the way, virtue, and practical skills in the analects

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xinzhong yao

THE WAY, VIRTUE, AND PRACTICAL SKILLS INTHE ANALECTS

Abstract

This article is intended to investigate how the concept of the Way(dao ) is applied in the Analects of Confucius both as a universalnorm and as a practical application in association with other con-cepts, virtue (de ) on the one hand, and ability or skill (neng ) ormethod ( fang ) on the other.Through a synthetic reconstruction ofthese concepts, it will come to the conclusion that the Way, virtue, andpractical skills are the three central and mutually interpreted themesin the ethical discourse as presented in the Analects.

Taking Confucius as the transmitter of the Way (dao), BenjaminSchwartz comments that the dao in the Analects “refers to nothingless than the total normative sociopolitical order with its networks ofproper familial and proper sociopolitical roles, statuses, and ranks, aswell as to the ‘objective’ prescriptions of proper behaviour—ritual,ceremonial, and ethical—that govern the relationships among theseroles.”1 Whether interpreted as the human sociopolitical order or asthe universal law of the human-natural world, the Way is positionedwith a clearly highlighted importance in the Analects,2 as evidenced inthe serious concerns (you ) Confucius had with the situations inwhich “the Way is not practiced”3 and “the Way does not prevail in theEmpire.”4 Dispute or disagreement arises as soon as we come to thequestions of whether or not the Way as the total order is purelysociopolitical, and whether or not there is tension between its univer-sal nature and particular applications. To fully appreciate the natureof the Way as the central concept of the Analects, we will have toreexamine its meanings and usages in association with other keyconcepts, and to reconstruct them into an ethical discourse. In thisarticle we will first investigate “the what question”—what the Wayis—in a critical examination of its possible metaphysical and episte-mological implications. Second, we will try to answer “the why

XINZHONG YAO, Professor, Department of Theology and Religious Studies; Director,King’s China Institute, King’s College London. Specialties: Chinese philosophy, religiousstudies, comparative ethics. E-mail: [email protected]

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Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39:1 (March 2012) 26–43© 2012 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

question”—why the Way is of a universal value—through an exami-nation of its relation with heaven (tian ) and virtue (de ). Third,we will come to examine “the how question”—how the universal Wayacquires a particular nature by means of an association with practicalskills (neng ) or methods ( fang ). The logical conclusion fromthese investigations will be that the Way, virtue, and practical skills arethe three central and mutually interpreted themes in the ethical dis-course as constructed and presented in the Analects.

I. Nature and Meanings of the Way

Contemporary scholars have employed various means to introducedifferent definitions or interpretations to the understanding of theWay in the Analects. By associating it to heaven (tian ), for example,some scholars have given the Way a meaning of “mental construc-tion” and defined it as “the principle of behaviour that all shouldrespect,” or as the “substantiated rule,” “the founding principle” thatis the source of virtues.5 In the latter sense it is often listed in thesame category as the Way in Daoist philosophy.6 When exploringthe concept of benti (origin-substance) in Chinese philosophy,however, Chung-ying Cheng disagrees that the Way is used as “sourcesubstance” in the Analects; rather he defines it in a derivative sense,pointing out that “the dao has a source and arises from it in itsrealization of growth and development.”7 The Way in the Analects isconceptualized in two, often seemingly parallel, meanings: the univer-sal Way that transcends the will and action of an individual, and theparticular way that is embodied in the thinking and behaving of anindividual. These two meanings are in most cases interrelated andinterdependent, knowing the one often depending on the apprecia-tion of the other. On occasions, however, there is tension or evenopposition between them, when accepting one implies, or is precon-ditioned on, the rejecting of the other.8

Some modern scholars see a link between the Confucian Way andthe Daoist way. Chad Hansen has, for example, suggested that interms of a historical order, Daoists might have transformed the Con-fucian interpretation of the Way as “moral doctrine” to a notion as a“metaphysical monistic absolute.”9 Other scholars tend to emphasizethe Confucian Way as a purely human matter, as Arthur Waley insiststhat “The Tao [Dao] taught by Confucius only concerned humanbehaviour (‘the ways of man’).”10 While accurate in their own con-texts, these views seem to have placed too much emphasis on one ofthe meanings by which the holistic concept of the Way in the Analectsis fragmented. In fact the seemingly contradictory process is con-

27way, virtue, and practical skills

structed by Chung-ying Cheng as two interrelated principles in aConfucian context: “the principle of immanentization of humanityand the principle of humanization of the immanent tao,” and hefurther places the two dimensional meaning in his onto-generativewhole of benti which is “an open process of creative formationand transformation of things.”11 Through benti, Chung-ying Chendissolves the dualistic problem of the whole–part or substance–derivative or universal–particular relation as we often see in theconcept of the Way.

There is a clearly defined substantive element in the concept of theWay when it is associated with heaven (tian dao ). However, thementioning of the “Way of heaven” occurs in a negative context inwhich one of Confucius’s disciples said that he had rarely heard fromhis master talking about it.12 How to interpret this sentence hasbeen in extensive dispute,13 and we must not allow ourselves to bedrawn into it. Only by a superficial glance can we see that one of themeanings that the Way carries with it in the Analects is “truth” or“principle” underlying the metaphysical, physical, and social worlds,leading to a comprehensive view of the world that ordinary humansare probably unlikely capable of grasping.14 It seems apparent thatConfucius has noted the ineffable nature of the Way of heaven, and hehas chosen not to openly talk about it due to its subtlety and pro-foundness. Interpreted as such, the Way is of a similar nature as that ofthe dao in the Daode Jing. However, the similarity disappears as soonas we look into the relation between the universal side of the Way andits particular dimensions as presented in the Analects and other earlyConfucian texts: in contrast with the Daoist Way that magnifies thetension between the universal and the particular15 Confucius tends toreconcile them, insisting that the Way must not be separated fromhuman life: “The Way cannot be separated from humans for amoment.What can be separated from humans is not the Way.”16 Fromthis perspective, it is evident that the difficulty in understanding theWay is taken as an epistemological and ethical rather than a cosmo-logical or ontological issue, and the reason for understanding or mis-understanding the Way must be found in connection with the middleway (zhong dao ). Confucius is quoted in the Doctrine of theMean as supposedly saying that “I know why the Way is not under-stood. The Worthy go beyond it and the unworthy do not come up toit.”17

Understood as nonsubstantive, the Way in the Analects is particu-larized as “ways,” particular qualities and characters that individualsdemonstrate in their thinking and acting or in their specific path andmethod by which a social or moral issue is dealt with. Everything andeverybody have thus their own ways. For example, a father has the

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way of the father ( fu zhi dao ); the former kings had their way(xian wang zhi dao ); a gentleman has the gentleman’s way( jun zi zhi dao ); and a good man is defined by the way of agood man (shan ren zhi dao ).18

Diversified and particularized, the Way provides criteria for humanliving and behaving. It can be taken but can also be abandoned. In anideal society (da tong ) of the past, those who followed the Waywould be promoted to the position of ruling, while those who abusedor departed from it would be demoted. Here the Way is considered tobe the moral standard of life, and those who follow it are regarded asa model by which the people come to rectify themselves. To smoothout the process of applying universal standards to particular ways,Confucius has to inject a personal element into the concept of theWay: from the universal principle that all humans must abide by to aparticular goal that an individual is aimed to realize, the Way cannotbe internalized except through practicing what is right.19

A particular path bears the nature of the universal Way. Howeverdistinctive the ways are from one another, they seem to partake, oneway or another, of the universal Way which is so highly regarded thatConfucius even said “When hearing the Way in the morning, diecontent in the evening.”20 Because of this universality, the Way carrieswith it in most cases a laudatory meaning of righteousness and truth.It is ascribed with an intrinsic moral value and does not need ethicaladjectives when it is used for a desirable quality.21 The value of theWay in a Confucian context is fully manifested in the contrastbetween those who “possess the Way” (you dao ) and those who“do not possess the Way” (wu dao ) or those who “have lost theWay” (shi dao ),22 referring to a variety of people who do not seekthe truth or who violate the moral standard, behaving in an unjust,immoral, and unrighteous way.23 It can also be observed in the con-trast between the highly valued way of the ancients (gu zhi dao

)24 and the devalued way of contemporary times.25 As the idealfor life and the root of virtue, the Way must be sought after (mou ),and humans should be really concerned (you) if they cannot attain tothe Way. For Confucius it is worrisome and even dangerous if the Wayis not carried out in the state or does not prevail in the world (dao buxing or tianxia wu dao ). It is even more so for thestate if those in power do not follow the Way, because it is believedwhen the people in authority lost the Way, then the common peoplewould certainly be rootless.26

Although the Confucian Way is used most frequently to refer to theright course of living or acting, this does not exempt it from beingabused or distorted by those whose morality is low. The Way is thesame, but people of different moral quality may well aim at different


achievements by practicing it: “A gentleman learns the Way in orderto love people, while an inferior man learns the Way in order to beeasily employed.”27 From this there comes a contrast between the wayof a superior person ( jun zi zhi dao) and the way of an inferior person(xiao ren zhi dao ). However, the contrast of its two differentdemonstrations does not necessarily negate the intrinsically righteousnature of the Way; rather it prescribes how a superior or inferiorfeature can be added to the Way through particular ways it is used orapplied. Different people often take the Way differently and thereforemanifest their ways differently. This fact often leads to a speculationthat minimizes or denies the universal nature of the Way, because itseems that the Way can be manipulated to one’s advantage asdescribed in the following statement: the Way can be straightfor-wardly followed but can also be bended in a crooked way. If so, thenthere is a real risk that the Way can be differentiated into differentcategories, in which the universal nature of the Way is negated.

As far as the nature of the Way is concerned, not only a differenceof quantity but also a difference of quality can be brought out. Con-fucius insists, for example, that people must not take counsel togetherif their ways depart from one another (dao bu tong ). However,in general this risk does not run high in the Analects. Interpretatively,the Way is the same but practically its manifestations vary, and differ-entiation comes from how humans pursue the Way rather than fromthe Way itself. Confucius is concerned about how to maintain theintegrity of the Way, calling for people to pursue it (shi dao ) orstudy it (xue dao ), in order to fully understand it or to be part ofit. “Pursuing” or “studying” the Way implies that the Way cannot bemodified or changed into one’s own benefits; rather it is a moralrequirement that humans must “believe in the Way” with all theirheart,28 because if not, they will not be able to achieve anythingimportant: there is not much value for a person who believes in theWay but without firm sincerity. This is essentially a moral argumentthat the universal Way must not be altered to one’s own preferences,and the value of the Way cannot be appreciated unless we live by itand act according to it. In other words, manifested differently, theuniversal Way and particular ways in the Analects are of the samenature, not only leading to each other but also mutually generating.

II. The Way, Virtue, and Moral Effort

Underlying the dynamic relation between the universal and the par-ticular of the Way in the Analects is the conviction that the Way mustbe lived by. This takes us to the issues of virtue and moral effort thatare the focus in Confucius’s discourses.

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While recognizing the universality of the Way, Confucius insiststhat the Way must be taken into one’s own heart and practiced inone’s own life. The interconnection between heaven, human nature,the Way, and moral cultivation is explained more clearly in the Doc-trine of the Mean where the first sentence states: “What Heaven(T’ien, Nature) imparts to humans is called human nature. To followour nature is called the Way (Tao). Cultivating the Way is callededucation.”29 According to this sentence, all Confucian concepts andprojects, either philosophical or social and educational, are interre-lated. The focal point here is on individuals. The universal Way mustbe cultivated, or in other words, must be particularized as psychologi-cal, social, moral, and spiritual ways that are necessary constituentelements for an individual’s character and nature. While this Zisi-Mencius position is most likely post-Confucius, its underlying ideasare not totally different from Confucius’s own perspective. One pointthat Confucius makes very clearly is that the universal Way cannotautomatically enhance an individual’s intellectual and moral worth;the Way requires to be expanded or enlarged through individual willand action, and its value cannot be manifested to its maximum unlessthrough moral efforts: “It is humans who can make the Way great. Itis not the Way that can make humans great.”30

The ethical nature of the discourses on the Way in the Analectsdetermines that the statement that humans can make the Way great isnot all what Confucius wants to make; rather he must further engagein a multidimensional discussion of how humans can make the Waygreat, which is central to Confucius’s teaching in the Analects. ForConfucius, the Way is to be lived rather than simply followed, becausehe strongly believes that only through living by it can the universalbecome particularized as part of everyone’s own life. Virtue thusstands at the core of Confucius’s understanding of the Way in thesense that it is a necessary extension or individualization of the Way.

Whether or not “de” in the Analects can be translated as “virtue” inthe European philosophy is an open question. However, if we acceptthe Greek understanding that “The virtues themselves are acquiredthrough systematic training in these practices, which produces in indi-viduals stable dispositions to act and to perceive the world in certainways,”31 then we can say that this description is also applicable to “de”in the Analects as Confucius repeatedly tells his students that trainingand practicing are necessary for them to become excellent and supe-rior, and for them to have stable dispositions to act on, and perceiveof, the Way.

However, in the Analects “de” is more than a customary “goodhabit or disposition.” It is the moral power that must be cultivated,and cultivation of moral excellence is both the prerequisite for, and


the necessary consequence of, acquiring an understanding of the Way.In this sense virtue in a Confucian context is related, on the one hand,to the particular practices and dispositions of an individual, and on theother hand to the universal principle embodied in the Confucianconcept of the Way or heaven. Without a full understanding of theWay or the mandate of heaven, Confucius insists, it is not possible forus to establish a particular way of life and to cultivate our moralpower within. This has rendered “virtue” in a Confucian context intoa conscientious ethico-religious activity upon one’s understanding ofthe Way and heaven, rather than a combination of stable habits thatmeet all customary requirements. In fact Confucius dislikes so-called“village honest men” and called them “the enemy of virtue.”32

According to Mencius the reason for Confucius to hold such anattitude is “I dislike the village honest man for fear he might beconfused with the virtuous.”33

It is not difficult to see that in the Analects there is an intrinsic linkbetween the Way and virtue, which according to Confucius must beconstantly strengthened and brought out in one’s conscious activity.While the Way determines, in a metaphorical sense, what we shouldpursue in life, its value and importance can be fulfilled only in leadinga virtuous life.This has made the Confucian discourse on the Way andvirtue fundamentally ethical and practically educational. The primaryconcern of Confucius is with how to govern the state in a righteousway, and to him the ruling of the state requires, not a balanced struc-ture of administration but reverence in dealing with business, behold-ing to sincerity, being economic in expenditure, and employing peopleat the proper seasons.

Like the concept of the Way, virtue in the Analects also containsboth the universal and the particular dimension. Its universal dimen-sion is primarily associated with the Way and heaven, and its particu-lar dimension with human efforts. Virtue is prerequisite to having afirm will on the Way (zhi yu dao ) that one can gain a meaningin daily life. To lead a virtuous life, one of the effective ways is torectify one’s own behavior in light of those who possess the way ( jiuyou dao ).There is little in the Analects suggesting that the Waymust be comprehended as a composite of fragmental elements bydeliberating on the subtle meanings of each part—this has differen-tiated Confucius not only from Greek philosophers but also fromDaoist authors of important texts such as Daode Jing and Zhuangzi.34

For Confucius, the Way is the whole, and having a firm will on the Wayis both the precondition for, and the necessary content of, beingbased on virtue—practicing virtues and leaning upon benevolence,namely following a course of life that carries with it significant ethicalvalue.

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Confucius is keen to explore the reasons why “the Way does notprevail.” On occasions he seems to suggest that this is the function of“destiny.”35 However, more substantially he seeks reasons for thisfailure in the lack of human effort. In this sense the Way cannotprevail unless people practice or live by virtue. Virtue is thus likenedto be the root while the Way the trunk that grows up naturally whenthe root is firmly established: “When the root is established, then theWay can spring up.”36 As the root, virtue is composed of all goodqualities of human living; in particular family virtues such as filialpiety (xiao ) and brotherly respect (ti ). In its connection with theWay, however, virtue is believed to have its source in heaven. Con-fucius proudly announces that his virtue comes from heaven.When heis confronted with life threats he braves his attackers, telling his dis-ciples that he has no fear at all because heaven has produced virtue inhim. Hence, virtue in the Analects has two connotations. On the par-ticular side, virtue is an excellent character demonstrated in suchqualities as loyalty (zhong ), trustworthiness (xin ), courage (yong

), respectfulness (gong ), generosity (kuan ), all being excel-lence in a particular aspect of life that require intensive cultivation.37

On the universal side, virtue has a meaning of charismatic distinctive-ness that is associated with the mission from heaven to transmitancient culture and with the fulfilling of this mission. The belief in theassociation of heaven and virtue has given an added value to theethical discourse on the Way. With his trust in heaven, for example,Confucius seemed not to have been bothered by the fact that nobodyunderstands him; rather he reconfirms that he does not complainagainst heaven, nor against other people, claiming that what he hasdone is in line with the heavenly principle and he will therefore beunderstood by heaven.38

Reconstructing these remarks into a discourse, we can find thatthe Way, virtue, and heaven are actually taken as three pillars sup-porting the moral world. In the later Zisi-Mencius strand of Confu-cian texts, the Way is internalized as the heart/mind (xin ), and theapproach to the Way is defined as a linear movement from extend-ing one’s own heart to knowing human nature (xing ) and finallyto serving heaven.39 In the epistemological discourse of the Analects,there is also an aspiration for the high. For example, Confuciusstrives for the progress from what is below to what is up above.However, this kind of movement is the key to his moral epistemol-ogy, but not central to his discourse on the Way. It seems that hisfocus is not on an outward movement. Rather he tries to convey aninterconnected relation between the Way, virtue, and heaven, whichare not arranged in a linear process, but as a circular movement. Incontrast with Zisi-Mencius’s heart/mind-based perspective on the


human–heaven relation, Confucius establishes in the Analects amoralistic approach to a realistic human–heaven relationship byinserting virtue and human efforts between them, engaging in a dis-course that involves the three aspects of a moral life: virtue–theWay–heaven, in which the Way is “enlarged” by virtue, virtue growsfrom pursuing the Way, and the Way and virtue lead to their ownsource in heaven that produces the Way on the one hand and gen-erates virtue on the other.40 This can be illustrated in Figure 1 pro-vided above. Because of the circular nature, there is no absolutestarting or ending point in this discourse. As far as the relationbetween the Way and virtue is concerned, no evidence suggests thatConfucius takes the Way that is rooted in virtue and the Way thatrequires or guides human cultivation of virtue as two separate orcontrasting entities. For him the Way cannot arise unless humansconsciously cultivate it in their personal and family life. In thetripartite of Way–Virtue–Heaven, human efforts are both the“pushing” force and the necessary ingredient.

How to establish the “root” is thus of significance for Confucius’sdiscourse. There is a tension between the universal and the particularin the concept of the Way and virtue. To overcome the tension, Con-fucius works on two fronts. On the one hand he resorts to the inter-action between individuals and their communities, and between ahuman person and the external world through the binding powerof ritual/rites (li ), and on the other hand he calls for the cultivationof the human self and character (xiu ji ) and for the developmentof moral and spiritual qualities that are believed to be innate tohuman existence. Confucius is fully aware of the tension between the

Heaven producesvirtue and

generates theWay

Virture is the rootfor the Way andlearning the Way

leads to virtue

Following theWay and

practicing virtuelead to heaven

Figure 1.

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upward tendency of the universal Way which connects the Way andheaven and the downward force that has dissolved it to particulars,and admits to the incomprehensibility of human destiny and the Way.He is worried about the human inability to reverse the trend that theWay fails to prevail in the world. While admitting the real risk ofhuman failure, however, Confucius is not totally pessimistic about theprospect of practicing the Way. He is known as a person who persistsin doing what he knows clearly as impossible to realize,41 and there-fore tends to believe that humans are capable of overcoming the gapbetween human efforts and the fulfillment of the Way. While occa-sionally accepting predetermination view that not all human effortswould produce desirable results and the destiny is beyond humancomprehension and control, Confucius in general takes a humanisticapproach to the Way: any failure in carrying out the universal Way isnot the failure of the Way itself, but a failure in human efforts. He isdeeply concerned that failure to cultivate virtue and to practice whatis right makes one’s life less valuable and meaningful. However,unlike some of his followers in a later age, he does not in generalattribute the failure totally to the nature of humans, nor to the limi-tations heaven has placed on human beings; rather he says that thishappens because of a moral shortcoming or the weakness of one’swill: some of us are just too lazy and tend to set limits for ourselvesbefore we even start. Since the reason for humans to fail to be with theWay is one’s moral weakness, then it is natural for Confucius tobelieve that by overcoming it or by addressing the shortcomings allhumans are able to make a change to the course of an unsuccessfullife, and that the Way can be prevailing only through humans’ makingefforts. In this sense, Confucius considers the Way as a personalchoice: you can choose to be with it or you can choose to turn yourback on it. It seems apparent that Confucius believes in a naturaldifference of personal qualities such as intelligence and moral excel-lence. But it is equally true that he emphasizes that humans makethemselves worthy by learning and training, which enable an ordinaryperson to become an ideal person, a junzi (gentleman or avirtuous person) whose way is threefold: “virtuous he is free fromanxieties; wise he is free from perplexities; courageous he is free fromfear.”42

III. Practical Skills as Paths to the Way

The universal and the particular dimensions of the Way and virtueare unified through moral effort; this implies that the Way and virtueare not only principles or values, but are also practical skills that are


necessary for solving problems and difficulties people are faced within their daily life. In the context of the Analects, practical skills arereferred to as one’s abilities or capabilities (neng), the majority ofwhich are of a moral nature and are enabled by moral virtues. As faras the value of the skills and abilities is concerned, practical skills canbe classified into three categories. For Confucius, the highest capabili-ties are possible because of virtue and the best skills to carry out theWay are such virtues as benevolence, righteousness, trustfulness, fidel-ity, kindness, and honesty, which enable the ruler to rule the worldpeacefully, and common people to live a happy and long life. Thesecond category of the skills is about the method by which a thing isdone and a goal is achieved, which are the abilities to carry out virtuesbut are not virtues by themselves; for example, the ability to take asanalogy what is near at hand is such a method by which benevolencecan be practiced. The third category is about small arts that areemployed at resolving individual problems or difficulties. All thesethree categories are of huge importance for the Way, and are what wecould call the “moral skills” of different grades. These skills are“moral” because they are mostly concerned with how the state isgoverned, education engaged, the self cultivated, and others treated,and are significantly different from the words as we would normallyrefer to “skill” in a technological sense.

Confucius believes that the Way cannot be fulfilled unless wehave mastered and skillfully employed various methods and abilities.However, unlike virtue that is said to have its source in heaven, one’sabilities are in general of a priori nature, coming from one’s ownlearning, practice, and experience. It is apparent that Confucius rec-ognizes natural difference in human intelligence and capability. Heputs it plainly that “Those who are born with knowledge are thehighest. Next come those who attain knowledge through study. Nextagain come those who turn to study after having been vexed bydifficulties. The common people, in so far as they make no effort tostudy even after having been vexed by difficulties, are the lowest.”43

This should be seen, however, more as his educational methods andhis emphasis on the necessity of cultivation and study rather than hisview of human nature, as he does emphasize that “Humans are closeto one another by nature. They diverge as a result of repeated prac-tice.”44 Practice and moral efforts are the real source of abilities andskills.The lack of abilities is the necessary result of the lack of practiceand moral efforts. Strongly disapproving some people who alwayscomplain that their abilities and skills are not rightly recognized,Confucius reminds them that “It is not the failure of others to appre-ciate your abilities that should trouble you, but rather your own lackof them.”45

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In the context of the Analects, skills and abilities are achievedthrough learning experience and accumulated in daily practices. Oneof Confucius’s contemporaries commented that Confucius was surelya sage sent by heaven; otherwise why should he be skilled in so manythings? To this Confucius did not resort to his belief in heaven orheaven’s mission to give an account of his skill and ability; rather hedescribed himself as someone who grew up in humble conditions andbecame therefore skilled in many menial things; the rich life experi-ence and learned skills combined had enabled him to make manypractical accomplishments. Skills can be learned and improved, and atthe same time can also increase and enhance one’s knowledge andwisdom. Confucius admits frankly that he does not possess wisdom,but by using proper methods (skills) he can answer various questions.Knowledge and wisdom in turn enable one to be more skillful,because skills to be practical must be based on good knowledge, wisechoice, and wide learning.46 For Confucius, each individual has toexplore his or her own way of life and to find meaning in it. To lead ameaningful life, individuals must be not only engaged in moral culti-vation and virtues, but also able to solve day-to-day problems bycultivating abilities and skills. Through these abilities and skills lifedifficulties are overcome and complicated situations are dealt with, inwhich the Way is manifested and virtue cultivated. To Confucius, aperson follows the Way, not only because he or she has faith or isengaged in moral cultivation, but also because he or she is in need tofollow the right course of action that makes life secure and safe, whilea foolish person does the contrary.

Compared with knowledge, cultivating virtue is more important foranyone to acquire ability or skill.Among all virtues Confucius praises,the most important one is benevolence (ren), the practice of which hehas squarely placed on the shoulders of one’s own self: “the practiceof benevolence depends on oneself alone, and not on others.”47 Thereare many ways to practice benevolence, but the most effective one isto follow the two paths of the so-called “Golden Rule”: “Do notimpose on others what you yourself do not desire,”48 and “wishing toestablish his own character, also establishing the character of others,and wishing to be prominent himself, also helping others to be promi-nent.”49 In these two ways, Confucius recognizes a common methodwhich enables one to be benevolent:“The ability to take analogy whatis near at hand can be called the method of benevolence.”50

As the first grade of all skills or abilities, virtues are of a generalnature, laying the solid foundation for other categories of skills to bebuilt up and employed.Virtues are applicable to all aspects of life, andare needed throughout the whole process of living.They are necessaryfor winning respect in community, for leading a successful career, and


for establishing ethical relations with others, as Confucius confidentlysays that “It is only the benevolent person who is capable of liking ordisliking others.”51 In contrast, the second and third categories of skillsand abilities are of a specific nature, enabling their holders to com-plete particular tasks and to deal with particular difficulties. Althougha virtuous person ( junzi) is likely able to be competent in all his tasks,general abilities (virtues) cannot replace specific skills, and labor divi-sion requires each individual to be skilled in a limited number ofprofessions. It seems that both specific and general skills/abilities areequally important in Confucius’s discourse on the Way and virtue. Interms of their relation, Confucius does not suggest the one-way trafficof flowing from virtue to specific skills/abilities; rather he ascribes highvalues to specific skills and abilities which are necessary for anyone tobecome a virtuous person or a gentleman, junzi. For example, whenasked about benevolence, Confucius responds by pointing out theabilities in relation to the following five things: respectfulness, toler-ance, trustworthiness in words, quickness, and generosity, and assertsthat “whoever is capable of putting them into practice is certainly‘benevolent.’”52 A good number of passages in the Analects are aboutthe qualities of a gentleman which are in stark contrast with those ofa small man (xiao ren ). Many of these qualities are in fact theabilities or skills which are necessary for a Confucian ideal person; forexample, a gentleman is said to be “widely versed in culture butbrought back to essentials by the rites”;53 a gentleman values threethings most in the Way: “to stay clear of violence by putting on aserious countenance, to come close to being trusted by setting aproper expression on his face, and to avoid being boorish and unrea-sonable by speaking in proper tones.”54 Confucius highlights theimportance for a person of benevolence to have no worries, for aperson of wisdom never to be in two minds, and for a person ofcourage never to be in fear.All these qualities are exactly the abilitiesor skills essential for becoming an ideal person in a Confuciancontext.

Apart from these skills and abilities directly associated with virtue,other skills are required for dealing with other people or with one’sown self. In dealing with others, the rites (li) are the guidelines for agentleman to follow. Confucius does not recommend his studentsto be in company with every sort of people; rather, he asks them tochoose carefully the people they are to be associated with. How tokeep a distance from the unworthy, and how to establish friendshipwith the virtuous are not only an important part of the Way, a dem-onstration of one’s virtue, but also an art of life. Primary concern inConfucius about friends is given to their personality and moralvirtues. He insists that in order to benefit from friendship people

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carefully choose their companions, who must be morally good and bemore advanced in moral cultivation.The reason why Confucius highlyvalues the skills to “make friends with the most benevolent gentlemenin a state”55 is because this is the way by which they can benefitincluding gaining necessary skills from friendship. He goes evenfurther to define three kinds of people as beneficial, and another threeas harmful: “To make friends with the straight, the trustworthy inword and the well-informed is to benefit. To make friends with theingratiating in action, the pleasant in appearance and the plausible inspeech is to lose.”56

In accordance to his view of governing by moral force and trans-forming people by moral examples, Confucius focuses his attention onthe skill and ability about how to deal with oneself, particularly forthose who bear a wide range of ethical, educational, legal, and politi-cal responsibilities. In dealing with the self, Confucius emphasizesself-cultivation and takes the cultivating of the self not only as thepath to the Way and virtue and to a peaceful relation with others, butalso as the administrative skill to bring security and peace to thepeople and the state.Whether in dealing with others or with one’s self,the key is the exercising of what is right, because this is the onlyguarantee for one to reach the Way. This exercise can be of differentkinds, but all require endurance and painstaking efforts. For instance,for a virtuous person the only means by which he can reach the Wayis through mastering learning, in the same way as an artisan whomasters his trade by staying in his workshop. To illustrate the impor-tance of practicing a variety of skills for completing administrativetasks, Confucius compares the cultivation of political skills to thesharpening of tools for a craftsman. “A craftsman who wishes topractise his craft well must first sharpen his tools”; likewise, a virtuousperson who wishes to be capable of governing the world must skill-fully “seek the patronage of the most distinguished Counsellors,” and“make friends with the most benevolent gentlemen.”57 Skillfullydealing with others and with oneself requires a balanced attitude andmanner, for which the mean or the Middle Way is brought to the fore,as both going beyond and falling short are equally wrong.

Practical skills are also concerned with how to use language. TheWay is the meaning of practical life but this meaning is not alwaysreadily there for humans to speak out. In fact the right way of livingmust be ensured by speaking less than speaking more. There is astrong disdain toward speaking about the Way in Daoist texts; forexample, “One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does notknow.”58 A similar attitude is also shared by Confucius, who does notthink that the appreciation of the Way and virtue can be derived fromone’s manipulating words.59 Confucius describes himself in learning as


“quietly storing up knowledge,” and praises those who do not have abig mouth as virtuous, because “A person of benevolence loathes tospeak.”60

To fully understand why Confucius values silence and refrainingfrom amply talking, we must come again to his view on the Way andheaven. For Confucius, the Way or the law of heaven guides thenatural and human world but does not tell them what they should do.“What does heaven ever say? Yet there are the four seasons goinground and there are the hundred things coming into being.”61 Since hebelieves that humans must follow the Way, then it is natural for him torefrain from making speeches and to admonish his students againstbeing talkative. Confucius’s giving priority to silence rather thanspeaking also reflects his view of virtue. For him, virtue is more inaction and must be cultivated through acting rather than speaking.However beautiful, words before action would bring undesirableeffect; while speaking after action would prove effective. Therefore,Confucius sets it as one of the necessary qualities for a virtuousperson to be “quick in action but cautious in speech.” Considering thestrong effect of bad words, Confucius even tends to agree that “asaying can lead the state to ruin.”62

IV. Conclusion

The Way in the Analects is one of the most comprehensive concepts inConfucianism, and contains both the universal and the particulardimension. It is the interaction and interrelation between these twodimensions which make the moral world of Confucius both dynamicand sustainable. One of the contributions made by Confucius toChinese philosophy is his seamless translation of the Way into adynamic ethical concept in which the universal and the particular areinterrelated and mutually interpreted. In this article I have examinedhow Confucius constructs in the Analects, through the concept of theWay, a moral world that is sustained by “virtue” on the one hand andenriched by “practical skills” on the other. Through interpreting andreexamining Confucius’s discourse I have also argued that when asso-ciated with practical skills, the Way in a particular sense does notnegate its universal nature because particularization and individual-ization are characteristic of the universal Way, and that by means ofvirtue and moral effort an individual gains moral qualities that theWay itself embodies, while through practical skills an individual opensup his or her own way of life, leading a career that does not deviatefrom the norm and virtue. It is in the dynamic interaction betweenthe universal and the particular dimensions of the Way Confucius

40 xinzhong yao

successfully completes his reconstruction of the dynamic system, inwhich the Way, virtue, and practical skills are not only established asthree pillars for the moral universe but also are treated as three keyinteractive and interpenetrative elements of a multifaceted ethicaldiscourse as found in the Analects.

KING’S COLLEGE LONDONLondon, United Kingdom

Endnotes

An earlier version of this article was presented at the “International Forum of theRe-reading of the Analects,” October 21–24, 2010, and the author thanks the participantsfor their responses and comments. The author also wishes to thank the Editor, theManaging Editor, and the blind reviewer of the Journal of Chinese Philosophy for theirconstructive comments and detailed suggestions, however, due to time and space con-straints, I have largely focused on their major remarks.

1. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge andLondon:The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 62. He also notes that“There is one use of the term tao in the expression of ‘Tao of Heaven’, where it seemsto refer to Heaven’s way in the nonhuman universe as well, perhaps as to all thoseaspects of Heaven in history over which men exercise no control.” (62–63)

2. “Dao occurs some eighty times in the Analects, and is of central importance forinterpreting the thinking not only of Confucius, but all other early Chinese thinkers aswell.” (Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr. The Analects of Confucius—APhilosophical Translation [New York: Ballantine Books, 1998], 45)

3. The Analects, 5: 7, see D. C. Lau, trans., Confucius—The Analects (London: PenguinBooks, 1979), 76. In this article “Confucius” refers to the Master who is recorded asspeaking, teaching, and acting in The Analects and all the sayings and conversations inthe Analects are taken as those by Confucius and his immediate disciples. No differ-entiation will be made concerning possible dates of its books and chapters. Unlessotherwise stated, all quotations from the Analects in this article are modified by mefrom D. C. Lau’s translation with references to their book and chapter numbers.

4. The Analects, 16: 2.5. Zhang Dainian, Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy, translated and edited by

Edmund Ryden (New Haven and London: Yale University Press; Beijing: ForeignLanguages Press, 2002), 13.

6. The Daoist dao is, primarily, “the way in which the universe work[s]” (JosephNeedham, Science and Civilization in China, Volume 2: History of Scientific Thought[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956], 36). Early Daoist philosophers placean emphasis on its metaphysical aspect where the Way is primarily referred to as thelaw of the universe, or the origin of the world (gen ) (the root), to grasp which onemust give up at least some of personal needs, such as desiring and preferences, orpractical tools such as language.

7. Chung-ying Cheng, “On the Metaphysical Significance of Ti (Body-Embodiment) inChinese Philosophy: Benti (Origin-Substance) and Ti-Yong (Substance and Func-tion),” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29, no. 2 (2002): 149.

8. Chung-ying Cheng, New Dimensions of Confucianism and Neo-Confucian Philoso-phy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 18.

9. Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 13.

10. The Analects of Confucius, translated and annotated by Arthur Waley (New York:Vintage Books, 1938), 110, Note 4.


11. Ibid., 148.12. The Analects, 5: 13.13. Within the Confucian tradition the interpretations of the fact that Confucius’s

teaching on the Way was rarely heard by his disciples were already divided, asdemonstrated in the distinction between the esoteric interpretation by Cheng Hao(1032–1085) and the epistemological interpretation by Cheng Yi (1033–1107). SeeChristian Jochim’s review of Confucius and the Analects: New Essays (ed. Bryan W.Van Norden), in China Review International 9, no. 2 (2002): 554.

14. “The Way, then, is a highly emotive term and comes very close to the term ‘Truth’ asfound in philosophical and religious writings in the West.” (Lau, Confucius—TheAnalects, 11)

15. Lao Tzu—Tao Te Ching, translated with an introduction by D. C. Lau (London:Penguin Books, 1963), 5.

16. Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton Univer-sity Press, 1963), 98.

17. Ibid., 99.18. The Analects, 1: 11, 1: 12, 5: 16, and 11: 20.19. Ibid., 16: 11.20. Ibid., 4: 8.21. In the Analects, we can read the expression of small ways (xiao dao ). However,

here the “small” is not contrasted with the great Way in a moral sense; rather it refersto “practical arts” that have something worthwhile (19: 4).

22. Ibid., 1: 14, 3: 24, 19: 19.23. A similar meaning is also expressed in Chapter 33 of the Doctrine of the Mean, Chan,

1963, 112–113.24. The Analects, 3: 16.25. There is no exact phrase of jin zhi dao for the way of the present in the

Analects. However, the frequent uses by Confucius of jin zhi (today’s) learning(14: 24), politicians (13: 20), and filial piety (2: 7) demonstrate a sharp contrasthe perceives between the way of the ancients and the way of his contemporaryfellowmen.

26. Ibid., 19: 19.27. Ibid., 17: 4.28. Ibid., 19: 2.29. Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 98. Zhu Xi (1120–1200), the great

representative of Neo-Confucianism, comments on this sentence that it is intended toillustrate that the root of the Way is originally from Heaven and it is therefore notsubject to change (Zhu Xi, Sishu Zhangju Jizhu [Beijing: ZhonghuaShuju, 1983], 17).

30. The Analects, 15: 29.31. Edward Slingerland. “Virtue Ethics, the Analects, and the Problem of Commensura-

bility,” Journal of Religious Ethics 29, no. 1 (2001): 100. Slingerland also points out thataccording to Maclntyre a virtue is “an acquired human quality the possession andexercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal topractices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any suchgoods.” (Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue [Notre Dame: University of Notre DamePress, 1981], 178)

32. The Analects, 17: 13, see Lau, Confucius—The Analects, 145.33. Mencius, 7B: 37, see Mencius, translated with an introduction and notes by D. C. Lau

(London: Penguin Books, 1970), 203.34. The intellectual approach by the Greek philosophers can be seen from Aristotle’s

understandings of the universal and the individual, or by his separation of intellectualvirtue from practical virtue: “Practical virtue brings only a secondary kind of happi-ness; the supreme happiness is in the exercise of reason” (Bertrand Russell, History ofWestern Philosophy [London: Routledge, 1961], 176, 192). For Daoist philosophers,the two levels of the Way, the constant and the ordinary, are totally separable andincompatible: “The Way that can be spoken of is not the constant way; the name thatcan be named is not the constant name.” (Lao Tzu––Tao Te Ching, 5).

42 xinzhong yao

35. The Analects, 14: 36.36. Ibid., 1: 2.37. It is recorded that “Not cultivating virtue” (de zhi bu xiu ) is one of Con-

fucius’s four worries (ibid., 7: 3).38. The Analects, 14: 35. See also Yao Xinzhong, “The Confucian Self and Experiential

Spirituality,” Dao—A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 7, no. 4 (2008): 398.39. Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, compiled by Wm. Theodore de Bary and

Irene Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 336.40. Chung-ying Cheng argues that from the onto-generative perspective of benti-

hermeneutics, a circular movement can be constructed as such: heaven as source →knowing the way by learning → having virtues by reflection → knowing heaven byunderstanding. This is a different road map in relating the Way, virtue, and heaven,which highlights the onto-generative status of the Way and virtue, and is aimed tobring out the Way of heaven out of the way of humans.

41. The Analects, 14: 38.42. Ibid., 14: 28.43. Ibid., 16: 9.44. Ibid., 17: 2.45. Ibid., 14: 30.46. Xinzhong Yao,“From ‘What Is Below’ to ‘What Is Above’:A Confucian Discourse on

Wisdom,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33, no. 3 (2006): 351.47. The Analects, 12: 1.48. Ibid., 12: 2.49. Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 31.50. The Analects, 6: 30.51. Ibid., 4: 3.52. Ibid., 17: 6.53. Ibid., 6: 27.54. Ibid., 8: 4.55. Ibid., 15: 10.56. Ibid., 16: 4.57. Ibid., 15: 10.58. Lau Tzu—Tao Te Ching, translated with an introduction by D. C. Lau (London:

Penguin Books, 1963), 63.59. Although both praise silence and disregard speech, difference between Confucius and

Laozi should not be overlooked. Neo-Daoists such as Wang Bi (226–249) attemptedto blur the line and regarded Confucius as a more sublime sage than Laozi, becauseConfucius was said to have transmitted wisdom without writing anything and devotedhis life to “remembering silently” (Liu I-ching, Shih-shuo Hsin-yu: A New Account ofTales of the World, trans. Richard B. Mather [Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress, 1976], 96). This is a misinterpretation of Confucius. Confucius praised silence ina moral sense and emphasized that inner cultivation is more important than seekingexternal reputation, while for Laozi, silence is the nature of Dao that cannot bespoken of.

60. The Analects, 12: 3.61. Ibid., 17: 19.62. Ibid., 13: 15.


the way, virtue, and practical skills in the analects

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