the urban south in the great depression

8/7/2019 The Urban South in the Great Depression

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Southern Historical Association

The Urban South in the Great DepressionAuthor(s): Roger BilesSource: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 71-100Published by: Southern Historical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2210665 .Accessed: 02/04/2011 11:27

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The Urban South

in the Great DepressionBy ROGERBILES

H ISTORIANSCONTINUETOBEFASCINATEDWITHTHEQUESTIONOFcontinuity and change in the modern South. Most studies havefocusedon theyearsof the nineteenthcenturyfollowingthe CivilWar-on Reconstruction,Redemption,thefateof theplanterclass,theputativeriseofanewmercantileclass,thetransitionsinsouthernagriculture,theredefinitionofblackstatusthroughthedevelopmentof sharecroppingand Jim Crow, and a host of other topics-questioningwhethertheconceptof a "New" Southaccuratelypor-trayed the reality of that era. Understandably,historianshaveconcerned themselves less with the region's cities; after all, theSouth'surbanareashadalwaysbeensmallerandlessimportantthan

theindustrialbehemothsoftheNortheastandtheMidwest.' AsW. J.Cash concludedin hisseminalTheMindof theSouth,theregion'sfewrealcities"wererathermeredepotsontheroadto the markets

I On the New South see C. Vann Woodward,Originsof the New South, 1877-1913 (BatonRouge, 1951); Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy:Lordand Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston, 1966); Dwight B. Billings, Jr.,Planters and the Makingof a "NewSouth":Class, Politics, and Developmentin North Caro-lina, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill, 1979); JonathanM. Wiener, Social Originsof theNew South:Alabama, 1860-1885 (Baton Rouge, 1978);DavidL. Carlton, Milland Townin South Caro-lina, 1880-1920 (Baton Rouge, 1982); Gavin Wright, ThePolitical Economy of the CottonSouth: Households, Markets, and Wealth in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1978);Patrick J. Hearden, Independence and Empire: The New South's Cotton Mill Campaign,1865-1901 (De Kalb, Ill., 1982); BroadusMitchelland George SinclairMitchell, TheIndus-trial Revolutionin the South (Baltimore, 1930); Paul M. Gaston, The New South Creed: AStudyin SouthernMythmaking(NewYork, 1970); RogerL. RansomandRichardSutch, OneKind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences of Emancipation (Cambridge, Eng., andother cities, 1977); Jay R. Mandle, The Roots of Black Poverty: The SouthernPlantationEconomyAfterthe Civil War (Durham,N. C., 1978); James Tice Moore, "Redeemers Recon-sidered: Changeand Continuityin the DemocraticSouth, 1870-1900,"Journal of SouthernHistory, XLII (August1978), 357-78; James L. Roark, Masters WithoutSlaves: SouthernPlanters in the CivilWarand Reconstruction(New York, 1977);NumanV. Bartley,"AnotherNewSouth?"GeorgiaHistorical Quarterly, LXV(Summer1981), 119-37; James C. Cobb,"Urbanizationand the ChangingSouth:A Reviewof Literature, "SouthAtlantic UrbanStud-ies, I (1977), 253-66; and James C. Cobb, "BeyondPlanters and Industrialists: A New Per-spectiveon the NewSouth,"Journal of Southern History, LIV (February 1988), 45-68.

MR. BILES is anassociateprofessor of history at Oklahoma State Univer-sity.

THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORYVol. LVI, No. 1, February 1990


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72 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY

of the world,mereadjunctsto the plantation,thanlivingentitiesin theirownright, after the fashionof Boston andNew Yorkand

Philadelphia."2YetbythelastquarterofthetwentiethcenturytheSouth'scitieshadmushroomedintosprawling,gleamingmetropoliseswithbustlingairports,downtownconventioncenters,professionalsportsfran-chises,andmountingcrimerates,provingthata "New"Southhad,forbetterorworse,actuallyarrived.FromAtlanta'sPeachtreeStreettoHouston'sGalleria,changehadbecomesocommonplacethatcrit-ics, infusedwiththemelancholyspiritof the NashvilleAgrarians,lamentedthehomogenizationthatdestroyedtheslower-pacedgen-tility and aestheticdistinctivenessthat once characterizedDixie'scities. Now,theygrumbled,"modernization"and "progress"hadwipedoutvirtuallyallremnantsofanearliercivilization.Thetrans-formationwascomplete,theonlyquestionbeingwhenthecitieshadsuccumbed.I

HistorianBlaineA. Brownellcontendedthatanurbanethoshademergedin southerncitiesby the 1920s,but otherstudentsof thequestiondesignatedthe 1930sas the timewhensweepingchanges

engenderedbytheGreatDepressionbegantoclosethegapbetweenurbanDixieanditsnortherncounterparts.Forexample,inhisstudyof the persistentpoliticaltraditionin southernpolitics,GeorgeB.Tindallconcludedthat the NewDeal"jeopardized"the traditionalsourcesofpowerinlocalgovernmentandreorientedsouthernurban-itesawayfromcityhallstowardthenation'scapital.InCottonFieldsandSkyscrapers,DavidR. Goldfieldarguedgenerallyfor theper-sistentdistinctivenessoftheregion'scities,saying:"Butthesoutherncityis differentbecausetheSouthisdifferent.Inthatregion,thecityismuchclosertotheplantationthanit is toChicagoandNewYork."Goldfieldnotedthat changecamegrudginglyto the urbanSouth,whichdidnotexperiencesweepingtransformationuntilwellintothetwentiethcentury.Andyet, admittingthat some measure of theSouth'suniquenesssurvivedtothepresent,Goldfieldalso alludedtotheimpactofthefederalgovernmentinbreakingthegripoftraditioninsoutherncities.TindallandGoldfieldsawFranklinD.Roosevelt'sNew Deal as havingthe unintendedeffectof initiatinglong-termchangesin thesouthernurbanlandscape.4

2 WJJ. Cash, The Mind of the South (NewYork, 1941), 99.3 On the cities of the Sun Belt see Rupert B. Vance and Nicholas J. Demerath, eds., The

UrbanSouth(Chapel Hill, 1954); David C. Perry andAlfredJ. Watkins,eds., TheRiseof theSunbeltCities (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1977); Carl Abbott, TheNew Urban America: Growthand Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill, 1981); and Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R.Rice, eds., Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World WarTwo(Austin, Texas, 1983).

4 Blaine A. Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930 (Baton Rouge, 1975);George B. Tindall, ThePersistent Traditionin New SouthPolitics (Baton Rouge, 1975), 71;


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URBAN SOUTH IN GREAT DEPRESSION 73

RecenthistoricalstudieshavenotedthelimitedimpactoftheNewDeal in the cities.In Pittsburgh,BruceStaveconcluded,the New

Deal relievedunemploymentand improvedhousingsomewhatbuthadlittleeffectonthemorelastingproblemsofeconomicstagnationand physicaldecay.A numberof studiessuggestthat, insteadofunderminingthe strength of the big city political machines,RooseveltsupportedthosebossesloyaltonationalDemocraticplat-formsandpolicies.CharlesH. Troutfoundthat"duringtheentireNew Deal period, policiesfromWashingtonalteredBoston,butjust as surelyBostonmodifiedfederalprograms."RichardC. Wadeconcludedthat"theNewDealmighthaveproduceda revolutionaryrearrangementin formalgovernmentalinstitutionsand agencies,but it left mostof the country'surbanfabricintact."Or, as ZaneMillersummarized,"Thefederalresponsetodepressioninthecitieswas conservative.The New Deal's urbanpolicyneitherenvisagednor produceda radicaltransformationof metropolitanform andstructure."'5

Thisstudyexaminesthesixlargestsoutherncitiesin 1930-NewOrleans,Houston,Atlanta,Dallas, Birmingham,andMemphis(the

Southbeingdefinedas theelevenstatesoftheConfederacy).Towhatdegreedidthesesoutherncommunitiesalterlong-standingtraditionsto deal with the economiccrisis?Did local leadersembracenewpoliticalstructuresor social arrangements?Didlocalinstitutionsorfederalagenciesbendmoretoaccommodatetheother?Inshort,didtheOld Southperishat thehandsof federalbureaucratsduringthedepressiondecade?TheNewDealwillbe examinedin fourareas,thoseoflocalgovernment,relief,labor,andracerelations.In thesesixcitiesthefederalgovernmentexertedlittleinfluenceon munici-pal governance.Cityhallsandcommunityelitesrespondeddesulto-rilyto theeconomicupheavalsof the 1930sandwerecommittedtobalancedbudgetsandlimitedreliefspending.Opponentsof laborunionismcontinuedtobesuccessful.TheNewDealintheSouth,asinotherregions,attemptedno massiveassaulton racial discrimina-David R. Goldfield, CottonFields and Skyscrapers:SouthernCity and Region, 1607-1980(Baton Rouge, 1982), 3 (quotation). See also David R. Goldfield, "The New Deal as a BigDeal for SouthernCities,"Newsletterof the North Carolina Institute ofAppliedHistory, III

(March 1984), 10-13; and David R. Goldfield, "The Urban South:A Regional Framework,"AmericanHistorical Review, LXXXV(December 1981), 1009-34.5 Bruce M. Stave, "Pittsburgh and the New Deal," in John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner,

and David Brody, eds., The New Deal: The State and Local Levels (Columbus, Ohio, 1975),376-402; Lyle W. Dorsett, "Kansas City and the New Deal," in Braeman, Bremner, andBrody, eds., The New Deal, 407-18; Roger Biles, Big City Boss in Depression and War:MayorEdwardJ. KellyofChicago (De Kalb, Ill., 1984); Charles H. Trout, Boston,the GreatDepression, and the New Deal (New York, 1977), 315 (quotation); RichardWade quoted inTrout, Boston,x; andZane L. Miller, TheUrbanizationofModernAmerica:A BriefHistory(New York, 1973), 168-69. In The New Deal in the Urban South(BatonRougeand London,1988), Douglas L. Smithmakes the case for changeduring the 1930s.


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tion,andtheplightofblacksremainedessentiallyunchanged.NewDeal largessprovidedwelcomeassistancebut did not alter tradi-

tional institutions. In many essential respects, southerncitiesrespondedtotheNewDeal inmuchthesamewaythatmunicipalitiesdidinotherregionsofthenation-that is, therewas morecontinuitythanchange.6

In the solidlyone-partySouthof the 1930s,theDemocratsheldswayinallsixcities.Ineachlocationmunicipalleaderspledgedtheirfealtyto PresidentRooseveltandobservedwhatbecamea rite ofpoliticalorthodoxyby affirmingtheir supportof the NewDeal.Rhetoricaside,however,the attachmentto Washingtonremainedpartisan,notideological.Mindfuloftheprecariousnessofanationalpartyallyingblacks,labor,thebigcity'spolyglotmasses,anda con-servativeSouth,the presidentcarefullycultivatedthe supportofDixie'ssachemswhileoverlookingtheirdeviationsfromofficialpol-icies.Moreover,he reacheda modusvivendiwiththe region'sbigcitypoliticosaswellas withthegalluseddemagoguesofthebackwa-ters.LiberalbackersofRooseveltandtheNewDealfounditdifficulttoacknowledgesupportforthepresidentfromsuchunsavorysouth-

ernersasTheodoreG. BilboandEllisonD. ("CottonEd")Smith-justastheyblanchedatbeinginleaguewithequallyunattractivebigcitybossesof theFrankHagueandThomasJ. ("Tom")Pendergastilk.ButRoosevelt,alwaysa cold-bloodedrealist,sawinthesevari-ousDemocratsasourceofvotesnottobe spurnedsimplyforreasonsof ideologicalpurity.As longas theydeliveredtheirprecinctsandkepttheirdefalcationsto an acceptablelimit,disreputablesouthernDemocrats-liketheirnortherncounterparts-remainedinthepresi-dent'sgoodgraces.7

Strainson such a tenuousalliancepredictablydevelopedinMem-phis,wherethe localDemocraticmachineof Edward H. ("Boss")Crumpmaintainedunquestionedhegemonythroughoutthe decadeandwellintothepost-WorldWarIIyears.Firstasacongressmanandlateras a privatecitizen,theMemphisbosssupportedallNewDealmeasures.Whileservingin the House of Representatives,Crumpvotedfor everyRoosevelt-endorsedlaw,remainedunstintingin hispraise of the New Deal, and argued that "Roosevelt. . . has done

morefor the Souththananypresident-aid to the farmers,publicworks, TVA. . . ." Crumpclashedwith Roosevelton occasion and6 U. S. Bureauof theCensus,FifteenthCensusoftheUnitedStates:1930.Population,I

(Washington,1931),18.' On Roosevelt'stiesto theSouthseeFrankFreidel,FD.R. andtheSouth(BatonRouge,

1965);JamesT. Patterson,CongressionalConservatismandtheNewDeal (Lexington,Ky.,1967); GeorgeB. Tindall,TheEmergenceof the NewSouth,1913-1945(BatonRouge,1967),chaps.11-18; andJamesMacGregorBurns,Roosevelt:TheLionandtheFox(NewYork,1956),135-38,341-43.


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URBAN SOUTH INGREAT DEPRESSION 75

balkedat themoreliberalNewDeal experiments,buthe remainedloyalbecauseof thelargessaffordedhismachineandtheautonomy

heenjoyedinpresidingoveritsdistribution.Citygovernmentappro-priatedverylittlemoney,butCrumpwas empoweredto namelocalreliefagentswho took chargeof dispensingfederalfunds.ShelbyCounty,whichincludedMemphis,with roughlyone-ninthof thestate's population,receivedone-seventhof the WorksProgressAdministration(WPA)jobs. Overthe years the combinedenroll-mentsof the FederalEmergencyReliefAdministration(FERA),CivilWorksAdministration(CWA),WPA,andPublicWorksAdmin-istration(PWA)broughtthousandsofjobs to Memphis-jobsthat,thoughcreatedandfundedbythefederalgovernment,passedintothehandsof needyMemphiansthroughthegoodofficesof theCrumporganization.NotonlydidthefederalgovernmentmakenoefforttodislodgethelocalDemocraticmachine,butitsbeneficentpatronagepolicyamountedto tacitapprovalof Mr. Crumpandhisminions.8

LikewiseinNewOrleans,Rooseveltwaswillingto associatewitha disreputablepolitical machine-in fact, whichevermachineappearedto hold theupperhand.MayorT. SemmesWalmsley,the

scionofanold and respectedNewOrleansfamily,claimedthesup-portof the localDemocraticmachine,the"Old Regulars."Indeed,onlythe oppositionof the OldRegularskeptU. S. SenatorHueyLongfromwieldingcompletecontrolinLouisiana,soLongusedhisdominancein the state legislatureto wagewar againstthe NewOrleansDemocrats.AstheLong-dominatedlegislatorstrimmedaidtothestate'sleadingcity,thefederalgovernment,mobilizingagainsttheKingfish,cutbackitscontributionstoNewOrleansas wellastoother cities in the PelicanState. MayorWalmsleyissuedseveralplaintiveappealsto thepresident,affirminghisloyaltyandarguingthathe and hiscitywerebeingpunishedunfairlywhenLongaloneshouldbe disciplined.Rooseveltrefusedto intervene,andthe OldRegularsboltedto Long'sfaction.Deprivedof patronageandcutadriftbyhisownparty,Walmsleybecamea forlornfigureheadandfinallyresignedin 1936.9

8 ShieldsMcIlwaine,MemphisDowninDixie(NewYork,1948),379-80(quotation);Wil-liamD. Miller,Mr. CrumpofMemphis(BatonRouge,1964), 179-80;LyleW. Dorsett,Franklin D. Rooseveltand the City Bosses (Port Washington,N. Y., 1977), 40; and RogerBiles,"ThePersistenceofthePast:MemphisintheGreatDepression,"JournalofSouthernHistory,LII (May1986),209-12.

9T. Harry Williams,HueyLong(NewYork,1969),425-27,675,849-53; BettyMarieField,"ThePoliticsoftheNewDealinLouisiana,1933-1939"(Ph.D.dissertation,TulaneUniversity,1973),83-84,109-12,286-87;WorkProjectsAdministration,"Administrationsof theMayorsof NewOrleans,1803-1936,"n.p., March1940,LouisianaDivision(NewOrleansPublicLibrary);T. SemmesWalmsleytoFranklinD. Roosevelt,August25, 1933,copyofa letterprovidedtotheauthorbyProfessorArnoldR. Hirsch.On thehistoryoftheOld RegularsinNewOrleansseeGeorgeM. Reynolds,MachinePoliticsinNewOrleans,1897-1926(NewYork,1936).


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AfterHueyLong'sdeath,thosewho inheritedhis organization,principallyGovernorRichardW. Leche and LieutenantGovernor

Earl K. Long,choseRobertS. Maestrito succeedWalmsley.Asmayor,accordingto a contemporary,Maestri"breakslaws,rules,and regulations with high-handeddisregard"and even seemedheadedforfederalprisonforincometaxevasion.In 1937hereacheda settlementwiththeInternalRevenueService,paid$134,000,andwas not indicted.Meanwhile,Maestriand Leche quickly mendedfenceswith the Rooseveltadministration,andthe flow of federaldollarsintoLouisianaresumed.In the strugglefor controlof NewOrleans'sDemocraticleadership,Rooseveltsidedwiththeeventualwinner,theOldRegulars-despitetheirconnectionswithHueyLongandtheirsordidreputations

Intheotherfourcitiesconservativeelitesdominatedlocalgovern-ments.In Dallas thedriveto bringcityhallmorefirmlyunderthecontrolofthebusinesscommunitycametofruitioninthe1930s.Thesilk-stockingCitizensCharterAssociation(CCA)successfullycam-paignedtoreplacethemayor-councilformofgovernmentwithacitymanager-councilarrangement.In 1935anoppositionfactioncom-posedofseasonedpols,knownas the CatfishClub,bestedtheCCAtogaincontrolofthecitycouncil.In1937,however,twohundredofthe city'scorporatepresidentsandchiefexecutiveofficersformedtheDallasCitizens'CounciltobreathenewlifeintothedyingCCA.Theinitiativewas providedbyoneman,R. L. ("Bob")Thornton.Aformertenantfarmerwhomismanagedseveralbusinessesintobank-ruptcy,Thorntonfinallystruckit richas a bankerandbecameoneofthe city'smostesteemedphilanthropists.Bythe mid-1930she hadgrowntiredof theinefficiencyof local governmentandresolvedtoseizeauthorityforthecity's"naturalleadership."In 1939thecandi-datesof thefledglingCitizens'Councilparlayedrumorsof graftinthe incumbentadministrationintoa resoundingvictory.The coun-cil's1941slate ran unopposed,andits dominanceof localgovern-mentcontinuedinto the 1960s.A localnewspaperobserved:"Inmanycities,powerdescendsfroma smallgroupof influentialbusi-nessmento the city council.Whatdistinguishesthe Dallaspowergroupfromothersis that it isorganized,ithasaname,it is not articu-latelyopposedanditwashighlypublicized.""

10Don Eddy,"KingfishtheSecond,"AmericanMagazine, CXXVIII(November1939),79(quotation);Field,"ThePoliticsof theNewDeal inLouisiana,"286-87;EdwardF. Haas,"NewOrleanson the Half-Shell:The MaestriEra, 1936-1946,"LouisianaHistory, XIII(Summer1972),288-99;NewOrleansBureauofGovernmentalResearch,"CityProblemsSeries,"No. 46, September28, 1936, Louisiana Collection(Howard-TiltonMemorialLibrary,TulaneUniversity,NewOrleans).

II WPAWriters' Project, Dallas Guideand History (Dallas, 1940), 193-94; Dallas Morn-ingNews,January26,March23, 27, 1967; transcriptofinterviewwithR. L. Thornton,Jr.,November8, 1980, DallasMayorsOral HistoryProject(Dallas PublicLibrary);Warren


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InBirminghamafiercelyconservativemunicipalgovernmentgaveno indicationof New Deal influence.With the Ku Klux Klan's

endorsement,truckingexecutiveJamesM. ("Jimmy")Jones,Jr.,wonthepresidencyofthethree-membercitycommissionin1925andheldtheofficeuntilhisdeathin 1940. Relinquishingthesupportofthehoodedempire,Jonesdriftedintotheorbitof thecity'spreemi-nentindustrialmoguls,theBig Mules.Herespondedto thedepres-sionby slashing city servicesand firing employees-muchto theapprovalofthedominantsteelinterests.Intheearly1930stheothertwo commissioners mitigatedJones's parsimony,primarily bydecreasingthenumberoffirings.TheBigMulesfoughtback,ledbyTennesseeCoal & Iron's(TCI) CharlesF. DeBardeleben,with anextensivepropagandacampaign.TheylobbiedAlabamanewspapereditorsandfinancedthereactionary,anti-NewDealweeklymaga-zine,Alabama.Asa result,thebalanceofpowerinthecommissionswungbacktotheconservativesin 1937withtheelectionofEugene("Bull")Connor,a renownedradiosportscaster.Fullydominatingthecommission,Jonesreaffirmedlocalgovernment'sdefenseofseg-regation,oppositiontounionization,andaversiontopublichousing

that, he argued,wouldunderminethe privatemarketfor low-renthousing.Thoughhe openlycriticizedthe New Deal infrequently,Jonescontinuedto exerthisindependencefromWashington.'2

InAtlantaandHoustonthelinkagesbetweencityhallandthecen-tralbusinessdistrictmayhavebeenlessobviousthaninBirminghamandDallas,buttheywerenolessbinding.Byallaccounts,theywereagooddealmoreadhesivethananyconnectionsbetweencityhallandWashington,D. C. In Atlanta,JamesL. Keyservedas mayorforthreeconsecutivetermsfrom1930to 1936-thankslargelyto thesupportof the Chamberof Commerce,RetailMerchantsAssocia-tion,Manufacturers'Association,andAssociatedGeneralContrac-tors, all of which endorsedhis austeritymeasures.DisenchantedwithwhattheyperceivedtobeKey'slacklusterrecord,thebusinesscommunitydesertedhiscandidacyin1936andsupportedstatelegis-latorWilliamB.Hartsfield,whowonaftera bitterstruggle.As onehistoriannoted: "Thougha hotly contestedelection, insteadofchangingthe directionof local government,Hartsfield'svictoryLeslie,Dallas, Publicand Private (New York, 1964), 64 (quotation).See also StanleyWalker, The Dallas Story (Dallas, 1956), 32-36.

12EdwardShannonLaMonte,"PoliticsandWelfareinBirmingham,Alabama:1900-75"(Ph.D. dissertation,UniversityofChicago,1976),135-36;RobertJ. Norrell,"LaborattheBallotBox:Birmingham'sBigMulesFightBack,1938-1948,"unpublishedpapergivenattheSouthernHistoricalAssociationannualmeetinginLouisville,Ky.,November2, 1984,10-11; "Miracle Man," Alabama: TheNews Magazine of the Deep South, II (May 17, 1937), 4;JamesM. Jones,Jr., toWilliamB. Hartsfield,June2, 1938,JamesM. Jones,Jr., Papers(AlabamaDepartmentof ArchivesandHistory,Montgomery,Ala.); BirminghamTimes-Herald,February8, 1940.


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7 8 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY

assuredcontinuity."In officeHartsfieldachievedsomenotorietybyvetoinganordinanceestablishinga housingauthorityandbyinviting

thered-huntingU. S. HouseCommitteeonUn-AmericanActivitiesto ferret outCommunistsubversivesinAtlanta.In 1940HartsfieldlostinhisbidforreelectiontoformerChamberofCommercePresi-dentRoyLeCraw.In Houstonfour-timemayorOscarF. Holcombefaithfullyrepresentedthe concernsof the local Democracyled bybankerandReconstructionFinanceCorporationdirectorJesseH.Jones.Againbusinessinterestswereserved,andthefederalgovern-mentplayedno major role.'3

Indeed,the local governmentsof these six cities showedno evi-denceof federal intrusionduringthedepressiondecade.The elec-toralsuccessesof Democratsowedless to FranklinD. Roosevelt'scoattailsthanto traditionalregionalvotingpatterns.In mostof thecities,firmlyentrenchedconservativebusinesselitescontinuedtodominatethelocalpolity;inmachine-governedcitiestheNewDealmadeno effort to unseat thegroupsin power.Justas thepresidentshowedconsiderableforbearanceinhisassociationwithavarietyofalliesinstateandnationalpolitics,so toodidhesufferinsilencehisrelationswithsouthernurbanleaders.FromAtlantatoHouston,justasinChicagoandPittsburgh,Rooseveltkepthandsofflocalpoliticsas solidly Democraticadministrationsreturned healthyvotingmajoritiesatelectiontime.IntheSouth'slargestcities,theNewDealexertednoinfluenceonthecompositionof communityleadership.

Tothemassiveunemploymentcrisisofthe1930s-bothbeforeandaftertheinceptionoftheNewDeal-southerncitiesrespondedinanextremelylimitedfashion.At the outsetof the GreatDepressionsoutherncitiesrankednearthebottomin socialservicesgenerallyandintheprovisionofreliefspecifically-thecontinuationofa long-standingtraditionthatwasdeeplyimbeddedbythetwentiethcentury.Whenthe stockmarketcrashedin October1929, none of the sixcitiesoperatedmunicipallyfundedreliefbureaus.From 1916 to1924Birminghamadministeredsuch a bureau,but it constantlystruggledto obtain adequatefundingandneverreceivedmorethan

13 NewYorkTimes,March20, 1932;KesavanSudheendran,"CommunityPowerStructurein Atlanta:A Studyin DecisionMaking,1920-1939"(Ph.D. dissertation,GeorgiaStateUniversity,1982),117;DouglasLee Fleming,"Atlanta,theDepression,andtheNewDeal"(Ph.D. dissertation,EmoryUniversity,1984), 214 (quotation);WilliamB. HartsfieldtoJamesL. Jones,Jr., July18, 1938,JamesM. Jones,Jr., Papers;AtlantaConstitution,Sep-tember 1, 1940; Harold H. Martin, WilliamBerry Hartsfield: MayorofAtlanta (Athens,Ga.,1978),32; E. ThomasLovell,"Houston'sReactionto the New Deal, 1932-1936"(M.A.thesis,UniversityofHouston,1964),2-3, 168-87;DavidG. McComb,Houston:TheBayouCity(Austin,Texas,1969),226-27;HoustonPost,April19,1933.Inhis1953studybasedonAtlanta,FloydHunternotedthatapermanenteconomicelitecontinuedtomakeallimportantcommunitydecisions,primarilyworkingbehindthescenesandthroughsurrogateofficials.Hunter, CommunityPower Structure: A Studyof Decision Makers (Chapel Hill, 1953).


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$18,000ayearfromcityofficials.After1924thecitymadea smallannualcontributionto theCommunityChest'sfamilyreliefagency.

Atlanta'sgovernmentunderwrotesomeof the expenseof indigentcare at the city'sGradyHospitalandcontributedto severalof thelocalCommunityChest'sthirty-ninecharitableagencies.In 1929onlytheMemphisCommunityFund,whichhadbeenorganizedsixyearsearlierthroughtheeffortsof theChamberof CommerceandtheCouncilof Social Agencies,functionedas a welfareagency.InNewOrleansa largenumberof privateandsectarianagenciesdis-pensedrelief; in HoustonandDallas,CommunityChestsdid thesame.14

As conditionsworsened,manufacturingreductionsandbusinessfailuresled to mountingunemploymentrates andwagecuts. TheTennesseeCoal& IronCompany,Birmingham'sleadingemployer,loweredwagesbetween50 and 75percentby 1933andthreatenedworkerswith dismissalif they protested the policy. Memphisemployersadopteda standardthirty-hourworkweekandpledgednotto hirewomen;between1929and1932employersin theBluffCityhandedoverto men approximately6,000jobs previouslyheldby

women.InHoustonthenumberofunemployedballoonedfrom1,100to nearly30,000in slightlymorethan a year. An Atlantasocialworkerestimatedin 1933 thatunemploymentratesreached30 per-centcitywideandashighas75percentinsomeblackneighborhoods.InNewOrleansthevolumeof foreigntradedecreasedover50 per-centfrom1928to 1933,andfederalsurveysreportedthatall indus-trialconcernsreducedtheirworkforcesandoperatedonlyafewdaysa weekatmost.Clearly,thoughtheextentofjoblessnessandmiserymayhavebeengreaterinsuchnortherncitiesasChicagoandDetroit,bythewinterof1932-1933southerncitiessufferedseverelyfromtheweightof the depression.15

14 Goldfield,CottonFieldsandSkyscapers,39-44;BlaineA.Brownell,"TheUrbanSouthComesofAge,1900-1940,"inBlaineA.BrownellandDavidR.Goldfield,eds.,TheCityinSouthernHistory: TheGrowthof Urban Civilizationin the South (Port Washington,N. Y.,andLondon,1977),155; DouglasL. Smith,"TheNewDeal andtheUrbanSouth"(Ph.D.dissertation,UniversityofSouthernMississippi,1978),239; Fleming,"Atlanta,theDepres-sion,andtheNewDeal,"47; MemphisCommunityFund,"AnnualReport,1940"(MemphisPublicLibrary);MarionAlcornto AubreyWilliams,April14, 1934, FERA StateFiles,1933-1936,Louisiana403-420,FieldReports(406),RecordsoftheWorksProjectsAdmin-istration,RecordGroup69(NationalArchivesandRecordsService,Washington,D. C.);HoustonPress,December4, 1934;DorothyDellDeMoss,"Dallas,TexasDuringtheEarlyDepression:The HooverYears,1929-1933"(M.A. thesis,Universityof Texasat Austin,1966),29-31; andWPAWriters'Project,DallasGuideandHistory,489-90.

15 Smith,"TheNewDeal andtheUrbanSouth,"35; Biles,"ThePersistenceof thePast,"188;WilliamE. Montgomery,"TheDepressioninHouston,1929-1933,"inRobertC. Cot-ner, ed., Texas Cities and the Great Depression (Austin, Texas, 1973), 156; Fleming,"Atlanta,theDepression,andtheNewDeal,"80-81; GlennMartinRunyan,"EconomicTrendsinNewOrleans,1928-1940"(M.A. thesis,TulaneUniversity,1967),22; AliceE.Stenholm,"Louisiana:ReportofaFieldTrip,December5-12, 1931,"StateFile:Louisiana,


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TABLE 1RELIEF EXPENDITURES BYCITY GOVERNMENT

AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONSJanuary 1 to March 31, 1931Municipal ($) % of Total Private ($) % of Total Total ($)

Atlanta 20,493 26.7 56,183 73.2 76,676Birmingham 74,544 50.4 73,326 49.6 147,870Dallas 34,622 48.3 37,109 51.7 71,731Houston 12,329 20.4 48,224 79.6 60,553Memphis 11,190 8.8 115,317 91.2 126,507New Orleans 0 0.0 27,103 100.0 27,103

TOTAL 153,178 30.0 357,262 70.0 510,440NOTE: Nationwide, local governments provided 60.4% and private sources, 39.6%.SOURCE:U. S. Bureauof the Census,ReliefExpendituresby Governmentand Private Orga-nizations, 1929 and 1931 (Washington, 1932), 6, 32-33.

Faced with unprecedenteddemandsfor relief, local governmentsrespondedbut not in a substantialway. The six cities contributedlittle for relief, roughly half as much as cities did nationally (seeTable 1). Burdenedby reducedtax collections,theycut expendituresto keep from going heavily in debt; this in turn resulted in paltryappropriationsforvital city services. In this regard, Memphisfit theSouth'stypicalpatternof keepingtax rates low and spendingmodestamountson services. The nation's thirty-sixth largest city in 1933,Memphisspentonly$18.21 per capita, placingit sixty-eighthoutofseventycitieswith over 100,000 population(seeTable2). FromJan-uary 1933untilSeptember1934ShelbyCountydependedentirelyon

federal and state funds for its $2 million emergencyrelief expendi-ture. In 1935Memphisbecamethe last major southerncity to estab-lish a permanentwelfaredepartment.16

If anything,the othercitiesprovedjust as niggardlyin their provi-sionof relief for the unfortunate.As late as 1934 New Orleans couldclaim the distinctionof being the nation's largest municipalitythatdid not provide a single penny for family relief; public employeedonationsand bond issues constituted the only ways in which cityhall responded.Even after MayorT. SemmesWalmsleydecidedtospendtax dollarsfor relief, the responsewas minimal:fromJanuary1933 to December1935 local fundscomprisedonly 3 percentwhilethe federal government contributed roughly 97 percent of relief

Records of the President's Organization for Unemployment Relief, Record Group 73(NationalArchives).

16 U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the U. S., 1935 (Washington,1936), 220-21; MemphisPress-Scimitar, February 18, 1935; and Memphis Boardof Com-missioners, "Resolution,"December 3, 1935, Folder 9, Box 10, Watkins Overton Papers,MississippiValley Collection(MemphisState UniversityLibrary, Memphis,Tenn.).


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TABLE 2PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 1935

Population NationalRank Total($) Rank

Atlanta 31 24.60 58Birmingham 34 15.58 69Dallas 33 24.81 57Houston 24 22.27 60Memphis 36 18.21 68New Orleans 16 24.91 56

Charities,Health & National Hospitals, & NationalSanitation ($) Rank CorrectionalFac. ($) Rank

Atlanta 2.48 39 2.50 48Birmingham 1.01 64 0.38 63Dallas 1.69 55 5.54 32Houston 1.63 56 1.78 53Memphis 1.84 50 1.45 55NewOrleans 2.76 32 0.71 60SOURCE:U. S. Departmentof Commerce,StatisticalAbstract of the U. S., 1935 (Washing-ton, 1936), 220-21.

funds. To guard against boondogglingand extravagant living bythoseon the reliefrolls, themayorandotherhighcityofficialsvisitedthe homesand inspectedthe automobilesof the needy. Birminghamrelief recipientsacceptedpaymentin "food checks"redeemableforcannedtomatoes,driedbeans,potatoes,rice, milk, andshortening-

not in cash that, officials felt, mightbe squanderedon nonessentialitems like liquor and tobacco. Determinedto cut spending, tight-fisted CommissionPresident Jimmy Jones said: "I am as much infavorof relieffor theunemployablesasanyone,but I amunwillingtocontinuethisreliefat theexpenseofbankruptingtheCityofBirming-ham."In a reply to U. S. SenatorHugoBlack'squery regardingthedesirabilityof increasedfederal aid to cities for relief, Jonesrepliednegatively.17

17 AlexanderKendrick, "Huey Long's 'Revolution'," Nation, CXXXIX (August 22, 1934),208-9; Robert E. Moran, Sr., "Public Relief in Louisiana from 1928 to 1960," LouisianaHistory, XIV (Fall 1973), 372; Alice E. Stenholm, "Louisiana"; New Orleans Bureau ofGovernmentalResearch, "CityProblemsSeries,"Numbers26 and43, Louisiana Collection;IrvingBeiman,"Birmingham:Steel Giant Witha Glass Jaw,"in Robert S. Allen, ed., OurFairCity(New York, 1947), 118; Memorandum,untitled, n.d. (quotation), andJamesM. Jones toHugo L. Black, telegram, February3, 1932, both in JamesM. Jones, Jr., Papers; New YorkTimes,July 25, 1932; and John Williams,"Strugglesof the Thirties in the South,"in BernardSternsher, ed., The Negro in Depression and War: Prelude to Revolution, 1930-1945 (Chi-cago, 1969), 173 (quotation).


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82 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERNHISTORY

Mountingdebtsleftcitiesat themercyoflocalbanks,whichman-dateddraconianbudgetcutsandemployeelayoffsbeforegranting

loans. On one occasion BirminghamavoidedbankruptcyonlybecauseOscarWells,headoftheFirstNationalBank,approveda $1millionloanto thecity.In 1934onlyan $800,000advancefromtheCoca-ColaCorporationkeptAtlantasolvent.Tomeetpayrollsthecityissuedscrip,whichlocalmerchantsfrequentlydiscountedto afractionof its intendedvalue. WhenWilliamB. Hartsfieldbecamemayorin 1937 the citystoodover$3 millionin debt,andthenewchiefexecutiveavoidedbankruptcybyconvincingRobertW.Wood-ruff, presidentof Coca-Cola,to providea loan sufficientto coverone monthof the city's$730,000monthlypayrollfor 4,000 cityemployees.18

A historianof the depressionin Houstonnotedthat the city'sresponses"weresimilartothoseoftheHooveradministration....Bothwereadherentsto the orthodoxeconomictheoriesof laissez-faire anda freemarket,andbothwerebelieversin governmentfru-galityandbalancedbudgets."Indeed,the city ended1935 with a$386,000 surplus and 1936with a $75,000cushion.Similarly,ledger-mindedDallas boastedof balancedbudgetsachievedby thetrimmingofoperatingexpensesby$1 millionayear.Asthemonthlycaseloadofthecitywelfaredepartmentrosetoanaverageof2,800in1931,cityofficialsinstitutedaplanwherebytheunemployedlaboredonedayperweekonpublicworksprojectsandwerepaidaslittleaseighteencentsanhour.Economycontinuedtobe the firstpriority.19

Withmunicipalgovernmentsscrupulouslyplayinga limitedrole,it felltoprivatecitizensto expandphilanthropicactivityin existingagenciesortoorganizeadhocorganizationstomeetthecrisis.Com-munityChestsincreasedtheirbudgetsand intensifiedtheir fund-raisingcampaigns.Hardtimescurtailedgivingby thosefortunateenoughtokeeptheirjobs,butmuchoftheresistancetofund-raisingfor emergencyreliefstemmedfromfirmlyentrenchedideologicalobjectionsto the "dole'"Forwhateverreasons,contributionsfre-quentlyproveddisappointing.When,forexample,MayorWalmsleyof New Orleanssentout twothousandlettersto the city'swealthylaunchingacharitycampaign,hecollectedonly$600forhisefforts.WhenWilliamJacobs,pastorof the First PresbyterianChurchofHouston,suggestedthat the city'sproblemscouldbe alleviatedif

18 Beiman,"Birmingham,"115-16; Atlanta Constitution,February2, 1932, December30,1934;Martin, WilliamBerry Hartsfield, 20; and Fleming, "Atlanta, the Depression, and theNewDeal," 222-25.

19 Montgomery,"Depressionin Houston," 153(quotation), 166;HoustonPost, January 25,1936; New York Times,August13, 1934; and Dorothy DellDeMoss,"Resourcefulnessin theFinancialCapital:Dallas, 1929-1933,"in Cotner, TexasCitiesin the GreatDepression, 124-26.


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twentyor thirtymillionairesdonated$5,000each,Dr. E. B. West,pastorof theSecondBaptistChurch,exclaimed,"I do not believea

moredangerousdoctrinehaseverbeenpreachedina pulpitinHous-ton."TheDallasMorningNewseditorialized,"TherichestoftherichinDallas havefallendownonthetask.Theyhaveshirkedinthefaceofthewinter'sdesperateneed."20 AndtheMemphisCommunityFundconcluded:"Comparisonswithcitiesbothnorthandsouthshowthatthe per capita giving in Memphis is low. . . . Our difficulties offinancingwillcontinueuntilthemenandwomenofwealthwithinourcitygivemoregenerouslyoftheirmeanstothecausesofsocialwel-farethantheyhavebeeninthehabitofdoinginthepast.'21 Theinade-quacyof individualeffortswas manifestin all six cities.Cityhallscloselyadheredto a policyof low taxes and limitedexpenditureswhilestrivingfor balancedbudgets.Stateresourcesweresimilarlylimited,andthefederalgovernmentbecamethelastresort.ThroughFERAs directreliefmeasuresand throughpublicworksagenciessuchas the CWA,PWA,and,mostimportant,theWPA,millionsoffederaldollarsmadetheirwayto southerncities.WhilePresidentRoosevelt'soffer of assistance met with eager

acceptance,thisdidnotreflectachangeinthecommunities'attitudestowardpublicwelfare.TheNewDealmeantsimplytemporarymea-suresto helpthebeleagueredcitiessurvivehardtimes.22

In somesoutherncitiesresistancetoanexpandedfederalpresencerestrictedtheamountofaidmadeavailabletothepoor;oftenrecalci-trant stategovernmentsthrewup elaboratedefensesagainstwhattheyviewedas excessiveNew Deal incursions.GovernorEugeneTalmadgeof Georgiainsistedthatfarmersdesperatelyneededhelpbut that city dwellerswere "bums"and "chiselers."As a result,accordingto WPA fieldrepresentativeAllenJohnstone,TalmadgerefusedtoletFERAadministratorGaySheppersondo herjob.John-stonereportedthat"daysandweeksofdelayinterrupttheorganiza-tion and interpretation.Appointmentsare held up. The Governorinsistsonsigningeverycheck.Wantstoknowthenameandaddressof everypersonon staff andalmostthenameandaddressof everypersonon relief. Harassesthe administrationby continuedcriti-cism."TalmadgetoldShepperson,in a widelyreportedremark,thatthebestwayto handlereliefapplicantswouldbe to "linethemupagainsta wall and give them a dose of castor oil." Conditions

20 New York Times, April 3, 1932; HoustonPost-Dispatch, October 5, 1931; and DallasMorningNews, December 4, 1931.

21 MemphisCommunityFund, "Annual Report, 1931,"p. 5 (Memphis Public Library).22 A comprehensivediscussionof NewDealagenciesandprogramscanbe foundinWilliam

E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Rooseveltand the New Deal (New York, 1963); and Otis L.Graham,Jr., andMeghanRobinsonWander,eds., Franklin D. Roosevelt,HisLifeand Times:An Encyclopedic View (Boston, 1985).


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84 THE JO URNA L OF SO UTHERN HISTORY

improvedwhen avowedNew Dealer Eurith D. RiversreplacedTalmadgein 1936,buta tightfistedlegislatureunderminedRivers's

blueprintfora "LittleNewDeal."Finally,thestate'srefusalto raiserevenueformatchinggrantsled Roosevelttoterminateall WPAandPWAfundsto Georgia.23

Resistancetofederalcontrolsurfacedinothercitiesaswell.NewDeal administratorschronicledthe oppositiontheymet, as in Bir-mingham,whereDirectorofPublicWelfareRobertaMorganrefusedto cooperate fully. FERA regional social worker Loula DunnreportedMorgan'sintransigenceand added that "the old privateagencyattitudesandmethodsstillprevailon the wholein thedirec-tionoftheprogram,andI sometimesquestionhowablewewilleverbe to makeanyrealprogressinBirmingham."FERArepresentativeElmerScottsimilarlynotedthedesireofHouston'sleaderstoacceptoutsideaid without shoulderingany responsibilities in turn; itshockedhim"howparasitica local communitymaybecome."In amomentofcandor,theHoustonPressacknowledgedthehypocrisyofits city'srelianceon states rightsdogma,saying:"Werecognizedstateboundarieswhenwe were calledon to give,but forgetthemwhenUncleSamis doingthegiving.'24In Memphisthe refusalto supplementfederalspendingunder-scoredthe unchangedprioritiesof communityleaders. In 1937Memphisallocatedone-tenthof 1percentofitsbudgetforcharities,whileauthorizingmorethanthatforrecreation.WPAchiefHarryL.HopkinsaccusedMemphisofshirkingitsduty,a chargethatMayorWatkinsOvertondeniedbyarguingthatMemphishaddoneyeomanworkin 1931-1932beforethefederalgovernmentbecameinvolved.Hopkinsrejectedthis argument,whichapparentlydid not botherOvertonatall. As onehistoriannoted,DemocraticbossEdwardH.Crumpand Overton"applaudedthe involvementof Washingtoninwelfarewhileorganizinga localreliefapparatusonlymarginallysympatheticto the jobless and indigent."ElmerScottobserved,"Memphisgave the distinct feeling that a warm welcomewasextendedto governmentconcerningitselfwith the plightof theunemployed,andpayingthebills-as longas it istheFederalgovern-

23

AllenJohnstonetoHarryHopkins,September18, 1933,FERAStateFiles,1933-1936,Georgia401.2-420,FieldReports(406), RG 69; Jane WalkerHerndon,"EdRiversandGeorgia's'LittleNewDeal',"AtlantaHistoricalJournal,XXX(Spring1986),99-103(quota-tionon p. 99); and "PWAandGeorgia:The State'sNo-DebtPolicyRousesthePresident'sIre;"Newsweek,XII (December5, 1938),12.

24"ServicetoHumanity:TheCareerofRobertaMorgan,"Folder12,Box1, RobertaMor-ganPapers(BirminghamPublicLibraryArchives);LoulaDunntoRobertP. Lansdale,Octo-ber19, 1934,FERAStateFiles,1935-1936,Alabama401.3-420,FieldReports(406), andMarionAlcornto AubreyWilliams,April9, 1934, FERA StateFiles, 1933-1936,Texas401.2-410,FieldReports(406),bothinRG 69;andHoustonPress,March23, 1936(Scottquotation).


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TABLE 3RELIEF BENEFITS BY CITY, JULY 1934-JUNE 1935

Population Average ReliefBenefitsRank Per Family Per Month ($)

Atlanta 31 21.13Birmingham 34 17.11Dallas 33 16.38Houston 24 17.56Memphis 36 21.97NewOrleans 16 28.46

Average= 20.44Akron,Ohio 35 29.08Columbus,Ohio 27 28.09Denver,Colorado 30 36.24Providence,RhodeIsland 37 35.94St.Paul,Minnesota 32 41.75Toledo,Ohio 28 26.70

Average= 32.96SOURCE:Arthur E. Burns,"FederalEmergencyReliefAdministration,"inClarenceE. Ridleyand Orin F. Nolting, eds., TheMunicipal Yearbook,1937(Chicago, 1937), 415-16.

ment.The local city and countygovernmentthus also welcomesabsolutionfromresponsibility-moralor financial.?25

Paltryallotmentsto relief recipientsin southerncities furtherunderscoredcommunitypriorities.Thefederalgovernmentdividedthe nationinto four regionsto establishvariableWPApay ratesapproximatinglocal standards.Thesoutheasternregion,includingAtlanta,Birmingham,andMemphis,receivedthe lowestmonthlystipends;thesouthwesternregion(NewOrleans,Dallas,andHous-ton)faredslightlybetter,andtheNortheastwas themostgenerouslyendowedregion.Certainlyreliefstipendsfellshortofdesirablelev-els nationwide,but southernurbanwelfarebeneficiariessufferedmost,receivingfrom33to65percentofthenationalaverage"emer-gencystandardof livingexpense"identifiedbyfederalauthorities.NewDeal officialsreportedthatWPAwagesforAtlanta'sunskilledworkers,adjustedfor costof living,constitutedthe lowestin thenationandthattheratesinotherDixiemunicipalitieswerecompara-ble(seeTable3).BitterAtlantaunionistsreferredtothelocaldispen-

25 MemphisPress-Scimitar,February18, 1935; U. S. Bureauof theCensus,FinancialStatisticsof CitiesOver100,000 Population, 1937 (Washington,1940), 186-87; Smith, "TheNewDeal andtheUrbanSouth,"264-65 (first quotation);ElmerScottto Harry Hopkins,April15, 1934,HarryL. HopkinsPapers,Box60, Folder"TennesseeFieldReports,1933-1936,"Group24 (FranklinD. RooseveltLibrary,HydePark,N. Y.) (secondquotation).


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sationof reliefas "legalizedpeonage."26Indeed,substandardpayrates,theimplacabilityofstateandlocal

officials,themiserlycontributionstopublicrelief,thenearlyabso-luterelianceon federalfunds,andthetestimonyof NewDealoffi-cialsallpointtoa dubiousrecordonthepartofsoutherncities.Thesemunicipalitiesdidestablish,for thefirst time,permanent,publiclyfundedwelfarebureausbut,accordingtoa studyofBirminghamthatseemsto reflectattitudesin theothercitiesaswell,"notbecauseofanyconvictionofthepublicatlargethatreliefwas a responsibilityofthewholepeopleratherthanaphilanthropytobesupportedbyafewindividuals;rather . . . becauseof the availabilityof federal fundsthrougha public department."Respondingtardilyand sparingly,localofficialsandcharity-mindedcitizenskepttheirfaithina fiscalorthodoxythat preachedthe virtues of a balancedbudget. TheacceptanceofNewDeal fundsprovidedawaytocleavetothesehal-lowednotionswhiletemporarilyexpandingreliefcoverage.Whendirectreliefbythefederalgovernmentwas terminatedby thecrea-tionoftheWPAin 1935,localofficialsmadeno movetotakeuptheslack;withoutfederalfunds,reliefvirtuallyvanished(seeTable4).27

As tables1, 2, and 3 indicate,thesesoutherncitiescontinuedtoprovidereliefin lesser amountsthandidothercitiesin the nation.Theyplaceddecidedlylowerinpercapitareliefexpendituresthaninnationalpopulationrankandpaidlowerreliefamountsthandidcitiesin otherregions.As a result, the indigentin these southerncitiesreliedmoreonprivatethanmunicipalaid-whereastheoppositepre-vailednationwide.Southerncitiesacceptedfederalfundsasatempo-rary expedient,but this concessioncertainlydid not acknowledgeanyneedtochangethesoutherncustoms,attitudes,andinstitutionsrelatedto providingreliefto the poor.Farfrombeinginfusedwithanynewspiritofsocialwelfare,thesesixsoutherncitiesseemnottohavealteredtheirpolicieson indigentcareat allduringthedepres-sionyears.

Whetherentirelyintendedor not, the New Dealhad a profoundimpactonlaborunionsbymeansofsuchlandmarkpiecesoflegisla-tionasSection7a,whichauthorizedworkerstoorganizeandbargainontheirownbehalf,oftheNationalIndustrialRecoveryAct(NIRA),theNationalLaborRelationsAct(NLRA),andtheFairLaborStan-dardsAct.Labor'ssuccessesinthe1930snotonlyactivatedalistless

26 Smith,"TheNewDeal andtheUrbanSouth,"225-26;DonaldS. Howard,TheWPAandFederalReliefPolicy(NewYork,1943), 178; and MichaelS. Holmes,"TheNewDeal inGeorgia:AnAdministrativeHistory"(Ph.D.dissertation,UniversityofWisconsin,1969),213, 237.

27 AnitaVandeVoorf,"PublicWelfareAdministrationinJeffersonCounty"(M.A. thesis,TulaneUniversity,1935),99.


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URBANSOUTHIN GREAT DEPRESSION 87

TABLE 4SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR RELIEF PROGRAMS, 1935-1936

Federal PercentofTotalSpent Dollars Spent Totalfrom

City and Time on Relief ($) on Relief FederalSources1935 5,910,810 5,051,153 85.5

Atlanta 1936 0 0 01935 5,452,319 5,072,506 93.0

Birmingham 1936 140,209 51,996 37.11935 1,776,400 1,429,494 80.5

Dallas 1936 0 0 01935 2,422,159 1,931,037 79.7

Houston 1936 0 0 01935 2,280,031 2,123,861 93.2

Memphis 1936 0 0 01935 9,241,949 8,973,956 97.1

New Orleans 1936 0 0 0SOURCE:Works Projects Administration,FinalStatisticalReportoftheFederalEmergencyReliefAdministration(Washington,1942), 327, 335, 343, 374, 376, 377.

AmericanFederationofLabor(AFL)butledindustrialunioniststobreakawayfromthecraftunion-controlledAFLto form the Con-gressof Industrial Organizations(CIO). Bothorganizationswonnotablevictoriesresultinginrecognition,collectivebargaining,andimprovedwagesandconditions,buttheymetstiffresistancein theSouth.Well-publicizedviolenceeruptedinthecoalminesofHarlan

County,Kentucky,thetextilevillagesoftheCarolinaPiedmont,andthecottonfieldsof plantationArkansas;andstaunchopponentsoftheclosedshop,higherwages,andemployeerightsmannedthebar-ricadesin urbanfactoriesas well. Determinedto protect regionalwagescales,whichpresumablygavesouthernindustrialistsa com-petitiveboost,andthreatenedby rumorsof Communistinfluenceandracialmixingin the CIO, big city governmentscurtailedcivillibertiesandemployedviolenceasreadilyasdidruralelites.Withafewexceptions,organizedlabor'sfoesinthesesixcitiesenjoyedcon-siderablesuccess.28Withoutquestion,organizedlabor'sgreatestbreakthroughin theSouthoccurredinBirminghamin 1937whentheUnitedStatesSteel

28 The standardtreatmentof labor's strugglesin the 1930s remainsIrvingBernstein,Turbu-lent Years:A History of theAmericanWorker,1933-41 (Boston, 1970). On southern attitudestoward labor see C. Vann Woodward,Originsof the New South, especiallyChap. 8; Tindall,TheEmergenceoftheNewSouth,351, 523; Cash,MindoftheSouth,296-99;andF. RayMarshall, Labor in the South (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 24-36.


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Corporation,parentcompanyof the TennesseeCoal & Ironfirm,signeda collectivebargainingagreementwith the CIO-affiliated

SteelWorkers'OrganizingCommittee(SWOC).ThisactionbroughtmorethantwentythousandsteelworkersinBirminghamanditssub-urbsunderunion-managementagreement.TCI disbandedits com-panyunion,andin1941SWOCobtainedexclusivebargainingrightswithinthecity'ssteelindustry.Althoughobtainingrecognitionfromthe city's leadingemployerconstituteda notableachievement,itwouldbewrongtoconcludethatresistancetoindustrialunionisminBirminghamhadbeencrushed.Afterall,theunionprosperedlocallyonlybecauseof a nationalsettlement,andmembershipremainedsmall.Immediatelythe chairmanof RepublicSteelrushedto Bir-minghamto assert thathis companyhadno intentionof followingU. S. Steel'slead in bowingto organizedlabor.The city'spolicechiefannouncedhis intentionto quashall strikesandrespondedtothecriticismhisremarksprovokedby sayingthat"communistrav-ingsfromNew Yorkare like so muchwateron a duck'sback."AresurgentKuKluxKlan terrorizeda ministerwho allowedUnitedMineWorkersorganizerstomeetinhischurch.In1937JamesSimp-son, a state senatorfrom Birmingham,wrote and helpedsteerthroughthe legislaturea bill prohibitingpicketing;in 1939 herewrotethestate'sunemploymentcompensationlawtodisallowben-efitsfor strikingworkers.If anything,TCI'spathbreakingconces-sionin1937seemedtostiffenresistancetoorganizedlabor.In1940thelocalChamberofCommercegrudginglyadmittedthatunionshadmadesomegainsintheircityoflatebutcounteredthat"thedistrictisstillopenshopandindicationsareit willremainSo."129

OppositionthroughouttheSouthtotheCIOwas causedlargelybytheunion'sputativeracialliberalism,andresistancewasespeciallystiff in Birminghamwhereapproximately41 percentof the steel-workers,56 percentof the ore miners,and 63 percentof the coalminerswereblack. In 1933 only threeor four of Birmingham'sunionshadlistedanyblackmembership.Therewerea few small,separatelocalsof blackplasterersandmusicians,anda handfulofblackbricklayersandpostmenbelongedtounions.Butbytheendofthe decaderecruitmenteffortsby the UnitedMineWorkers,theUnionofMine,MillandSmelterWorkers,andtheSWOCincreasedblackmembershipintheunions,perhapstoasmuchas30percent.30

29 LucyRandolphMason,ToWinTheseRights:A PersonalStoryoftheCIO in the South(New York, 1952), 62; Marshall, Labor in the South, 186; George R. Leighton, "Birming-ham, Alabama: The City of PerpetualPromise,"Harper'sMagazine, 175(August1937), 241;New York Times,August2, August 5, 1937, p. 18, col. 3 (first quotation);Norrell, "Labor atthe Ballot Box,"15; and Billy Hall Wyche, "SouthernAttitudes Toward Industrial Unions,1933-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1969), 61 (second quotation).

30 Norrell, "Labor at the BallotBox,"7-8; Horace R. Cayton andGeorgeS. Mitchell,Black


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ThesouthernheadquartersoftheCommunistpartywerelocatedinBirmingham,and that presenceexplainswhy chargeswere fre-

quentlymadeaboutCommunistinfluenceonlaboractivitiesthere.Membershipin thepartyneverexceededabout250(mostofwhomwereblack),butthelocalbranchofficepublishedawidelycirculatednewspaper,SouthernWorker,and the Communist-fundedInterna-tionalLaborDefensekepta highprofile.Fearof radicalismledtoviolentretributionby the KuKluxKlan,AmericanLegion,WhiteLegion,SilverShirts,andAlabamaBlackshirts.TheBirminghampolicedepartmentformeda "redsquad,"ledby a privatedetectivewhowas paidbyTCIandRepublicSteel,toharassCommunistsandlaborleaders.Thecity'sofficiallabornewspaper,SouthernLaborReview,blamedlocal authoritiesfor attemptingto "'passthebuck'for'so manystrikes'and'so muchdisorder'totheCommunists....Thepurposeoftheoperatorsistogetthepeople'sattentionontheso-calledCommunistssotheywillnotseetherealcauseof thetrouble..... Fueledbythefearof radicalismaswellasby anaversiontointegration,Birmingham'sleaderscontinuedto fight a rear-guardactionevenaftertheunionizationof theredoubtableTCI.31

Labor'swidelyheraldedvictoryintheBirminghamsteelmillsdidnotresultina city-widecapitulationonthepartofcivicandbusinessleadership,nordidnewsofthebreakthroughfororganizedlaborleadto massivechangeselsewhere.A fewisolatedvictoriesfor laborattractedattention,principallybecause they were uniquein theSouth.Forexample,theUnitedAutoWorkers(UAW)stagedtheautoindustry'sfirstsit-downstrikeinAtlanta'sFisherBodyandChevroletplants.Precipitatedbymanagement'sthreatto fire twoworkersforwearingunionbuttons,thesit-downlastedonlyonenight,andpick-etingresumedoutsidetheplantswhenGeneralMotorsagreednottoproducepriortoastrikesettlement.TheUAWheldoutforoverthreemonthsin theunusuallysnowywinterof 1936-1937,andmember-shipinthepreviouslytinyorganizationincreased.TheAtlantaCon-Workersand the New Unions (Chapel Hill, 1939), 315, 328; Herbert R. Northrup, OrganizedLaborandtheNegro(NewYork,1944),33, 45; and RobertJ. Norrell,"Castein Steel: JimCrow Careers in Birmingham,Alabama,"Journal ofAmerican History, LXXIII (December1986),672-80.

31

CaytonandMitchell,Black Workersand the NewUnions,

337-41;Marshall,Labor in

theSouth,183;U. S. Senate,CommitteeonEducationandLabor,75 Cong.,1 Sess.,Pursu-anttoS. Res.266,"HearingsonViolationsofFreeSpeechandRightsofLaborBeforea Sub-CommitteeonEducationandLabor,"Part3, p. 762; SouthernLaborReview,May9, 1934.See alsoWilliamR.Snell,"MaskedMenintheMagicCity:ActivitiesoftheRevisedKlaninBirmingham,1916-1940,"AlabamaHistoricalQuarterly,XXXIV(Fall andWinter1972),206-27;BruceCrawford,"BulletsFellonAlabama'"Nation,CXLI (September18, 1935),319-20; Thomas A. Krueger,And Promises To Keep: The Southern ConferenceFor HumanWelfare,1938-1948(Nashville,1967),10-21;andRobertP. Ingalls,"AntiradicalViolencein BirminghamDuringthe1930s,"JournalofSouthernHistory,XLVII(November1981),521-44.


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90 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERNHISTORY

stitution condemnedthe sit-downtacticand praisedthe AFL forrefusingtoemployit.Thestrikeendedinunionrecognition,andthus

a symbolicvictoryfor theCIO, butthesuccesswas isolated.From1935to 1938onlytwenty-fourstrikesbrokeoutin thecity,withnoresultant increasesin prevailingpay scales. As a historian ofdepression-ageAtlantaconcluded,"Thoughthe WagnerAct bol-steredAtlanta'sunions,theystill remainedsmallin numbersandstrengthin 1940."32

Communityleaderscommittedto the preservationof openshopsworkedassiduouslyto minimizetheinfluenceof labororganizers.ThelocalChamberofCommerceboastedthatDallas"wasoneofthefirstopenshopcitiesof the country"andadvertisednationallythevirtuesofthecity'sdocilelaborforce.Itadduced:"Thepercentageofforeignbornis negligible.Fromthesevast laborresourcesDallasindustriesmaydrawan unlimitedsupplyofnative,intelligentlabor,easily trained, loyal and efficient."The chamber's"Open ShopBureau"tookanactiveroleinpolitics,supportinganti-unioncandi-dates.TheDallasOpenShopAssociation,formedin1919byacote-rieoflocalbusinessmen,guaranteedthesolvencyofallitsmembers

incaseofwork-stoppingstrikesthroughtheuseofa rumoredtwo-to-three-million-dollarreservefund. Furthermore,it subjected anymemberwhoknowinglyhiredunionworkersto a $3,000fine.Thesuccessof thebusinesscommunityin safeguardingthe openshopresultedin total capitulationby the local AFL leadership,as wit-nessedbytheCentralLaborCouncilofferingtohelptheChamberofCommercekeepthe CIO outof the community.In Memphis,EdCrumpsotightlycontrolledtheAFL-affiliatedunionsin the TradesandLaborCouncilthattheytooenlistedintheanti-CIOcrusade.ThebossusedtheradicalspecteroftheCIO tolureindustrytoMemphisby promisingthatlocal authoritieswouldkeepthe dreadedunionsfromgaininga footholdthere. Severalfirmsbuilt largeplantsinMemphisafterreceivingthepromiseof thelocalChamberof Com-merce,as well as thecovertassurancesof the cityadministration,thattheCIOwouldbekeptout.33

Whenall else failed,municipalofficialsresortedtoviolence.InMemphislocalofficialsdrewthebattlelinesat theentrancesof the

32 Neil Herringand Sue Thrasher,"UAWSit-downStrike:Atlanta,1936,"in Marc S.Miller, ed., WorkingLives: The Southern ExposureHistoryofLabor in the South(New York,1980),173-79;AtlantaConstitution,February7, 1937;Mason,ToWinTheseRights,34-36;andFleming,"Atlanta,theDepression,andtheNewDeal,"350 (quotation).

33 Dallas Chamberof Commerce,"The Dallas Market,"Dallas, 1941 (Dallas PublicLibrary),12 (firstquotation),13 (secondquotation);NewYorkTimes,January5, 1930,sec. 3, p. 1; George Lambert,"DallasTriesTerror,"Nation,CXLV(October9, 1937),377;andRogerBiles,"Ed CrumpVersustheUnions:TheLaborMovementinMemphisDuringthe 1930s,"Labor History, XXV (Fall 1984), 533-52.


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city'sauto-relatedconcerns(FordMotorCompanyand FirestoneTireandRubberCompany).NormanSmith,a veteranUAWorga-

nizer,wasviciouslybeatenontwooccasionsbyunknownassailants.Despitestrenuousprotestsby the AmericanCivil LibertiesUnionandtheidentificationofthethugsbyseveraleyewitnesses,thepolicemade no arrests. WhenSmithrecoveredsufficiently,the UAWrecalledhimto its nationalheadquarters-amovesymbolicof theunion'sfailuretocracktheFordfortress.Withina fewmonthsCrumptriumphantlyboastedthat"everyonehasforgottentheCIOdownthisway.Don'thearanythingaboutit."In 1940therelativecalmof theprevioustwoyearsevaporatedas theUnitedRubberWorkers(URW)traineditsgunsonthecity'sFirestoneplant,thelargestunorganizedrubberfactoryinthenation.Ananti-unionmobbrutallypummelleda URWspokesman,andthe organizingcampaignfaltered.At thecloseof 1940theCIO'sfailuretoorganizetheworkersatFirestone,punctuatedby the equallyfruitlesseffortsat Ford, kept the vastmajorityofMemphis'sunskilledworkforcefreefromtheinfluenceof industrialunionism.34

In AtlantatheCIO metequallystiffopposition.The 1934General

StrikebytheUnitedTextileWorkersignitedsparksthroughoutGeor-gia, and strikersin Atlantaclosedall ten of the city'scottonmills.Threefemalepicketsat theExpositionCottonMillsuedthecompa-ny'sexecutivevice-presidentfor runningthemdownwithhis car.AnotherpicketerdiedafterbeinghitbyarunawayautoattheFultonBagandCottonMill.Policeteargassedan estimatedonethousandstrikerswhorefusedto clear theSouthernRailroadtracksneartheExpositionplant.Thestrikeragedinthemidstofthestate'sguberna-torial primary, an unpropitiousmomentfor incumbentEugeneTalmadge,whopromisedthathewould"neverusethetroopstobreakup a strike."Ontheverynightof theprimary,however,Talmadgecalledout thestate'sentirefour-thousand-manNationalGuardanddeclaredmartiallaw.Guardsmenbeatandbayonetedthestrikersandthensentthemto a makeshiftinternmentcampat Fort McPherson.Thegovernorreleasedthe16womenand119menpicketers,whohadbeenkept in a barbed-wireenclosurefor severaldays,whenthestrikeended.TheGeneralStrikefailedtotally,andtheAtlantamills

34 MemphisPress-Scimitar,September22, 23, 1937; Miller,Mr.CrumpofMemphis,215;Mason,ToWinTheseRights,104-5;E. H. CrumptoKennethD. McKellar,April6, 1938,Crump-McKellarCorrespondence,Box 3, KennethD. McKellarPapers,Memphis-ShelbyCountyArchives,MemphisPublicLibrary(quotation);RogerBiles,"Ed CrumpVersustheUnions,"543-46.OnetheoryidentifiedtheassailantsasPinkertonagentsemployedbytheFordMotorCompany.See JohnClarencePetrie,"MemphisMakesWaronCIO,"ChristianCentury,LIV (October13, 1937),1273-74;andMemphisCommercialAppeal,August25-30, December24, 1940.


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92 THE JO URNA L OF SO UTHERN HIS TORY

reopenedwith no change in their rigid open shop policy.35InNewOrleansandHoustonlaborconflictcenteredalmostexclu-

sivelyon the raciallychargedbattleto control the docks.In NewOrleansthecitycounciladoptedanordinancestipulatingthatonlycertifiedregisteredvotersbe employedon the waterfront.BlacklongshoremendescendeduponCityHall to protest,andinresponsecitycouncilpasseda revisedordinancerequiringatwo-year-oldpolltaxreceiptas a preconditionfor employment,whichstillpreventedblacksfromworkingon the docks.To circumventSection7a of theNationalIndustrialRecoveryAct,theNewOrleansSteamshipAsso-ciationorganizedseparatecompanyunionsforwhitesandblacks.Bytheendofthe1930s,the700whitelongshoremenworkedregularly;the2,100blackmembers,whoeachpaidhigherdues,didnot.TheHoustonShipChannelbecamethe locusof periodicviolence,andseveralpeoplewerekilledingunfightsbetweenpicketersandstrike-breakers.Laborwonfewvictories,however.In1931,forexample,alongshoremen'sunioncalledastrikewhensteamshipoperatorslow-eredwages from eightyto sixty-fivecentsper hour. After threeweeksofbitterfighting,thestrikersacceptedseventycentsperhour

andresumedwork.36Ascountlessepisodesinthesesixlocalitiesdemonstrate,therewasa largeamountofunionactivityinsoutherncitiesinthe1930s.TheviolencetriggeredbyCIOorganizingeffortsmadeit clearthatlocalauthoritiesbelievedthatunionsthreatenedestablishedsouthernlaborrelations.Laborrecordedsomenotablevictories-in thecase of theBirminghamsteelmills,thevictorywasduetoanationalagreement;but in other instances,suchas in theAtlantaautofactories,localeffortswonthe day.Nonetheless,themajorbreakthroughsfor theCIOwouldcomeinthenextdecade.Thisbelatedsuccess,achievedearlierinotherpartsof thenation,was forestalledbythepersistenteffortsof localauthoritieslikeMemphis'sEdCrumpandorganiza-tionslike the Dallas OpenShopAssociation.As F. Ray Marshallconcludedinhiscomprehensivesurveyofsouthernlabor,"inspiteofconsiderablefermentduringthe1930s,southernunionmembershipwasconcentratedmainlyin the olderAFLunionsandthe railway

35AtlantaConstitution,September5-23, 1934;andJohnE. Allen,"TheGovernorandtheStrike:EugeneTalmadgeandtheGeneralStrike,1934"(M.A. thesis,GeorgiaStateUniver-sity,1977),2 (quotation),3, 112-26.

36 Daniel Rosenberg,"Race, Labor and Unionism:New OrleansDockworkers,1900-1910"(Ph.D. dissertation,CityUniversityof New York,1985),303; RobertC. Francis,"LongshoremeninNewOrleans,"Opportunity,XIV (March1936),84; CarrollG. Miller,"AStudyoftheNewOrleansLongshoremen'sUnionsfrom1850to1962"(M.A. thesis,Louisi-anaStateUniversity,1962),30-31,36-37;Northrup,OrganizedLaborandtheNegro,149-50;NewOrleansTimes-Picayune,July2, 1938;HerbertR. Northrup,"TheNewOrleansLongshoremen,"Political Science Quarterly, LVII (December 1942), 544; Houston Post-Dispatch,October1, 22, 1931; andLovell,"Houston'sReactiontotheNewDeal,"77.


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TABLE 5POPULATION AND RACIAL COMPOSITION, 1930

TotalPopulation Blacks (0%o)Atlanta 270,366 90,075 (33.3)Birmingham 259,678 99,077 (38.2)Dallas 260,475 38,742 (14.9)Houston 292,352 63,337 (21.7)Memphis 253,143 96,550 (38.1)New Orleans 458,762 129,632 (28.3)SOURCE:U. S. Bureau of the Census, Negroes in the United States, 1920-32 (Washington,1935), 54.

brotherhoods."AndGeorgeB. Tindallcouldwellhavebeenspeakingoftheregion'scitieswhenheobservedthatsouthernorganizingcam-paigns"assumed. . . the characterofguerrillaactionspunctuatedbyoccasionalvictories,"implyingthat,despitenominalgainsinmem-bershipandthelayingofa foundationforfuturegrowth,"theSouthremainedpredominantlynonunionandlargelyantiunion."37

Blacksinthesesixsoutherncitieswerethevictimsofarigidracial

castesystem,weresaddledwiththelowest-payingjobs,andsuffereddisproportionatelyfromtheravagesof theeconomy'scollapse(seeTable5 for thesize of theblackpopulationin thesixcities).Tradi-tionally"lasthiredandfirst fired,"blackshadunemploymentratesthatdwarfedthoseforwhites.Ineachofthesixcities,incomparisonwithwhiteresidents,blackswerelesslikelytoowntheirhomes(andmorelikelyto own homesof lessvaluewhentheydidso), sharedtheir livingunitswithmorepersons,andmoreof them occupieddilapidatedstructures.Theyenduredthe indignitiesof a JimCrowsystemofsegregationstillinitsprime,experiencedpoliticalpower-lessnessbased upon systematic disfranchisement,and, thoughlynchingsoccurredlessfrequentlythanpreviously,fellvictimto acampaignof violenceand intimidationdesignedto preservewhitesupremacy.The New Deal suppliedrelief but alwaysunder thewatchfuleyeoflocalauthorities.Federalmoneyhelpedagoodnum-berofdestituteblackssurvive,a considerableaccomplishmentgiventhe tenorof the times,but it caused no changesin the racialcastesystem.3

37Smith, "TheNew Deal and the UrbanSouth,"519-22; Marshall,Labor in the South,222;and Tindall, The Emergence of the NewSouth, 515, 522.

38 Roger Biles, Memphis in the Great Depression (Knoxville, 1986), 92-93; Smith, "TheNew Deal and the Urban South," 38; James Martin SoRelle, "The Darker Side of 'Heaven':The Black Community in Houston, Texas, 1917-1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, Kent StateUni-versity, 1980), 133;-AlwynBarr, Black Texans:A History of Negroes in Texas,1528-1971(Austin, Texas, 1973), 154-55; RandyJ. Sparks, "'HeavenlyHouston'or 'Hellish Houston'?Black Unemployment and Relief Efforts, 1929-1936," Southern Studies, XXV (Winter


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94 THE JO URNAL OF SO UTHERN HISTORY

Jim Crow continuedto flourish as public accommodationsremainedseparateandunequal.Publicschoolsystemskeptblackand

whitepupilsstrictlysegregatedandappropriatedfarfewerresourcesfor the educationof blacks than for whites. In Birmingham,forexample,whiteteachersearnedan averageannualsalaryof $1,466andblackteachersonly$682.InAtlantatheaveragepupilexpendi-tureforwhitestudentsstoodat $95.20 but at $30.55forblackstu-dents.Publicparksand playgroundsalso bore the stampof JimCrow,asinHouston,whereblackshadaccesstoonlyoneoftwenty-sevenmunicipalparksandoneoftenplaygrounds.InthatTexascityan ordinancemandatedseparateseatingonbuses,butsomedriversrefusedtotakeanyblackpassengersatall;inBirminghamstreetcars,largemovablepartitionsclampedonthebacksofseatserectedbarri-ers betweenblackandwhiteseatingareas.Taxicabsoperatedbywhitesrefusedblackpassengers,andonly"Harlemcabs"acceptedblackfares.TheAtlantaCityCouncilpasseda barbershopsegrega-tionlawpreventingblackbarbersfromservingwhites.Somerealestateagentsprotested,fearinglossofmoneyifblack-ownedshopsclosed,andtheAtlantaConstitutionnotedthatblacksservingwhitesdidnotviolateacceptedcustoms.Thecitycouncilreconsideredandadoptedaweakerlawthatonlyprohibitedblackbarbersfromservingwhitewomenandchildren.39

Segregatedhousingprevailed,bycustomifnotbylegalfiat.Inthe1920sAtlanta,Birmingham,andNewOrleansalladoptedresidentialsegregationstatutesto assure the separationof the races,but theU. S. SupremeCourtdecisionofSmithv. Atlanta in 1926ruledthepracticeillegal.In 1926theTexasCourtofCivilAppealsabrogatedaDallas residentialsegregationlaw,butDallaslegislatorsled a suc-cessfulfightforanewstatelawthatproducedsegregationbypermit-ting municipalcontroloverbuildingpermits.In all of the citiesblacksinhabitedthe mostundesirabletopographicalareas, con-1986), 353-66; U. S. Bureau of the Census, Negroes in the United States, 1920-32 (Wash-ington, 1935), 277-81. On the impactof the New Deal on blacks see Harvard Sitkoff,ANewDealfor Blacks: The Emergenceof Civil Rights as a National Issue (New York, 1978); JohnB. Kirby, Black Americans in the Roosevelt Era: Liberalism and Race (Knoxville, Tenn.,1980); RaymondWolters, Negroes and the Great Depression: The Problem of EconomicRecovery(Westport, Conn., 1970); RichardSterner, TheNegro'sShare: A Studyof Income,Consumption,Housingand PublicAssistance (NewYork, 1943); RalphJ. Bunche,ThePoliti-cal Statusof theNegroin the Age of FDR (Chicago, 1973); Allen F. Kifer, "TheNegroUnderthe New Deal, 1933-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, Universityof Wisconsin, 1961); and LeslieH. Fishel, Jr., "The Negro in the New Deal Era," WisconsinMagazine of History, XLVIII(Winter 1964-1965), 111-26.

39 CharlesS. Johnson,Patterns ofNegroSegregation(New York, 1943), 22, 50; MarciaE.Turner-Jones, "A Political Analysis of Black Educational History: Atlanta, 1865-1943"(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1982), 194; Jesse 0. Thomas, A Study of theSocial WelfareStatusoftheNegroesinHouston, Texas(Atlanta, 1929), 93-94; SoRelle, "TheDarker Side of 'Heaven',"97; and Sudheendran, "CommunityPower Structure in Atlanta,"280-82.


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signedto theleastcovetedlandnearswamps,creeks,bayous,mainrailroad lines, spur lines, terminals, and manufacturingareas.

Unlikethesituationinmostnortherncities,whereblackssucceededotherimmigrantgroupsandformedexpansiveghettosin the innercityadjacentto downtowns,landin southerncitieswas usuallysetasideforscatteredblackhousingsites.Therefore,blacksclusteredinneighborhoodslike"SlipperyLogBottoms,""QueenBeeBottoms,"and"Shinertown"inMemphis;"BeaverSlide"and"TanyardBottom"in Atlanta;"ElmThicket"and"OakCliff' in Dallas;and"TuxedoJunction"in Birmingham.40

Keenlyawareof the severesocioeconomiclimitationsimposeduponthem,blacksfoundno hopefor ameliorationin the politicalrealm.Primarilythroughtheuse of JimCrowlawsbutalso throughforceand intimidation,municipalgovernmentdisfranchisedthou-sandsof potentialblackvoters.In Texasthewhiteprimaryformedtheprincipalhurdle.In 1936a groupof thestate'smostinfluentialblacks,includingAntonioMaceoSmithandMaynardH. JacksonofDallas andCliffordRichardsonandRichardR. GroveyofHouston,organizedthe ProgressiveVotersLeagueto foster blackpolitical

activism.Theirprincipalgoalcontinuedtobetherepealofthewhiteprimarylaw,buttheyenjoyednosuccessinthe1930s.Notuntil1944didtheU. S. SupremeCourtrulethewhiteprimaryunconstitutionalinthelandmarkSmithv.Allwrightdecision.In Dallas andHouston,therefore,fewblacksvotedorevenpaidtheirpolltaxes-only3,400in Dallas in 1938 and 400 in Houston in 1935.41

Statelegislaturesin Louisiana,Alabama,andGeorgiautilizedavarietyof methodsto barblacksfromvoting,includingpoll taxes,grandfatherclauses,understandingclauses,literacytests,andprop-erty requirements,in additionto whiteprimaries.Of the 117,347registeredvotersinNewOrleansin 1930,only2,128wereblack;by1940only609blacksremainedontherolls.InBirminghamblacks

40 Johnson,Patterns ofNegroSegregation, 176; Brownell, UrbanEthosin the South, 183-84; "TheAtlantaZoningPlan,"Survey,XLVIII(April22,1922),114-15;BirminghamZon-ingCommission,"ZoningOrdinanceofBirmingham,Alabama:EffectiveAugust4, 1926,"n.p., n.d.,DepartmentofSouthernHistory(BirminghamPublicLibrary);MichaelL. Port-er, "BlackAtlanta:AnInterdisciplinaryStudyofBlackson the EastSideofAtlanta,1890-1930"(Ph.D. dissertation,EmoryUniversity,1974),27; Barr,BlackTexans,140; RobinFlowerdew,"SpatialPatternsofResidentialSegregationinaSouthernCity,"JournalofAmer-icanStudies,XIII (April1979),96-100;RayburnW. Johnson,"LandUtilizationinMem-phis"(Ph.D. dissertation,Universityof Chicago, 1936),50-52; DorothySlade,"TheEvolutionofNegroAreasintheCityofAtlanta"(M.A. thesis,AtlantaUniversity,1946),23-28; JamesK. Howard,"AnEconomicandSocialHistoryofDallas,Texas"(Ph.D.disserta-tion,HarvardUniversity,1956),39; andOtisDismuke,"TheOtherSide:TheStoryofBir-mingham'sBlackCommunity,"n.p., n.d. (UniversityofAlabamainBirminghamLibrary).

41 RobertHaynes,"BlackHoustoniansandtheWhiteDemocraticPrimary,1920-1945,"inFranciscoA. Rosales and Barry J. Kaplan, eds., Houston: A TwentiethCentury UrbanFron-tier (PortWashington,N. Y., 1983), 122-37;SoRelle,"TheDarkerSideof'Heaven',"172-94, 300-307; Barr, Black Texans,136; and Bunche,Political Status of the Negro, 466.


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96 THE JO URNA L OF SO UTHERN HISTORY

madeuproughly38 percentofthepopulationbutlessthan2percentof the electorate.In Atlanta,wherea varietyof civic and church

groupsin the blackcommunityhadworkedfeverishlyduringthedecadeto counterdisfranchisement,thenumberofblackregisteredvotersincreasedonlyfrom500in 1930to 1,500in 1940,andfeweractuallyvotedbecausetheywereunabletopaytheirpolltaxes.OnlyinMemphisdidlargenumbersofblacksexercisethefranchise-andthen only at the sufferanceof the omnipotentCrumpmachine.Crumpusedthestate'spolltaxtohisadvantagebypayingthelevyforblackvoters,keepingthereceiptsuntilelectionday,andthendistrib-utingthemto "reliable"voters.Blacksvotedin Memphisin greaternumbersthananywhereelsein theSouth,buttheirvoteswerecon-trolledbya whitepoliticalmachine.42

Thepoliticalpowerlessnessofblacksreflectedtheirvulnerabilityinallareasoflifeinthe1930s.Periodicviolenceandsustainedperse-cutionof blacksunwillingto adhere to prescribedbehavioralrolesservedasgrimremindersofwhitesupremacy.AlthoughtheKuKluxKlanhaddisappearedinmostplacesbythemid-1920s,it continuedtooperateonareducedscaleinBirminghamandDallasinthe1930s.

Aslateas1939theAtlantaKlan,sixhundredstrong,paradedinfrontof the offices of the AtlantaConstitutionto protest the newspaper'seditorialpolicies.Forseveralmonthsin 1930,anotherparamilitaryorganization,theBlackShirts,ledthecrusadeforwhitesupremacyinGeorgia'scapital.Led byformermayorWalterA. Sims,theBlackShirtsblamedunemploymentoncompetitionfromblackworkersand"servednotice"on Atlantabusinessesto replaceblackwithwhiteworkers.Whenitsleaderswerejailedforpassingfraudulentchecks,drunkendriving,andtaxevasion,theorganizationunraveled-butnotbeforeit focusednationalattentionon the NewSouthcitythatlaterprideditselfon beingtoobusytohate.43

Throughoutthe 1930sAtlantawas the southerncitymostvisiblyengagedinthepersecutionofdissidentblacks.Inthemostcelebrated

42 DonaldE. DeVore,"TheRisefromtheNadir:BlackNewOrleansBetweentheWars,1920-1940"(M.A.thesis,UniversityofNewOrleans,1983),12-42,124;Norrell,"LaborattheBallotBox,"7; ClarenceA. Bacote,"TheNegroinAtlantaPolitics,"Phylon,XVI (FourthQuarter,1955),342-43;AugustusAlvenAdair,"APoliticalHistoryoftheNegroinAtlanta,

1908-1953"(M.A. thesis,AtlantaUniversity,1955),39-50;andBunche,PoliticalStatusoftheNegro,300,485. Thelasttwosentencesof thisparagraphareparaphrasedfromRogerBiles,"RobertR. Church,Jr. of Memphis:BlackRepublicanLeaderin theAgeof Demo-craticAscendancy,1928-1940,"TennesseeHistoricalQuarterly,XLII(Winter1983),372.

43 Snell,"MaskedMenintheMagicCity,"225; Barr,BlackTexans,139;NewYorkTimes,November27, 1939,sec. 1, p. 7; John HammondMoore,"CommunistsandFascistsin aSouthernCity:Atlanta,1930,"SouthAtlanticQuarterly,LXVII(Summer1968),444-53;EdwinTribble,"BlackShirtsin Georgia,"NewRepublic,LXIV (October8, 1930),204-6(quotedphraseon p. 205);andCharlesH. Martin,"WhiteSupremacyandBlackWorkers:Georgia's'BlackShirts'Combatthe GreatDepression,"LaborHistory,XVIII(Summer1977),366-81.


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URBAN SOUTH IN GREAT DEPRESSION 9 7

cases the citychargedthe"AtlantaSix"andAngeloHerndonwithviolatingan obscure1866blackcodethatprohibited"attemptingto

inciteinsurrectionand circulatinginsurrectionaryliterature."Theplight of someone like Angelo Herndonmightbecomea causece'lbre, but for countlessthousandsof other blacksarbitraryvio-lenceandsubjugationremainedeverydayremindersoftheirinferiorstatus.Blacksin the IronCityreferredto their hometownas "BadBirmingham,"inreferencetoPoliceCommissionerEugene("Bull")Connor'sbrutal legions.Policehomicidesproliferatedthere, and"resistingarrest"becameoneof theleadingcausesof thehighmor-talityrateamongthecity'sblacks.TheMemphispolicehadasimilarreputation,enhancedbysuchepisodesas thekillingofblackpostmanGeorgeBrooksin 1938.PolicesergeantA. 0. Clark fatallyshotBrooksaftera whitewomen,whosenamethe authoritieshad notbotheredto ask when recordingher complaint,accusedthe lettercarrierof annoyingher. His superiorsquicklyexoneratedClark.Thoughviolenceagainstblackstranspiredless frequentlyin theotherfivecities,blackscomplainedof their poortreatmentat thehandsof local authorities.Theabsenceofmoreviolencegavetesti-

monytothefearandhopelessnessthatpervadedtheblackcommuni-tiesof thatera."In sucha benightedatmosphere,the New Deal understandably

madefewinroads,and southern-basedfederalbureaucratsdid notlaunchunpopularreformcampaigns.Southernersfearedthe NewDeal'sreputationof beingliberalon theissueof race, eventhoughRooseveltinitiatedfeweffortsdesignedspecificallytoaidblacksandhisadministration'scelebritycanbestbe attributedto theunofficialeffortsof a few activistssuchas HaroldL. Ickes,AubreyW. Wil-liams,and Eleanor Roosevelt.As in areaslikepoliticsand labor,localadministratorsexercisedconsiderableautonomyintheapplica-tion of New Deal programsand policies. For example,lack ofenforcementof the National RecoveryAdministration's(NRA)"color-blind"provisionsbecamelegendary.SouthernbusinessmenarguedthatwhiteshadalwaysreceivedhigherpayandtermedtheprevailingNRAwage scale muchtoo generousfor blacks.LongbeforetheU. S. SupremeCourtdismantledtheNRA,manyMem-

phisemployerssimplydisregardedthecodes'mandatoryequalpayfortheraces.InAtlantatheChamberofCommerceandthepurport-edlyprogressiveCommitteeon Inter-racialCooperationtookthe

44 WalterWilson,"Atlanta'sCommunists'"Nation,CXXX(June25,1930),730-31;DavidEntin,"AngeloHerndon"(M.A.thesis,UniversityofNorthCarolina,1963),21-61;CharlesH. Martin, TheAngeloHerndonCase and Southern Justice (BatonRouge, 1976); DorothyA.Autrey,"TheNationalAssociationfor theAdvancementof ColoredPeoplein Alabama,1913-1952"(Ph.D. dissertation,Universityof Notre Dame,1985),65, 124-29;Bunche,Political Status of the Negro, 493-94; and Houston Informer, March 26, 1932.


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leadinestablishinga wagedifferentialbaseduponrace.Indespera-tion,Atlanta'sblackChamberofCommerceaccededtoa two-tiered

scalebuthopedthebottomratewouldberaisedtoamoreacceptableminimum.TheAtlantaDailyWorldsardonicallycalledtheNRAthe"NegroRemovalAct."45

Blatantdiscriminationalso characterizedthedispensationofNewDeal relief and public worksjobs. DespiteRoosevelt'sexecutiveorderandadministrativeguidelinesbarringracialdiscriminationintheWPA,localagentsopenlypaidblackworkerslessthantheypaidwhites.In 1935Atlanta'saveragemonthlyreliefawardtowhiteswas$32.66andtoblacks$19.29;Houstongavewhites$16.86andblacks$12.67. Certificationofficialsin Birminghamcommonlyturneddownblackapplicantsafterintensivequestioningfoundthemunde-serving.In HoustonandMemphisofficialsregisteredblacksonlywhenall white applicantshad been providedfor. The MemphisbranchoftheNationalAssociationfortheAdvancementofColoredPeople(NAACP)inveighedagainsttheCivilWorksAdministrationofficials'practiceof assigningblackwomento homesof personalfriendsfor domesticworkas a prerequisitefor receivingaid. TheMemphisbranchof theNationalYouthAdministration(NYA)basi-callylimiteditsjob trainingprogramsforblackstodomesticworkinresponsetothecrythat"goodhelp"wasbecomingincreasinglyhardtofind.46

SegregationalsoprovedunassailablebyNewDealagencies.Manyprogramsenforcedseparation,as did theWPAin its sewingroomsandtheCivilianConservationCorps(CCC)initscamps.Theincho-ate publichousingprogrampreservedresidentialsegregationfirstundertheaegisofthePWAand,subsequently,undertheU. S. Hous-ingAuthority(USHA).All six citiesbeganconstructionof publichousingprojectsduringthe 1930sanddesignatedat least someofthemforblackoccupation.Noquestioneveraroseaboutthesuitabil-ityof segregatedhousingunits,butimplementationof theprogramarousedsomecontroversynevertheless.InHoustonblackhomeown-erswithhouseslocatedin the wayof federalpublicworksprojectshadnorecoursebutto acceptfromthegovernmenta fractionof the

45

GloriaBrownMelton,"BlacksinMemphis,Tennessee,1920-1955:AHistoricalStudy"(Ph.D. dissertation,WashingtonStateUniversity,1982), 148-49;AnnWellsEllis, "TheCommissiononInterracialCooperation,1919-1944:ItsActivitiesandResults"(Ph.D. dis-sertation,GeorgiaStateUniversity,1975),294-98;MichaelS.Holmes,"TheBlueEagleas'JimCrowBird':TheNRAandGeorgia'sBlackWorkers,"JournalofNegroHistory,LVII(July1972),277-79;AtlantaCityBuilder,September10, 1933;andAtlantaDaily World,August17, 1933.

46 Howard,WPAandFederalReliefPolicy,292; RuthDurant,"HomeRulein theWPA,"SurveyMidmonthly,LXXV(September1939), 274; Tindall, Emergenceof the NewSouth,547; Johnson, Patterns of NegroSegregation, 37; SoRelle, "Darker Side of 'Heaven',"138-39;andBiles,MemphisintheGreatDepression,94(quotedphrase).AlsoseeEdwardLewis,"TheNegroon Relief,"JournalofNegroEducation,V (January1936),73-78.


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valuefortheirproperty;if theyrefused,thegovernmentleveledthestructuresanywayto make roomfor improvements.DespitePWA

andUSHA housingcontracts'stipulationsthatblacksbeemployedinconstruction,local authoritiesfailedto honorthe agreement.Siteselectionwasunsettlingandstressfulforblacks.Birminghamblacksprotestedtheirexclusionfromdecisionmaking,especiallyregardingtheconstructionoftheSmithfieldCourtprojectforblacks.InMem-phis authoritiesrazeda black neighborhoodto erect whites-onlyLauderdaleCourtsanddestroyedoneofthecity'sfinestmiddle-classblack enclaves to build Foote Homes.The unilateral decisionsregardingpublic housing confirmedwhat many black leadersfeared-that theprimaryfunctionofpublichousingwastomaintainexistingracialsegregationratherthantoaddressinadequatehousing.Local officialssetguidelinesandimplementedpoliciesto reinforceexistingracialnorms-withlittleor no federal interference.Blackscontinuedtobesecond-classcitizensin thesesix cities.47

The NewDealdidnotdrasticallyalterlife in thesesix southerncities.Trueenough,federallyfundedprojectsgavethemaface-lift,asnewbuildingsshotupdowntown,andexistingstreets,sewers,and

otherpublicfacilitiesreceivedmuch-neededrepairs.Theselargelycosmeticchangesmayhaveimprovedtheappearanceofthecitiesbutapparentlyachievedlittleelse. The NewDeal workedthroughlocalcityhallsbutexertedvirtuallyno influenceonwhomadepolicyinthem.Alphabetagenciesallowedthecommunitiestomaintaintheirminimalcontributionstoindigentcarewhilefederalreliefcarriedtheoverwhelmingportionof theburden.No increasein socialwelfareactivityinthesecitiesensuedtoreflectanexpandedcommitmenttorelief.The abortiveattemptsof the CIOto establisha beachheadunderlinedthedegreetowhichlocalauthoritieseffectivelyopposedall that JohnL. Lewis'sunionsrepresented-theclosedshop,blackparticipationin the labor movement,collectivebargaining,and,reputedly,radicalism.Blackssurvivedthedepressionin somewhatbetterfashionbecauseofNewDeal aid,buttheirstatusin southerncommunitiesremainedunchanged.In short,PresidentRoosevelt'spoliciespresentedsoutherncommunityleaderswitha "can'tlose"proposition,the provisionof emergencypalliationwithno strings

attached.UndoubtedlytheNewDeal hadagreatimpacton someaspectsofsouthernlife.As historiansPeteDaniel,GilbertC. Fite, andJackTempleKirbyhaveshown,federalprogramsinitiatedduringthe

47HoustonInformer, May 20, 1940; SoRelle, "Darker Side of 'Heaven',"147-49; RobertC. Weaver, "Racial Policy in Public Housing,"Phylon, I (Second Quarter 1940), 153-54;E. W. Taggart (president, BirminghamNAACP) to J. C. DeHall, May 4, 1936, James M.Jones, Jr., Papers; and Biles, Memphis in the Great Depression, 94-96.


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1930srevolutionizedsouthernagriculture.BecauseoftheincentivesestablishedbyNewDealfarmprograms,plantationtenancyevapo-

rated, sharecroppersdesertedthe land, and modern mechanizedfarmingsteadilyenvelopedthe region.And as economistGavinWrighthaspersuasivelyargued,NewDeallegislationliketheNIRAandtheFairLaborStandardsAct,alongwithwork-reliefprogramsliketheWPA,raisedsouthernwagelevelsandtherebynudgedtheregionintothenationallabormarket.Thesesignificantchangesnot-withstanding,theNewDeal hadfewerrepercussionsin theregion'scities. Curiously,giventhe South's longtimestatus as a rural-dominatedregion,thecitiesprovedmoreresistantthanthecountry-side to the forces of change loosed by the intrusive federalgovernmentin thedepressionera. In the urbanSouththeforcesofconservatismsuccessfullyresisted-at leasttemporarily-thechal-lengesto traditionalpolitical,social,andeconomicconditions.48

As thisstudysuggests,itwouldbe an oversimplificationtoascribetheerosionofsoutherncities'distinctivenesstotheimpactoffederalgovernmentpoliciesofthe1930s.IfGoldfieldandTindallwerecor-rectinsuggestingthatunintendedchangescamelater,thenwhendidthe transformationoccur?In TheBurdenof SouthernHistoryC.VannWoodwardreferredtotheastoundinggrowthofsoutherncitiesas the"BulldozerRevolution"andpinpointedthetakeoffof Dixie'surbanboomtothe1940s.Tobe sure,thefederalgovernmentplayedasignificantroleinthatdevelopmentduringandafterWorldWarIIbythelocationof militaryinstallations,shipbuildingyards,andotherdefense-relatedconcernsin the region'smoderateclimate.FederalpoliciesdoubtlesslycontributedtotheenrichmentoftheSouth'scit-ies and to the hegiraof modern-dayhomesteadersfromtheNorth'sdecliningmetropolisessouthward.Accordingly,the 1940s doesappeartobe a likeliercandidateforthecrucialdecadeofchange.Thefederalgovernment'simpacton southerncitiesinthe1930scanbestbe understoodinconjunctionwiththefindingsof recentNewDealscholarship;thatis, thepaucityofchangewas causedbythestrengthof entrenchedelites,the staunchcommitmentto traditionalvaluesandinstitutions,thepoliticalimpotenceof thehave-nots,andPresi-dentRoosevelt'slimitedagendafor reform.In short, it washardlywhathistorianCarlN. DeglercharacterizedtheNewDealasbeing:"a revolutionaryresponseto a revolutionarysituation."49

48 Pete Daniel, Breaking the Land: The Transformationof Cotton, Tobacco, and Rice Cul-tures since 1880 (Urbana and Chicago, Ill., 1985); Gilbert C. Fite, CottonFields No More:SouthernAgriculture, 1865-1980 (Lexington,Ky., 1984); Jack TempleKirby,Rural WorldsLost: TheAmericanSouth, 1920-1960 (Baton Rouge, 1987); and Gavin Wright, Old South,NewSouth:Revolutionsin the SouthernEconomySince the Civil War(New York, 1986).

49 WoodwardTheBurdenofSouthernHistory(BatonRouge1960)6;andDeglerOutof

the urban south in the great depression

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