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Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR0000243 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-35831-ML, IDA 3583A-ML, IDA 35830-ML) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 34.2 MILLION (US$43.5 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND ON AN ADDITIONAL FINANCING IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 13.3 MILLION (US$20 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF MALI FOR A AGRICULTURAL SERVICES AND PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS PROJECT June 28, 2010 Agriculture and Rural Development Unit (AFTAR) Sustainable Development Department Country Department AFCF1 Africa Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

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  • Document of The World Bank

    Report No: ICR0000243

    IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-35831-ML, IDA 3583A-ML, IDA 35830-ML)

    ON A

    CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 34.2 MILLION

    (US$43.5 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

    AND ON AN

    ADDITIONAL FINANCING IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 13.3 MILLION

    (US$20 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

    TO THE

    REPUBLIC OF MALI

    FOR A

    AGRICULTURAL SERVICES AND PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS PROJECT

    June 28, 2010

    Agriculture and Rural Development Unit (AFTAR) Sustainable Development Department Country Department AFCF1 Africa Region

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    CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

    ( Exchange Rate Effective June 15, 2010 ) Currency Unit = FCFA (XOF)

    US$1.00 = FCFA 535 US$ 1.00 = SDR 0.680

    Fiscal Year

    January 1 – December 31

    ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

    AF Additional Financing APCAM Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d’Agriculture du Mali

    (Permanent Assembly of Mali Agricultural Chambers) APL Adaptable Program Loan ASPOP Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Program CARI Cellule d’Appui aux Réformes Institutionnelles (Institutional Reform Support Unit) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CDI Commissariat au Développement Institutionnel (Institutional Development

    Commissionership) CFAF Franc CFA (XOF) CLCE Cadre Local de Concertation et d’Echange (Local Consultation Framework) CMDT Compagnie Malienne des Textiles (Malian Cotton Company) CNRA Comité National de la Recherche Agricole (National Agricultural Research

    Committee) CNU Commission Nationale des Utilisateurs des Résultats de la Recherche (National

    Committee of Users of Research Results CRA Chambre Régionale d’Agriculture (Regional Chamber of Agriculture) CRCE Cadre Régional de Concertation et d’Echange (Regional Consultation

    Framework) CRU Comité Régional des Utilisateurs des Résultats de la Recherche (Regional

    Committee of Users of Research Results) DAF Direction Administrative et Financière (Financial and Administrative Division) DNA Direction Nationale de l’Agriculture (National Directorate of Agriculture) ERR Economic Rate of Return FAPP Fostering Agricultural Productivity Program FNDA Fonds National de Développement Agricole (Agricultural Development National

    Fund) FRR Financial Rate of Return GoM Government of Mali GPRSF Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework ICR Im plementation Completion Results Report IDA International Development Association IER Institut d’Economie Rurale (Institute for Rural Economics) IOI Intermediate Outcome Indicator

  • iii

    IPM Integrated Pest management IPR Institut Polytechnique Rural (Rural Polytechnic Institute) ISR Implementation Status and Results Report IRR Internal Rate of Return LOA Loi d’Orientation Agricole (Agricultural Framework Law) MA Ministry of Agriculture MDR Ministère du Développement Rural (Ministry of Rural Development) MES Ministry of Environment and Sanitation MLF Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MTEF Mid-Term Expenditure Framework NA Not Applicable NAES National Agricultural Extension System NARS National Agricultural Research System NARC National Agricultural Research Committee NGO Non-Governm ental Organization NRM Natural Resources Management NPV Net Present value OED Operations Evaluation Department OPA Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles (Agricultural Organizations) OPCS Operations Policy and Country Services PAD Project Appraisal Document PAPAM Projet d’Appui à la Productivité Agricole au Mali PASAOP Programme d’Appui aux Services Agricoles et aux Organisations Paysannes

    (Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project ) PD CARPPE

    Plan de Développement pour la Croissance Agricole, la Réduction de Pauvreté et la Protection de l’Environnement (Development Plan for Agricultural Growth, Poverty Reduction and Protection of the Environment)

    PCU Project Coordination Unit PDO Project Development Objective PDO-I Project Development Outcome Indicator PNRA Programme National de Recherche Agricole (National Agricultural Research

    Program) PNVA Programme National de Vulgarisation Agricole (National Agricultural Extension

    Program) PO Producer Organization R&E Research and Extension S&E Suivi et Evaluation (Monitoring and Evaluation) RGA Recensement Général de l’Agriculture (General Agricultural Census) TORs Terms of Reference TTL Task Team Leader WAAPP West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program WDR World Development Report

  • iv

    Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Habib M. Fetini Sector Manager: Karen Mcconnell Brooks

    Project Team Leader: Agadiou Dama ICR Team Leader: Maniével Sène

  • v

    MALI AGRICULTURAL SERVICES AND PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS PROJECT

    CONTENTS

    Data Sheet

    A. Basic Information ...................................................................................................... viB. Key Dates .................................................................................................................. viC. Ratings Summary ...................................................................................................... viD. Sector and Theme Codes ......................................................................................... viiE. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................. viiF. Results Framework Analysis ................................................................................... viiiG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs .................................................................. xiiH. Restructuring ............................................................................................................ xiiI. Disbursement Profile ............................................................................................... xiii1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 43. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................ 94. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 165. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 176. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 197. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 20Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 22Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 24Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 31Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 43Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 45Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 46Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 48Annex 8. Comments of Co financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ...................... 56Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 60MAP .............................................................................................................................. 62

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    A. Basic Information

    Country: Mali Project Name:

    AGRICULTURAL SERVICES AND PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS PROJECT

    Project ID: P035630 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-35830,IDA-35831,IDA-3583A

    ICR Date: 06/30/2010 ICR Type: Core ICR

    Lending Instrument: APL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF MALI

    Original Total Commitment:

    XDR 34.2M Disbursed Amount: XDR 45.8M

    Revised Amount: XDR 47.0M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Cellule de Coordintion Comite National de la Recherche Agricole (CNRA) Direction Nationale de l'Agriculture (DNA) Assemblee Permanente des Chambres d'Agriculture du Mali (APCAM) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Local Farmer Organizations B. Key Dates

    Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 01/13/2000 Effectiveness: 08/21/2002 08/21/2002 Appraisal: 02/12/2001 Restructuring(s): Approval: 12/11/2001 Mid-term Review: 06/30/2004 01/28/2005 Closing: 12/31/2005 12/31/2009 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

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    C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

    Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Moderately Unsatisfactory

    Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

    Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

    Overall Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

    C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

    Implementation Performance Indicators

    QAG Assessments (if any) Rating

    Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

    No Quality at Entry (QEA):

    None

    Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

    No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

    None

    DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

    Moderately Satisfactory

    D. Sector and Theme Codes

    Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Agricultural extension and research 55 55 Animal production 5 5 Central government administration 23 23 Crops 15 15 Health 2 2

    Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Administrative and civil service reform 24 24 Decentralization 13 13 Other financial and private sector development 13 13 Rural policies and institutions 25 25 Rural services and infrastructure 25 25 E. Bank Staff

    Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Habib M. Fetini A. David Craig Sector Manager: Karen Mcconnell Brooks Joseph Baah-Dwomoh

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    Project Team Leader: Agadiou Dama Daniel Moreau ICR Team Leader: Manievel Sene

    ICR Primary Author: Franz Schorosch and Manievel Sene

    F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the first phase of the program (the Project- PASAOP) is to establish an institutional Framework conducive to the efficient delivery of agricultural services to the producers. The project w ill support the decentrali zation of core functions in the Minis try of Rural Development (MDR), promote the em ergence of private acto rs in the exec ution of agricultural support servic es, and e mpower producer or ganizations. De mand-driven mechanisms will be developed with the vari ous stakeho lders for the d esign, selection, financing and the execution of technology gene ration and transfer programs and projects, to improve the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of such activities. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The Project Development Objectives were not revised. (a) PDO Indicator(s)

    Indicator Baseline Value

    Original Target Values (from

    approval documents)

    Formally Revised Target Values

    Actual Value Achieved at

    Completion or Target Years

    Indicator 1 : Share of MDR work programs ad hoc budgets managed at regional levels reaches 80% Value quantitative or Qualitative)

    10% 80% 70%

    Date achieved 05/10/2003 12/31/2005 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Five new ministries against one in the beginning (National budget figures) among which work programs ad hoc budgets managed at regional levels reaches 79% for MA; 69% for MES; 62% for MLF

    Indicator 2 : Extension agents at local level are managed by local governments or POs Value quantitative or Qualitative)

    0 800 720 extension agents

    Date achieved 05/10/2003 12/31/2005 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    11,418 Performance contracts have been signed between farmers' organizations, communes and 720 extension agents

    Indicator 3 : Cost sharing formula between different levels of government and with the private sectors are introduced in 5 pilots areas

  • ix

    Value quantitative or Qualitative)

    0 73 296

    Date achieved 05/10/2003 12/31/2005 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    296 contracts signed with private sector (99 in cotton area) Mayors of communes and/or farmers paid 20% of the cost of extension during the test phase (2004 - 2006)

    Indicator 4 : Improved AIDS prevention messages and PNLS outreach program

    Value quantitative or Qualitative)

    No specific program devoted to HIV/AIDS prevention in the Ministry of Agriculture

    7500 7500

    Date achieved 05/10/2003 12/31/2005 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Indicator 5 : Proportion of targeted farms (number of farms families) benefiting from new goat breed that reach a productivity level of 1.5 liter per day Value quantitative or Qualitative)

    0 75% Additional Financing 62%

    Date achieved 05/30/2007 06/30/2009 04/30/2007 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Achieved at 82.7%

    Indicator 6 : Proportion of targeted cowpea producers whose net profit per ha has increased by at least 20% Value quantitative or Qualitative)

    27310CFA Franc per ha 70% Additional Financing 62%

    Date achieved 05/30/2007 06/30/2009 04/30/2007 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Achieved at 88.6%

    (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

    Indicator Baseline Value

    Original Target Values (from

    approval documents)

    Formally Revised

    Target Values

    Actual Value Achieved at

    Completion or Target Years

    Indicator 1 : MDR's non-core functions are divested: Functions, services transferred to private sector

    Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

    Managed by the State (Government)

    Transfer of veterinary services and artificial insemination

    Animal health: 65% of vaccine services provided by 135 private veterinary agents;

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    Private artificial insemination: a total of 8400 cows and 200 goats artificially inseminated by 18 private agents

    Date achieved 05/10/2003 12/31/2005 12/31/2009

    Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Animal health mandate transferred: Artificial insemination transferred in Bamako district: Areas of slaughter transferred to municipalities, two slaughterhouses transferred to private operators: 14 technical and management services transferred to APCAM

    Indicator 2 : A rural communication strategy and an action plan are ready for implementation

    Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

    No ad-hoc strategy at the Ministry of Agriculture level

    Action plans at the national and regional level are operational

    The strategy was approved; Regional plans approved during a national workshop

    Date achieved 05/10/2003 12/31/2005 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Indicator 3 : CNRA is reorganized with increased producer participation in decision making in research

    Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

    Strategic research :76%, R&D research (on farm and participatory research with producers) :24%

    CNRA reorganization completed; Strategic research :20% and R&D :80%

    Strategic research: 50% and R&D: 50%; Research user consultative commissions are operational at the regional level; Number of institutions engaged in research increases from 2 to 5; Increased regional and international collaboration

    Date achieved 05/10/2003 12/31/2005 12/31/2009

    Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Research proposals reviewed by regional committees including representatives of producer organizations; Research/extension interface commissions are operational at regional level: M&E systems established including management information system

    Indicator 4 : Extension services are provided on a contractual basis Value (quantitative N/A

    800 civil servants 160 contracts in

    11,418 Performance contracts with 720

  • xi

    or Qualitative) pilot areas civil servant extension agents and 296 contracts with private agents in the 5 pilot areas

    Date achieved 05/10/2003 05/10/2005 12/31/2009

    Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Extension needs are identified with communities based on participatory diagnose. As a result, extension agents have signed performance-based contracts benefitting more than producers and farm units for the delivery of extension activities

    Indicator 5 : Demand-driven financing mechanism for agricultural advisory services (PO Agricultural Advisory Services Grant) established

    Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

    N/A

    At least 250 local and 8 regional committees are functioning

    Financing mechanism in place in seven regions since 2003, in the whole country since 2004

    Date achieved 05/10/2003 12/31/2005 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Projects financed for the benefit of more than 2,500 producer organizations representing about 50,000 farmers; Total amount US$ 6.75 million

    Indicator 6 : Proportion of decentralized staff

    Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

    Agriculture :53.5% Environment:43.4%

    Agriculture :80% Environment:69.2% Livestock: 62%

    Additional Financing

    Agriculture :79.3% Environment:80% Livestock: 80%

    Date achieved 05/30/2007 06/30/2009 04/30/2007 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Indicator 7 : Quantity of Cowpea seeds available for multiplication Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

    0 8tons Additional Financing 11.3 tons

    Date achieved 05/30/2007 06/30/2009 04/30/2007 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Indicator 8 : Proportion of certified cowpea seeds in Mali Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

    0 60% Additional Financing 63%

    Date achieved 05/30/2007 06/30/2009 04/30/2007 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Indicator 9 : Proportion of farmers benefiting from improved cowpea seeds that reach a yield

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    of 700 kg per ha Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

    0 75% Additional Financing 58%

    Date achieved 05/30/2007 06/30/2009 04/30/2007 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

    Achieved at 77.3% due to weak protection against pests

    G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

    No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual

    Disbursements (USD millions)

    1 04/11/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 09/30/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 11/22/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.11 4 12/07/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.11 5 05/29/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.41 6 11/24/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.90 7 02/25/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.63 8 05/09/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.41 9 06/26/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 15.15

    10 12/06/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 20.71 11 04/28/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 25.79 12 10/12/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 30.35 13 01/18/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 34.11 14 06/30/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 45.14 15 12/20/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 47.28 16 06/28/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 49.27 17 12/13/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 56.96 18 05/29/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 57.95 19 12/12/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 64.11 20 04/08/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 65.16 21 12/28/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 69.13

    H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

  • xiii

    I. Disbursement Profile

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    1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Poverty situation in Mali. According to a study carried out in 1998, 72 percent of Mali’s population lived below the poverty line and the incidence of poverty was three times higher in rural than in urban areas. Ac celerated growth of the agricultural sector was considered a priority to reduce poverty. Consequently, Mali’s poverty reduction strategy (2002-2006) was based on the develo pment of hum an capital and broad based economic growth that needed to accelerate from 5-6 percent a year in 2002 to 7 percent in 2006. 2. Constraints to rural development. In Mali, the sector with the highest potential for growth in employment and income is the agricultural sector. 80 percent of the population is rural and the sector employs about 80 percen t of the total labor fo rce, contributes 45 percent to GDP, and accounts for 75 percent of export earnings. Principal causes of poverty in rural areas are: (i ) low agricultural pr oductivity and production due to natural resources constraints; (ii) di fficult a ccess to loc al and in ternational m arkets; ( iii) weak agricultural serv ices (agricultura l res earch and ex tension) and weak producer organizations; ( iv) wea k public in stitutions an d polic ies that discr iminate ag ainst the sector; and (v) limited access to social services and physical and social infrastructure. 3. Government actions to address these constraints. In October 2000, the Government revised its long-term rural developm ent plan ( Schéma Directeur du Développement Rural) and developed a new Action Plan for the ne xt decade, which emphasized the f ollowing priorities: (i) improving the m anagement and conservation of natural resources to promote sustainable gr owth ; (ii) im proving the provision of basic rural infrastructure: (iii) refocusing the Mi nistry of Rural Developm ent (MDR) on core public service functions; (iv) strengthening MDR’s capacity to deliver its core functions; (v) str engthening the e fficiency and sustainab ility of agricultu ral se rvices; and (vi) strengthening the capacity of producer organizations (POs). 4. Rationale for Bank ass istance. The Bank playe d a ca talytic role in he lping the Government throughout the preparation of the PASAOP by: (a) assisting it in the development of an overall coherent rural development policy and strategy, (b) associating intensively all other donors; and (c) involving systematic ally and proactively the beneficiaries in the preparation process. It was expected that this would augur well for program implementation and would help MD R to regain control ove r externally funded projects. IDA particip ation in this long-term institu tion building effort through an adaptable lending program was al so considered needed gi ven that other donors had difficulties to comm it their resources for long term purposes. Through the project, the Bank also expected to assist the Borrower to create synergy through a m ore effe ctive coordination of all donors intervening in the ru ral sector. L ast, but not least, given its involvement and experience in m any sim ilar operations in W est-Africa, IDA was expected to be well placed to prov ide and mobilize the needed technical, managerial, and policy advice. 5. The overall objective of the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) FY09- 01 for Mali was the reduction of poverty. It was structured around two m ajor axes: (i) sustainable human development; and (ii) stab le economic growth through private sector

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    development. The CAS put particular em phasis on supporting com petitive, broad-based growth in the rural sector because of the overwhelming prevalence of extreme poverty in rural areas, but also because the rural econom y was considered to rem ain the country’s main engine for broad-based growth. Key ar eas of focus in the CAS included capacity building, decentralization, protection of the environment, and gender issues. 6. In the agricultural sector, the Bank sought to support m ajor institutional reforms and investments in social capital. It realized that this agenda required long-term support. Therefore, the Agricultural Serv ices and Produ cer Organization Project (Projet d’Appui aux Services Agricoles et aux Organisations Paysannes – PASAOP) was designed as the first phase of an 11-year Adaptable Program Loan (APL) consisting of three phases (3, 4 and 4-year period) and bringing together ag ricultural se rvices (ag ricultural res earch, extension and support to farmers’ organizations). 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 7. The original PDO, as specified in the PAD, was “to establish an institutional framework conducive to the efficient delivery of agricultural services to producers.” To achieve this PDO, the project had four interdependent sub-objectives to be pursued under four components: (a) MDR Refor m: Rationalization and Modernization (Com ponent A); (b) Im proving the efficiency, relevance and su stainability of the Natio nal Agricu ltural Research System (Component B); (c) Im proving the efficiency, relevance and sustainability of the Nationa l Agric ultural Exte nsion Serv ices Com ponent C); an d (d) Support to Producer Organizatio ns ability to provide se rvices to their m embers (Component D). The Development Credit Agreement indicated that “the objective of the Project is to assist the Borro wer in alleviating rural poverty through m easures designed to: (a) sustain productivity in creases in agricultural and no n-agricultural activities; and (b) strengthen the institutional framework to carry out the Borrower’s agricultural reform program including: (i) capacity building in MDR and public agricultural service agencies; (ii) pilo ting the tr ansfer of extension activ ities to the pr ivate s ector in f ive of the Borrower’s regions; and (iii) improving the effectiveness of private agricultural producer’s associations.” 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 8. The project was granted an Additional Financing (AF) a mounting to SDR 13.3 million (US$20 m illion equivalen t). This AF a pproved on April 30, 2007, intended to allow for th e scaling-up of institutional reforms undertaken successfully during project implementation so f ar, particula rly in te rms of i mprovement of agronom ic research performance, prom otion of dem and-driven extension services, and empowerm ent of producer organizations. Project design rem ained basically the same and the original four components were not changed. However, the AF put more emphasis on the introduction of scaled-up technology transfer initiatives to increase the impact of Project activities on the ground. The underlying rationale for this w as to dem onstrate how the collaboration developed between research, extension and PO s as developed under the original Project could be translated into tangible improvement of productivity and farmers’ incomes 9. The PDO was neither revised during the m id-term review in January 2005 nor at the tim e when the AF was put in place in April 2007. However, key perform ance

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    indicators were revised at midterm review; they were narrowed down and m ade more specific and results-oriented. Before the AF was approved, the originally agreed triggers for phase 2 of the APL were evaluated to assess whether they had been achieved and targets were revised to reflect the additional results and effects expected from the AF. A new set of indicators was added to specifically monitor and capture the additional outputs and outcomes expected through the proposed scaled-up activities under the AF (see Annex 2). 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 10. Through the introduction and diffusion of improved agricultural technologies over the whole country, the Project, as stated in th e Project Appraisal Docum ent (PAD), was expected to benefit directly about 450,000 rural families, including vulnerable groups and women far mers. In addition, 2,500 producer organizations with 50,000 m embers at the national, regional and local level were expect ed to benefit from proj ect interventions. Furthermore, the country’s agricultural resear chers and extension agents as well as civil servants of the Min istries dealing with agri culture were targeted to receive degrees an d in-service training under the Project. Fina lly, input suppliers, local traders and transporters were expected to indirectly benefit from increased agricultural production and trade. 1.5 Original Components 11. The project had four components at the appraisal stage:

    A. MDR –Reform: Rationalization and Modernization (US$15.5 million – additional financing: US$4.9 million). This com ponent had several sub-com ponents: (i) sharing and/or transfer of non-basic publ ic service functions to autonom ous and/or private entities; (i i) de centralization and st rengthening of MDR’s basic public services; (iii) strengthening of MDR’s policy formulation, planning, statistics, and m onitoring and evaluation functions; (iv) stre ngthening of MDR’ s Direction of Administration and F inance; (v) special programs: the rural train ing program, the rural com munication program , the AIDS prevention program and provisions for a rural disaster preventi on and emergency assistance program; and (vi) project coordination unit.

    B. Improving the efficiency, relevance, and sustainability of the National Agricultural Research System - NARS (US$8.7 m illion – additional financing : US$6.4 million). This com ponent had four sub-components: (i) strength ening of NARS research m anagement capacity; (i i) upgrading and maintaining the NARS research scientific capacity ; (iii) funding of strategic and applied research sub-projects; and (iv) competitive funding of demand-driven Agricultural research and development sub-projects.

    C. Improving the efficiency, relevance, and sustainability of the National Agricultural Extension System (US$18.0 million – addition al financing : US$3.1 million). This com ponent had th ree s ub-components: (i) streng thening and regionalization of extension services; (ii) pilot extension prog ram for contracting extension to private providers of exte nsion servic es; an d (iii) con tracts for agricultural support services in cotton areas.

    D. Support to producer organizations (US$9.2 m illion – addition al financing: US$5.6 m illion) This com ponent had thr ee su b-components: (i) s trengthening

  • 4

    national associations and regional unions capabilitie s; (ii) prom otion and strengthening of private advi sory services prov iders; and (iii) strengthening local and regional POs through demand-driven agricultural advisory service grants.

    1.6 Revised Components (after restructuring) 12. There was no restructuring 1.7 Other significant changes 13. In 2004, to respond to the Government’s re quest to support the fight against the desert locus t outbreak, a rea llocation of the Credit p roceeds was appro ved to allocate US$2 million equivalent for the purchase of aerial treatments, equipment and vehicles.

    14. The project has not be form ally restructured, but, although the project had been conceived as the first phase of an 11-year APL, during CAS discussions in October 2006 it was decided not to continue the APL route and not to initiate the second phase but rather to consolidate the Bank’s agricultural and rural development projects in Mali. No changes were m ade to the project deve lopment objective, project com ponents or implementation m odalities. The p roject resu lts f ramework was revised to ref lect the increased development benefits expected from the AF (see Annex 2). 15. In 2005 and 2006, the closing date of the project was extended. T he first extension in 2005 was justified by delays that occurred in commencing and implementing institutional reforms, mainly due to the fact that in 2004 the MDR was split into five new entities: the Ministry o f Agricultu re (MA) , t he M inistry of Li vestock and Fisheries (MLF), the Ministry of Environment and Sanitation ( MES), the Min istry of W omen Affairs, and the Food Security Comm issariat. This happened as a result of the June 2002 elections of a new Pre sident and Parliam ent. A period of institution al instab ility and frequent personnel changes ensued. As a consequence, the subcomponent “decentralization and strengthen ing of MDR’ s basic public services’’ was delayed , as public functions had to be re-ana lyzed and re-as sessed in light of the new institu tional framework and applied to five entities. The second extension in 2006 (until December 31, 2007) was granted because in IDA’s view chances of successfully achieving the institutional reforms sought by the project had greatly improved, as responsibility for this component was transferred from the Institu tional Reform Support Unit inside the new Ministry of Agriculture (MA) to th e Inst itutional Developm ent Comm issariat (CDI) , a unit under the direct supervision of the Ministère de la Fonction Publique. Also, this second extension was m eant to gi ve addition al tim e to project stak eholders to draw lessons from the innovative approaches prom oted a mongst research institutions, extension providers and POs, and to allow tim e for puttin g in place the AF. A final extension was granted during the im plementation phase of t he AF from June 30, 2009 t o December 31, 2009. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 16. Referring to the ICR Guidelines (p p. 31; OPCS, August 2006 and updated on 2/9/2007), the analysis includes lessons learned, project objec tives and com ponents organization, government’s commitment. The project as designed sought to support the

  • 5

    implement of the reform s adopted by the government in 1996 aim ing at m odernizing most of the institutions in th e agricultural sector allowing a new distribution of roles and responsibilities between the public and private sector. 17. As stated earlier, the proliferation of small, uncoordinated donor-financed projects has in the past overtaxed MDR' s sector management capacity, leading to parallel implementation arrangem ents (Rur al Developm ent Agencies), insufficient coun terpart funds, and contradictory philosophies and appr oaches to developm ent. The Government organized a Donor Coordination Committee to ensure coherence and com plementarities in the vario us programs in the rur al secto r. Also, institu tion building objectiv es and sustainability were usually not obtained given the short duration of t ypical projects. This approach has been replaced in the prepara tion of this program and pr oject, th rough a more consolidated approach with a much longer time horizon. The main lessons from the ongoing or recently completed IDA-financed rela ted projects, i.e. the National Research Project, and the Agricultural Services Project are as follows:

    National Agricultural Research Program (PNRA): Although som e improvements have been made in the piloting of user participation at national and regional lev els through the creatio n of the National Committee of Users of Research Results (CNU) and Na tional Committee of Use rs of Research Results (CRUs), the impact of research on agricultural development remained insufficient because of: (i) th e still lim ited particip atory process for research d esign and testing; and , (ii) poo r accountab ility to p roducers. In ad dition, a nu mber of organizational and management issues remain unresolved under that project: (i) a civil service attitude and lack of a p erformance review and reward system based on resul ts; ( ii) lack of com petition for resear ch program proposals a nd am ong research in stitutions; a nd (iii) an overex tended networ k of inf rastructures (experimental stations and laboratories) that cannot be maintained adequately; and (iv) weak performance for financial and accounting management.

    National Agricultural Extension Program (PNVA): The fundamental weakness of the Agricultu ral Ser vices Proje ct was its institutional set-up: (i) lack of accountability of extension agents to producers and insufficient use of participatory diagnosis, programm ing a nd evaluation m ethods; (ii) insufficient supervision and technical back-up of front-line extension workers by subject matter spec ialists and nation al a nd region al extens ion m anagers; and ( iii) insufficient attention to vulnerable groups and in particular wom en producers' needs. In addition, the beneficiary assessment done for the Im plementation Completion and Results Report ( ICR) of this projec t em phasized th at the way extension agents established and worked with "contact groups" was problem atic. One major weakness was that extension ag ents were not paying enough attention to the already existing comm unity associations or producer organizations and not working through them in setting up their con tact groups. A review of the Bank' s experience in agricultural technology generation and tr ansfer, as documented by Operations Evaluation Departm ent (O ED) evalu ations, ind icates that th e following elem ents are im portant for success: (i) ) user ownership and participation for priority settings, planning and monitoring, as well as financing, is crucial; (ii) a single m odel cannot be de signed for global application, pluralism and com petition am ong services pro viders (pub lic, private, nonprofit, and non-governmental sectors) im prove the effici ency of the system ; (iii) g eneration,

  • 6

    transfer and adoption of technologies is a continuum (the -9- linear model of technology generation and transfer found in a large percentage of national research an d tran sfer system s, has show n its lim itations in particular vis- à-vis farmer participation in pl anning and priority setting, and research-extension linkages) w ithin an in tegrated Knowle dge and Inform ation System ; and (iv) success and sustainability of development programs require commitment for long-term endeavor towards social capita l building through organizational and technical training of user groups and community-based organizations. These lessons from previous projects have been incorporated into the project design.

    18. Nevertheless, there were three b asic wea knesses in the project preparation and design. First, the project was prepared as if it was a sector investm ent program where there is no need to prepare and define project components in detail. Consequently, Annex 2 (“Detailed Project Description”) in the PAD is very general and includes dozens of important activities that are s tated in the f orm of a headline and hardly any subsequent elaboration of their con tent. Secon d, the PAD assum ed that the institution al cha nges introduced in the MDR in the late 1990s ha d broad support within the Governm ent and that there w as a strong comm itment to syst ematically pursue their im plementation. It considered the r isk of institution al sustai nability as m oderate. Unfortunately, this assumption was incorrect. Although the broa d thrust of the administrative refor m (redefinition of roles for the pub lic and priv ate secto r and decentraliza tion) was ne ver challenged, after the presid ential elections in 2002, the MDR was split into five Ministries and achievem ent of the key orig inal objec tives of : (a) dec entralizing M DRs core activities, and (b ) redeploying and reduc ing staff becam e more difficult, esp ecially with regard to the country’s extension service. No longer was there a unified extension service for crops, livestock and forestry, but rather separate extension services m anaged independently by each newly created Ministry. In hindsight, it is clear that the difficulties involved in im plementing institutional reform s seem to have been underestim ated. This reorganization was to h appen with in the cons traints of a civil se rvice h iring freeze and within the lim its of civil service pay restrictions. At the sam e tim e governm ent commitment was not fully assured and Mini sterial staff was oppos ing a reorganization that would have m eant a potential staff re trenchment and redeploym ent from the capital to the regions. Third, the PDO wa s defined in very broad and vaguely worded term s while the corresponding key perform ance indicat ors lacked sufficient detail. W hile the lack of precision in the PDO probably re flected the project’s overall em phasis on institutional change, it precludes a m eaningful evaluation o f project achievem ents based the wording of the PDO that was adopted during the preparation stage. Likewise, the key performance indicators in the PAD were very general, overly numerous and parts of them were too vaguely f ormulated, not s ufficiently r esults-oriented or too institu tional to be easily measured. 2.2 Implementation 19. The project can be separated into three dist inct phases. The first phase covers the period from effectiveness to the mid-term review in January 2005 during which the project suffered significant star t-up delays and slow disbur sements. The locust invasion of 2004 significantly affected project im plementation as all governm ent resources had to be used to fight this calam ity. During th is period the im plementation of com ponent A was under the responsibility of C ARI inside MDR as in stitutional refor m, especially decentralization of government services, was not yet a preoccupation of the Govern ment

  • 7

    as a whole. W hen the Governm ent in 2004 started to s plit MDR into 5 Min istries, a special Bank m ission visited the country to analyze the consequences. This m ission, backed up by Bank managem ent, cam e to the c onclusion that it would be unwise to suspend disbursements under this com ponent or to eliminate it as, (a) this would have a negative impact on the pace of im plementation of the other com ponents, and (b ) there was no fundam ental change in the reform ag enda per se (decen tralization of service provision and redefinition of roles of MDR vi s-à-vis the private sector). The second phase covers the period from m id-term review to the tim e the AF was put in plac e in April 2007. The m id-term review was used to modify the legal docum ents in or der to account for the changed institutional set-up as a result of the Governm ents’ decision to split MDR into f ive separate Ministries. By tha t time the new Governm ent had decided on a far reaching institutional developm ent program for the whole of th e administration (all Ministries) and the Bank team judged that the transfer of res ponsibility from CARI inside MDR to CDI under the Ministère de la Fonction Publique would give new impetus to reform . CDI was m andated to carry ou t an overall reform of all governm ent departments and the ongoing reorganization of the Ministries dealing with agricu lture was to serve as an example. During this period, performance under components B and C, and especially Com ponent D continuously im proved, as farm ers and their organizations deepened their collaboration with re gional and n ational agricultural chambers. The th ird phase of implem entation corre sponds with the AF from April 2007 onwards to project closing. During this period, the effort was de voted to technology transf er and adoption and the empower ment of POs. This im proved greatly technol ogy transfer and achievements of results on the ground. 20. During project im plementation, several prob lems were reiterated in the Bank’s Implementation and Status Results Reports (ISRs): (a) serious delays in obtaining project counterpart funds, especially from 2006 onw ards, (b) weak m onitoring and evaluation system, and (c) absence of som e key studies to evaluate projec t achievem ents and to formulate a National Agricultural Extension System (NAES). 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation and Utilization 21. In the PAD, the design of the m onitoring and evaluation (M&E) system probably was not sufficiently adjusted for this kind of pr oject that is exp ected to produce many outputs and outcomes, including those that are relatively hard to measure and to quantify. The project design summary is rather complex with too m any vaguely defined performance indicators. The PDO itself, as sp ecified in the PAD, is too vaguely wo rded to allow for meaningful evaluation. Triggers for the initially planned second phase of the APL should have been used as the key pe rformance indicators; however they were reformulated and added to a long list of perfor mance indicators. The PAD did not systematically specify b aseline and target values f or s elected pe rformance indicators. Also the ex isting hum an and institu tional c apacity f or M&E in the d ifferent ex ecuting agencies and the Project Coordination Un it (PCU) was not adequately assessed and consequently insufficient capacity building measures for implem entation were included at the outset. 22. However, during project im plementation, the M&E system was i mproved. In preparation of the mid-term review, through a series of technical assistance missions, the M&E system was revised and a m ore clearly defined results fram ework with baseline data and measurable impact indicators was drawn up. In preparation of the AF, a new set

  • 8

    of indicators was added to specifically m onitor and capture the additional outputs and outcomes expected th rough the scaled-up activ ities. W hile the M&E system during the last project im plementation support m ission was judged as satisfactory, it nevertheless still faced som e challen ges in the areas of the analysis of adoption and diffusion of agricultural technologies promoted by the project and the analysis of social impacts. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 23. Environmental safeguard policies. The project was classif ied as environm ental category B which requ ired a p artial ass essment. Several m easures were included to ensure a system atic environm ental screeni ng of far m activities and to m ake producers aware of the environmental consequences and opportunities associated with their farming operations. Extension agents were trained on topics such as integrated pest m anagement, soil fertility, water m anagement, soil erosion, and overgrazing. The monitoring of the environmental im pact w as carried o ut by the Ministry in charge of the Environm ent, whose rep resentative was a m ember of the St eering Comm ittee of the project. Several field missions were carried out to verify a dherence to sound environm ental management practices. A plan to deal with the stock of obsolete pesticides has also been developed and is being implemented. 24. Vulnerable Groups Special Initiative. A specific gender assessm ent study was carried out during project preparatio n. It iden tified women’s lack of access to exten sion advice, and m ore specifically to technica l recomm endations for products like fruits, vegetables, fish m arketing, and s mall livesto ck, which are m ainly the responsibility of women, as a critical issue. During project execution, the gender dimension was taken into account, but no fe male extension agents could be hired since there was a hiring freeze in the public sector. Under com ponent D, depending on the regions, between 17-66 percent of micro-projects belonged to women. 25. Procurement is rated satisfactory in the final ISR. Apart from weaknesses in procurement planning, procurem ent plans we re regularly updated and discussed with IDA, and IDA procurement guidelines were strictly followed. 26. Financial management is rated moderately satisfactory in the final ISR. With exception of the 2008 audit report, project a udits were alw ays on tim e and unqualified. During 2008 there was a sm all amount of in eligible expenditures and bottlenecks still exist in justifying advance accounts to executing agencies at the regional level and delays in releasing counterpart funds, especially after 2006. Alth ough counterpart funds in the end were always contributed, they cam e with significant delays (up to 15 m onths) and slowed down project implementation. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 27. This pro ject (PASAOP) will be f ollowed up by the: “Fostering Agricultural Productivity Project: FAPP” which was approve d in FY10. This new operation has the objective to increase the produc tivity of sm allholder produ cers in targeted production systems and project areas of intervention. It builds on the legacy of PASAOP a nd its achievements, namely: (i) stronger POs; (ii) a better technology generation m echanism; and (iii) m ore efficien t advisory services . Following PASAOP, the emphasis of FAPP remains on using com petitive research f unding and on expanding and strengthening the

  • 9

    network of private service providers, and on helping POs develop their own expertise and service networks. FAPP also includes funding for defining the framework for a national extension system. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 28. In line with ICR Guidelines (pp. 31; OPCS, August 2006 and updated on 2/9/2007), the project’s objectiv es were and rem ain highly relevant. T he developm ent objectives of PASAOP (to establish an institutional framework conducive to the efficient delivery of agricultural services to producer s) are re levant with Ma li’s Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Fram ework (GPR SF) for 2007-2011 that prioritizes food security and raising the incom es of rura l p roducers throu gh increas ing, securing and diversifying food production. In 2006, thanks to the support of the project, the G oM adopted the Loi d’Orientation Agricole (LOA) intended to spearhead modernization of the sector and increased value addition. PA SAOP’s past objectives are also very consistent with the Bank’s current Country A ssistance Strategy (CAS; 2007-11) that places ag riculture as one of the three key sectors to drive econom ic growth and the GoM’s overall development priority which emphasize high priority on agriculture. 29. The strateg ic shift tow ards decentralizat ion of the departm ents dealing with agriculture and their focus on regulatory, policy-making and monitoring functions and the concomitant streng thening of the private secto r through s upport to P Os constitu tes a paradigm shif t. This str ategic shif t rem ains equally high ly relev ant as it rem ains f ully consistent with the country’s current developm ent priorities and the Bank’s country assistance s trategy. These orientations will continue to be supported un der the recently approved FAPP. 30. The project design brought together the necessary elements for m odernizing the agricultural sector and f or promoting a science based agricu lture. The multi-s takeholder financing m echanisms for com petitive rese arch grants, for contracting of private extension services, and for grants for m icro-projects of POs were effi cient in alloca ting funds to activities that were relevant and consistent with the needs of producers and their interests. These m echanisms fost ered di alogue, partnership a nd collaboration among institutions and ensured stronger coordi nation in the field. Through the Bank’s implementation assistance, the financing mechanisms became more and more refined and allowed a greater focus on strateg ic activ ities that have a high payoff. Finally, the emphasis on strengthening POs as a way to im prove the responsiveness of the extension and research system to farmers’ needs and expectations was right on target. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 31. The orig inal PDO as s pecified in the PAD was to establish an ins titutional framework conducive to the efficient delivery of agricultural serv ices to producers. Considering that the PDO is so vaguely word ed as to preclude a meaningful evaluation, and in line with ICR Guidelines (pp. 31; OPCS, August 2006 and updated on 2/9/2007) the assessment of PDO achievem ent in this c ase is inf erred from key associa te outcome targets as defined at the com ponent level. To achieve its overall PDO, the project (see PAD, table on pages 5 and 6) had four m ain interdependent project developm ent

  • 10

    objectives to be pursued under four com ponents: a) MDR restructured and strengthened (Component A); b) i mproved relevance and effectiveness of the National Agricultural Research S ystem (Component B); c) im proved the relevance and e ffectiveness of the National Agricultural E xtension Services (Com ponent C); and d) strengthening of POs’ ability to provide serv ices to their m embers (Component D). It is noted that the project description in the Credit Agreement largely reflects these four dimensions of the PDO as stated above. Also, the project had a set of triggers to be ac hieved in order to pass fro m the first phase of the AP L to the second phase , which provide additi onal detail about the achievement of Project Development Objectiv es. Ach ievement of these triggers is presented in Annex 211a and the full set of detailed project developm ent outcome indicators are given in Annex 211b. Achievement of the four main project development objectives is as follows: 32. Objective 1: reorient/restructure/decentralize and strengthen MDR (Component A). Achievement of this objective is rated moderately unsatisfactory. MA’s focus has been reoriented towards functions that only the public sector can provide. Several services previously provided by the MA were transf erred to the private s ector: veterinary services and arti ficial insemination; the produc tion and com mercialization of improved seeds and seedlings; the m anagement of slaughter houses/areas. Other services such as agricultural extension advisory se rvices have becom e a joint responsibility between the public and private sector; and the management of natural resources is in the process of being transferred to local communities. The rationalization and modernization of public services, the strengthe ning of technical capacity, the formulation of agricultural policies and investm ent programs and the restru cturing of the cotton sector were carried out as planned. 33. Also, the project m ade progress toward th e restructuring and decentralization of first the MDR and later on the f ive ministerial departments that resulted from the spit up of MDR in 2004 (MA, MLF MES, Ministry of Wom en Affairs, and Food Sec urity Secretary). All the ne cessary studies concerning personne l needs and staff availability, job descriptions, organizational charts, and training needs assessm ents were carried out. However, due to the political decision in 2004 to create five Ministries to deal with the agricultural sector rath er th an one and due to the lengthy approval process for such governmental reorganizations that involves th e Presidency and Parliam ent, the a ctual transfer of staff to their new positio ns and the training for their new po sts after 8 y ears has not yet s tarted. This was a trigge r that was not fulfilled at the time of the approval of the AF and at the clos ing of the projec t is still outstand ing. Neverth eless, th e MDR reorganization is the most advanced a nd the m ethodology and process developed are utilized by the other m inistries. T he legal texts have been adjus ted and foresee that implementation of th is reform will take pl ace, thereby indic ating the commitment of the Government of Mali (G oM) to this. The GoM has started preparing a t riennial plan for the decen tralization of m inistries. Also, PO s, which have beneficiated from strong institutional support under the Project, contin ue to make strong demands that GoM move forward on this agenda. It is because of its unfinished nature and the lon g delays in the modernization and decentralization process that the com ponent is rated m oderately unsatisfactory. For m ore detailed outputs, see Annex 2, Table 212 (Original Credit) and IOI-1 and 2 in Table 2.2.2. (AF).

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    34. Objective 2: improve the relevance and effectiveness of the National Agricultural Research System (Component B). Achievement of this o bjective is rated satisfactory. For more details on outputs, see Annex 2, Table12 (Original Credit) and IOI-4 to IOI-8 in Table 222 (AF). Throughout project im plementation, the NARS and its com ponents (Rural Econom y Institute – IER; Centra l Ve terinary La boratory – LC V, Rural Polytechnic Institu te of Katibougo u and NGOs) and research comm ittees th at include representatives of extension and far mers, have been w orking properly and in full concordance with their m andates and rules. The research system is now orien ted to meet the technology needs of producers (see IOI-4 and IOI-7 in Annex 222). A com petitive research fund to finance (see IOI-6 to IOI-8 in Annex 222) all research projects has been put in place and is financed by all donors supporting agricultural research. The sam e mechanism for financing the dem and-driven re search and extens ion is utilized by th e West Africa Agricultural Productivity Pr ogram (W AAPP). The quality and output of research has i mproved to the point where the Government has increased its financing of the core functions of IER. Thanks to the p erformance c ontract signed with IER, the Government allocates yearly CFA 1.5 billion to IER. In addition, a long term financing plan for IER is under preparation at the request of the Prime Minister. A long-term vision and implementation strategy for agricultural re search in M ali is has been prepared and adopted. Where there is scope for improvem ent is in the area of economic analysis. The NARS as well as the N AES needs to integ rate ex-ante economic analysis in the research and extension process in order to appraise th e sustainability and oppor tunities of specific agricultural research and extension programs. 35. Objective 3: improve the relevance and effectiveness of the National Agricultural Extension Services (Component C). Achie vement of this objectiv e is rated moderately satisfactory. A m ajor innovation was succe ssfully introduced with the establishment of an ef ficient, r esponsive and p artially pr ivatized agr icultural adv isory service system through the regi onalization and decentraliza tion of extension prog rams and budgets (see Annex 2, Table 212) with incr eased producer participation in the design and management of extension programs. Extension programs are no longer elaborated at the central level and dissem inated through a top-down structur e of extension agents. On the contrary , extension needs are identif ied with communities ba sed o n participa tory diagnoses of village po tential and constraints. Ninety percen t of public extension agents (720 agents) during 2005-07 carrie d out their work on the basis of performance contracts between the agent and the mayor of a comm unity representing the farmers. In five pilot regions and in the cotton area, the delivery of demand-driven extension services has been successfully im plemented under 294 contract s with 70 private extension providers. According to the in Econom ic and Financia l Analysis Annex 3: (i) the im pact of extension recommendations on farmers’ yields was m easured for selected technologies and benef iciaries and ha s been generally in the 10-70 perce nt range (m illet 50 perc ent, maize 67 percent, peanuts 30 percent, and so rghum 60 percent); (ii) yield increases for cowpeas and goat m ilk more than doubled and incom es increased significantly. In view of the creation of five ministerial departments dealing with agriculture instead of one, and each trying to set-up its own extension orga nization, the available long term vision and implementation strategy for agricultural extension in Mali n eeds to be up dated to r eflect this change in institu tional set-up o f the sect or. Sustainab le financing of extension will be a key issue and will have to be addressed under the Loi d’Orientation Agricole (LOA)/Agricultural Framework Law of 2006. I n view of the fact that presently there are uncertainties about the future funding and m anagement of e xtension and that there is no

  • 12

    NAES and no strategy in place com parable to the one for agricu ltural res earch, the component has been rated m oderately sati sfactory. For more details on outputs, see Annex 2, Table 212 (Original Credit) and IOI-9 to IOI-13 in Table 222 (AF). 36. Objective 4: strengthen POs’ ability to provide services to their members (Component D). Achie vement of this objec tive is rated satisfactory. Detailed o utputs are provided in Annex 2, Table 212 (Original Credit) and IOI-14 to IOI-18 in Table 222 (AF). The m ain objective of this com ponent, namely to improve the ability of P Os to provide services to their m embers and to m ake their voice heard in the decision-making processes for for mulating and implem enting local, regional and national rural development policies and in particular, re search and extension activities, has been achieved. The Cham ber of Agricu lture at the national (APCAM) a nd regional level as well as POs have become more visible and have gained in credibility with their members. This has enabled them to develop partnerships with other a ctors, including international donors who increasingly finance projects destin ed for farm er organi zations. It also enabled th em to inf luence the Agricu ltural Fr amework Law that was published on September 5, 2006. Also, the grant m echanism to support m icro-projects of far mer organizations is functioning well and covers the whole country. US$ 6.75 m illion were disbursed for som e 2,500 m icro-projects benefitting 50,000 m embers. The capacity of APCAM and Regional Cha mbers of Agriculture (CRAs) has im proved significantly (see IOI-16 and IOI-18 in Annex 2, Table 222). Howeve r, in order to be able to carry out economic and technical analysis for these micro-projects, capacity of APCAM and CRAs will need to be f urther strengthened. This will r equire hir ing of bette r trained staf f and can only be done to the extent that the AP CAM improves its capacity to generate own resources. It is for this last reason that th e component is not rated as highly satisfactory but as satisfactory. 37. At the appraisal of the AF in 2007, th e achievem ent of project triggers was reviewed. At that time, out of 11 triggers, 6 were comp leted and 4 were partially completed, among which: 3 on Component A (MDR restructured and strengthened) and 1 on Com ponent B (im proved relevance and ef fectiveness o f the National Agricultural Research System). All targets for research programs, demand-driven extension services and capacity building activities for producer organizations were met, or even exceeded in some cases. See Annex 2, Table 211a for details. 3.3 Efficiency 38. The cost-benefit analys is carried out at appraisal and at the tim e of the AF was updated at the ICR stage. As th en, it focuses on the return s from the investm ents under Component B (“Im proving the efficiency, rele vance and sustainability of the NARS”) and com ponent C (“Improving the efficiency, relevance, and sustainability of the NAES”). More spec ifically, the an alysis estimates th e re turns f rom: (i) inc reased crop production due to the diffusion of technologies and better agronomic practices in several regions of Mali, (ii) increased production of m ilk due to the introduction of improved small ruminants with basic husband ry practices and, (iii) increas ed production of m eat due to the introduction of i mproved poultry wi th basic husbandry practices. The project also generated a number of important externalities under component A (“MDR Refor m”) and com ponent D (“Support to POs”) which have not been quantified because of the difficulty to assess and quantif y the ef fects of institu tional strength ening and s ocial

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    capital building. As a result, given the difficulty to model IRR for the establishment of an institutional framework, the present analysis assesses partly the efficiency of the project. 39. The results of the econom ic and financia l analysis are detailed in Annex 3. Overall, the results show that the PASAOP project is economically attractive, with sound IRRs which are significantly higher than th e opportunity cost of capital, both for the Original Financing (22.8 percent) and th e Additional Financing (38 and 39 percent for the FRR and ERR respectively). T he sensitivity analysis also suggests that the project appears robust against: (i) som e deterioration in yields, (ii) som e delays in the adoption of technologies; and (i ii) unfavorable price movements. Returns at completion are, in the baseline scenario, slightly less than those expected at appraisal (where a 27.3 percent IRR was assumed in the PAD for the original credit). Table 3. Summary of economic and financial analysis

    National level: PASAOP, summary of economic and financial analysis Baseline (PAD) ICR (2010)

    Original credit(2001)

    Additional financing

    (2007)

    End of original

    financing

    End of Additional financing

    End of the two credits

    (overall)

    IRR (20 years life cycle)

    27.3%

    (ERR=FRR)

    18.42% (FRR)

    15.81% (ERR)

    22.8%

    (ERR=FRR)1

    38% (FRR) 39% (ERR)

    24.2 %

    (ERR=FRR)

    Financial NPV @12% in USD million 104 11.863 12.458 7.486 16.300 Economic NPV @12% in USD million 104 14.347 12.458 8.065 16.720

    3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 40. Overall project ou tcomes are rated as moderately satisfactory. Since the overall PDO is very broad and vaguely for mulated, for evalu ation pu rposes the specific dimensions of the PDO were used as defi ned at the component level. These four dimensions of the PDO that were discusse d above constitute a re levant package of interventions to bring about sustained technical and instit utional change in Mali’s agriculture and thereby contributing to increasing rural incomes. They are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. They were pursued under four com ponents of similar size in terms of expenditures. Consequently, it m akes sense to give equal weight to each objective. The result is an overall score of 3.25 or m oderately satisfactory (see Table 4 below).

    1 As assumed in the PAD of the Original Financing, no significant price distortions were used to calculate the economic rate of return of the Initial Credit; consequently, the financial rate of return (FRR) is equal to the economic rate of return (ERR)

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    Table 4. Summary of ratings Component Rating Rating

    Value (a)

    Share in Total Cost (b)

    Evaluation Weight

    (c)

    Contribution to Overall

    Score (d)=c*(a)

    Objective 1 A MU 2 29% 25% 0.50 Objective 2 B S 4 22% 25% 1.00 Objective 3 C MS 3 30% 25% 0.75 Objective 4 D S 4 19% 25% 1.00 Overall

    Score 3.25

    Note: Rating value follows a 1-5 scale with 5=Highly satisfactory and 1=Unsatisfactory) 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 41. The support to producer organizations from the local to the regional and national level has enabled them to becom e an effe ctive partner vis -à-vis governm ent and international donor agencies in matters related to rural development. A good example for this increased voice of the fa rming community was the prepar ation of the Agricultural Orientation Law published on September 5, 2006 which was strongly influenced by the National Chamber of Agriculture and POs it represents. In addition, thanks to the demand of POs, a National Agriculture Day has been instituted. Furthermore, a total of 2,500 sub-projects was financed by the project and benefited 50,000 beneficiaries of which 15,000 (30 percent) were wom en. Depe nding on the region, the l proportion of wom en beneficiaries from the project ranged betw een 29 and 61 percent. An im pact study performed by Mahieu (2009) highlighted that PASAOP also benefited vulnerable groups: 53 percent of projects’ be neficiaries under component D were wom en (3292 wom en), and the youth have enjoyed new local em ployment opportunities inst ead of international migration towards Ivory Coast or Guinea. Through its support fo r functional literacy and work with wom en and youth, the project al so encouraged the creation of a national women farm er organization and a national young far mers association. Increased food security and higher revenue s due to better yields helped to reduce poverty and malnutrition. For more details, see also paragraph 14 in annex 3. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 42. The institu tional dev elopment impact has been substan tial on all executing agencies thanks to PASAOP’s support in term s of reorga nization, m ission redefinition and capacity building activities, but also thanks to office equipment. Beyond logistical inputs that have im proved working conditio ns, PASAOP’s soft investm ents have contributed to re-define the role and responsib ilities of the different stakeholders and the building-up of social capital.

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    43. PASAOP st rongly pushed for technology ge neration and transfer, promotion of private delivery for advisory services to farming communities, and em powerment of producer organizations (POs). As a result, th ree m ajor institutional impacts ne ed to be highlighted:

    i. Producer empowerment at the local, regional and national level: POs are now key partners for policy dialogue at the national level and im plementation of investments at the loca l level. APCAM, CRAs and loca l POs have bee n able to increase th eir pa rticipation in de cision-making processes and take part in projects/programs i mplementation. They now contribu te to the definition, implementation and evaluation of research and extension programs. As mentioned before, they were a key player in th e formulation of the Basic Agricu ltural Law issued in 200. In addition, the project has promoted the em ergence of a national women federation, the National Federation of Rural Wom en ( Fédération Nationale des Femmes Rurales: FENAFER) and of a national youth federation, the National Federation of Rural Youth of Mali (Fédération Nationale des Jeunes Ruraux du Mali: FENAJR).

    ii. Demand-driven approach: Institutional changes brought about by PASAOP have strongly contributed to m ake the de livery of agricultural services evolve from a “top-down” and centralized a pproach to a m ore de mand-driven and regionalized approach. Agricultural research institutions are now better o rganized and m ore responsive to producers’ needs. In creased emphasis is placed on dissemination of superior and sustaina ble technologies, as well as co ntinued investment in research. Thanks to the pr oject’s support, Mali has em barked on a transition f rom a traditional top -down and state-led extension system to a m ore demand-driven and pluralistic network of service providers. Accountability to producers as clients based on contractua l relationships is another important institutional innovation introduced by the project in this respect.

    iii. Partnership: the different financing m echanisms set up under the project have instilled the habit of regular cons ultations among stakeholders, beyond the allocation o f f inancial resourc es. I n th is way, the ASAOP has contributed to public-private partnerships, especially be tween government officials, researchers, extension agents and representatives of POs.

    (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 44. In the cam paign for locust invasion control in 2004, the PSAOP contributed overall 50 percen t of the funds and logistics: (i) USD 2 m illion out of a total budg et of US$4.1 m illion; (ii) 49 230 hect ares were treated with PSAOP support out of 96 ,000 hectares treated (51.3 per cent); (iii) Out of 301 825 lit ers of pesticides, PSAOP contributed 100,000 liters (33 per cent); (iv) PASAOP funded 100 vehicles out of a total of 154 procured for treatm ent against locust and 10 pick-ups for m onitoring teams. This campaign had also pos itive env ironmental extern alities, such as the inventory of 1,000 tons of obsolete pesticides and their subsequent destruction.

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    3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 45. In 2009, a consultant of the Social Deve lopment Department of the W orld Bank carried out a lim ited beneficiary assessm ent for com ponents D (Support to producer organizations) and C (Improving the efficiency, relevance, and sustainability of the National Agricultural E xtension System). For Component D som e 250 people who had benefitted from nine selected PO projects we re interviewed in three r egions (Koulikoro, Kayes and Ségou). For Com ponent C, 60 farmers, local offici als and staff of extension service providers were interviewed in th ree Counties. Concerni ng Com ponent D, the assessment found that all beneficiaries were sati sfied with the results of their projects in terms of production increases, business turnover, higher sales and/or better sales prices. Male and fem ale far mers benefitted in about the sam e proportion, with variations according to the type of project financed. Concerning Component C, 92 percen t of the farmers interviewed were either highly satisfied (73 percent) or satisfied (19 percent), and only 7 percent were little satisfied or unsatis fied (1 percent) with the economic impact of the ex tension advice they had received. Concerning how far mers evalu ated the performance of extensio n service providers, the results we re as follows as indicated in Table 5. Table 5. Results of the evaluation of services providers by farmers Highly

    satisfied Satisfied Little

    satisfied Unsatisfied

    Service provider is competent 80% 20% 0% 0% Service provider is accessible/available 81.3% 17% 1.7% 0% Service provider follows up on results 68% 30.5% 1.5% 0% Service provider has the necessary tools and techniques to provide advice

    64.5% 30.5% 5% 0%

    Service provider provides assistance in resolving issues that arise during implementation of new technologies

    45.5% 30.5% 24% 0%

    4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 46. Rating: Significant. The general thrust of reform s promoted under this project is likely to continue, especially as changes in the legal framework anchor the move towards decentralization. The Governm ent is comm itted to a restructuring, rationalization and decentralization of its entire ad ministration and donors continue to support this orientation. Equally, the Governm ent’s commitment towards a new sharing of roles and responsibilities between the pub lic and private sector is unw avering and the transf er of non-core activities has already taken place and there is little risk of backsliding. The competitive research grant m echanism, and the funding of exten sion on a con tractual basis have proven their effectiveness and the key players are familiar with the procedures and appreciate their usefulness. They are lik ely to continue these innovations. Equally, the fund for financing of m icro-projects managed by APCAM/CRAs and its procedures has been internalized. T he degree to which farmer organizations have been em powered can be expected to prevent any push back of refor ms and ensure the long-term sustainability of dem and-driven ap proaches. Finally, the se nsitivity ana lysis has sh own that the project was econom ically sustaina ble. Nevertheless, su stainable financing resources for agricultural services rem ain a key issue for the future. Although the L OA

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    foresees th e establishm ent of a funding m echanism ( Fond National de Développement Agricole: FNDA) for these purposes, it does not define the sources of funding. Resolution of this issue is high on the agenda of APCAM and the upcom ing FAPP, in cooperation with other donors, will equally address this issue. Given the fact that no public ex tension agents h ave been hired for over 1 4 years, ex cept f or the las t two a nd that private extension providers and public extension depend on governm ent fundi ng and donors, there is a risk that agricu ltural extension will become the weakest link in the technology generation and transfer triang le involving agricultural re search, extension and POs. However, experience under the project with the contracting of extension services and the financial contribution of beneficiaries should reduce this risk. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance

    (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry 47. Rating: marginally unsatisfactory. The project design was based on a number of strategic choices that were conceptually correct and closely aligned with the Government’s rural sector strategy and CAs pr iorities, including: (i) increased em phasis on producer participation in th e planning and delivery of agri cultural services; (ii) better integration of agricultural technology generation (research) and transfer (extension); and (iii) introduction of co mpetition among agricu ltural s ervice prov iders by separating the financing from the execution of research and extension programs. W ith the benefit of hindsight, those strategic choices remain highly relevant. The Bank team ensured that the project was iden tified and de signed closely w ith government and m ajor stakeholders, particularly producer organizations. Explicit efforts were also m ade to include the lessons learned from r elevant predecessor pr ojects, particularly National Agricultural Research Project and the Natural Agricult ural Extension Project as well as Bank’s experience in agricu ltural t echnology generation and transf er as docum ented by the Operations and Evaluations Department (OED) at the time. 48. Despite the relevant overall project de sign con cept, there were however m ajor shortcomings in the assessm ent of risk s as well as the s pecification of opera tional arrangements. In this c ontext it is worth mentioning that: ( i) the politic al commitment, associated risks, and administrative capacity for carrying out the pla nned restructuring of MDR under Com ponent A in the context of a hiring freeze and restri ctive civil service rules for salaries were n ot adequately analy zed; (ii) the p roject di d no t present a clear road map on how to go about im plementing the institutional changes sought under the project; and (iii) insuf ficient a ttention wa s given to the monito ring and evaluation (M&E) system; the project design summ ary was rather complex with a PDO which was too vaguely worded and too m any (over 60) vaguely defined perform ance indicators. Since these aspects had an im portant bear ing on the implem entation of the pr oject, especially in the early s tages, Bank performance in ensur ing quality at e ntry is ther efore rated as marginally unsatisfactory.

    (b) Quality of Supervision 49. Rating: moderately satisfactory. Supervision was initially hands-off but improved over time. The IP and DO ratings before MTR were probably overly optimistic.

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    The Bank responded swiftly to provide support under the project fo r the Governm ent’s emergency response to the locust outbreak in 2004. In preparation of the m id-term review, by putting the spotligh t on M&E and th rough a series of international technical assistance missions, IDA ensured th at the M&E system was im proved and baseline data were established. In the Add itional Financing IDA increased its support for POs, i.e. the private sector. The A F put the em phasis on strengthening th e research -extension-producer collaborative m echanism led by CNRA and to the funding of selected key technologies where more visible results coul d be more quickly obtained and m ore easily monitored and evaluated. Only with regard to Component A (MDR Refor m), and more specifically the sub-co mponent “Decentrali zation and strengtheni ng of MDR’s basic public services” did IDA i mplementation support missions have little discernible im pact. Once the decision was taken by the new G overnment to split up MDR into five ministerial departments and to put the reor ganization agenda under the responsibility of to CDI und er the Ministère de la Fonction Publique, IDA supervision m issions should have ass isted the Governm ent in th inking th rough the im plications for decentralization and staffing needs more proactively.

    (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance 50. Rating: moderately satisfactory. Based on th e assessment in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, and given the overall m arginally satisfactory outcom e, overall Bank performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance

    (a) Government Performance 51. Rating: moderately unsatisfactory, Com ponent A produced a num ber of legal texts that c larified the respective roles of the public and private sector in agriculture and that pu shed the o rganization of sectoral ministries in the direction of greater decentralization. Concerning decentraliza tion, the ongoing reform process in the agricultural ministries served as an exam ple for other ministries to follow. Nevertheless, the dialogue between the Borrower and IDA concerning this com ponent and more particularly concernin g the sub-com ponent: Decentralization and strengthen ing of MDR’s basic public services seem s to have b een less than candid a nd led to unrealistic expectations about the speed with whic h refor m steps could be undertaken and subsequent frustrations. Also, the Governm ent contributed to delays in project execution due to a lack of institutional stab ility and continuous changes in key personnel invo lved in the project. This affected especially components A and C after MDR was split into five Ministries which led to increased poli tical interference in personnel decisions (clientelism/patronage). Although in the end Go vernment always provid ed the n ecessary counterpart funds, it only did so after long delays, at tim es up to 15 m onths. This led to delays in project execution a nd to higher prices for proj ect inputs than would have otherwise been the case.

    (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance 52. Rating: moderately satisfactory. Despite its lim ited a uthority, th e Proje ct Coordination Unit overall succeeded in holding the project together and in ensuring that executing agencies at the fiel d level would follow disbursem ent procedures and provide

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    justifications for funds rece ived. However, several cruc ial studies to docum ent and evaluate project experience and resu lts concerning Component C and D were not carried out, although they were recomm ended by successive project supervision missions. DNA, although it had no authority over other newly created Directorates dealing with extension, was able to m aintain c ritical coor dination of extension staff at all levels (national, regional an d local) de aling with a griculture. The CDI relied pr incipally on the f ocal points within the different Ministries to push the restructuring and decentralization agenda but its leadership was not strong enough. APCAM, a fter initial weaknesses, and CNRA performed satisfactorily. In addition, the fiduciary activ ities of the project have been well implem ented as th e pro curement is satisfactory and financial m anagement moderately. Audits were always on time and unqualified.

    (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance 53. Rating: Moderately satisfactory. Based on the two ratings above, and given that the overall project outcome rating is above the bar, overall Borrower performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned

    Multi-stakeholder financing mechanisms (be they for com petitive research grants for contracting of private ex tension services or grants for micro-projects of POs) are efficient for allocating funds to activities that are relevant and consistent with the needs of producers and their interest s. These m echanisms foster dialogue, partnership and collaboration among institutions and ensure stronger coordination in the field. But there is a necessary learning phase and the whole process needs to be carefully m onitored. Representatives of POs need to be tr ained to play their role.

    In financing am bitious, far reaching institutional ref orms of m inisterial

    departments for which political commit ment is param ount, a cle ar d istinction should be made between the preparation phase and the im plementation phase. As part of the prepara tion phase ther e is need to pay due atten tion to politica l commitment and associated risks. As far as implementation is concerned, there is need for a clear road-m ap that details th e operation al arrangem ents and sequencing of reforms.

    A com bination of capacity building m easures to strengthen POs and their

    federations, and investments in m icro-projects that are m anaged by these sam e organizations can be a powerful tool to modernize the agricultural sector and to induce greater dynam ism in the agricult ural technology genera tion and diffusion process. If the Government and donors co llaborate in this field, as was the case under this project, transformational achievements are possible.

    For agricultural services projects, special attention needs to be given to introduce

    and/or strengthen a perm anent in house econom ic analysis capacity inside the research and extension organizations. This capacity building support should enable th ese organizatio ns to carry out prospective im pact studies of different specific research and extension activ ities that can guide th eir efforts towards the ones that are likely to have the highest ec onomic returns and social payoff. This

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    support should also enable them to carry out cost-benefit analyses and to conduct adoption and diffusion studies on thei r own, requiring a m ore cost-efficient external validation process.

    The privatization of agricultural exte nsion and the public funding for private

    agricultural service delivery based on contracts is a long term process and needs to be conceived as such. Supporting policy m easures as well as analytical work and public funding and training are necessary to m ake it sustain able. W ithout specific measures to upgrade the public sectors capacity in such areas as extension planning, monitoring of performance of extension contracts carried out by private providers and defining standards for p