the yalta and potsdam conferences - yapoutchian

8/9/2019 The Yalta and Potsdam Conferences - Yapoutchian

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The Yalta and Potsdam ConferencesThe Yalta and Potsdam Conferences

Contention and Cooperation amongst the TitansContention and Cooperation amongst the Titans



The start of Operation Barbarossa;The start of Operation Barbarossa;

the Wolf enters the Bear’s Denthe Wolf enters the Bear’s Den Invasion of the Soviet Union was notInvasion of the Soviet Union was not

only inevitable, but imminent by Juneonly inevitable, but imminent by June1941 There was su!"ient eviden"e,1941 There was su!"ient eviden"e,warnings, and lea#s to "on$rm thewarnings, and lea#s to "on$rm thefa"t that %itler was planning afa"t that %itler was planning amassive operation in the east, butmassive operation in the east, butdespite the warnings and messagesdespite the warnings and messagesfrom his allies, &erman defe"tors, andfrom his allies, &erman defe"tors, and

his own spies '(i"hard Sorgehis own spies '(i"hard Sorgeoperating in To#yo) Stalin refused tooperating in To#yo) Stalin refused toa"#nowledge the threat of invasiona"#nowledge the threat of invasionand dismissed them all as anand dismissed them all as an*elaborate provo"ation+ 'ation 1-.)*elaborate provo"ation+ 'ation 1-.)

Stalin/s refusal to a"#nowledge theStalin/s refusal to a"#nowledge theimpending war, his purging of the (edimpending war, his purging of the (ed0rmy !"er Corps between 1923250rmy !"er Corps between 192325'6ennedy7ipe 42), and the relative'6ennedy7ipe 42), and the relative

unpreparedness 'for 8lit#riegunpreparedness 'for 8lit#riegta"ti"s), la"# of training andta"ti"s), la"# of training ande:perien"e of the (ed 0rmy, as welle:perien"e of the (ed 0rmy, as wellas possessing outdated vehi"les,as possessing outdated vehi"les,tan#s and airplanes at the start of thetan#s and airplanes at the start of thewar, all led to initial sweepingwar, all led to initial sweepingvi"tories for the ai ;ar <a"hine invi"tories for the ai ;ar <a"hine inthe Soviet Union during the $rst fewthe Soviet Union during the $rst fewmonths of the war 'ation 11519)months of the war 'ation 11519)



The Red Bear awakens . . .The Red Bear awakens . . .

eent!all"eent!all" ;hen news of the invasion rea"hed Stalin, he still $rmly believed that disaster "ould be;hen news of the invasion rea"hed Stalin, he still $rmly believed that disaster "ould be

averted through negotiations, and he staun"hly refused to allow artillery "rews to open $reaverted through negotiations, and he staun"hly refused to allow artillery "rews to open $reon the advan"ing &ermans '6it"hen 35)on the advan"ing &ermans '6it"hen 35)

;hen Stalin $nally realied how "riti"al the situation had be"ome, he be"ame traumatied;hen Stalin $nally realied how "riti"al the situation had be"ome, he be"ame traumatiedand su=ered a nervous brea#down> *The ?i"tator/s behaviour in the wa#e of the initialand su=ered a nervous brea#down> *The ?i"tator/s behaviour in the wa#e of the initialatta"# has been well do"umented &romy#o re"alls that Stalin was "onvin"ed that %itleratta"# has been well do"umented &romy#o re"alls that Stalin was "onvin"ed that %itlerwould honour the treaty This view is reinfor"ed by others, who also tell of Stalin/s sho"#would honour the treaty This view is reinfor"ed by others, who also tell of Stalin/s sho"#and brea#down at the timing, if not the substan"e, of the &erman @betrayal/+ '6ennedyand brea#down at the timing, if not the substan"e, of the &erman @betrayal/+ '6ennedy7ipe 49)7ipe 49)

It wasn/t until July 2It wasn/t until July 2rdrd that Stalin $nally addressed the Soviet people of the "urrent state ofthat Stalin $nally addressed the Soviet people of the "urrent state ofa=airs resulting from %itler/s trea"hery %is spee"h involved nationalist rhetori", "alling fora=airs resulting from %itler/s trea"hery %is spee"h involved nationalist rhetori", "alling forthe destru"tion of the fas"ist invaders, implementation of @s"or"hedearth/ poli"y, and thethe destru"tion of the fas"ist invaders, implementation of @s"or"hedearth/ poli"y, and the"reation of a partisan unit to guard and defend the motherlandA despite his temporary"reation of a partisan unit to guard and defend the motherlandA despite his temporarylapse and brea#down, Stalin had awa#ened and transformed into the national leader thatlapse and brea#down, Stalin had awa#ened and transformed into the national leader thatthe (ussian people "ould empathie and appeal to, someone who "ould assure them ofthe (ussian people "ould empathie and appeal to, someone who "ould assure them ofvi"tory '6it"hen 39)vi"tory '6it"hen 39)

(egardless of the initial su""ess of peration 8arbarossa in the $rst few months of the(egardless of the initial su""ess of peration 8arbarossa in the $rst few months of theinvasion, it was ultimately a failure by the end of 1941> the &ermans ground to a halt Bustinvasion, it was ultimately a failure by the end of 1941> the &ermans ground to a halt Bust

outside the gates of <os"ow by ovember of the same year, and despite the betteroutside the gates of <os"ow by ovember of the same year, and despite the better Budgment and wisdom of his e:perien"ed generals and o!"ers, %itler was against a Budgment and wisdom of his e:perien"ed generals and o!"ers, %itler was against ablit#rieg stri#e at <os"ow, instead, he ordered all three armies to *advan"eblit#rieg stri#e at <os"ow, instead, he ordered all three armies to *advan"esimultaneously, giving priority to a brea#through in the south+ 'ation 1-3)simultaneously, giving priority to a brea#through in the south+ 'ation 1-3)

The loss of initiative against <os"ow, "ombined with the onset of winter, the arrival of The loss of initiative against <os"ow, "ombined with the onset of winter, the arrival ofhu#ov to organie and "oordinate the defense of the (ussian "apitol, and the failure tohu#ov to organie and "oordinate the defense of the (ussian "apitol, and the failure toget Japan involved in the war against the Soviet Union, made peration 8arbarossa aget Japan involved in the war against the Soviet Union, made peration 8arbarossa afailure '?onaldson and ogee DD)failure '?onaldson and ogee DD)



#$%&' The Tide T!rns#$%&' The Tide T!rns 8y 1942 the war in the Eastern front had "hanged> The (ed8y 1942 the war in the Eastern front had "hanged> The (ed

0rmy was more e:perien"ed, better eFuipped, and highly0rmy was more e:perien"ed, better eFuipped, and highlymotivated to halt and "rush the &erman invadersmotivated to halt and "rush the &erman invaders The 8attle of Stalingrad whi"h ended with the surrender of the The 8attle of Stalingrad whi"h ended with the surrender of the

&erman Si:th army, and the $rst &erman $eld marshal of the&erman Si:th army, and the $rst &erman $eld marshal of thewar 'Griedri"h 7aulus) on January 21war 'Griedri"h 7aulus) on January 21stst 1942, was the $rst turning1942, was the $rst turningpoint for the (ed 0rmy '0dair 2-)point for the (ed 0rmy '0dair 2-)

%owever, while the destru"tion and surrender of the Si:th army%owever, while the destru"tion and surrender of the Si:th armywas a severe loss, it was in no way a fatal blow to thewas a severe loss, it was in no way a fatal blow to the;ehrma"ht> as @peration Citadel/ would show, the &ermans;ehrma"ht> as @peration Citadel/ would show, the &ermanswere still "apable of mounting large s"ale o=ensives a"ross thewere still "apable of mounting large s"ale o=ensives a"ross thevast (ussian lands"ape '0dair 22)vast (ussian lands"ape '0dair 22)

0ppro:imately si: months later, the &ermans laun"hed0ppro:imately si: months later, the &ermans laun"hedperation Citadel to overwhelm the 6urs# salient, and theperation Citadel to overwhelm the 6urs# salient, and thelargest ground battle in history began %aving re"eivedlargest ground battle in history began %aving re"eivedintelligen"e reports from allies, the Soviets were well preparedintelligen"e reports from allies, the Soviets were well preparedthis time, and they entren"hed themselves to meet thethis time, and they entren"hed themselves to meet the&ermans head on> *The salient, an area about half the sie of&ermans head on> *The salient, an area about half the sie ofEngland, was stu=ed with armour and infantry and awaited theEngland, was stu=ed with armour and infantry and awaited thene:t move+ '6it"hen -294.)ne:t move+ '6it"hen -294.)

n July Hn July Hthth 1942, the 91942, the 9thth army and 4army and 4thth 7aner division7aner divisionspearheaded the assault, thin#ing they "ould overwhelm thespearheaded the assault, thin#ing they "ould overwhelm theSoviet defenses with another blit#rieg stri#e Instead, theySoviet defenses with another blit#rieg stri#e Instead, they

were met with $er"e resistan"e in the form of tan# traps,were met with $er"e resistan"e in the form of tan# traps,entren"hed antitan# infantry divisions, improved T24 tan#s,entren"hed antitan# infantry divisions, improved T24 tan#s,and (ussian reserves ready to be "alled in for "ounteratta"#sand (ussian reserves ready to be "alled in for "ounteratta"#s0fter su=ering "ountless setba"#s, p Citadel was abandoned0fter su=ering "ountless setba"#s, p Citadel was abandonedon July 12on July 12thth, and the ;ehrma"ht su=ered its most "ostly and, and the ;ehrma"ht su=ered its most "ostly andsevere defeat>severe defeat> ** The 8attle of 6urs#, the @greatest tan# battle of all t ime/, was an The 8attle of 6urs#, the @greatest tan# battle of all time/, was an

appalling bloodbath, veteran soldiers insisting that it was the mostappalling bloodbath, veteran soldiers insisting that it was the mostbrutal engagement of the war The de"isive fa"tor was that thebrutal engagement of the war The de"isive fa"tor was that the&ermans had been defeated at the game they #new best Their elite&ermans had been defeated at the game they #new best Their elitearmoured units, eFuipped with the latest 7aner models and mannedarmoured units, eFuipped with the latest 7aner models and mannedby fresh troops, had been smashed, and the Soviets had $nally wonby fresh troops, had been smashed, and the Soviets had $nally wonthe strategi" initiative 6urs#, not Stalingrad, was the turning point ofthe strategi" initiative 6urs#, not Stalingrad, was the turning point of

the war on the Eastern Gront '6it"hen 241)the war on the Eastern Gront '6it"hen 241)



Operation Ba(ration; TheOperation Ba(ration; The

Backbreaker Backbreaker The 8yelorussian o=ensive in the summer of 1944 The 8yelorussian o=ensive in the summer of 1944

was arguably the most important and de"isivewas arguably the most important and de"isiveengagement of ;;II 'in the European theatre)engagement of ;;II 'in the European theatre)

Its su""ess was a "ombination of strategi"Its su""ess was a "ombination of strategi"planning and the use of de"eptive ta"ti"splanning and the use of de"eptive ta"ti"s''maskirovkamaskirovka) to fool the &erman %igh Command,) to fool the &erman %igh Command,and mas# the real obBe"tives and s"ale of theand mas# the real obBe"tives and s"ale of theo=ensive that was to be brought to bear againsto=ensive that was to be brought to bear against0rmy &roup Centre '0dair H5D.)0rmy &roup Centre '0dair H5D.)

** The Soviet su""ess depended upon the se"ret The Soviet su""ess depended upon the se"retdeployment of three armies, Ddeployment of three armies, D thth &uards and -5&uards and -5thth on the north and south an#s, and Hon the north and south an#s, and H thth &uards Tan#&uards Tan#as the Stav#a reserve The defeat of 0rmy &roupas the Stav#a reserve The defeat of 0rmy &roupCentre resulted in the destru"tion of about 2.Centre resulted in the destru"tion of about 2.divisions+ '0dair 131)divisions+ '0dair 131)

The a"tual number of "asualties from both sides is The a"tual number of "asualties from both sides isstill debated, and $gures for &ermany varystill debated, and $gures for &ermany varybetween -3H,... 2H.,... dead, andbetween -3H,... 2H.,... dead, andappro:imately 1H.,... &erman prisoners of warappro:imately 1H.,... &erman prisoners of warn the Soviet side, appro:imately 135,... died inn the Soviet side, appro:imately 135,... died inthe o=ensive, whi"h was roughly 5K of the for"esthe o=ensive, whi"h was roughly 5K of the for"esinvolved in the engagement '0dair 131)involved in the engagement '0dair 131)

Two senior &erman sta= o!"ers re"ognied the Two senior &erman sta= o!"ers re"ognied thesigni$"an"e of the o=ensive, and "ommented thatsigni$"an"e of the o=ensive, and "ommented that*the loss of 0rmy &roup Centre greatly*the loss of 0rmy &roup Centre greatlya""elerated the "ollapse of the &erman State+a""elerated the "ollapse of the &erman State+'0dair 131)'0dair 131)

;ith &erman for"es e=e"tively out of the Soviet;ith &erman for"es e=e"tively out of the SovietUnion, the (ed 0rmy pushed forward and #ept theUnion, the (ed 0rmy pushed forward and #ept the&ermans on the defensive all the way to 8erlin&ermans on the defensive all the way to 8erlin



The Yalta Conference' )eb. %*##+The Yalta Conference' )eb. %*##+

#$%,#$%, <eeting of the 8ig Three for dis"ussion and "ooperation over the future of<eeting of the 8ig Three for dis"ussion and "ooperation over the future of

Europe following the defeat of ai &ermanyEurope following the defeat of ai &ermany 0t the time of the "onferen"e, the (ed 0rmy was within 4. miles of 8erlin,0t the time of the "onferen"e, the (ed 0rmy was within 4. miles of 8erlin,

while the 0llied for"es in the west were re"overing from the @8attle of thewhile the 0llied for"es in the west were re"overing from the @8attle of the8ulge/ in the 0rdennes (oosevelt himself informed Stalin that Eisenhower8ulge/ in the 0rdennes (oosevelt himself informed Stalin that Eisenhowerdid not intend to "ross the (hine until <ar"h '6ennedy7ipe D9)did not intend to "ross the (hine until <ar"h '6ennedy7ipe D9)

Stalin a"tually made it "lear to hu#ov that he wanted 8erlin ta#en asStalin a"tually made it "lear to hu#ov that he wanted 8erlin ta#en as

Fui"#ly as possible in GebruaryA however, on Gebruary D, Stalin "an"elledFui"#ly as possible in GebruaryA however, on Gebruary D, Stalin "an"elledthe demand, having re"eived assuran"es from Chur"hill and (oosevelt thatthe demand, having re"eived assuran"es from Chur"hill and (oosevelt thatthe Soviet Union would be guaranteed its own o""upation one in &ermanythe Soviet Union would be guaranteed its own o""upation one in &ermanyafter the war '6ennedy7ipe 3-)after the war '6ennedy7ipe 3-)

The main "on"erns and points of interest throughout the Lalta "onferen"e The main "on"erns and points of interest throughout the Lalta "onferen"e"an be bro#en down into three "ategories>"an be bro#en down into three "ategories> The 7olish Muestion The 7olish Muestion

The future of &ermany and the *?e"laration on Niberated Europe+ The future of &ermany and the *?e"laration on Niberated Europe+ The "onditions for the entry of the Soviet Union into war with Japan The "onditions for the entry of the Soviet Union into war with Japan The "reation of the United ations rganiation was also dis"ussed at the The "reation of the United ations rganiation was also dis"ussed at the

Lalta "onferen"e, but its importan"e was relatively low in "omparison with Lalta "onferen"e, but its importan"e was relatively low in "omparison withthe other three points, espe"ially the future of 7oland and &ermanythe other three points, espe"ially the future of 7oland and &ermanyGurthermore, the issue was generally agreed upon, with Stalin a""eptingGurthermore, the issue was generally agreed upon, with Stalin a""eptingthe veto me"hanism and redu"ing his demand of the number of generalthe veto me"hanism and redu"ing his demand of the number of generalassembly seats for the Soviet Union from 1H to 2 'ation 1H2)assembly seats for the Soviet Union from 1H to 2 'ation 1H2)



Yalta cont’dYalta cont’d

The issue of 7oland was of "ru"ial signi$"an"e for The issue of 7oland was of "ru"ial signi$"an"e forall three powers 7oland was, after all, the reasonall three powers 7oland was, after all, the reasonwhy Gran"e and England de"lared war onwhy Gran"e and England de"lared war on&ermany, and as su"h, it was a "ru"ial point of&ermany, and as su"h, it was a "ru"ial point ofinterest between the two sides in the "onferen"einterest between the two sides in the "onferen"eut of the eight meetings in the Lalta "onferen"e,ut of the eight meetings in the Lalta "onferen"e,seven of them involved the Fuestion of 7oland,seven of them involved the Fuestion of 7oland,and four #ey aspe"ts were dis"ussed>and four #ey aspe"ts were dis"ussed> 0 formula for establishing a single provisional0 formula for establishing a single provisional

government for 7olandgovernment for 7oland %ow and when to hold free ele"tions%ow and when to hold free ele"tions 7ossible solutions to the future of 7oland/s frontiers, both7ossible solutions to the future of 7oland/s frontiers, both

in the east and the westin the east and the west Steps designed to safeguard the se"urity of the SovietSteps designed to safeguard the se"urity of the Soviet

rear '7etro and (ubinstein 45)rear '7etro and (ubinstein 45)



;hy was 7oland su"h a signi$"ant point of "oni"t between the two;hy was 7oland su"h a signi$"ant point of "oni"t between the twosidesOsidesO Gor Stalin, 7oland was a vital se"urity interest that would a"t as an essentialGor Stalin, 7oland was a vital se"urity interest that would a"t as an essential

bu=er one in the event of another invasion from the ;est Gor Stalin and thebu=er one in the event of another invasion from the ;est Gor Stalin and the(ussian people, the Se"ond ;orld ;ar had left a permanent s"ar on their(ussian people, the Se"ond ;orld ;ar had left a permanent s"ar on theiroutloo# of life, espe"ially "onsidering the unpre"edented $gures and "ostsoutloo# of life, espe"ially "onsidering the unpre"edented $gures and "oststhat the war had e:a"ted on the Soviet Union 'NaGeber -.)that the war had e:a"ted on the Soviet Union 'NaGeber -.)

Gor (oosevelt, the future of 7oland was a "ru"ial fa"tor for the future ofGor (oosevelt, the future of 7oland was a "ru"ial fa"tor for the future ofEastern and Central Europe, and %arriman '0meri"an ambassador to (ussia)Eastern and Central Europe, and %arriman '0meri"an ambassador to (ussia)warned (oosevelt that *Stalin must not be allowed to establishwarned (oosevelt that *Stalin must not be allowed to establish*Totalitarianism+ in Sovieto""upied territories,+ and that unless they were*Totalitarianism+ in Sovieto""upied territories,+ and that unless they werewilling to live in a Sovietdominated world, they should do everything theywilling to live in a Sovietdominated world, they should do everything they"an to e"onomi"ally assist states that were naturally friendly to them"an to e"onomi"ally assist states that were naturally friendly to them'NaGeber 13)'NaGeber 13)

(egarding &ermany, the 8ig Three dis"ussed the nature of how(egarding &ermany, the 8ig Three dis"ussed the nature of how&ermany should be dealt with after their un"onditional surrender&ermany should be dealt with after their un"onditional surrender'whi"h was agreed upon by all three heads) and how it would be'whi"h was agreed upon by all three heads) and how it would bepartitioned to allow for a free and demo"rati" Europe 7oints of "oni"tpartitioned to allow for a free and demo"rati" Europe 7oints of "oni"twere raised regarding the form of reparations that were to be paid outwere raised regarding the form of reparations that were to be paid outto the Soviet Union, and the in"lusion of Gran"e into the partitionto the Soviet Union, and the in"lusion of Gran"e into the partitionsystemsystem

Stalin was angered by the notion of Gran"e Boining in the partition ofStalin was angered by the notion of Gran"e Boining in the partition of&ermany be"ause of their poor performan"e in resisting and $ghting&ermany be"ause of their poor performan"e in resisting and $ghting&ermany throughout the war 0s for reparations, Stalin wanted to&ermany throughout the war 0s for reparations, Stalin wanted toeither destroy or relo"ate &erman industry to prevent them fromeither destroy or relo"ate &erman industry to prevent them fromdominating Europe in the future %e argued two points> that 5.K ofdominating Europe in the future %e argued two points> that 5.K of&ermany/s industrial "apa"ity should be dismantled, leaving the rest in&ermany/s industrial "apa"ity should be dismantled, leaving the rest in"ontrol of the 0lliesA and that &ermany would pay ba"# the Soviet"ontrol of the 0lliesA and that &ermany would pay ba"# the SovietUnion in reparations for the devastation that it "aused during the warUnion in reparations for the devastation that it "aused during the war

'6ennedy7ipe 32)'6ennedy7ipe 32)



The )ar -ast' the secret protocolThe )ar -ast' the secret protocol

The 0meri"an delegation was also "on"erned with the entran"e of the Soviet The 0meri"an delegation was also "on"erned with the entran"e of the SovietUnion into the war with JapanUnion into the war with Japan

Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan under "ertain "onditions>Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan under "ertain "onditions> The preservation of the status Fuo in the <ongolian 7eople/s (epubli" The preservation of the status Fuo in the <ongolian 7eople/s (epubli" The return of lost territories and rights that (ussia had lost to Japan after the war The return of lost territories and rights that (ussia had lost to Japan after the war

of 19.4H, namely the return of Southern Sa#halin and the anne:ation of theof 19.4H, namely the return of Southern Sa#halin and the anne:ation of the6urile Islands6urile Islands

The restoration of former (ussian e"onomi" privileges in <an"huria The restoration of former (ussian e"onomi" privileges in <an"huria The internationaliation of the "ommer"ial port of ?airen and the lease of 7ort The internationaliation of the "ommer"ial port of ?airen and the lease of 7ort

0rthur as a naval base of the Soviet Union restored '7etro and (ubinstein 49)0rthur as a naval base of the Soviet Union restored '7etro and (ubinstein 49) (oosevelt, with the advi"e and inuen"e from 0dmirals imit and 6ing, and(oosevelt, with the advi"e and inuen"e from 0dmirals imit and 6ing, and

&enerals <arshall and <"0rthur, a""epted the "onditions under whi"h Stalin&enerals <arshall and <"0rthur, a""epted the "onditions under whi"h Stalinproposed he would enter into war against Japan The reasoning behind theproposed he would enter into war against Japan The reasoning behind theneed for Soviet entran"e into the war was that it would ta#e anotherneed for Soviet entran"e into the war was that it would ta#e anothereighteen months to defeat Japan after the defeat of &ermany, and that theeighteen months to defeat Japan after the defeat of &ermany, and that the

invasion of mainland Japan would "ost 0meri"a dearly in terms of "asualtiesinvasion of mainland Japan would "ost 0meri"a dearly in terms of "asualtiesand resour"es '7etro and (ubinstein 49)and resour"es '7etro and (ubinstein 49) These "on"essions gave the Soviet Union a greater "ommanding presen"e These "on"essions gave the Soviet Union a greater "ommanding presen"e

in the far east, greater than what they originally had prior to 19.4 Ironi"allyin the far east, greater than what they originally had prior to 19.4 Ironi"allyenough, three months after the defeat of &ermany, the US0 found itself inenough, three months after the defeat of &ermany, the US0 found itself ina position "apable of bringing Japan to its #nees without the aid ora position "apable of bringing Japan to its #nees without the aid orassistan"e of the Soviet Union '7etro and (ubinstein 49)assistan"e of the Soviet Union '7etro and (ubinstein 49)



The res!lts of Yalta' s!ccess orThe res!lts of Yalta' s!ccess or

fail!refail!re n the Fuestion of 7oland, Stalin was resolute and unsha#able in his insisten"e of itsn the Fuestion of 7oland, Stalin was resolute and unsha#able in his insisten"e of its

strategi" importan"e to the Soviet Union, and the maintenan"e of the pro"ommunist Nublinstrategi" importan"e to the Soviet Union, and the maintenan"e of the pro"ommunist Nublin"ommittee as the de fa"to government of 7oland ?espite minor "on"essions and"ommittee as the de fa"to government of 7oland ?espite minor "on"essions and"ompromises made by Stalin to appease (oosevelt and Chur"hill on in"orporating some pro"ompromises made by Stalin to appease (oosevelt and Chur"hill on in"orporating some pro;estern 7oles in the government, the fa"t remained that 7oland was se"urely within the;estern 7oles in the government, the fa"t remained that 7oland was se"urely within theSoviet sphere of inuen"eA *the agreement was so elasti" the (ussians "ould stret"h it fromSoviet sphere of inuen"eA *the agreement was so elasti" the (ussians "ould stret"h it from

Lalta to ;ashington without brea#ing it+ 'NaGeber 1D) Lalta to ;ashington without brea#ing it+ 'NaGeber 1D) Even when (oosevelt attempted to de"rease the @elasti"ity/ of the "ompromise in 7olandEven when (oosevelt attempted to de"rease the @elasti"ity/ of the "ompromise in 7oland

through his *?e"laration of a Niberated Europe+ it was amended by Stalin and eventuallythrough his *?e"laration of a Niberated Europe+ it was amended by Stalin and eventually

a""epted by (oosevelt himself 'NaGeber 1D)a""epted by (oosevelt himself 'NaGeber 1D) ?espite the gains that Stalin was able to pull out from the Lalta "onferen"e, there were still?espite the gains that Stalin was able to pull out from the Lalta "onferen"e, there were still

some issues and demands that were either "ompromised or reBe"ted The issue ofsome issues and demands that were either "ompromised or reBe"ted The issue ofreparations from &ermany was left unresolvedA a (eparation Committee was established, butreparations from &ermany was left unresolvedA a (eparation Committee was established, butthere was no unanimous de"ision amongst the big three as to what the e:a"t sum ofthere was no unanimous de"ision amongst the big three as to what the e:a"t sum ofreparations was to be set at 'ation 1H-)reparations was to be set at 'ation 1H-)

Gurthermore, Stalin had to a""ept the role of Gran"e in postwar &ermany as a "on"ession toGurthermore, Stalin had to a""ept the role of Gran"e in postwar &ermany as a "on"ession toChur"hill for giving him 7oland as a bu=er one Chur"hill argued that @Gran"e was asChur"hill for giving him 7oland as a bu=er one Chur"hill argued that @Gran"e was asimportant to &reat 8ritain as 7oland was to the USS( 'ation 1H-)important to &reat 8ritain as 7oland was to the USS( 'ation 1H-)

The 0meri"ans a"hieved their goals of getting the Soviet Union involved in the war against The 0meri"ans a"hieved their goals of getting the Soviet Union involved in the war against Japan, as well as setting up the basi" foundations for the United ations and the voting Japan, as well as setting up the basi" foundations for the United ations and the votingmethods to be used in the Se"urity Coun"il '7etro and (ubinstein 45)methods to be used in the Se"urity Coun"il '7etro and (ubinstein 45)

In the end, the big three made "ompromises that would ensure mutual "ooperation until theIn the end, the big three made "ompromises that would ensure mutual "ooperation until theend of the war, and set the stage for a postwar pea"e following the defeat of Japanend of the war, and set the stage for a postwar pea"e following the defeat of Japan

The results of the Lalta "onferen"e "an be seen as a su""ess to an e:tent, in the form of The results of the Lalta "onferen"e "an be seen as a su""ess to an e:tent, in the form of"ooperation between the three heads of the most powerful states in the world It is espe"ially"ooperation between the three heads of the most powerful states in the world It is espe"iallyimpressive "onsidering the fa"t that "ooperation was a"hieved despite their opposingimpressive "onsidering the fa"t that "ooperation was a"hieved despite their opposingideologi"al interests>ideologi"al interests> ** The Lalta negotiators "onfronted numerous "oni"ts of interest, but a mutual willingness to The Lalta negotiators "onfronted numerous "oni"ts of interest, but a mutual willingness to

"ompromise ultimately allowed the vital "on"erns of all parti"ipants to be a""ommodated+ 'ation 1H-)"ompromise ultimately allowed the vital "on"erns of all parti"ipants to be a""ommodated+ 'ation 1H-)



The Controers" behind YaltaThe Controers" behind Yalta

The results of the Lalta "onferen"e have spar#ed many debates and theories regarding a The results of the Lalta "onferen"e have spar#ed many debates and theories regarding avariety of issues, ranging from the division of Europe to the trea"hery of the Soviet Unionvariety of issues, ranging from the division of Europe to the trea"hery of the Soviet Unionin failing to uphold its end of the bargain Some "laim that Eastern and Central Europe,in failing to uphold its end of the bargain Some "laim that Eastern and Central Europe,along with parts of the far East, were sold out to Stalin, in return for re"ognition ofalong with parts of the far East, were sold out to Stalin, in return for re"ognition of0meri"an and 8ritish interests in ;estern Europe and 0sia0meri"an and 8ritish interests in ;estern Europe and 0sia

This theory, however, ultimately fails The agreements that were made "on"erning the This theory, however, ultimately fails The agreements that were made "on"erning the"ontrol and inuen"e over "ertain parts of Eastern and Central Europe were a ree"tion of"ontrol and inuen"e over "ertain parts of Eastern and Central Europe were a ree"tion ofthe reality of the situation that en"ompassed the area following the Soviet thrusts intothe reality of the situation that en"ompassed the area following the Soviet thrusts into(umania, 8ulgaria, %ungary and 7oland throughout the "ourse of the war> *if anything,(umania, 8ulgaria, %ungary and 7oland throughout the "ourse of the war> *if anything,what happened at Lalta was an attempt by the ;est to mitigate the reality of the Sovietwhat happened at Lalta was an attempt by the ;est to mitigate the reality of the Soviet"ontrol in the East+ '6ennedy7ipe D9)"ontrol in the East+ '6ennedy7ipe D9)

The reality of Lalta was both an a!rmation of regional power politi"s and selfinterested The reality of Lalta was both an a!rmation of regional power politi"s and selfinterestedgoals, as well as the desire to establish a pea"eful and stable postwar setting that wouldgoals, as well as the desire to establish a pea"eful and stable postwar setting that woulda""ommodate all three powers> *what o""urred at Lalta was a "lassi" negotiating pro"essa""ommodate all three powers> *what o""urred at Lalta was a "lassi" negotiating pro"ess"hara"teried by hardbargaining and mutual "on"essions 0n en"ounter in whi"h they"hara"teried by hardbargaining and mutual "on"essions 0n en"ounter in whi"h theypried agreement by traditional negotiation as preferable to unilateral a"tion whi"h mightpried agreement by traditional negotiation as preferable to unilateral a"tion whi"h mightundermine the international stability+ 'ation 1H2)undermine the international stability+ 'ation 1H2)

;hen the Soviet Union intervened in the politi"al a=airs of (umania two wee#s after the;hen the Soviet Union intervened in the politi"al a=airs of (umania two wee#s after the

Lalta "onferen"e, (oosevelt alleged that Stalin had fallen ba"# on his word regarding the Lalta "onferen"e, (oosevelt alleged that Stalin had fallen ba"# on his word regarding the@?e"laration of Niberated Europe/ %owever, the "ase for (umania was easily ripped apart@?e"laration of Niberated Europe/ %owever, the "ase for (umania was easily ripped apartby <olotov, and despite 0meri"an dissatisfa"tion, the fa"t remained that (umania was anby <olotov, and despite 0meri"an dissatisfa"tion, the fa"t remained that (umania was anintegral part of the Soviet sphere of inuen"e over Eastern Europe 'NaGeber 13) <oreover,integral part of the Soviet sphere of inuen"e over Eastern Europe 'NaGeber 13) <oreover,Chur"hill himself turned a blind eye to the events o""urring in (umania in return forChur"hill himself turned a blind eye to the events o""urring in (umania in return forStalin/s nonintervention in &ree"eStalin/s nonintervention in &ree"e

These would inevitably a=e"t the poli"ies and politi"s that would be dis"ussed at the These would inevitably a=e"t the poli"ies and politi"s that would be dis"ussed at the"onferen"e in 7otsdam in July 194H, following the defeat of ai &ermany"onferen"e in 7otsdam in July 194H, following the defeat of ai &ermany



The Potsdam Conference' /!l" #0The Potsdam Conference' /!l" #0

1 2!(!st #+ #$%, 1 2!(!st #+ #$%, ""urring $ve months after the Lalta "onferen"e, the meetings in""urring $ve months after the Lalta "onferen"e, the meetings in

7otsdam revolved around some similar issues, but the "onte:t of7otsdam revolved around some similar issues, but the "onte:t ofthe "onferen"e, and the a"tors, had "hanged dramati"allythe "onferen"e, and the a"tors, had "hanged dramati"ally

&ermany had been defeated, (oosevelt was dead and repla"ed&ermany had been defeated, (oosevelt was dead and repla"edby Truman, the poli"ies and "on"essions of Lalta were beingby Truman, the poli"ies and "on"essions of Lalta were beingFuestioned, and the su""essful testing of the atomi" bomb wouldFuestioned, and the su""essful testing of the atomi" bomb would

ultimately "hange the fate of the postwar worldultimately "hange the fate of the postwar world



Ob3ecties of PotsdamOb3ecties of Potsdam

The primary goals of the "onferen"e was to "ome to terms over three important The primary goals of the "onferen"e was to "ome to terms over three importantissues that were left unresolved from LaltaA the fate of former ai satelliteissues that were left unresolved from LaltaA the fate of former ai satellitestates 'espe"ially Italy), the borders of 7oland, and the Fuestion of reparations,states 'espe"ially Italy), the borders of 7oland, and the Fuestion of reparations,whi"h was the subBe"t of mu"h debate and "ontestation between all three sideswhi"h was the subBe"t of mu"h debate and "ontestation between all three sides'Lergin 114)'Lergin 114)

The issue of reparations was "ontested between the two sides when the The issue of reparations was "ontested between the two sides when the0meri"ans and 8ritish argued that payments were to be made $rst to the0meri"ans and 8ritish argued that payments were to be made $rst to the"reditors '0meri"an and 8ritish ban#ers), while <olotov argued that the Soviets"reditors '0meri"an and 8ritish ban#ers), while <olotov argued that the SovietsreFuired initial payments to o=set the huge s"ale of destru"tion andreFuired initial payments to o=set the huge s"ale of destru"tion anddevastation &ermany had "aused to the Soviet Union 'Lergin 114)devastation &ermany had "aused to the Soviet Union 'Lergin 114)

n matters of former satellite states there was also a failure of negotiations>n matters of former satellite states there was also a failure of negotiations>when as#ed if Stalin would normalie relations with Italy, Stalin responded bywhen as#ed if Stalin would normalie relations with Italy, Stalin responded bybasi"ally as#ing Truman and the 0meri"an government to normalie relationsbasi"ally as#ing Truman and the 0meri"an government to normalie relationswith 8ulgaria, (umania and %ungary 0s 8yrnes noted, however, Truman "ouldwith 8ulgaria, (umania and %ungary 0s 8yrnes noted, however, Truman "ouldnot re"ognie the three Eastern European states, not with their "urrentnot re"ognie the three Eastern European states, not with their "urrentgovernments at least 'Lergin 114)governments at least 'Lergin 114)

Ginally, on the Fuestion of 7oland/s frontiers, there too e:isted "oni"t TheGinally, on the Fuestion of 7oland/s frontiers, there too e:isted "oni"t The0meri"an delegation in parti"ular, feared that by giving more land to 7oland,0meri"an delegation in parti"ular, feared that by giving more land to 7oland,they were e=e"tively "onstraining and damaging &ermany/s potentialthey were e=e"tively "onstraining and damaging &ermany/s potentiale"onomi" and industrial rebirth 'Lergin 11H)e"onomi" and industrial rebirth 'Lergin 11H)

?espite a "omplete failure of negotiations in the initial phase of the 7otsdam?espite a "omplete failure of negotiations in the initial phase of the 7otsdam"onferen"e, Lergin argues that there would eventually be renewed, and"onferen"e, Lergin argues that there would eventually be renewed, andsu""essful, attempts at resolving these disputes in the near future, than#s insu""essful, attempts at resolving these disputes in the near future, than#s inpart to the su""essful testing of the most destru"tive weapon invented by manpart to the su""essful testing of the most destru"tive weapon invented by man

Th 2 B b d i li i lTh 2t B b d it liti l



The 2tom Bomb and its politicalThe 2tom Bomb and its political

impact on post*war -!rope and theimpact on post*war -!rope and the

worldworld The atom bomb fundamentally "hanged the outloo#, ambitions and The atom bomb fundamentally "hanged the outloo#, ambitions and

goals of the 0meri"an delegation at the "onferen"e in 7otsdam Thegoals of the 0meri"an delegation at the "onferen"e in 7otsdam Thefa"t that 0meri"a possessed a weapon more powerful than anythingfa"t that 0meri"a possessed a weapon more powerful than anythingever invented by man gave Truman an undeniable sense ofever invented by man gave Truman an undeniable sense ofsuperiority, and greater impatien"e, throughout the rest of thesuperiority, and greater impatien"e, throughout the rest of thepro"eedings following su""essful "on$rmation of the bombs testingpro"eedings following su""essful "on$rmation of the bombs testing'Lergin 11H)'Lergin 11H)

%owever, despite the "hange in attitude, Truman, and 8yrnes in%owever, despite the "hange in attitude, Truman, and 8yrnes inparti"ular, pressed for a Fui"# end to the "onferen"e by proposing aparti"ular, pressed for a Fui"# end to the "onferen"e by proposing apa"#age deal that would serve the interests of the Soviet Union,pa"#age deal that would serve the interests of the Soviet Union,8ritain and 0meri"a 0 solution was o=ered on the issue of8ritain and 0meri"a 0 solution was o=ered on the issue ofreparations, and 8yrnes noted that if Stalin a""epted the "ompromisereparations, and 8yrnes noted that if Stalin a""epted the "ompromiseon reparations, than the ;est would a""ept "on"essions on matters ofon reparations, than the ;est would a""ept "on"essions on matters of

territorial interest for the Soviet Union in the East, so long as intereststerritorial interest for the Soviet Union in the East, so long as interestsover Italy and the ;est were respe"ted by Stalin 'Lergin 113)over Italy and the ;est were respe"ted by Stalin 'Lergin 113) The logi" behind a Fui"# end to the "onferen"e was based on the The logi" behind a Fui"# end to the "onferen"e was based on the

strategi" importan"e of "onstraining Soviet e:pansion and ambition instrategi" importan"e of "onstraining Soviet e:pansion and ambition inthe far East, espe"ially in Japan ;ith the 0tom 8omb, 0meri"a nothe far East, espe"ially in Japan ;ith the 0tom 8omb, 0meri"a nolonger needed Soviet assistan"e to "rush Japan be"ause an invasionlonger needed Soviet assistan"e to "rush Japan be"ause an invasionwas no longer ne"essary 'Lergin 11D)was no longer ne"essary 'Lergin 11D)



The 2tom Bomb cont’dThe 2tom Bomb cont’d

;hy did the bomb suddenly "hange the ambitions and goals for;hy did the bomb suddenly "hange the ambitions and goals for Truman and allow the 0meri"an delegation to ma#e "on"essions for Truman and allow the 0meri"an delegation to ma#e "on"essions forthe Soviet Union that were, up until that point, in"on"eivableO Thethe Soviet Union that were, up until that point, in"on"eivableO Theanswer lies in a statement made by &eneral <"0rthur in response toanswer lies in a statement made by &eneral <"0rthur in response tothe 0tomi" 8omb> *;ell, this "hanges warfareP+ Indeed, as Lerginthe 0tomi" 8omb> *;ell, this "hanges warfareP+ Indeed, as Lerginnotes, the leap in te"hnologi"al warfare *was a dismal promise tonotes, the leap in te"hnologi"al warfare *was a dismal promise toma#e geography meaningless+ 'Lergin 1-.)ma#e geography meaningless+ 'Lergin 1-.)

8efore the bomb, "on"erns for the se"urity of Eastern and Central8efore the bomb, "on"erns for the se"urity of Eastern and CentralEurope were dependant on "onventional methods of warfare TheEurope were dependant on "onventional methods of warfare The8omb pra"ti"ally eliminated those barriers by ma#ing it possible to8omb pra"ti"ally eliminated those barriers by ma#ing it possible toimpose se"urity on any lo"ation in the globeimpose se"urity on any lo"ation in the globe

Thus, while it "ould be argued that the bomb was an important Thus, while it "ould be argued that the bomb was an importantfa"tor that allowed the 8ig Three to ma#e "ompromises andfa"tor that allowed the 8ig Three to ma#e "ompromises and"on"essions that served their selfinterests, the fa"t remains that the"on"essions that served their selfinterests, the fa"t remains that thebomb inevitably resulted in a deep sense of inse"urity 'Lergin 1-.)bomb inevitably resulted in a deep sense of inse"urity 'Lergin 1-.)

;hen Truman $rst hinted to Stalin on July -4;hen Truman $rst hinted to Stalin on July -4 thth that 0meri"a possessthat 0meri"a possessa weapon of unimaginable power, Stalin responded, in ana weapon of unimaginable power, Stalin responded, in anunin"hing manner, that he hoped they would use it to its fullunin"hing manner, that he hoped they would use it to its fullpotential against Japan 'ation 1D-)potential against Japan 'ation 1D-)



Res!lts of the PotsdamRes!lts of the Potsdam

Conference' s!ccess or fail!reConference' s!ccess or fail!re Compromise was made to in"rease the frontiers of 7oland, pushing itCompromise was made to in"rease the frontiers of 7oland, pushing it

westward up to the dereisse line In return, a demand for a $:ed sumwestward up to the dereisse line In return, a demand for a $:ed sum"ompensation out of &ermany/s industry was dropped by Stalin Instead, it"ompensation out of &ermany/s industry was dropped by Stalin Instead, itwas agreed upon by the 8ig Three that reparations would be e:tra"ted outwas agreed upon by the 8ig Three that reparations would be e:tra"ted outof their own o""upation ones, with the Soviet Union being allowed anof their own o""upation ones, with the Soviet Union being allowed anadditional 1HK of @unne"essary/ "apital eFuipment out of ;estern ones inadditional 1HK of @unne"essary/ "apital eFuipment out of ;estern ones inreturn for raw materials and foodstu=s from the East, and an additionalreturn for raw materials and foodstu=s from the East, and an additional

1.K with no e:"hange 'Lergin 11315)1.K with no e:"hange 'Lergin 11315) (egarding the spheres of inuen"e over Europe, the "ommon approa"h was(egarding the spheres of inuen"e over Europe, the "ommon approa"h wasto let ea"h side retain their separate interests in their own ones, for la"#to let ea"h side retain their separate interests in their own ones, for la"#of a better approa"h> *8e"ause they "ould not agree on how to governof a better approa"h> *8e"ause they "ould not agree on how to governEurope, they began to divide it+ 'Lergin 115)Europe, they began to divide it+ 'Lergin 115)

Thus, the fate of Eastern Europe was left in the hands of the Soviet Union, Thus, the fate of Eastern Europe was left in the hands of the Soviet Union,while Italy remained in the hands of the ;estern powers 'Lergin 115)while Italy remained in the hands of the ;estern powers 'Lergin 115)

Ni#e Lalta, the 7otsdam "onferen"e "an be seen as a su""ess in the form ofNi#e Lalta, the 7otsdam "onferen"e "an be seen as a su""ess in the form of

mutual "ooperation between the two emerging superpowers of the worldmutual "ooperation between the two emerging superpowers of the world?espite their radi"ally polaried perspe"tives and ambitions, Truman and?espite their radi"ally polaried perspe"tives and ambitions, Truman andStalin, with the help of their aides and advisors, were able to hammer out aStalin, with the help of their aides and advisors, were able to hammer out apostwar environment that left both sides relatively satis$edpostwar environment that left both sides relatively satis$ed

%owever, li#e Lalta, 7otsdam "an also be seen as a failure due to some of%owever, li#e Lalta, 7otsdam "an also be seen as a failure due to some ofthe "ontroversies that arose shortly after its "on"lusion The weight of thethe "ontroversies that arose shortly after its "on"lusion The weight of the0tomi" 8omb had "ast an un"ertain future for the balan"e of power in not0tomi" 8omb had "ast an un"ertain future for the balan"e of power in notonly Europe, but of the worldonly Europe, but of the world



Concl!sion' the sta(e is set for theConcl!sion' the sta(e is set for the

Cold War Cold War The "onferen"es held at Lalta and 7otsdam "an be The "onferen"es held at Lalta and 7otsdam "an beargued to have laid the foundations for the end of theargued to have laid the foundations for the end of theSe"ond ;orld ;ar and the beginning of the Cold ;arSe"ond ;orld ;ar and the beginning of the Cold ;ar

The shortterm "onsiderations that were a"hieved at The shortterm "onsiderations that were a"hieved atboth "onferen"es ree"ted the selfinterestedboth "onferen"es ree"ted the selfinterestedobBe"tives that the 8ig Three had in mind for theirobBe"tives that the 8ig Three had in mind for theirrespe"tive spheres of inuen"e The prin"iple fa"torrespe"tive spheres of inuen"e The prin"iple fa"torthat guided the "onferen"es was based on mutualthat guided the "onferen"es was based on mutual"ooperation to end the war, and the desire for"ooperation to end the war, and the desire forpea"eful "oe:isten"e in the postwar period 8ypea"eful "oe:isten"e in the postwar period 8y

Lalta, the Soviet Union stood as a military Lalta, the Soviet Union stood as a militarysuperpower that was more than "apable of $nishingsuperpower that was more than "apable of $nishing&ermany o= on her own The "on"essions made by&ermany o= on her own The "on"essions made byChur"hill and (oosevelt was a ree"tion of this realityChur"hill and (oosevelt was a ree"tion of this realityConseFuently, Truman and the 0meri"an delegation,ConseFuently, Truman and the 0meri"an delegation,fearful of the threat that the Soviets posed on all offearful of the threat that the Soviets posed on all ofEurope, were determined to ta#e a hardlineEurope, were determined to ta#e a hardlineapproa"h to "urtail Soviet interests and ambitions, atapproa"h to "urtail Soviet interests and ambitions, atleast until the advent of the bomb 0nd while theleast until the advent of the bomb 0nd while theCold ;ar was pra"ti"ally inevitable with theCold ;ar was pra"ti"ally inevitable with theintrodu"tion of the bomb, it seemed, for a shortintrodu"tion of the bomb, it seemed, for a short

while, that diploma"y and "oe:isten"e was possible,while, that diploma"y and "oe:isten"e was possible,and that after witnessing the most destru"tive,and that after witnessing the most destru"tive,"ostly, horri$", and inhumane war in history, pea"e"ostly, horri$", and inhumane war in history, pea"ewas perhaps somewhat plausible The use of thewas perhaps somewhat plausible The use of thebomb in %iroshima and agasa#i, however, shatteredbomb in %iroshima and agasa#i, however, shatteredthat vision, and the "onseFuent politi"al andthat vision, and the "onseFuent politi"al andideologi"al struggles of the following year betweenideologi"al struggles of the following year betweenthe two superpowers made the Cold ;ar anthe two superpowers made the Cold ;ar aninevitable "onseFuen"einevitable "onseFuen"e



Works Cited'Works Cited'

0dair, 7aul0dair, 7aul Hitler’s Greatest Defeat: Disaster on the Eastern Front Hitler’s Greatest Defeat: Disaster on the Eastern Front Nondon> (igel 7ubli"ations, 1994Nondon> (igel 7ubli"ations, 1994

?onaldson, (obert % and ogee, Joseph N?onaldson, (obert % and ogee, Joseph N The Foreign Policy ofThe Foreign Policy ofRussia: Changing SystemsRussia: Changing Systems En!uring "nterestsEn!uring "nterests ew Lor#> Sharpe ew Lor#> Sharpe7ublishing, -..H7ublishing, -..H

6ennedy7ipe, Caroline6ennedy7ipe, Caroline Russia an! the #orl! $%$&'$%%$Russia an! the #orl! $%$&'$%%$ ew Lor#> ew Lor#>

:ford University 7ress, 1995:ford University 7ress, 1995 6it"hen, <artin6it"hen, <artin ( ( #orl! in Flames: a short history of the Secon!#orl! in Flames: a short history of the Secon!#orl! #ar in Euro)e an! (sia $%*%'$%+,#orl! #ar in Euro)e an! (sia $%*%'$%+, Nondon> Nongman &roup Nondon> Nongman &roupU6 Nimited, 199.U6 Nimited, 199.

NaGeber, ;alterNaGeber, ;alter (merica Russia an! the Col! #ar $%+,'-../ (merica Russia an! the Col! #ar $%+,'-../ ew ew Lor#> <"&raw %ill, -..5 Lor#> <"&raw %ill, -..5

ation, Craig (ation, Craig ( 0lack Earth Re! Star: ( History0lack Earth Re! Star: ( History of Soviet Securityof Soviet Security

Policy $%$&'$%%$Policy $%$&'$%%$ Itha"a> Cornel University 7ress, 199- Itha"a> Cornel University 7ress, 199- 7etro, i"olai and (ubinstein 0lvin 7etro, i"olai and (ubinstein 0lvin Russian Foreign Policy: fromRussian Foreign Policy: from

em)ire to nation'stateem)ire to nation'state ew Lor#> 0ddison ;esley Nongman, in", ew Lor#> 0ddison ;esley Nongman, in",19931993

Lergin, ?aniel % Lergin, ?aniel % Shattere! Peace: The 1rigins of the Col! #ar an!Shattere! Peace: The 1rigins of the Col! #ar an!the 2ational Security Statethe 2ational Security State 8oston> %oughton <iQin Company, 1935 8oston> %oughton <iQin Company, 1935

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