Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 34544-BD

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(IDA-31630)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$177 MILLION

TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

BANGLADESH

FOR DHAKA URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT

December 01, 2005

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective August 31, 2005)

Currency Unit = Bangladesh Taka (Tk.) Tk.1.00 = US$ 0.0153US$ 1.00 = Tk.65.480

FISCAL YEARJuly 01 June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMSAQMP Air Quality Management ProjectBRTA Bangladesh Road Transport AuthorityBUET Bangladesh University of Engineering and TechnologyCAS Country Assistance StrategyCNG Compressed Natural GasDCC Dhaka City CorporationDITS Dhaka Integrated Transport StudyDMA Dhaka Metropolitan AreaDMP Dhaka Metropolitan PoliceDPL Development Policy LendingDSM Design, Supervision and MonitoringDTCB Dhaka Transport Coordination BoardDUTP Dhaka Urban Transport StudyED Executive DirectorERR Economic Rate of ReturnFIDIC Federation Internationale des Ingenieurs-Conseils

(International Federation of Consulting Engineers)GDTPCB Dhaka Transport Planning and Coordination BoardGIS Geographic Information SystemGOB Government of BangladeshICB International Competitive BiddingICR Implementation Completion ReportIDA International Development AssociationMMG Maintenance Management GroupMOC Ministry of CommunicationsMOLGRD&C Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development and CommunitiesMTR Mid-Term ReviewNCB National Competitive BiddingNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationNMT Non-Motorized Traffic/TransportOD Operational DirectivesPAD Project Appraisal DocumentPAP Project Affected PeoplePCG Public Consultative GroupPCP Project Concept PaperPD Project DirectorPDO Project Development Objectives

PIU Project Implementation UnitQAG Quality Assurance GroupQEA Quality-at-Entry AssessmentRAJUK Rajadhani Unnayan Karthpakhya (Capital City Development Authority)RAP Resettlement Action PlanRHD Roads and Highways Division, MOCRMMS Road Maintenance Management SystemRRMP-III The Third Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance ProjectRTMF Road and Traffic Maintenance FundSOP Standard Operating ProceduresSTP Strategic Transport StudySTU Shock Transmission UnitTA Technical AssistanceTED Traffic Engineering Department, DCCTEG Traffic Engineering Group, DCCTSC Traffic Signal Cell, DCC

Vice President: Praful C. PatelCountry Director Christine WallichSector Manager Guang Z. Chen

Task Team Leader: Navaid A. Qureshi

BANGLADESHDhaka Urban Transport

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 55. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 126. Sustainability 147. Bank and Borrower Performance 158. Lessons Learned 189. Partner Comments 2010. Additional Information 28Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 29Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 34Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 37Annex 4. Bank Inputs 40Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 44Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 45Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 46

Project ID: P009524 Project Name: Dhaka Urban TransportTeam Leader: Navaid A. Qureshi TL Unit: TUDTRICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 1, 2005

1. Project DataName: Dhaka Urban Transport L/C/TF Number: IDA-31630

Country/Department: BANGLADESH Region: South Asia Regional Office

Sector/subsector: Roads and highways (75%); Sub-national government administration (13%); Central government administration (11%); Other social services (1%)

Theme: Other urban development (P); Pollution management and environmental health (P); Municipal governance and institution building (P)

KEY DATES Original Revised/ActualPCD: 02/13/1996 Effective: 05/18/1999 06/16/1999

Appraisal: 06/24/1998 MTR: 02/05/2002 02/05/2002Approval: 01/19/1999 Closing: 06/30/2004 06/30/2005

Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOB/MIN. OF COMMUNICATIONSOther Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Praful C. Patel Mieko NishimizuCountry Director: Christine Wallich Frederick TempleSector Manager: Guang Chen Frannie HumplickTeam Leader at ICR: Navaid Qureshi Thampil PankajICR Primary Author: Mitsuyoshi Asada

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: L

Institutional Development Impact: M

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: U

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: U

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

3.1.1 Context: Urban population growth in Bangladesh in recent decades has been phenomenal, and has far outstripped the capacity of urban infrastructure, leading to low level of efficiency and massive shortages. The urban hierarchy of Bangladesh has been strongly dominated by metropolitan Dhaka, the largest and most industrialized city. The transport environment in Dhaka was in chaotic condition characterized by chronic traffic congestion and delays, lack of traffic management, conflict of jurisdictions and poor coordination among agencies, and increasing air pollution problems. In light of this situation, the Dhaka Integrated Transport Study (DITS; 1994, supported by UNDP Technical Assistance) and subsequent discussions with the Government have highlighted the elements to constitute an urban transport strategy for Dhaka, and it has become the basis for the design of Dhaka Urban Transport Project (DUTP) in 1998.

3.1.2 Project Development Objectives:The project's overall objectives were: (a) To improve urban transport infrastructure and services in Dhaka Metropolitan Area (DMA) in an economically and environmentally sustainable manner, and (b) To strengthen institutional and policy framework and address long-term transport planning and coordination issues in DMA. This project was intended as the first phase of a program to address the multi-faceted transport problems in DMA spread over the years, and the project performance should be judged in this context.

3.1.3 Relevance of Project Development Objectives: The project objectives were relevant to the Bank Group's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and related sector strategies when the project was appraised. The strategic priorities of CAS included, among others; institutional development, promoting competitive private sector as the engine of growth, and promoting better public sector management and improved public services for private sector and civil society. In addition, the project development objectives (PDOs) remain relevant to the current CAS Progress Report (dated June 30, 2003) objectives of supporting accelerated private sector led growth through removing infrastructure constraints.

3.1.4 Clarity of Project Development Objectives: The objectives were clear, realistic and important for the country and the sector. They were necessarily general to allow flexibility in response to changing constraints and opportunities. The institutional strengthening was challenging to the borrower in terms of the difficulty of institutional changes in bureaucracy, and some risk was expected and recognized.

3.2 Revised Objective:

3.2.1 The project development objectives were not revised.

3.3 Original Components:

3.3.1 Project Component 1 - Infrastructure Development (US$178.2 million)

(1) Traffic Management Measures and System Improvements: Improvement of junctions throughout Dhaka with pavement reconstruction, better channelization, separation of motorized and non-motorized traffic (NMT), diversion of rickshaws at certain key junctions, protected right turn lanes, improved traffic control using modern traffic signal equipment or roundabouts, measures to reduce risks of pedestrians, increase traffic capacity and where appropriate implement special measures to help buses avoid traffic congestion.

(2) Road Improvements: Rehabilitation and improvement of existing roads.(3) Bus Lanes and Lay-bys: Provision of bus lanes along selected bus routes that have been identified as a

priority.(4) Rehabilitation of Existing Bus Terminals: Rehabilitation of three (3) existing inter-district bus

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terminals at Saidabad, Mohakhali and Gabtoli, including sidewalks, parking area reconstruction, covered sidewalks, toilets and passenger waiting arrangements.

(5) Pedestrian Facilities Improvements: Rehabilitation of existing sidewalks, construction of about 40 km of new sidewalks along existing major arterial roads, construction of about ten pedestrian bridges.

(6) NMT Network Improvements: Improvement of facilities for parking and traffic for NMT on secondary and local roads. Alternative routes provision on secondary and local roads to reduce NMT use on main arteries. Provision of additional road links and three (3) underpasses to facilitate a pilot NMT network. Separation of rickshaws from motor vehicles by suitable barriers on some routes.

(7) Grade-separated Interchange Facilities: Construction of two (2) overpasses at Jatrabari and Mohakhali intersections.

(8) Flood Damage Rehabilitation of Roads and Drainage: Rehabilitation of about 200 km of existing roads and associated drainage damaged during the 1998 floods.

3.3.2 Project Component 2 - Equipment Support (US$10.9 million). Equipment and Vehicles: Provision of necessary equipment, computers and accessories, and vehicles to strengthen technical and institutional capacity of project agencies; Dhaka City Corporation (DCC), Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) and Bangladesh Road Transport Authority (BRTA).

3.3.3 Project Component 3 - Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building (US$24.9 million)

(1) Project Preparation & Implementation Support, including Design, Supervision & Monitoring: Provision of consultancy services for preparation, implementation, supervision and monitoring of various components under the project.

(2) Financial Management Services: Establishment of financial and technical capacities for Greater Dhaka Transport Planning and Coordination Board (GDTPCB) (later officially named as Dhaka Transport Coordination Board (DTCB)), and strengthening of the same for DCC and Roads & Highways Division (RHD).

(3) Institutional Development & Training: Support for institutional capacity building and training for DTCB, DCC, RAJUK (Rajadhani Unnayan Karthpakhya; Capital City Development Authority), DMP and BRTA.

3.3.4 Project Component 4 - Policy Support and Future Studies (US$9.5 million)

(1) Preparation of Long-term Transport Strategic Plan: Preparation of a long-term (20 year) Strategic Transport Plan for DMA.

(2) Feasibility Study for Follow-up Project: Identification and detailing of the scope of a follow-up project consistent with the long-term strategic transport plan.

(3) Feasibility Study for Dhaka Ring Road: Support feasibility study for the Western segment (from Tongi to Mirpur to Buriganga Bridge 1 onto Demra) of the Ring Road.

3.3.5 Project Component 5 - Land Acquisition and Resettlement (US$10.7 million). Finance for resettlement and land acquisition at sites of new flyovers, road, intersections and sidewalk improvements in accordance with a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) prepared in accordance with OD4.30 and other IDA guidelines.

3.3.6 Associated Component - Phase out of Two-stroke Engine Three-wheelers with Dhaka Air Quality Management Project (AQMP). DUTP was expected to improve the air quality in Dhaka by reducing vehicular emissions through enforcement of different measures, and some of these measures were included as legal covenants. The air quality related works in the project were pursued in coordination with another IDA financed project, Dhaka Air Quality Management Project (AQMP). The agreement related to this issue reached with GOB and DCC during the DUTP project negotiation was as follows:

(1) Discontinue registration of additional two-stroke engine three-wheelers in Dhaka after July 1, 1999;

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(2) Phase out from Dhaka all existing two-stroke engine three wheelers by January 1, 2003;(3) Discontinue importation of two-stroke engine three-wheelers and their engines, and reconditioned

buses, into Bangladesh by July 2001; and(4) Develop vehicle-specific emission standards for all types of imported and locally assembled motor

vehicles by June 30, 2000.

3.4 Revised Components:

3.4.1 The project's failure to show satisfactory progress in implementation and achievement of development impact at the early stage of the project has led to a project restructuring at the Mid-term Review (MTR) in February 2002. The IDA supervision team and DTCB reassessed the original scope of the project on the basis of (i) contribution to the PDOs; and (ii) probability of implementation within the remaining project period. The revised implementation arrangements included the change in implementing agency and reduction in the scope of works that were not expected to be completed within the remaining project period (including reasonable extension). Due to the weak implementation performance of DCC, the responsibility for implementing the remaining ICB works originally included in the DCC portfolio was shifted to RHD. The major components dropped from the restructured project by not satisfying these criteria included: Jatrabari Flyover (W) C13; NMT Underpasses (W) C6; BRTA Emission Lab (W) C14 and (G) AE1; and Equipment for DOE (DOE-1). The restructured project components had an estimated project cost of US$140.3 million (against US$234.2 million at PAD), with IDA assistance of US$107.5 million (against US$177.0 million at PAD). Although Jatrabari Flyover was dropped from the project due to redesign related delays, it was picked up by the GOB as a BOT project, and it is understood that negotiations to develop this facility are underway with a foreign investor.

3.4.2 The scattered road improvements, junction channelization measures and traffic signalization originally included as part of project design, were consolidated and repackaged into integrated arterial corridor improvement contracts at MTR. TA and studies for institutional strengthening were added at MTR to (i) build maintenance management capacity for the DCC network; (ii) develop Road and Traffic Maintenance Fund (RTMF) financial rules and standard operating procedures; and (iii) identify constraints and propose improved policy and regulatory framework for bus operations in DMA, including a pilot corridor for bus route franchising. In terms of key policy/institutional support, IDA's post MTR supervision mission efforts have focused on (i) improved maintenance management and financing arrangements for DCC arterial road network by making RTMF operational, and (ii) improved traffic flows along selected arterial corridors with separation of fast and slow moving traffic.

3.4.3 The revised scope accounted for 60% of the original project scope. The original project costs and MTR restructured costs are summarized in the following table:

DUTP Original vs. Revised Costs

Original Cost in PAD Revised Costs in MTRComponentsGOB IDA TOTAL GOB IDA TOTAL

Civil WorksEquipmentTechnical AssistanceLand Acq. & Resett.

44.62.80.49.4

133.68.1

34.01.3

178.210.934.410.7

24.20.50.24.7

72.55.0

18.80.6

96.65.5

19.05.4

Contingency 3.1 10.6 13.8Total Project Cost 57.2 177.0 234.2 32.8 107.5 140.3

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3.5 Quality at Entry:

3.5.1 No formal Quality at Entry Assessment (QEA) was carried out by QAG. The ICR rates quality at entry as moderately unsatisfactory, as there were significant shortcomings in identification, preparation and appraisal for the following reasons:

(1) Complex project design: The project was highly complex by involving many different ministries and implementing agencies, and by having too many components. It was undoubtedly oversized for IDA's first urban transport operation in Bangladesh. This project was a classic example of a "Christmas Tree Project". The support for public transport service improvements was inadequate in the project design.

(2) Poor Institutional Arrangements: In the original project design, 70% of the project works was assigned to Dhaka City Corporation (DCC), an agency with very limited institutional and financial capacity. The implementation arrangement was ineffective by giving lead implementation responsibility to newly created Dhaka Transport Coordination Board (DTCB) without the authority needed for coordination, and by the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) of DCC created outside the mainstream. Institutional strengthening measures were not well thought out. The complex project design has promoted the ambiguous responsibilities among the implementing agencies.

(3) Weak borrower ownership & commitment: The weak ownership and commitments were later reflected in poor implementation record, non-addressing weak leadership in DTCB all through the project period, but these were not recognized at entry. There could be two possible reasons for this: (1) the task team and the Country Management Unit (CMU) were too ambitious for this first urban transport project to ignore signals for the later events; or (2) they were led to believe that there was strong ownership. In either case it implies that the analysis of project risks and formulation of risk mitigation measures at entry were insufficient.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

4.1.1 Summary: The achievement of the project development objectives is moderately satisfactory, as there were moderate shortcomings in the operation's achievement of its objectives and in its efficiency. One of the two development objectives (to improve urban transport infrastructure and services in the Dhaka Metropolitan Area (DMA) in an economically and environmentally sustainable manner) has been broadly achieved. The project's physical investments have helped improve urban transport infrastructure in DMA, but it was not as much as originally intended due to the MTR scope reduction and final quality of the infrastructure. At the institutional side (to strengthen institutional and policy framework and address long-term transport planning and coordination issues in DMA), the project has achieved institutional strengthening in various agencies involved. However, it had only a modest impact on the strengthening of Dhaka Transport Coordination Board (DTCB), which was expected to be a core agency proposed by the project to act as an inter-agency unit for overall transport planning and coordination for DMA to fill a major gap in the institutional framework for urban transport.

4.1.2 The project performance indicators were revised at MTR to better reflect the performance, even though the PDOs were not revised. The assessment of the PDOs was carried out mainly by outcome/impact and output indicators revised at MTR as shown in Annex 1, and referred to in the initial indicators given in the PAD (Annex 1) whenever possible. However, the initial indicators were broad, and baseline data were not provided for most of the indicators, nor measured through the project period. Hence, the reference to the initial indicators was limited. Also, the overall good performance of the indicator values does not necessarily represent the entire characteristics of the project. Some assessment,

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therefore, was given from general observation of the project outcomes.

4.1.3 Improve urban transport infrastructure and services in DMA in an economically and environmentally sustainable manner (achieved). The project was expected to contribute to an improvement of urban transport infrastructure and services by the physical works components implemented by the project. The latest values of the performance indicators suggest that this PDO has been broadly achieved. The corridor improvements, intersection improvements, rehabilitated three inter-district bus terminals, grade separation of Mohakhali Flyover and pedestrian facilities improvements have all contributed to the better urban transport infrastructure and its service level. Among all, one of the largest improvements provided by the project is the signalization of the 68 intersections, which was the first major effort to create signalized intersections all over the city. However, assessment of the site has revealed that the influence of the physical improvement could have been much higher if the quality of design and construction had been better.

4.1.4 Overall values of outcome/impact indicators and output indicators show a good achievement in this PDO. The estimated Economic Rate of Return (ERR) for physical components at completion (29.1 % overall; 17.0 % for Mohakhali Flyover; 23.9 % for Intersection Improvements; 34.4 % for Inter-district Bus Terminal; 39.7 % for Integrated Corridor Development; 26.6 % for Flood Damage Rehabilitation) shows a satisfactory level, and support the intended economic benefits at appraisal. The overall traffic speed in Dhaka has increased from 15 kph to 22 kph only, against the targeted value at MTR (25 kph), and the initial target value (30 kph). This is because the estimated final value was based on the STP model which took overall (average) value of entire DMA, whereas the target was set for the project corridors. The capacity of model corridor intersections has increased by 20 % and travel time has reduced by 75 % for a total day, which was much higher than the initial target value (reduced by 50 %). In terms of improvement in public transport services, both the indicator values on the demonstration corridor and overall average at inner/outer cordon lines all show that large bus and mini-bus volumes have increased during the project period, which are all far more than the target value at MTR (increased by at least 15 %).

4.1.5 The traffic safety records also show a satisfactory improvement. The total accidents have decreased by 85 % and fatal accidents have decreased by 33 % on the NMT-free corridor during the three months of the NMT-free conversion. Accidents in DMA overall have also decreased by 50 %; these are all above the targeted value at MTR (reduction by at least 10 %). The motor vehicle pollution has also reduced to the satisfactory level; (a) Lead reduced by 65 % since the introduction of unleaded gas in 1998, (b) PM10 reduced by 30 % after the withdrawal of 2-stroke 3-wheelers in January 2003, (c) Hydrocarbon (HC) reduced by 20 %, which are all more than the target value at MTR: (a) Lead by 60-80 %, (b) PM10 by 20-35 %, (c) HC by 20-45 %.

4.1.6 However, some of the intended improvements had to be cancelled at MTR restructuring, among which the largest component was Jatrabari Flyover. Also, the public transport services improvements are an indirect influence of the physical improvements of the project, but it was not directly improved by the project components since there was no explicit public transport enhancement measures in the project.

4.1.7 Strengthen institutional and policy framework and address long-term transport planning and coordination issues in DMA (partially achieved). The project was expected to strengthen the urban transport institutional and policy framework by setting up DTCB to act as an inter-agency coordination body for overall transport planning and coordination for DMA. At the end of the project, the intended function of DTCB was only partially achieved. This is largely due to the dual authority set up in its Act that DTCB reports to both DCC and Ministry of Communications (MOC) without an effective mechanism to reduce conflicts between them, and also the continuous insufficiency of effective leadership in DTCB.

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There remained various structural and staffing constraints in DTCB, which keeps weakening the agency's effectiveness. These facts all imply a lack of government's commitment to the sustainability of DTCB in its future role in Dhaka urban transport improvement. This is the most significant factor which assesses that this PDO has not been fully achieved.

4.1.8 The project has supported tangible strengthening in road maintenance management capacity in DCC. The output indicator values show that all the intended organizational improvements and training needs have been achieved. The training has been largely provided for DCC maintenance engineers, DTCB officials, and policemen in DMP. A basic maintenance management system has been developed based on functional classification of road; a road inventory and condition survey has been completed; zonal engineers have been trained, annual maintenance plans adequately funded and gradually putting greater emphasis on periodic maintenance strategies; a computerized Road and Traffic Maintenance Fund (RTMF) accounting system has been set up and audited by commercial auditors; and RTMF financial rules and standard operating procedure has been finally notified by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development and Communities (MOLGRD&C).

4.1.9 The project also involved Bangladesh Road Transport Authority (BRTA) for institutional strengthening framework. The BRTA computerized vehicle registration and driver licensing system has achieved the benefits of country-wide operation of driver licensing and vehicle registration. Although the system development contract included vendor support for system operation and maintenance for three years, the system required adequate number of operators with appropriate training. At the project closing, required professional IT managers and system analysts were not available in BRTA. BRTA has been provided with necessary technical support and equipment to enforce vehicle emission standards.

4.1.10 The Strategic Transport Planning (STP) Study has produced an urban transport policy document, a functioning traffic model and traffic database for DMA, and a 20 year perspective plan for urban transport investments based on fairly extensive stakeholder consultations. These study results provide a robust framework for long-term transport planning and coordination in DMA. The STP Study also have finally appeared to have GOB ownership as the GOB endorsement process is ongoing.

4.2 Outputs by components:

4.2.1 Project Component 1: Infrastructure Development. This component is rated moderately satisfactory overall. The physical infrastructure development was successfully completed even though there were significant delays in the schedule. The level of achievement in outcomes in each sub-component has variance. The construction quality of the completed works was reasonably good. The finishing details including the serviceability to the users could have been better if additional attention had been paid to design adjustment and quality enhancement during construction. Separation of motorized and non-motorized traffic (para. 4.2.3) was not explicitly envisioned in the PAD, therefore performance of this component was not judged on the basis of the degree of success achieved in implementing this policy.

4.2.2 Traffic Management Measures and System Improvements: Good traffic channelization has been achieved by installing traffic signals at 68 locations throughout the city with a total cost of Tk136 million (US$2.3 million). These locations were mainly selected to be on the network of motorized traffic oriented corridors, where traffic discipline and compliance were expected to be higher than in other non-motorized traffic oriented areas. It was the first major signalization for the entire city area. It created some initial chaos soon after the first implementation, however, the adjustment of signal timing and channelization was achieved reasonably quickly, and it began to significantly improve the traffic flows. A three-year maintenance arrangement is in place whereby the signal supply and installation contractor will continue to

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provide maintenance. However, the sustainability remains to be a concern since the capacity and capability of the staff within the Traffic Engineering Division (TED)/DCC has not been sufficient to participate effectively in the necessary monitoring activities associated with the operation and maintenance of the traffic signalling system, as they have been relying entirely on the contractor and the DSM Consultant for technical advice. There is a significant risk that if the signals are not operated and maintained effectively, they will fall into disrepute and disrepair, as it happened in many other developing cities.

4.2.3 Separation of non-motorized traffic (NMT) was planned in the final agreement for the six agreed integrated improvement corridors during the MTR. This followed the recommendations by the Committee for Integrated Corridor Improvement set-up by DTCB, which identified a 120 km arterial network (about 6% of the total road network in Dhaka) for NMT-free operations. Among them, Mirpur Road was adopted as a Demonstration Corridor for the NMT-free operations. The first withdrawal of NMT (mainly cycle rickshaws) was conducted between Gabtali and Russel Square in December 2002 (Phase-1). A preliminary after-project survey indicated significant reductions in travel time along the corridor, and also indicated a need for parallel complementary NMT routes and crossing points. It was followed by the second NMT-free conversion between Russel Square and the New Market in December 2004 (Phase-2) after two years of interval. The Phase-2 conversion created a social criticism, especially from NGOs, because the conversion was not associated with complementary increase in public transport services, such as additional and enhanced bus services, sufficient provision of complementary parallel routes and crossing points for NMT, social safety net package for rickshaw pullers and vulnerable rickshaw owners, despite IDA's repeated advice to implement those measures. It was also argued that there was no conclusive proof that aggregate positive impact for the travelling public outweighed the negative impact of the NMT-free conversion. As a result, the Mirpur Demonstration Corridor was the only NMT-free conversion piloted under DUTP.

4.2.4 Corridor Improvements: Integrated corridor improvements together with intersection improvements and about 135 km of sidewalks were completed in various contracts. These were; (i) Intersection Improvements (20 intersections), (ii) Corridor Development (20 intersections and 21 km road improvement), and (iii) Road Improvement (18 intersections and 46 km road improvement). The completion of these works contributed to the improved traffic flows. However, the consistency and quality of the works in the corridors and junctions could have been better with more careful quality control in continuity and width of pedestrian footways, relocation of utility poles, re-levelling of man-hole covers and road marking. The total cost of this component was Tk3,200 million (US$53 million)

4.2.5 Rehabilitation of Existing Bus Terminals: The rehabilitation of the three existing inter-district bus terminals at Saidabad, Mohakhali and Gabtoli was completed with a cost of Tk505 million (US$8.4 million), and private operations have been arranged by contracts. The works included terminal area restoration, parking area reconstruction, covered sidewalks, toilets and passenger waiting arrangements. The rehabilitation works have finished about one year behind the schedule. There were some complaints about the design and the quality of the facilities from the operators and the passengers, such as toilet fittings and tiles, narrow space for ticket counter, poor water supply lines and water leakage. There were more than 150 small businesses and vendors. Though the design accommodated essential businesses by providing small shops/kiosks, accommodation for vendors were not kept. DCC should monitor the Private Operator's performance and ensure sustainability and functionality of the assets.

4.2.6 Pedestrian Facilities Improvements: 40 km of new sidewalks along the existing major arterial roads and about 135 km of sidewalks under corridor improvements were rehabilitated. This sidewalk rehabilitation has helped particularly the movement of garment workers who are mostly female. Twelve foot over bridges were constructed at (1) Farmgate, (2) Azimpur Girls School, (3) Suritola Govt. Primary

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School, (4) Badda Alatunnessa School, (5) New Market, (6) Dhanmondi Boys School, (7) HBFC Uttara, (8) Kakoli Bus Stand, (9) Wills Little Flower School, (10) Kallyanpur, (11) Asad Gate, and (12) Kalabagan. These works was completed by May 2005 with a cost of Tk87 million (US$1.4 million). However, according to an independent survey performed by the Center for Urban Studies, these pedestrian bridges are not fully used mainly due to the lack of enforcement.

4.2.7 Grade-separated Interchange Facilities: The 4-lane Mohakhali Flyover from the Airport Road over the railway to the road leading to the Old Airport Road was constructed and put to operation in November 2004 with a cost of Tk1,167 million (US$15.2 million). However, at the opening of the flyover, only 50% of the 42 Shock Transmission Units (STUs) were installed, due to delays attributed to the contractor. The delayed installation of the remaining 21 STUs and noncompliance of the contract specifications with the installed STUs were the major problems in the orderly closing of the project. This STU issue remained unsolved until the project closing date. The STU installation was finally completed by the end of August 2005, and its certification process has been underway. The progress on this issue is being pursued by the implementing agencies and DTCB, and will be monitored by IDA for satisfactory completion. The cancellation of Jatrabari Flyover was a negative factor for the achievement of the intended traffic flow improvements.

4.2.8 Flood Damage Rehabilitation of Roads and Drainage: The 1998 flood damage restoration works were completed by October 2003 in two packages, 41.5 km in total length. The final cost was Tk300 million (US$5 million).

4.2.9 Project Component 2: Equipment Support. This component is rated moderately satisfactory. The equipment included in this component was intended to provide with necessary equipment for urban transport management to strengthen technical and institutional capacity of the project agencies, which were DTCB, DCC, RHD, DMP and BRTA. The equipment provided for DMP was aimed at establishing traffic management teams for NMT-free operations on the identified corridors during the post MTR period. However, the equipment and vehicles provided were diversified overall, such as computers, software, patrol vehicles, pickups, towing vehicles, motorcycles, parking clamps and other miscellaneous equipment. It certainly helped each agency to strengthen its daily technical capacity, but the project design lacked focus on how consolidatedly those equipment and vehicles would contribute to the PDO of strengthening institutional and policy framework.

4.2.10 Some important achievements are observed as a system to improve the technical capacity of each agency. The installation of computerized vehicle registration and driver licensing system (BRTA) and the delivery of pollution control equipment for measuring roadside vehicular emissions (BRTA) are certainly strong tools to enhance the agency's capability. DCC started GIS ward mapping for withholding tax using own resources and completed 38 wards out of 90 municipal wards, and support was given from DUTP to cover 21 municipal more wards. DCC need to mobilize resources to cover the remaining wards. After completion a systematic tax collection approach is expected to be in place under DCC. However, a common issue observed in both cases is the risk of sustainability. Whether these newly established systems will work as intended in these agencies still remain to be seen in the medium term.

4.2.11 Project Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building. This component is rated moderately satisfactory. The intended strengthening of the implementing agencies, particularly DTCB and DCC was partially achieved by the institutional support in this component. The project design for project preparation, implementation support including design supervision and monitoring, financial management, and training programs were standard and superficial, and it was not specifically designed to address the weak implementation capacity of newly created DTCB and limited institutional and financial

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capacity of DCC. The lack of adequate implementation arrangements was the major cause of project implementation slippage at the initial half of the project period, which eventually led to the major project restructuring at MTR. However, one positive result achieved at the end of the project was that the capacity of Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) to use the transport model (EMME/2) was strengthened. BUET had a good understanding of the model and will be able to advise DTCB in the future if the model needs to be run to help in the decision-making process for urban transport investments in DMA.

4.2.12 Project Component 4: Policy Support and Future Studies. This component is rated moderately satisfactory. The preparation of long-term Transport Strategic Plan (STP) was conducted by the selected consultants. However, the procurement of the STP study was largely delayed, and the actual study activities started in April 2004. The project closing date was then extended until March 2005 for the STP study to be completed, but the tightened study period associated with lack of timely commitment and participation of main DMA stakeholders in the process had led to the deterioration of the study results. Normally this type of study in nature should have at least 18 months for satisfactory study procedures. At the time of contract, it was intended to be performed within 7 months, which was later extended to one year. The tight study period caused by delay of procurement process has led to partial analysis, insufficient quality, comprehensiveness of the study outputs and recommendations, and eventually to inadequacy of results for appropriate decision-making process and weak ownership in the absence of consultation process. The STP study had a slippage over the final closing date (June 30, 2005) to build ownership of the study results through a comprehensive consultation campaign in order to facilitate adoption of the recommendations and future implementation. It necessitated a separate financing arrangement after the closing date. The final quality of the study was recovered to satisfactory with close monitoring by the IDA task team during the later stage of implementation.

4.2.13 Project Component 5: Land Acquisition and Resettlement. This component is rated moderately unsatisfactory. There were three out of six RHD contracts which required land acquisition and resettlement. Both agencies, RHD and DCC, were extremely slow and inefficient in arranging land acquisition and utility relocations, which resulted in long delays and in many places the works could not be completed as designed. However, the completion of construction was finally achieved. Hence, it is rated moderately unsatisfactory.

4.2.14 Associated Component: Phase out of Two-stroke Engine Three-wheelers with Dhaka Air Quality Management Project (AQMP). This component is rated moderately satisfactory. The removal of two-stroke engine three-wheelers from Dhaka by January 1, 2003 was a landmark achievement which led to a quantum jump improvement in air quality in Dhaka. While this was done to implement a legal covenant of DUTP, adoption of new standard for ambient air quality, new and in-use vehicle emission standards were achieved through AQMP. The impact of the action was vividly captured at the Continuous Air Monitoring Station (CAMS) in Dhaka set up under AQMP. The weekly average before and after the removal of two-stroke engine three-wheelers showed 31% drop in average PM10, 41% drop in PM2.5, 59% in hydrocarbon, and 28% in CO. The street noise level was also significantly reduced as per general public perception, although no quantitative measures were available. Overall it was estimated that the impact of the ban translated to about 24µg/m

3

decrease in the PM10 level in Dhaka on yearly basis. Health benefits estimates using accepted methodology showed health benefit of about US$2 per capita per year amounting to about US$25 million per year for the city.

4.2.15 However, this removal program of two-stroke engine three-wheelers also had a serious negative impacts. (i) it was implemented by MOC but it was in blatant disregard of recommended social mitigation

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measures following a social assessment study carried out by DUTP, and it led to significant short to medium-term adverse impacts on the livelihood of affected drivers, and (ii) lack of a follow-up ban on polluting diesel buses had gradually eroded the air quality improvements achieved by the phase out of two-stroke engine three-wheelers, as is indicated in Annex 1: 2.2.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

4.3.1 At the ICR, an economic re-evaluation of the project was undertaken following a similar methodology used in the PAD. The method of the economic analysis at completion was centered upon the use of the urban transport planning model developed for the STP study. In assessing the various components, the networks were built for the "with-project" case and the "without-project" case. The model was run for both cases resulting in an estimation of the effects which the addition of the complements would have on the trips in the project affected area. This method was adopted for the Mohakhali Flyover, Intersection Improvements, Inter-District Bus Terminal Improvements and Integrated Corridor Developments. The assessment for the Flood Damage Rehabilitation used a traditional approach by estimating incremental capital cost savings of rehabilitating the flood damaged roads and calculating changes in vehicle operating cost savings and time savings due to the road improvements. This was because the flood component links were minor residential roads and not included in the STP strategic network.

4.3.2 The following assumptions were made when carrying out the economic analysis at completion:

- A 20 year analysis period was considered with 2004 being the base year and 2024 as the terminal year.- At the terminal year a residual or salvage value of 15% has been taken for assets with life of 20 years or

more.- Constant base year prices have been used for economic evaluation. All the future costs and benefits

relating to the project were at 2004 prices.- The value of time savings were calculated by a weighted average travel time costs using the data in the

RHD Annual Report, and then multiplied by the number of vehicle-hours to obtain the overall travel time costs.

- The vehicle operating cost savings (VOC) were measured by multiplying the vehicle kilometer of travel (VKT) by a weighted average of VOC per km based on the data in the RHD Annual Report.

4.3.3 The results of the analysis at completion showed that as stand-alone components, Mohakhali Flyover had an Economic Rate of Return (ERR) of 16.98% (19 % at appraisal), Intersection Improvements had an ERR of 23.94% (28 % at appraisal), Inter-District Bus Terminals had an ERR of 34.35% (17 % at appraisal), Integrated Corridor Development had an ERR of 39.68% (38 % at appraisal), and Flood Damage Rehabilitation had an ERR of 26.63% (38 % at appraisal). The consolidated project analysis shows an ERR of 29.11% (27 % at appraisal) for the total of the above components. The level of ERR for each component was at an satisfactory level, and the achieved values at completion reasonably support the intended economic benefits at appraisal (Annex 3 for detail).

4.4 Financial rate of return:

N/A

4.5 Institutional development impact:

4.5.1 The institutional development impact of the project was modest. The important equipment support, such as the computerized vehicle registration and driver licensing system, and the roadside emissions monitoring equipment for gross polluters for BRTA, the computerization of RTMF accounts and

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the GIS mapping system for DCC, the signal controlling and management for TED/DCC, has certainly given an opportunity to these agencies to enhance its performance and capability. However, from the past record of their performance through the project period, the sustainability for the enhancement remains to be seen further to judge if it eventually contributes to their strengthening.

4.5.2 DTCB was expected to be a permanent body to merge responsibilities for urban transport planning and coordination of new urban transport development projects in DMA. It was a major proposal in the DUTP design because the continuation of past practices would lead to the failure of the city to meet the economic and social needs of its inhabitants, making it impossible to catch up later with the deficit in transport infrastructure. Although the Government expressed a commitment at the project appraisal to establish DTCB, it has been operated mainly as a PIU for DUTP during the project period. However, the STP study has proposed establishment of a single metropolitan agency responsible for both transport planning and land use planning. There are suggestions which could be an opportunity for DTCB be strengthened to grow into this role.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

5.1.1 Major Floods in 2004: A genuine factor outside the control of the government or implementing agencies was the force of nature, the exceptional floods of July - September 2004. The widespread flood caused by the heavy rains during this monsoon season largely damaged the urban infrastructure of Dhaka. Large areas of the city have been flooded for a number of weeks, causing delays in ongoing construction works. However, it caused relatively little damage to the completed works by that time, according to the DSM consultant. The damages to these works that were under construction or within the defects liability period were covered by insurance.

5.1.2 Repeated Hartal (General Strike): The repeated political turmoil, such as the "hartal" all through the project period, did have significant effect on the implementation of civil works components of the project. It obviously also have affected other "intangible" factors of daily project activities, as well as other economic activities, such as meetings, delivery, transport, etc. The implementation progress could have been improved at certain level if there had been without hartal, which should be significant if all hartal days were counted during the project implementation period.

5.1.3 Complex Project Structure of DUTP: Perhaps the individual agencies should not be blamed for the complicated structure of DUTP, in which many departments and organizations involved were under unclear command structures, misunderstood command structures, or understood but ignored command structures, which has often created complications.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

5.2.1 Failure to Empower DTCB: As part of the project, GOB set up DTCB as an inter-agency unit for overall transport planning and coordination for DMA. DTCB has been chaired by the Mayor of Dhaka and represented by other municipalities in DMA. At the same time, since transport planning, policy and regulations are functionally a responsibility of the MOC, DTCB has been administratively under MOC. The Executive Director (ED) of DTCB reports to the Secretary of MOC. DTCB has played a major role in coordinating implementation of DUTP. It also should have played a leading role in carrying out transport planning, policy formulation for the metropolitan area, and also in the coordination of major operation and investment decisions regarding urban transport in general with other agencies and stakeholders.

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5.2.2 However, due to the lack of its full authority to administer various implementing agencies, lack of technical capability/expert staff to perform its mandated leadership, and also the lack of effective leadership, the role of DTCB remained weak. It is true that this is largely because of the difficulty in creating a new agency in vested rights and authorities of bureaucratic environment of the government. However, DTCB could have played much more effective role in the coordination of urban transport among other agencies and stakeholders if the proper leadership had been given from its birth and maintained through the project period. From this viewpoint, it was certainly a factor subject to government control.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:

5.3.1 Slow land acquisition and utility trenching over completed roads: The slow and inefficient progress in arranging land acquisition, utility relocations and associated delays have been the factors subject to the implementing agencies. Also, the trenching by Utility Department (UD) at newly reconstructed roads and footpaths have substantially deteriorated the quality of the completed construction. This is a consequence of bad coordination among the implementing agencies, which could have been avoided with reasonable planning and discussions within the given mandate of the agencies.

5.3.2 Inappropriate STU Installations: The procurement of the STUs for Mohakhali Flyover by the contractor has caused a delay in their commissioning approximately by one year. The contractor tried to find a way to reduce the cost of the STUs which was included in its bid price, and it took too long to settle between the Engineer (PD of RHD) and the contractor, and it was a major cause of the delay. The construction progress could have been much faster if the Engineer had taken a resolute and strict measures to the contractor's compliance at the earlier stage. Considering the fact that the delayed installation of 21 STUs and noncompliance with the contract specifications of the installed STUs were the major problems in the orderly project closure, it was a significant factor of delay subject to implementing agency control.

5.3.3 In addition to the STU issue, there are notable factors subject to implementing agency control which have been discussed in this report such as: (i) repeated flyover design changes that eventually made it impossible to implement the Jatrabari Flyover in the project period; (ii) lack of implementation of measures to fully mitigate the adverse impacts of NMT-free conversion of Mirpur Road in Phase-2; (iii) delay in notification of the RTMF financial rules and SOP by MOLGRD&C; and (iv) non-implementation of the Dhaka bus study recommendations, as well as the pilot bus route franchise.

5.4 Costs and financing:

5.4.1 At appraisal the total project cost was estimated at US$234.2 million, of which IDA's share was US$177.0 million equivalent. The civil works at appraisal accounted for US$178.2 million, which was 76 % of the total project cost, whereas the procurement of equipment accounted for US$10.9 million (5 %), and the technical assistance accounted for US$34.4 million (15 %). Due to the serious delays and slow progress, the total project cost was revised at the MTR to be US$140.3 million, of which US$107.5 million was to be financed by IDA. The revised civil works component was estimated to be US$96.6 million (68 %), procurement of equipment was estimated to be US$5.5 million (4 %), the technical assistance was estimated to be US$19.0 million (14 %), the land acquisition and resettlement was estimated to be US$5.4 million (4 %) with a contingency of US$13.8 million (10 %).

5.4.2 At project closing, the total cost of the project was US$124.9 million, and IDA's financing share was about US$93.1 million. About US$106.2 million was cancelled from the credit. The reduction in total project cost was due to the reduction of the project scope at MTR. The final project cost (US$124.9

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million) accounts for 53% of the original project cost, and 89% of the MTR revised project cost.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:

6.1.1 The sustainability of the project is rated moderately likely, as the risk, at the time of evaluation, that the development outcomes will not be maintained is moderate for the following reasons:

1) The physical completion of the project components has been in place and the improved urban transport infrastructure is effectively operational and its continued service is likely. Mohakhali Flyover has improved the through traffic of the complicated at-grade intersection with the railway crossing, the three inter-district bus terminals are expected to be in improved operations with private operators, and the rehabilitated corridors and intersections are also contributing to better traffic flow.

2) Due to the overall success in functionalizing the signalization in the 68 intersections, there is an opportunity for the TED in DCC to maintain and improve the signal operation to contributing to the better traffic management of the city, which is moderately likely. However, the initial stage of the signal operation was dependent on the contractor and the DSM consultants, and the effective take-over of these operations by the actual TED staff will have to be observed in the medium term.

3) A successful operation of the Road and Traffic Maintenance Fund (RTMF), with which DCC committed to route its entire annual road maintenance allocation through a dedicated account with setting up of proper financial controls and separate accounting/reporting, is moderately likely after its Rules and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) was approved by the DCC Mayor in early 2004, and finally approved by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development and Communities (MOLGRD&C) in June 2005 after a long time of non-compliance with the related legal covenant.

4) The sustainability of DTCB, the most important institutional arrangement of the project, is uncertain due to the weak commitment of senior officials of GOB at the end of the project, and repeated absence and frequent change of full time ED. As a recent example, a new full-time ED was appointed in March 2005, after the absence of full time ED since October 2004, but the new ED was replaced again at the beginning of July 2005, soon after the closing date of the project. Also, DTCB's sustainable acquisition of a revenue budget status (i.e. permanent organization in the government organogram) has remained uncertain. It is difficult to expect the sustainable DTCB functioning for its expected role under these frequent changes of the leadership and uncertain revenue budget status, which are the key factors for DTCB to be sustainable. However, an opportunity remains with the earnest implementation of the institutional recommendations made in the STP study to strengthen DTCB's role in transport planning and coordination and extend its responsibility to land-use planning.

5) Award of pilot bus route franchise on an designated corridor had been pending since May 2004, and was not awarded by the end of the project. The enhancement of the key public transport mode, which should be associated with the NMT-free operation on major corridors, is unlikely, which gives uncertainty to the public transport enhancement, as well as to the sustainable expansion of NMT-free operation.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

6.2.1 All the civil works and procurement of goods financed by the project were carried out and have been fully operational at the end of the project. However, there were several remaining activities to be done

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after the credit closing date. The remaining activities for the Strategic Transport Planning Study and Impact Evaluation for the Mirpur Road, the demonstration corridor for NMT-free operation, were arranged to be financed from the surplus credit amount available under the Third Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project (RRMP-III). The Social Safety Net Package for affected rickshaw pullers and vulnerable rickshaw owners were arranged to be financed under a proposed Microcredit-II project for orderly closure of the remaining activities.

6.2.2 The future of the project could be further evaluated by potential "performance indicators". These indicators would be:

a) The continuous revenue budget allocation for DTCB after the project closing and restored strong leadership by the full-time ED, clarification of the roles and responsibilities of DTCB.

b) GOB endorsement of the Strategic Transport Planning Study, finalized with effective stakeholder consultation.

c) TED's independent management of signal operations and further expansion of signalized intersections.d) Pilot and further extended bus franchise awarding.e) RTMF - making Road and Traffic Management Fund operational and functional by DCC.

6.2.3 The possibility of any follow-up operation by the IDA would highly depend on the satisfactory evaluation of the above indicators. As urban transport condition in DMA continues to be in a serious situation, follow-up projects based on GOB endorsed Strategic Transport Plan would be desired if there is a positive outcome of the above "performance indicators". The priority for the follow-up operation would depend on the final recommendation of the STP, but any follow-up project should have a high focus on the enhancement of public transport services, particularly in an economically and environmental sustainable manner and with a strong focus on helping the urban poor.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:

7.1.1 IDA's performance at the identification and preparation stage was moderately unsatisfactory, as there were significant shortcomings during identification, preparation and appraisal of the project. The DUTP PAD was a very well documented material to figure out the urban transport problem and diagnosis in Dhaka, but it could have only been a good implementation plan if it had been designed for well organized, functioning and mature implementing environment. The project design was too complex with involving too many different government agencies and too many components for the given urban transport project implementation environment in Dhaka. The task team should have considered the reality of implementing environment more seriously, and the fact that this was IDA's first urban transport operation in Bangladesh and there would have been a high risk of implementation delays and problems with the weak implementing agencies. The project should have been designed to begin with focusing on only a few key elements with high impacts, which could have been extended (in size) and expanded (in scope) with capacity enhancement of the implementing agencies.

7.1.2 The setting up of DTCB was a main proposal in DUTP, which was designed to be an inter-agency unit for overall transport planning and coordination for DMA, to fill a major gap in the existing institutional framework for coordination of urban transport. This idea is not unique for Dhaka; similar mechanisms have been proposed in many urban transport plans worldwide. However, it could only be functional by providing such agency with sufficient capacity and authority to act for the anticipated

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function. This is always the major difficulty in setting up a new agency like DTCB because the existing various transport agencies have their own established mandate, authority and income generating mechanism from user fees and government budget, and none of these existing agencies would be pleased to give up their power. So in the institutional aspect, the major focus should have been given to how to strengthen DTCB in its capacity and line of authorities for its expected function. However, very little technical support was given in this context in the project design. Also, the dual authority on DTCB (chaired by the DCC Mayor but reporting to MOC), and the ambiguity in supervision decisions between DTCB and RHD/DCC should have been noticed as critical risks against orderly implementation.

7.2 Supervision:

7.2.1 IDA's performance during project supervision was moderately satisfactory, as there were moderate shortcomings in the proactive identification of opportunities and resolution of threats. During the initial stage of the project implementation, the land acquisition, resettlement and other implementation activities were already showing critical signs of substantial implementation incapability, but the task team did not propose fundamental mitigation measures except for raising alarm for the delays. Also, quite significant part of delays in the procurement process was attributable to the IDA side.

7.2.2 However, during MTR and its follow-up, the task team tackled with most of the critical issues, and actively negotiated with the hesitating implementation agencies to restructure the project for dropping some components and shifting the implementing agency. It eventually led to the orderly closure of the project with at least revised physical components of the project to be completed, so that one of the PDOs (improve urban transport infrastructure and services) has been broadly achieved; it also partially achieved some institutional mechanism developed under the project, such as the RTMF. The supervision in the later stage of the project has looked into various technical factors as well, and the advice and suggestions during the supervision was appropriate and effective. It was typically evident in the STU installation delay, where IDA's strong intervention in the Mohakhali Flyover STU testing standoff and referral of the matter to the integrity unit eventually caused the implementing agency to insist that the contractor meets his contractual commitments.

7.2.3 Phase-2 NMT-free conversion on the demonstration corridor was largely delayed, while the task team had focused on the social safety net for affected rickshaw pullers. After DCC implemented the Phase-2 NMT-free conversion with no associated social mitigation measures, a strong social criticism occurred against the NMT-free conversion particularly from various NGO groups. The criticism varied in nature; it accused the lack of social safety net package for the affected people, the lack of providing alternative public transport services to mitigate the functions of NMT, and also accused IDA's support to NMT-free conversion itself based on a "car-free world" philosophy, which is opposing the allocation of more road space to private motorized vehicles. With the benefit of hindsight, IDA could have been more prepared to the risks associated with supporting a potentially controversial policy by giving more technical support in preparation of social mitigation measures, for example, where the Borrower lacked the capacity and/or the will to fully implement the suggested mitigation measures.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:

7.3.1 The overall performance of IDA is rated moderately satisfactory, considering the above assessment with the outcome rating given in Section 4.1.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:

7.4.1 The performance of the Borrower during the preparation stage was unsatisfactory, as there were

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major shortcomings in their performance. Many commitments for DUTP components and project implementation were made during extensive discussions with IDA, but many of the key actions were delayed, which eventually caused the significant slippage of the appraisal. The procedural delays have slipped the project implementation already by two years at the beginning of the project in early 1999. In particular the delay in establishing GCTPCB (currently DTCB) and appointment of its key staff including the Executive Director, delay of ECNEC's approval of the Project Concept Paper (PCP), delay of consultant's work for preparation of Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) which largely due to difficulty in getting access to land related data from the concerned GOB agencies, among others, were the major slippage toward the appraisal.

7.5 Government implementation performance:

7.5.1 The Government's implementation performance was moderately unsatisfactory, as there were significant shortcomings in their performance. DUTP, given its nature and involvement of several ministries and many agencies, was a complex project. Due to procedural delays, many of which were attributable to delays in Government approval, the implementation of the project was largely slipped. In particular, the establishment of DTCB, which was the main institutional reform for urban transport system in DMA, was largely delayed; the enabling legislation (DTCB Bill) has finally passed the Parliament in April 2001, two years after the beginning of the project. It was a major discouraging event for effective project implementation leadership.

7.5.2 Even though setting up a new organization is a major challenge in the Government bureaucracy, the establishment of DTCB was a major reform opportunity for urban transport sector in DMA, and it could have been a much higher success with the Government's strong leadership. However, the lack of leadership in DTCB during the repeated absence and frequent change of the full-time ED throughout the project period has implications that the Government was not fully committed that DTCB should act as it was intended to.

7.5.3 The success in the removal of two-stroke three-wheelers from Dhaka in coordination with AQMP and as a legal covenant of DUTP was a landmark achievement of the Government. A lot of public support was created through the project-related interactions with the stakeholders and the press, and the impact was remarkable. It was a good example that a strong political commitment could achieve a significant result, which turned to imply that the Government is largely attributable to the above-mentioned unsatisfactory outcomes. However, the disregard of social mitigation measures, the governance concerns related to the import of CNG three-wheelers, and the lack of follow-up measures to reduce polluting diesel buses which eroded the air quality improvement should also be noted associated with this achievement.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

7.6.1 Overall project management was moderately unsatisfactory, as there were significant shortcomings in the performance of the implementing agencies. The entire project period from the preparation to the closing was associated with repeated delays. The major delays during the first half of the project period had led to the restructuring and reduction of the significant project scope at MTR from US$234.2 million to US$140.3 million. Even after the MTR, the continued delays have caused the two time credit closing date extension by one year. However, the project was eventually closed with many achievements even with these associated delays.

7.6.2 Many of the delays were related to the project management. For example, both of the two flyovers in the original scope (Mohakhali and Jatrabari) were redesigned after project commencement due to changing Borrower/implementing agency's requirements, and in case of Jatrabari Flyover, the delayed

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design and substantial increase of the construction cost had led to the cancellation of this component from DUTP. The delayed installation of the STUs and noncompliance with the contract specifications of the installed STUs for Mohakhali Flyover were attributable to the insufficient project management.

7.6.3 The Phase-2 NMT-free conversion on Mirpur corridor had created a strong social criticism since it was implemented without associated social mitigation measures and associated bus priority measures, without public transport enhancement for the NMT-free corridor, without effective roadside parking restrictions and appropriate usage of the created space. The pilot bus route franchise recommended in the associated study had not been implemented until the project closing. These facts have hampered further implementation of the NMT-free conversion on the designated corridors.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:

7.7.1 The overall performance of the Borrower is rated moderately unsatisfactory, considering the above assessment with the outcome rating given in Section 4.1.

8. Lessons Learned

8.1 Complex project design should be avoided in a weak implementation environment. Urban transport projects tend to be fairly complex operations. To be successful in a weak implementation environment as in the case of DUTP, the project design should be kept simple, and the project size must be calibrated to demonstrated implementation capacity. Urban transport measures in a large city should rather be addressed through a series of operations, possibly in rapid succession, which can be progressively increase in size and complexity. Significant policy reforms, such as establishing new agencies, designating bus priority and/or separation of slow and fast moving traffic modes, establishing secure and stable road maintenance funding, public transport reform, may be better pursued through the Development Policy Lending (DPL).

8.2 Project objectives and components with TA requirements must be clearly aligned. The PDOs for DUTP explicitly included improvements in transport services, but the initial project design did not include particular TA sub-component or measures to support this PDO. That was a cause of unsuccessful improvement in transport services, particularly the bus sector. Measures proposed under the Dhaka Bus Study initiated in MTR were not implemented by the GOB.

8.3 Borrower's high ownership and clear leadership are essential to ensure progress on significant policy and institutional reform. A project should not be initiated unless the Borrower's high ownership is clearly demonstrated. To drive a project like DUTP, the city needs an empowered, committed and competent core agency with tenured top management, having ready access to the Mayor/decision maker's office, and coordinating with the various players. Such an organization cannot be created overnight, and it needs strong political leadership and support. The formal establishment of DTCB was delayed by two years after the commencement of the project, and the fact that the position of ED have been changed five times (6 EDs) with repeated lengthy absence clearly shows the lack of commitment to empowerment of DTCB.

8.4 Line of authorities for project management should be clearly defined. In DUTP the DSM consultant was appointed by DTCB, and conflicting situations occurred often between DTCB and RHD/DCC on project management decisions. The DSM consultant was also confused in the ambiguous authority regarding final approval of designs, where any decision was never final, and there was always interference from all corners (ministries, members of parliament, commissioners, police sergeants, shopkeepers, etc.). A better way would have been that the DSM services should be directly provided to the

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implementing agencies, not through a coordinating office, since it dilutes ownership and responsibility.

8.5 The independent "Engineer" role separated from the "Employer" should be insisted in a complex project with weak borrower implementation capacity. For agencies with weak contract administration capacity, it is important to strongly insist on moving the "Engineer" role to an international (definitely not local) consulting firm. In DUTP, the DSM consultant was only the "Engineer's representative", and the "Engineer" was the PDs both in RHD (ICB) contracts and in DCC (NCB) contracts. This weak position of the DSM consultant has obviously led to many unsatisfactory events, such as the STU fiasco at Mohakhali Flyover. The independence of the Engineer's role was seldom achieved in Bangladesh including DUTP in spite of IDA's push during preparation discussions. Many of the delays and improper project performances were caused by this very weak position of the DSM consultant, who should have played a key role in project management. The difference is obvious by comparing DUTP with the Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project (completed in December 1999), in which the supervision consultant was designated as the Engineer (as the first and the only case so far in Bangladesh transport sector), and it was assessed as a major cause of satisfactory project management results. This is more like a "governance" issue, rather than a "capability" issue.

8.6 Clear incentive/penalty mechanism must be enhanced for better consultancy services. In time-based supervision consultancy contracts under IDA guidelines, the more the construction delays, the more the supervision consultant will be paid, in which the consultant does not have a strong incentive to facilitate Contractor's work on schedule, in fact it is quite opposite. In DUTP the consultant's contract payment eventually ended up about 50% higher than the original contract value. There should be a penalty clause for the consultant's remuneration related to progress achieved by the Contractor, by applying a penalty or capping the total payment. It can also be applied as an incentive, when appropriate, that the consultant could receive extra bonus if the Contractor's progress is beyond the schedule. However, such incentive/penalty mechanism should be applied with stronger authority or ability of the consultant to exercise project management decisions, such as the designation of the Engineer's role, as discussed above.

8.7 The maximum number of consultant firms forming a joint venture must be capped. In DUTP the DSM consultant was made up of seven firms (four international and three domestic), and was constant in-argument about who provides the resident supervisory staff. The maximum number of firms should be capped at about three or so in maximum. The overall quality of local consultant staff provided for construction supervision was generally fairly poor.

8.8 Wider civil society consultation, parallel implementation of social mitigation measures and higher quality impact assessment studies are essential for potentially controversial measures, such as NMT-free conversion. Urban transport/development projects draw a lot of public attention. The project affected people (PAPs) by the NMT-free conversion under DUTP drew a lot of attention from NGOs and media. At the initial stage of implementation, adequate attention was not paid for preparing a fact-based social safety net for PAPs in parallel with the implementation, nor a comprehensive social assessment including stakeholder mapping and analysis was undertaken, which left a large gap in identifying stakeholder groups, their interests and potential mitigation strategies. The assessment of social impacts of the NMT-free conversion on the demonstration corridor was explicitly initiated at MTR. The specific adverse impacts were quantified after implementation of Phase-1 conversion, but detailed preparation of the mitigation package was delayed due to lack of timely decisions in GOB. This is also partly because the impact assessment study was not in high quality, and an effective social safety net was difficult to be designed, and civil society consultation was not sufficient to share its purposes, benefits and losses. These factors have delayed the process, and the social safety net for the rickshaw pullers could not be implemented by the credit closing date. IDA offered to provide support to this under another project. In

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future transport projects, social safety net for PAPs for implementing influential operation measures should be carefully prepared in advance and implemented in parallel within the project period.

8.9 Car parking strategy should be prepared for converted NMT-free streets. Car parking is one of the major urban transport issues, and Dhaka is no exception. After the NMT-free conversion, the roadside of Mirpur corridor has been jammed by parked cars. Other limited street space has been also often blocked by parked cars. A fairly good car parking policy was drafted with the DSM consultant's assistance, but it was never fully implemented. There could have been a coordination with RAJUK, who provides licences for building construction, as DUTP undertook traffic management. Car parking should be an important issue to be considered in future urban transport project.

8.10 Public relations and comprehensive communication strategy are particularly important for urban transport projects. A Public Consultative Group (PCG) was formed under DTCB Chairman (DCC Mayor) to discuss issues with the stakeholders. During project preparation, regular meetings were held, however, very few meetings were held during project implementation. It gave rise to lots of misunderstanding among public, particularly in the case of NMT-free conversion on the demonstration corridor. The PCG should have been formed based on the stakeholder analysis. A detail communication strategy based on social assessments, providing information in effective regular briefing with the media, would have helped reduce opposition, obtain allies, and avoid unnecessary public criticism to some specific issues. Socially difficult and challenging decisions can be implemented with strong public support created by working with the stakeholders and the press. A transparent, open-minded, discussion-oriented approach with enhanced stakeholder consultations is the key for success in urban transport projects which are controversial by nature.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:

9.1 Introduction

The comments made in this section were prepared by DTCB in consultation with other agencies and parties, namely RHD, DCC, BRTA, DMP, and consultants and contractors involved in the project.

With the World Bank funding, the implementation of Dhaka Urban Transport Project (DUTP) was started is 1998-99 FY and completed in June 2005. This was the first major aided project in the urban transport sector in Bangladesh. The World Bank agreed to provide US $177 million for this pilot projects. The principal development objective of the project was to improve urban transport infrastructure, services (in an environmentally sustainable manner for Dhaka residents including women and poor people) and to address the long term transport planning. The major project components were (i) infrastructure development, (ii) goods and equipments for different stakeholders, (iii) institutional strengthening and human resource development for concerned agencies and (iv) consultancies and different studies such as design, supervision and monitoring consultants (DSM) and long term (20 years horizon) Strategic Transport Plan (STP) Study for DMA.

9.2 Objectives and other Goals

Project Development Objectives: the main project development objective of this project was to improve the urban transport infrastructure, services (in an environmentally sustainable and integrated manner for Dhaka residents including women and poor people) and to address long term transport planning.

Project Outputs: the project was formed with three major components: urban transport infrastructure, institutional support and training, and policy support.

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The urban transport infrastructure, included (a) intersection improvements, providing parking facilities and earmarking vehicle restricted areas; (b) arterial road rehabilitation and improvement; (c) bus route improvements; (d) bus terminals rehabilitation; (e) pedestrians facilities improvement; (f) NMT network improvement; (g) flood damaged roads rehabilitation; and (h) construction of grade separated interchange facilities at two location (Mohakhali and Jatrabari). .

The institutional support and training involves (a) traffic management; (b) project supervision, coordination and management; (c) financial management; (d) environmental management; (e) monitoring and enforcement; and (f) regulation of public transport services.

The policy support included (a) long term strategic transport plan; (b) feasibility study for Dhaka ring road; and (c) detail engineering design and preparation of follow up project.

Clarity of Project Development Objectives: The objectives were clear and measurable. The project benefits and the targeted groups were clearly identified during project preparation, and a project monitoring and evaluation system was developed to track implementation and achievement of development outcomes.

9.3 Consistency of Project Components

The project appraisal team for DUTP identified the relevance of the project objectives, consistency of the design, and arrangements made to handle the complexity of the project components. The project was assessed as a medium risk project and the most critical one was institutional capacities to execute components by the respective agencies in a timely manner. This happened in terms of preparation of contract documents, proper design of roads, intersection and bus terminals. The “software” components were the key for success of the project including (a) improving traffic management, (b) enforcement of traffic rules, (c) strengthening line agencies capability to monitor and coordination, (d) implementation of resettlement plan, and (e) total ban of 2-stroke engines from Dhaka City

9.4 Complexity of the Project

Urban Transport development depends on several inter related components. Several ministries (4 ministries) and agencies (7 agencies) are involved in this gigantic task. It was the first major aided project in Dhaka City funded by the World Bank. Without past experience in such project of complex nature it was difficult to achieve the loan covenants of the World Bank.

Urban Transport experts are not easily available in this country because the local universities did not produce such experts. They did not have necessary faculty. Also overseas experts could not be adequately procured for various reasons. So it was difficult to fill the experts post of DTCB with skilled manpower for which the project implementation works suffered more. In case of the most of the packages due to traffic condition plying on that road, the physical works had to be done during late night only i.e. for 11-00 pm to 6 am only which also contributed to the cost and time overrun of the packages.

Though Capital city’s transport development deserved a special consideration and it is one of the priority development agenda of the government but mainly in the absence of a Strategic Transport Plan for the city it could not be improved in the past. Even though the demand is 4/5 times higher than the supply facilities. In such a critical situation sustainable achievement could not be made with first DUTP project, which was designed with short-term components only.

Initially, the design of the project was very poor and components scattered through out the city which would have no impact in respect of achievements of project development objective. DCC was assigned with 70% of the physical works but the capacity and experience of DCC was not enough to handle such a big project having ICB contracts. During Mid Term Review (MTR) of the project. the project was downsized and restructured. ICB components were shifted from DCC to RHD who have better experience and capacity to handle ICB contracts. As a result the project gained momentum. Largely it could now be

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completed successfully with strong commitment of DTCB.

DTCB by now have gained valuable experience on urban transport development. Its capacity has also increased to some extent. It can now undertake activities with better strength and experience in meaningful way to improve city transportation in the days to come.

9.5 The Revised Components

As already mentioned, the projects were restructured with revised components during Mid Term Review MTR of the project the work of construction of Jatrabari Flyover, NMT network improvements, ideas of auto-restricted zones etc. were dropped instead of Integrated Corridor Development package (4 packages) and 2 Pedestrian Improvement packages were incorporated in the project. The detail of project components and costs are presented in the following table. It is worth mentioning that some minor components, which were planned at the planning stage, were changed in the implementation periods. Accordingly US$ 65 million were cancelled from the project. This amount could have been utilized for financing the increased construction cost of Jatrabari Flyover which would have greater impact in respect of achievement of project development objective.

(Figure in US$)Detail of components Contract

numberShare of

IDATotal cost

A. Infrastructure development (civil works)1. Widening and improvement of different road

(4 packages)A1,A2, A3, A4 14,151,097 18,868,127

2. Integrated corridor improvement (4 packages) C15A, C15B, C15C, C15D

7,512,253 10,016,338

3. Footpaths, Foot over bridge and NMT links (3 packages)

C4A, C4B, C12 2,683,345 3,577,792

4. Pedestrian Corridors (2 packages) C4D, C4C 3,738,604 4,984,8055. Parking facilities C9-1 180,679 240,9056. Flood Damaged road (2 packages) C11/1, C11/2 3,912,760 5,217,0147. Improvement of intersection (2 packages) C2, C3 5,713,240 7,617,6538. Inter-district bus terminal C5 6,236,723 8,315,6309. Mohakhali Flyover C1 14,189,003 18,918,67110. Tongi Bypass and Bridge C7 692,570 923,426B. Goods and equipment Dhaka City Corporation (DCC)

11. Installation of Traffic Signal ETSS1 2,018,426 2,691,235

12. Routine Road maintenance equipment RME-1B 83,150 103,93713. Procurement of vehicles (3 packages) V1NV1, V2NV5,

EV2195,339 244,173

14. Computer and computer software (3 packages) V1C3, V1C5, V1C6

160,170 200,212

15. Office Furniture R-2, OE/2, OE/3 9,210 11,513Bangladesh Road Transport Authority (BRTA)

16. Computer Accessories /ID System for BRTA V1C1 911,659 1,008,69617.Partial Flow meter, micro bus, Gas Analyser

and Walkie-Talkie (4 packages)EGP-1, EGP-2A, EGP-2B, GGP-2C,

101,720 127,150

18. Computers with other related equipment V1EC1 117,155 146,443

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Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) 19. Communication equipment (2 packages) R-1, EGP-2D 80,678 84,15420. Vehicles TE/01, TEO2/1,

TEO2/2, TEO2/2A, DMPV3, DMPV4, DMPV2

1,009,038 1,106,872

21. Computer and Portable Generator EGP-2C, EGP-2B 3,539 4,42522. Training Equipment TTO1 76,806 94,75823. Field Equipment TE-03 183,029 228,786Roads and Highways Department (RHD)

24. Cross Country vehicle V2NV4 83,437 104,296Dhaka Transport Coordination Board (DTCB)

25. Computers with accessories V1EC2, V1C4 112,947 141,18426. Computer with accessories V1C2 45,217 56,52227. Cross country vehicles EV1, V2NV/01,

V2NV/02AV2NV/02-B

422,747 528,435

C. Institutional strengthening and human resource development

- 267,826 267,826

D. Studies and Design, Supervision and monitoring Consultant (DSM)

31. Design, Supervision and Monitoring (DSM) 11,304,348 11,304,34832. Strategic Transport Planning (STP) study T5 2,034,783 -33.GIS Mapping for Holding Tax, FM System

Accountant, RTMF Accounting Audit- 117,018 117,018

34. Bus Route Franchise Study, Phase-I (S) T3 55,141 55,14135. Performance Audit, Phase-I Phase-II T2 15,914 15,91436.After study, video documentation, census for

development of mitigation strategy for Rickshaw Pullers

- 37,636 37,636

37. Traffic Demand Survey TS1 33,790 33,79038.Urban Poverty Mapping, NGO Assistance for

Enforcement programme implementation Assistance, Awareness and training etc.

- 126,070 126,070

39. Environmental Specialist - 6,000 6,000

9.6 Quality at Entry

The project appraisal team for DUTP identified the relevance of the project objectives and consistency of the project components, and arrangements made to handle the complexity of the project components. The project was oversized in the context of institutional capability. Corridor concept, which was included at a later stage proved effective. Moreover, the assessment of the risks was more accurate and practical.

9.7 Risks and Mitigation Measures

The project was assessed as a “Medium” risk project. The most critical one was identified as institutional capacities to execute the components in a timely manner. This happened in terms of preparation of contract

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documents and general documentation, proper design of roads, intersection, and bus-terminals. Moreover, approval on documentation and other works also delayed by relevant authorities. The “software” components were key for success of the project including (a) improving traffic management, (b) enforcement of traffic regulations, (c) better road rehabilitation and establishment of maintenance standards, and (d) strengthening the line agencies capability to monitor and coordinate transport planning in Dhaka. Moreover, cost recovery and O&M (which will be financed by Road and Traffic Maintenance Fund, RTMF) was addressed as a key action for sustaining of the proposed investments and thought that those efforts would cumulatively improve sustainability.

However, the risks were sufficiently dealt with in timely manner, for instance, implementation of resettlement action plan, total ban of 2-stroke engines from Dhaka city, road maintenance, coordination among different line agencies, and implementation of traffic diversion management plans during implementation of civil works. The other risks, e.g. delay in execution of civil works specially the DCC components, keeping sidewalks clear from encroachment were also mitigated to some extent.

9.8 Attention of financial aspects

During project preparation, a financial management assessment was carried out. The PCU was staffed with a qualified Cost and Management Accountant (CMA) to handle disbursement of funds, which was recommended by March 1-17, 1999 The World Bank Mission. As per Bangladesh Government rules, the Comptroller and Auditor General was responsible for carrying out audits of the project accounts. As recommended by the World Bank an individual firm was engaged to conduct the Performance Audit of the project components. Moreover, PIUs were staffed properly.

9.9 Achievement of Objective and Outputs

The overall achievement from civil works of the pilot DUTP are; increasing of bus service (1500 to 2839) including CNG operated buses, increasing of vehicle speed from 15 kph to 22 kph, decreasing of air pollution (PM10 reduced by 30% and HC reduced by 30%) and accident reduced by 50% in the city. As part of infrastructure development, vehicles are moving faster, pedestrians are walking safely, city terminals have been improved for smooth movement of buses. Commissioning of traffic signals at 59 intersections have brought back the discipline of vehicles. The other achievement relating to project implementation are; creation of Traffic Engineering Division (TED) at DCC, creation of Road Traffic Maintenance Fund (RTMF) under DCC, Road Maintenance Management System (RMMS) at DCC and engagement of private sector for bus terminal operation, and establishment of city transport database at DTCB and BUET respectively.

On the other hand, the implemented civil works were economically rational. The Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) results for major physical components conducted by STP consultants are presented in below:

Name of components NPV (@ 12%) in million. Taka.

EIRR (%)

Mohakhali Flyover 548 16.98Intersections Improvements 762 23.94Three inter-district bus terminals 484 34.35Integrated Corridor Developments 3,998 39.68Flood Components Links 309 26.63Total 6,102 29.11Source: Implementation Completion Report, The Louis Berger Group, Inc and Bangladesh Consultant Ltd, September 2005.

The preparation of Strategic Transport Plan (STP) was the key objective for future follow-up projects

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and continuity of transport improvement projects for Dhaka city. Accordingly, proposal for 36 months long study was received, evaluated and sent to the World Bank for concurrence. But, the World Bank Mission of July 2000 had decided that the Strategic Transport Plan study would be unbundled. Later, on persuasion of DTCB the World Bank agreed to finance STP component, but due to time constrain the duration of the study was shortened to 8 months periods. The prime objectives of the STP are; (a) formulation of long-term Strategic Transport Plan for DMA for the period of 2004-2024, (b) Formulation of urban Transport Policy including urban transport development, operations and management, and (c) Identification of priority projects and preparation of terms of reference for the first phase (first five years). The other objectives were to develop EMME/2 Urban Transport Model and creation of database at DTCB and BUET. As a Part of Consultation process the STP Consultants have made about 50 presentations for creating a feeling of ownership amongst the stakeholders. The consultants performed their presentation at Planning Commission, Ministry of Communications, Dhaka City Corporation, Bangladesh Railway, Roads and Highways Department, Dhaka Transport Coordination Board, Local Government Engineering Department, RAJUK, Bangladesh Transport Authority, Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority, Bangladesh Inland Transport Corporations, Dhaka Metropolitan Police, Institution of Engineers Bangladesh, Federation Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industries, Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Press conference, Editors conference, Reporters conference, civil societies, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Institute of Planners etc.

As per recommendation of the World Bank an Advisory Committee, consisting of eminent professionals and senior ex-government officials have been constituted to guide the Consultants in finalization of STP. So far, the Advisory Committee hold nine meetings and contributed greatly to guide the consultants in improving the quality of different reports of the STP Study.

9.10 Major Factor affecting Implementation and Outcome

The DUTP was the first multi-agency urban transport project. The personnel had no high level of capacity in respect of technical expertise, overall urban road design, coordination and accountability. It was expected that the DTCB would play the lead role in coordination of the project. However, due to the absence of its authority to administer various implementing agencies the role of DTCB remained weak and the project could not achieve its goal timely. During implementation of the contract packages it was observed that there were so many items included in more than one variations in a single contract reflects the absence of farsightedness on the part of consultant’s design review stage. Project Management Arrangement agreed between the World Bank and the GOB and incorporated in the PP “AED(TMPTI) will be the Engineer of the Project” could not be adhered to due to timely non response from PIU, DCC which have contributed to cost and time overrun of the packages. Delay of the World Bank on concurrence of Mohakhali Flyover and Inter-district Bus Terminals Packages respectively have also contributed to overall delay of the project activities. It was also observed that during preparation and approval stage of tender documents and their evaluations the consultant’s performance was not effective, because some of the documents were corrected too many times due to non-fulfillment of IDA’s requirements.

The Performance Audit Team remarked that all procurement processes started later than planned and delays occurred almost at every milestone and some of the delays may be termed as inordinate. Most of the delays remained unexplained casting dark shadows over the entire procurement due to sheer time overrun. IDA’s contribution to the delays were also significant, in some cases inordinately occurred on approval of procurement contract. From borrower perspective, there was no continuity of posting of Executive Director throughout the project period. This reduced the continuity of project knowledge and ownership. It is difficult to take preparation for transport improvement with so many problems in head especially because of shortage of skilled manpower in the field. It is also difficult to enforce traffic discipline in such an over congested city. Moreover, all the related agencies lacked skilled manpower and

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management capacity at the initial stage of the project.

9.11 Performance of the World Bank

The project plan was prepared as per DCA approval by GOB and IDA but the same had been changed time to time as per the WB visiting mission’s requirement reflected in their subsequent aide memoire, which also caused delay of project implementation. During approval stages of different documents, in some cases, IDA also took longer time to convey their concurrence. Moreover, the decision to unbundle the STP had seriously handicapped DTCB in transport planning and identifying future components as follow up projects of GOB. Therefore, combining all the factors delayed the project activities.

It may also be mentioned here that, the supervision of the World Bank specially in the initial years were not adequate which was covered up subsequently.

9.12 Sustainability

In context of sustainability, the project is economically robust. The project exhibited tangible benefits in the context of traffic flow, traffic management and enforcement and Dhaka City dwellers are getting benefits from the project. On the other hand, public bus service and traffic flow increased and at the same time, traffic signals have been rationalized. Traffic police are now giving more attention to enforce traffic rules. The benefits from the major physical infrastructure work were knowledge gained by the implementing agencies, which can be replicated in future. The other indication of sustainability is the involvement of private sector for bus terminal operation. However, the establishment of DTCB as transport planning and coordination organization is a big indication for sustainability. The DTCB has prepared a Strategic Transport Plan for DMA and it is the good start for future urban transport sector improvement. With this plan, DTCB can now attract Donors fund in the urban sector. However, to sustain these benefits, Dhaka Metropolitan Area (DMA) needs continuity of investment for introduction of efficient public transport, construction of missing links, and control over land use plan and lastly implementation of Strategic Transport Plan (STP).

9.13 Lessons Learned

DTCB and related agencies have now learnt valuable lessons from the experience of coordination and monitoring of such a complex project, especially because of training at home and abroad and discussions with overseas experts. The organizations are now capable to prepare urban transport policy, parking policy, land use planning, construction of roads, footpath, over bridges, improvement of intersections, construction of inter-district bus terminals, integrated corridor improvement, creation of pedestrian corridors, construction of flyovers etc. It would be easier to handle such a complex project in future with better output. As a part of ICR, the stakeholders have also responded from their view point which are accommodated in the following sections.

9.14 RHD’s Comments

Firstly, RHD’s comments relating to the factors, which have affected to their implementation progress are; (a) rain and flood, (b) late hand over of working space of 3 IDBT, (c) hartals (strike) and local disturbance, (d) slow progress of utility relocation and lengthy process of land acquisition, due to late procurement of STU of Mohakhali Flyover, and (e) late concurrence of the World Bank in some cases..

The problems encountered at the implementation periods were; (a) DTCB’s intervention in the implementing process suggesting changes in the design and taking up additional works beyond the contract, though they had no authority to change the works, (b) DSM consultants appointed by DTCB (b) awarding delay of Mohakhali Flyover from the World Bank, which have caused cost overrun in respect of supervision cost and price escalation, and lastly (c) slow and unplanned activities of utility agencies in

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removal of utility.

9.15 DCC’s Comments

The context of ICR, DCC had commended on various aspect of project implementation works including services. The first comments of DCC were shifting of packages at the period of Mid-Term review by the World Bank. DCC has noticed that RHD did not expand the scope of works and city dwellers deprived from the project benefits. At the same time, hand over of Inter-district bus terminals to RHD was not a wise decision of the World Bank, because RHD dropped major scope of works which could reduce people sufferings. The completion of supply and installation of traffic signals delayed due to poor consultant supervision, for instance, proper documentation, supervision support and intervention from police department. The deficiencies of tender and contract document also delayed the project works. The other comments were lack of coordination between civil works contractor and traffic signaling contractor, and Sr. Traffic specialist was not available at the crucial time

DCC had various comment on consultants services. The comments were; (a) the design was not practical in many cases that caused frequent modification of design, (b) Consultant delayed preparation of bidding documents and mentioned cost was not estimated in a logical way, for instance, contract packages A1, A2, A3, A4, C15A, (W)C15B, (W)C15C, (W)C4C and (W)C4D, and (c) DSM consultant appointed by DTCB and this situation had created confusion to get service for PIU, DCC.

DCC concluded their comments pointing out that Dhaka city needs more works in context of infrastructure development, Road safety works, etc. More NMT link road to be improved to facilitate movement of the low income/middle class people. DCC is more experienced than before by availing the foreign and local training and it was a great achievement from organized training program. Presently, DCC is capable to prepare urban transport policy, land use plan, intersection design, construction of road and footpath and construction of flyover in a better way.

9.16 BRTA’s Comments

The BRTA’s comment includes mainly institutional capacity related to handle the BRTA-IS which have been installed under the project. They need more training on it and for sustainability of the system, post warranty maintenance of BRTA-IS for at least 3 (three) years is very essential.

9.17 DMP’s Comments

The DMP’s ICR report appreciated the initiatives taken in this project by way of providing Towing Vehicles, Patrolling Vehicles, Motor Cycle, Buses, Field equipments, Traffic enforcement equipments, etc. which have enhanced traffic enforcement capability to a great extent. Training to their officers, Sergeant and Constable at home and abroad also increased their capabilities, which have added new momentum into their activities.

9.18 Contractor’s Comments

Part of ICR, some Contractors also gave comments. The China First Metallurgical Construction Corporation opined that they completed substantial works by 04.11.2004 as per contract. Abdul Momen Ltd. comments that during execution of DUTP works, they found variations to great extent in the bill of quantity items. Due to the variation in quantities, they faced lot of problems to get approval, so BOQ should have been prepared very carefully. Again, many changes were made at the time of execution, for instance Kakrail, Mouchak, Malibagh, Ittefaq, etc intersections. They feel that there were lack of coordination among RHD, DCC and DTCB to give clear-cut decision. The IRCON International Limited also gave same comments. TANTIA Construction Co. Ltd. commented that implementation of such urban transport project needs all sorts of cooperation from all concerned agencies to handle the works smoothly.

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(b) Cofinanciers:

N/A

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):

N/A

10. Additional Information

N/A

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome / Impact Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix

Projected in last PSR1

Actual/Latest Estimate

1.1 Improved Traffic Flow along integrated improvement corridors - avg. speed increased (Target at MTR: average speed on project corridors increased from 15 to 25 kph)

The traffic speed increased from 24 to 31 kph along Mirpur Road Demonstration Corridor.

The overall traffic speed in Dhaka has increased from 15 kph to 22 kph because of DUTP (source: STP 2005). Moreover, the capacity of Mirpur Road intersections has increased by at least 20% and travel time has reduced by 75% for a total day (source: DTCB Traffic Survey)

1.2 Improved public transport services along integrated corridor - bus and minibus ridership increased. (Target at MTR: bus and minibus ridership increased by at least 15%)

20% to 190% increase in bus and minibus traffic volume on Mirpur Road following the NMT-free conversion. Bus volume increased from 19% to 184%, and minibus volume increased from 21% to 196%.

Bus and minibus volumes have increased during the last 5 years (2000 to 2005). For outer cordon line; (a) no. of large buses increased from 12,375 to 17,141 (39%), (b) no. of minibuses increased from 20,038 to 40,371 (101%). For inner cordon line; (a) no. of large buses increased from 10,055 to 17,878 (78%), (b) no. of minibuses increased from 20,296 to 43,647 (115%).

2.1 Improved traffic safety, especially for pedestrians, along integrated and other project corridors - number of pedestrian related traffic accidents reduced. (Target at MTR: pedestrian related traffic accidents reduced by at least 10%)

85% decrease in total accidents and 33% decrease in fatal accidents on Mirpur Road in the first 3 months following NMT-free conversion.

Accidents decreased in DMA from 851 (2000) to 469 (2004), which was 50% reduction. On Mirpur Road total accidents decreased by 85% and fatal accidents decreased by 33%.

2.2 Motor vehicle pollution reduced: (a) Lead; (b) PM10; (c) HC (Target at MTR: reduction in (a) Lead by 60-80%; (b) PM10 by 20-35%; (c) HC by 20-45%)

%decrease: (a) Lead: 60%; (b) PM10: 20%; (c) HC 20%

Lead level in air (PM2.5) declined by about 65% since the introduction of unleaded gas in 1998. PM10 fell by 30% and PM2.5 by about 40% after withdrawal of 2-stroke 3-wheelers. However, air pollution is again increasing mainly because of usage of old diesel vehicles.

3. Better coordination and better integrated transport planning, management, and implementation among responsible agencies in DMA, guided by the strategic directions set out by the DITS. (Target at MTR: N.A.)

DTCBoard meeting held regularly, following approved Urban Transport Policy for DMA

The most recent DTCB Board meeting was held on May 25, 2005 to monitor the progress of DUTP and completion of the remaining works. Other issues discussed were "DUTP-II" with STP recommendations, present situation of DTCB and its transfer to revenue budget, which is still under process.

Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix

Projected in last PSR1

Actual/Latest Estimate

A1 (a) No. of Intersections and adjacent roads improved; (b) parking policy drafted; (c) parking plans implemented at No. of locations. (Target at MTR: 29 intersections improved; parking policy drafted by MTR, and parking plans implemented at 2 locations by eop.)

(a) 29 intersections improved; (c) Parking plans implemented at 2 locations.

(a) 27 major intersections have been channelized and installation of electronic traffic signals at 69 major intersections have been completed, (b) Parking policy has been approved and under the project 22,000m2 of parking facility has been created.

A.2 (a) Length of Arterial roads rehabilitated/improved (Target at MTR: 23 km rehabilitated by MTR; 38 km improved by eop.)

61 km rehabilitated/improved. Rehabilitation of 64 km arterial road has been completed. Rehabilitation of 40 km sidewalks has been completed.

A.3 Length of Integrated corridors developed and functional. (Target at MTR: upto 30km developed & functional by eop.)

30 km 31.3 km of integrated corridor has been completed.

A.4 No. of rehabilitated and private sector operated inter-district bus terminals (IDBTs). (Target at MTR: 3 private sector operated rehabilitated terminals by eop.)

2 terminals completed Improvement works for 3 inter-district bus terminals (Mohakhali, Gabtali and Sayedabad) have been completed, and private operators have been appointed.

A.5 Length of flood damaged roads 42 km completed Repair of 42 km flood damaged roads has

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rehabilitated. (Target at MTR: 18 km rehabilitated by MTR; upto 50 km by eop.)

been completed.

A.6 Flyovers: (a) constructed at Mahakhali; (b) redesigned at Jathrabari. (Target at MTR: Mohakhali FO constructed by eop.)

(a) Mahakhali completed; (b) Jatrabari re-designed

(a) The construction of Mohakhali Flyover has been completed, (b) Jatrabari Flyover has been cancelled, but taken up by DCC under BOT.

B1.1 (a) TED created in DCC; (b) No. of Traffic engineers trained; (c) No. participating in development of integrated traffic mgmt plans (Target at MTR: TED created, 6 traffic engineers trained by MTR; participate hands-on in development of traffic mgt plans by eop.)

(c) 4 TED traffic engineers participating hands-on in development of integrated traffic management plans.

(a) TED has been created at DCC, (b) 37 DCC personnel were trained including 17 from TED, (c) TED staff has participated in NMT-free conversion, pedestrian corridor and integrated corridor development packages. Overseas training for 140 personnel and local training for 835 personnel has been done.

B.1.2 (a) Road Maintenance Group created in TED/DCC; (b) No. of Maintenance Engineers trained; (c) Maintenance Management System developed. (Target at MTR: RMG created by MTR; 6 maint. engineers trained by eop; Interim maint. allocation framework developed by June 2002 and used to implement annual maint. plans for FY02-03; Maintenance Mgt System developed by eop.)

(b) 6 Maintenance engineers trained; (c) Maintenance Management system developed.

(a) RM Group has been created, (b) 11+ maintenance engineers trained in HQ and Zones. 4 engineers from DCC have been trained for Asset Management at the Univ. of Birmingham, (c) Maintenance Management System including RTMF Rules and SOP for annual maintenance planning have been developed and approved by DCC Mayor and the Ministry. RTMF accounts have been functional since July 2003, recently computerized.

B1.3 No. of Staff in PIUs provided hands-on training in project supervision, monitoring and contract administration. (Target at MTR: N.A.)

12 staff trained 15 PIU staff at DCC and 3 RHD staff worked with supervision consultant in contract administration activities. 2 staff from RHD and DCC received training.

B.1.4 (a) Financial Management System introduced in DTCB and DCC; (b) quarterly PMRs prepared. (Target at MTR: as stated.)

(b) done by both DTCB and DCC (a) Done, (b) Done by DTCB, DCC and RHD.

B.1.5 (a) No. of Policemen added for traffic management in DMA; (b) dedicated traffic police team created, trained and deployed to enforce traffic rules on No. of arterial corridor. (Target at MTR: (a) 250 policemen added by June 1999; (b) as stated by June 2002)

(c) teams created, equipped and deployed in 3 corridors

(a) 450 DMP traffic police trained, (b) DMP team consisting of additional 250 policemen have been created and successfully deployed on NMT-free corridor and traffic enforcement at electronic traffic signals. Traffic enforcement equipment has been handed over to DMP.

B.2.1 The DITS recommended transport development strategy updated and refined, urban transport planning tools developed, and a policy document drafted. (Target at MTR: as stated by eop.)

Strategy updated; Policy document drafted and under GoB review

Strategic Transport Plan (STP) is expected to be completed by October 2005.

1 End of project

Project Design at Entry

Narrative Summary Performance Indicators Monitoring & Evaluation*

Assumption/Risk

CAS Objectives:

Accelerate economic growth and reduce poverty by among other measures: increasing both public and private investments in critical infrastructure areas, institutional strengthening, reforming regulatory framework and fostering participation of the poor in

GOAL to Bank Mission

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the growth processProject Development Objectives (DO):

1. Improve urban transport services in an environmentally sustainable manner for Dhaka residents, including women and poor people.

2. Institutional and policy framework strengthened.

1.1 Living and work environment in greater Dhaka area improved;1.2 Road capacities increased through traffic management and improvements/rehabilitation of road network;1.3 Pedestrian safety enhanced;1.4 Bus services improved, providing better access to women and low-income groups;1.5 Environmental pollution from 2-stroke auto-rickshaws, poor quality buses and trucks reduced.

2.1 GDTPCB adequately staffed and functional by July 31, 1999;2.2 PCU and PIUs within key agencies fully staffed and functional;2.3 Staff in implementing agencies trained.

Economic surveys;Traffic surveys;Air quality surveys;Bus transport study by mid-term review.

Records of implementing agency

DO to GOAL:

1.1 Future growth of the city is in conformity with coordinated development plans;1.2 Implementing agencies have the necessary resources and competent staff to manage and enforce traffic rules;1.3 Suitable measures are put in place to control growth of 2-stroke engines;1.4 Incentives to allow the private sector to invest in urban buses are in place.

2.1 Relevant staff made available for training and stays on the job for an extended period.

Project Outputs:

1. Reduction in congestion and delays

2. Expansion of private bus services

1.1 Average delay at most critical intersections reduced by 50% by the end of project;1.2 Average speed by motorized vehicles increased from 15 km/hour to 30 km/hour by the end of project;1.3 Parking area plans prepared and implemented at two locations by mid-term review and four locations by end of project.

2.1 Premium bus services introduced along 3 corridors by December 1999 and 10 by August 2002;2.2 No. of buses in private sector in DMA increased from the present 1600 approximately to 2500 by end of project;2.3 Average waiting time for buses at key bus stops reduced by at least 30% by 2002;2.4 At least one private sector bus depot to be set up by December 2000 and

Transport surveys;Records of implementing agency

PCU/PIU records;Transport surveys

Output to DO:

1.1 Traffic management plans are implemented1.2 Trained police force available during construction phase for traffic management1.3 Land made available for developing parking facilities and complementary measures to ban/restrict parking in the adjoining areas introduced;

2.1 Land for bus terminals provided by DCC2.2 Bus fares increased annually to keep pace with inflation;2.3 Incentives provided by the Government to import both diesel and CNG buses

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3. Pedestrian facilities improved

4. Implementation capacity strengthened in DCC, BRTA and DMP

5. Roads are rehabilitated and maintained including road safety improvements

6. Vehicle-related pollution reduced

7. Address long-term transport planning issues for Dhaka metropolitan area

three by December 2002.

3.1 40 kms of sidewalks constructed during project period;3.2 Three pedestrian foot over-bridges constructed by December 2001; and about 7 more by December 2002.

4.1 10 engineers trained in DCC by 2001;4.2 250 policemen added for traffic management by June 30, 1999;4.3 At least 75% of the total traffic police staff in DMA trained by December 2000;4.4 5 transport professionals trained in BRTA by mid-term review.

5.1 Advanced road works completed by December 2000 and 10 km per year till the end of project;5.2 Drainage improved at 20 intersections by 2002 and two flyovers by 2003.

6.1 Roadside emission checks performed on at least 3000 auto rickshaws and 500 bus/trucks every year from year 2001, and statistics compiled;6.2 Importation into Bangladesh of two-stroke engine three wheelers and reconditioned buses, banned by July 01, 2000;6.3 New and in-use vehicle standards by type, to be developed by June 30, 2000;6.4 Phasing out from Dhaka all existing two-stroke engine three-wheelers by January 01, 2003.

7.1 Long-term urban transport plan developed by 2002;7.2 Plans to improve commuter rail and IWT developed by end of 2002.

Data collected by project agency

Training records of implementing agency

Implementation records

BRTA baseline statistics and regular follow-up surveys and DoE measurements

Draft standards

PCU/PIU records

3.1 Sidewalks kept clear of illegal encroachments and maintained

4.1 Technical staff made available for training

5.1 DCC staff use new skillsAdequate funds are made available for maintenance

6.1 Emission systems designed and in place by June 19996.2 Government will continue to enforce ban on 2-stroke three wheelers and not allow more polluting industries to be located in Dhaka city.

7.1 Close involvement of all agencies responsible for urban growth and traffic planning.

Project Components

Physical investments

1. Civil works for traffic management

1.1 Around 30 intersections improved;1.2 Medians, road signs,

PIU progress reports 1. Procurement: Timely land acquisition, procurement of works and

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2. Facilities for NMT improved

3. Grade separated interchange facilities constructed

Equipment and Vehicles

1. Equipment and vehicles procured for implementing/project agencies.

Technical Assistance and Project Support

1. Provide technical assistance for implementation, policy support, institutional development and follow-up project preparation.

bus laybys constructed; pavements rehabilitated etc.;1.3 Completing 60 kms of main road improvement, including Tongi link road;1.4 Completing rehabilitation of flood damaged roads (about 200 kms) in DMA.

2.1 Secondary road links for NMT constructed at three locations, to improve NMT network;2.2 Underpasses for facilitating NMT movement constructed at 3 locations;2.3 Parking facilities for NMT on secondary roads improved.

3.1 Two facilities constructed at Jatrabari and Mohakhali.

1.1 Equipment and vehicles procured for DCC/DMP/BRTA/DOE and GDTPCB

1.1 DSM Consultants appointed to oversee further design, project supervision and monitoring;1.2 Consultants for institutional support and training for DCC, BRTA, DMP, RAJUK, GDTPCB appointed by September 1999;1.3 DMP trained in traffic control and at least 75% of the DMP traffic police trained by 2001;1.4 Long-term strategic transport plan developed by 2002;1.5 Feasibility Study of Dhaka Ring Road, and preliminary engineering and feasibility of follow-up project (DUTP-2) completed by December 2002.

equipment, and appointment of consultants;2. Financing: Sufficient counterpart funds;3. Construction Adequate supervision, and cost and quality control on works.

* Note: Some benchmarks will be established within 6 months of project approval by IDA, with the help of DSM consultants.

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)AppraisalEstimate

Actual/Latest Estimate

Percentage of Appraisal

Component US$ million US$ millionA. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT - Intersection Improvements - Road Improvements adj. to Intersection - Traffic Flow Improvements - Parking Facilities

50.10 29.41 58.7

B. ROAD IMPROVEMENTS - Road Works - Tongi Link Road Construction

30.70 27.88 90.8

C. BUS & ROUTE IMPROVEMENTS - Bus Only Lanes (cancelled) - Bus Stops and Others (merged into B)

2.70 0.00

D. REHABILITATION OF BUS TERMINALS - Works at Bus Terminals - Road Works adj. to Bus Terminals (cancelled)

17.20 8.32 48.4

E. PEDESTRIAN FACILITY IMPROVEMENTS - Construction of Footbridges - Constructions/improvements of Sidewalks

5.40 5.30 98.2

F. NMT NETWORK IMPROVEMENTS - Secondary Road Links (merged into B) - NMT Underpasses (cancelled)

5.30 0.00

G. GRADE SEPARATED INTERCHANGES - Jatrabari Flyover (cancelled) - Mohakhali Flyover

46.80 18.92 40.4

H. FLOOD DAMAGE REHABILITATION OF ROADS 20.00 5.22 26.1I. EQUIPMENT - Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) - Dhaka Metropolitan Police Department (DMP) - Bangladesh Road Transport Authority (BRTA) - Dhala Transport Coordination Board (DTCB) - DoE (cancelled)

10.90 4.49 41.2

J. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - Project Preparation and Support - Institutional Development and Training - Policy Support and Studies

34.40 15.10 43.9

K. RESETTLEMENT COSTS - Land Acquisition and Compensation for PAP - Other Resettlement Activities

10.70 4.88 45.6

L. MISCELLANEOUS 0.00 5.39

Total Baseline Cost 234.20 124.91Total Project Costs 234.20 124.91

Total Financing Required 234.20 124.91

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Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 128.20 50.00 0.00 0.00 178.20(96.00) (37.50) (0.00) (0.00) (133.50)

2. Goods 8.60 0.00 2.30 0.00 10.90(6.40) (0.00) (1.70) (0.00) (8.10)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 34.40 0.00 34.40TA, Studies & Training (0.00) (0.00) (34.00) (0.00) (34.00)4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 1.40 0.00 1.40Resettlement - Other Costs (0.00) (0.00) (1.30) (0.00) (1.30)5. Land Acquisition & Compensation

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

9.30(0.00)

9.30(0.00)

Total 136.80 50.00 38.10 9.30 234.20(102.40) (37.50) (37.00) (0.00) (176.90)

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 54.20 40.90 0.00 0.00 95.10(40.60) (30.70) (0.00) (0.00) (71.30)

2. Goods 1.80 2.70 0.00 0.00 4.50(1.60) (2.40) (0.00) (0.00) (4.00)

3. Services 13.30 0.20 1.50 0.00 15.00TA, Studies & Training (13.30) (0.20) (1.30) (0.00) (14.80)4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 5.71 0.00 5.71Resettlement - Other Costs (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.30)5. Land Acquisition & Compensation

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

4.60(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

4.60(0.00)

Total 69.30 43.80 11.81 0.00 124.91(55.50) (33.30) (1.60) (0.00) (90.40)

1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies.2/ Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff

of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

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Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest EstimatePercentage of Appraisal

IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF.A. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

37.60 12.50 22.06 7.35 58.7 58.8

B. ROAD IMPROVEMENTS

23.10 7.60 20.91 6.97 90.5 91.7

C. BUS & ROUTE IMPROVEMENTS

2.00 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0

D. REHABILITATION OF EXISTING BUS TERMINALS

12.80 4.40 6.24 2.08 48.8 47.3

E. PEDESTRIAN FACILITY IMPROVEMENTS

4.00 1.40 3.97 1.32 99.3 94.3

F. NMT NETWORK IMPROVVEMENTS

4.00 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0

G. GRADE SEPARATION INTERCHANGES

35.10 11.70 14.19 4.73 40.4 40.4

H. FLOOD DAMAGE REHABILITATION OF ROADS

15.00 5.00 3.91 1.30 26.1 26.0

I. EQUIPMENT 8.10 2.80 3.83 0.66 47.3 23.6J. TECHINCAL ASSISTANCE

34.00 0.40 14.86 0.24 43.7 60.0

K. RESETTLEMENT COSTS

1.30 9.40 0.28 4.60 21.5 48.9

L. MISCELLANEOUS 0.00 0.00 0.30 5.11 0.0 0.0GRAND TOTAL 177.00 57.20 90.55 34.36 51.2 60.1

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

Economic Evaluation in Project Appraisal Document

In the PAD, the economic analysis was conducted at two levels. At the first level, total project benefits were evaluated against the cost of all physical components, equipment and technical assistance (excluding follow-up studies and including physical contingencies), which constitutes 87% of total project cost. In particular, the road network traffic benefits were evaluated using a network-based travel demand model. At the second level, detailed economic analysis was performed for each of the major physical components: 20 intersection improvements, 2 flyovers, 3 inter-district bus terminal rehabilitation, NMT underpasses, and road rehabilitation. These analyses were conducted for assessing the economic viability of the individual components treated as stand-alone projects.

The quantified benefits included savings in vehicle operation costs and travel time costs. These were computed for existing traffic, induced traffic (traffic generated by lower trip costs) and diverted traffic (redistribution of traffic resulting from traffic diverted from alternate routes and modes because of changes in relative trip costs). While the project expected to result in considerable benefits in the form of improved traffic safety and reduced auto pollution, they were not quantified due to shortage of reliable data. The estimated ERRs, therefore, were conservative and represent the low-end of total realizable benefits.

The costs of each component included costs for physical works, detailed engineering design, implementation supervision, and physical contingencies. Annualized operations and maintenance costs were also included in the evaluation. Moreover, the costs to road users associated with loss of road or junction capacity during project implementation were included in the evaluation. A standard conversion factor of 0.9, which was the latest World Bank estimate for Bangladesh, was used to convert financial costs to economic costs. For physical components, annual maintenance cost was assumed to be 0.5% of capital cost, and periodic (every 6 years) maintenance cost, 3% of capital cost. Assumed project life was 30 years for major structures and 20 years for road works. Moreover, the levels of annual benefits were set to freeze at the time when traffic growth reaches capacity (approximately 10 years after implementation).

Both network and intersection traffic simulation models were used to simulate traffic performance under scenarios with and without project. Traffic data were based on city-wide household surveys and traffic counts conducted in 1992-93, which were updated in 1997 for the purpose of project evaluation. Additional data sources on bus delays at bus terminals and waiting time at bus stops were also used for the analysis.

Unit vehicle operating costs by vehicle type and passenger travel time costs by mode were updated based on the findings of previous studies in Dhaka and more widely for Bangladesh. Value of travel time for business trip purpose was assumed to be 100% of trip maker's hourly income, and 35% for other trip purpose. The resulting value of travel time by a given mode for all purpose combined was roughly 50% of average hourly income of the users of this mode.

Economic Evaluation at Completion

The method of the economic analysis at completion was centered upon the use of the urban transport planning model developed for the STP study. In assessing the various components, the networks were built for the "with-project" case and the "without-project" case. The model was run for both cases resulting in an estimation of the effects which the addition of the complements would have on travel in the project affected area. This method was adopted for the Mohakhali Flyover, Intersection Improvements,

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Inter-District Bus Terminal Improvements and Integrated Corridor Developments. The assessment for the Flood Damage Rehabilitation used a traditional approach by estimating incremental capital cost savings of rehabilitating the flood damaged roads and calculating changes in vehicle operating cost savings and time savings due to road improvements. This was because the flood component links were minor residential roads and not included in the STP strategic network.

The vehicle operating cost (VOC) savings will accrue due to shorter trip lengths and lower levels of congestion. The VOC savings linked to shorter trip lengths was measured by multiplying vehicle kilometers of travel (VKT) in the "with" and "without" project scenarios by a weighted average of VOC per km based on the figures. The average VOC per km has been calculated for public transit and private vehicles considering the vehicle composition on the road network. Figures for 2004 and 2024 were derived from the model runs and the figures for all years in between were interpolated.

The value of time savings accounts for a major share of the project's benefits. The reduction in vehicle-hours spent on the road network was assessed for both the public transit modes and the private vehicles using the STP model. A weighted average travel time cost was calculated and then multiplied the weighted average cost by the number of vehicle-hours. This resulted in the overall travel time costs in the "with" and "without" project situations. As in the case of VOC estimation, the travel time cost was calculated for 2004 and 2024, and then interpolated for the in-between years.

The following assumptions were made when carrying out the economic analysis:- A 20 year analysis period was considered with 2004 being the base year and 2024 as the terminal year.- At the terminal year a residual or salvage value of 15% has been taken for assets with life of 20 years or

more.- Constant vase year prices have been used for economic evaluation. All the future costs and benefits

relating to the project were at 2004 prices.

The project cost comprised the costs relating to physical works, fees for consultancy services, land and resettlement costs plus a contingency. The impact of maintenance costs was significant in the case of the Flood Component. For other project components the impact was marginal. The present practice for periodic maintenance for city roads is about every 4 years. Based on the rehabilitation works being carried out by DCC with regard to flood affected roads, the periodic maintenance cost was taken as 60% of the capital cost for "without" project scenario. The cost appears to be substantial and relates to rehabilitation works, which were considered every 5th year.

For the "with" project scenario, the future periodic maintenance cost was assumed to reduce to 70% of the existing level (i.e. 42% of capital cost). Also, since the savings in VOC are the difference between IRI8 and IRI4, a provision for higher annual maintenance cost at 2% of capital cost has been provided. This is in addition to the periodic maintenance cost indicated above. The annual and periodic maintenance cost for other project components was 1% and 3% respectively.

The ERR values at appraisal and those at completion have some differences partly due to the difference in cost. However, the level of ERR for each component at completion shows a satisfactory level, and the achieved values at completion are not very much different from those at appraisal; those are reasonably supporting the intended economic benefits at appraisal.

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Cost-Benefit Analysis Results for Major Physical Components: Comparison between at-appraisal and at-completion

Values at Appraisal Values at CompletionProject ComponentsProject Cost

(US$ million)ERR Project Cost

(US$ million)ERR

Mojor Physical ComponentsMohakhali FlyoverJatrabari FlyoverIntersection ImprovementsInter-District Bus TerminalsNMT UnderpassesIntegrated Corridor DevelopmentFlood Damage Rehabilitation

21.216.426.014.53.6

24.116.8

19%20%28%17%18%38%38%

25.9(Cancelled)

9.710.6

(Cancelled)51.66.5

16.98%(Cancelled)

23.94%34.35%

(Cancelled)39.68%26.63%

Total 122.6 27% 104.3 29.11%Note: Jatrabari Flyover, NMT Underpasses were dropped from the project components at Mid-term Review.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle Performance Rating No. of Persons and Specialty

(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)Month/Year Count Specialty

ImplementationProgress

DevelopmentObjective

Identification/Preparation09/07/1995 6 MISSION LEADER (1);

TRANSP, SAFETY & TRAFFIC ENGR. (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SPEC. (1); INST. DEV. SPEC. (1); TRANSP. ENGR. (1); TRANSP. MGMT. SPEC. (1).

07/18/1996 5 MISSION LEADER (1); TRANSP. ENGR. (1); PUBLIC SECTOR SPEC. (1); SR.TRANSP. ENG. (1); SR. COMM. OFFR. (1).

03/13/1997 11 MISSION LEADER (1); TRANSP., SAFETY & TRAFFIC ENGRS. (3); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SPEC.(1); PROCUREMENT SPEC. (1); SR. URBAN SPEC. (1); PUBLIC TRANSPORT/POLICY SPEC. (1); TRAFFIC MGMT.SPEC. (1); INST. DEV. SPEC. (1); SR. OPERATIONS OFFR. (1).

Appraisal/Negotiation03/11/1998 13 MISSION LEADER (1);

ENGR. & POCUREMENT (1); TRANSP & INST. SPL (1); TRANSP SPL (1); TRANSP ENGR (1); ENV SPL (1); RESETTLEMENT (1); PROCUREMENT SPL (1); DISBURSEMENT SPL (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SPL (1)

07/15/1998 15 MISSION LEADER (1); ENGR. & POCUREMENT (1); TRANSP & INST . SPL (1); TRANSP SPL (1); TRANSP ENGR (1); ENV SPL (1); RESETTLEMENT (1); PROCUREMENT SPL (1); DISBURSEMENT SPL (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SPL (1)

Supervision03/17/1999 13 MISSION LEADER (1); SR.

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TRANSPORT ENGR. (1); PROCUREMENT SPEC (1); URBAN PLANNING/SOC, ENV. SPEC. (1); GENDER SPEC. (1); SOC. SCIENTIST (1); ECONOMIC ANALYST (1); OPERATIONS OFFR. (1); TRANSPORT ENGR. (1); RESETTLEMENT SPEC. (1); DISBURSEMENT OFFR. (2) FINANCIAL MGMT. SPEC. (1)

06/30/1999 7 MISSION LEADER (1); PROJ. COORDINATOR/ECONOMIC ANALYST (1); ENGR. (1); DISBURSEMENT OFFR. (1); PROC. SPEC. (1); FINANCIAL MGMT. SPEC. (1); SOCIAL ASSESSMENT (1)

12/15/1999 15 MISSION LEADER (1); PROCURMENT SPEC. (1); URBAN PLANNING, SOCIAL & ENV. SPEC. (1); ECONOMIC ANALYST (1); TRANSPORT PLANNER (1); ENVIRONMENT SPEC. (1); SOC. SCIENTIST (2); ECONOMIC ANALYST (1); ENGR. (1); RESETTLEMENT (1); DISBURSEMENT OFFR. (2); FINANCIAL MGMT. (2);

U S

07/12/2000 8 INSTITUTIONAL DEV. (1); HIGHWAY ENGR. (1); CIVIL ENGR. (1); TRANSPORT ENGR. (1); TRANSPORT. ECON. (1); RESETTLEMENT (1); PROCUREMENT (1); FINANCIAL MGMT. (1)

S S

06/06/2001 8 TRANSPORT ENGINEER (1); URBAN TRANSPORT SPEC. (1); SR. TRANSPORT ENGINEER (1); HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); SOCIAL SCIENTIST (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); DISBURSEMENT SPECIALIS (1)

S S

05/30/2002 10 MISSION LEADER (1); TRANSPORT ENGINEER (1); IMPLEMENTATION SPEC. (1);

U U

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OFFICE ADMN. (1); SOCIOLOGIST (1); PROCUREMENT SPEC. (1); FINANCIAL MGT SPEC. (1); DISBURSEMENT SPEC. (1); TRAFFIC ENG.(CONSULT) (1); ENV. SPEC (CONSULTANT) (1)

12/03/2002 10 TASK LEADER (1); TRANSPORT ENGINEER (2); OFFICE ADMINISTRATOR (1); SOCIOLOGIST (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT S (1); DISBURSEMENT (1); TRAFFIC ENGINEER (1); ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIALI (1)

U S

06/26/2003 9 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); TRANSPORT ENGINEER (2); OFFICE ADMINISTRATOR (1); SOCIOLOGIST (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT S (1); TRAFFIC ENGINEER (1); ENVIRONMENTAL S (1)

U S

01/13/2004 9 TEAM LEADER (1); TRANSPORT ENGINEER (1); OFFICE ADMINISTRATOR (1); SOCIOLOGIST (1); SOCIAL SCIENTIST (1); ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIALI (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); FINANCIAL MGMT SPECIAL (1); TRAFFIC ENGINEER (1)

S S

07/14/2004 13 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); TRANSPORT ENGINEER (1); TRAFFIC ENGINEER (1); TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (1); FM SPECIALIST (1); SOCIALOGIST (1); ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIALI (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); PROJECT ANALYST (1); OFFICE ADMINISTRATOR (1); SOCIAL PROTECTION SPEC (1); DISBURSEMENT SPEC (1)

S S

03/03/2005 12 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); U U

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TRANSPORT ENGINEER (1); TRAFFIC ENGINEER (1); TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (1); FM SPECIALIST (1); SOCIALOGIST (1); ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIALI (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); PROJECT ANALYST (1); OFFICE ADMINISTRATOR (1); SOCIAL PROTECTION SPEC (1)

09/18/2005 3 TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); TRANSPORT ENGINEER (1); PROJECT ANALYST (1)

S S

ICR10/27/2005 4 TASK TEAM LEADER (1);

TRANSPORT ENGINEER (1); PROJECT ANALYST (1); SOCIAL PROTECTION SPEC (1)

S S

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ ('000)

Identification/Preparation 158.40 635.54Appraisal/Negotiation 70.40 135.16Supervision 435.85 788.60ICR 11.47 32.45Total 676.12 1,591.75

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingMacro policies H SU M N NASector Policies H SU M N NAPhysical H SU M N NAFinancial H SU M N NAInstitutional Development H SU M N NAEnvironmental H SU M N NA

SocialPoverty Reduction H SU M N NAGender H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

Private sector development H SU M N NAPublic sector management H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

Lending HS S U HUSupervision HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

Preparation HS S U HUGovernment implementation performance HS S U HUImplementation agency performance HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Appraisal Document, Dhaka Urban Transport Project, December 17, 1998

2. Confirmed copy of the Development Credit Agreement, Dhaka Urban Transport Project, February 17, 1999

3. Preparation mission reports.

4. Supervision mission reports.

5. Project Status Reports/Implementation Status and Results

6. Mid-term Review mission reports.

7. Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA5) results, January 2003

8. Mid-term Review Report, Dhaka Urban Transport Project; PD-DTCB, January-February 2002

9. Country Assistance Strategy for Bangladesh Progress Report, June 30, 2003

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