the united states, turkey, and the kurdish regions: the peace process in context

8/21/2019 The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions: The Peace Process in Context

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The United States, Turkey,and the Kurdish RegionsThe Peace Process in Context

By Michael Werz and Max Hoffman July 2014


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The United States, Turkey,and the Kurdish RegionsThe Peace Process in Context

By Michael Werz and Max Hoffman July 2014


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1 Introduction and summary

7 The Turkish political context and the challenge of divers

10 The recent history of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey

17 The status of the peace process

23 The regional dimensions of the peace process

35 Regional Kurdish dynamics and Washingtons role

37 Recommendations

44 Endnotes

Contents


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1 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions

Introduction and summary

Te pas our years have swep away he old pillars o U.S. policy oward he

Easern Medierranean. Egyp, a radiional American securiy parner, is con-

roning a saggering poliical and economic crisis. Syria has descended ino a

horrific civil war wih no resoluion in sigh. Lebanon is clinging o basic sabiliy

in he ace o long-sanding secarian ensions and a massive reugee crisis. Jordan

remains a srong U.S. ally bu aces srucural hreas ha sem rom demographic

rends and he war in Syria. Iraq is once again enguled in a sruggle agains mili-

ancy soked, in par, by percepions ha Prime Miniser Nouri al-Maliki and hissupporers have insiuionalized heir ascendancy in a way unaccepable o Iraqs

minoriies. O course, governmens across he region are sruggling o conron

he rising influence o violen Salafi jihadiss. Te seizure o MosulIraqs second-

larges ciy and home o nearly 2 million peopleby he Islamic Sae o Iraq and

al-Sham, or ISIS, brough his realiy ino sark relie.1

In his conex, he poenial ramificaions o recen developmens in urkey and

along is borders have become criical o U.S. ineress and he long-erm rajecory

o he Middle Eas as a whole. Poliical and miliary Kurdish acors have, separaely,

solidified an auonomous governmen in norhern Iraq and carved ou a semi-inde-

penden sronghold in norhern Syria. Indeed, Kurdish orces in norhern Iraq and,

o a lesser exen, norhern Syria have become a bulwark agains jihadi groups such

as ISIS and a basion o sabiliy in a region racuring along secarian lines. Tis

realiy necessiaes a re-evaluaion o U.S. policy oward Kurdish poliical groups

and a reinvigoraion o urkeys peace process wih is own Kurdish minoriy.

A key NAO ally and a model o economic and poliical sabiliy or many years,

urkey is in he hroes o a deep poliical crisis ha is disracing rom is effors

o achieve a lasing peace setlemen wih is Kurdish minoriy, as well as miigaehe spillover effecs o he Syrian conflic and couner he rise o violen groups in

Iraq. Afer promising firs seps, he peace process seems o be suck, wih Kurdish

insurgens haling heir wihdrawal rom urkey due o he urkish governmens


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ailure o quickly provide more exensive poliical and language righs o Kurdish

communiies. Bu boh he urkish governmen and is Kurdish counerpars have

come oo ar o back away; he poliical cos o a breakdown in negoiaions may

be prohibiive o boh sides given he urmoil on urkeys borders and he hrea

o ISIS o Kurdish enclaves in Syria and Iraq.

For he Unied Saes and urkey, he rapidly changing poliical siuaion in Syria

and Iraq underpins he need or new parners wih whom o work oward regional

sabiliy and he provision o basic governance. Tis goal reaches beyond a nar-

rowalbei imporannoion o naional securiy, rooed in combaing miliancy

and denying erroris organizaions space in which o operae. Te effor should

also be inormed by he wider objecive o allowing he counries o he Easern

Medierranean o make poliical reorms and grow heir economiesa goal ha is

crucial o peaceully accommodaing he demographic wave reaching mauriy his

decade wihin pluralisic and accounable poliical insiuions. Te realiies on he

ground mean ha his search or parners mus include engagemen wih Kurdishpoliical acors o encourage peaceul relaions wih heir respecive hos counries,

hus promoing regional sabiliy and advancing U.S. ineress.

Tis peacebuilding process will ake ime, requiring long-erm effors o make and

culivae new conacs. Meanwhile, given he complexiy and fluidiy o curren

evens in he region, he Unied Saes and is allies canno afford o be picky in

heir search or governance parners. Te Syrian conflic has made i necessary or

he Unied Saes o deal wih Kurdish organizaions ha are helping define he

realiy on he ground, such as he milian Democraic Union Pary, or PYD, wih

which he Unied Saes does no have relaions.

Addiionally, given Iraqs racured poliics and he pressing securiy siuaion in

he norh o he counry, he Unied Saes mus se aside he concerns o Prime

Miniser al-Maliki and redouble is oureach o Presiden Massoud Barzanis

Kurdisan Democraic Pary, or KDP, o bring i ino a producive peacebuild-

ing role. Indeed, his process finally began in earnes wih U.S. Secreary o Sae

John Kerrys visi o Erbil in June and Vice Presiden Joe Bidens drop-by wih

represenaives o he Iraqi Kurdisan Regional Governmen, or KRG, a he

Whie House in July.2

Solving many o he regions major problems will require Kurdish paricipaion and

consulaion. Kurdish organizaions have he poenial o be consrucive parners

in providing sabiliy in boh Iraq and Syria. Given he pluralisic, secular rheoric

o many o hese groups, he Unied Saes should re-evaluae is curren policies,


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which have largely bowed o he radiional urkish sraegy o decreasing Kurdish

organizaional capaciies and shied away rom engagemen wih he KRG or ear o

undermining Iraqi naional uniy. Wih Iraq racured, and wih urkey increasingly

relying on Kurdish orces as a buffer o insabiliy along is borders, hese concerns

abou mainaining he wri o Baghdad are becoming less imporan.

Tis analysis does no represen advocacy or Kurdish naionalism or independence,

bu raher acknowledges he realiies on he ground. In norhern Iraq, he KRGa

largely auonomous Kurdish-dominaed adminisraive bodyhas demonsraed

reasonably effecive governance and economic growh. Mos recenly, ollowing

he collapse o he Iraqi Armys presence in Mosul and oher pars o norhern Iraq,

Kurdish orces, known as he Peshmerga, ook conrol o Kirkuk, a major ciy and oil

hub roughly 150 miles norh o Baghdad.3In norheasern Syria, a newly auono-

mous Kurdish-conrolled regionsomeimes called Rojavahas ormed amid he

urmoil o he civil war. Syrian Kurdish orces have also batled wih radical Islamis

milians, including ISIS, and occasionally ough alongside he Free Syrian Army aspar o heir effors o proec local populaions and mainain basic sabiliy.4

In urkey, he saes long-sanding effors o assimilae Kurdish culure and sup-

press Kurdish poliical organizaionsprimarily he Kurdisan Workers Pary, or

PKK, which is also a milian armed grouphrough miliary orce seem o have

been abandoned. Te urkish governmen has underaken a new se o polii-

cal negoiaions, accompanied by a sofer rheoric oward culural differences.

urkeys approach oward he Kurds remains inegral o he counrys process o

democraizaion and he esablishmen o he effecive rule o law, which is in urn

imporan o urkeys role as a NAO ally and U.S. parner. I is in his longer-

erm conexalongside he urgen need o insulae agains he urher spread o

violen groups such as ISISha he Kurdish quesion should be re-examined.

O course, he Kurds are no a coheren poliical group. Personal rivalries, naional

idenificaions, borders, economic ineress, and poliical belies are differeniaing

acors. Bu here are signs o a muual cohering o he poliical agenda across much

o he Kurdish-majoriy region, driven in par by he rise o Kurdish-language media

and growing linguisic convergence.5Regarding he Kurds as a loosely conederaed

group o poliical acors sharing a language, hisory o oppression, andin somecasesaspiraions or poliical auonomy, a number o quesions arise:


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Wha is a realisic role or Kurdish poliical organizaions in he new Middle Eas? Wha are he various goals o hese groups, and can hey be accommodaed

wihin a sable regional model? Wha is expeced o hese groups, and wha should be offered in reurn? How should he Unied Saes and is NAO alliesincluding urkeyiner-

ac wih hese subnaional groups and poliical organizaions?

Te Kurds place in he Middle Eas is no a new quesion. Neiher, more broadly,

is he quesion o how o incorporae subnaional ehnic or religious groups wihin

he naional borders ha emerged rom World War I. By and large, mos policy-

makers have concluded ha i would be coslier o redraw hose borders han o

work wihin exising lines, problemaic as hey ofen are. Te naional idenifica-

ions based on hese boundaries have aken roo over he pas cenury and should

no be underesimaed. Tis repor does no dispue ha core conclusion, nor

does i advocae a de aco Kurdish naion-sae. Bu he realiy o wo auonomous

Kurdish regions and a hird engaged in negoiaions wih is naional govern-men over greaer sel-deerminaionalong wih he effecive collapse o cenral

governmen auhoriy in boh Syria and Iraqdemands a re-examinaion o his

quesion. Wesern policy circles should devoe greaer hough o he problem and

underake more requen and nuanced oureach o Kurdish poliical acors.

Tis repor seeks o advance his policy conversaion by oulining he polii-

cal conex in urkey; summarizing he relevan hisory o he Kurdish regions;

examining he curren sae o he peace process in urkey; placing he issue in

is regional conex, paricularly wih regard o evolving auonomy in Syrian and

Iraqi Kurdish areas in ligh o he rise o ISIS and he collapse o sae auhoriy;

explaining he poenial consequences o posiive or negaive oucomes wih he

Kurds; and evaluaing U.S. policy in ligh o hese challenges.


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FIGURE 1

The Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran

Note: Many of these areas are ethnically mixed, and reliable data are hard to obtain. The region has seen heavy migration and multiple

government efforts at resettlement designed to alter the ethnic makeup. This map does not display areas of political or military controland should not be seen as a political statement.Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (last

accessed July 2014).

Abu Kamal

Dayr az Zawr

Malatya

Erzurum

Diyarbakir

Zakho

Irbil

Tikrit

Baqubah

GaziantepDahuk

Kirkuk

Mosul

SamarraKermanshah

TURKEY

SYRIA

IRAQ

IRAN

Al Qamishli

Al Hasakah

As Sulaymaniyah

1215 million

57 million

1.52 million

78 million

Approximate areas ofKurdish-majority settlement

Approximate Kurdish population


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AKP:Turkeys governing party, the conservative Justice and Develop-

ment Party, founded in 2001. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan

and President Abdullah Gl are both founding members. The party

won 45.5 percent of the overall popular vote in the March local elec-

tions.

BDP:The Peace and Democracy Party, the primary Turkish Kurdish

political party. The partys support is heavily concentrated in the ma-

jority-Kurdish regions of southeastern Anatolia. The recently formed

sister partythe Peoples Democratic Party, or HDPaims to attract

urban liberals and non-Kurds to the broader BDP-HDP constituency.

CHP:The Republican Peoples Party, Turkeys main opposition party.

The party was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, Turkeys first presi-dent, and has a nationalist history but is in the process of rebranding

itself as a social democratic alternative to the AKP.

DTP:The Democratic Society Party, a pro-Kurdish Turkish political

party, banned in 2009 by the Turkish Constitutional Court for alleged

links to the PKK.

ISIS:The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, an extremely violent

jihadi militant group active in Syria and Iraq. The group has claimed

large swaths of territory in both Syria and Iraq, proclaiming an Islamic

caliphate. Recently, the group has started calling itself simply the Is-lamic State, or IS, but this report will continue to use the ISIS acronym.

MHP:The Nationalist Movement Party, Turkeys ultranationalist party,

strongly opposed to Kurdish autonomy.

MIT: Turkeys National Intelligence Organization, the primary s

intelligence service.

KDP:The Kurdistan Democratic Party, founded by Mustafa Bar

and currently led by President Massoud Barzani, is the dominan

political party in Iraqi Kurdistan.

KRG:The Kurdistan Regional Government, the largely autonom

ruling structure of Iraqi Kurdistan, a federal region of Iraq.

PJAK:The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan, a militant Kurdish sep

ist group operating in Iran that is regarded as the PKKs Iranian

organization.

PKK: The Kurdistan Workers Party, a militant armed group that

waged an intermittent war against the Turkish state and is seek

Kurdish independence. Led by Abdullah calan, now imprisone

the Turkish government, the organization has softened its dem

to greater Kurdish autonomy and cultural rights and has uphel

unilateral ceasefire for two years.

PYD:The Democratic Union Party, a Syrian Kurdish political pa

sister organization to the PKK that seeks Kurdish federal autono

the context of the Syrian state. The PYD has declared autonomy

three majority-Kurdish cantons in northern Syria.

YPG:The Peoples Protection Units, the military units fighting t

defend Kurdish areas in northern Syria, widely regarded as the

wing of the PYD.

Glossary


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The Turkish political context

and the challenge of diversity

In he ace o his regional urmoil, urkey remains a crucial regional pillar and

U.S. ally. As he regional power wih he mos a sake in he upheaval along

is borders, urkey is deeply invesed in he oucomes o poliical and miliary

sruggles in boh Syria and Iraq. Indeed, he porous naure o urkeys souhern

border, is economic ineress in norhern Iraq and is desire or Iraqi energy, and

he presence o more han 800,000 Syrian reugees in urkey mean he counry

is exremely vulnerable o spillover effecs rom he conflics in boh counries.

Tese ineress and vulnerabiliies underpin urkeys relaions wih Kurdishpoliical acors in Syria and Iraq. Finally, urkey is also conducing delicae nego-

iaions wih domesic Kurdish insurgenshe PKK.

All o hese rends ge swep up ino urkeys passionae domesic poliical debae,

which is why i is imporan o place he regional picure in is urkish polii-

cal conex. I is also equally imporan o analyze he regional implicaions o

domesic urkish poliical developmens. urkeys ongoing ransormaion rom a

sociey in which culural homogeneiy rumps minoriy righs oward a more open,

pluralis communiy capable o reconciling ehnic and religious differences has con-

ribued o he counrys heaed poliical debae and is conribuing o a recasing

o urkeys relaions wih poliical acors in norhern Iraq and Syria. Te so-called

Kurdish quesion lies a he cener o his effor o recognize inernal diversiy.

Since is vicory in he 2002 elecions, he ruling Jusice and Developmen Pary,

or AKP, has driven he laes chaper in he process o recognizing he Kurds.

Dubbed he Kurdish opening beore being rebranded as he democraic

opening, he AKP has atemped o emper conflic beween urkeys Kurdish

minoriy and he miliary while gradually exending more o he righs available

o all urks o Kurdish communiies.6

A is core, he issue urns on many urksaccepance ha Kurds should enjoy equal righs as urkish ciizens bu resen-

men o wha hey view as effors o achieve special collecive righs. A he same

ime, many urkish Kurds believe ha hey need cerain collecive culural and

poliical righs due o hisorical repression and marginalizaion.


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Resolving his issue is no an easy askhe legacy o fierce, sae-driven naional-

ism daes back o he oundaion o he Republic o urkey in 1923. Afer lead-

ing he naionalis revoluion ha succeeded he muliehnic Otoman Empire,

Musaa Kemal Aark, he firs presiden o urkey, spearheaded an acceleraed

process o secularizaion and modernizaion ha implemened he Gregorian cal-

endar and Lain alphabe, abolished religious cours and schools, and esablisheda purely secular sysem o amily law.7KemalismAarks ideologysough o

aggressively build he power o he secular naion-sae a he expense o acknowl-

edging and inegraing diversiy. Te perceived need o neuralize ehnic and

religious differences drove his effor in he wake o he naional disinegraion and

rerenchmen ha ollowed World War I. Aark and many o his supporers el

ha he Otoman Empire had been undermined, in par, by is diversiy, which con-

ribued o inernal unres ha gave ouside powers preexs or erriorial claims.

Even oday, urkeys consiuion leaves no room or he linguisic and culural

differences o minoriy communiies, declaring, Te urkish Sae, wih is er-riory and naion, is an indivisible eniy. Is language is urkish. 8Te preamble

is similarly caegorical, saing, No proecion shall be accorded o an aciviy

conrary o [he] hisorical and moral values o urkishness.9Tis consiu-

ion, writen when urkey was under miliary rule, has become largely unworkable

in he ace o he diversiy o he urkish people and he body poliic, wih litle

explici legal acknowledgemen o his culural and linguisic diversiy.

However, as economic sandards improved afer he end o he Cold War, he

effor o esablish culural pluralism and acknowledge urkeys someimes violen

hisory wih minoriy groups has gained impeus. Bu radiional urkish ears

o naional ragmenaion have no subsided. Te emergence o Iraqi Kurdisan

ollowing he firs Gul War, as well as he milian PKKs use o norhern Iraq as

a launching pad or atacks agains he urkish sae, have conribued o hese

concerns. Indeed, American suppor or Iraqi Kurds has reinorced some urks

belie ha he Wes wans o dismember urkey, a ear ha was used o jusiy he

urkish saes ruhless campaign agains he Kurds hroughou he 1990s. 10

Bu despie recen effors o address urkish diversiy, Kemalismwih is

narrow concepion o naionhood and ciizenshiphas mainained a grip onurkish sociey. A significan segmen o he body poliic coninues o cones

he very exisence o ehnic and religious pluraliy in he counry and ears any

poliical asseriveness rom urkeys minoriies. Afer he decisive elecoral suc-

cess o he AKP in 2002, he governmen did ake he posiive seps o ending


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marial law in he Kurdish regions and engaging in negoiaions wih represena-

ives o Kurdish poliical groups. Even hough his process has salled, i repre-

sens an imporan move oward overcoming wha poliical scienis mi Cizre

describes as urkeys chronic poliical insecuriy.11

Tese are no absrac quesions. Tey underpin he deepening o democraicpracices in urkey and, hereore, is uure role as a par o he NAO alliance,

poenial member o he European Union, and parner o he Unied Saes. Te

mos aggressive and undemocraic porions o he exising consiuion and he

wors sae excesses o he pas cenury are linked o hese quesions o minor-

iy righs, ears o separaism, and challenges o sae auhoriy. Te opporuniy

now exiss or he urkish sae o permanenly recas is relaions wih minoriy

groups and peaceully incorporae hem ino he poliical sysem. Evens in he

region have only added urgency o his effor.

Bu his goal canno be achieved wihou concessions. Final resoluion o heKurdish quesion will be dicaed by poliical realiies shaping he negoiaions and

may ulimaely require a new consiuion shorn o ehnic definiions o ciizenship

and he mos problemaic ulranaionalis provisions and elecoral reorms, such

as lowering he hreshold o parliamenary represenaion. Some observers believe

his resoluion could be achieved wihou a new consiuion hrough a series o

laws and amendmens. Peace will also likely require a final hisorical acknowledge-

men o he roughly 40,000 vicims o he war in easern Anaolia.12

Wih decades o delay, urkish sociey is beginning o address hese issues. o

regain leverage in he region, i mus acknowledge diversiy as a srengh insead o

a weakness. Te laes round o peace alks wih he PKK launched in December

2012. Tis peace process is a criical componen o moving urkey oward a more

inclusive sociey and a more confiden regional role.


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The recent history of the

Kurdish conflict in Turkey

In 1984, he PKKesablished in he lae 1970slaunched a ull-scale separa-

is guerilla war in souheasern urkey. Te PKK was responding o he aggressive

suppression o Kurdish language and culural righs by he urkish sae and sough

an independenand, a he ime, communissae or he Kurds, who are sill

reerred o as he larges ehnic group in he world wihou a sae.13Te conflic

quickly escalaed, wih insurgen atacks ocused in he easern region bu no

limied o he radiional Kurdish homeland in souheasern urkey. A he heigh o

he conflic in he early 1990s, he PKK was esimaed o have up o 15,000 fighersand considerable inrasrucure in he Iraqi Qandil Mounains, jus across he border

rom urkey, as well as aci suppor rom hen-Presiden Haez al-Assad in Syria,

where he organizaion had is headquarers and a number o raining camps.14

Conroning he PKK hrea became he key driver o urkish regional policy

and, alongside is role in he NAO alliance agains he Sovie Union, he ani-

maing impulse o is overall oreign policy. Te end o he Cold War lef urkey

more confiden and able o ac beyond is borders on his regional goal o eradi-

caing he PKK. urkish roops enered he Iraqi sae havens wih miliary offen-

sives o 20,000 roops in 1992 and 35,000 roops in 1995.15urkey hreaened

Syria wih war over is suppor or he PKK in 1998, and PKK leader Abdullah

calan and much o he pary inrasrucure was orced o leave Syria.16calan

was evenually capured in Kenya in 1999, brough o urkey o ace rial, and

senenced o deah. His senence, however, was laer commued o lie imprison-

men a he reques o he European Union.17

Te cos o he conflic was enormous. Since he oubreak o hosiliies, he

Deparmen o Peace and Conflic Research a Uppsala Universiy in Sweden

esimaes ha here have been beween 25,000 and 30,000 Kurdish aaliies, wihhe desrucion o more han 2,000 villages.18Oher esimaes pu he oal a as

high as 40,000 or 44,000 dead.19Te Inernaional Crisis Group evaluaed he eco-

nomic cos a an esimaed $300 billion o $450 billion.20Nearly 7,000 members

o urkish securiy orcesmiliary, police, and gendarmerieare esimaed o

have been killed in he conflic, according o governmen sources.21


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Te capure o calan, he enormous financial cos o he fighing, and he grow-

ing desire or democraizaion has led many urks o ponder he governmens

endgame or he Kurdish conflic. Following calans capure, he PKK declared a

unilaeral ceasefire and sofened is demands or independence.22Surely, as many

began o argue in he lae 1990s, i was ime o recas he erms o he conflic

rom he sricly miliary ramework used hus ar by he urkish sae o a polii-

cal negoiaion and culural dialogue.23Te Kurdish quesion sared o become

abou more han he PKKand an increasing number o urkish poliical leaders

recognized ha he Kurds and he PKK are no one and he same.

Liberal urks and moderae religious groups who were chafing under aggressively

secular sae insiuions recognized ha a number o immediae domesic goals

revolved around he necessiy o esablishing a more inclusive noion o urkish

ciizenship. Tese goals included he need or a new consiuion o replace he

exising documen; he EU requiremen o esablish judicial independence and

press reedom in line wih European norms; and he aboliion o draconian ani-

error laws and special, secre cours. Indeed, i was his poliical alliancebol-

sered by he rise o a new Anaolian middle classha would ransorm urkishpoliics in 2002 wih he elecoral vicory o he AKP.

A Kurdish female member of thePopular Protection Units stands at a checkpoint near the northeacity of Qamishli, Syria. Syrias Kurdramatically strengthened their the far northeast reaches of the carving out territory as they drivIslamic militant fighters allied wirebellion and declaring their owadministration in areas under thtrol amid the chaos of the civil wPHOTO: AP PHOTO/MANU BRABO


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Tere were poliical consideraions driving he process as well: An esimaed 2

million o 4 million Kurds lived in Isanbul alone, and he group had become an

imporan reservoir o voers.24Te leaders o he AKP ried o emphasize broh-

erly uniy beween urks and Kurds, invoking Islamic radiion o avoid conron-

ing he legacy o sae violence and orced assimilaion head on, a conronaion

ha would undoubedly rigger a naionalis backlash.25

I became clear ha a per-manen soluion would only be ound i common poliical ground were esablished

ha acknowledged pas crimes and reversed he naionalis urkish heriage codi-

fied in he consiuion and reinorced by he sae-dominaed educaion sysem.

Te AKPs decisive elecoral vicory in 2002 allowed he pary o eschew coaliions

and orm a single-pary governmen, he firs in more han a decade,26and provided

a solid poliical plaorm upon which o base reorms. Tis gave rise o hopes o a

new era in minoriy relaions and he aboliion o bans on Kurdish educaion and

broadcasingpar o a wider AKP push o open he poliical process o people

beyond he radiional Kemalis elie, such as minoriies and devou Muslims.

Te ollowing year, he urkish Parliameneyeing EU membershippassedlaws ha eased resricions on reedom o speech and Kurdish language righs and

reduced he poliical role o he miliary. urkish sae elevision broadcased he

firs-ever Kurdish-language program in 2004, a sign o he AKPs new openness and

Men with their faces covered by of jailed Kurdish rebel leader Abdcalan demonstrate during the celebrations in the southeasterncity of Diyarbakr, Turkey. The ba

reads, Negotiation or the war!PHOTO: AP PHOTO


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he saes accepance o deea in he effor o conrol Kurdish diaspora and uno-

ficial communicaions. Kurdish-language media has grown since hen, leading o

several second-order effecs, including an increased sense o a pan-Kurdish poliical

dialogue and rising muual inelligibiliy o Kurdish language and dialecs.27

Evren Bala Paker, a proessor o poliical science a Yildiz echnical Universiy inIsanbul, describes his juncure:

In this period, all political camps grew aware that the consolidation o [the]

AKPs political rule was contingent on the normalization o the Kurdish issue

and the demilitarization o politics. Both proponents and opponents o [the]

AKP started to view democratization as the ground or strategic trench warare.

Whereas both the military authority and the opposition Republican Peoples

Party (CHP) approached democracy through the lens o secularism, [the] AKP

interpreted democracy through the lens o civilian rule. [Te] period would be

dominated by a conflict between these two perceptions o democracy. In act, nei-ther side had a comprehensive program o democracy; both expressed a strategic

demand or fagmented democracy in order to consolidate its own power. Neither

side would refain fom recourse to non-democratic methods whenever this strate-

gic demand or democracy ailed to yield the desired results.28

In he absence o undamenal reorms, however, ensions flared, wih a series o

bloody PKK atacks on urkish miliary and civilian arges in 2007. Nearly 50

urkish soldiers were killed in Ocober 2007 alone.29In response, he urkish

miliary conduced operaions along he urkish-Iraqi border agains Kurdish reb-

els. urkish orces launched numerous air and ground raids ino norhern Iraq in

pursui o PKK fighers beween Ocober 2007 and February 2008. Tese acions

evenually led o improved inelligence sharing beween American and urkish

orces, launched in an effor o hal urkish miliary incursions ha he Unied

Saes el hreaened effors o achieve sabiliy in Iraq.30

o deuse he siuaion ollowing he AKPs second decisive elecoral vicory

in 2007 and he show o miliary srengh in lae 2007 and early 2008, Prime

Miniser Recep ayyip Erdoan held a rare meeing wih Ahme urk, he leader

o he pro-Kurdish Democraic Sociey Pary, or DP, in Augus 2009. Tis mee-ing would provide he oundaion or he so-called Kurdish opening, which ried

o provide space or a negoiaed setlemen.31Tree monhs laer, he governmen

inroduced measures in parliamen o increase Kurdish language righs and reduce

he miliary presence in he mainly Kurdish souheas.


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Te opening proved shor lived, however, as he effors o exend piecemeal righs

o Kurds ailed o alleviae grievances in he absence o undamenal reorms o

ani-errorism laws or he drafing o a new consiuion. Te AKP governmen also

ailed o explain he deails o he program and convince he public o is necessiy

beore is announcemen. When PKK fighers enered urkey rom Iraq ollow-

ing he announcemen and were welcomed a a large rally by locals and officials ohe Kurdish-majoriy DP, a predecessor o odays Peace and Democracy Pary,

or BDP, in urkey, he media coverage o he inciden riggered a srong naional-

is reacion and a hasy poliical rerea by he AKP, earul o losing voes.32While

he PKK members enered urkey a he inviaion o he governmen and were

processed by cours a he border, he AKP had no prepared he urkish body

poliic or he image o PKK fighers openly celebraing on urkish soil and gave in

o fierce criicism. Te ailure o he opening resuled in escalaing miliary conron-

aion and he banning o he DP, subsequenly succeeded by he BDP.33

Te ailure o he Kurdish opening in 2009 inauguraed anoher period o sharpviolence beween he urkish sae and he PKK, wih persisen atacks on urkish

soldiers hroughou 2010, 2011, and 2012. Despie ongoing secre negoiaions

beween he PKK and he urkish Naional Inelligence Organizaion, or MI,

in Norway rom 2009 o 2011, he bloodshed coninued.34Te collapse o hese

secre alks inauguraed he bloodies period o he conflic since he capure o

calan: Te Inernaional Crisis Group couned more han 900 deahs, including

a leas 304 urkish securiy orces or police, 533 milians, and 91 civilians34 o

whom were killed by he urkish Air Force in a single raidrom 2011 o 2013.35

In his conex, i is imporan o recognize a more undamenal poin abou he

urkish saes Kurdish policy: I is ofen swep up in larger urkish poliical debaes

or used in he service o broader sraegic goals. In he early years o he AKP gov-

ernmen, he Kurdish issue ell under he umbrella o aciliaing EU membership,

parly o open up poliics o minoriies and religious peopleand hus o he AKP

iseland parly o weaken he miliarys role in he poliical sphere. More recenly,

he peace process has become imporan in ligh o effors o reduce energy shor-

alls hrough oureach o he auonomous Kurdish region in norhern Iraq.

Currenly, Prime Miniser Erdoan has a vesed ineres in mainaining he processo hold ogeher his poliical base in he ace o corrupion inquiries and growing

inernaional skepicism o his auhoriarian endencies. Te process simulane-

ously neuralizes he pro-Kurdish BDPs role as a progressive opposiion pary and

mainains one o he las posiive iniiaives in he eyes o he inernaional commu-

niy. Anoher major moivaion or Prime Miniser Erdoan is his need o secure

Kurdish voes in his bid or he urkish presidency in he elecions scheduled or


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Augus 10, 2014. Te balance o moivaion or he AKPs engagemen wih he

BDPviewed by some as he poliical arm o he Kurdish naionalis movemen

is open o debae, bu he urkish sae has sill never engaged wih he issue in a

comprehensive way wih he sole goal o achieving a lasing peace.

Prime Miniser Erdoan seemed o revive he peace process when he confirmedin December 2012 ha he head o he MI had been in conac wih jailed PKK

leader calan in an effor o achieve a negoiaed ceasefire and disarmamen.36

Bu despie renewed mediaion, he urkish governmen coninued o suspec he

PKKs inenions and reused o decrease miliary pressure on he organizaion.

Alhough he PKK had been visibly wihdrawing rom urkey ino is Iraqi srong-

holds in he Qandil Mounains, urkish armed orceswih American inelligence

supporconinued o operae atack helicopers and drones over areas o PKK

aciviy. In Diyarbakr, urkeys larges Kurdish-majoriy ciy, Kurds sill complained

o governmenal marginalizaion, judicial discriminaion, poliical arress, bans on

public use o he Kurdish language, and economic sriedespie anoher symbolicand hisoric meeing o Prime Miniser Erdoan and Massoud Barzani, he presiden

o Iraqi Kurdisan, in he ciy.37Presiden Barzaniwhose aher Musaa Barzani

ounded he KDP, which has dominaed Iraqi Kurdish poliics or yearshad long

been branded an insurgen by he urkish sae, so his reinvenion as an ally o he

conservaive urkish governmen came as a surprise. Tis even also demonsraed

some o he inconsisencies inheren in urkish reamen o differen Kurdish

poliical acors, as he PKK is sill considered a erroris organizaion by urkey, he

Unied Saes, and he European Union, and is leader calan is in a urkish prison.

Turkeys Prime Minister Recep TaErdoan, center, Iraqi Kurdish leaMassoud Barzani, left, and Kurdisinger Sivan Perwer, right, attendmarriage ceremony for 400 coupin the southeastern Turkish city oDiyarbakr, Turkey. Barzani was into support the Turkish governmeKurdish peace process.PHOTO: AP PHOTO


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Bu he mos dramaic recen developmen in he urkish-Kurdish sory came in

March 2013, when calan publicly called or an end o he PKKs armed sruggle

and len his suppor o a delicae new effor a peace, a move welcomed by Prime

Miniser Erdoan.38Wih calan, sill lionized by many Kurds and apparenly

influenial a all levels o he PKK, working or peace, he prospecs seem beter

now han hey have or decades. Te increasing diversiy o urkish sociey, iner-marriage, he shif away rom sric Kemalis sae ideology, and he coss o he

violen sruggle mean here is new poliical space or a negoiaed setlemen; wo-

hirds o urkish sociey avor he setlemen, and many hard quesionsinclud-

ing he personal uure o calanare discussed openly, somehing ha would

have been sricly aboo jus a decade ago. Te deails o a viable disarmamen

process and he reinegraion o Kurdish insurgens ino legal poliical srucures

remain o be hashed ou, bu a poliical soluion seems possible.


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The status of the peace process

Te ceasefire beween he urkish governmen and he PKK remained in place

hroughou 2013 and has held or he firs par o his year, bu he durabiliy o

he peace remains unknown. While previous breaks in he fighing have proved

ragile, srucural rends such as inermarriage, economic growh across urkey,

and overall inegraionalong wih shor-erm poliical condiions such as

calans paricipaion in he processmay make his paricular insance differ-

en. Te domesic poliical urmoil ha has enguled urkey over he pas year

including he June 2013 Gezi Park proess and he corrupion scandal ha brokein December 2013has drawn public atenion away rom he peace process.39

Bu his domesic poliical disracion migh be good or he process, allowing

boh sides room o poliically maneuver. Te rise o ISIS along urkeys souhern

border may also promp Ankara o acquiesce on he PYDs movemen oward

auonomy in Syria and increase he urgency o he PKK peace process.

Beyond immediae securiy concerns, many in he AKP sill recognize he oppor-

uniy o use a long-erm peace arrangemen as a bridge o a resh sar in he

dysuncional relaionship wih he Kurdish minoriy, along wih he economic

benefis ha could accrue i a lasing peace is achieved. Bu he AKP has been

ocused on poliical damage conrol and preparaion or he firs-ever popular

presidenial elecion in Augus. On July 10, he AKP passed a new bill graning

legal proecions o officials negoiaing wih he PKKwhich was previously

illegaland allowing he governmen o offer amnesy o PKK fighers as par o

a disarmamen program.40Te new bill could be inerpreed as anoher angible

sep oward peace or as an elecion-year ploy o shore up suppor rom Kurds

crucial i Prime Miniser Erdoan is o win he presidency in Augus. Despie

he disracion o he impending elecion and urkeys domesic poliical crisis,

he ulimae success or ailure o he process will have implicaions or Kurdishregional dynamics, or urkish relaions wih he Unied Saes and he European

Union, and or U.S. ineress in he regionparicularly in Iraq and Syria.


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One challenge acing he peace process is ha i is difficul or hose ouside he

urkish governmen o assess is progress because inormaion is so ighly held

wihin AKP ranks. Indeed, i is difficul o even speak o a ormal process, given

he ac ha he negoiaions are aking place inermitenly hrough unknown

inermediaries, lacked a legal basis unil he passage o he July 10 bill, and have

no brough in acing commanders o PKK field unis or leaders o he urkishopposiion paries. Noneheless, his inormal process has achieved several obvi-

ous posiive developmens since he beginning o he laes peace iniiaive, mos

noably he beginning o a PKK wihdrawal rom urkey o camps in norhern

Iraq and Syria and he lack o casualies over he pas year.41Many criics observe,

however, ha he process is essenially a wo-man show,42involving Prime

Minser Erdoan and Abdullah calan, wih only a small inner circle beyond

hese wo principals having inpu and visibiliy. While here are advanages o hav-

ing a sreamlined processincluding ease in decision making and ewer voices o

dissensakeholders excluded rom he process have begun o express concerns,

and he AKP may be repeaing he misakes o he ill-aed Kurdish opening o2009. Among hem is a lack o ouside experise on useul precedens, such as

relevan peace negoiaions ha have occurred elsewhere in he world.

Furhermore, he AKP has sough o manage his imporan naional process

wih only very limied paricipaion o he opposiion paries. CHP leader Kemal

Kldarolu has repeaedly asked Prime Miniser Erdoan o include a wider

range o urkish eleced officials in he process and o diversiy he sakeholders

by esablishing a reconciliaion commission in parliamen wih all paries rep-

resened. A he same ime, Kldarolu has opposed he urkish governmens

direc engagemen wih PKK leader calan, mos likely due o pressure rom

naionaliss wihin his own pary.43Te absence o a clearly defined road map and

he lack o ransparency are limiing he broader discussion o he issue wihin

urkish sociey, which is crucial o building poliical consensus on such a conro-

versial and emoional subjec.

A second challenge is he poenial or he process o disinegrae i eiher princi-

pal pulls back rom he process due o philosophical or personal disagreemens

or domesic poliical consideraions. Prime Miniser Erdoan and calan obvi-

ously do no have a hisory o parnership, and he 2014 elecionshe naion-wide local elecions las March and he presidenial elecion his Augushave

inroduced an unpredicable elemen o he negoiaions. Indeed, opposiion

poliicians and some ouside expers speculae ha Prime Miniser Erdoan and

he PKK are pursing he peace alks or poliical advanage and ha moivaion

o coninue working hrough a difficul process will wane afer he presidenial


22/53


elecions in Augus, when he prime miniser will no longer need o reach ou or

Kurdish voes.44O course, here is a undamenal power imbalance wih calan

imprisoned and a he mercy o Prime Miniser Erdoans governmen. Likewise,

he wo men are no siting down direcly wih each oher, andwih all negoia-

ions passing hrough inerlocuorshe risk o misundersandings is high.

Anoher, more basic challenge is reason or concernand possibly greaer

Wesern involvemen. urkeys conservaive poliical leadership began he peace

process by emphasizing Islamic uniy and values, drawing a sric disincion

beween he AKP and is Kemalis predecessors, who had sressed he concep o

urkishness.45Tis ransormaion o he poliics o he conflic was an impor-

an sep away rom he legacy o sae repression o Kurdish language and culure,

bu i also exaggeraed he culural and religious dimensions o wha is sill largely

a conflic over poliical economy and he righ o sel-deerminaion wihin a

diverse naion-sae. o deflec criicism o his culural and religious oureach

by naionaliss, some AKP officials ramed he soluion as a sep oward a Greaurkey sraegy o enhance Ankaras influence in he wider region.46

Te poliical sraegy o deflec naionalis criicism while reaching ou o Kurds

seems o be workinga leas or he ime being. While he March local elec-

ions were primarily a reerendum on Prime Miniser Erdoan and he AKP, he

pary also received suppor rom Kurds in urban areas where he BDP did no

field compeiive candidaes, and he vicory could be inerpreed, in par, as

demonsraing he poliical benefis o expending poliical capial on he peace

process.Alernaively, despie claiming o suppor he process, i is unclear how

commited o is conclusion or adep a managing is inricacies oher poliical

paries would be should hey win power. Indeed, he CHP coninues o rely on

naionalis suppor, and he Naionalis Movemen Pary, or MHPanoher

opposiion groupis a devoed naionalis pary. Even he moderae CHP

elemens migh shy away rom alienaing he older, naionalis porion o heir

poliical coaliion by pursuing he peace process.

Te AKPs vicory in he March naionwide local elecions has bolsered Prime

Miniser Erdoans perceived srengh as a leader in urher negoiaions wih

he PKK. Te AKPs vicory and resh poliical capial have increased hechances ha he Erdoan-calan dialogue will remain a eaure o urkish

poliics. In addiion, he resuls o he March elecions have made i clear ha

Prime Miniser Erdoan mus mainain Kurdish suppor i he hopes o secure


23/53


elecion as urkeys firs direcly eleced presiden. Kurdish suppor or he

AKP in he March elecions eliminaed he possibiliy ha a deea or Prime

Miniser Erdoan could undermine he peace negoiaions, causing he AKP o

limi his reedom o pursue a Kurdish setlemen. Bu clear Kurdish suppor or

Prime Miniser Erdoan may also enrench CHP opposiion o a setlemen i

opposiion paries are given a more subsanial role in he peace process. Hence,boh he AKP and he BDP have aken a cauious approach; he BDP has named

is own candidae and warned ha Kurdish suppor should no be aken or

graned,47while Prime Miniser Erdoan has pledged o coninue he peace

process i eleced presiden and has pushed hrough he bill o provide a pah o

amnesy and a legal ramework or negoiaions.48

While here have been significan public developmens over he pas year, none

o hem demonsrae much progress in permanenly easing ensions. Te AKP

presened and passed reorms mean o advance he peace process in Ocober

2013, including allowing Kurdish-language educaion in privae schools andelecoral campaigns and he repeal o he law ha required urkish sudens o

recie a naionalis vow each week in school. Bu he package did no commi o

lowering he 10 percen hreshold or admission o parliamena key limi on

Kurdish represenaion in Ankaraor provide or Kurdish-language educaion

in sae schools.49calan made rare public commens reacing o he package,

noing ha while he process had eased social ensions, mounainous problems

remained.50In a writen saemen released by he BDP, he remarked ha he

was waiing or he sae o respond wih meaningul, deep negoiaions, and

ha while he remained hopeul, he was repeaing once again [his] hisoric call

so ha his hope does no urn ino disillusionmen.51Tese commens were

wached closely by PKK fighers in he mounains o norhern Iraq, who have

been considering wheher o mainain he ceasefire afer wha is, in heir minds,

a disappoining reorm package.52Tese concerns abou he lack o significan

reorm compounded he misgivings ha led PKK unis o suspend heir pullou

rom souheasern urkey in all 2013 due o he AKPs ailure o make enough

progress on democraizaion.53


24/53


Anoher complicaion is ha

he desired areas o ocus or

he alks are no ully aligned

beween he PKK and he

AKP a his juncure. Te

PKK expecs urkey o makesignifican progress in improv-

ing Kurdish righs, including

dismanling he ani-errorism

law ha has been used o

jail housands o individuals

wih alleged links o he PKK

and allowing Kurdish youh

o be educaed in heir own

language in public schools.

I accuses Ankara o buildingnew dams and miliary poss

in Kurdish areas and no prop-

erly consuling Kurds abou

reorm plans. For is par,

he AKP insiss ha he PKK

mus wihdraw ully rom urkey and lay down is arms in order or peace alks o

advance.54Te process remains deadlocked a his phase, wih he PKK miliary

wihdrawal haled and he urkish sae unable or unwilling o go urher wih-

ou complee PKK disarmamen. Several incidens in lae 2013 and early 2014

indicae how delicae his salemae could be, including PKK fighers blockades

o highways near Diyarbakr; several kidnappings, including o urkish soldiers,

reporedly carried ou by he PKK; and he ongoing consrucion o gendarmerie

poss, which he PKK views as a provocaion.55

Te incenives or he urkish governmen o ge pas hese sumbling blocks and

conclude a permanen peace are srong, wih regional and inernaional govern-

menal sakeholders also poised o benefi. For he AKP, a successul resoluion

o he Kurdish issue could help neuralize one o he major obsacles o meaning-

ul democraic reorm in urkeyi, indeed, ha remains a goal o he pary.56

Inaddiion, a successul compleion o he peace alks wih he PKK and a poliical

soluion o he mulidecade conflic wih he PKK would be a major boon o Prime

Miniser Erdoan in he monhs leading up o he presidenial elecion in Augus. 57

A masked man in a guerrilla outfia flag of the PKK during the Nowrcelebrations in the southeastern city of Diyarbakr, Turkey. NowruzFarsi-language word for new yeaancient Persian festival celebratethe first day of spring, March 21, iCentral Asian countries of Iraq, TuAfghanistan, and Iran.PHOTO: AP PHOTO


25/53


I would help him solidiy suppor among wavering or hosile consiuencies such

as he Kurdish populaion, urban liberals, young people, and he conflic-weary

populaion o souheasern urkey, mos o whom are eager o move on rom

he PKK conflic and see heir counry ocus on improving poliical reedom and

economic developmen. Tis is he logic behind he July inroducion and passage

o he bill o legalize direc alks wih he PKK and allow he governmen o akeall necessary measures o creae a pah or PKK fighers o disarm and reine-

grae.58While a pahway o amnesy, disarmamen, and dismanlemen o Qandil

Mounain camps will be crucial o he resoluion o he conflic, he bill remains

very vague a his poinleading o accusaions ha i is jus an elecion-year ploy.

o move orward, he AKP and is poliical leaders have o overcome several

challenges. Te pary has no srong presence in Kurdish civil sociey and lacks

rused inerlocuors.59Te AKPs elecoral presence is likewise limieddespie

success in he 2014 local elecions in provinces such as anlura, Gazianep, Mu,

Bingl, Elaz, and Malaya on he periphery o he Kurdish regions, he BDP wonall he provinces in he Kurdish hearland.60Also, despie some success bringing

inrasrucure invesmens such as irrigaion projecs o souheasern Anaolia,61

economic developmen and educaional atainmen in Kurdish-majoriy areas sill

lag behind he res o urkey, leading o anger and disillusionmen. 62

Mos imporanly, he curren AKP discourse ends o limi he quesion o Kurdish

sel-deerminaion o culural issues and avoids he more pressing poliical seps

ha need o be aken. Kurds wan a serious debae abou new ways o adminiser

local economies, provide local governmen, and decide on inrasrucure plans

in he Kurdish-majoriy regions. In essence, he Kurds wan a higher degree o

auonomya erm ha has aken on such symbolic value in urkish poliical

discourse ha i has become almos meaningless. Te urkish sae and many

urkish ciizens view Kurdish auonomy as an anahema. Te issue o public school

educaion elicis paricularly vehemen opposiion rom many urks. Daing back

o Aarks ransormaion o he counry, conrol o public educaion has been a

source o grea poliical power and he roo o many urks poliical consciousness.

Tereore, educaion means he difference beween, as hey see i, Kurdish assimila-

ion ino urkish sociey or a movemen oward a Kurdish-urkish ederaion. For

naionalis urks schooled in he vision o Aark, ederaion is anamoun onaional breakup and decline, while or Kurds assimilaion has hisorically mean

shedding culural reedom and ceding all poliical auhoriy o Ankara.


26/53


The regional dimensions

of the peace process

Te peace process in urkey canno be seen in isolaion rom he regional dynamics

ha affec i, paricularly he increasing leverage o Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq.

Te pariioning o he Otoman Empire compleed by he 1923 reay o Lausanne

spli he regions Kurdish populaion among our sovereign saesurkey, Syria,

Iraq, and Iranadminisered by cenral governmens based in disan ciies. Tis

hisorical spli orced he Kurdish populaion o develop in differen ways and a

differen raes, while occasionally working collecively across borders.

urkey may finally be saring o resolve is cenury-old Kurdish issue, buoyed

by he PKK ceasefire. A he same ime, Syrian Kurds are seeking auonomy

while he counry collapses. In Iraq, o course, he Kurds remain deeply div ided

rom he counrys Arab populaion, an unorunae legacy o he counrys his-

ory and especially o ormer Presiden Saddam Husseins rule. Mos recenly,

Kurdish Peshmerga have aken conrol o Kirkuk, providing securiy in he wake

o ISISs rapid offensive agains cenral governmen orces, which sowed chaos

hrough much o norhern Iraq, hereby solidiying a de aco pariioning o he

counry. Te Iranian Kurds remain under he conrol o ehran, bu are closely

waching he changing circumsances o neighboring Kurdish minoriies. Te

cenral governmens o Syria, Iraq, and Iran are also monioring he urkish

peace process closely and have sakes in is success or ailure. Many Kurdish

naionaliss believe ha he movemen is poised or a significan breakhrough

and have ried o capialize on he regional chaos caused by he implosion o

Syria, he hosile relaions beween urkey and he Assad regime, and he col-

lapse o Baghdads auhoriy in norhern Iraq.63Tese regional dynamics will

affec he ulimae success or ailure o he peace process.


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Syria

Te crisis in Syria has hrown he Middle Eass poliical uure ino flux and will

coninue o influence he course o he urkey-PKK peace process. Far rom end-

ing wih he U.N. chemical weapons deal, he Syrian civil war has sen desabiliz-

ing currens hrough all o he counrys neighbors, hough some Syrian Kurdsbelieve hey have a chance o build poliical capial and consolidae conrol o

heir erriory. In paricular, he PYD has aken conrol o pars o norhern Syria

along he borders wih urkey and Iraq.64Te PYD-led Syrian Kurdish Council

unilaerally declared sel-rule o hree separae Kurdish canons on November

12, 2013, an announcemen condemned by some oher Syrian Kurdish paries,

he urkish governmen, and Presiden Barzanis Iraqi KDP.65

Te PYDs orces conrol sizable swahs o erriory and have ough jihadi and Al

Qaeda-linked groups such as he al-Nusra Fron and ISIS, and hey have recenly

drawn fighers across he border rom urkey.66Te PYD has also occasion-ally cracked down on dissening Kurdish groupsmosly younger and liberal

Kurds who disagree wih he PYDs auhoriarian endencies and supporers

o Presiden Barzanis KDP in Iraq, which is a odds wih he PYD. Indeed,

he PYDs declaraion o auonomy undermined previous effors by Presiden

Barzani o mediae beween he various Kurdish poliical groups in Syria and

bring he PYD ino a unied Syrian Kurdish poliical alliance, effors ha cul-

minaed in he ormaion o he Supreme Kurdish Council in summer 2012.67

Te Supreme Kurdish Council a leas provided a venue or he Barzani-aligned

Kurdish Naional Council68and he PYD, along wih oher Syrian Kurdish

groups, o air grievances and coordinae acion, bu he PYDs batlefield suc-

cesses oupaced he Supreme Kurdish Councils poliical progress. As he overall

Syrian conflic moved ino a purely miliary ramework, he PYDs miliary pre-

dominance made i he driving orce in Syrian Kurdish-conrolled areas, leading

i o exer is auhoriy over dissening groups in areas under is conrol.

Despie he PYDs unilaeral seps oward auonomy, he 2 million o 3 million

Kurds in Syriaabou 10 percen o he overall populaionare ragmened,

parly as a resul o pas repression by he Assad regime. Since he murder o Sheikh

Mohammed Mashouq al-Khaznawi in 2005, apparenly by Syrian inelligenceoperaives, Syrian Kurds have largely lacked a uniying leadership figure.69Many

Kurds suppor he PYDs miliary gains and are happy o have a Kurdish enclave

in Syria, even i hey may disagree wih aspecs o he PYDs poliical plaorm. 70

Perhaps mos imporanly, he effors o he PYDs miliary armhe Kurdish

Peoples Proecion Unis, or YPGo proec local populaions rom atacks by

exremis groups such as ISIS have earned hem a modicum o legiimacy.


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Te PYDs saed goals include ensuring he righ o Syrian Kurds o govern

hemselves and promoing democracy and equiable represenaion wihin he

Syrian republic, bu he group rejecs Kurdish secession rom Syria.71Te PYD

was ounded as a Syrian offshoo o he PKK, and he urkish and Syrian milian

organizaions have had close linkshence he similariy o he PYDs posiion

o calans concep o democraic auonomydaing back o he era o cur-ren Presiden Bashar al-Assads aher, Haez al-Assad. Ten-Presiden Haez

al-Assad, angered by urkeys damming o he Euphraes River in 1984, sup-

pored he PKK as a lever o pressure urkey rom ime o ime and o appease

he Kurdish minoriies in his own counry, hough he also had deep reservaions

abou poenial Kurdish separaism wihin Syria and oversaw atemps o resetle

Kurdish areas wih Arab setlers.72

Despie he PYDs saed democraic goals, here have been abusesor exam-

ple, he PYD auhoriies violen crackdown on peaceul demonsraions in

Amuda, which lef six people dead, dozens wounded, and 90 aciviss deained.73Neverheless, he YPG has emerged as a ormidable orce in he region. Te YPG is

said o have several housand fighers, which would place i among he larges mili-

ary organizaion in norhern Syria.74Unlike he PKK, however, neiher he Unied

Saes nor urkey has ever officially lised he PYD as a erroris organizaion.

Te PYD seized conrol o many areas i now holds when he Assad regime wih-

drew is orces in July 2012effecively ceding conrol wihou a figh. Te PYD

ook advanage, filling he securiy vacuum and providing proecion rom jihadi

orces. Te regimes wihdrawal was par o a sraegy o realiae agains urkey

or supporing he rebels and o spli he Kurds rom he majoriy-Arab rebel

orces.75Noneheless, he circumsances o he Assad regimes wihdrawal rom

Kurdish areas o Syria and he lack o major fighing beween he PYD and he

regime have led manyincluding urkish Foreign Miniser Ahme Davuoglu,

Presiden Barzanis KDP in Iraq, and many among he majoriy-Arab rebelso

argue ha he PYD has a aci deal wih he Assad regime, hough here have

been occasional, minor clashes beween he PYD and Assad-regime orces.76PYD

leader Salih Muslim Muhammad, or his par, has repeaedly rejeced his claim,

arguing ha YPG orces are he mos effecive orces conroning ISIS and ha

hey only wan o proec he populaion in heir areas.77


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Te Kurdish orces batlefield successes have been impressive since he Assad

regimes wihdrawal. Te YPG capured he own o Manajeer, near he urkish

border, and expelled all Al Qaeda-linked orces rom he border province o Ras

al-Ain in lae 2013. Over he firs ew monhs o his year, he YPG capured 19

owns and villages spanning Syrias norheasern border. Jus one week beore

capuring Manajeer, he YPG overook he Iraqi border-crossing poin in he own

o Yarubiya.78Despie he uneasy and someimes violen relaionship beween

he PYD and he pachwork o Sunni rebel groups in Syria, Kurdish orces have

managed o preserve a modicum o sabiliy in areas under heir conrol. Fighing

coninues or conrol o key owns and border crossings, such as Ceylanpinar-

Serekaniye, and he access o ouside supplies ha he crossings bring.79

Wih he consolidaion o poliical conrol in norhern Syria under he PYD,

condiions have emerged ha poin o he creaion o a viable ransborder Kurdish

naionalis movemen, he firs o is kind since World War I. Indeed, he flow o

PKK fighers across he border o join he PYDs figh in Syria can be seen, in par,

as evidence o a consolidaion o Kurdish sel-percepion. Even Kurdish suppor-

ers o Presiden Barzani in Iraqno riends o he PYDmay see heir ineressas more closely aligned wih he PYDs sruggle agains ISIS. Tese developmens

have changed he regional power equilibrium, as some argue ha Syrian Kurdish

auonomy could srenghen he hand o hardline PKK elemens in urkey, which

migh atemp o operae ouside Syria even i he peace in urkey holds.80On he

Kurdish female members of the PProtection Units stand guard at acheckpoint near the northeasternQamishli, Syria. Syrias Kurds havefirst steps toward creating an autmous region similar to the one acborder in Iraq, which is run as virta separate country. But the Kurdshas angered rebels who are fighttopple Syrian President Bashar al-PHOTO: AP PHOTO/MANU BRABO


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oher hand, hardline Kurdish naionaliss and PKK fighers are leaving urkey

o help secure auonomy in Syria, drawing poenial violen acors away rom

conronaion wih urkey. Likewise, fighers or boh he PYD and he PKK view

he conronaion wih ISIS as a more pressing figh. Tey may increasingly see

urkey as a poenial parner in ha sruggle, and vice versa.

Meanwhile, he Assad regime has no reason o wan a peaceul oucome o he

PKK negoiaions wih urkey, given urkeys suppor or he Arab rebels, and

would likely seize any opporuniy o derail he negoiaions in order o cause

a problem or Ankara. Bu he Syrian sae is a shadow o is ormer sel and has

effecively ceded conrol o mos o he norheas o he Kurds o ocus on fighing

he majoriy-Sunni Arab rebels elsewhere, meaning is leverage is limied. Barring

a major urn in he momenum o he Syrian civil war in avor o he Assad regime

or a major provocaion by urkey oward he PYD, i is hard o see a scenario in

which Presiden Assad has he abiliy o undermine he negoiaions on his own.

While he PYD has had success consolidaing miliary conrol over regions in

norhern Syria and has declared auonomy,81major challenges remain, including

he coninuing presence o he Syrian cenral governmen, serious disagreemens

beween he PYD and Kurdish leaders in norhern Iraq, he exclusion o Syrian

Kurds rom he Geneva negoiaions o achieve a poliical setlemen, and basic

quesions abou he orm o poliical economy ha will be esablished in he

newly auonomous areas. Te rise o ISIS has led o some rapprochemen beween

he PYD and Barzani-affiliaed groups in Syria and across he border in Iraqor

example, hrough he easing o he KRGs blockade o cerain border cross-

ings o PYD-conrolled areas.82Te PYD mus sill insiue a more inclusive and

accounable orm o governmen and share power wih all elemens o sociey in

he majoriy-Kurdish areas, including oher ehnic groups, in order o gain access

o sources o inernaional supporbu ha is difficul o execue or o veriy

under he curren circumsances. Te Unied Saes should clearly convey he

requiremens or cooperaion o he PYD, such as some orm o poliical power-

sharing wih oher Kurdish poliical eniies, including hose wih ies o he KDP.

A poliical undersanding among Syrian Kurds is sill possible; here is room oday

or he PYD and he PKK o move pas heir Cold War revoluionary radiionsand broaden heir appeal o an expanded range o Kurdish acors. Te hrea o

ISIS, now viewed as more immediae and serious han he figh agains urkish

or Syrian sae oppression, may precipiae such a poliical opening. Indeed,

ideology only serves o marginalize boh organizaions oday, undermining heir

abiliy o consolidae democraic auonomy and conribue o regional sabiliy.


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Indeed, in his wriings rom prison, calan has acknowledged ha he PKKs

heory, programme and praxis o he 1970s produced nohing bu uile separa-

ism and violence.83For Syrian Kurds, a poliical undersanding could srenghen

heir posiion and uniy, reassuring urkey o heir ideological openness, hereby

removing a major ouside opponen and paving he way or poenial cooperaion

wih he Unied Saes and oher Wesern powers.

Given he absence o any good opions or morally unimpeachable acors in he

Syrian conflic, a poliical conversaion beween PYD leaders and American

officials would be pracicalurkish officials have already underaken such

meeings, despie heir hosiliy oward he PYD. A recen analysis by ormer

U.S. Ambassador o Syria Rober Ford emphasized ha he PYD will emerge

somewha vicorious rom he ongoing conflic.84Te Unied Saes and urkey

did litle o address Kurdish concerns as par o he early effors o organize he

overall Syrian opposiion, meaning ha boh powers now ace a long-erm process

o convince he PYD ha is sraegy o acical alliances in pursui o Kurdishauonomy should be subordinaed o wider regional effors a sabiliy. Sill, a

poliical dialogue would begin his process, improve undersanding o he siua-

ion on he ground, build personal relaionships wih Kurdish leaders, and help

enhance poliical opions in he region in he long erm. Indeed, i is in he ineres

o he U.S. and European governmens. Finally, he PYDs consolidaion o power

in norhern Syria raises he long-erm sakes o he urkish-PKK peace process, as

any breakdown in negoiaions and reurn o miliary conflic would see urkey

conroning a hardened and well-enrenched miliary orce across he border in

Syria ha is able o aid PKK operaions in urkey.


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Iraq

As he PKK negoiaions coninue in urkey and as he PYD consolidaes is

auonomy in Syria, he Iraqi KRG remains he bes-esablished Kurdish polii-

cal eniy. Te KRGs posiion has only been enhanced in he shor erm by he

collapse o Baghdads auhoriy in he norh ollowing ISISs advance and he all

o Mosul. Te all o Mosul placed Kurdish sabiliy and he effeciveness o he

Peshmerga in sark relie and allowed he KRG o ake conrol o he oil-rich ciy

o Kirkuk and is pipelinesa long-sanding Kurdish goalwihou provoking a

direc clash wih Baghdad. Te KRGs posiion was urher boosed by he recen

receip o a $100 million paymen or oil i piped hrough urkey o inernaional

markesa key sep in he KRGs ques or energy and economic independence.85

Because o is srong posiion, he KRG plays a crucial role in engaging Kurds across

he Middle Eas and, or many Kurdish naionaliss, raises immediae hopes or a

Kurdish sae. Massoud Barzani, presiden o he KRG and leader o he KDP, has

worked diligenly o solidiy his poliical conrol over norhern Iraq and o culivae

an image as he aher o he broader Kurdish people. Bu while Presiden Barzaniis an imporan eleced figure and is working hard o posiion himsel as a represen-

aive o he Kurdish people as a whole, he does no represen he enire Kurdish

communiy. Indeed, his culivaion o close ies wih Prime Miniser Erdoan has

cemened a spli wih he Syrian PYD, which has is roos in poliical disagreemens

A Kurdish Peshmerga fighter staguard as new equipment arriveKalak refinery on the outskirts oIraq, as Kurdish authorities are tto help ease the fuel shortage. Imilitants have laid siege to Iraqest oil refinery in the city of BaijPHOTO: AP PHOTO


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beween he KDP and he PYD; rivalry or leadership o he pan-Kurdish poliical

movemen; and personal dispues beween Presiden Barzani, calan, and Muslim

Muhammad. Noneheless, Presiden Barzanis personal ambiions and naionalis

aspiraions will be imporan in shaping he uure o he Kurdish regions.

Presiden Barzani has reasons o be sel-confiden; norhern Iraq represens anexcepional success given he roubled hisory o he counry over he pas wo

decades, hough human righs challenges remain.86Te U.S.-led no-fly zone o

proec Kurdish civilians in he wake o he firs Gul War resuled in he reurn

o many reugees and gave a degree o de aco auonomy o he region.87In par

since he 1991 Gul War, bu paricularly since he 2003 U.S.-led invasion and

occupaion o Iraq, Iraqi Kurdisan has been largely auonomous. Parliamenary

democracy has produced wo successive presidenial elecions, economic devel-

opmen, and some o Iraqs lowes povery raes.

Economically, he KRG is easily he mos impressive Kurdish case, exporingnearly 400,000 barrels o crude oil per day by he end o 201388and receiving

abou 15 percen o he cenral Iraqi budgehough hese paymens are in

arrears given he collapse o cenral governmen auhoriy, dispues over Kurdish

effors o expor oil independenly, and he inabiliy o orm a consensus govern-

men in Baghdad.89A he same ime, he KRG relies heavily on he energy secor

as a whole and is share o he cenral Iraqi oil revenues in paricular.90While his

reliance has begun o change wih he akeover o Kirkuk and he firs paymen or

independen oil shipmens hrough urkey, he legal basis or hese sales is sill

unclear. Te Supreme Cour o Iraq has delayed is rulingmeaning he KRGs

abiliy o atrac inernaional loans o finance is budge is sill in flux.91

Tis reliance on Baghdadwih which he Kurds have a deeply roubled relaion-

shiphas led Presiden Barzani o culivae deeper rade and energy ies wih

urkey over he pas wo years. Indeed, he proceeds rom he firs independen

sale o Kurdish oil were deposied wih Halkbank, urkeys sae-owned lender.92

Tese energy poliics underpin he conronaion wih Baghdad, ineviably pulling

he Unied Saes ino he conflic. Te Unied Saes official posiion has been

ha all Iraqi oil mus be expored hrough he Sae Oil Markeing Organizaion

o Iraq, while he KRG believes i should be able o marke is oil independenly.93

A mulibillion-dollar pipeline deal, solidified in 2012 and designed o help mee

urkish demand by pumping oil direcly rom he KRG, has heighened he en-

sions. Te pipelines, when finished, could expor up o 1 million barrels o oil per

day o urkey, wih much o i bypassing he cenral Iraqi oil nework.94


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Te Unied Saes, concerned ha hese deals could ear he counry apar, has

coninued o asser ha he deals require Baghdads approval. Meanwhile, Iraqi

Prime Miniser al-Maliki has repeaedly condemned he move and has hreaened

o sue Ankara or dealing direcly wih he KRG, as well as resoring o acics such

as closing Iraqi airspace o urkeys energy miniser in an atemp o block nego-

iaions wih he KRG.95

Mos recenly, Baghdad sopped cargo flighs o Erbil andSulaimaniya in realiaion or independen oil expors and Kurdish minisers deci-

sion o boycot cabine meeings in proes o Prime Miniser al-Malikis accusa-

ions ha he Kurds were aiding ISIS.96

Te all o Mosul and ISISs remarkable gains in norhern Iraq have changed he

overall sraegic picure, dramaically srenghening he KRGs hand and weaken-

ing Prime Miniser al-Maliki. Te need or Kurdish suppor in counering ISIS,

orming a new Iraqi governmen, and holding he counry ogeher may mean

ha concessions o he Kurds on oil revenues and conrol o Kirkuk are necessary.

Presiden Barzani cerainly believes so, declaring ha Mosuls all has made a newrealiy and a new Iraq, a sign ha he KRG may no relinquish conrol o Kirkuk

o he cenral governmen i securiy in he norh is resored.97U.S. policy has

only begun o reac o his new realiy, and here are signs ha Washingon may be

acknowledging ha is principled sance on revenue sharing may have been over-

aken by evens on he ground. Signs o a poenial sofening o U.S. policy oward

he KRG were visible in Secreary o Sae Kerrys visi o Erbil in June98and Vice

Presiden Bidens meeing wih KRG officials a he Whie House in July.99

Bu despie Washingons reservaions and Baghdads proess, dynamics on he

ground have coninued largely unabaed. Iraq was urkeys second-larges expor

marke in 2012, accouning or $11 billion in rade, up rom $8.3 billion in 2011,

and urkey was a primary source or crucial iems such as machinery, cereals,

produce, and finished meal producs. Iraq, meanwhile, accouned or $3.1 billion

in impors o urkey in 2012, up rom $2.5 billion in 2011.100While rade o he

KRG is no broken ou rom he overall Iraqi saisics, he geography means ha

he Kurdish regions are cenral o his bilaeral rade. Tese growing economic

ies have brough closer poliical cooperaion; Presiden Barzani has effecively

allied himsel wih Prime Miniser Erdoan. Tis new relaionship was on display

a a public rally in Diyarbakr in November 2013, a which he wo men appearedon sage ogeher and Presiden Barzani offered his ull suppor o he urkish-

Kurdish peace processan unhinkable sigh jus a ew years ago.101Te rise o

ISISand is argeing o urkish diplomas and ruck drivers102may only

cemen his alliance, once again demonsraing o Ankara he benefis o having a

reliable securiy parner in he KRG.


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Te KRGs closer ies wih urkey have revealed aul lines in he regional Kurdish

bloc, hough he growing ISIS hrea may promp a rapprochemen beween he

Kurdish paries. Prime Miniser Erdoans hosiliy oward he PYD in Syria and

he PKK in urkeyalong wih Presiden Barzanis poliical ambiionshave

conribued o he conronaion beween he KDP and he PYD. KRG auhoriies

have periodically closed he border crossings beween norhern Iraq and Syria andhave even begun consrucion o a rench o block he flow o smugglers, milians,

andunorunaelyaid supplies.103

Presiden Barzani also has mixed eelings abou he emergence o he Syrian

Kurds as an influenial poliical bloc, as i represens a posiive developmen or

he Kurds a he regional level bu a hrea o his personal leadership ambiions i i

coninues o be dominaed by he PYD. Presiden Barzanis poliical coaliion also

espouses a more conservaive, radiional poliical docrine ha is a odds wih he

radical lefis ideology o he PKK and he PYD. Ta said, he rise o ISISboh

he securiy hrea i represens and he naionalis opporuniy i has creaedmay lead o greaer cooperaion beween he KRG and he PYD. Indeed, here are

already indicaions ha he Peshmerga and he YPG are seeking greaer coordina-

ion o comba ISIS along he Syrian-Iraqi border.104

Te personal relaionship beween Presiden Barzani and PYD leader Muslim

Muhammad has been ense, mirroring he regional maneuvering. Presiden Barzani

condemned he PYD in lae 2013 or unilaerally declaring is auonomy and

ignoring oher Kurdish paries,105and Muslim Muhammad was denied access o

Iraqi Kurdisan as relaions worsened.106Tis rif beween wo prominen Kurdish

leaders has escalaed ino a conronaion verging on a proxy war ha has no been

setled oday, despie he shared ISIS hrea. Many Kurdish naionaliss lamen

he spli as i undermines he poenial o poliically uniy he Kurds by piting a

Baghdad-Damascus-PKK axis agains a KRG-Ankara-Washingon axis.107

Bu his simplisic divisionand he assumpion behind i ha he divide is

mainained by ouside powersignores he legiimae divides among he various

Kurdish poliical acors. In paricular, Presiden Barzanis hopes have been damp-

ened by he PYDs vicories in Syria agains orces affiliaed wih his own KDP,

and he is mobilizing his poliical capial o ry and recapure conrol o Kurdishnaionalis orces in he region. I remains o be seen i he ISIS hrea is sufficien

o cause Kurdish leaders o se aside poliical differences and personal rivalries.


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Iran

Irans main concern regarding he Kurdish issue is prevening PKK fighers rom

atemping o join orces wih is Iranian siser organizaion he Pary o Free Lie

o Kurdisan, or PJAK. ehran would also ideally wan Iraqi Kurds o more acively

join he figh agains ISIS and agree o a poliical setlemen ha mainains Shia con-rol in Baghdad, bu Iranian officials likely realize he improbabiliy o his goal. In is

curren orm, he PJAK does no presen a hrea o he Iranian saei concluded

a ceasefire wih ehran in 2011 and largely wihdrew o he Qandil Mounains in

Iraq108bu he group could become more dangerous wih PKK reinorcemens.109

Kurds in Iran have many o he same complains as Kurds in urkey and, indeed, as

Irans oher minoriies: srucural unemploymen, discriminaion in procuring gov-

ernmen jobs, inadequae educaional insiuions, underdevelopmen, and a lack o

culural represenaion in he media.110In Syria, Iranian Kurdish fighers have joined

he figh o secure an auonomous Kurdish-conrolled region along he urkish

border. Te PJAKconsidered o be he Iranian branch o he PKKrepored hai would be sending fighers o is counerpars in norhern Syria.111

Bu i is difficul o discern how concern abou poenial reinorcemens or he

PJAK will shape Iranian policy. Iran has suppored he PKK in he pas, using he

organizaion as leverage agains urkey in much he same way ha Syria has used

he group.112Iran may calculae ha he peaceul resoluion o he PKK conflic

in urkey could lead o he reinorcemen o he PJAK and ry o saboage he

peace process. Indeed, he acing miliary leader o he PKK, Mura Karaylan,

has claimed ha Iran offered he organizaion maerial suppor, including heavy

weaponry, i i derailed he peace process; he PKK rejeced he offer, according o

Karaylan.113Alernaively, Iran may see he prospec or closer cooperaion wih

urkey agains violen Kurdish acors who hreaen boh governmens as a worhy

goal, as i has in he pas when violence has flared up.114While Iran and urkey

nominally share an ineres in combaing boh Kurdish naionalis ambiions and

he rise o ISIS, he counries regional rivalry means any real cooperaion is very

unlikely, unless he hrea dramaically increases.

Remarkably, urkey and Iran have hus ar managed o comparmenalize rela-

ions on a range o issues; he wo counries are able o cooperae on individualracks wih litle regard or oher issues on which hey find hemselves in opposi-

ion. For example, hey find hemselves on opposie sides o a biter proxy war

in Syria, while simulaneously seeking o improve bilaeral rade ies. Tis care-

ul secioning o ineress has led o srange oucomes. Prime Miniser Erdoan,

or insance, sa down in ehran wih Iranian Supreme Leader Ayaollah Ali


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Khamenei and Presiden Hassan Rouhani o negoiae bilaeral rade and energy

deals115while urkish-backed rebels clashed wih Iranian-backed Hezbollah figh-

ers in Syria.116Bu he wo counries rely on each oher economically; Iran was

urkeys hird-larges expor marke in 2012, accouning or $10 billion in rade,117

while 39 percen o urkeys oal crude oil imporsmos o is supplycame

rom Iran.118

I is likely ha he governmens have decided o comparmenalizeheir shared Kurdish challenges in he conex o wider sraegic maneuvers and

he realiies o heir exensive rade and energy ies.

Iran has displayed how careully i considers he burgeoning siuaion wih he

Kurds in he Middle Eas. I has counless sae houses hroughou he KRG

hrough which i boh gahers inormaion on he ground and esablishes is sake

in norhern Iraq.119Iran is also one o he mos ruhless repressors o is own

Kurdish populaion, regularly auhorizing public execuions and floggings ha

have coninued under Presiden Rouhani.120Wih he poliical spoligh ocused

on he nuclear negoiaions beween Iran and he inernaional communiylargely relegaing oher aces o inernal Iranian poliics o secondary impor-

ancei is unlikely here will be much movemen on Iranian Kurdish issues in

he near uure. Te negoiaions only srenghen he curren Iranian governmen,

hus giving i more auhoriy and public backing o is curren policies.


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Regional Kurdish dynamics

and Washingtons role

In assessing he poliical implicaions o recen regional power shifs, i is impor-

an o recognize he hisorical conex. Te Kurds consiue he larges ehnic

group in he world wihou a naion-sae in which hey are he majoriy, hough

naional borders, differen sublanguages, ribes, poliics, hisory, and secarian

orienaion divide hem. Because hey are spli beween our counries and have

differen relaions wih each o hose cenral governmens, hey presen a unda-

menally inermesic policy problem. While he Kurdish quesion remains cen-

ered in urkey, where hal o all Kurds live, he issues discussed in his repor aredeeply inerwinedwha happens in one counry will direcly affec he inernal

poliics o neighboring cenral governmens and Kurdish poliical groups. Te

cross-border naure o Kurdish poliical organizaion orces cenral governmens

o address he issue hrough oreign policy, while hey wish o relegae he Kurds

o domesic saus. Te conflic in Syria and he legacy o he U.S. invasion o Iraq

have oday placed he quesion o Kurdish auonomy in is varied orms a he

cener o each o hese counries oreign and domesic policies. Despie inernal

divisions, Kurdish poliical acors are making srides in heir ques or greaer sel-

deerminaion and canno be ignored.

Te Wes has been undersandably hesian o engage wih subnaional groups

or ear o upseting cenral governmens. Bu or Washingon, reusing o grapple

wih his conundrum or reasons o naional sovereigny is becoming increas-

ingly unenable. Cerainly, here are serious concerns o be addressed, and he

Unied Saes and Europeans should require Kurdish poliical leaders o do so.

As menioned earlier, he PYD has demonsraed auhoriarian pracices in Syria,

and he PKK has no ully renounced violence and remains an official erroris

organizaion under U.S. and European law.121Sill, he Unied Saes and is allies

will no ge o choose perec parners in a ime o massive ransormaion andparial disinegraion and mus a leas alk o hose wih he abiliy o influence

oucomes on he ground. Furhermore, he success or ailure o he urkish-PKK

peace process will affec regional dynamicsparicularly in neighboring Syria and

Iraqor years o come.


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Despie Kurdish rusraion wih many aspecs o U.S. policy oward he region,

Washingon has no been explicily posiive or negaivenor even paricularly

consisenoward he Kurds. Te bes example migh be he Unied Saes

relaionship wih he KRG; he American-led no-fly zone and subsequen invasion

o Iraq essenially creaed he auonomous zone, bu he relaionship has grown

ense due o independen KRG energy projecs, which Washingon ears will earIraq apar. In urkey, Washingon has pressed he governmen o resol

the united states, turkey, and the kurdish regions: the peace process in context

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