the weakened state

8/9/2019 The Weakened State

1/32

The Weakened State Explanation for the Rise of Separatist Movements:

The Experiences of India

By

Dean E. McHenry, Jr.

Claremont Graduate University

Prepared for delivery at the 1998 International Studies AssociationWestern Regional

Conference, Claremont, CA, October 9-10, 1998.


2/32

2

ABSTRACT

Is globalization the cause of the rise of separatist movements during the 1990s?

Even a casual glance at the literature on globalization suggests such a belief is

widespread. Most often the argument is presented as a two-step one: globalization

produces a decline in the strength of states; the decline in the strength of states

produces a rise of separatist movements. Our purpose is to assess the validity of

both parts of the two-step explanation. We use as our test case the Indian state and

five Indian separatist movementsthose seeking the formation of Bodoland,

Gorkhaland, Jharkhand/Vanachal, Khalistan, and Uttarachand/Uttarnachal. We

conclude the weakening of the Indian state is not primarily a consequence of

globalization and the weakened state explanation does not account for the rise of

separatist movements. Both dependent variables appear to be much more closely

linked with the struggle for control of the state in India than with globalization or a

weakened state.


3/32

3

The Weakened State Explanation for the Rise of Separatist Movements:

The Experiences of India

By

Dean E. McHenry, Jr.

Claremont Graduate University

Introduction

The current era is sometimes characterized as one of globalization and localization, i.e., a

period when opposing trends contend with each other. The loser is the state forglobalization transfers many of its functions to the international level and localization

transfers them to the local level. In the midst of this contest, separatist movements

appear to be increasing in both number and vigor. The question we will address in this

paper is whether there is an empirical link between globalization, a weakened state, andthe rise of separatist movements. We use India as our test case.

I. The Explanation Examined

The most common form of the explanation found in the literature about the relationshipbetween globalization and separatism can be summarized as follows:

GLOBALIZATIONWEAKENED STATESEPARATIST MOVEMENTS

That is, globalization will produce a decrease in state strength which will produce an

increase in the number and/or intensity of separatist movements. The explanation has a

rational foundation: Globalization involves the transfer of powers that had been held bystates to other entities often outside their territories. This transfer means that states areweakened and, consequently, less able to control their populations. Alienated sections of

society, seeing the increased vulnerability, intensify their efforts to achieve separation.

The terminology used in the explanation is soft, i.e., the key words lack agreed-upon

empirical referents. Globalization generally refers to the growth of inter-state political,

social and economic linkages. It is the intensification of social and culturalinterconnectedness across the globe, says Timothy Scrase.1 Or, the compression of

the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole, says Roland

Robertson.2

Or, global economic, political, and cultural forcesrapidly penetrating theearth in the creation of a new world market, new transnational political organizations, and

a new global culture, say Ann Cvetkovich and Douglas Kellner.3 The general

implication is that globalization involves the imposition of outside economic, political

and social practices on the state.

That intrusion weakens the state. A weakened state is sometimes defined as one whose

capacity has diminished. Or, if sovereignty is treated as a continuum, a weakened state isone that moves from a high to a low level of sovereignty. There are critics who say that


4/32

4

generalizing a degree of strength, capacity or sovereignty for the state as a whole is

meaningless. Linda Weiss, for example, contends that there can be only state capacitiesin particular arenas.4 Stated differently, she suggests that the level of state capacity

varies with the context and purpose of a particular state action.5

Whether state strength

can be generalized or not, it refers to the states ability to achieve popular compliance.

And, a separatist movement is a collectivity seeking partial or complete autonomy from

an existing political unit of which it is a part. The type of such autonomy may becategorized either by the identity of the collectivity, e.g., ethnic, racial or religious, or by

the degree of autonomy sought, e.g., secession or regional autonomy. Separatist

movements may change both their identity and the form of autonomy they seek overtime.

The Literature on the Explanation

There is a substantial literature which accepts the validity of the hypothesis in part or in

whole. Some accepts the globalization

weakened state

separatist movementrelationship in its entirety; some the globalizationseparatist movement relationship

without mention of the intervening variable; some supports the globalizationweakening

state relationship; and, some supports the weakening stateseparatist movementrelationship. Others argue that the relationships are much more complicated than implied

by the globalizationweakened stateseparatist movements, or 1-2-3, hypothesis.

1. The 1-2-3 hypothesis

The two-step hypothesis is widely assumed. Paul Hirst and Grahme Thompson, for

example, argue that globalization has reduced the ability of states to control the

economic and social processes within their territories, and that the decline in thecentrality of national-level politics means that subnationalities and regions can assert

their autonomy with less fear.6

Similarly, Cvetkovich and Kellner contend thatglobalization is supplanting the primacy of the nation-state by transnational corporations

and organizations, resulting in a significant eruption of subcultures of resistance that

have attempted topreserve specific forms of culture and society against

globalization.7

And, Christopher Dandeker argues that relations of economic,political, and cultural interdependence are undermining both the sovereignty and the

autonomy of nation-states, and that this gradual breakdown of nation-states tends to

encourage the development of subnational (andother types) of communal identitieswithin even the more established nation-states.8

2. The 1-3 hypothesis

Others contend that globalization is directly prompting the rise of separatist movements

without mentioning the state as an intermediate cause. That is the argument of Scrasewhen he contends that as a response to the increasing global, social, and cultural

homogenization, oppressed and marginalized groups are finding the necessary space in

which to promote various social and political claims for justice and liberation, be it


5/32

5

through the cause of tribalism, environmentalism, or indigenization.9

Similarly, Joszef

Borocz and David Smith contend that one response to globalization is ethnicmobilization and resistance.10 Referring to only an aspect of globalization, Roger

Burbach, Orlando Nunez and Boris Kagarlitsky assert that a central factor in the rise of

ethnic and national struggles is the electronic globalization of the media, which gives

people the capacity to understand their ethnic or national particularities and identities.

11

Underlying each of these views is a belief that globalization produces separatist

movements or the precursors of separatist movements.


That globalization weakens states is a widely held belief. Burbach, Nunez and

Kagarlitskys views are illustrative. They claim, from a Marxist perspective, that States

were once able to implement policies at the national level that would not be significantly

undermined by global economic forces.But now that has ended with the rise ofglobalization and finance capital.12 Similarly, they assert that in the regions where the

bulk of the worlds population livesthe peripherygovernments find themselvesincreasingly weakened as international capital imposes its prerogatives on them.13


The weakened state explanation for the rise of separatist movements is widely asserted.

Michael Keating observes that In the late twentieth centurythe state is retreating in

some spheres and has lost its monopoly in others.14

The consequences include the

reassertion offorms of national identity and mobilization not associated with theexisting states.15 The result is a retreat to identity politics in which ascriptive status

provides the basis for rights and entitlement claims.16

A similar observation appears to

underlie Crawford Youngs contention that the momentum toward politicalliberalization, and the relative institutional vacuum within newly empowered civil

societies which it often encountered, created a context in which cultural solidarities might

most readily serve as nodal points of structuration.17

However phrased, the belief isthat one should expect a rise in separatist activity to be inversely related to the strength of

the state.

The Critics and Complications of the Explanation

Many scholars view the rather simplistic relationship among globalization, state strength

and separatism outlined above as abstractions which fail to capture the complexity ofreality. Weiss has claimed that Globalization is a big idea resting on slim

foundations, and contends that the implicit state denial is too blanket an idea and

ignores the variety of state responses to international pressures.18

In summary, sheasserts that the enthusiasm for globalization has transcended the evidence.19

David Brown observes that despite globalization, states diverge greatly in terms of theirlegitimacy, autonomy, capacity, and organizing principles.20 He argues that it is the

character of the state which crucially influences the pattern of situational insecurities in a


6/32

6

society, and thence the pattern of ethnic consciousness and relationships.21

And, he

contends that these variations are reflected in the broad distinction between reactive,responsive and manipulative patterns of state impact upon ethnicity.22 This complexity,

he argues, accounts for the fact that the states of Southeast Asia, with the exception of

Burma, have not been overwhelmed by the forces of ethnic disintegration as has been

the case in several African, and more recently Eastern European, countries.

23

Young argues that a weakened state may even reduce the politicization of ethnicity, oftenthe basis for separatist movements. He notes that if the argument that the politization of

communal cleavages was partly driven by the steady rise in the stakes of the national

political arena are accurate, one might speculate that a depolitization of the politicaleconomy through a reduced state role might over time lower the temperature of cultural

politics. Nevertheless, he cautions that the outcome is likely to be affected by a

complex of other factors, i.e., that this impact would only come gradually and might

well be overwhelmed by those trends which have tended to exacerbate communaltensions.24

This brief review of the literature suggests that many scholars have accepted the whole or

parts of the globalizationweakened stateseparatist movement hypothesisbut thatother scholars are skeptical about the simplicity of its claims. Our goal is to test these

relationships empirically.

II. The Measures Used in the Examination of the Explanation

India was chosen as a test case for three reasons: First, it is a significant state. Second,

the before and after globalization periods are fairly clear, at least with regard to economic

matters. Third, there is a plethora of separatist movements to examine. We chose thefive separatist movements because they are among the most significant affecting thecountry, their character is diverse and the contexts in which they operate are varied.

To measure the three variables, globalization, state strength and the vigor of separatistmovements, we rely primarily upon soft data, i.e., reasonable assumptions, the

judgement of scholars, and the historical record. More specifically, we assume

globalization has an increasing impact, especially since 1991 when the state formallybegan to liberalize. The measurement of the strength of the Indian state is based upon the

subjective assessment of scholars and a quantitative measure of political capacity. The

vigor of the separatist movements is determined by a subjective assessment of the authorand other scholars of major events and activities and the electoral success of parties

representing separatist movements. We contend that a reasonably sound answer can be

given to our research question even though subjective judgement plays a major role in

our measures.


7/32

7

III. The Strength of the Indian State

Skepticism toward the a globalization--weakened state-separatist movement explanation.

is reflected in scholarly work on India. Scrase contends that movements for change in

India rather than being a culturalist response to a new global order...have their genesis in

the preindependent (i.e., pre-1947) Indian social formation.

25

In other words, hebelieves that the phenomenon of various localized social movements fostering various

political agendas is not new, nor can it be theorized simply as a reaction to, or emergenceout of, the latest phase of globalization.26 Scrases views leave out the intervening

variable, state strength. The first question we will address concerns the validity of the

first stage of the hypothesis, i.e., has globalization weakened the Indian state?

Changes in State Strength

There is little controversy over the assertion that the Indian state has weakenedif acommonsensical qualitative view of state strength is accepted. Atul Kohli summarizes

the view of many writers: since about 1967the states capacity to govern (i.e., thecapacity simultaneously to promote development and to accommodate diverse interests)has declined. Along with this decline, order and authority have been eroding.27 If our

hypothesis about the correlation between the intensity of globalization and the strength of

the state holds, the qualitative data would lead us to expect that the intensity ofglobalization increased from 1967.

This qualitative view of the strength of the state in India is supported only in part by

quantitative data on Indias relative political capacity. These show a decline in the periodfrom 1969 to 1992, corresponding to that reported by qualitative observers,

Nevertheless, they do not show the continuous decline implied by such observers.

Indeed, state capacity increased slightly from 1984 to 1992.


8/32

8

SOURCE: Raw data developed and used by Lewis Snider in his bookGrowth, Debt, and

Politics, Economic Adjustment and the Political Performance of Developing Countries(Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).

If our hypothesis about the correlation between the intensity of globalization and the

strength of the state holds, we would expect globalization to have been most intensebetween 1972 and 1974 while its intensity diminished slightly between 1984 and 1992.

Neither the qualitative nor the quantitative assessments correspond with what we would

expect if the globalizationweakened state hypothesis were true for changes in thedependent variable do not accord with Indian experiences with the independent variable.

Writing in 1997, Manmohan Agarwal observed that Though India still remains arelatively closed economyimportant steps have been taken to integrate the Indianeconomy into the world economy.28 Those steps really began only with the acceptance

of IMF conditionalities and the introduction of liberalization policies in 1991.29

Neither

the Snider data nor the qualitative data suggest that the decline in state strength beganthen.

Explanations for the Weakened State

The explanations provided by scholars of India for the weakened state do not mention

globalization as a significant factor. Most cite actions by Indira Gandhi to ensure her

control of the state as the principal cause of the initiation of the decline of the state. Forexample,MayaChadda says that Indira Gandhis efforts to retain power led her to

undermine the Congress party as an institution by personalizing power which resulted in

a decisive break in the link between the party and the people. The result was that

The provincial leaders of the Congress ceased to represent ethnonational

aspirations in their dealings with the central state. This robbed the Congress partyof its ability to deal with emerging ethnonational sentiment by either co-opting its


9/32

9

emerging leaders, or appropriating a large part of their agendas and isolating

them, as Nehru had done on more than one occasion.30

Chadda suggests that by the 1980s Ethnonational appeals began more and more to

reflect moral outrage against a corrupt Center. With this there was a decline in the

central state's capacity to maintain the interlocking balance with India's nationalities."

31

In sum, efforts to centralize power led to a decline in the quantum of power enjoyed by

the government in its dealings with the states.32

Kholis argument about the weakening of the state in India is similar to Chaddas. He

claims that the explanation for Indias growing problems of governability involvemany factors.33 Nevertheless, he suggests that

The roots of the decay in the national authority structures are to be found in a

dilemma that consistently plagued Indira Gandhi: how to maintain her hold onpower while either fending off or accommodating the growing demands of power

blocs in the polity.The paradox is that the very strategy that enabled IndiraGandhi to hold on to power also undermined the possibility of using that powerfor constructive ends.34

Thus, in the case of India, there appears to be little correspondence between changes instate strength and globalizationand, explanations for the former by scholars of India

tend to locate the reasons in the struggle for political power. In other words there is little

empirical support for the globalizationweakened state hypothesis for the case of India.

Let us turn to the weakened stateseparatist movements hypothesis.

IV. The Separatist Movements

If the weakened state explanation is correct, we should expect an increase in the number

and/or intensity of separatist demands over the past 30 years. Such a change should be

evident in the separatist movements we examinethe Bodoland, Gorkhaland,Jharkhand/Vanachal, Khalistan and Uttarachand/Uttarnachal movementsif the

hypothesis is valid. Most of the general literature on separatist movements in India,

though, does not account for such movements in terms of the weakened state explanation.This is true for both Marxist and non-Marxist literatures.

Ajeya Sarkar, writing from a Marxist perspective, contends that separatist movements are

fostered by the state to serve the interests of those classes who control the state. Morespecifically, he argues that the economic component is the crux of the problems of

regionalism.35

Yet, he says the material interests of these regional movements, except

that of the tribals, are not the same as that of the subaltern masses.36

Indeed, to containand in some cases to destroy the radicalisation of politics on class lines at that level, the

central state power paves the way for growing influence of ethnicity, by one form of

ethnic/religious manipulation or the other depending upon the specificity of socio-economic reality.37 So, Sarkar says, movements like Gorkhaland, Jharkhand, Assamese


10/32

10

and Khalistan are not basically anti-system [i.e., they do not challenge the class rule of

the Indian bourgeoisie]On the contrary, these regional movements have onlychallenged the functioning of the state apparatus.38 In other words, the explanation for

the separatist movements has to do with the maintenance of state power in the hands of

the ruling class.

Sajal Basu formally takes issue with such a Marxist interpretation, though he adopts the

Marxist tendency to look behind appearances. He asserts that the age old concept ofprimacy of economic factors and level of development are not the key causes.39 Yet,

economic factors may be used for mobilization purposes. He asserts that economic

factors such as deprivation, exploitation by outsiders, [the central governments]negligence, [and] developmental aspirations remained the mobilisational factors for such

non-secular sentiments.40 And, he argues that in many regions the economic idioms

were utilised as ornaments only to rationalise the parochial content of the movements.41

In so doing he turns a Marxist interpretation on its head, arguing that the appearance of acausal role in economic factors belies a reality in which non-economic factors are causal.

He gives an example of how the level of economic development does cause separatistmovements, noting that both development and backwardness may give rise to suchmovements, e.g. Khalistan and Jharkhand. A sense of deprivation, feeling of being

discriminated and oppressed do not necessarily arise from development factors.42

The

causes of separatist movements have more to do with the sense of deprivation than actualdeprivation. Still, whether that sense of deprivation causes separatist movements, he

argues, depends upon the states reaction. For example he notes how the creation of the

Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council dissipated the energies of the Gorkhaland movement and

concluded that a timely compromise on behalf of the ruling leadership in the state andintelligent political manoeuvering could envelop the recalcitrant Indian Nepalese.

Whereas, in Punjab and Assam, the authorities and leadership concerned have failed to

respond in an intelligible way."43

When political parties or the administration did notdeal with peoples grievances, they may resort to ethnicise, communalise the issues of

their grievances.44

He said,

We have such examples in Assamese hostility to the Bengalees; the Punjabi

Sikhs antagonism against the Hindu Panjabis; Jharkhandi vehemence against the

dikus; Bodo reaction against Assemese language Chauvinism; Gorkha tirade

against Bengalee colonialism and so on.45

So Basu sees the explanation for the movements in a variety of interacting factors, rather

than simply in efforts of the dominant bourgeoisie to maintain its power. Agreeing withBasu, Tanka Subba expresses his frustration over attempts to locate the cause of

separatist movements in a single factor, contending that It is indeed nonsensical to think

ofthe explanation to any ethnic movement in the world today. Most such movements arecaused by a multiplicity of factors operating actively at different points of time in their

life histories. Politicians and academicians alike throw varying and often weird theses

which suit their own interests and ideas rather than help, even partially, in understandinga movement.46 These general views correspond to the experiences of the separatist

movements in our sample.


11/32

11

In reviewing these movements, we will briefly describe the character of the movement todetermine whether it accounts for variations we might find, the activities of the

movement to see if they are intensifying in accord with the weakening of the state, and

scholarly explanations for the movements activities to see if they support the weakened

state explanation.

The Bodoland Movement

1. Character of the movement

The Bodo are a plains tribal people who live in the state of Assam primarily in the

valley on the north side of the Brahmaputra river. At one time, they occupied a much

larger territory. They are educationally deprived and economically depressed. Most

Bodos are Hindu, but 25 to 40 per cent are Christian.47

According to scholars on thesubject, the overground organization tends to be predominantly Hindu, while the

militant underground tends to be predominantly Christian.

48

Their grievances includedthe progressive loss of land, the lack of development attention from government and theAssamisation campaign, especially its impact on language.49 They tend to fear the

Assamese caste-Hindu population who dominate the AGP-led state government.50

Primarily because of land alienation, the Bodos are in a minority in most areas theyclaimeven when they are combined with other tribal people who live in the same area

the total is still less than that of the non-tribal peoples.51 Those smaller tribes are

worried by the prospects of Bodo suzerainty over their tiny communities.52

According

to B.G. Verghese, of all the tribal people in the northeast only the Bodo have resorted toarmed violence to achieve their objectives.53

2. Intensity of movement activities

In many ways, Bodo politicization mapped itself on the preceding experiences of the

Assamese and was a reaction to Assamese developments. A summary of actions bydecade provides a basis for determining variations in intensity of the struggle.

1950s: A literary organization called the Bodo Sahitya Sabha was formed in 1952. It

demanded that the Bodo language be used as the means of instruction at the primarylevel, eventually succeeding in 1963.

1960s: It then turned its attention to extending the use of the language to the secondaryschool level, succeeding there in 1968. Prabhat Datta suggests that the language

movement provided the brick and mortar for the construction of a homeland.54 Early in

1967 the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) was founded followed immediately by thePlains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA). These became the primary political

organizations supporting Bodo interests. Nevertheless, the PTCA boycotted the 1967

elections, yet began calling for the creation of a separate state of Udayachal55


12/32

12

1970s: In 1974 the Bodo Sahitya Saba, ABSU and PTCA launched a Boro script

movement demanding the use of Roman script.56

Yet, in 1976 the Devanagari script wasimposed on them. PTCA joined with the Janata party in 1977 to form the Assam

government, but its leaders were attacked for selling out the Bodo cause. In April 1977

they gave up the demand for Udayachal and replaced it with a demand for an autonomous

region.

57

That same year PTCA (Progressive) split from PTCA and in 1979 became theUnited Tribals National Liberation Front (UTNLF).

1980s: The ABSU sided with the UTNLF and in 1980 demanded a separate homeland

called Mishing Bodolandthe Mishing being the second largest plains tribe. The

Assamese anti-foreigner movement at this time was joined by the Bodo groups andprovided them with inspiration. The Assam Accord of 1985, though, made no mention of

other tribal interests besides those of the Assamese.58 ABSU split in 1987 with the main

group under the leadership of Upen Brahma known as ABSU (UB) calling for a division

of the Brahmaputra valley with the northern half a tribal state. In 1988 at the BansberiaConference of ABSU the organization abandoned the effort to divide the valley and

called for the establishment of a separate state. Frustrated with progress, the ABSU (UB)moved to support violence. This was undertaken by the Bodo Volunteer Force (BVF)under Premsing Brahma and ULFA-assisted Bodo Security Force (BdSF) under Ranjan

Daimuri.59

1990s: While Assam was under presidents Rule in February 1991, a 3-member Expert

Committee under Dr. Bhupinder Singh was created to examine the question of Bodo

autonomy. It reported in 1993 that two autonomous councils should be established, one

on the west with Bodo predominance and one on the east with Mishing predominance.The Bodos rejected the plan. Nevertheless, in the same year a newly-elected Assamese

government subsequently negotiated the Bodo Accord. Premsing Brahma, the BVF

chief, subsequently surrendered as did others. In May the legislature passed theBodoland Autonomous Council Act and an Interim Bodoland Executive Council was

sworn in . The BdSF, though, formally denounced the Bodo Accord. Conflagration

broke out. When the government unilaterally defined the BAC area, the interim head,S.K. Bwismutiary, resigned in protest. Adjustments were made in the imposed

boundaries, but the ABSU rejected them in October 1995. The BdSF depredations

increased. According to Verghese, Muslims were initially the principal victims of Bodo

fury though more recently Hindu settlers of East Bengal origin have also beentargeted.60 The Bodo Accord remains mired in uncertainty because of problems with

determining the territorial jurisdiction of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) and

disagreements among Bodo leaders. By the fall of 1998, elections to the BAC had notyet been held and the demand for statehood has been reiterated by many Bodo leaders.

The intensity of the struggle for the separation of Bodoland has increased and decreasedover the years from the 1960s. Following the disillusionment after the Assam Accord of

1985, there has been substantial violence that has intensified and eased over the

subsequent years. Nevertheless, compared with thirty years ago, the intensity of thestruggle appears to have risen while the strength of the Indian state has declineda trend

which overall accords with the weakened state explanation.


13/32

13

3. Scholars explanations

All the grievances noted in the first section of our review of the Bodoland movement

the land encroachment, Assamese hegemony, lack of development, and so onhave been

cited by observers as causes. In addition, the movement was fostered by institutions forpolitical advantage. Datta claims that During Rajiv Gandhis regime the central

government had at first encouraged the Bodos to demand a homeland with the objectiveof harassing the AGP-led government in Assam.... It was...the green signal from New

Delhi which boosted the morale of the agitationists. The double role of the central

government had therefore complicated the situation.61

He claims,

The state, threatened by the growing crisis on many fronts, fanned primordial

loyalties to divide the poor and create an illusion in them that the solution of their

problems lay in having a separate state within the Indian Union. It was a strategyfor the crisis-ridden capitalist feudal state to fend itself off from attacks and thus

to survive. The erosion of state authority and legitimacy also facilitated the riseof primal constructs as social identities.62

Verghese reports, similarly, that the Congress had moved to build up the Bodo Security

force through Central intelligence agencies to counter...the AGP.63

Nevertheless, thestate has committed substantial military resources to suppress the violence wrought by

the movement.

The Gorkhaland Movement


The Gorkhaland area borders Nepal, Sikkim and Buthan and forms part of the chicken

neck connecting the northeastern states with the rest of India. The original inhabitants

of the area were tribals who were overwhelmed by Nepali and Bengali immigrants.64

There remain significant tribal minorities in the Darjeeling hills, primarily Lepchas and

Bhutias, and in the Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri plains, primarily Oroas, Mech and

Modeshias.65

According to Datta, except for the Darjeeling hills area, the Nepali-

speaking population in the Gorkhaland area is below 50 per cent of the total population.66

It is the leaders of the Nepali-speaking portion of the population, the Gorkhas, which

have called for the formation of a new state.67


The demand for some form of autonomy for Darjeeling hills has its origin well beforeindependence.

1950s: In 1954 CPI renewed its earlier call for regional autonomy for the hill areas ofDarjeeling and this was followed by a similar call from the Darjeeling District Congress

Committee in 1955.68 The All India Gorkha League (AIGL) revived its demand for a


14/32

14

separate state that year, too.69

In 1957 CPI, Congress and the All India Gorkha League

jointly presented Nehru with a request for regional autonomy for Darjeeling.70

1960s: In 1961 the AIGL was instrumental in getting Nepali recognized as one of the

official languages under the Official Languages Act passed by the West Bengal

Assembly.

71

In 1969 it joined the United Front government in West Bengal and the leftparties excepted both the demand for regional autonomy of Darjeeling and for the

inclusion of Nepali into the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution.72

1970s: In 1972 the Nepali Bhasa Samiti was formed and renamed the All India Nepali

Bhasa Samiti to promote the Nepali language and get it accepted as part of the EighthSchedule.73

1980s: The Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) was formed in 1980. In 1981 a

resolution calling for regional autonomy was unanimously passed in the state assembly,but rejected by parliament. In 1983 the GNLF submitted a memorandum to the King of

Nepal about the problems of Gorkhaland. Then, in 1986, the GNLF adopted an 11 pointprogram of action at a meeting in Ghoom and agitation began in earnest.74

In the periodbetween April of 1986 and March of 1988, it was estimated that almost 200 people died

in violence accompanying the agitation.75

In 1988 an agreement was reached to create

the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council and Ghising promised both the Center and the WestBengal government that he had given up his demand for Gorkhaland, but he told his

followers that the autonomous council was only the first step toward a separate state.76

Sarkar notes that the Gorkha Hill Council is unique in the sense that the degree of

autonomy granted...is available to no other minority community in the country.77

1990s: After the central government failed to respond to Ghisings 1992 ultimatum that

it respond to his claim that the Darjeeling hills were never properly incorporated into theIndian Union, the GNLF filed a case in the Supreme Court seeking clarification on the

hills status.78

In December of 1996 all the CPI(M) leaders in Darjeeling broke from the

party and formed the Communist Party of Revolutionary Marxists (CPRM) demandingthe creation of the separate state of Gorkhaland. Perhaps, in response, Ghising called a 3-

day strike on March 28, 1997 to mark the re-launch of the volatile demand for a separate

State for Gorkhas.79

And, the GNLF boycotted the 1998 Lok Sabha polls in Darjeeling

on the plea that no elections there would have legal validity until the InternationalCourt clarified the areas legal and constitutional status.80

The activities of the Gorkhaland movement were relatively peaceful until 1986.Following two years of great violence, the movement quieted. Yet, the absence of

sustained violence did not mean the movement had ended for Ghising sustained the idea

of a separate state through his questioning of the legality of the incorporation ofDarjeeling, his boycotting of elections and the exercise of autonomy he had obtained.

Perhaps because of the autonomy achieved through the Gorkha Hill Council, there has

not been the kind of intensification of the movement present in the Bodoland case.


15/32

15


The explanations for the Gorkhaland movement are numerous and vary with different

stages in its development. There is a widespread belief that economic problems were a

background factor in the rise of the movement.81

The perceived threat to Gorkha identity

is raised, especially by those associated with the movement, as a critical cause.

82

Subbahas summarized and critically assessed a vast array of other micro explanations such as

Gorkha colonization of Darjeeling which led to land shortages and unemployment which,in turn, led to the Gorkhaland movement; government policy decisions that stirred ethnic

solidarity; inadequate implementation of rural development programs; the negative

attitude of the Bengalis; and the transferred anger for the injustice meted out to theirbrethren in Meghalaya and Assam.83

The anti-foreigner campaigns in Assam and Meghalaya led to the expulsion from those

areas of many Nepali-speaking workers, many of whom were Indian citizens fromDarjeeling. These actions were widely viewed as an immediate cause of GNLF violence

beginning in 1986.

84

But, scholars like Subba contend that this explanation is insufficientto explain the initiation of the movement for there had been no similar response to the1967 expulsion of 8,000 Nepalis from Mizoram, the thousands who fled Assam in 1979

in response to actions of the All Assam Students Union or the 2,000 driven from

Manipur in early 1980.85

And, a variety of political motivations spurred the movement according to several

scholars. Subba suggests that the 1947 support CPI gave to the formation of a state

called Gorkhasthan was, more than anything else, to broaden their base in the Nepali-speaking areas.86 He suggests that CPI ended its support for Gorkhasthan in 1951,

following Soviet ideological shifts, and began to propagate the concept of regional

autonomy.87

Sarkar contends that Delhi plays politics with regard to agitations likeGNLFs, i.e., it used the Gorkhaland agitation against the Left Front government of

West Bengal to maintain the dominance of the Centre.88

Once again, none of these explanations see globalization or a weakened state as the cause

of the Gorkhaland agitation.

The Jharkhand/Vananchal Movement


The composition and leadership of the Jharkhand movement have changed over time. It

began as a movement of tribal peoples in the Chotanagpur plateau area in what becamesouthern Bihar; it expanded to include tribes in contiguous areas in West Bengal, Orissa

and Madhya Pradesh. Yet, the population within such territorial boundaries changed as a

result of in- and out-migration from predominantly tribal to predominantly non-tribal.Sarkar characterizes the population as follows:


16/32

16

In industrial employment the unskilled workers are the tribals, the well-paid

workers are outsiders. The officers in the government establishments comemostly from north-Bihar, their orderlies may be tribals. The contractors are

Gujrati, Punjabi, Marwari or even Bengali, the labourers are recruited locally.

The small pan-shop owner is Jharkhandi, while the big traders and merchants are

Punjabi, Gujrati or Marwari.

89

54

At the turn of the century tribals were estimated to constitute 60 per cent of the totalpopulation of the area, while in 1951 they accounted for 36.81 per cent of the population

and in 1981 for only 30.26 per cent.90

A Jharkhand Mukti Morcha memorandum in 1989

claimed that the tribal population of Jharkhand was about 32.5 percent of the total,though the total of Scheduled Classes and Scheduled Tribes amounted to about 47 per

cent.91 The migrants included contractors, workers and others seeking opportunities in

mining and industry. The consequences of the population change was that the movement

became more inclusive, reflecting more than the interests of the tribal populations.Today Vananchal produces more wealth than any other part of Bihar.

At independence, the leading organization was the Adivasi Mahasabha which had beenfounded in 1938 by Jaipal Singh. The movement was led by Christians, though as the

movement grew and its social base...extended among other indigenous groups, religion

became secondary to other sources of identity....92

In 1950, partly responding to thechanging population of the area, it changed its name to the Jharkhand Party.93 In 1973

the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha under the leadership of Shibu Soren was founded and

became the leading organization of the movement. In the 1980s the Bharatiya Janata

Party (BJP) became a strong advocate for a separate state in the Bihar sections ofJharkhand, calling such a state Vananchal. Critics suggest the BJP action was solely for

political, and more precisely for electoral gains.94

The movement has been characterized in a variety of ways. Sarkar says it is not an

ethnonationalist struggle but it is a struggle by the oppressed Jharkhandis for national

autonomy within the federal polity.95

Basu says the movement began as a Christianadivasi affair but became a broad coalition of indigenous communities and the...settled

migrants....96 A.C. Kumar says it is basically a protest movement against the

exploitation of the indigenous tribal people by the outsider dikus.97


Like the Bodoland and Gorkhaland movements, the intensity of activities of theJharkhand/Vananchal movement varied over time.

1950s: The Jharkhand Party, formed in 1950 as the successor to the Adivasi Mahasabha,challenged the Congress Party in the 1952 elections and won 32 seats in the Bihar

Assembly and three seats in the Lok Sabha from the Jharkhand area; and, in the 1957

elections it won 30 seats in the Assembly and five in the Lok Sabha.98

Yet, according toA.K. Jha, the bright and inspiring days of a tribal political party was over in this tribal

region by 1957.99 The reason was internal dissention, with charges of autocratic


17/32

17

behavior against the leader Jaipal Singh and disagreements over nominations to contest

parliamentary seats.100

1960s: The Jharkhand party won no seats in the 1962 election. Partly as a result, in 1963

the party merged with Congress, greatly diminishing its leadership of the movement.

According to Sarkar, this new strategy on the part of the Jharkhandi leaders failed toyield any tangible results....between 1964 and 1969 factions and cleavages among the

tribal leaders weakened the movement and exposed its contradictions.101

Jaipal Singhdeserted Congress in 1965. In 1967 the Jharkhand Party won no seats either in the Lok

Sabha or the Vidhan Sabha elections. But, one of the splinter parties, the Hul

(Revolutionary) Jharkhand party won seven seats in the 1969 Vidhan Sabha mid-termelection.

1970s: The Hul (Revolutionary) Jharkhand party lost its Assembly seats in the 1972

elections. Then in 1973 the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) was formed, combined inits operations elements of agrarian radicalism and cultural revivalism.102 It began as a

militant group under the leadership of Sibu Soren. The JMM was virtually routed in the1977 general election which brought to power the Janata party both at the Center and inBihar. Yet, to appease the sentiment of the tribal population and to woo their votes, all

parties gave their support to the Jharkhand idea.103

Victor Dass notes that as a result the

almost dead Jharkhand Movement started gaining fresh ground from 1978onwards....Shibu Soren emerged as a messiah and the main protagonist of [a] separate

Jharkhand state.104

1980s: Yet, Soren led the JMM into an electoral alliance with Congress in 1980 whichvirtually caused an end to the militancy of Shibu Soren.105 Datta observes that this

action alienated JMM from a large section of the tribals.106

The mantle was picked up

by the All Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU) formed in 1986 and the following year bythe Jharkhand Coordination Committee (JCC). The JMM remained aloof from the JCC

revitalization efforts, but was persuaded to join the JCC in talks in 1989.107

In 1989 Rajiv

Gandhi set up a Committee on Jharkhand Matters (COJM) to bring the protagonists intodiscussion.

1990s: The COJM issued its report in 1990, opposing a separate state but supporting a

degree of autonomy. In 1991 the Jharkhand Area Development Council (JADC) bill waspassed by the Bihar Assembly, but never approved by the President reportedly because it

did not provide sufficient autonomy to gain Jharkhandi support. The JMM split in 1992.

Four JMM(S) members of the Lok Sabha supported Congress in a critical confidencevote in 1993 and were later charged with taking bribes to do so. After pressure from the

Center and withdrawal of the JADC bill, the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council

(JAAC) bill passed the Bihar Assembly in 1994 over the opposition of the BJP and otherJharkhand groups because it did not provide sufficient autonomy. The Bihar state

government appointed interim members and the JAAC formally came into being in

August 1995. According to Lourduswami, the hopes for even a limited autonomy haveproved deceptive....The JAAC is a toothless body without any real legislative, financial

or administrative powers.108 In the 1996 elections, the BJP had become the most


18/32

18

successful party in the area, winning 12 of 14 seats.109

In 1997 the JMM(S) gave its

support to Laloo Prasad Yadav and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and in return the RJDsupported a resolution calling for the creation of Jharkhand state.110 In the 1998

elections, campaigning for the creation of a Vananchal state, it repeated its election

victoryand, the JMM(S) failed to win a single seat. Then, in September 1998 the Bihar

Assembly rejected a resolution favoring the creation of the stateand, the JAAC wasdismissed.

The movement has waxed and waned, split and unified, and changed in composition over

the years. As in the Bodoland case, though, the intensity has risen over the last decade or

so.


The original cause of the movement is the feeling by the tribal Jharkhandi that theywere being exploited by outsiders. A wide range of other factors sustained and

undermined the movement over time. Vijay Kumar summarizes the views of manyscholars when he suggests that the movement was sustained because of

the support for the movement by different tribal political parties for their own

political ends; its propagation by non-tribal political parties for obtainingfoothold in the region; guidance and funds through Christian Missionaries for the

advancement of their religion; tribal elites own demand for their recognition and

power within their community and outside; non-tribals to preclude the fear of

eviction from the proposed state and with the intention of capturing politicalpower as Jharkhandis with the support of non-tribals out side the state in case

Jharkhand became a reality; the governmental failure to appreciate the tribal

culture and social life, to involve them properly in the development efforts andbring them in the national mainstream.111

Once again, globalization and the weakening state are not identified as causal factors.

The Khalistan Movement


The Khalistan movement in the Punjab is unlike any of the other separatist movementsfor it seeks a separate state for a religious group, the Sikhs. Its strength was never

uniform throughout the Sikh community. According to Basu, it has been strong among

the Jat Sikhs, whereas non-Jats and Harijans are less involved in this sense of identity.112

Although the principal organization of the Sikhs is the Akali Dal, the militant Khalistan

movement was undertaken by other organizations like Dal Khalsa and the All India Sikh

Students Federation (AISSF). The Punjab is one of the wealthiest states in India as aresult of its agriculture.


19/32

19


None of the Indian separatist movements reviewed here has been as violent and costly as

has the Khalistan effort.

1950s: The demand for a Punjabi Suba was incorporated in the 1951 election manifestoof the Akali Dal. The States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) did not favor a Punjabi-

speaking state, angering many Sikhs. In reaction, the Akali Dal organised agitations andmass rallies which forced the Government of India to initiate a dialogue with the Dal.113

According to Sarkar, the Punjabi-Suba agitation of 1955 was basically a demand for

Sikh-statehood...carefully concealed in the garb of the demand for the creation of alinguistic state in Punjab.114

1960s: When Sant Fateh Singh took the leadership of the Akali Dal from Master Tara

Singh in 1962, it ended the hegemony of the urban higher caste leadership and resultedin a diminution of the demand for separation.115 In the 1965 election, Sant Akali Dal beat

Master Tara Singhs Akali Dal. Yet, in September 1965 Sant Fateh Singh announced hewould fast until death or a Punjabi Suba was formedand, if he lived 15 days he wouldimmolate himself.116 A subcommittee was set up by the Cabinet and then a commission

and then a Punjabi Suba was formed in November 1966. The Master Tara Singh Akali

Dal was dissatisfied with the boundaries and passed a resolution in 1966 demanding aSikh homeland.

1970s: Congress won a landslide victory in the 1971 Lok Sabha elections and the 1972

Assembly elections. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution was adopted by the Akali Dal in1978. According to Dipankar Gupta, it did not signal mass communal excitement and

it was not a secessionist document, though Congress tried to make it appear that way.117

Instead, it called for the resolution of specific problems facing Punjab. Despite a greatdeal of factionalism, the Akali Dal led a coalition government from 1977-1980.

1980s: A small number of Sikh militants under Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale beganto agitate for a sovereign Sikh homeland, Khalistan. In June 1983 the Akali leaders met at

Amritsar and drafted 8 demands, including autonomy for Punjab. Akali Dal-organized

demonstrations followed. The army was placed in control of Punjab. Operation Bluestar,

undertaken June 1, 1984, involved the army seizing the Golden Temple complex and 42other religious places. Indira Gandhi was assasinated in October 1984. In November

1984 nearly 2,500 Sikhs were killed in Dehli in reaction to the Gandhi assasination. The

consequence was that the credibility of Sikh militants grew....118

In July 1985 theRajiv-Longowal Accord was signed accepting most of the demands. The Akali Dal won

the 1985 elections, but the center did not fulfill its promises. According to Datta, this

angered many people and their anger was exploited by the extremists.119

During 1986-1987 Operation Woodrose was undertaken which systematically terrorized the

youth...driving many youngsters closer to the extremist point of view.120

In 1988,

Operation Black thunder was undertaken to flush out terrorists in the Golden Templewith a patience that eventually led to their humiliating surrender. Gupta observed that

this profoundly undermined the militants and their cause.121


20/32

20

1990s: Elections were held in 1992 which most moderate Sikhs boycotted. Congresswon with a small electoral turnout. Within a few months of the assumption of power by

Beant Singh government, terrorism and extremism collapsed.122

In 1994 six major

factions of the Akali Dal united to form the Shironmani Akali Dal (SAD) and pledged to

strive through democratic means for Sikh autonomy. Beant Singh was assassinated in1995, apparently by pro-Khalistan militants. In 1997 the General Secretary of SAD

reiterated its demand for greater autonomy. A SAD-BJP alliance won the 1997Assembly elections. Afterwards, the Punjab Chief Minister, Parkash Singh Badal,

refuted claims that the victory was a referendum in favor of Khalistan or separatism.


Perhaps because of the level of violence and the economic significance of the Punjab,

there has been a greater scholarly effort to locate the causes of the Khalistan movementthan of any of the others we have or will review.

Gupta argues that the vehemence of the Khalistan agitation was principally a result ofCongress (I)s political calculation. He says,

The overriding aim was, of course, to secure Congress (I) domination in Punjabby disgracing the Akali Dal. This limited drive was sought to be achieved by

portraying the Akalis as secessionist. Once this was done then the issue could no

longer be contained within Punjab but became all India in character.

Consequently, even though the Congress was losing Sikh sympathy it waswinning political kudos in the rest of the country by pumping anti-partition

sentiments. It is out of this that ethnicity grew in the Punjab in the 1980s.123

Datta adds economic and other factors in his explanation:

While the economic factor, namely, the growing ambitions of the peasants whobecame rich as a result of the Green Revolution, constitutes the mosaic of the

present agitation for a separate homeland, the political factors, namely,

manipulation of the Sikh community by the Indian ruling classes through the

Congress to make political capital have also played a very important role. Thegrowing alienation and frustration among the Sikhs as a result of the approach of

the Indian state to the problems of the Sikhs has aggravated the crisis. The

imperialists have added fuel to the fire with a view to balkanising the country.124

Sarkar provides a Marxist explanation, arguing that the rich, capitalist farmers,

to establish and maintain their socio-political dominance over the vast Sikh

masses,...use religion as a cloak. It helps them to project their own class demands

and aspirations as those of the Sikh in general....The communal card suits them toincrease their mass base but by itself it does not guarantee them power because of

one-man-one-vote and the specific ethnic composition of Punjab where the


21/32

21

Hindus are not a small minority and in spite of various social pressures the

support for the Akalis amongst the common Sikhs is far from overwhelming.Thus, the need to terrorise the masses. Thus, the demand for a Sikh theocratic

state (may be within India).50

Once again, students of the separatist movement identify factors other than globalizationand a weakened state as the principal explanations for the rise of separatism.

The Uttarakhand/Uttaranchal Movement


Uttarakhand, or as the BJP calls it, Uttaranchal, is primarily a mountainous area in

northwest Uttar Pradesh bordering on Nepal, China and Himachal Pradesh. It is thesource of many of Indias greatest rivers and the home of some of her most sacred Hindu

shrines. It consists of two administrative divisions, Kumaon and Garhwal. Most of thepeople are Brahmins and Rajputs, though the Scheduled Classes constitute about 15 percent of the population, the Scheduled Tribes about 3.2 per cent, and the Other Backward

Classes between 0.75 and 2.95 per cent.125

As might be expected in any movement, the

leaders are students, teachers and retired military personnel.126

A portion of Uttarakhandextends to the plains and is known as the Terai. Since World War II, much of the Terai

land has been cleared and settled, primarily by Punjabi Sikhs. In 1995 it was separated

from Nainital district and named Udham Singh Nagar. The hills people were greatly

aggravated by this intrusion.127


Although the movement is a long-standing one, it is only in the 1990s that it has had a

major political impact.

1950s: P.C. Joshi, the General Secretary of CPI, usually is given credit for inaugurating

the modern movement for autonomy in 1952. He opposed statehood, but favored

autonomy. Zakir Husain says, to him the demand for separate state was dangerous not

only for the people of hills but also for the nat ion as a whole.his Brahmin brain seemedreluctant to accept the logic of separate state.128 The issue was raised before the States

Reorganisation Commission in the fifties. P.D. Pande notes that It was fully endorsed

by Sardar K.M. Panikkar but he was overruled by the other two members, one of theimportant grounds given was that this area would develop better if it formed part of the

bigger state of Uttar Pradesh.129

1960s: During the 1960s the issue continued to be raised by P.C. Joshi and others,

though the movement languished. In 1967 a Hill State Council was formed to pursue the

movements goal.130


22/32

22

1970s: In 1973, the Hill State Council was reconstituted as the Uttarakhand Hill State

Council. Then, in the late 1970s, during the period of Janata rule, the demand for a hillstate was revived once again. In 1979, the Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD) was

established with the avowed aim of making this a reality.131

Husain contends that in

the 70s the demand for the separate state was merely a counter-move against the demand

of autonomous region.

132

1980s: In 1981 a memorandum was presented to Indira Gandhi on a visit to Uttarakhandcalling for the creation of a new state.133 According to J.C. Aggarwal, the previously

sporadic demand for the creation of a hill state gained momentum following the election

of Kashi Singh Aeri, the president of UKD to the state Assembly in 1985.134

1990s: In 1992 the BJP government in Uttar Pradesh passed a resolution calling for the

creation of Uttaranchal state. The Swamajwadi Party (SP)-Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP),

coalition government under Mulayam Singh Yadev passed a 27 per cent reservationpolicy for OBCs in Uttar Pradesh in 1994. It was the spark which ignited Uttarakhand, a

land where OBCs formed only about 2.4 per cent of the population. The fear was that thefew jobs and educational opportunities available would become fewer. The intensity ofthe mass rebellion left the UKD and other separatist organizations unable to direct the

anger. At about the same time, the formation of the new state of Uttarakhand was

endorsed through a unanimous resolution by the Assembly. The Congress government inDelhi refused to act on the resolution. During the 49th anniversary of Indias

independence in 1996, the new Prime Minister, Deve Gowda, announced that his

government would support the creation of Uttarakhand, yet that government was brought

down before action was taken. Gowdas successor, I.K. Gujral, announced his supportfor the creation of Uttarakhand the following year.135 He, too, was brought down before

he took action. In 1997 a third resolution was passed by the Uttar Pradesh Assembly

calling for the formation of Uttarakhand. In 1998, the BJP sought control of the centre ona platform calling for the creation of Uttaranchal state; it passed a draft bill for that

purpose to the Uttar Pradesh Assembly; the Assembly approved it in September.

Clearly, the Uttarakhand movement became more vigorous during the 1990s, a period

when globalization increased and the state seemed to weaken. Some of that vigor

involved politicians using the movement for their own political advantage and some of

that vigor was really opposition to the imposition of the OBC quota rather thanforstatehood.


Once again, the scholarly literature points to a variety of causes other than the two to

which our hypotheses refer.

P.C. Joshi lists an array of factors: the sudden opening up of this region to new stimuli

from outside, the breaking-up of the old framework of social security and the traumaticeroding of the old way of life. The massive brain-drain and the exodus of male members

of the labour force from Uttarakhand to metropolitan and urban centres.the new era


23/32

23

inaugurated by new means of transport and new modes of communication has created a

new kind of openness.136

Nalini Pant, on the other hand, suggests that the Uttarakhand movement

is basically a protest against the socio-economic exploitation of the region andmanifestation of peoples anguish against tyranny; it is a fight against the

subversion of democratic norms and a protest against stifling the voxpopuli of theregion; it is a disapproval of the practice of administering the region through

remote control and murdering the spirit of self-governance; it is a remonstrance

against internal colonialism and a combat against the insidious marginalization ofthe region; and lastly, it is an assertion for recognizing the sociocultural identity

of a part of the sub-Himalayan terrain.137

Husains view was that the causes were political. He asserts that Samajwadi Partys latecommitment to the creation of Uttarakhand state was a counter-move against the BJPs

politics of opportunism; that Yadavs active support of the separate state movementwas a part of this socialist counteractive doctrine; that Even UKD which was an ally ofthe Mulayam Government in the Legislature felt threatened by the increasing influence of

the SP in the hill areas; and that Along with the BJP they used the anti-reservation

movement to foster demands for a separate state which might promise them more votes,more seats, more power and, ultimately, more control over the people.138335

R. R. Nautiyal and Annpurna Nautiyal contend that the explanation for the traumatic

1994 uprising lie in insensitive political interference and exploitative developmentimposed upon the region by the successive state governments.pernicious tinkering with

the culture.Repugnant tactics...used to secure votes in the election, by way of

estranging and alienating one caste from the other. the culture of Uttarakhand has beenneglected callously by the powers....more than three-fourth of the financial allocations

have been misused by a racket of corrupt officials leaving the people of this area high and

dry.139

The litany is long. Globalization and weakened state do little to capture these diverse

factors.

IV. Conclusion

Four summary observations follow from this brief survey of the relationship between

globalization and the weakening Indian state and the relationship between the weakening

Indian state and the intensity with which Indian separatist movements have pursued theirobjectives.

The first observation is that our measures are crude. We assume that the intensificationof globalization is gradual until 1991 and then more rapid since. Our primary measure

of state strength is a summary of qualitative observations by scholars and our second


24/32

24

measure is a construct meant to measure relative political capacity. We have sought in

our five cases to gain a sense of the intensity of the movements by an examination of thesequence and nature activities related to the achievement of movement goals. And, we

have sought through a comparison of scholars explanations of the intensity of the

movements activities with globalization and the weakened state to see if they perceive

the latter to be causal.

The second observation is that some of the trends correspond to those predicted by thehypotheses. The qualitative measures suggest the Indian state is weakening while

globalization is increasing. And, several of the separatist movements have become more

active as the state weakens and globalization advancesat least, that appears to be thecase for Uttarakhand and Bodoland. Violence in the Punjab has diminished; in

Gorkhaland it is lower than the 1986-1988 period; and, in Jharkhand the trend is

ambiguous. We would contend, though, that the relationships found do not appear to

provide significant support for our hypotheses.

The third observation is that such a contention is reinforced by our assessment of theexplanations supplied by the scholars who have studied the movements. Thoseexplanations vary considerably from one another. And, seldom do they identify either

the weakened state or globalization as significantly contributing to the changes in the

intensity of activity they are observing.

The fourth observation is that a recurring theme in each of these separatist movements is

their use for political purposes. That is, political leaders foster or hinder the actions of

the movements solely for reasons extraneous to the movements objectives. Thosereasons involve gaining or maintaining political power their own political power. Such

an instrumental use appears to be the most important determinant of the movements

fortunes, a fact that makes scholarly predictions of the outcome of such movements verydifficult.


25/32

25

ENDNOTES

1 Timothy J. Scrase, Globalization, India, and the Struggle for Justice, in David A.

Smith and Jozsef Borocz, eds., A New World Order? Global Transformations in the Late

Twentieth Century (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1995), p. 147.

2Roland Robertson, Globalization, Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage,

1992), p. 80.

3Ann Cvetkovich and Douglas Kellner, Introduction: Thinking Global and Local, in

Ann Cvetkovich and Douglas Kellner, eds.Articulating the Global and the Local,

Globalization and Cultural Studies (Boulder: Westview, 1997), p. 3.

4Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998),

p. 4.

5

Weiss, p. 17.6 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question, The International

Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), p.

177.

7 Cvetkovich and Kellner, pp. 1 and 9, respectively.

8Christopher Dandeker, Nationalism, Nation-States, and Violence at the End of the

Twentieth Century: A Sociological View, and Introduction, in Dandeker, ed,

Nationalism and Violence (New Brunswick, U.S.: Transaction Publishers, 1998), pp. 37

and 5, respectively.

9Scrase, p. 151.

10 Joszef Borocz, and David Smith, Introduction: Late Twentieth-Century Challenges

for World-System Analysis, in David A. Smith and Jozsef Borocz, eds., A New WorldOrder? Global Transformations in the Late Twentieth Century (Westport, CN:

Greenwood Press, 1995), p.3.

11Roger Burbach, , Orlando Nunez and Boris Kagarlitsky, Globalization and its

Discontents, The Rise of Postmodern Socialisms (London: Pluto Press, 1997), p. 24.

12 Burbach, Nunez and Kagarlitsky, p. 144.

13 Burbach, Nunez and Kagarlitsky, p. 19.

14Michael Keating,Nations Against the State (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), p.

24.

15Keating, p. 24.


26/32

26

16 Keating, p. 41.

17Crawford Young, The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Reality, in

Young ed., The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism, The Nation-State at Bay? (Madison:University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), p. 18.

18 Weiss, pp. 212 and 3, respectively.

19Weiss, pp. 212.

20 David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in South-East Asia (London: Routledge,

1994), p. 3.

21 Brown, p. 32.

22Brown, p. 3.

23Brown, pp. 3-4.

24 Young, p. 18.

25Scrase, p. 154.

26 Scrase, p. 158.

27Atul Kohli,Democracy and Discontent, Indias Growing Crisis of Governability

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 5; also see, Maya Chadda,

Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India (New York: Columbia University Press,

1997), p. 104; and, Sudipta Kaviraj, On State, Society and Discourse in India, in JamesManor, ed.,Rethinking Third World Politics (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 92-92.

28Mohan Agarwal, India, in Padma Desai, ed., Going Global, Transition from Plan to

Market in the World Economy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 494.

29Agarwal, pp. 490 and 491.

30 Chadda, p. 104.

31Chadda, p. 106.

32Chadda, p. 106.

33 Kohli, p. 14.


27/32

27

34Kohli, p. 16.

35Ajeya Sarkar,Regionalism, State and the Emerging Political Pattern in India, A New

Approach (Calcutta: Firma KLM Private Limited, 1990), p. 91.

36Sarkar, p. 95.

37 Sarkar, p. 96.

38Sarkar, p. 91.

39 Sajal Basu,Regional Movements, Politics of Language, Ethnicity-Identity (Shimla:

Indian Institute of Advanced Study and New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1992), p. xii.

40 Basu,Regional Movements, Politics of Language, Ethnicity-Identity, p. 12.

41Basu, Regional Movements, Politics of Language, Ethnicity-Identity, p. 12.

42Basu,Regional Movements, Politics of Language, Ethnicity-Identity, p. 41.




46Tanka B. Subba,Ethnicity, State and Development, A Case Study of the Gorkhaland

Movement in Darjeeling (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications in association with Vikas

Publishing House, 1992), p. 122.

47 B.G. Verghese,Indias Northeast Resurgent, Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance,

Development(Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996), p. 67

48Verghese, p. 67, and Datta, p. 142.

49Prabhat Datta,Regionalisation of Indian Politics (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers,

1993), p. 134; also see, Ajay Roy, The Boro Imbroglio (Guwahati: SpectrumPublications, 1995), pp. 44-54.

50Sarkar, pp. 29-30.

51Datta, p. 140.

52 Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist, Tales of War and Peace from Indias Northeast

(New Delhi: Viking, 1994), p. 152.


28/32

28

53 Verghese, p. 61.

54Datta, p. 133.

55Datta, p. 134.

56 Roy, p. 59, and, Madan C. Paul,Dimensions of Tribal Movements in India, A Study of

Udayachal in Assam Valley (New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 1989), p. 82.

57 Datta, p. 135.

58Verghese, p. 61.

59 Verghese, p. 63.

60Verghese, p. 67.

61Datta, p. 142.

62 Datta, p. 143.

63Verghese, p. 63.

64 Sarkar, p. 69.

65Sarkar, p. 78.

66Datta, pp. 149-150.

67 Subhas Ghishing has claimed that the language should be called Gorkha. He has

argued, too, that Gorkha should have been added to the Eighth Schedule of the

Constitution, rather than Nepali.

68 Subba, p. 91.

69Amiya K. Samanta, Gorkhaland, A Study in Ethnic Separatism (New Delhi: Khama

Publishers, 1996), p. 85.

70Samanta, p. 94.

71Datta, p. 154.

72 Datta, p. 154.


29/32

29

73Subba, p. 97.


75

Datta, p. 152.76

Sarkar, p. 83.

77Sakar, p. 81.

78TheHindu (Madras), 3 September 1994, p. 16.

79The Hindu, on line, 24 March 1997,

http://www.webpage.com/hindu/daily/970324/02/02240005.html

80

The Indian Express, on line, 16 April 1998,http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19980416/10650324.html

81Sarkar, p. 75, and Subba, p. 118.

82 Subba, p. 121.

83Subba, pp. 113-122.

84 Sarkar, p. 79; Subba, 115; and, Verghese, p. 272.

85Subba, p. 116.

86Subba, p. 91.

87 Subba, p. 91.

88Sarkar, p. 84; Datta, pp. 153-154, makes a similar point.

89 Sarkar, p. 54.

90Stan Lourduswamy,Jharkhandis Claim for Self-Rule (New Delhi: Indian Social

Institute, 1997), pp. 13-14, and Sajal Basu, Fall in Bihars Tribal Population Fanning

Flames of Jharkhand, Statesman, May 10, 1993, in Lalan Tiwari, ed.,Issues in Indian

Politics (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1995), p. 392.

91Memorandum from the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha to the Home Minister, 11 August

1989, in Lalan Tiwari, ed.,Issues in Indian Politics (New Delhi: Mittal Publications,1995), p. 363.


30/32

30


93Vijay Kumar, Crystallization of a Regional Movement: The Case of the Jharkhand,

Third Concept, April 1992, in Lalan Tiwari, ed.,Issues in Indian Politics (New Delhi:

Mittal Publications, 1995), p. 399.94

Lourduswamy, p. 11.

95Sarkar, p. 64.

96 Basu, p. 19.

97Amal Chandra Kumar, Jharkhand Movement at Crossroads,Mainstream, April 1992,

in Lalan Tiwari, ed.,Issues in Indian Politics (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1995), p.412.

98A.C. Kumar, p. 400.

99A.K. Jha, Jharkhand Politics of Bihar: Paradigm of Non-Performance, in S.

Narayan, ed.,Jharkhand Movement, Origin and Evolution (New Dehli: Inter-IndiaPublications, 1992), p. 103.

100A.K. Jha, p. 103.

101 Sarkar, p. 59.

102Lourduswamy, p. 9.

103Victor Das,Jharkhand, Castle Over the Graves (New Delhi: Inter-India Publications,

1991), p. 149.

104 Dass, p. 149.

105Dass, p. 150.

106Datta, p. 170.

107 Ram Dayal Munda and Bisheshwar Prasad Keshari,Indian International Centre,Quarterly, 1992, in Lalan Tiwari, ed.,Issues in Indian Politics (New Delhi: Mittal

Publications, 1995), p. 330.

108Lourduswamy, p. 16.

109 Lourduswamy, p. 18


31/32

31

110Shibu Soren, Laloo Yadav kept us in the Dark till the Last Moment, Indian Express,

20 September 1998, http://www.indian-express.com/ie/daily/19980920/26350774.html.

111Vijay Kumar, p. 411.


113 Datta, p. 63.

114Sarkar, p. 42.

115 Datta, p. 64.

116Datta, p. 64.

117

Dipankar Gupta, The Context of Ethnicity, Sikh Identity in a Comparative Perspective(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 74.

118Gupta, p. 77.

119 Datta, p. 68.

120Gupta, p. 81.

121 Gupta, p. 85.

122Gupta, p. 86.

123Gupta, pp. 85-86.

124 Datta, p. 74.

125Frontline (Madras), 7 October 1994, p. 14; and, Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, Caste

Aside, Frontline (Madras), 23 September 1994, p. 127. J.C. Aggarwal and S.P.Agrawal, Uttarakhand, Past, Present and Future (New Delhi: Concept Publishing

Company, 1995), p. 19.

126 Nalini Pant, Reflections on the Uttarakhand Movement, in R.R. Nautiyal and

Annpurna Nautiyal, eds., Uttarakhand in Turmoil (New Delhi: M D Publications,

1996), p. 35.

127Zakir Husain, Uttarakhand Movement, The Politics of Identity and Frustration

(Bareilly: Prakash Book Depot, 1995), p. 58.

128 Husain, p. 325.


32/32

129 B.D. Pande, Why Uttarakhand? in R.R. Nautiyal and Annpurna Nautiyal, eds.,

Uttarakhand in Turmoil (New Delhi: M D Publications, 1996), p. 3.

130

Annpurna Nautiyal, Separate Uttarakhand State, Political Issue or EconomicNecessity, in R.R. Nautiyal and Annpurna Nautiyal, eds., Uttarakhand in Turmoil (New

Delhi: M D Publications, 1996), p. 8.

131Joshi, P.C.,Mainstream, Feb. 17, 1990, in Lalan Tiwari, ed.,Issues in Indian Politics

(New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1995), p. 282.

132 Husain, p. vii.

133J.C. Aggarwal and S.P. Agrawal, Uttarakhand, Past, Present and Future (New Delhi:

Concept Publishing Company, 1995), p. 456.

134Aggarwal, p. 7.

135India Journal, 27 June 1997, p. A20.

136 P.C. Joshi, p. 283.

137Pant, p. 32.

138 Husain, pp.332-335.

139R.R. Nautiyal and Annpurna Nautiyal, eds., Uttarakhand in Turmoil (New Delhi: M

D Publications, 1996), introduction.

the weakened state

Documents