the war of the moles: dig or die

8/8/2019 THE WAR OF THE MOLES: DIG OR DIE

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THE WAR OF THE MOLES: DIG OR DIE

The shovel is brother to the gun.

Carl Sandburg, American Poet and Spanish-American Warveteran

Soldiers hate to dig. Soldiers have always hated to dig. No doubtwhen the Roman Legions broke off their march early for the day todig and erect a defensive stockade, the legionnaires bitched aboutthat digging. But the Romans digging in every night in theircastra

marching camps played a great part in their kicking butt across acontinent or too.

The advantages of fortified marching-camps were substantial.Camps could be situated on the most suitable ground: i.e.preferably level, dry, clear of trees and stones and close tosources of drinkable water, forageable crops and good grazingfor horses and pack-animals. Properly patrolled, fortified campsmade surprise attacks impossible and successful attacks rare -in fact, no case is recorded in the ancient literature of a Roman

marching-camp being successfully stormed. The securityafforded by fortified camps permitted soldiers to sleep soundly,while animals, baggage and supplies were safely corraledwithin its precinct. If the army engaged an enemy near amarching-camp, a small garrison of a few hundred men wouldsuffice to defend the camp and its contents. In case of defeat,fleeing soldiers could take refuge in their marching-camp. Aftertheir disaster on the battlefield of Cannae (216 BC), some17,000 Roman troops (out of a total deployment of over 80,000)

escaped death or capture by fleeing to the two marching-campsthat the army had established nearby, according to Livy.

In more modern times, as our pal Burt Gummer says, dirt is the bestbullet stopper there is. And not just bullets. The trend in wars pasthas always been that shrapnel--from grenades, mortars, artillery,bombs, etc.--has inflicted many more casualties than small arms fire.


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To the enemies who found themselves at the mercy of massedWestern firepower, the keep up the fight it became Dig or Die.

Consider the following from a U.S. Army study. This represents aplatoon of 33 men spread throughout an area 250 by 50 meters. Anartillery battery firing 30 rounds at the area will probably cause thefollowing casualties under the conditions shown. By medium artillery,we can assume something in the range of the NATO 105-mm or theformer ComBloc 122-mm. PD means Point Detonating, i.e. the shellsexplode when they hit the ground. VT means Variable Time, i.e.shells set for airbursts overhead.


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Although light forces are supposed to be able to dig and dig fast, withjust an E-tool it is an exhausting endeavor. Thats with the old schoolwooden-handled combination pick and shovel E-tool. Digging inanything but soft loam with the modern U.S. tri-fold shovel is anexercise in futility. Then again, U.S. forces havent faced any realheavy incoming artillery from the enemy since the Vietnam War.Iraqis and Taliban guerillas may lob some mortars or rockets at anFOB, but in such cases heavy engineering equipment such asbackhoes and dozers have been available to do the real work.

In the case of most opponentsJapan, Iraq, North Korea,

Afghanistan, Vietnam, even Germany in Italy and the coast ofFrancetheir forces have had, sometimes quite literally, years inwhich to dig elaborate fortifications, bunkers, pillboxes, bombproofs,fighting positions, tunnels, trenches, etc. With years to prepare, evenguerilla forces can create positions virtually impervious to all but thelargest and most accurate heavy weapons. Examples include suchdiverse places as Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the tunnels of Cu Chi inVietnam, and the Zhawar Kili cave complex in Afghanistan.


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Just some of the Japanese fortifications faced by United StatesMarines on Iwo Jima and Okinawa.


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In WWII, at places like Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the Japanese hadmonths if not years, as well as heavy equipment and forced labor, tofortify these islands. The larger of these fortifications provedimpenetrable to even 1,000-pound aircraft bombs and 2,000-pound16-inch battleship shells. When the fighting in Korea stale-mated, theNorth Koreans and Red Chinese burrowed into the mountains likemoles to survive U.N. artillery and air strikes. The Vietnamese hadbeen digging and tunneling for literally decades, and in the case ofplaces like Cu Chi, may have even had tunnels directly under U.S.bases.

VIETNAM

It came as a big surprise to most when Colonel David Hackworth didan in-depth on-the-ground study of American troops in Vietnam calledthe Vietnam Primer. Rather than jungle fighting or guerilla warfare, hebegan with the age-old tactics of how to reduce an enemy fortress asthe most important item to be addressed.

Though it may sound like a contradiction to speak first of thetactics of engaging fortifications in a war where the enemy ofthe United States is a hit-and-run guerrilla, seeking more at thepresent time to avoid open battle than to give itexcept when heimagines that the terms are more than moderately favorable tohis side, a moment's reflection will sustain the logic of theapproach.

His fortified areas almost invariably present the greatestdifficulty to U.S. tactical forces, and it is when we voluntarilyengage them that our loss rates are most immoderate. At noother technique is he more skilled than in the deceptivecamouflaging of his fortified base camps and semi-fortified

villages. There, even nature is made to work in his favor; trees,shrubs, and earth itself are reshaped to conceal bunkerlocations and trench lines. Many of these locations are fundtemporarily abandoned, thus presenting only the problem ofhow to wreck them beyond possibility of further use.


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The VC, when trapped by superior infantry forces, either slippedaway or used simple subterranean hidey holes which they coulddisappear into as U.S. troops made their sweeps through the areawithout finding them. When darkness came, they would slip out ofthese holes and disappear from the battle zone.


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At the other end of the spectrum, they had elaborate fortifications andfighting positions in and around their base areas, and these positionswere hell itself for American infantry to root out without receivingheavy fire and incurring casualties.

U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence noted of such bunkers:

+ Bunkers are constructed from locally available materials.+Positions are interconnecting and mutually supporting.+ Firing apertures are small, located close to the ground, andextremely hard to see.+ Fire lanes are cleared of brush and growth up to 18 incheshigh and are difficult to detect.

+ In some areasthe fortifications are directional in nature.+ Camouflage is exceptional; in most instances, bunkers cannotbe detected until the unit is fired upon.+ Bunkers are built with a very low silhouette that blends intothe natural growth of the area.+ Trench lines are constructed in depth; tunnels connect thesetrench lines and provide safe and easy access to the numerousbunkers and fortifications.

Then there were the tunnels, such as those found at Cu Chi


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AFGHANISTAN

Knowing their home terrain like the back of their hands and havingfought bitter tribal wars between themselves when not fightinginvaders, the Afghans have been building one type of fortress oranother for literally centuries. The newer ones have deep, artilleryand bombproof shelters with quick access to these bombproofs viacommunications trenches; redundancy is built into the positions incase of destruction of one. Two-man rifle pits are 2x3 meters, with upto 1.5 meters of overhead cover.

In the mountains, firing positions for anti aircraft weapons werecircular and had no overhead cover so that they could fire in a 360-degree circle on either air or ground targets. When strafed orattacked by helicopter gunships, the personnel disappeared into deepslit trenches or shelters resembling vertical mine shafts. Stone andsometimes concrete reinforced these defensive works andcommunications trenches, often covered, connected the positions.


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Natural features of the mountains, such as caves, crevices, andravines were incorporated into their shelters.

In towns and villages, firing positions were built into or behind adobewalls as much as two meters thick, and reinforced with sandbagswhere needed. The Mujahedeen burrowed holes in the walls so thatthey could move from building to building without being exposed tofire. In the Green Zones, irrigation ditches were sometimes coveredover to provide shelters and invisible egress routes.

Even with good fortifications, the Mujahedeen sometimes conduct alight forces mobile defense. Large numbers of positions, manyunoccupied, and redundancy is important to the style of defenseutilized by the Mujahedeen; an aggressive maneuver defense taking

advantage of their interior lines, covered routes, and intimateknowledge of the land. Units were kept relatively small, able to launchquick, minor, distracting local counter-attacks and then disappear intothe next set of fortifications. A reserve would normally be located indeep fortifications near a central location for larger, more crucialcounter-attacks.


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There is not much difference between Japanese WWIImachine gun positions and the general Afghani AA gun position.The entrance to the nearby bombproof shelter can be seen in the

upper right of the bottom picture.

When it came to air power, although modern American aircraft,targeting-systems, and weapons are much advanced from the Sovietplanes of the 1980s, the fighting in Afghanistan showed yet again, asin Serbia, that air power alone is no panacea.

Operation Anaconda: Moreover, enemy targets often were sowell protected by the surrounding mountains and ridges that
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c1/Jamiat_e-Islami_in_Shultan_Valley_1987_with_Dashaka.jpg


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hitting them with strikes was difficult. Exact hits were oftennecessary, and even precision JDAMs sometimes were notable to achieve this accuracy. Even when exact hits wereachieved, only a single small targetperhaps two or threeenemy fighters manning a heavy machine gunwas normallydestroyed. Hundreds of enemy fighters were deployed in themountains and ridges, thus creating a very large number ofsmall targets, each of which had to be attacked individually. Afurther complication was that enemy fighters often wouldscramble for the protection of caves when they sensed animpending air attack, only to re-emerge after the ordnance hadbeen delivered. The process of rooting them out by air strikesthus was slow, frustrating, and time-consuming. Several daysof intense air bombardment were needed before enemy fires

began abating noticeably[emphasis added].

Fighting in the Panjwayi Valley in 2006 showed how the Talibanattempted to use fortifications to shelter from air and artillery strikeswhile they tried to hold the ground in a conventional defense:

The insurgents prepared to defend the valley like aconventional army. They stockpiled weapons, mined roads andfootpaths, laid ambushes, and set up concealed defensivepositions. Many took cover in the valleys numerous small grapehouses, which had sun-dried mud walls that were two to threefeet thick and as hard as concrete. These buildings had slits inthe walls, which made them natural bunkers. Tall marijuanaplants, grape orchards, and trees provided cover. Insurgentsmoved unobserved using the valleys many irrigation canals, aswell as a network of tunnels. They set up machinegun andover-watch positions on hills and mountaintopsTheinsurgents withdrew only after several days of heavy air and

artillery bombardment. They did so in a disciplined fashion,taking many of their dead and wounded with themTheinsurgents quickly infiltrated back in, re-established control overthe population, and launched a devastating campaign of smallambushes, suicide bombings, and IED attacks.

Insurgents occasionally fought through repeated airstrikes.


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During a battle in Shewan village of Farah province in 2007,insurgents ensconced in a set of fortified compounds kept firingthrough repeated bombings. They did so again during anotherbattle in the same village in 2008. Insurgents frequently tookcover from airstrikes by hiding in tunnels, bunkers, behindrocks, or inside fortified compounds. It was not uncommon forinsurgents to retreat into bunkers during airstrikes, thenreemerge and continue fighting.

Make no mistake. Air superiority has always been a must since theFirst World War. Air strikes and CAS provide American troops withunbelievable firepower which they can use at any time and in anyplace. With air cover, conventional military units, such as tanks,

supply columns, and even anti-aircraft gun and missile positions, aretoast. Guerillas have little to no chance to fight back at moderncombat aircraft (with the exception of attacking them on the ground);they often suffer prohibitive casualties from the air and the survivorsare forced to flee and disperse just to survive at all. In Vietnam, ArcLight strikes by large numbers of B-52 dropping thousand-poundbombs from 30,000 feet, unseen and unheard, wiped out entireinfantry units and entire base tunnel complexes. PGMs (PrecisionGuided Munitions) can now thread the needle to hit small, hardtargets with surgical accuracy.

Even with PGMs, you still have to find em to fix em. Less thanhalf of the Taliban fighting positions used in Operation


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Anaconda were found by intensive aerial and satellite hightechnology search equipment.

The new Thermobolic Mother of all Bombs type of weapons nowoffer yet another powerful weapon in the aerial arsenal that hasproven very effective at killing opponents within caves and bunkers,in both American and Russian use in Afghanistan and Chechnya.But, as with all weaponry, combat evolves as one side or the otherdevelops tactics to negate the other sides advantage. Ziz-zagconstruction of tunnels and trenches to isolate blast andfragmentation has been an accepted practice since WWII. The VCbuilt water-filled sumps into their tunnels to seal out gas, deviceswhich would also help negate some of the effects of thermobolicblast. There has already been evidence of the use of blast doors by

some insurgents as well.

American air power is indeed an awesome thing that gives our forcesa seemingly omnipotent weapon. No one can match it, and it canstrike pretty much at will. But, in and of itself, it still cannot flat-out wina war single-handedly. Despite the firepower, fear, destruction andcasualties, in the end it still eventually comes down to boots on theground.

During Operation Anaconda, Objective Ginger proved to be a toughnut to crack:

in spite of over a week of sustained heavy bombing, alQaeda positions on [Objective] Ginger survived to fire uponU.S. infantrywhen the latter finally reached and overran theobjective [after 10 days of hard ground fighting]. One dug-in alQaeda command post was found surrounded by no fewer thanfive JDAM craters, yet its garrison survived and resisteduntil they were overrun by U.S. infantry.

You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize itand wipe it clean of lifebut if you desire to defend it, to protect it, and keepit for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Romanlegions did, by putting your young men into the mud.


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T.R. Fehrenbach

the war of the moles: dig or die

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