Salim Yaqub

The United States and theArab-Israeli Conflict,

1947 to the Present

• Jewiah State

S ince the establishment of the stateof Israel in the late 1940s, the U.S.government has worked to promote a

settlement ofthe Arab-Israeli dispute alonglines conducive to the maintenance of Israe-li security and to the preservation of friendlyties with Arab countries. This formula isonly rational, given America's simultane-ous commitments to Jewish national sur-vival and to continued Western access tothe oil reserves ofthe Arab world. All U.S.administrations have subscribed to the vievjthat any lasting peace will require painfulconcessions from Israelis and Arabs alike.In practice, however, the U.S. governmenthas been more reluctant to exact Israeli con-cessions than Arab ones. Indeed, since theearly 1970s Washington has steadily revisedits prescriptions for a settlement to bringthem more into line with Israeli preferenc-es. In part, this pattern reflects the consider-able influence that Israel's supporters havewielded in domestic American politics. Inpart, it reflects the fact that Israel has cometo occupy a militarily advantageous posi-tion; supporting Israel's preferences oftenamounts to accepting the status quo, whichis always easier than imposing new realities.Finally, frightening scenarios that once con-strained Washington from endorsing Israelipositions too readily—like another majorwar between Israel and the Arab states, orSoviet intervention in the region—have re-ceded from view. Within these parameters,the U.S. government has been remarkably

successful in narrowing the geopolitical scope ofthe Arah-Israeh con-flict and in reducing its ability to threaten global stability. It has so farfailed, however, to promote an actual resolution of the dispute.

PalestineU.N. Partition Plan(1947)

Egypt

In 1947 the U. N. developed the plan shown above to par-tition Palestine into separate states for )ews and Arabs.From Issues in the Middle East, Atlas, U.S. Central Intelli-gence Agency, 1973. (Image courtesy ofthe Perry-CastaPie-da Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin.)

Although official U.S. involvement in thePalestine issue dates back to World War 1, auseful starting point for our purposes is early1947, when Britain announced that it wouldsoon withdraw its forces from Palestine(which it had governed under a League of Na-tions mandate since the early 1920s) and letthe United Nations adjudicate the competingclaims of Zionist )ews and Palestinian Arabs.A special U.N. committee investigated the is-sue and proposed that Palestine be dividedinto a Jewish state and an Arab state. Tlie Zi-onists accepted the proposal, albeit with somereluctance as they had hoped to gain a largershare ofthe territory. The Arab states and thePalestinians, seeing the Zionists as Europeaninterlopers on Arab land, flatly rejected thepartition plan. In November 1947 the U.N.General Assembly approved partition. Vio-lence immediately erupted between Palestin-ians and Zionists, with Zionists eventuallygaining the upper hand. In May 1948, theZionists proclaimed the independent stateof Israel, whereupon several Arab countriesdeclared war on the new state. Israeli forcesrebuffed the attack and seized a larger shareof Palestine than had been initially allotted tothe Jewish state. Of the remainder of Pales-tine, the West Bank was annexed by Jordanwhile the Gaza Strip came under Egyptiancontrol. Meanwhile, about 750,000 Palestin-ian civilians either fled or were driven fromtheir homes in the territory of the Jewishstate, settling in refugee camps in neighbor-ing Arab countries. By early 1949, Israel and

the Arab states had concluded armistice agreements, but the partieswere far from peace. Israel refused to relinquish the additional terri-tory it had seized or to repatriate significant numbers of Palestinian

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refugees; the Arab states refused to recognize Israel as long as it tookthese positions (i).

Against the advice of most of his foreign policy advisers who wor-ried about ahenating the Arab world, President Harry S. Trumanplayed a key role in facilitating Israel's creation, first by supporting theU.N. partition plan and then by recognizing the newly proclaimed Jew-ish state. Truman was motivated partly by domestic American politics,partly by humanitarian concern for the phght of Holocaust survivors,and partly by the belief that no feasible alternative to partition existed.Although Truman was not happy with Israel's positions on territoryand refugees, he declined to exert significant pressure on Israel tomodify its stance {2).

Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was equally unsuc-cessful in resolving the disputes arising from Israel's creation. In themid-1950s, his administration proposed a peace plan whereby Israelrelinquished some of its southern territory to Egypt and Jordan whilethe Arab states recognized Israel and permitted the resettlement of Pal-estinian refugees in Arab countries. None ofthe parties to the disputeendorsed the plan. Meanwhile, tensions escalated on the Egyptian-Is-raeli frontier, with Egypt sponsoring commando raids into Israel andIsrael retaliating disproportionately against Egyptian garrisons andtowns. In October 1956, following Egypt's nationalization ofthe SuezCanal Company, Israel joined Britain and Erance in a military assaulton Egypt. Eisenhower was outraged by the move, which inflamed anti-Western sentiment throughout the Middle East and gave the SovietUnion an opportunity to gain influence there. Eisenhower condemnedthe aggression and used extraordinary diplomatic and economic pres-sure to force Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from Egyptian ter-ritory, in exchange for its withdrawal, Israel received assurances fromthe international community that U.N. peacekeeping forces would bestationed on Egyptian territory to prevent a resumption of Egyptian-

President Harry S. Truman (left) played a key role in Israel's creation by recognizing the newlyproclaimed nation. Here, in 1951, he receives a Menorah as a gift from Israeli Prime MinisterDavid Ben-Gurion (center), and Abba Eban, Israel's Ambassador to the United States. {Imagecourtesy of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum and the National Archivesand Records Administration, NLT-AVC-PHT-(73)368o.)

sponsored raids into Israel, and assurances that the Strait of Tiran,which Egypt had blockaded prior to the Suez War, would be accessibleto Israeli shipping (3).

These arrangements held until May 1967 when the Egyptian gov-ernment, erroneously anticipating an Israeli attack against Syria, de-manded the departure from its territory ofthe U.N. peacekeepers andreinstated the blockade against Israeli shipping in the Strait. Regardingthe latter step as a casus belli, Israel launched a devastating strike againstEgypt, moving also against Jordan and Syria when they entered the waron Egypt's side. In six days, Israel seized the Sinai Peninsula and GazaStrip from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heightsfrom Syria. Unlike Eisenhower, who a decade earlier had demanded afull and immediate Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian land. PresidentLyndon Johnson pushed for a "cease-fire in-place," which allowed Isra-el to occupy the captured territories indefinitely. More evenhandedly. inNovember 1967 the United States cosponsored U.N. Security CouncilResolution 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from Arab land inexchange for the Arab states' recognition of Israel's right to live in peaceand security. Because the resolution referred to "territories occupied inthe recent conflict' rather than "the territories . . . ," Israel later claimedthat it was authorized to retain signiflcant portions of that land. At thetime ofthe resolution's passage, however, Washington had privately as-sured the Jordanian government that the omission ofthe definite ar-ticle was meant to facilitate only minor changes in Israel's borders (4).

The 1967 war made an eventual settlement of the dispute bothharder and easier to imagine. On the one hand, the Arab governments'disastrous performances led to the emergence ofan independent Pal-estinian movement determined to take matters into its own hands. Inthe late 1960s and early 1970s, the Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO) not only sponsored spectacular acts of terrorism but called for thedismantling of Israel and for the establishment in mandatory Palestineof a "secular democratic state" in which Muslims, Christians, and Jews

would have equal political rights—an obvious non-starter asfar as most ofthe international community was concerned.On the other hand, Israel's post-1967 occupation tended topush earlier Arab-Israeli controversies into the backgroundand to bring the possibilities of a pragmatic settlement to thefore. Arab governments became increasingly explicit abouttheir willingness to recognize Israel within its 1949 (ratherthan 1947) borders, provided it relinquished the territoriesseized in 1967.

In December 1969, William Rogers, Richard Nixon'sfirst secretary of state, publicly proposed that Israel withdrawfrom virtually all ofthe territory seized in 1967 in exchangefor recognition and pledges of nonbelligerency from the Arabstates. Although the Rogers Plan remained the official policyofthe Nixon administration, the president and his nationalsecurity adviser, Henry Kissinger, privately assured Israel thatthe plan would not be implemented. Nixon and Kissinger re-garded the Arab-Israeh conflict as a proxy battle in the ColdWar—U.S.-backed Israel vs. Soviet-backed Arab states—andsaw little reason to pressure their ally to relinquish territoryon the scale envisioned by Rogers. In 1971, Egyptian presi-dent Anwar Sadat announced that Egypt would recognizeIsrael if it withdrew from all the territory taken in 1967 andthat such a settlement could be accomplished in stages. Rog-ers was encouraged by the gesture and urged Israel to re-spond favorably. But when Israel rejected the initiative, onthe grounds that the 1949 borders were unacceptable, Nixonand Kissinger supported the Israelis, sinking Sadat's initia-tive. Meanwhile, U.S. military and economic assistance to Is-

14 OAH Magazine of History • May 2006

rael was rapidly increasing, from about $93 million in fiscal year 1970to $500 million in 1973. Also in these years, Washington began usingits veto in the U.N. Security Council to shield Israel from criticism andsanctions for its occupation of Arab land (5).

In October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a major offensiveagainst Israeli positions in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. Al-though the attack was surprisingly effective at first, Israel soon gainedthe initiative and was able to push Egyptian and Syrian forces back tothe 1967 cease-fire lines (and behind them in some places). Still, theOctober War was deeply unsettling to Washington. For one thing, inretaliation for a U.S. airlift of weapons to Israel, several Arab states im-posed an embargo on oil shipments to the West, causing considerabledamage to the global economy. For another, in backing their respec-tive proxies, the superpowers came dangerously close to fighting eachother directly. A shaken Kissinger (now secretary of state) hastened tothe Middle East to begin his famous "shuttle diplomacy," which wouldconsume him for the next two years (6).

As Kissinger launched his diplomatic initiative, Israel was comingunder growing international pressure to withdraw to the pre-June 1967lines. Kissinger, however, believed that Israel should be permitted toretain substantial portions of the occupied territories. To circumventdemands for total withdrawal, Kissinger capitalized on the attitude ofSadat, who was extremely eager to end his country's conflict with Israeland focus instead on Egypf s dire economic needs. Sadat was so desper-ate for a deal that he was willing to drift away from the Soviet orbit andplace his trust in Kissinger's mediation. Although Sadat insisted thatany Egyptian-Israeh agreement be linked to an overall Arab-Israeli set-tlement. Kissinger suspected that Sadat would, if necessary, accept theformer without the latter. With Egypt thus removed from the conflict,the remaining Arab states would find it extremely difficult to resumemajor hostihties and again galvanize world opinion to compel a fullIsraeli withdrawal. Accordingly, Kissinger launched a series of step-by-step negotiations through which Israel gradually withdrew from por-tions ofthe Sinai in exchange for a gradual reduction in Egypfs state ofbelligerency against Israel. As a further inducement to Israel, in 1975Kissinger secretly pledged that the United States would not negotiatewith the PLO as long as it refused to recognize Israel {7).

The process was completed in 1978 when President Jimmy Cart-er brokered an agreement at Camp David between Sadat and Israeliprime minister Menachem Begin. Israel withdrew from the remainderofthe Sinai, and Egypt granted full recognition to Israel. Although theCamp David accords included arrangements for Palestinian autonomyon the West Bank and Gaza, these provisions were never implementedbecause the Jordanian government, whose participation was required,refused to cooperate. And, because there was no operational linkagebetween the Egyptian-Israeli and the Palestinian components ofthedeal. Camp David amounted to a separate peace agreement betweenEgypt and Israel. Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights, the WestBank, and Gaza continued. Indeed, the occupation intensified as Beginstepped up construction of (ewish settlements in the West Bank andGaza, in an effort to strengthen Israel's hold on the territories (8).

Meanwhile, Israel was facing a growing challenge from the PLO.From bases in Lebanon, PLO militias launched rocket attacks and raidsinto northern Israel, to which Israel responded with air raids againstPalestinian camps and Lebanese villages. But the PLO's main threatwas political. In the mid- and late 1970s, the PLO gradually shed itsrejectionist baggage and moved toward acceptance of a historic com-promise: a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza with East Je-rusalem as its capital, living alongside Israel. As this vision accordedwith an emerging consensus in world opinion, the PLO gained ininternational legitimacy. A Palestinian state was anathema to Begin,

A large c l o u d o f s m o k e , v i s ib le for n i i l e i , a ro^e i r t ; ' ; •• . • • • • • .- - .• :^

in Beirut, Lebanon, on the morning of October 23,1983. A suicide bomber drove atruck filled with explosives into the barracks, killing 241 American service personnel.(Official USMC Photo. Image courtesy ofthe U.S. Marine Corps Image Archives.)

who set out to crush the PLO. In June 1982 he launched an invasionof Lebanon; soon Israeli forces were besieging and shelling Beirut,where the PLO had its headquarters. President Ronald Reagan sentto Lebanon a special envoy who convinced Israel to lift the siege inexchange for the PLO's relocation to Tunisia. Shortly after the PLO'sdeparture, Israeli-backed Lebanese Christian militiamen entered Pales-tinian refugee camps and massacred hundreds of civilians, promptingthe Reagan administration to station U.S. Marines in the country. InMay 1983, the administration convinced the Lebanese government tosign a peace treaty with Israel. Coming on the heels ofthe Israeli inva-sion, and concluded while Israeli soldiers remained on Lebanese soil,the treaty aroused bitter opposifion within Lebanon. It also angeredthe Syrian government, which had its own troops in Lebanon and be-lieved it should have a say in Lebanese foreign policy. In October 1983,a suicide bomber—apparently a Syrian-backed Lebanese Shiite—drovea truck filled with explosives into the Marines' compound in Beirut,killing 241 servicemen. Reagan withdrew the Marines from Lebanon afew months later {9).

The disastrous experience in Lebanon left the Reagan administra-tion wary of Arab-Israeli diplomacy. But the Palestinian uprising, or In-tifada, against Israeli rule over the territories, which began in late 1987and continued for the rest of the decade, forced Washington to revisitthe subject. Because the Intifada pitted stone-throwing Palestiniansagainst gun-toting Israeli soldiers, it was a public relations disaster forIsrael. Seizing the opportunity, the PLO formally committed itself toa two-state settlement in November 1988. The following month, PLOChairman Yasser Arafat renounced terrorism and recognized Israel'sright to live in peace and security, prompting the Reagan administra-tion to establish, for the first time, a formal dialogue between the Unit-ed States and the PLO. But Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush,suspended the dialogue in [une 1990 when Arafat refused to condemna PLO facfion for an attempted terrorist operation inside Israel (10).

Still, by the early 1990s circumstances were pushing Palestinians,Israelis, and Americans toward compromise. The decline and fall of

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the Soviet Union deprived the PLO of a major source of material anddiplomatic support. Arafafs backing oflraq in the Persian Gulf Warof 1990-91 infuriated wealthy Gulf Arab states, which curtailed theirfinancial assistance to the PLO. Meanwhile, the Palestinian uprisinghad convinced many Israelis that they could not rule indefinitely overPalestinians. On the American side. Bush had sought Arab support forthe Gulf War by pledging to revisit the Arab-Israeli issue once the warended. In October 1991, the United States and the moribund SovietUnion co-sponsored a Middle East conference in Madrid attended byIsrael, the major Arab states, and a Palestinian delegation approvedhy, though not formally affiliated with, the PLO. By prearrangement,after a few collective sessions the conference split up into separateIsraeli-Syrian, Israeh-Jordanian, Israeli-Lebanese, and Israeli-Pales-tinian negotiations, which yielded fewconcrete results (11).

In the summer of 1993, however, Is-raeli and PLO officials held secret talksin Oslo and agreed on a formula for re-solving the dispute: Israel would with-draw from portions of Gaza and from theWest Bank town of Jericho, allowing forPalestinian self-rule there. From thesenuclei, the Palestinians would graduallyassume responsibility for administer-ing Caza and unspecified portions ofthe West Bank. This transitional phasewould culminate some years later in ne-gotiations between Israelis and Palestin-ians over the final status of the territo-ries. Although the United States playedno role in the Oslo talks, the agreementwas unveiled on the White House lawn,and the administration of Bill Clintonbecame the principal mediator for sub-sequent Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.As a result of those negotiations, overthe next several years Israel withdrewfrom most Palestinian population cen-ters, allowing a Palestinian Authority,under Arafafs presidency, to administerthem instead. Israel continued, however,to populate the territories with Jewishsettlers, whose numbers nearly doubledduring the Oslo years (12).

The Oslo process came to a tragicend in 2000-2001. The Israelis laterclaimed that, at a July 2000 Camp Davidsummit meeting, Israeli prime ministerEhud Barak offered Arafat virtually ev-erything the Palestinians had previouslydemanded but that Arafat rejected the offer and opted for violence in-stead. The documentary record reveals a murkier process whereby Is-raeli and Palestinian leaders, in a series of meetings from July 2000 toJanuary 2001, floated various proposals for ending the conflict, oftenthrough American intermediaries. The most far-reaching Israeli pro-posal involved a Palestinian state in all of Gaza and about 94 percent ofthe West Bank, with Palestinian sovereignty over pockets of East Jeru-salem. The Palestinians, at their most conciliatory, called for Palestin-ian sovereignty over all of Gaza, about 97 percent ofthe West Bank, andalt of East Jerusalem, except for some Jewish holy sites over which Is-rael would enjoy sovereignty. On refugees, the Palestinians insisted on

Behind a barbed wire fence at a West Bank checkpoint, Palestiniansawait entry into Jerusalem in June 2003. (Image courtesy ofthe UNPhoto Library archives, UN Photo #UNEi52.)

the affirmation of Palestinians' "right to return" to their homes in Israelbut were willing to discuss practical limitations on the exercise of thatright. The Israelis preferred to speak of a "wish to return" but seemedopen to the possibility that Israel would eventually absorb tens of thou-sands of refugees. Negotiators on both sides hoped that the talks wouldcontinue and that the gaps could be narrowed in later discussions. ButAriel Sharon's election to the Israeli premiership in February 2001, ona platform sharply critical of Baraks concessions to the Palestinians,dashed that prospect. Meanwhile, a new Intifada had erupted in Sep-tember 2000, reflecting Palestinians' accumulated frustration over thefailure ofthe peace process to end the occupation. The second uprisingwas much more violent than the first, with Palestinians escalating fromstones to guns to suicide bombs and Israelis advancing from guns to

tanks to helicopter gunships (13).As prime minister, Sharon dis-

pensed with negotiations and treatedthe Palestinian movement as little morethan a terrorist enterprise, intensify-ing the Israeli military's campaign inthe territories. The administration ofGeorge W. Bush, which took office inJanuary 2001, was initially skeptical ofthis approach. But the terrorist attacksof September 11, 2001, Arafafs failureto stem the tide of suicide bombings in-side Israel, and vigorous pressure fromIsrael's American supporters all swungadministration opinion sharply inSharon's direction. With few objectionsfrom Washington, Sharon took a seriesof unilateral steps to enhance Israel'ssecurity and consolidate the occupa-tion. To keep out suicide bombers, hebegan construction of a "separation bar-rier" between Israel and the West Bank.Because the barrier lay well within theterritory of the West Bank, however, italso served as a mechanism for the defacto annexation of Palestinian land. Inthe spring of 2004, Sharon unveiled aplan whereby Israel would witlidraw itsforces and settlements from Gaza, dis-mantle some settlements deep insidethe West Bank, and annex a broad beltof West Bank territory that bordered Is-rael and contained most of the Jewishsettlers. In April 2004 Bush endorsedthe plan; it was the first time the U.S.government had formally counte-nanced large-scale Israeli annexation of

Palestinian land (14). Arafafs death in late 2004, followed by the elec-tion to the Palestinian presidency of Mahmoud Abbas, a figure moreacceptable to Israel, raised hopes for a new direction in Israeli-Palestin-ian relations. So, too, did Sharon's pullout from Gaza in August 2005,over the bitter opposition of his own political party. Neither event, how-ever, altered Sharon's annexationist policy toward the West Bank. And,although Sharon was nominally committed to the establishment of aPalestinian state, his territorial ambitions precluded a Palestinian statethat was viable.

In January 2006 Sharon suffered a debilitating stroke that appearedto end his political career. In late 2005 Sharon had left the conservative

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Likud bloc to form a new party, Kadima, committed to enacting hisannexationist policies in the West Bank. In March 2oo5 Kadima, nowled by Ehud Olmert, was victorious in Israeh elections, Weeks earlierthe Palestinian party Hamas, an Islamist group formally committed tothe dismantling of Israel, prevailed in Palestinian parliamentary elec-tions. While the Bush administration welcomed Kadima's victory, itwas dismayed by Hamas's, and in April Washington cut off economicassistance to the Palestinian Authority, conditioning the resumptionof U.S. aid on Hamas's recognition of Israel (15). As ofthe spring of2oo5, then, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was defined by two rejec-tionist parties, one of which enjoyed steadfast American support. Q

Endnotes1. Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 4th ed. (New York: St.

Martin's Press, 2001), 189-206.2. Peter L Hahn, Caught in clie Middle East: U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli

Conflict, 1945-1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolitia Press, 2004),35-63, 99-111; Stephen L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conjlict: MakingAmerica's Middle East Policy, From Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University ofChicago Press. 1985), 16-49; Michael J. Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkeley:University of Califomia Press, 1990), 149-72,186-222.

3. Steven Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in theMiddle East, 1953-1957 (Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1992), 121-24, 187-209; Hahn,Caught in the Middle East. 163-66, 182-86, 200-7.

4. William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-IsraeliConflict Since ic)6j, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,2001), 41-46: Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States andthe Middle East Since 1945 (Chapel Hi!l: University of North Carolina Press,

2002}, 282.5. Quandt, Peace Process, 67-72, 86-94: Little, American Orientalism, 286;

Clyde R. Mark, "Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance," Issue Brief for Congress,Congressional Research Service, 2002, <http://www.adc.org/IB85066.pdf>.

6. Quandt, Peace Process, 104-24.7. Quandt, Peace Process, 130-70; Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York:

Simon & Schuster, 1999), 355-57, 366-68, 427-29.8. Quandt, Peace Process, 177-242.9. Quandt, Peace Process, 250-59: Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation

in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 176-92.10. Quandt, Peace Process, 274-85, 300-301.11. Quandt, Peace Process, 310-11, 315-17, 324-27.12. Quandt, Peace Process, 328-30, 333-54.13. Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure ofthe Peace Process in the Middle

East, ic)C)y2002, trans, by Susan Fairfield [New York: Other Press, 2003), 181,212-13, 284-97, 3i7'i9' }M' 326-60: Quandt, Peace Process, 362-72.

14. Peter L. Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle EastSince 1945 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 98-103; Barry Schweid,"Bush Endorses as 'Courageous' Sharon's Plan to Withdraw from Part [sic]the West Bank," The Associated Press, April 14, 2004.

15. Anne Cearan, "United States Will Cut Indirect Aid to Palestinians FollovdngHamas Takeover," The Associated Press, April 7, 2006.

Salim Yaqub is associate professor of history at the University of Califor-nia at Santa Barbara, where he specializes in the history of U.S. relationswith the Middle East. His first hook. Containing Arab Nationalism: TheEisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East, was published in 2004 by theUniversity of North Carolina Press. He is now writing a hook on U.S. in-volvement in the Arab world in the

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