The Victor’s Dilemma & Regime Change: Postwar Enforcement as a Commitment Problem

Melissa Willard-FosterUCLA

EITM July 19, 2007

Gulf War 1991 Iraq Invasion 2003Data & Literature: Why regime change?Puzzle:

Why not always remove the defeated government?

Why not negotiate a bargain to avoid risks & costs?

Basic Model: Commitment ProblemWork in Progress

The Victor’s Dilemma & Regime Change: Postwar Enforcement as a Commitment Problem

Data & Literature

Pleasing domestic audiences Bueno de Mesquita, et. al 2003; Werner 1996

Enhancing Security Owen 2002 Siverson and Starr 1994

Does regime change alter alliance patterns? Externally imposed regime changes show strongest effect

S&S: A response to neo-realism It’s structure, not who rules If true, then regime change should be rare

Wars to Remove or Alter Foreign Governments, 1648-1989

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1648-1714 1715-1814 1815-1914 1918-1941 1945-1989

Government composition

Dynastic succession

State/regime survival

Source: Holsti, Kalevi J. 1991. Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sources: Gurr, Ted Robert. 1989. Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800-1986; Goemans, Hein, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. 2006. Archigos: A Data Set of Leaders 1875—2004.

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

0.12

1816

1825

1834

1843

1852

1861

1870

1879

1888

1897

1906

1915

1924

1933

1942

1951

1960

1969

1978

1987

1996

Years

Regime Change as a Percent of States in the International System, 1816-2001

Puzzle

Victor’s Dilemma: Conflicting incentives of victor and vanquishedWhy not always remove the defeated

government?Why not negotiate a bargain to avoid the

risks & costs of postwar instability?

Basic Model: Regime Change as a Commitment Problem

FightAccept

RemoveKeep

Victor

Defeated Gov’t

x Є [0,1]

Victor

p-CV, 1-p-CW

q-CV, 1-q-CW1-X, X

Assume Cv and Cw > 0; 0<p<1; 0<q<1; DG prefers x=1; V prefers x=0

Solution

Two Scenarios:

1) Acquiesce Equilibrium {Keep, Accept, x=1}

Defeated Gov’t: x=1

1-x > q-Cv

Cv > q

Victor Keeps the DG if:

p-Cv < 0

FightAccept

Remove

Keep

V

DG

x Є [0,1]

V

p-CV, 1-p-CW

q-CV, 1-q-CW1-x, x

• Removal & punishment are so costly that V prefers x=1. • Example:

Iraq after the Gulf War Costs: Dick Cheney (BBC Radio 4, 2/16/92)

“If we’d gone into Baghdad and got rid of Saddam Hussein …we’d have had to put a lot of forces in…. Then you’ve got to put a new government in his place and then you’re faced with the question of what kind of government are you going to establish in Iraq? … How many forces are you going to have to leave there to keep it propped up, how many casualties are you going to take through the course of this operation?”

x = 1: Chemical & Biological Weapons

Implication

Solution

“Deal or No Deal” Equilibrium If DG wants V to play Accept:

1-x ≥ q-Cv

x* ≡ 1-q+Cv

Will DG offer x*? x* ≥ 1-q-CDG

Cv + CDG ≥ 0 (True)

Will the V prefer x* to Remove?

1-x* ≥ p-Cv

q ≥ p

FightAccept

RemoveKeep

V

DG

x Є [0,1]

V

p-CV, 1-p-CDG

q-CV, 1-q-CDG1-x, x

Implication

Relative Power Tomorrow versus Today If q>p: {Keep, Fight, x*} If q<p: {Remove, Fight, x*}

DG’s Commitment Problem & Indefinite Coercion

Examples {Keep, Fight, x*}

China 1901, Post-Boxer Rebellion {Remove, Fight, x*}

Post-Napoleonic Wars, World War II

Hypotheses

H1: When power is asymmetric between belligerents, victors will retain the defeated government.

H2: When power is symmetric between belligerents, victors will remove the defeated government.

H3: Given a complete victory, states engaged in enduring rivalries will be more likely to remove each other.

Work in Progress: Altering Assumptions

Adding a Third PartyRival to Victor

Removal in cases of asymmetric powerRival to Defeated Government

Distance of Ideal PointsGiving the DG more bargaining power

Voluntary versus Involuntary DefectionObserved & UnobservedEffects on Monitoring