives of responding first with a volleyof rounds from their K-9 howitzers and onlythen report ing the inc ident to theircommanders.

Army Cobra attack helicopters and Navyvessels will wrap up the drill by attackingNorth Korean spec ia l forces t roopsapproaching Baeknyeong Island aboardhydrofoils.35

Wow! Hold onto your hats boys, we’re off toWorld War III!

Well not quite. Looking at the small print wesee that this is more like a film than the realthing.

At 1 p.m., a mock marine firing exercise isbeing held with crew-served weapons such asthe K9 self-propelled artillery. A hypotheticalNorth Korean response with a launch of dozensof rounds of 122 mm artillery at the Gaemeoriarea 12 kilometers off Yeonpyeong Island isplanned for 2:33 p.m [Emphasis added].36

And again

The JCS [South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff]said the exercise wi l l begin with theYeonpyeong Marine Unit simulating firing itsK-9 self-propelled howitzers and other artilleryin a regular exercise at 1 p.m. Then at 2:33p.m., the time when North Korea began firingat Yeonpyeong a year ago, the JCS will simulateNorth Korean launching shots from its artillerybase in Kaemori [Gaemeori], only 13 kilometersfrom Yeonpyeong….

The JCS said the Yeonpyeong Marine Unit willsimulate bombing Kaemori base five minutesafter the North's first strike, and the South'sfighters will also launch missiles.

The JCS said the simulated drill will wrap upwith the shooting down of a North Koreanaircraft attempting to land on BaengnyeongIsland, using an AH-1 Cobra attack helicopterand other naval and aerial weapons….

The Army said in a statement that the CapitalCorps exercise will involve simulated firingdrills with self-propelled guns and ground-based air defense weapons, under the scenarioof North Korean maritime infiltration and aerialprovocation.37

South Korean marines on patrol onYeonpyeong Island, 22 November2 0 1 1 ( s o u r c e(http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/506555.html))

So no live firing of the sort that brought NorthKorean retaliation in 2010. So no possibility ofSouth Korean forces ‘fir[ing] one bullet or shelltoward [North Korea’s] inviolable territorialwaters, sky and land’. So no ‘sea of fire inChongwadae’.38 All smoke and mirrors. TheSouth Korean government made a big splashabout the anniversary but did it in such a waythat the North had no ‘legitimate’ reason fortaking action. The word ‘legitimate’ in thiscontext raises all sorts of arcane issues whichare not entirely legalistic in the Western sensebut perhaps relate more to Confucian conceptsof acceptable behaviour. The North did notrespond to the South’s resumed live fire

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exercise in December 2010 because the otherside was :

……firing shells left unused during the militaryprovocation on November 23 after shifting bystealth the waters to be a scene of theprojected shelling and its target (sic).39

This might mean that the South was firing notinto what the North considered its territorialwaters but into the ‘lane of access’ (see Fig 2).The fact that the South merely finished off theshells left over from the first exercise seems tohave been a factor, but why is unclear. By thetime of the anniversary it seems that both sideshad reached some unspoken agreement aboutwhat was acceptable, and what would cross theline in the sand. Simulations were annoying,but bearable; live fire might have been anothermatter.

However, from the point of view of the South,simulations provided the necessary drama andphoto opportunities.

South Korean (US made) Patriot surface toa i r m i s s i l e s ( s o u r c e(http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/09/19/2011091901021.html))

Sustaining and increasing tension

It is all really to do with sustaining andincreasing tension, partly in order toprecipitate some further military clash thatmight in turn lead to a takeover of the North. Itis also designed to instil in the South Koreanpopulation a feeling of being under threat fromthe North.

Thus we have the military build-up in the WestSea:

While the situation at the very front is one offighting spirit based in hostility, the militaryleadership is moving to fortify the five West Seaislands. In June, a Marine-centered NorthwestIslands Defense Command was set up, and anadditional budget of 100 billion won ($87.2million) for 2011 was allocated just forreinforcement of military strength around theislands. An additional 1,000 military personnelwere stationed there, and K9 units were morethan doubled. Also brought in was an AH-1SCobra attack helicopter with Vulcan andgrenade-launching capabilities, a multiplerocket launcher and new Artillery HuntingRadar (ARTHUR), and daytime and nighttimeobservation equipment for monitoring thefront. Plans are under way to bring in Spikemissiles, tactical aerial vehicles, and unmannedreconnaissance aircraft.40

A lop-sided arms race

What has been happening in the West Sea isbut a microcosm of a quite astounding increasein South Korean military capabilities. Just inthe last few weeks alone there have been anumber of reports in the Seoul mediahighlighting this. Interestingly, much of thisbuildup, like the construction of the naval base

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on Jeju island for the US navy (denied ofcourse), is clearly aimed at China.41 Thus:

South Korea is developing a supersonic cruisemissile that can be used to attack aircraftcarr iers , Aegis ships and up-to-datedestroyers. 4 2

Since North Korea does not have aircraftcarriers, Aegis ships or destroyers of anyvintage, let alone up-to-date ones, theconclusion is obvious and is surely not lost inBeijing.

The Dokdo, South Korea’s helicopterassault ship, designed for amphibiouslandings. North Korea has nothingc o m p a r a b l e . ( s o u r c e(http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/09/116_94626.html))

Following a 6 December report that ‘Korea topurchase 170 stealth cruise missiles next year’,the following day a report indicated that 150bunker buster bombs were being purchased.43

The South Korean military naturally comes outpublically with stories that the North has moretroops and in various fields more hardwarethan the South, but even if the numbers werecorrect the disparity in quality of equipmentbetween the two sides (let alone bringing theAmer i cans in to the ca l cu la t i on ) i s

overwhelming.44 An article in the right-wingSeoul paper Chosun Ilbo in August exulted:

The North has fallen sharply behind SouthKorea in terms of airpower. Experts conducteda simulated war game and found that SouthKorean and U.S. fighter jets could overpowerNorth Korean aircraft and gain control of itsairspace within three days. …

Some 70 percent of North Korea's fighter jetsare MiG-15, 17, 19 and 21s that were built inthe 1950s to 1960s. A lack of fuel hasprevented pilots from training properly, and ashortage of parts has left the aircraft in badshape. ..

No North Korean aircraft is capable of takingon the F-15K.

The difference in airpower is expected to widenfurther with the South planning to bring in fourmore E-737 "Peace Eye" airborne early warningand control aircraft next year.45

Perhaps the area where advanced technologyhas the most leverage is in airborne (or space)intelligence and surveillance equipment suchas Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and theearly warning and control aircraft mentionedabove. Here South Korea has a clear edgethanks to its access to US technology (in thediagram the E-737 still carries Americanmarkings).

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T h e E - 7 3 7 s y s t e m ( S o u r c e(http://app.yonhapnews.co.kr/YNA/Basic/ArticleEnglish/ArticleGraphic/YIBW_GraphicView.aspx?contents_id=GYH20110802000900341))

In general, as a South Korean militarystrategist recently put it in an article for the[US] Naval War College Review: [North Korea]is poor and small, uses ageing and obsoleteweapons, and lacks sustainment capabilities.46

High-tech equipment is not everything, as thisstrategist acknowledged, but as, for instance,the rapid US conquest of Iraq at the start of thewar demonstrated, it can be devastating.

The best measure of the quality of equipmentfor countries such as the Koreas is the amountof military imports. Here the South is far in theascendant. Over the last five years alone South

Korea was the world’s third largest armsimporter, and when one considers that thecompetition includes India, Saudi Arabia, andChina, that is saying something.47 Between2000 and 2008, according to the World Banks’sWorld Development Indicators, South Koreaimported a hundred times as much militaryequipment as North Korea; $9,682 millionagainst $98 million.48

A South Korean Type 209 submarine.Three of these, worth $1.1 billion, arebeing sold to Indonesia. South Korea faroutstrips North Korea in arms sales andp u r c h a s e s . ( s o u r c e )(http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2011/10/123_96458.html)

The specific buildup of equipment and marineson the West Sea islands is justified by referenceto the 2010 clash and by creating scare storiessuch as the idea that North Korea is poised toinvade the islands:

Analysts said North Korea has brought inthousands of additional special forces soldiersfor overseas invasion and hovercrafts, whileSouth Korea is stepping up its exercises inanticipation of a surprise land attack by NorthKorea.49

‘Analysts’ in this context presumably meansspokespersons for the military. A glance at themap (Fig 1) will show how implausible a landattack is, except perhaps as a counterattack toneutralise attacking forces in the case of aninvasion of the North. It should be noted thatthe troops on these islands are not some sort of

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decrepit Home Guard but marines, speciallyselected and trained amphibious assaulttroops.50 From the South, the offshore islandsin the West Sea could conceivably lie on theroad to Pyongyang, and a landing from themwould outflank Northern forces along the DMZ.But for the North, the islands lead nowhereexcept out to sea. Moreover, given the South’ssea and air superiority, an invading force fromthe North would be isolated and easily moppedup.

One consequence of this geographicalasymmetry is that the West Sea is a good placefor the South Korean military to build uptension without much risk of it getting out ofhand, unless they so desire.

Dangerous times lie ahead

Whether they do desire an explosion, so thatthe situation in the West Sea goes from tensionto conflict, presumably depends on theirreading of the state of affairs in Pyongyang, inWashington, in Beijing, and to a lesser extent inMoscow. If it is considered that serious fightingthere will produce a crisis in Pyongyangleading to a collapse, or what could beportrayed as such, and if this is endorsed bythe Americans (and no military action ispossible without the Americans) then we mightsee a provocation to which the North would beforced to react. That still leaves the Chinesereaction. The right wing press and thegovernment in South Korea (and friends in theUS) frequently claim that China (and Russia)would not oppose the takeover of the North.51

Sometimes they wheel out a tame Chineseacademic to offer reassurance:

"I believe China will call for a diplomaticsolution even if the North is attacked by SouthKorea or the U.S.," [Prof. Chu Shulong ofTsinghua University] said. "Most Chinese don'tthink a reunited Korea would stand againstChina, even if the U.S. keeps stationing troopsor bases on the peninsula. China won't mindKorean reunification, even if it is led by South

Korea."

In reality such acquiescence is unlikely.

So it comes down to a game of bluff and feint tosee the reactions in Pyongyang, Washington,Beij ing and Moscow. At the same it isnecessary to keep things stirred in the South,to make people think they are under threat andneed exercises such as those at Yeonpyeong tokeep them safe.

This time it was all theatre, but next time,through miscalculation or because of aperception of changing opportunities, it may bethe real thing. No longer theatre, just war. Thatperception of changing opportunities turns tosome extent on what happens in that largertheatre of Sino-US and Sino-Russian-USinteraction. Here, although the rhetoric ofpeace still prevails, the underlying theme isbecoming increasingly belligerent as theUnited States, facing setbacks in the MiddleEast, ‘moves back to Asia’.52

Dangerous times lie ahead and the likeliestplace for a second Sino-American war remainsthe Korean peninsula.53

Tim Beal is the author of North Korea: TheS t r u g g l e A g a i n s t A m e r i c a n P o w e r(http://www.amazon.com/dp/0745320139/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20), Senior Lecturer (emeritus)at Victoria University of Wellington, he is theeditor of The Pyongyang Report and an Asia-Pacific Journal Associate.

This is an updated and expanded version ofPyongyang Report V13 N2, 6 December 201154

http://www.timbeal.net.nz/geopolitics/pyr_index.html

http://www.timbeal.net.nz/geopolitics/

Recommended citation: Tim Beal, 'Theatre of

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War and Prospects for Peace on the KoreanPeninsula on the Anniversary of theYeonpyeong Incident,' The Asia-Pacific JournalVol 9, Issue 51 No 1, December 19, 2011.

For articles on related themes see

S e e S e u n g h u n L e e a n d J . J . S u h(https://apjjf.org/-JJ-Suh/3382), “Rush toJudgement: Inconsistencies in South Korea’sCheonan Report,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 12July 2010.

Tim Beal (https://apjjf.org/-Tim-Beal/3459),“Korean Brinkmanship, American Provocation,and the Road to War: the manufacturing of acrisis,” The Asia-Pacific Journal,” 20 December,2010.

W a d a H a r u k i(https://apjjf.org/-Haruki-Wada/3458), “Fromthe Fir ing at Yeonpyeong Is land to aComprehensive Solution to the Problems ofDivision and War in Korea,” 13 December,2010.

N a n K i m a n d J o h n M c G l y n n(https: / /apj j f .org/ - John-McGlynn/3452),“Factsheet: WEST SEA CRISIS IN KOREA,” 6December, 2010.

P a i k N a k - c h u n g(https://apjjf.org/-Paik-Nak_chung/3466),“Reflections on Korea in 2010: Trials andprospects for recovery of common sense in2011,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, January 10,2011.

J o h n M c G l y n n(https://apjjf.org/-John-McGlynn/3372), “Politicsin Command: The "International" Investigationinto the Sinking of the Cheonan and the Risk ofa New Korean War,” June 14, 2010.

T a n a k a S a k a i(https://apjjf.org/-Tanaka-Sakai/3361), WhoSank the South Korean Warship Cheonan? ANew Stage in the US-Korean War and US-China

Relations, May 7, 2010.

This essay was occasioned by the anniversaryon 23 November 2011 of the YeonpyeongIncident. A longer essay on the currentsituation on the peninsula, within the context ofcontemporary geopolitics, is under preparation.

Tim Beal’s most recent book, Crisis in Korea:America, China and the Risk of War waspublished by Pluto Press in 2011. Details area v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://www.timbeal.net.nz/Crisis_in_Korea/).

Beal, Tim. Crisis in Korea: America, China, andthe Risk of War. London: Pluto, 2011.

———. "Korean Brinkmanship, American

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Provocation, and the Road to War: TheManufacturing of a Crisis." The Asia-PacificJournal 8, no. 51:1 (20 December 2010).

Beck , Peter . "Nor th Korea in 2010:Provocations and Succession." Asian Survey 51,no. 1 (January/February 2011).

"Bombardment of Yeonpyeong." Wikipedia, link(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Yeonpyeong).

Chomsky, Noam. "The Threat of Warships onan "Island of World Peace"." Truth-out.org, 7October 2011.

Davies, Michael. "High Value Targeting -Organization Vs. Leadership." Pynx, 30 October2011.

Dobbins, James, David C. Gompert, David A.Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell. "Conflict withChina: Prospects, Consequences, andStrategies for Deterrence." Rand Corporation,10 October 2011.

"Extent of Nk Damage Remains Uncertain."Chosun Ilbo, 26 November 2010.

"Full Text of Inter-Korean Agreement." KoreaTImes, 4 October 2007.

"Gov't Mulls Turning Baeknyeong into ForwardDeployment Base ". Chosub Ilbo, 30 November2010.

Hardy, John. "The Value in High ValueTargeting." Pynx, 23 September 2011.

Hart-Landsberg, Martin. "What's Happening onthe Korean Peninsula?" Global Research, 4January 2011.

International Crisis Group. "North Korea: TheRisks of War in the Yellow Sea." Asia ReportN°198 (23 December 2010).

Joint State/Defense message. "Rokg LegalMemorandum on Northwest Coastal Incidents

(Cable to Us Embassy Seoul) ." StateDepartment, 22 December 1973.

Jung, Sung-ki. "Satellite Image Shows Damagesin Nk Artillery Site." Korea Times, 2 December2010.

Kate, Daniel Ten, and Peter S. Green."Defending Korea Line Seen Contrary to Lawby Kissinger Remains U.S. Policy." Bloomberg,17 December 2010.

Kim, Duk-Ki. "The Republic of Korea’s Counter-Asymmetric Strategy: Lessons from RoksCheonan and Yeonpyeong Island." Naval WarCollege Review 65, no. 1 (2011).

Kim, Hyung-jin. "Skoreans Dismissed IntelNorth Might Attack Island." Washington Post, 2December 2010.

Kim, John. "The Artillery Duel in Korea: MissingFacts and Historical Context in the MilitaryClash of Nov. 23." Korea Policy Institute, 18March 2011.

"Kim Jong Il Inspects Kpa Large Combined UnitCommand." KCNA, 25 November 2011.

Kim, Nam. "Korea on the Brink: Reading theYo˘Np’yo˘Ng Shelling and Its Aftermath."Journal of Asian Studies 70, no. 2 (May 2011).

Kissinger, Henry. "Cable to Us Embassy,Seoul." State Department, February 1975.

Klare, Michael T. "Playing with Fire: Obama'sThreat to China " Al Jazeera, 10 December2011.

"Korea Remains World's 3rd Biggest ArmsImporter." Chosun Ilbo, 8 December 2011.

Kotani, Tetsuo "Tip of the Spear: The 13Missions for US Marines in Okinawa." PacNet43 (24 September 2010).

"Kpa Supreme Command Warns S. KoreanMilitary Not to Act Rashly." KCNA, 24

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November 2011.

"Kpa Supreme Command: World Should KnowWho Is Provoker." KCNA, 20 December 2010.

Lam, Willy. "China Pitches a Fork at Invading'Pacific President'." Asia Times Online, 8December 2011.

Landler, Mark. "U.S. Is Not Trying to ContainChina, Clinton Says." New York Times, 14January 2011.

"Lee Blasts N.Korea's 'Inhumane' Attack onYeonpyeong Island." Chosun Ilbo, 30 November2010.

Lee, Chi-dong. "Main Opposition Heading forStunning Victory in Local Elections." Yonhap, 3June 2010.

Lee, Hyo-sik. "Families of Yeonpyeong CivilianVictims Want National Merits." Korea Times, 1December 2010.

Lee, Jin-man. "Skorea Flaunts Firepower Yearafter Nkorean Attack." Associated Press, 23November 2011.

Lee, Soon-hyuk. "Costly ReinforcementHeightens Tensions on Yeonpyeong Island."Hankyoreh, 22 November 2011.

Lee, Tae-hoon. "Korea to Purchase 170 StealthCruise Missiles Next Year." Korea Times, 6December 2011.

———. "Seoul to Deploy 150 Bunker Busters."Korea Times, 7 December 2011.

Luo, Yuan , and Robert M. Farley. "Sino-Us WarUnlikely but Not Impossible " Global Times, 15November 2011.

"Massive Military Drill Marks YeonpyeongAttack Anniversary." Chosun Ilbo, 23 November2011.

"Military Drill Planned on Anniversary of

Yeonpyeong Shelling." Yonhap, 23 November2011.

"Military Suggests Counterfire Caused 'ManyCasualties' in N. Korea ". Yonhap, 2 December2010.

"Most S.Koreans Skeptical About CheonanFindings, Survey Shows." Chosun Ilbo, 8September 2010.

"N. Korea Adds More Tanks, Artillery Guns toArsenal." Korea Times, 18 September 2011.

"N.Korea Desperately Seeking Cutting-EdgeWeaponry." Chosun Ilbo, 29 August 2011.

"Northern Limit Line." Wikipedia, link(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Limit_Line).

Oliver, Christian, and Geoff Dyer. "China CouldAccept Korean Unification." Financial Times,30 November 2010.

Oppenheim, Robert. "Introduction to the JasMini-Forum “Regarding North Korea”." Journalof Asian Studies 70, no. 2 (2011).

"Panmunjom Mission of Kpa Sends Notice toU.S. Forces Side." KCNA, 25 November 2010.

"Press Conference on Issue of Mdl at West Seaof Korea." KCNA, 26 August 1999.

"Preventive Priorities Survey: 2012." Center forPreventive Action, Council on ForeignRelations, 8 December 2011.

"Reunified Korea Would Be a Better Partner forRussia, China." Chosun Ilbo, 7 November 2011.

Richardson, Ben, and Saeromi Shin. "SouthKorea Faces Domestic Skeptics over Evidenceagainst North." Bloomberg Businessweek, 29May 2010.

"Russia Expects N.Korea to Collapse by 2020 ".Chosun Ilbo, 4 November 2011.

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"S. Korea Remembers Island Shelling inSolemn Ceremony." Yonhap, 24 November2011.

"S.Korean Navy Says New Base Will Not HostU.S. Military Vessels." Chosun Ilbo, 6 October2011.

Son, Won-je. "Military Prepares for Exercisesnear N.Korean Border." Hankyoreh, 23November 2011.

"South Korea: The Shifting Sands of SecurityPolicy." International Crisis Group Asia BriefingN°130 1 December 2011.

"Spies Intercepted Plans for Yeonpyeong Attackin August ". Chosun Ilbo, 2 December 2010.

"Statement Released by Spokesman of DprkForeign Ministry ". KCNA, 24 November 2010.

"Supersonic Cruise Missile in Development."Chosun Ilbo, 17 August 2011.

Tisdall, Simon. "Wikileaks Cables Reveal China'Ready to Abandon North Korea'." Guardian, 29November 2010.

"Two Civilians Found Dead on S. Korean IslandShelled by N. Korea." Yonhap, 24 November2010.

Underhill, Francis "Defusing Western CoastalIsland Situation." State Department, December1973.

Van Dyke, Jon "The Maritime Boundarybetween North & South Korea in the Yellow(West) Sea." 38 North, 29 July 2010.

Van Dyke, Jon M., Mark J. Valencia, and JennyMiller Garmendia. "The North/South KoreaBoundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea."Marine Policy 27, no. 2 (March 2003).

World Development Indicators 2010.Washington: World Bank, 2010.

Yoo, Cheong-mo. "Election Defeat Casts Gloomover Lee Administration, Ruling Party."Yonhap, 3 June 2010.

Notes

1 Tim Beal, "Korean Brinkmanship, AmericanProvocation, and the Road to War: themanufacturing of a crisis," The Asia-PacificJournal 8, no. 51:1 (2010).

2 Mark Landler, "U.S. Is Not Trying to ContainChina, Clinton Says," New York Times, 14January 2011.

3 Because of the obvious parallels withGermany, nordpolitik is often used as a labelfor South Korea’s policy towards the North. Seefor instance Robert Oppenheim, "Introductionto the JAS Mini-Forum “Regarding NorthKorea”," Journal of Asian Studies 70, no. 2(2011). However, this use of German should notobscure the considerable differences betweenthe two situations.

4 This is covered in detail in my book Tim Beal,Crisis in Korea: America, China, and the risk ofwar (London: Pluto, 2011).

5 Jon M. Van Dyke, Mark J. Valencia, and JennyMiller Garmendia, "The North/South KoreaBoundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea,"Marine Policy 27, no. 2 (2003); Jon Van Dyke,"The Maritime Boundary between North &South Korea in the Yellow (West) Sea," 38North, 29 July 2010.

6 "Press conference on issue of MDL at WestSea of Korea," KCNA, 26 August 1999.

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7 Daniel Ten Kate and Peter S. Green,"Defending Korea Line Seen Contrary to Lawby Kissinger Remains U.S. Policy," Bloomberg,17 December 2010; Henry Kissinger, "Cable toUS embassy, Seoul," State Department,February 1975; Francis Underhill, "DEFUSINGWESTERN COASTAL ISLAND SITUATION,"State Department, December 1973; JointState/Defense message, "ROKG LEGALMEMORANDUM ON NORTHWEST COASTALINCIDENTS (Cable to US embassy Seoul),"State Department, 22 December 1973.

8 International Crisis Group, "North Korea: TheRisks of War in the Yellow Sea," Asia ReportN°198 (2010).

9 "Full Text of Inter-Korean Agreement," KoreaTImes, 4 October 2007.

10 "Gov't Mulls Turning Baeknyeong intoForward Deployment Base ", Chosun Ilbo, 30November 2010.

11 Soon-hyuk Lee, "Costly reinforcementheightens tensions on Yeonpyeong Island,"Hankyoreh, 22 November 2011.

12 This is covered in some detail in Beal,"Korean Brinkmanship, American Provocation,and the Road to War: the manufacturing of acrisis."

13 "Panmunjom Mission of KPA Sends Notice toU.S. Forces Side," KCNA, 25 November 2010.

14 John Kim, "The Artillery Duel in Korea:Missing facts and historical context in themilitary clash of Nov. 23," Korea PolicyInstitute, 18 March 2011.

15 Nam Kim, "Korea on the Brink: Reading theYonp’yong Shelling and its Aftermath," Journalof Asian Studies 70, no. 2 (2011).

16 Tetsuo Kotani, "Tip of the Spear: the 13Missions for US Marines in Okinawa," PacNet43(2010).

17 "Statement Released by Spokesman of DPRKForeign Ministry ", KCNA, 24 November 2010.

18 Martin Hart-Landsberg, "What's HappeningOn The Korean Peninsula?," Global Research, 4January 2011.

19 "Spies Intercepted Plans for YeonpyeongAttack in August ", Chosun Ilbo, 2 December2010; Hyung-jin Kim, "SKoreans dismissed intelNorth might attack island," Washington Post, 2December 2010.

20 The Wikipedia entry on the Northern LimitLines gives 53 dead on the North and 54 of theSouth, but the latter seems to include the 46 onthe Cheonan; "Northern Limit Line," Wikipedia,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Limit_Line.

21 "Lee Blasts N.Korea's 'Inhumane' Attack onYeonpyeong Island," Chosun Ilbo, 30 November2010.

22 "S. Korea remembers island shelling insolemn ceremony," Yonhap, 24 November2011.

23 "Two civilians found dead on S. Korean islandshelled by N. Korea," Yonhap, 24 November2010.

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24 Hyo-sik Lee, "Families of Yeonpyeong civilianvictims want national merits," Korea Times, 1December 2010.

25 "Extent of NK damage remains uncertain,"Chosun Ilbo, 26 November 2010; "Militarysuggests counterfire caused 'many casualties'in N. Korea ", Yonhap, 2 December 2010; Sung-ki Jung, "Satellite image shows damages in NKartillery site," Korea Times, 2 December 2010.

26 "Bombardment of Yeonpyeong," Wikipedia,l i n k(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Yeonpyeong).

27 "Kim Jong Il Inspects KPA Large CombinedUnit Command," KCNA, 25 November 2011.

28 "KPA Supreme Command Warns S. KoreanMilitary Not to Act Rashly," KCNA, 24November 2011.

29 John Hardy, "The Value in High ValueTargeting," Pynx, 23 September 2011; MichaelDavies, "High Value Targeting - OrganizationVs. Leadership," Pynx, 30 October 2011.

30 Ben Richardson and Saeromi Shin, "SouthKorea Faces Domestic Skeptics Over EvidenceAgainst North," Bloomberg Businessweek, 29May 2010; "Most S.Koreans Skeptical AboutCheonan Findings, Survey Shows," ChosunIlbo, 8 September 2010.

31 Chi-dong Lee, "Main opposition heading forstunning victory in local elections," Yonhap, 3June 2010; Cheong-mo Yoo, "Election defeatcasts gloom over Lee administration, rulingparty," Yonhap, 3 June 2010.

3 2 Peter Beck, "North Korea in 2010:Provocations and Succession," Asian Survey 51,no. 1 (2011).

33 "South Korea: The Shifting Sands of SecurityPolicy," International Crisis Group Asia BriefingN°130 1 December 2011.

34 Jin-man Lee, "SKorea flaunts firepower yearafter NKorean attack," Associated Press, 23November 2011.

35 "Massive Military Drill Marks YeonpyeongAttack Anniversary," Chosun Ilbo, 23 November2011.

36 Won-je Son, "Military prepares for exercisesnear N.Korean border," Hankyoreh, 23November 2011.

37 "Military drill planned on anniversary ofYeonpyeong shelling," Yonhap, 23 November2011.

38 "KPA Supreme Command Warns S. KoreanMilitary Not to Act Rashly."

39 "KPA Supreme Command: World ShouldKnow Who Is Provoker," KCNA, 20 December2010.

40 Lee, "Costly reinforcement heightenstensions on Yeonpyeong Island."

41 "S.Korean Navy Says New Base Will Not HostU.S. Military Vessels," Chosun Ilbo, 6 October2011; Noam Chomsky, "The Threat of Warshipson an "Island of World Peace"," Truthout.org, 7October 2011.

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42 "Supersonic Cruise Missile in Development,"Chosun Ilbo, 17 August 2011.

43 Tae-hoon Lee, "Korea to purchase 170 stealthcruise missiles next year," Korea Times, 6December 2011; ———, "Seoul to deploy 150bunker busters," Korea Times, 7 December2011.

44 "N. Korea adds more tanks, artillery guns toarsenal," Korea Times, 18 September 2011.

45 "N.Korea Desperately Seeking Cutting-EdgeWeaponry," Chosun Ilbo, 29 August 2011.

46 Duk-Ki Kim, "The Republic of Korea’sCounter-Asymmetric Strategy: Lessons fromROK's Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island," NavalWar College Review 65, no. 1 (2011).

47 "Korea Remains World's 3rd Biggest ArmsImporter," Chosun Ilbo, 8 December 2011.

4 8 World Development Indicators 2010,(Washington: World Bank, 2010).

49 Lee, "Costly reinforcement heightenstensions on Yeonpyeong Island."

50 For a photo of them practising such a thing,

in a joint exercise with the Americans, see thecover of Crisis in Korea

51 Simon Tisdall, "Wikileaks cables reveal China'ready to abandon North Korea'," Guardian, 29November 2010; Christian Oliver and GeoffDyer, "China could accept Korean unification,"Financial Times, 30 November 2010; "RussiaExpects N.Korea to Collapse by 2020 ", ChosunIlbo, 4 November 2011; "Reunified KoreaWould Be a Better Partner for Russia, China,"Chosun Ilbo, 7 November 2011.

52 Michael T. Klare, "Playing with fire: Obama'sthreat to China " Al Jazeera, 10 December2011; Willy Lam, "China pitches a fork atinvading 'Pacific President'," Asia Times Online,8 December 2011.

53 James Dobbins et al., "Conflict with China:Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies forDeterrence," Rand Corporation, 10 October2011; Yuan Luo and Robert M. Farley, "Sino-USwar unlikely but not impossible " Global Times,15 November 2011; "Preventive PrioritiesSurvey: 2012," Center for Preventive Action,Council on Foreign Relations, 8 December2011.

54 I am grateful for the valuable comments of JJSuh and Mark Selden for this revision, and toAnkie Hoogvelt, Don Borrie, and Peter Wilsonfor proofreading the original