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JacobSegal2014ISSN:18325203

FoucaultStudies,No.18,pp.154172,October2014ARTICLEMichelFoucaultandMichaelOakeshott:TheVirtuosityofIndividualityJacobSegal,KingsboroughCommunityCollegeoftheCityUniversityofNewYork

ABSTRACT:Inthispaper,IreinterpretMichaelOakeshottsideaofaliberalselfthroughtheconceptual frameworkofFoucaults theoryof theaestheticsof the self. Oakeshottbelievesthatagentscancreatethemselvesasastyleoradistinctiveshape. Thisstyleisavirtuosity,anartisticachievementthatisalsoanexcellenceinitself.OakeshottsliberalversionoftheaestheticsoftheselfisanewwaytothinkaboutwhatFoucaultsargumentmightmean.Oakeshottstheoryisaninternalchallengetoliberalisminsofarasliberalismispurportedlyatheoryofindividualityandtheunalienableworthofeachperson;butforOakeshott,thisindividualitypertainstotheagentgainingadistinctivestyle,sustainingdistinctness,notachieving distinction.Oakeshottdrawsour attention tohowdistinctness isunderminedby theforcesofconformityandnormalityinexistingliberalsociety.Ialsoarguethatthepurportedly radical social policy of the basic income, which, while in tension with parts ofOakeshottstheory,providesallcitizenstheopportunitytoenjoyhisparticularideaoftheself.Keywords:Oakeshott,Foucault,Individuality,BasicIncome,liberalismIn thispaper, I reinterpretMichaelOakeshotts ideaofa liberal self through theconceptualframeworkofFoucaults theoryof theaestheticsof theself.1 Oakeshottbelieves thatagentscancreatethemselvesasastyleoradistinctiveshape.Thisstyleisavirtuosity,anartisticachievementthatisalsoanexcellenceinitself. Idemonstratehowthisselfenjoysitsfreedomasanend in itself,a firstordergoodand that this freedom isanethicalpractice,bothabouttheselfandaboutthewayinwhichtheselftreatsothers.

Myprojecthastwointerrelatedaims.First,OakeshottsliberalversionoftheaestheticsoftheselfisanewwaytothinkaboutwhatFoucaultsargumentmightmean. Heprovidesdetailstoaconceptoftenleftvagueinpoststructuralism.Oakeshottdescribesthematerialtheselfhastoenactitselfasastyle ina liberalpoliticalorder. Oakeshottdescribeshowtheselfenacts itself,asastyle, through themoralmomentofactivityandhow thisselfemerged in 1AnumberofcommentatorshaveconnectedOakeshottwiththeliberaltradition.Forexample,seeWendellJohnJr.,MichaelOakeshottasLiberalTheorist,CanadianJournalofPoliticalScience,Vol.18,No.4(December1985),773787,andPaulFranco,MichaelOakeshottAsLiberalTheorist,PoliticalTheory,Vol.18,No.3(August1990),411436.

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modernEuropeanhistory. Second,Oakeshotts theory isan internalchallenge to liberalisminsofarasliberalismispurportedlyatheoryofindividualityandtheunalienableworthofeachperson;butforOakeshott,this individualitypertains totheagentgainingadistinctivestyle,sustainingdistinctness,notachievingdistinction.Oakeshottdrawsourattention tohowdistinctnessisunderminedbytheforcesofconformityandnormalityinexistingliberalsociety. Iargue thatOakeshotts liberal critiqueof liberalism reveals theambiguousplaceofcertain institutionsandmarket relations in liberal theory. Ialsoargue that thepurportedlyradicalsocialpolicyofthebasic income,which,while intensionwithpartsofOakeshottstheory,providesallcitizenstheopportunitytoenjoyhisparticularideaoftheself

Like Foucault, Oakeshott identifies a normalized self in the modern order. Thisshows that power is productive, not merely repressive, and that this power has manysourcesbeyondthestate.Thisnormalizationcompromisesdistinctness,aconcernthatweseeinthepoststructuralistwriterBonnieHoniginapassageonHannahArendt.

Theatonalpassionfordistinction,whichsomovedArendtstheoreticalaccount,mayalsobereadasastruggleforindividuation,foremergence,asadistinctself:inArendtstermsawhoratherthanawhat,aselfpossessednotoffame,persee,butofindividuality,aselfthatisneverexhaustedbythesociological,psychological,andjuridicalcategoriesthatseektofixit.2

Foucaultspeaksofresistancebytheselftotheforcesthatcreateit.WhileOakeshottdoesnotuse this language specifically,hedoesdescribeahistoricalandprotean self that sustainsitselfdespiteconstantchanges.Wefindinhisworkanagonicself,inwhichdifferentdispositionsaboutexperiencestruggle.Thisstruggleisbothpublicandprivatebecausehearguesthateveryactionaimingatanendisconditionedbymoralconsiderationsthatarepublic.Oakeshottchallengesthetraditionalpublic/privatedistinctionofliberalism.Thiselementoftheselfisalwayspotentiallysubjecttodebate.

ThemoralmomentoftheselfisalsoessentialtoOakeshottsunderstandingofitselfasavirtuosity.Themoralmomentofactionispresentoriented,notconcernedwiththefuture.Moral considerations are an element in Oakeshotts long engagement with finding selfsufficientexperienceandactivities,whicharevaluedforthemselves.Ishowhowtheseselfsufficientexperiencesare thematerial throughwhichagentsconstitute themselvesasastyleandavirtuosity.Tobesure,Oakeshottunderstandsthatbothselfsufficientandinstrumentalactivities (and the frustrationsof thoseendsorientedacts)have theirplace inahuman life.My argument is thatOakeshott identifies selfsufficiencydeveloped as a styleas amoremeaningfulandmoreindividuatingexperience.

Idevelopthisargumentthroughthefollowingsections. Ifirstbrieflyexplorethedebateabout the correct ideological label forOakeshottand theplaceofmyargument in thisdebate.IthendiscussOakeshottsconcernwithnormalizationanditsparallelswithFoucaultianthought.WeseehereOakeshottsearlycriticismofwhatcanbecalledmainstreambourgeoisethics.Third,IdevelopOakeshottsconceptofmoralityandactionasamoralpractice. 2BonnieHonig,PoliticalTheoryandtheDisplacementofPolitics(Cornell:CornellUniversityPress,1993),159.

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WealsoseeherehowOakeshottcallsintoquestiontheliberaldistinctionbetweenpublicandprivate.Fourth,IshowhowOakeshottunderstandsactionasavirtuosityandastyle.Finally,Iargue that thebasic incomevindicatesOakeshottsconceptof individuality,even if itgoesbeyondthestrictlimitsofOakeshottstheory.

OakeshottsLiberalismLabelingOakeshott a liberal is controversial. Nonetheless, the current scholarly consensusdoes identifyhimwith that tradition, albeitwith somedissent. In thispaper, I follow thescholarlyconsensusplacingOakeshottwithintheliberaltradition.Oakeshotthimselfavoidedideologicallabelsandwasexplicitlycriticalofaspectsofliberalism.Earlierinhiscareer,withthe publication of his collected essays, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essay, in 1955,Oakeshottwasseenasaconservative traditionalistandacriticof liberalrationalism. Rationalism inPoliticsdoessuggest liberal themes inhisdefenseofmarketsassystems fordispersingpower.3

Oakeshottsmajor theoreticalstatement,OnHumanConduct, is thebestexpressionofhisliberalism.CentraltothisworkisOakeshottsdistinctionbetweentwoformsofthestate:an illiberalenterprisestate thathasapurposesuchasengenderinggoodnessoreconomicgrowth,andaliberalcivilassociation,anoninstrumentalassociationwhereinthelawregulatesthemannerofactingbutneverdescribesspecificgoalstoindividuals. Oakeshottreplicatesthebasicliberalframeworkofstateindifferencetothegoalsofindividuals,onlycreatingtheconditionsunderwhichindividualsareabletopursetheirgoals.Oakeshottspeaksfavorablyoftheumpireconceptofthestate,famouslyarticulatedbyLockeintheSecondTreatiseofGovernment.4

OakeshottstheorycanbeseenasclosetotheclassicalmarketbasedliberalismofaF.A.Hayek.5OakeshottsideaofthelawissimilartotheHayekscentralnotionoftheruleoflawasnoninstrumentallaw.Oakeshotthasbeenlinkedtotheconservativecritiqueofsocialdemocraticusesof thestate forcollectiveends. He isaceaselesscriticofwhathecalls thestateasamanagerialassociation,thatis,thestatethatdirectsindividualstospecificgoals,suchastheexploitationofnaturetosatisfyhumanneeds,ortheforcibleimpositionofafairdistributionofresources,orprovisionofacommunalwarmththatsheltersindividualsfromlifesdifficulties.

Partof thedifficultyof identifyingOakeshott ideologically is theambiguityof the labelsthemselves.AnthonyGamblearguesthatOakeshottisaconservativewhenconservatismisdefinedasan ideologythatsupportsnineteenthcenturyEnglishtraditions,resistschange,and seeks thatwhichhas intrinsicworth.6Gamble recognizes the liberal, indeed libertarianaspects ofOnHuman Conduct and argues thatOakeshott defends the basic liberal idea of 3SeeMichaelOakeshott,ThePoliticalEconomyofFreedom,inRationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays(Indianapolis,Indiana:LibertyFund,1991),284406,4MichaelOakeshott,ThePoliticsofFaithandthePoliticsofSkepticism(Yale:YaleUniversityPress,1995),5556.5F.AHayek,TheConstitutionofLiberty(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1978).6AndrewGamble,OakeshottsIdeologicalPolitics:Conservativeor liberal inEfraimPodoksik(ed.),TheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012),153176.


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freedomtochoosebetweenavarietyofbeliefs,valuesandactivities to inventandreinventoneselfwithin the context of laws that forbid thedirection of individuals toward specificgoals.7Gambleargues,however,thattheseliberalideasareembeddedinalargerconservativeframework.ForOakeshott,politicsisaconservativeenterprisethatprotectsthebasicEnglishtraditionsinwhichindividualspursuedtheirownendswhilesubscribingtoproperlyformulatedlaw. ForGamble,Oakeshottrejectsanumberofaspectsofdoctrinalliberalism,suchasthefocusonhumanrights,laissezfaireeconomicsandmassdemocracy.8

Inhis important essay in 1985, JeremyRayner rejects the associationmade betweenOakeshottandU.Sconservatism.9 Thisconservatismisunderstoodintermsofthefoundingofpolitical society innatural rightandan equationof liberalpoliticsand free enterprise.Raynernotesthat,forOakeshott,lawisnotauthoritativebecauseofanextrahumanvaluelikenaturalright,butbecausehumanscometoacceptthelawasauthoritative.Rayneralsoarguesthatcivilassociation isnoninstrumentalassociation,andsonotorganized tolimitgovernmentortoreproduceacapitalistorder.HewritesthatOakeshott

deniedthatapreferenceforcivilassociationhasanythingtodowithapreferenceforalimitedornoninterventioniststyleofgovernment.Suchconsiderationsaresimplyirrelevanttoanydistinctionbetween civilandpurposiveassociation. Hedenied that civilassociationhasanynecessaryconnectionwithcapitalismwhich,ifitreferstoanything,denotesanarrangementforthesatisfactionofneeds.10

ItiseasytofalselyconflateOakeshottwithwriterslikeHayekandMiltonFriedmaninsofarasOakeshottsworkappearstobedirectedagainstgovernmentintervention.RaynerinsiststhatOakeshottsconceptionofthestateiswithoutends,noninstrumentalandsocannotaimatthepromotionofaneconomicsystem.Hearguesthatfreedomandprosperitymightresultasabyproductofthesystemofnoninstrumentallawbutisnotitsgoalandcannotbejustifiedintheseterms.11

Myinterpretationbuildsontheseinsights.GambleshowshowOakeshottsthoughtisconnectedtoatraditionalistattachmentoftheintrinsicworthofexistingsocialrelationsmarriedtoamoreliberalviewoftheselfcreationoftheindividual.Ishowthatselfcreationisaformofintrinsicworth.RaynercorrectlynotesthatOakeshottshistoricismentailsarejectionofthetranscendentalfoundationofpolitics.Thishistoricismneedstobeextendedintheanalysisof theself itself. HenoteshowOakeshottseparates the justificationofcivilassociationfromcapitalism.IshowthatOakeshottcriticizesmarketrelationsinsofarastheyengenderthevalueofinstrumentality.

7Ibid.,170.8Ibid.,172173.9 JeremyRayner, TheLegend ofOakeshottsConservatism: SkepticalPhilosophy andLimitedPolitics,CanadianJournalofPoliticalScience,vol.18,no.2(June1985),313338.10Ibid.,315.11Ibid.,335.


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OakeshottandNormalizationThesedebatesaboutOakeshottspoliticshavenotpaidsufficientattentiontoOakeshottscriticismsofthenormsandinstitutionsofreallyexistingliberalism. ForOakeshott,thevaluesofmarketsociety,thepowerofthestate,andsocialwelfareinstitutionsallgenerateformsofbeingthatcompromisedistinctness.

Foucaulthas famouslychallengedhow liberals limit thediscussionof theproblemofpowertotheexcessesofthestate.Foucaultfindspowerinhowagencyinmodernsocietyisproduced througha training innormalorcorrectbehavior throughavarietyofstateandnonstatedisciplinessuchashospitals,schoolsandprisons.12Thistrainingaimsattheinternalizationofthenormssothatindividualsguidetheirownconductbybeinghealthyorhardworkingorgood consumers. In laterwork,Foucault shiftedhis focus tobiopower,understoodnotasthetrainingofindividualacts,butafocusonthemanipulationoflifeprocessesandcapacitiesofthepopulation:propagation,birthsandmortality,the levelsofhealth, lifeexpectancyandlongevity.13

Some have noted the theme of normalization in Oakeshotts work. Suvi SoininenwritesthatOakeshottshareswithFoucaultanotionofindividualsasbeingcreatedbypower.14ShewritesthatthereisaFoucaultianflavortoOakeshottsthinkingthatthemoreagivenactivityoccupieshuman life, themorepeople internalize its rules,which thenbecomesapartofconductassuch.15

ForOakeshott,theproblemofnormalizationislinkedtothetemporalorientationofactivity.16 Thevalueof instrumental activity ismore liable tobedefinedby confining socialmeanings.Weseekachievementsthatgettheapprovalofothers.Oakeshottbelievesthatthepresentorselfsufficientmomentofactivitybelongstotheselfandismoredistinctorindividuated.

Inayouthfulessay,ReligionandtheWorld,Oakeshottdescribesthispotentialconformityintermsofanorientationtoexperiencehecallsworldliness,inwhichactionisvaluableinsofarasitcontributestotheexternalsocialworld.Theworldlyselffindsworthprimarilyinworkandtheresultsofgettingthingsdone.Theworldlyselfwantstomakeacontribution to thestabilityof thepresentorder.Thiscontribution requiresaconcern for thefuture,anorientationtowhatisachieved. Thisbeliefimplieswhatmaybedescribedasanexternalstandardofvaluewhatisprizedissuccess,meaningtheachievementofsomeex

12MichelFoucault,DisciplineandPunish(NewYork:RandomHouse,1975).13MichelFoucault,HistoryofSexuality:AnIntroduction(NewYork:VintageBooks,1990),139.14SuviSoininen,FromaNecessaryEviltoanArtofContingency:MichaelOakeshottsConceptionofPoliticalActivity(Exeter:AcademicImprint,2005),8687.15Ibid.,94.16Foradiscussionof temporality inOakeshottsworkseeCampbellCorey,MichaelOakeshott:OnReligion,Aesthetics, andPolitics (Columbia,Missouri:UniversityofMissouri, 2006);MichaelOakeshott:OnReligion,Aesthetics,andPolitics(Columbia,Missouri:UniversityofMissouriPress2006);AndrewSullivan,IntimationsPursued:TheVoiceofPractice in theConversationofMichaelOakeshott (Exeter:Academic Imprint,2008);andDavidMapel,CivilAssociationandtheIdeaofContingency,PoliticalTheory,vol.18,no3(August1990),392410.


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ternalresult.17 Oakeshottemploysa famousexistentialdescriptionofexistence. HewritesthatworldlinesspromisesanillusiveimmortalitythatmakeshumanityaSisyphusanditslifeapointlesstrundlingofauselessstone. For,aslikeasnot,ifwesetvalueuponexternalachievement alone,deathordiseasewill robusofourharvest, andwe shallhave lived invain.18

Inhiscritiqueofafutureorientation,Oakeshottrejectsthecentraltemporalbourgeoisnormoftheindefiniteprogressofsociety. Progressorthecontinuousimprovementofexternalcircumstancescannotbethesourceoflifesinceitisapracticeofdeath,thedeathofwhatismostvaluable,ourselvesinthehereandnow.

Oakeshott links this instrumental thinking with conformist bourgeois, futureorientatedvirtues. Thesevirtues arenormalizing since they require a selfmanipulation inordertoachievegeneralizedexpectations. Oakeshottcriticizesthemiddleclassvaluesofcareerandreputationinwhichthevividnessofpresentexperienceissubordinatedtothefuture:[F]orthesakeofanhypotheticaloldman,whomaybearhisnamethirtyyearshence,theyoungmanhoardshisenergiesandrestrainshisactivities.19A reputation issomethingrecognizedasvaluablebythecommunityandsoactivitiesarerestrainedinordertocreateanimpressiononothers. Individualsmoldordiscipline themselves inorder to fita collectiveideaofhowtolive.Oakeshottcondemnsthevirtueofprudencebecauseitrobsthepresentofmeaningandteachesthatweoughtto liveaheadofourselves.20 Theprudentialpersonfocuses on future considerations. This person is careful, likely to avoid the eccentric.Oakeshottwarns against an impulse toward averageness that creates apredicable self. Hearguesthatthatmodernlifeissaturatedwiththemiddleclasspassionforsafety,regularity,andpossession.21Thesethreenotions,socentraltobourgeoisconcerns,allspeaktoanormalizingforce.Safetyandregularityareaversetotheunusualandtheabnormal.Differencemustbesuppressedasunsafe.

In Religion and theWorldOakeshotts focus is on the conformity engendered bybourgeoisnorms.InOnHumanConduct,hediscussesconformityasafunctionofstatepowerandsubpoliticalinstitutions.OakeshottsargumentsaresimilartoFoucaultsargumentsconcerning individuals andhow they arenormalized, that is, by bringing lifeprocessesundercontrolinordertomaximizedesirableoutcomes.

Oakeshottexamines two formsof theenterprise state. Inonecase, the state isorganizedtomaximizetheefficientexploitationoftheestateofthestate. Humanbeingsareorganizedby the state to contribute to thisgoal to themaximaldegree. Oakeshottunderstandscompulsoryschoolingintermsofthiscorporategoal:

17MichaelOakeshott,ReligionandtheWorld,inReligion,PoliticsandtheMoralLife(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1993),31.18Ibid.,32.19Ibid.,31.20Ibid.,33.21Ibid.,3334.


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TherightanddutyofthegovernmentofamodernEuropeanstateistoschoolthenationinsuchamannerthateachofitshumancomponentsmightrecognizehimselfasamemberofthecorporateassociationandbemadefittocontributetothepursuitofthecorporateenterpriseaccordingtohisabilitiesandinrelationtothecurrentmanagerialpolicy.22

Anotherversionoftheenterprisestateisoneinwhichtheinhabitantsareseenasdiseasedordisorderedand the therapeutic state isorganized to cure themby enforcing anormality.Oakeshott argues that social science and socialwelfareworkers of allkindssociologists,socialpsychologists,psychiatrists,grouptherapistsare instrumentsoftheruleoftherapy.Citizens become associates joined in beingdiseased and recognizing themselves as thesubjectsof therapeutae (aswellas for the therapists themselves),everything iswhat it is intermsofcurativevirtue:work(except,ofcourse,socialwork)isoccupationaltherapy,education is curative, leisure is remedial treatment.The functionof the state is toguaranteeauniversalsanity;thatis,auniformsocallednormality.23

SelfSufficiencyandfreedomasanethicalpractice In the following two sections, IdescribeOakeshotts alternative to anormalized self, a selfwithinthelimitsofaliberalpoliticalorderthatcreatesitselfasavirtuositythroughactivitiesthat are selfsufficient. In this section, I trace the idea of selfsufficiency in Oakeshottsthought. In thenextsection, IreconstructOakeshotts ideaofagency in termsofFoucaultsconceptsoftheaestheticsoftheself.

Irecall,forthepurposesofcontrast,thatFoucaultgroundshisideaofaestheticsoftheselfinthenotionofEnlightenmentasanhistoricalinvestigationintotheeventsthathaveledustoconstituteourselvesandtorecognizeourselvesassubjectsofwhatwearedoing,thinking,saying.24ForFoucault,theundefinedworkoffreedomisthepositiveresultofenlightenment,whichallowsustoseparateoutfromthecontingencythathasmadeuswhatweare,thepossibilityofno longerbeing,doing,or thinkingwhatweare,door think.25Foucaultidentifiesthisasapresentactivity.HeagreeswithBaudelairethatinmodernexperiencetheindividualfindssomethingeternalinthepresent.Itisaheroicconceptofthepresent,inwhich there is an intensificationof experience: natural thingsbecome more thannatural,beautifulthingsbecomemorethanbeautiful.26

InancientGreekandRomanethics,Foucaultfindsagentswhocreatedthemselvesinastyleofbeingandenactedpresentness.InhisstudyofGreekethicsheexaminedhowGreeksacted intermsofastyleofbeinggood,beautiful,honorable,estimable,memorableandexemplary.27Hewritesthatthismodeofselfconstitutionentailsastylizationbecausetherare 22MichaelOakeshott,OnHumanConduct,307.23Ibid.,310.24MichelFoucault,WhatisEnlightenment?inPaulRabinow(ed.),Ethics:SubjectivityandTruth(NewYork:TheFreePress,1997),315.25Ibid.,315316.26Ibid.,311.27MichelFoucault,TheEthicsoftheConcernforSelfasaPracticeofFreedominPaulRabinow(ed.),Ethics:SubjectivityandTruth,286.


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factionofsexualactivitypresenteditselfasasortofopenendedrequirement.28ThisstylizationconstituteswasFoucaultcallsfortheindividualanattitudeandaquestionthatindividualizedhisaction.29

InrelationtotheStoicethichewritesofacareofaselfthatbelongedtoitself.Selveslooktowhattheycancontrol,thatistosaytheirinnersensibility,notexternalcircumstances.ForFoucault,thisconstitutestheselfasapleasureforitselfasitforgoesinterestinexternality. This pleasure arises out of ourselves andwithin ourselves. He notes that itknowsneitherdegreenorchange.30WewillseeverysimilarreflectionsbyOakeshottonthenatureofselfsufficientexperience.

Foucaultargues thatsince theself isnotgiven tous ithasnoendpoint,suchasadestiny,salvationorauthenticcompletion,butmustbeachangingoutcomeofacreativeprocess.HeassentstoaninterviewersformulationthathisprogramfitsNietzschesideathattheindividualcreateshimselforherselfinastylethroughlongpracticeanddailywork.31

Foucaultarguesthattheaestheticoftheselfisinitselfethical.Henotesthattheinwardconcernoftheselfinsexualrelationshipsisinherentlywiththepleasureoftheother.Heargues therefore thatfreedom is theontologicalconditionofandethicsbutethics istheconsciouspracticeoffreedom.Ontheonehand,anindividualcannotbeethicalwithoutactingfreely.Ontheotherhand,ouractionisalwaysethical,reflectingaconcernwithothers.32

Theideaofpresentness,theexperienceofwhichiscentraltotheselfasstyle,hasbeenaconsistentfeatureofOakeshottswork. InReligionandtheWorld,Oakeshottdescribes indetailwhathecallsareligioussensibilitythatfocusesonpresentexperience. HedevelopsthisfromtheexperienceofearlyChristiancommunitiesthatimaginedtheendofdayswouldoccuranymomentandthereforefeltsalvationineverymoment.Thereligiouslifecarriedineachofitsmomentsitswholemeaningandvalue.33

The religious life is informedbyanoninstrumentalattitude toward thingsand individuals. Life to [the religiousperson] isnotagameof skill,peopleandeventsarenotcountersvalued forsomething tobegained,orachieved,beyond them.34Oakeshottarguesthatexperiencegainsmeaningwithpresent insight.35 Inpresent insight,experience isvalued forwhat isnearest,namely, ourselves.The religious self achieves freedom from allembarrassmentalikeofregretforthepastandcalculationonthefuture.36Forthisreason,thereligiouspersonlacksnothingandso faras ispossiblehe livesasan immortal.37Glenn

28MichelFoucault,TheUsesofPleasure:Volume2oftheHistoryofSexuality(NewYork:VintageBooks,1988),92.29Ibid.,62.30MichelFoucault,TheCareoftheSelf:Volume3oftheHistoryofSexuality(NewYork:VintageBooks,1988),64.31MichelFoucaultTheEthicsoftheConcernforSelfasaPracticeofFreedom,284.32Ibid.33Oakeshott,ReligionandtheWorld,32.34Ibid.,37.35Ibid.,33.36Ibid.,37.37Ibid.,3738.


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Worthingtonwritesthatreligiosityconcernstheselfisitsownend. Salvationinareligioussystemofvalueisunderstoodintermsofaselfrealizingwhatitis.38

InRationalism inPolitics,Oakeshottdevelops thisconcept inadiscussionofaestheticexperience. Aestheticexperienceinvolvesthecontemplationofimagesthatarepermanentandunique.39Thepermanenceoftheimagesofcontemplationresidesintheirintrinsicvalue.Theseimageshaveworthnotasmeanstoanend,butasthingsvaluedforthemselves.Suchimagesareentirelyliberatedfromtheconstraintsofpragmaticrequirement.Aestheticexperience is characterized by selfsufficiency enjoyed by each engagement in the activityandbytheabsenceofanypremeditatedend.40ForOakeshott,thedelightofart iscompletewithinitself:

Theimageswhichpartnercontemplation,ontheotherhand,havetheappearanceofbeingbothpermanentandunique.Contemplationdoesnotuse,oruseuporwearoutitsimages,or inducechange inthem: itrests inthem, lookingneitherbackwardsnorforwards. Butthisappearanceofbeingpermanent isnot toseemdurable insteadof transitory; likeanyotherimage,theimagewhichpartnerscontemplationmaybedestroyedbyinattention,maybelost,ormaydecompose.Itispermanentmerelybecausechangeanddestructionarenotpotentialinit;anditisuniquebecausenootherimagecanfillitsplace.41

Thecrucialpointofthisabstractpassageisthatthedelightofaestheticexperiencelooksneitherbackwardsnorforwards,that is,neithertothepastnorfuture,butrests inthepresent,filling,asitwere,theentirespaceofexperiencewithitsmeaning.Agencyisintensified,adelightindoing,becauseitisnotdissipatedintotheothertemporalelements.

ThecomprehensivenessofOakeshottsideaofintrinsicworthappearsinhisaccountofeducation.ForOakeshott,educationiswhollywithoutextrinsicpurposeincludingtheproductionofsociallyfunctionalindividuals.Schoolsanduniversitiesareplacesofrefugefromtheinstrumentalityofdailylife.Theplaceoflearningisliberatedfromtheurgenciesofthehere and now and it provides a noninstrumental place to listen to the conservation inwhichhumanbeingsforeverseektounderstandthemselves.42

InOnHumanConduct,Oakeshottshowshow thispresentnessexists inallhumanaction.Oakeshottarguesthatactionhasfourelementsorpostulates:anactioninrelationtoanend,apractice,selfdisclosure,andselfenactment.Ahumanactionaimsattherealizationofanexternalendandisgovernedbyapracticethatregulatesthemannerinwhichthatendispursued.Thesepracticesareadverbial,generalizedconditionsofaction.Onetypeofpracticeisinstrumental,thatisorientedtothepursuitofanend.Therulesthatgovernfirefighters 38GlenWorthington,ReligiousandPoeticExperienceintheThoughtofMichaelOakeshott(Exeter:AcademicImprint,200),61.39MichaelOakeshott,TheVoiceofPoetry in theConversationofMankind inRationalism inPoliticsandOtherEssays,510.40Ibid.,514.41Ibid.,510.42MichaelOakeshott,APlaceofLearning inTheVoiceofLiberalLearning:MichaelOakeshottonEducation(NewHaven,YaleUniversityPress,1989),41.


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arepurposeful;theyareaimedatputtingoutfires.MoreimportanttoOakeshottaremoralpractices,modesofrelationshipsthathavenothingtodowithends.Hewrites,amoralityisthearsartiumofconduct; thepracticeofallpractices; thepracticeofagencywithout furtherspecifications.43Amoralpractice is likea language thatsupplies thegrammarandvocabulary of speaking, but does not demand particular speechacts. A moral practice of beingneighborlydoesnotspecifyhowwetreataneighbor.Amoralpracticehasnoextrinsicpurpose.44

Inadditiontoamoralpracticeandasubstantiveend,anactorengagesinanactinrelationselfdisclosureandselfenactment.Theformerisactionamongothers,theactintheexternalworld;thelatteristheselfunderstandingoftheactor.

Everyhumanpracticalactioncanbeplaced inamatrix that relates to these fourelements.Aselfdisclosesitselfinrelationtoasubstantiveendandbysubscriptiontoapractice.Aselfalsoenactsitselfinrelationtoanendandapractice.Forexample,whensellingacar,thesellerisdisclosedintheattempttomakethebestdeal.Thesellerisalsodisclosedthroughsubscriptiontothepracticesofsellinghonestly,althoughsuchconsiderationsdonothelpconcludeasuccessfuldeal.Further,thesellerisenactedinpursuitofthisend,inthiscase,ofthegoalofgettingaprofit.Finally,thesellerisenactedthroughthereasonforsubscriptiontothepracticeof sellinghonestly, the fear, for instance,ofpunishment,or thedesire foran innersenseofbeinghonest. HereOakeshottargues that theagentmay recognizehimself in respecttovirtuousness45

Oakeshott relateseachmomentofacting to temporality. Seekinganexternalend inselfdisclosureistheleastmeaningfulmomentofactivity;itisimmersedincontingencyitis interminable, liable to frustration,disappointment,anddefeat.46 Moralityunderstood interms of selfdisclosure, actingwith others but limitingwhat onedoes according tomoralrules,abatescontingencybecauseitstipulatesgeneralconditionsforchoosinglessincidentalthan the choices themselvesand establishesrelationshipsmoredurable than thosewhichemergeandmeltawayintransactionstosatisfyasuccessionofcontingentwants.47Insellingacar,apersonactsinaccordwiththemoralcodeofhonesty.Shedisclosestheproblemswiththecarandrespondswithprecisiontoquestions.Thesedisclosurestakeplacewithoutconsiderationoftheoutcome.Thecustomermaypurchasethecarbelievingthesellerhonest,andknows thecars truecondition. Or thecustomermayreject thecarbecauseofwhatwasrevealedaboutitstruecondition.However,thehonestpracticeofsellinghasvalueindependentoftheoutcome.

Selfenactmentsabatecontingency.Intermsofexternalends,thereasonforseekingagoal is less transitoryandprecarious than theachievementof thegoal. However, themoststableorpresentorientedmomentofacting isvirtue (moral selfenactment),wherein theselfisasunconcernedasmaybewiththebrittlepursuitandenjoymentofsatisfactionsand 43Oakeshott,OnHumanConduct,60.44Ibid.,62.45Ibid.,75.46Ibid.,73.47Ibid.,74.


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thereforeas indifferentasmaybe to its frustration.48Thevalueofmyhonesty tomyself isfreedomfromthedissolventeffectoftime.ForOakeshott,thenoninstrumentalityofvirtueisnotaltruisticbutselfaffirming,whollyindifferenttoconsequencesofanysort. And it isthis [] which constitutes its release from the bondage of contingent circumstances.49Oakeshott takes pains to note that virtue is not selfdenial but the affirmation of personalcharacterwithoutregardtowhathappensintheworld.Virtuemayimprovetheworld,buttheinnervalueofvirtuousconductdoesnotdependonanysuchimprovement.

Oakeshottrevisesthecommonideaofthepublic/privatedistinctioncommoninliberalthought.Hedeniesthatpublicandprivateareseparatespheresbetweenwhichtheindividualmoves. Whilehedoesnotpoliticizeareasof family,aspoststructuralistswouldwant,hedoesopenupthepersonalityforagreaterpoliticalquestioningastowhatitmeanstobeaperson. Oakeshottarguesthatthecontentofamoralpractice,suchashonor,isnotprivate,because it isasharednotion,developedover time. Inotherwords,virtue ispubliclydefinedthroughmoralpractices. Individuals enactmoral rules in contingent circumstanceson theoccasionofpurposefulaction.Whatcountsasintegrityisatthedisposaloftheagent,buttheagentsreflectiononthisproblemisbasedongenerallysharedconsiderations.Everyactionisprivateinseekingagoal,e.g.sellingacar,butthisprivateconsiderationisqualifiedbythepublic considerationof sellinghonestly. Everypurposeful action isbothpublic andprivate.50

Oakeshottsliberalismliespreciselyinhowlaworwhathecallslexiscodifiedmoralitythatplacesconditionsonactionratherthanmandatingspecificpurposes. ForOakeshott,lexdoesnotinfringeonfreedombecauselawfulrequirementsareadverbial,noninstrumentalconsiderations. Hewritesthatthe lawforbidsnotthesubstantiveactofmurderbuttheadverbialconsiderationofa typeofkilling,donemurderously. The liberalstatecannotbeadministrativebecauseithasnotoolstomanagetheindividualortheeconomy.Theliberalstateisconstitutedbynoninstrumental law. Thisnoninstrumentalitymeans that there isa fundamentallimitonwhatthestatecando. Muchcontroversyhasbeenraisedabouttheseformulations.51Myaim,however, is to show the suggestivepowerofOakeshotts theory. ForOakeshott,theliberal,noninstrumentalstateprovidestheopportunityforanoninstrumentalindividuality.ThiscontrastswithathinkerlikeHayek,forwhomagencyispurposefulwhiletheruleoflawisnoninstrumental.

IndividualityasStyleandVirtuosityInthissection,IbringtogetherthestrandsofOakeshottsthoughtthatproducehistheoryofanaestheticsof theself. It flows fromOakeshottshistoricalandproteannotionof theself.OakeshottassentstoLeBonsassertionthathumanshaveahistorybutnonatureandsoa

48Ibid.,75.49Ibid.,7576.50Ibid.,146.51Seeforexample,BhikhuParekh,OakeshottsTheoryofCivilAssociation,Ethics,vol.106,no.1(October1995),158186.


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humanbeingiswhatinconducthebecomes.52Oakeshottapprovesofthefollowingsymbol:[N]otAdam,notPrometheus,butProteusacharacterdistinguishedonaccountoflimitlesspowersofselftransformationwithoutselfdestruction.53

TimothyOLeary,inhisworkonFoucaultsethics,arguesthattheaestheticoftheselfemergesfromthishistoricalself.Hewrites:myselfandmylifehasnoshape,nopurpose,nojustification outside of the form which I give to them. It is, therefore, imperative (noncategoricallyimperative)thatIthinkaboutthatform,developthetechniquesthatwillhelpmetotransformit,andthatIreflectupontheends,theteloi,towhichIwilldirect.54

Oakeshottalsoseestheselfassomethingitcreatesfromitshistoricalmaterialandthatthe greatest achievement of this individuality is creating itself as adistinctive style. Hewrites thatan interpretationofmodernity is that theselfcanfindvirtue inbeingadistinctpersonandthisselfisapttorecognizeandrespondtodistinctness(ratherthandistinction)inothers.55

Thisdistinctnessisachievedpartlythroughthehighlyindividualisticengagementwithalanguagethatoffersavarietyofpatternsofsubscription.Oakeshottwritesthatmoralactivity isanartthat islearnedandthatoffersanalmostendlessopportunityfor individualstyleinwhichvirtuosityandmasteryaredistinguishable.56Wedonotmastermoralpracticessinceouractivitiesareconstitutedby thesepractices. Theyescapeourcontrol,butweenactourselvesthroughthemandpartlybecomeavirtuosity(oranexcellence)throughthem.

Oakeshottbroadensthecategoriesofthewaysinwhichtheidentityoftheactorisenactedthroughavarietyofdispositionalcapacities,theoutcomeof learningandeducation.Moralityhereisapartofalargerconceptofapersonality.HeidentifiesidealcharactersofdominantdemeanourssuchasTheMiser,theStoictheMagnanimous,theTreacherous,theSecretive, theAmbitious.57Allof these labels reflect stylesbywhich individualsadaptthemselvestovariouspractices. PaigeDegeserandRichardFlathmanspecificallyarguethattheseformulationsbyOakeshottreflecthisbeliefthatindividualityisavirtuosity.58

Oakeshottdescribes the emergenceof this individuality inEuropeanhistory. Theseagentsappreciateexperienceforitsownsake.Itemergedoutofthemoral,substantivecommunitiesofmedievalisminwhichpersonalityhasbeensubmerged.Thisindividualityhasthe

dispositiontotransformthisunsoughtfreedomofconductfromapostulateintoanexperienceandtomakeityieldasatisfactionofitsown,independentofthechancyandintermittent satisfactionofchosenactions thedisposition to recognize imagining,deliberating,

52Oakeshott,OnHumanConduct,41.53Ibid.,241.54TimothyOLeary,FoucaultandtheArtofEthics(London:BloomsburyAcademic,2006),188189.55Ibid.,250.56Ibid.,62.57Ibid.,93.58PaigeDegeserandRichardFlathman,OakeshottsOnHumanConduct inTheCambridgeCompaniontoMichaelOakeshott,210.


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wanting,choosing,andactingnotascostsincurredinseekingenjoymentsbutasthemselvesenjoyments,theexerciseofagratifyingselfdeterminationorpersonalautonomy.59

Thelanguageofdeliberating,wanting,choosing,andactingclearlyflowsfromtheanalysisofselfsufficiency inTheVoiceofPoetry in theConversationofMankind. In thisdisposition,selvesfindtheirmeaningintheexperienceoftheactivitiesandsubordinatetheresultofactingtothedoingofacting.Theimpulsetoreshapeandmanipulatetheselflosesforce.

WendellJohnCoatshaselaboratedontheaestheticsofselfhoodinOakeshott.AccordingtoCoats,Oakeshottassertstheimportanceofforminexperiencebecauseofhisemphasison thepoeticcharacterofallhumanexperience.Coatswrites that thepoeticqualityofexperiencelies,inpartakindofevanescentimmortality,apartialescapefromthedeadlinessofdoing,indoingthingsfortheirownsakewhenpossibleandappropriatedoingthemforformalrather thansubstantivereasons. ThisOakeshottianpreference, then, tohighlight thepoeticcharacterofhumanactivityexplainshispreferenceforactivitiesthatlendthemselvesto ritualistic or formalisticperformance: fishing and friendship, for example.CoatsnotesOakeshottsaversion toactivities,howevernecessarywhereselfsufficientengagement isnotappropriate,suchasthemarketactivityofshoppingfortherealdealorproduct.60

InOnHumanConduct,Oakeshottdescribesthevariouswaysinwhichthevirtuosityofindividualityhasappeared inEuropeanhistory. Ineachcase, the individuality findsvalueapartfromexternalcircumstances,findingitsvalueinitsownstyleofbeingaself.Andtheseselvesmoderatetheirbehaviortowardothersbecausetheyunderstandthatthecontrolofothersispartofthefoolishnessofthecontrolofcircumstances.

Oakeshottdescribesonepersonalitythattendstowardsamasterfulegoismthatoverlookstheconcernsandopinionsofothers.Thisegoismispartofamoregeneraldisdainfor consequences or recognition. This selfsufficient personality avoids tendencies towardconformity.Butaconcernforactionforitselfshouldnotbeconfusedwithaninterestinselfgratification.61

Anothercharacterknowsitslimitsinanunaggressiveselfrelianceandfindsmeaning in selfenactment. This agent has an aristocratic recognition of ones own unimportanceandahumilitydevoidofhumiliation. Suchmodestymeans that thischaracterknowshowtobelongtohimselfandisnotdismayedathisownimperfections.62

Athirdtypeidentifiesselfdirectioninconductasanimportantvirtue.Thismeansthatagencytakesplace inamoralpracticeandauthenticitybecomescentralastheexcellenceofthischaracterorjustifiableintheseterms.OakeshottrelatesthispersonalityinitsidealformtoMartinLuthersfamousstatement:HereIstand,Icandonoother.Andwhile

59Oakeshott,OnHumanConduct,236.60WendellJohnCoats,Jr.,OakeshottandHisContemporaries:Montaigne,St.Augustine,Hegel,EtAl(Cranbury,NewJersey:AssociatedUniversityPresses,2000),105.61Ibid.,238.62Ibid.


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thispersonalitycandegenerateintofanaticism,itremainsanimportantinterpretationofselfsufficiency.63

Theseindividualities,likeallindividualities,areagonicbecauseofthetensioninagencybetweendifferentdispositions. Anelementof thedramaofbeinghuman is thecontrastbetween two dispositions that are powerful and contrary, where neither one is strongenough to defeat or put to flight the other.64 One disposition is concerned with endsattainment.Theotherdispositionpreferstobeselfemployed.Thisselfemphasizesorselfdeterminationisunderstoodastheenjoymentofwantsratherthanslipperysatisfactions,ofadventures rather than uncertain outcomes. Traveling is preferred to the destination andambulatoryconversationtodeliberationaboutmeansforachievingends.65

TheBasicIncomeandthePoliticsofVirtuosityInthissection,ItakeOakeshottstheoryinanegalitariandirectionbyexploringhowhisconceptof individualitymightbecomewidelyavailable. Iargue that thebasic income,a largemonthlygrantofmoneyby the state independentofall conditions, includingworkoroutcome,wouldhelp enlarge the scopeofhis individuality even ifdoing somightviolatehisprincipleaboutnoninstrumentallaworlex.Ialsoexplorehowthisargumentrelatestotensionbetweenegalitarianismandelitism inOakeshottstheory,theproblemofpoverty inhiswork,andhowmydiscussionofOakeshottcontributestothelargerdebatearoundPhilippeVanParijsinfluentialcaseforthehighestsustainablebasicincome.66

Oftenunderstoodasanelitist,Oakeshottsthinkingactuallycontainsbothegalitarianismandelitism. Anegalitarian interpretationofOakeshottcan flow fromhisbelief thathisprized individuality is inherent inexperienceandthereforepossibleforanyperson,perhapseventhepooresthe.67Inthis,forexample,TimothyFuller,notesthatOakeshottsworkcorrespondstoaspiritualdemocracy:hedidnotthinkanyonecouldgainexemptionfromthelimitsofmortalhumanexistence.68

Oakeshott,also,sometimesdescribesthis individualityasaristocratic. InanessayonHobbeshewrites thatHobbeswasprimarilyconcernedwith therarely found individualswhoweremotivatedbypridemorethanfear.ForthisHobbesianpersonality,prideappearsasselfknowledgeandselfrespect.thedelusionofpoweroverothersisreplacedbytherealityofselfcontrol,and thegloryof the invulnerability fromwhichcouragegeneratesmagnanimity and magnanimity, peace.69 This aristocratic figure, concerned with self 63Ibid.64Oakeshott,OnHumanConduct,323.65Ibid.,324.66PhilippeVanParijs,RealFreedomforAll:What(IfAnything)CanJustifyCapitalism?(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995).67Oakeshott,OnHumanConduct,241.68TimothyFuller,ThePoeticsoftheCivilLifeinJesseNorman(ed.),TheAchievementofMichaelOakeshott(London:GeraldDuckworth&Co.,1993),274.69MichaelOakeshott,TheMoralLifeintheWritingsofThomasHobbes,inRationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssay,341.


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sufficiency,abandons thedelusionofpowerovercircumstances,andso, isacreaturemoreproperlyconcernedwithhonourthanwithsurvivalandprosperity.70WilliamGalstonarguesthatOakeshottisanaristocraticliberalasOakeshottbelievesthatwearenotallcapableofagency.71

This egalitarianversus elitist conflict finds its counterpart indebates aboutFoucaultandpoststructuralism.Thetheoryofanaestheticsoftheselfsuggestsadandyquality,aselfbent on endless selfcreation, caring nothing for others. Critics have linked Foucault andOakeshottwiththispersonality.72WilliamConnollyfindstheproblemcentraltopoststructuralistthoughtitself,notingadivisionbetweentheelitismofNietzscheandtheegalitarianismofFoucault.Nietzsche,accordingtoConnolly,identifiesanovermanwhocultivatingcertaindispositionsisabletoriseabovetheresentmentthatConnollyseesasthesourceofnormalizationinmodernsociety.73ConnollyarguesthatNietzschesaristocraticovermanisethicallyunacceptableasinthelatemodernperiodeveryoneisentangledwitheveryoneelse.Connolly findsapath towardsamoredemocraticethos inFoucaultwhoeschews the termovermanand instead focusesoneverydaymisfits.74 Connolly suggestsamove fromadistinctionbetween types as found inNietzsche to a strugglewithin selves. Thinkingaboutadivisionwithinselvescanleadtoanegalitarianethosbecauseitallowsforthepossibilitythatanysinglepersoncouldattainaparticularindividuality.

ThisdualityofaconflictbetweentypesorwithinasplitisthesameproblemfoundinOakeshott.BydevelopingtheegalitarianpossibilitiesofOakeshott,Imovebeyondthemerepossibilitythatexperiencecanbeappreciatedforitself,tomakingthatexperiencemorelikely.Thisegalitarianspirit Iseek inOakeshott isliberal in takingpart in the liberal ideaof themoral equality of each person. It also deepens that liberal egalitarianism because forOakeshott idea of selfsufficiencymeans that eachperson appreciateshis/her experience asintrinsicallyvaluable. Thispersonisacceptingofthevalueofeachpersonbecauseshecareslessforcontroloverthingsandtheactionsofothers.

Using thebasic income todevelopOakeshotts theory in thisdirection isproblematicdue tohis rejectionofdistributive justice,ora categoryof economic justicebeyondmarketeconomics.Distributivejusticeisanoutcomethatviolatesthestrictnoninstrumentalityofthe law.75 Oakeshottsmain concernwith the poor is that they threaten the liberal order.Oakeshottwrites:Thepoorwererecognizedtobeathreattocivilassociationbecausetheirerroneousbeliefthattheyhadnothingtolosebuttheirpovertymadethemthewillinginstru 70Ibid.,344.71WilliamGalston,OakeshottsPoliticalTheory:RecapitulationandCriticisms,inTheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott,236.72OnOakeshottanddandyismseeStevenWulf,OakeshottsPoliticsforGentlemen,ReviewofPolitics,vol.69,no.2(Spring2007),244272.ForFoucaultseePierreHadot,ReflectionsontheNotionofCultivationoftheSelf,inTimothyJ.Armstrong(ed.),MichelFoucaultPhilosopher(NewYork:Harvester/Wheatsheaf,1992).73WilliamConnolly,Identity/Difference:DemocraticNegotiationsofPoliticalParadox(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1991),187.74Ibid.75Ibid.,153.


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mentsofanambitiousmanbentuponsubversion.76Aredistributionofwealthmighthaveanegativeeffectontheindividualinsofarasapersonscapacityforagencymaybeemasculatedbyeleemosynarybenefits.77

Still,Oakeshottwasentirelyhostile to thenotion thatmaterialgoodscansupport theenjoymentoffreedom.Headdressestheissueconcretely,inafootnoteinOnHumanConduct,inadiscussionaboutHegelsexplorationoftherelationshipbetweenmodernsocietyandthepoor. Oakeshottseemstorecognizethatgreatdisparitiesofwealthcouldbean impediment (thoughnotabar) to theenjoymentofcivilassociation.And soHegel,andperhapsOakeshottwouldallow for theexerciseofa judicious lordship for the reliefof thedestitute.78Lordship forOakeshott is theuseof thestate toredistributewealth,an instrumentalrelationship.Hesuggeststhatinstrumentalitycanbeusedtoallowfortheenjoymentofcivilassociation.

ForOakeshott,theenjoymentofcivilassociationincludesthatwhichisgainedfromtheachievementofsubstantiveaccomplishments.However,myargumenthasbeenthatthecentral promise of this association is the individuality of virtuosity. The basic incomewouldmakepossible thevalueof the freedomcentral tocivilassociation,namelywhen thepersonjudgesimagining,deliberating,wanting,choosingandacting tobeenjoyments inthemselves,notascostincurredwhilepursingenjoymentsexternaltothedoing.

Asufficientlyhighbasic incomewouldprovideresourcestoguaranteethenecessitiesoflife.Theattainmentofnecessitiesisaninstrumentalgoal,whichrequiresthattheindividualunderstandheractivitiesasmeanstothatoverridingconcern.Thebasicincomeconstitutesliberationfromthesebasicneeds,andsoeliminatesthispulltowardsinstrumental judgmentofactivities.

Ahighenoughbasic incomewould reduce thenecessityof the instrumental requirementofearninga living,orreduce theneededworkhours. Itdoesnotreduce thevalueofworkorcreativelabor,understoodasanendinitself,butonlypaidlabor.Althoughindividualswouldstillworkinordertohavehigherincomeorforthepleasureinvolvedinwork,itreduceswhattheconsciousnessofagentsofbeingacommodity,orameremeanstoanend.

Thebasic incomewouldprovide theopportunity forwhatOakeshott identifiesasselfsufficientactivities,suchasfriendshipand loveandaesthetics. Asnotedabove,SuviSoininenarguesthatforOakeshottagivenactivitybecomespartofconduct,assuchthemoreitisundertaken;wemightconjecturethatanactivitydecreasesitsinfluenceonconductwhen itdecreases in importance. Oakeshottdescribesanoninstrumentalorientation that isenhancedbymorenoninstrumentalandfewerinstrumentalactivities.HerewetakeseriouslyCoatsobservationthatOakeshottwaswaryofactivitiesthathadnothingtodowiththepoeticpossibilityofexperience,suchastheselfunderstandingofapersonwhoknowsthatherlaborisacommoditytobeboughtorsold.

76Oakeshott,OnHumanConduct,304fn.77Ibid.,305fn.78Ibid.,305fn.


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IsthereapaththatmightmakethebasicincomeacceptabletoOakeshottsframework?EfraimPodoksikdistinguishesbetweenhumanfreedomandcivilfreedom.Theformerisintrinsic to the human engagementwith contingency, and occurswhenever human beingschoosetodothisorthatbasedonreflectiveconsiderationoftheirsituation. The lattertakesplacewithinthecontextoflex.Thisfreedomcanbecompromisedbytheenterpriseassociationstatethatdirectsindividualstoendswithoutthefreedomtoexittheassociation.

ForPodoksikthefreedomofcivilassociationisenhancedbythefactthatitsmembersbelievethatlexisconsistentwiththeirfreedomtopursuechosenends.Trafficlightscouldbeseenasimpedimentstothefreedomofmotionorasageneralsetofnoninstrumentallawthatneverdirectsindividualswheretogo.Podoksikarguesthatthesecondjudgmentismorelikelywhen individualsconsidertraffic lightsnotasbarriers toactivitybutasnoninstrumentalconditionsfordrivingthatcreatethepossibilityoftheirachievingtheirendtodrivethiswayorthat. Therelationshipof lawtofreedomshiftsaccordingtotradition:Inotherwords,todeprivea lawof itscharacteras lex is toshow that the lawdoesnotestablish thecontext inwhichpeoplepursue theirgoals,butratherpromotessomesocialgoaland thereforerestrictcivilfreedom.79

PodoksikarguesthatOakeshottsaccountoffreedom isclosetoourcommonsenseunderstandingoffreedom,andasafundamentaldefenseofthemodernwesternliberalviewof freedom.80Podoksiksargumentwouldnot seem friendly toan interpretationofaFoucaultinfluencedOakeshott. However, ifPodoksik iscorrect,thenthebasic incomecouldbereinterpretedasaculturallyappropriateenhancementofthetypeoffreedomOakeshottprizesasafirstordergood.Thebasicincomealthoughitappearsinstrumentallyorientedtopursueagoallikedistributivejustice,isbetterseenasavehicletofurtheraconceptionoftheindividual.

My interpretation ofOakeshott can transform the ethical debate about the basic income.Thequestioniswhetherthebasicincomeviolatesaprincipleofreciprocityorsolidarity. VanParijsarguesthat isbasedonareal libertarianism,arealfreedomforallwhichmeansoneisreallyfree,asopposedtojustformallyfree,totheextentthatonepossessesthemeans,notjusttheright,todowhateveronemightwanttodo.81Realfreedomistheopportunity to liveasonewishes,which includesalternative lifestyles,suchas the rejectionofpaidlabor. VanParijsscrupulouslyshowshownowayoflifeisencouragedordiscouragedbythebasicincome.

Someopponentsofthebasicincomearguethatreallibertarianismdeniestheprincipleof reciprocitywherein recipients of government fundsmust give back to society.82 Somesupportersof thebasic income rejectVanParijsaccountbecause itassumes thatagentsare 79EfraimPodoksik,OakeshottsTheoryofFreedomasRecognizedContingency,EuropeanJournalofPoliticalTheory,vol2,no.1(January2003),70.80Ibid.,7374.81PhilippeVanParijs,Real Freedom forAll:What (IfAnything)Can JustifyCapitalism? (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),3233.82WilliamGalston,WhataboutReciprocity,inWhatsWrongwithaFreeLunch(Boston,BeaconPress,2000),kindleversion,location301337.


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selfinterested,concernedwiththeirownfreedomtoact,notafeelingofsharedvalue.Thesecriticsargue thatabetter justification for thebasic income is that it isasharingofcollectivewealth,suchastheproductofsociallabor.83

Oakeshottsperspective cuts through thisdebate. When freedom isunderstoodasavalue in itself,andasanethicalpractice,thenthebasicincomeenhancesboththerealfreedomofthepersonandconcernforothers.Thisclaimoffreedomisneitherinherentlyatomistic,norgroundedinasharedsubstantivevalue.

Thisnotionoffreedomimpliesaresponsetothecommonobjectiontothebasicincomethat it exploitsworkerswho are compelled to support thosewhomight choose leisure.Oakeshottdescribesindividualswhofindvalueinthemselves,andtheirownselfenactments.Lessconcernedwithexternalcircumstances,theywouldalsobelessconcernedwiththeactionofthoseotherswhogetthebasic income. TheOakeshottianself, liketheFoucaultianself, isfocusedonitsownselfasanintrinsicvalueanddoesnotcompareitselftoothers.Thebasicincome is thepoliticaleconomyofaselffreetobe itsownend,notaselfworriedabouttheguiltlessomissionsofothers.

ConclusionOakeshottwouldnotagreewithFoucaultsbeliefthatmodernEnlightenmentcanbesummarizedas thepermanent critiqueofourselves.84 Oakeshottdidnotbelieve that identityassuchshouldbeconstantlychallenged.Hiscritiqueofnormalityandbourgeoisnormsdoessuggesthissuspicionofidentityasithasbeenformedundermodernconditions;hebelievesthatthisidentityshouldbequestioned. Further,theselfisopentochallenge,beingprotean,historicalandpartlyframedbythepublicpracticeofmorality.

Wehave seenhowOakeshottspolitical theory can be reconstructed toparallel andsupplementFoucault.Hechallengesliberalismtotakeseriouslytheworthoftheperson,bothintheinnerexperienceofintrinsicworthandthesocialconditionsthatengenderthatideaofworth. HedevelopsoneavenueFoucaultsaestheticsof theselfmight take. NikolasRose,writinginthepoststructuralistperspective,capturestheethicalprinciplewhich,Ibelieve,revealsthe innercommonalitybetweenOakeshottandFoucault. Rosecallsforapoliticalprogramthatopposesallthatwhichstands inthewayof lifebeing itsowntelos.85 ForRose,thisentailsopposition toanything that subordinates thevalueof life to somethingelse: anexternalcode,truth,authorityorgoal.RosebringstogetherthetwoelementsofFoucaultianthought:acriticismofhowthenormalizedselfissubordinatedtosomethingexternalandhowaselfthatgivesitselfashapeorstyleresistsnormalizationandisitsowntelos.

Aselfthatisitsownend,however,isnotafinishedorcompleteself.Itisaselfthatisengaged with itself, for Oakeshott, a self engaged with the knowledge of is own history,strugglingwiththecompetingdispositionsaboutthemeaningoftheactivitiesthatcanbeexploredasenjoymentsthemselvesorasmeanstosomethingelse. 83RobertM.Solow,ForwardinWhatsWrongwithAFreeLunch,kindleversionlocation4445.84Foucault,WhatisEnlightenment,313.85 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999),282.


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Oakeshottsaccountofthisagencyisdetailedbuthistheoryisincomplete.Heidentifiesthoseforcesandinstitutionsthatpushagentstowardsinstrumentalityasfirstonthescaleofvaluesbutdoesnotconsiderthecountervailingforces.Thebasicincome,althoughaviolationofthenoninstrumentalityofcivilassociation,liftsindividuals,iftheywish,fromthepullofinstrumentalityandgrantsthemopportunitytofindmeaninginwhattheydo,regardlessofvictoryordefeat.

JacobSegal

AssociateProfessorDepartmentofHistory,PhilosophyandPoliticalScience

KingsboroughCommunityCollege2001OrientalBoulevard

NewYork,[email protected]

the virtuosity of self

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