THE TRUTH ABOUT EAST TIMOR

NOTES AND ANALYSIS ABOUT THE DECOLONIZATION OF

PORTUGAL'S LAST COLONIAL OUTPOST IN THE EAST

By JUSSAC M.R. WIROSOEBROTO

JAKARTA. 1976

-, ...•. ",

THE TRUTH ABOUT EAST TIMOR

Notes and analysis about the deco10nisation

of Portugal's last colonial outpost in theEast.

By Jussac MR Wirosoebroto +)

According to a Reuter report published in Australia and

~uoted.bY several newspapers in Jakarta at the end of 1975, on

his way back from the Macau Meeting, one of the leading figures

of the UDT political party in East Timor visited Sydney and

ma~e some remarks about East Timor. He expressed his concern

about the possibility th~t Indonesia. would use fo~ce to annex the

last Portuguese colonial outpost 1n the East. As reported by

Reuter, the UDT leede.r said 'that it'thl.t't.thou1:d("h8ppen-;,:;~p().r.tuguese

Timor would become ,~second vietnam"pmd that Indonesia must

prepare itself for wh~t he termed "years o.f'-~erri.~la"warfare.n

Lopez da Cruz, wh~ became the first deputy~Governor of

E~st Timor after' ~he inte~ration with Indonesia, was rather at '

~ loss when he was interviewed by this writer at his hotel room

in Jakarta on the morning of Friday, July 4-1975 and was asked

to comment on the statement made by his colleague in Sydney.

"I do not know whether he really said so. Perhaps he was

misquoted. Or, there is always the possibility that the reporter

added something to his story. You knowhow journalists do their

job •••• " said d~ Oruz, who was President of UDT at that time.

He was in Jakarta.on his way to Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines,

Thailand" Malaysia and Singapore. To the reporters of the

Indonesian news agency ANTARA who later interviewed him, da Cruz..revealed th~t he made the trip to marshal' support for his party

to deal with the decolonisation process of the.Portuguese·.colony. In

response to questions made: by the reporters, Lopez da Cruz made

some interesting statements: .'"

1. he did not consider the view aired by his colleague in

S~dneyastheir.partY'sposition;.

2. he was atill' conviI?-ced,.,l,1k~:the other UDT leaders, that

Indonesia would never resor.t:>to force in dealing with the

Portuguese Timor problem as stated by the late Leuitenant General

Ali Murtopo, then. deputy~Chief of BAKIN, Indonesia'sintelligence se~vice to him and Mounsinho, vice-President o.f'UDT

during. their me~ting in Jakarta toward the end of April 1975.

'3. upon his returntrom the current trip, he would ask his~ ' . '. '

colleague whowas:reported to have made the statement in Sydney

to explain what.really·happenedj

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\',:'Page Two

4. he still did not know the outcome of the Macau Meeting

because when he left Dili on July 2)1975, his colleagues who

attended the Macau Meeting had not returned to Dili. Obviously

as Pr~sident of the UDT party, Lopez da Oruz was not present at

the meeting.

Raised temperature.

The temperature surrounding the East Timor issue did go up

before the Macau Meeting (June 25 to 28 1975).

There were indications that what some of the FRETILIN

leadership t?ld this writer in Dili at the end of April 1975 would

become a reality. As the .outcome of several discussions in Dil!

with Jose Ramos Horta (~RETILIN secretary in charge of foreign

affairs), Alarico Jorge Fernandes ( FRETILIN secretary general)

and Xavier Amaral ( FRETILIN'president), it was known that

,FRETILIN would not 'a~tend the Macau Meeting. The reason givenby the three top FRETILIN leaders was, that FRETILIN was not

prep~red "to sit at the same table with APODETI" because'right

from the start, APODETI decided to ~trive.for integration with

Indonesia ~nd refused to support the idea of independence forEast Timor.

Queried whether such position was democratic beCause

virtually it denied the partiCipation of another group in the

search for 8 democratic solution'to the East Timor problem, Horta

who was known to be the mostanti-APODETI replied that "In

politics people use to put forward high claims. If accepted, okay.

If not, there will always be the opportunity to compromise. Should

in the end the Portuguese government decide that all three

political parties in East Timor must participate in,lthe Macau

Meeting, FRETILIN would ,attend."

Thatpoaition was made clear by Ramos Horta, Alarico

Fernandes and Xavier Amaral at least once in Dili and once by

Horta dur~ng his meeting with the staff of the Indonesian Center

for Strategic an4 International Studies (OSIS) in Jakarta toward

the end of April 1975.

But the Macau Meeting which according to 'initial:.plans would

have been opened on June 13, 1975 was postponed several times

and finslly.',did>not·start until June 26 1975; for the simple reason

that unt.ilthe last days FRETILIN did not show up in Macau. Thus,

FRETILIN which was against integration with Indonesia did carry

out its',determination to.boycott the Macau Meeting.

Meanwhile the developments in East Timor was tense.

The problem of several thousand refugees from the Portuguese

colony who fled to the. territory of the Republic of Indonesia

.because they could not stand the FRETILIN acts of terrorism could

still no~. ~e -solyed due:,t~l.<thefact that apparently no B\l~tableformula" '.'.:could be!found, although talks ~ad been held between. "

•< -. PaJ2;e.Three

Indonesian officials from Kupang and Portuguese officials from

Dili.

And while there were uncertainties about the Macau Meeting

it was reported that on June 1~1975 ata place near the border

between Indonesian ~i~or and Portuguese Timor, about 5, kilometers

INSIDE the territory of the Renublicof Indonesia,a shooting...incident too~ place. A group of Portuguese colonial police who

were apparently on the heels of a group of refugees or were

trying to'stop them from entering the territory of the Republic

of Iadonesia 'were confronted by several Indonesian HANSIP..

(civil defens~personnel • Following the ensuing shoot-out oneHANSIP was killed.

Thehightened, temperature in East Timor was not caused

only by the relations, between APODETI (inte~ation with

Indonesia) and FRETILIN (independenca,for East Timor, anti

Integration with Indonesia) which progressively became arch enemies.

The so-called UDT-FRETILIN Coalition of only several months

was unilat~rally dissolved by UDT on May 27)1975 following the

UDT contention that ,gradually FRETILIN fell under Communist

control and that the FRETILIN ways to achieve its goal were ,

endangering the interests of the people.

Later, in early June 1975, a'member of 8 delegation of

Portuguese government officials from Lisboa who came to Dili

for talks with local political parties. to prepare the Macau

Meeting, revealed to UDT leaders that almost all of the FRETIL~N

leadership were Dnce members of PIDE, the Port~guese secret police

under dictator Salazar who was overthrown on April 25~197~.

The .expos' which virtually laid bare the FRETIL,IN

leadership i~ the eyes of the public completely destroyed their

image. Questions were raised. How on earth could they say they

would fight for the independen~eof the people when only one year

before they were stillleckeys of the oppressive Portugueseregime who terrorised and~oppressed the people?

..In such ,circumstances reports were circulating that somewhere

around Dili and at another unspecified location two members of

APODETI'were shot to death by Portuguese soldiers at the inst~gation of

FRETILIN activists. and five people were wounded and taken to

hospital.in Dili following other incidents of shooting by Portuguese

soldiers •. '

Later, .on June 27,1975 when UDT staged a demonstration in

i1i in support of its policy in the Macau Meeting, a known

radical and ..fierc~ FRETILIN. figure, q~rvarino, and his wite werepursued. by the.mass p~ticipa.ting in the demonstration. Carvarino

was forc~d.to .flee for his life while his wife found refuge in

the. house of an APODETI le~~;~g figurel

Page ]'our

assuranoes- • ...J

The UDT demonstration was also meant 88 a forum to conti

once again its anti-Communist position. Carvarino and his wite

~e~e considered two of the hard-core Communists within the

?~~~~ leadership.

...•;;ril1975 saw the visits of several political par't7

~igures ~rom East Timor. Lopez da Cruz (UDT president) and

Mounsinho (UDT vice-president and Mayor of Dili at that t:ime)

stayed in Jakarta several days ,before,continuing their journey

to several countries, followed by Jose Ramos Horta (FRETILIN

se~retary in charge of foreign affairs) and Alarico J9r~e'Fern8ndes

(FRETILIN secretary general).

Both UDT and FRETILIN leaders were given the opportunity to

talk with Leuitenant ,General Ali Moertopo who assured them during

their meetings that Indonesia would never use force in its

efforts to help solve, the East Timor 'problem.The main base for Indonesia's position was its Constitution

which would not allow the Repuhlic to pursue a policy ot territorial

~~ansion' or to indulge in territorial ambitions because the

-~epublic of Indonesia is not an expansionist state.

Later with obvious relief Lopez da Cruz reported his meeting

with LeuitenantGeneral Ali Moertapo to a press conference held

at the Auditorium of the Department for Information and on every

occasion when he spoke to journalists, da Cruz expressed his

joy that such assurance had been given by the gove~nment of the

Republic of Indonesia. '

Similar assurances were also given by A1iMoertopo to Horta

and Fernandes during ,his meeting with the FRETILIN leaders. He

also asked tpe ~wo FRETILIN1eaders to convey his message to theleaders of all political parties in East Timor to foster harmony­

and unity because Indonesia could not tolerate chaos in the area.

The Macau Meeting

In the beginning the so-callAd Macau Meeting was intended

and pub1icised with much fanfare as a "Summit Meeting" between

the representatives of the Portuguese government in Lisboa and _

the 2.'epresentatives",of the_ political parties in East Timor, namely

UDT, FRE~ILIN and APODETI to discuss wa~s to'so~ve the problem

ot ':thedeco10nisation ot' the -territory. '

The me~ting was considered nececssary because from the s~art

,there -were ,sharp differences in the ideas of the politic_~i parties

in East Timor about the,,region's deco1on1.sation._,, '

'APODETI'with. the_indigeno~s people of East Timor representing

t~,e"majority (99~9 percen.-t)of its members opted for inteln'ationwith Indonesia in the shortest possible time.

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..Page :E'our

The UDT demonstration was also meant 58 a forum to conti

once again its anti-Communist position. Carvariao and his wife

~ere considered two of the hard-core Communists within the

?~~~~ leadership.

~tonesian assuranoes

~yri1 1975 saw the visits of several political party

~~gures ~rom East Timor. Lopez da Cruz (UDT president) and

Mounsinho (ODT vice-president and Mayor ot Dili at that t.ime)

stayed in Jakarta several days betore, continuing their journey

to several countries, tollowed by Jose Ramos Horta (FRETILIN

se~retary in charge ot foreign affairs) and Alarico J9r~e'Fern9ndes

(FRETILIN secretary general).

Both UDT and FRETILIN leaders were given the opportunity to

talk with Leuitenan~,General Ali Moertopo who assured them during

their meetings that Indonesia would never use force in its

efforts to help solve the East Timor 'problem.

The main'base tor Indonesia's position was its Constitution

which would not allow the Repuhlic to pursue a policy ot territorial

~~ansion' or to indulge in territorial ambitions because the

'~epublic of Indonesia is not an expansionist sta~e.

Later with obvious relief Lopez da Cruz reported his meeting

with Leuitenant General Ali Moertapo to a press conterence held

at the Auditorium ot the Department for Information and on every

occasion when he spoke to journalists, da Cruz expressed his

joy that such assurance had been given by the gove~nment of the

Republic of Indonesia •.

Similar assurances were also given by AliMoertopo to Horta

and Fernandes d~ring.his meeting with the FRETILIN leaders. He

also asked tpe ~wo FRETILINleaders to convey his message to the

leaders of all political parties in East Timor to foster harmony­

and unity because Indonesia could not tolerate chaos in the area.

The Macau Meeting,

In the beginning the so-callAd Macau Meeting was intended

and publicised with much fanfare as a "Summit Meeting" between

the representatives of the Portuguese government in Lisboa and.

the representatives", ot the, political parties in East Timor, nsmely

UDT, FRETILIN and APODETI to discuss wa~s to'so~ve the problem

ot:the decolonisation ot' the ·territor;r•.

The me~ting was considered nececssary because from the s~art

.there,were ,sharp differences in the ideas ot the politic.al partiesin East Timor about the,,region's decolon:Lsation •..

, .

APODETI with. the. indigenous people ot East Timor representing

the, majority, (99~9percen~) of its members opted,tor inte~ation, ... .

with Indonesia in the shortest possible time.

"

.. -Page Five

UDT expressed the hope to gain independence from Lisboa ~ ••

in a gradual process and virtually wished to mai~tain certa~~

torms ot relationship with Portugal. In other words the UDT idea

about independence can be summed up as follows: independent but

still under Portugal's protection •. ,

FRETILIN made it clear it wanted full independence as a

,souvereign state andexpressedly refused the idea of integration

with Indonesia.:

On top of all those ideas there was another one held by the

government of Portugal who had made a self-commitment that after

it managed to throw off the yoke of dictator~hip on April 25~1974,

it would grant independence to its colonies in Africa and East

Timor, through a democratic process of decolonisation by submitting

the issue to the peoples concerned who will be given the right

for self-determinati:.o,n.in line with the basic human rightsguaranteed by the United Nations.

When the Macau 'Meeting was finally opened on June 26~1975at the Hotel ESTQRIL in Macau. and not at the Hotel Pousada de

Coloane on the Island of Coloane about six miles from Maca~ ,

no representatives of FRETILIN appeared. Only the representatives..

of the Portuguese government from Lisboa and delegates

representing UDT and APODETI attended the meeting.

Representing'the Lisboa government were Army Major Vitor

Alves (Ambassador at large), Dr. Almeida Santos (Coordinating~

Minister for Overseas Territories) and Dr. Jorge Campinos. The

central government delegation was backed by two officials from

Di1i: Army Majors,:Mota:aIidCoelho.

UDT was represented by Cesar a da Costa Mousinho (the Mayor

of Di1i who was later found,murdered by FRETILIN during the

chaos in East Timor), Mario Carasca1ao, Joao Ca~ascalao, Antonio\

Nascimento and Jacinto dos Reis.

APODETI sent Hermegi1dq W. de J Martins, Casimiro Ascencao

4e Araujo, Guilherme M. Goncalves (the King of Atsabe), Jose. ;'.

Fernando Osorio Soares, Jose A.B. des Reis Araujo, Domingos Pinto

Soares and Albuquerque M. Borges.

'yo After it became clear that FRETILIN did not send its,r~~resenta'tives,·.., the so-called Macau Meeting was changed intoa hearing, ,much like the ones held by a prime minister_elect at

the start of forming a new government.

It is understand~ble the~efore that the meetings's outcome

bore no le~al validity compared with the usual decisions made atinternational. summit. d8M.be~ations.

Nevertheless,the ~esults of the s~parate bilateral

.hearings".be,tween.Lisboaan~ UDT and APODETI respectively merit ....

attention because no mat~er how weak they were as agreecents,

they could be'used ~t.le.8t·as a base to gauge the meaning of

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·Page Six

the current developments in ~he Portuguese colony.

Before coming to Macau, Lisboa had conceived a concept for

the decolonisation ot E$8t Timor. Atter Macau, the concept would

be pertectedwith the results ot the hearings with UDT and APODETI.

In a press conference held prior' to their return to Portugal

atter the Macau Meeting, the Lisboa delegation stated, among

other thingsth~t "The people of Portuguese Timor will be free tochoose their future political status. If they want independence

or inte~ation with Indonesia, they may do so."I •

But from talks with various delegates, a conclusion could be

drawn (and this was later.also reported by the Hongkong and Macau

press) that the final decision pertaining to the Portuguese Timor

problem did not lie in the hands of the local political parties

but in the hands of the Central Government of Portugal. It could

be more accurately stated that the final word about the future of

East Timor is the·sole right ot the Revolutionary Council in

Lisboa as the holder of the ultimate pOli.~r_inPortugal!':

Some of the results of the: meetings in Macau between the

representatives of Lisboa, UDT and APODETI ar as follows:

1. «fter the approval and ratification of the results of the

Macau Meeting by the Government of Portugal through consultations

with ths Revolutionary Counail (and that would include the Armed

Forces Movement), a "Law for the Decolonisation of Timor" will

be promulgated as the foundation for the decolonisation of the

territory;

2. About three months (one hundred days to be exact) after

the promulgation of the "Decolonisation Law", the Governor of Dili

will be replaced by a "Hi~hCommissioner". The High Commissioner

of Dili will nominate or telect five~offici~l~ to .assist him,

with the title of "Adjunct Secretaries!!They will be appointed by\

the President of Portugal;

3. The High Commissioner and the five Adjunct Secretaries

will be assisted by a body called "Government Council". Each,

politicalc.party in East Timor is entitled to appoint four

representatives,iinthe Government Council. Any' political party

which refuses to participate in.the Government Council will not

be forced to do SOj ..

4 •. ~The,High .Commissioner, .the five Adjunct Secretaries and

the members of the Government Council will be charged with the duty

of preparing a referendum to elect- members for a "Popular Assembly"

during the third'week of October 1976. It is this Popular Assembly

which later will decide the political status of Portuguese Timor:

independent but still within a certain bond with Portugal or

integration with Indonesia.

iI

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.Page Seven

Further information about the four points as the'resul

the Macau Meeting indicated that should the majority of the

Popular Assembly be represented by APODETI,Portuguese Timor

old be automatically inte~rated with Indonesia. Following

~~e coopletion of the integration as the outcome of the Popular

nsseobly decision, the High Commissioner of Dili would directly

~and over·.sou."e~e;tgntyOver East Timor to APODETI. On the other hand

if aDT mana~ed to dominate ~he Popular Assembly leading to a

decision of independence for East Timor under the pr~tection of

Portugal, the government of Portugal would not remain in East

Timor beyond October 1978. The Lisboa delegation to the Macau

Meeting had made it clear that Portugal had no ambition whatsoever, , .e~cept to leave East Timor in October 1978 at the latest.

In response to the commitment made by the Lieboa representatives

APODETI delegates stated that the tim~able could be shortened

after APODETI manag~d,to carry out inte~ration with the Republic

of, Indonesia. After ..the integration, Portugal could leave its

more than 400 years old colony ,as soon as possible.

The FRETILIN Eroblem.

,The fact that ~RETILIN boycotted the Macau Meeting created

new problems th~t could not be solved until the end of 1975. The

main problem o~ourse was FRETTLIN's future role and participation

in the subsequent implementation "of the decolonisation policy

for East Timor. To answer the question it would be nece~sary to

.take note of and to consider the following ma~ters:

1. Major Vitor Alves stated during one of the Macau Meeting's,

sessions that he would report the FHETILIN boycott of the meeting

to the government of Portugal so that firm actions could be taken

ag8in~t FRETILIN;

2. Ma~or Vitor Alves also stated on another occasion during

the'Macau Meeting that those who were once members of banned

organisations , like PIDE (Secret Police of the Salazar regime

which was overthrown on April 25,1974) will not be permitted "to

hold governmental and social positions". It had become a pUblic

secret then, "both in East ~imor and in the international community,

that almost all members of the FkE~ILIN leadership were members

of PIDE, the secret police used by the dictatorship to terrorize

and to oppress the people;

3. 'the statement made by APODETI representatives in the

Macau Meeting which demanded that F~TILI~ should be barred from

all political activities in East Timor, including the decolonisation

of the territory, following its boycott of the Macau Meeting;

It would be proper to note in this context that in its..

participation in the Macau Meeting, APODETI had shown its good

will and~iscipline by coming to the Meeting.

Page Eight

will and discipline by being present in Macau on June 13 1975,

the originsl date for the opening of the meeting and later

waited until the meeting actually took place on June

Secause the final word pertaining to the Portuguese Timor

rob:eo was. in the hands of the government of Portugal in Lisboa,

it woU:c only be fair to assume ,that responsibility for ,the

F~'IlI:, -~i problem should also be borne by Lisboa. The world wanted

to know how f~r the government of Portugal. would go in bearing

the' conseouences of the FrtETLLIN boycott after it became clear- .that by doing so, FHETILIN had deliberately made big mistakes and

violations of trust.

It wou.ld be important to note in that context that ]'l'(ETLLI.N

stated it would not attend the Macau Meeting because it did not

deem it necesaary. 'It reasoned that ultimately Portugal would

leave East Timor. In the FKETILIN's view that would m~an .that what

all the people of East Timor should db was just wait for the

transfer of souvereignty without discussing it in Macau!

Bearing in mind that the Macau Meeting was designed as a phase

in the process of decolonisation of East ~imor conceived by Lisboa

and was based on the principle of the right of·self-determination

,for the people of its colony, it ~hould be clear that with its

stated position, FHE~ILIN deliberately trampled on the. basic rights

ot .th$p~ople whom it claimed it.would free from the shackles of

imperialism, especially the people's right for self-determination. ,because the Macau Meeting was intended as the first step toward

the implementation of that particular right for the people of EastTimor.

Beside trampling on the basic rights of the people, with its

boycott of th~ Macau Meeting, FRETILIN virtually carried out a

deliberate and blatant sabotage against Portugal's decolonisation

policy.

It would only be proper therefore if Portugal acte~ decisively

against FRETILIN. :At least it may be justly expected that Lisboawould disqualifyFRETILIN after its deliberate violations of the

existing rules <;If)thegame by completely barring FRETILIN from

taking a part in all and every activities related to the implementation

of the decolonisation process of East Timor •

..Such punitive .act .would be proper and fair, bearing in mind that

·s:tterthe.:.incorporation·of'th!t·resul ta·of·the ~Macau Meeting into

the decolonisation concept of the government of Lisboa, that concept

w?uld.be made into 8 law for the decolonisation of East Ti~or as

Lisboa'abasic rule.of the game iriits decolonisation policy,

representing the fusion of ideas of the holders of power in Lisboa

and those of UDT and APOD~TI which stuck to the rules of the game and

attended therMacau Meeting.

..

••(

•

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Page Nine

There were enough reasons for the government of Lisboa to

act firmly against FRETILIN:

,1. FRETILIN had boycotted the Macau Meeting which meant that

(a) FRETILIN deliberately trampled on the right of self-determination

for the people of East Timor ann in so doing it also trampled on the

principle of democracy which was the core of the decolonisation

policy of the government.of Portugal and (b) FRETILIN sabotaged

Lisboa's decolonisation policy, an act which undep normal circumstances

,could be fairly considered an act of rebellion or subversion •

2. alm~st all the members of the FRETILIN leadership were

former members ofPIDE, the secret pOlice under the overthrown

dictator Salazar'who were prohibited from holding governmental and/or

social positions.

But o~ours~ there were other factors at work which could alter\ , ..

sUQh line of reasoning. Inevitably the political constellation and

situation in Portugal at that time played a role in de~er~ining or

at least in influencing Lisboa's attitude. The most recent developments

in Portugal then indicated that the influence of the Communists who .

were beaten in the general elections turned out to be stronger thanks

to their, c~nspiracy with the military.The case of the REPUBLICA daily newspaper which was owned by

the Socialists under Soares and wa~ hijacked by its Communist workersclearly showed that in the eyes of the Armed Forces Movement a~d the

Revolutionary Council, the $ocialists (who won a.decisive victory in

the general elections) was the step-son while the Communists (who

were soundly beaten in the elections) w8s~the favourite son. The

~olicy of like and dislike became more apparent following the hijacking

of the Catholic radio station by a small group of its Communist

employees. After its order to the Communist group to return the radio

station to its owners was ignored, the Armed Forces Movement

proceeded to nationalize all radio stations' in the country! As the

result of the military actio'n, the Catholic radio was freed from the

hands of the Communists but it was not restored to the hands of the .

Church! Besides, all the other radio stations lost their independence

because all must be placed in'the f al~..,.powe1':tull~':hand8.of the Armed

Forces.

People were inclined to speculate that perhaps there was a

consp~racybetween,the Communists and the Armed Forces Movement to

mount a concerted campaign to silence all means fo~ the expression

and dissemination of opinion which were not under the complete control

of the military. \

Such suspicion. was also aroused in connection with the FRETILIN

boycott of the Macau Meeting. People wanted to know if perha~s

.. ;. \ there was a conspiracy betweenthe,g~vernment of Portugal

and.FRETILIN to provide the party with'~lthe;~:()pporttinit;rto boycott the

Macau Meeting?

.,.

Page Eleven

four were people of mixed blood and only one was an indigenous

Timorese. He was the secretary of the Mayor of Dili who had no right

to speak in 'the Macau Meeting. His sole duty was to act as the

UDT delegation secretary. As noted previously, as pre~ident of the

'party, Lopez da Cruz was not present at the Macau Meeting and up to

July 3 1975 did not know the results of the deliberations because

the party's delegation had not reported the meetings's results to him.

On paper, the UDT's program looked quite impressive but the

basic motive of its endeavours was its concern about the future of

its members, espocially its leading members, should there be a change

in the politic'al status of East Timor. It would make no difference

whether East Timor became indenendent as intended by FRETILIN or it

choose integration 'with Indonesia as planned by APODETI,. it felt

,that the fate of,its members who almost all held governmental positionsI

both in Dili and the_outlying regions were in danger. Would the

current resents pe still regents after the political change? And

what about the current district officers? And so on, and so on •.

It was interesting to note in that, connection the position held

by the UDT delegates attending the Macau Meeting. They asserted that

no matter what would result from the proposed referendum in East Timor

in~ctober 1975, UDT would accent and honor it because UDT was a

demooratio party.

Meanwhile, Lopez da Cruz als~ stated in Jakarta that,should

Indonesia resort to force in its interference in th~48.oo1oni8a~ion.

of East Timor, he might call on'the people of the region to "go to

mountains and mount a guerrilla warfare a~ainst Indonesia". But if

the proposed referendum resulted in the integration of the re~ion

,with Indonesia, UDT would accept it, once ap;ain because " UDT is a

democratic party".

During his proposed tour of about three weeks to visit Taiwan,\

Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, da Cruz

carried with him photographs of the UDT demonstration on June 27

1975 (to support the Macau Meeting and to fight Communism in East

Timor) which were quite impressive because they showed large

gatherings of people surrounding UDT figures speaking in Dili and

the outlying towns.

It should be noted of course that an open car equipped with

loudspeakers would easily attract a crowd not only in backward East

Timor but anywhere else. What could perhaps be used as a relia~le

parameter to gauge the real strength of UDT was the fact that the

majority of its members were people of mixed ancestry.

The.population of East Timor at the time numbered about 650

thousand, with no more than 1 000 full-blooded Portuguese,

represented by soldiers and government officials at all levels in

Dili and other towns. Then there were no more than 2 000 people of '

·~~xed blood who were public servants of all levels, in Dili and

the outlying areas. There were about 20 thousand Chinese in East

Pa~e Ten

Such suspicion stemmed from the known fact that both FRETILIN

and the Armed Forces Movement as the real holder of power in

Portugal were influenced and controlled by the Communists.

On April 1975 this writer obtained information frDm several

sources in Dili that Lisboa intended to take action against FRETILIN

if enough ~vidence could be found that it was indeed controlled by

Maoists. Such intention was quite likely because it had become a

public secret in the international community that the holders of

power in Lisboa represented one of the biggest MOSGOW lobby in the

world. It follows that whatever actions the government of Portugal

wanted to take against FRETILIN it would never amount to the

total house-cleaning to remove Communists from the political party

but merely to rid it from the Beijing brand of Reds. In spite of

everything, the boycott of the Macau Meeting by FRETILIN had at least

caused itself to suffer since its absence from Macau had spawned

questions·. which placed it in an akward position because the answers

would not do it any good.

On June 18 1975 evening at the MAXIM restaurant in Macau, three

APODET~eading figures who had arrived in the city on June 13,

namely GuilhermeM. Goncalves (the King of Atsabe), Casimiro Ascencao

de Araujo and Domingo Pinto Soares held a press conference attended by

the representatives of the Chinese-speaking press in Macau and a

Chinese speaking television station in Hongkong.

Answering. a question asked by this writer as an Indonesian

.journalist covering the Macau Meeting, Casimiro stated firmly that

.it was quite likely that .FRETILIN would not attend the meeting because

it was afraid to face facts. On May 27 1975, the coalitioID between

UDT and FRETILIN was unilaterally dissolved by UDT, causing FRETILIN

to lose its real strength. With no coalition with UDT, FRETILIN

did not have enough supporters t 0 become a stron~ and significant\

political entity. Casimiro also revealed th~t at the end of April

1975 it had-'become public knowledge in East Timor that almoS~ all

members.of the FRETILIN leadership, includin~ its president (Xavier

Amaral), the secretary general of the 'Preisidium (Alarico Jorge

Fernandes) and its secretary in charge of foreign affairs (Jose Ramos

Horta) were once PIDE personnel, the secret police in Portugal under

dictator Salazar!,

Another mor~ important and interesting fact was that UDT was

the party of half-breeds, the descendants of people~f mixed blood,

Timorese and ,Portuguese. According to sources in Dili in April lQ75,

no lass than 70 percent of the members of UDT were people of mixed

bloodl while almost all of its leaders, both in Dili and the outlying

regions ..were of mixed ancestry. In its Presidium for instance, only

the president, Lopez da Cruz, was a n indigenous.

It would be proper to note in this connection that of the five

members of ,the UDT central leadership who attended the Macau Meeting,'.

...

"

..

Page Twelve

Timor. It could be safely assumed then that there were at least

625 thousand indigenous people in East Timor.

In the past, until April 25 197~ when there was a revolution

in Portugal following the coll~pse of the Salazar dictatorship and

the wind of freedom blew in the Portuguese overS8SS colonies resulting

in the emergence of political parties like UDT, FRETILIN and APODETI

in East Timor, the half-bloods in the region constituted a group

of people who deliberately kept themselves at a distance from the

indigenous people. Although they were not fully accepted by the

(Portuguese) whites, they nevertheless were more inclined to assume

a pO,ai.tion·,closer to the whites.

It.wasoDly after April 25 197~ that the people of mixed ancestry

"found themselves" and enthusiastically so.ught a closer place to and

integr~ted themselves with the ~ndigenous population. That change of

attitude could not fool the indigenous people "of course.

They knew that the new attitude of the mixed-bloods in East

Timor was not motivated by lofty ideals. They knew that should there

be a change in the political status of.East Timor, those of mixed

ancestry would become a people without roots, without terra firma

to stand on. Should they declde .to abandon East Timor and migrate to

Portugal, they knew they would be reJected because among the whites,racism against people of mixed blood was no less severe then racism

against fully coloured people. From the point of view of the people.

of mixed ancestry themselves, Portugal was also not very attractive

due to its political and socia-economic climate.

So it was quite understandable that after April 25,1974 the

people of mixed ancestry in East Timor executed a U-turn and moved~closer to and united themselves with the indigenous people by posing

themselves as leaders who would fight for the interests of the

people.of East Timor, ninety percent of whom were indigenous. The

people of mixed ~ncestry rea1ised that no matter how unsavoury it

eould be to live among the indigenous people, it'would still be the

lesser of two evils, compared with the unattractive prospect of

integrating themselves with the (Portuguese) whites who they knew

.would not accept them.

Viewed against such a background it would be possible to

predict what UDT would be able to gain from a referendum in East

Timor, including the balloting proposed to be held in October 1976" , , .... \

to elect members of the·Popular Assembly which later would decide

the political status of the Portuguese colony.

Could a minority of only I 000 people of mixed ancestry

(the majority of the members of FRETILIN were also half-bloods)

who for more than 400 years refused to consciously integrate

themselves with the ...indigenous people win their sympathy and trust

so that those indigenous"peop1e who had been fed up living under

the feet of white colonialists would support the minority of mixed

,.

Page Thirteen

ancestry who had white blood running in their veins?

FRETILIN

Even before leaving Jakarta ~or Dili on April 23, 1975, this

writer told Jose Ramos Horta and Alarico Jorge Fernandes who became

his travel companioDs'from Jakarta to Dili that he intended to stay

in Dili until after May 1,1975 'because he wanted to see the May 1

Rally in Dili which according to the two FRETILIN leaders would be

the first International Labour Day in 400 years to be held in the

Portuguese colony.

Prior to May 1, Horta and Alaricoattended at least four meetings

of the FRETILIN Presidium held since April 25 to discuss preparations

for the May Day Rally at the Dili soccer field.

One day before the event, this writer made an appointment with

an official of the Indonesian Consulate in Dili to cover it. But on

May 1, at S in the morning, Alarico Jorge Fernandes, Secretary General

of the FRETILIN Preiiidium,:cameto visit this writer at 'the hotel to agl!lj

talk about FRETILIN and himself. In response to a question by this writE

the FRETILIN Secretary General said that he was not interested to

attend the May Day Rally because there he would meet with what he called, ,

"the group of radicals" who were suspicious of him. Asked where Horta

was, Alarico said that the day before~Horta left ~or the interior and

quite likely would not attend the event too. Alarico did not leave the~hotel until 11. This writer was later driven by the Consulate driver

to the site of the May Day Rally and was quite surprised to see what

he found there.

, In the middle of the soccer field severa~osters were placed with

various slogans, including one expressing refusal against integration

with Indonesia. On the podium a cluster of people sat listening to

another who w~s standing and made a speech. In front of the podium ,

in unorderly scattered small groups stood people listening to the

speech and occasionally responded non~chalantly. The usual atmosphere

of a RALLY was completely lacking. No orderly lines of people usually

seen in such events were seen. What was in sight were just small

.groups of people standing in front of the podium occasionally shouting

in ,response to the speaker. And according to the careful count 'made

.by this writer, less than 300 people attended the May Day Rally in

Dili, that morning. It was the very first International Labour Day.. Icelebration in Dili in the last 400 years. And it was staged by

FRETILIN,the political party which claimed to be the most progressive

and most revolutionary in East Timor. And not even 300 people attended

it! ,. Mr.Subtjlgdj~:;of,the Indonesian Consulate who managed to shoot

'", ")

a reel of pictures of the "Rally" told this writer later that according

to his count no more than 250 people were there.

..

"

Page Fourteen

On the side lines there were seversl tens of peQple but they

came only as onlookers.

It would be impo~tant to note the(~act that Alarico Jorge

Fernandes, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the FRETILIN

did not attend the "Rally" because since 8 in the morning he visited

this writer at his hotel. About a quarter of an hour later, on the

road near the beach, driving around town, this writer saw Jose Ramos

Horta wesring white pants and a blood-red T-shirt riding;piggy-back

with someone ona motorcycle heading West. It was 11:30)near noon.

People were forced to think •

It it turned out that FRETILIN could not move people to stage

s rally, how would be its chances in marshalling support of the

masses to win a reterendum? The behaviour ot its leading figures

like Alarico and Horta spawned disturbing questions. What about their

responsibility as l~aders? Later this writer found out directly from

Horta himself that he overslept that morning and did not get up until

10:001

Alarico who always presented himself as a moderat~ within FRETILIN

did show signs of doubt since several days before the "rally". After

seeing the facts: in Jakarta and the area between Jakarta and Bandung,

including his visits to some of Indonesia's indust~ial projects andI

atter' exchenging;',ideas with the Indonesian leaders, Alarico Is doubt

grew more intense. That morning when he should have been at the_ "rally".he was with this writer at the hotel to discuss the future ot East

Timor and his own. He was simply not interested to attend ·the May

Day celebration which he termed lithe business of extremists like

Carvarino". Aside from the tacts about the "rally", FRETILIN

also sutfered t~om l-wlAiDfej similar to the one that plagued UDT.

90 percent of the followers ot FRETILIN were people of mixed ancestry.

Among the members of its Central' Committee ,except Alkatiri and Hamish\

who were of Arab origin, only Xavier Amaral was a Timorese native.

The rest were all Portuguese halt-bloods. Pertaining to that fact,

both Horta and Alarico admitted on several occasions that Xavier Amaral

was the only one who had real influence among the people. Horta was

.quite straightforward about the matter when he said "If I make a speech

to the people of the interior, they would not listen to me. It would

be different with Xavier. He is very influential." On another

occasion, Horta openly stated: "Without Xavier, FRETILIN will be

finished. It is meaningless." IXavier Amaral was the President of FRETILIN. He was small with

fierce eyes reminding people· of Bung Tomo, the leader of the armed

confrontation against the coming British forces in Surabaya during

the first months of the Indonesian Independence which led·to the

Heroes Da] celebrated annually o.nNovember 10. He was a man of ten~e

personality and when he talked about FRETILIN he sounded very spirited •.

Many years ago he studied at a seminary in Macau and was about to be

.'

Page Fifteen

ordained a priest. There was no information about what caused him

to back off.When the wind of freedom blew in East Timor following

the revolution in Portugal on ,April 25 1974, Xavier Amaral

entered politics and was one of the founders of FRETILIN which at

the outset was a social-democratic movement.

Later seven Timores8 'students 'who spent several years studying

at various tertiary educational institutions in Lisboa returned to

East Timor. During their tenure in Lisboa they were influenced by

extremist-radical views and when they returned home they managed to

turn FRETILIN into a radical political party •

According to several sources, including two FRETIDIN secret

documents, the change from a social-democratic movement to 8 Front

for the Liberation of East Timor with the acronym FRET~LIN was the

result of Jose Ramos Horta's efforts during his visit to Australia.

According to one of__~he secret documents, during his stay in AustraliaHorta was involved in meetings with a Chinese official representing

Communist China in Canberra. The Chinese.suggested to.Horta that the

social-democratic movement which aspired to fight for the independence

of the Portuguese oolony should be turned into a liberation movement

like the ones in Africa and its name changed into PRETILIN. That was

the story of the transformation from ASDT (Social-Democratic

Assooiation of Timor) into FRETILIN, the Liberation Front for the

Independenoe of the Eastern part of Timor •

. That ofJourse w~uld not suffice to establish beyond doubt~thatFRETILIN was a Communist organisation or one controlled by the

Communists in East ,Timor. To arrive at such conclusion several

matters should be taken into consideration.

A FRETILIN secret document dated October 18, 1974 clearly

discussed the education o!~FRETILIN cadres in Marxism. Beside that,

two of the returning Timorese students who left Lisboa to revolutionizt\

FRETILIN were members of PCP, the Communist Party of Portugal. They

,were Antonio Carvarino and,Abilio. Abilio's wife, Gui~hermina Abilio,was known as a Portuguese woman who accompanied her husband in

his campaigns forFRETILIN in East Timor's interior areas wearing

Timorese dress and walking barefoot and squatting on the groundI

chewing beatle nuts just like a native woman.

,"Exactly like a GERWANI (the women Wing of th~ former Communist

Party of Indonesia) agitprop (ap;itation-propaganda) activist."

oommented an official of the Indonesian Consulate in Dili. And

Guilhermina was officially registered as a "sympathiser" of the

Communist Party of Portugal in Lisboa!

Aocording to several sources in Dili later, one of the students,

Hamish Basarewan who was of Arab origin, was also an activist of the

PCP (Communist Party of Portugal).

Meanwhile another secret document obtained from the Chinese, .

(almost all of them Kuomintangs, Nationalist Chinese) community in

.'

Page Sixteen

Dili revealed .,Chinese by the name of Lim Kian Yung who was

associated with FRETILIN. During the not too distant past he was

in charge of the finances of the Uentral Committee of FRETILIN.

The man who owned a soap .factory and was known as "Cina Sabaun"

(soap Chinese) once circulated a letter among the Chinese in Dili

and other centers in East Timor, e~horting them to give support to

FRETILIN. Information was also obtained from the Chinese in Dili,

including the COD8u1>-of Taiwan, that Lim Kian Yung also acted as

go-between co~necting FRETILIN and a source in Communist China to

channel funds to finance the activities of FRETILIN •

The FRETILIN Central Committee figures adamantly denied that

their party was controlled by Communists or that therew.re Reds .

within their rank and file •

. Horta and.Alarico conceded there were radical elements within

FRETILIN. Tpey were ,the Timorese students who returned from I,isboa

and took part in the party's campaigns. Horta always tried to create

the impression that they had no influence among the masses.

"'J!heydo not know the realities among the people. 'l'heytalk

in a language not understood by the people. They have no inlfluence

whatsoever, among the peop'le." said liorta everyftime he was asked about

the students, who had nurtured the revolutionary character of the

,party.

Alarico said there were two opposing groups within the Central

uommittee of FHETILIN. ~he moderate group which included himself

and liorta. And the radical group which included Oarvarino, Basarewan

and the other returning students from Lisboa. He: said Xavier Amaral

was among the FRETILI~ moderates.

While staying in Dili for ten days, this writer talked twice to

Xavier Amaral. 1~e first meeting was held at the front veranda of his

house one evehinguntil late at night. ~he second encounter was on\a sidewalk in the middle of Dili.

The first impression apout Xavier Amaral was that the man was

ambitious but not realistic. lie appeared for the first time in

East Timor polit;cs in April 1974. ~he most important thing for

Xavier was the independence of Portuguese Timor. He was not too

deeply concerned about other things associated with the management

of a free country. The fact that Portuguese Timo~, with its 650 000

people, 90 percent of whom were illiterate and with an:sunual per

capita income less than US$30 was to Xavier no problem in the formation

of sn independent nation. liewas, also not concerned about the fact that

in Portuguese Timor there were no industries which'could provide

enough work for the people; t~at, there were no significant exports

to earn foreign exchange; no paved roads, even third class connecting

the towns; no fairly proper agriculture to support the production

of foodstuffs 80 that the people needed not to depend, 8S they

did until then, on the import of the commodity from Hong Kong,

Taiwan and Indonesia (Kupang).

'Page Seventeen

Pressed with the question about what he would do to provide

the people with enough food, medicines and shelter after Portuguese

Timor gained independence as FHETILIN claimed it would make it so,

Xavier Amaral only vaguely said there must be friendly countries .

which would come to his aid. Talking to Xavier Amaral about aid

and aupport from friendly countries, one would inevitably get the

impression that he was entertaining dangerous thoughts about the

future of East Timor.

Diseussinc the',lssuer.ofaid and support from would-be friendly

countries with Xavier Amaral, one also got the impression about

his narrow-mindedness and that he was like a frog under the coconut

shell, as the Indonesian saying goes. His h~rizon was very limited

indeed. Meanwhile although Alarico Jopge ~ernandes claimed that

Xavier was a modera~e, it beqame clear that he was opening the door

for Communism without understanding or wish to fight it as a

dangerous ideology .-..I ..

~ccording to Xavier's fantasies (this _~.8the mo~t ~ppropriatephrase that could be applied to him because as a politician who was

expected to be i-ealistic,.Xavier Amaral clearly lived in the air withhis head stuck among the clouds and his feet not on the ground) after

East Timor became independent as FHETILIN promised it would fight

to make it so, A~strali8, Communist China, the Philippines and

Singapore would bestow independe~t East Timor with economic and other

aid~. Obviously Xavier thought that Independent EAst Timor wi~h

FRETILIN ~s its architect would be of so great significance in South

East Asia that the countries he mentioned would place such great

interest in it and would be willing to give aid to it.

Xavier completely refused to understand that for the sake of

its own security, Australia was vitally interested to maintain and

even to improve its good~neighbourly relations with the RepUblic of

Indonesia an~ that Australia would not enter into a political .

adventure in East Timor that could hurt the feelings ot the .Indonesian

people or even endanger the interests ot the Indonesian state. Ue

further refused to comprehend that as the result of deve19pments

in Indo Uhina, Indonesia would become a more important umbrella

for Australia considering the dangers threatening it from the North.

Australia would therefore use all its resources ,to strengthen itsrelations and cooperation with Indonesia and that it would not be

likely that Australia would do something that could endanger those

relations and cooperation. Australia must also be aware that an

independent state as fantasiZed by F~T1LI~ would inevitably

need foreign aid and that it would open the door tor the major

countries in the world, the Soviet Union and 00mmunist 0hina in

particular, to gain a foothold for their influence in the region.

That would pose a direct threat for Indonesia because of Timor'a

vitally strategic meaning to Indonesia's defense. Stealthily stabbed

there ~rom.the eastern half, Indonesia would be wounded at a very

(

Page Eighteen

tender part of its body!

During one of his conversations with this writer, Xavier

Amaral admitted that he must be very careful in accepting aid from

other countries because as the saying goes, even to plant a new

tree in his own garden, one should heed his neighbour's opinion.

That was why Xavier said he would not be rash in accepting eid

from a uommunist country for East ~imor because he knew it would

hurt Indonesia's feelings. But on another occasion he openly said:

"But if educating the people so that they would become cleverer

and more aWa~e of their rights is considered vommunist; if providing

enough food and clothing is considered vommunist; well, I do not

care."

At the height of a heated discussion with this writer, Xavier

finally laid his true cerds aboutvommunism on the table and almost

shouted: "l do not believe FRE·J.'ILli~is controlled by Communists

end I am not a Communist. But I will not fight the O_o~mu~istsor:_

C,ommunism. n .,u_'

Horta who was frequently reported as ana of the o~rri.rs of

communism into FRETELIN, created speculations about his true self.

There were reports that in his apartment room in Dili there were

communist posters and banners. But considering his inclination to

enjoy jokes and to joke, his tend~ncy toward loose living and the

good life, there was reason to wonder whether Horta was a comm~nist.

What could be near the t~uth was that as an ambitious man who longed

for a high position in the government or an'independent state in

East Timor, Horta was prepared to accept help from and to cooperata

with just about everyone inCluding the Communists, like the Timorese

students who re~urned to Dili from Lisboa. Perhaps he "knew, but then

perhaps he did not know oneottthe~ra~r~~.m~nist traits, namely

its inclinat10nto take advantage of the national aspirations of

others for its pwn benefi~, or perhaps Horta thought he couldtake advantage of the communists for tbe ,benefit-'ofhis own ambition.

If so, Horta obviously was not aware that if a man goes to bed with

a cobra under his blanket, the most likely accident that could

happen during the night wes that the snake would bite the man end

not the man bites the sneke! Anyway' Horta '8 se~f-discipline and

militancy did not reflect something that could be accepted as proof

that he wa~ a Communist. During the May Day "rally" in Dili on May

1, 1975 which began at 9 in the morning, Horta was still asleep in

his apartment room and later near noon appeared in the street and

not among the no1~y:'people gathered at the soccer field. And during

his visits in Jakarta and Bandung in April 1975, Horta created the

perfect image of a Don 'Juan. In ,his eyes every woman he saw was

beautiful and attractive, either in the night-clubs 8D,di'steambaths

he visited or those who kept him company at the hotels where he stayed.

------.-r~-----------------:-· :-:-.-------;--~---------

Page Nineteen".'

.

According to·the observation made by this writer since the

fifties, there was among the communists, especially those occupying

.leading positions like Horta, a strict code about women. Womanizing

was co~sidered-taboo among the1eading.comm~nists because it was

considered one of the weaknesses that could destroy their image in

the eyes of the people and their followers. If the communists wanted

to rid this world of the bourgeOisieFnd capitalists who like to .eXploit women as playthings, it would only be fitting if refraining

from indulging in the same practices should be a must for communist

leaders.

While associating with Horta in Jakarta and Bandung, this write~,found out that :Horta did not adhere to such a code and that he

I '

gave free reign:to his sexual desires, day and night.

That was why jokingly this writer tp1d A1arico Jorge Fernandes

and Jose Ramos norta that after the solution of the East Timor

issue, let Alarico become "the 27th Governor. of the Republic of

Indonesia in Dili", :while Horta should be made"Ambas8ador to Monaco"

where he could relax and enjoy the company of as many beautiful

ladies as he likea. As a matter of fact until his depa~ture from Dili

in early May 1975 this writer continued to address Alarico as .'

"Mister Go.vernor"..sod Horta as "Mister. Ambassador". An incident

happened in Bandung which indicated Horta's intensity in womanizing.

While standing in front of a sto~e he saw a young lady dressed in

the. traditional kain and kebava who waa indeed very beautifur. Eyeing

her with desire and naughtily smiling, Horta said easily: "If I couldget a wife like that, well, I'll join APODETI!"

It turned out that A1arico Jorge Fernandes took the joke about

the governor of the 27th prov~nce of the Republic of Indonesia very

seriously. He wanted to know whether following the inte~ation of

East Timor w~th the Republic of ,Indonesia, the ~egion could enjoythe status of a province with certain autonomous rights. This writer

informed him that as a province the people of East Timor would be

entitled to elect their own legislative assemblies, at"both the

province and regency·or.municipa1 levels and that therel2:ion would

have the right to elect its own governor and regents or mayors •

Considering some unique facts in East Timor, for instance the existenceIof the Portuguese language, as a new province East Timor would be

given the status of s Special District like Yogyakarta in Central

Java and Aceh at the northern tip of Sumatra. Suddenly, Alarico

exclaimed "Should .anyone know that I discuss su()h~.metterawith you,

I would definitely be stamped a "tr~idor" , s traitor."

Even while still in Jakarta there were indications that Alarico

had started ito-change his mind about Portuguese Timor and Indonesia.

One got the impression that after his visits to Jakarts and Bandung,

A1arico's ideas about FRETILIN had undergone drastic transformations.

During the heated discussion between this writer and Xavier Amaral

...

Page Twenty:-one

no firm ground to stand on for:a Portuguese-Timorese half cast

and that he or she would always float between the earth and the

sky as the saying_goes in Indonesia>just like all people with mixed

blood anywhere in this world.

After stepping off the GELATIK aircraft used for his joy flight

at LIPNUR (nowNUSANTARA),:lsircratt industry in Bandung, Alarico...

spontaneously expressed his wish to learn to fly in Indonesia so

that in the future.he could work as a pilot in Indonesia I But

during quiet moments at the front veranda of his brother's house

facing the se~ one night when he was apparently worried in face ofthe' confrontation between the moderates and the radicals within his

party, Alarico suddenly said that he might decide to migrate to

Brazil and settle there. Such was the contrast between Alarico Jorge

Fernandes and Jose Ramos Horta.

"Horta had apparently for quite some time made preparations to

create his second front for his retreat should his effgrt~ to. _.~become an important man in Independent East Timor meet with failure.

His trips to Australia, twice that year, were apparently not onJy

in the interest of hi~ party, namely to seek support for FRETILIN

from the communists and leftists in Australia, but also his own.

With no longer close family ties with his mother and'younger sister

and brother in Dili, it~~Uld. be much easier for Horta to leave

everything associated with him and move to another country as ..a

migrant. UDT President Lopez da Cruz stated during his interview

the news agency ANTARA in Jakarta in/earlY July 1975 that shouldIndonesia invade Portuguese Timor he might go to the mountains as

a guerrilla fighter. When this writer interjected "But I think

Horta would not go to the mountains. Horta would go to Australia

and settle there.", da Cruz laughed and said he a~reed with the idea.

The FRETlLIN position became more difficult after'the revelation

about the membership ot alm~st all of its C~nt~al Co~mittee leading

figures in the secret police of the former Salazar dictatorial regime.

If the three factors were combined , namely that FRETILIN allowed

itself to be used as an instrument by Maoists, that~almost all of its

leaders were people of mixed ancestry and' that they were former

lackeys at the dreaded. dictatorship which terrorized ~n:loppressed

the people, then the face of FRETILIN became very unattractive indeed

for the people of East Timor.

Both FRETILINleaders like Xavier, Alarica and Horta and

UDT figures like daCruz and Mounsinho said that basically it was

difficult for communism to flourish in East Timor. A certain part

of the population, .about 30 percent, were Roman Catholics. A small

number of them, only several hundred, were Muslims. There were also

Buddhists and Protestans in smaller numbers. The majority of the

people still adhere to believe in the spirit of their ancestors or

animism.

(

Page Twenty-two

Anyway, the political ~.aaders admitted that the people of

Portuguese Timor believed in something above them, something

super-natural, no matter what the unseen power is called: God,

Allah or whatever. In short, the people of the re~ion is religious

and it would be difficult for them to accept Communism which denies

spiritual things.

Alfonso do.s Santos, the captain of a paramilitar'y unit in

Liqui~a and chairman of the FRETILIN chapter in the area told this

writer during lunch at a restaurant in town and later during a talk

that lasted mor~ than two hours in his house at the edge of Liqui~a

(about 35 KM from Dili, almost two hours by Toyota jeep, over unpaved

road, most of it no more than a beaten path wide enough for a four­

wheel vehicle and crossing rivers with no bridges) that the people

of East Timor would fight against communism. He admitted that he

had no knowledge about communism. But the Chinese in Liqui~~ told

him that communism 'is the most wicked teaChing pr ideology in the

world and' that it advooate,::""the 'abolition of private property,

the destruction of the family ~Y8tem and the denial of God. That

was why Santos claimed he was anti-communist and that if there were

communists in his party, especially in the Central Committee of

FRETILIN, 'as the FRETILIN'regional leader in Liqui~a, Alfonso dos

Santos would move his followers to fight the Central Committee.

The discussion with the regional FRETILIN leader showed the ,disarray

within the FRETILIN line of command.

As a matter of fact the main impression about FRETILIN was that

inls pi. t,"e,of its roar~ng voice about independence and its

radical-revolutionary pretenses, the no-more-than-one-year old party

with leaders without experience in national movement, turned out to

have no party line or program usually found in advanced societies~

Xavier Amaral, Ramos Horta and Alarico Fernandes all could not

answer this writer's simple question: what would you do to provide

the people with foo~, clothing, education and medicine after East

Timor became independent as you cls1med you would fight to make it

so? Or considering other events, the three FRETILIN leaders had

actually abandoned their pronciples about FRETILIN.

During a meeting with six leading members of the Indonesian

Center for Strat~gic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta

in late April 1975 for instance, after being pressed with the

realities in Portuguese Timor, Jose Ramos Horta admitted that it

would be difficult to wed the idea 8bout the independence ot East

Timor with the current realities in the region. He was so open and

suggested that Indonesia should launch peaceful efforts to educate

and ,to boost the standard of living of the people of Portuguese

Timor so that one morning "the people would awake from their sleep

and feel they are already Indonesians.", without integration or

I

Page Twenty-three

other efforts. To achieve that goal, Horta suggested that the

Indonesian government should as soon as possible carry out large­

scale efforts with the aim of creating more and more education and

health facilities in Portuguese Timor and that Indonesia should

give economic aid to improve the daily living standard of the people

of the region. He called on the Indonesian government to bring

sehool children and university students from Portuguese Timor to

study in Indonesian schools and universities beside building schools

in Portuguese Timor. Horta also made the suggestion to the government

of the Republic of Indonesia to help build more health centers and

hospitals in Portuguese Timor because such facilities were still

scarce. Finally in front of the managing staff of the Indonesian

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, the

FRETI1IN Secretary in charge of foreign affairs openly declared:

"As a FRETILIN member I would be sad if you gentlemen succeed in those

efforts. But for the sake of the people of Portuguese ·Timor I would.

rejoice."

Horta also admitted during that meeting and subsequently during

discussions with this writer in Kupang prior to entering Portuguese

Timor and late~'in Dili that the integration of Portuguese Timor with

the Republic of Indonesia would be the most logical and·correct

solution for the Portuguese colony.problem as long as it was done

peacefully and gradually and not in the manner propagated by APODETI.

"APODETI wants inte~ration with Indonesia right now, ignoring

the fact that socio-economic conditions in the eastern part of the

island is not ready for such development." asserted Horta.

That was why he suggested that there should be at·least 8 two or

three year transition period during which Indonesia should be allowed

to carry out its;peacetul and developmental efforts in Portuguese

Timor until ohe moment in the future there would be no alternative

for the people o~ the colony but integrate with Indonesia.

Horta's ideas about the future of Portuguese Timor was virtually

supported by Xavier Amaral during the discussions with this writer at

his house one night in late April 1975.

"You talk so much about democracy and the right of self-determinati

for the ~eople of this region. Now, it in the end, democratically and

as the implementation of the right ot self-determination, they decide

to integraie with the.~epublic of Indonesia, what would you say?"

this writer pinned'him.

Without doubt the FRETILIN President replied: "I am not against

that. As long as it is done peacefully."

But a few monents later he added: "I am not against inte~ration

with Indonesia provided it was done after the peonle become moreI

educated, more aware of their democratic rights. But I think that

would be difficult. It would be difficult to achieve inte~ration

"

Page Twenty-four

after the people of this region are better educated and have more

knowledge about their political rights."

What Xavier had in his mind was o~ourse opposed to the elementalteachings of democracy, but he deemed it necessary to add the last

statement to his pronouncements if only to cover up the serious leak

i~ his own ideas when pinned into a tight corner he finally gave

up and admitted that integration was the best availlable solution

for the Timor problem.

Alarico's ideas did not differ much from Horta's. His were even

more open and'realistic. Without exports, without industries, it

would be impossible to develop East Timor into an independent state

in the true sense of the word. He further said that it would be easy

to proclaim independence but when after the proclamation the people

ask for food, clothes and schools, what could be done? He deplored

the radical elements within his party, who he said refuse~ to recognise

realities and he endo;,sed this writer's opinion that "A politician

must be realistic. His head may float among the clouds, but his feet

must be planted on the ground of reality."

During the last meeting in Dili, one day before this writer

left Portuguese Timor for Jakarta, Alarico expressed his wish to

resign from his party.

" H6rta, who would leave for~Australia on May 5, had tendered

his resignation as Secretary in charge of foreign affairs of FRETILIN.

After he is gone I will be the only o~e to oppose the radicals. It

would be better for me to resign now." He··'saidmorosely.

"NoJRico. You must not do that. In Indonesia we would say you

had jumped into the atreamlong ago and you are now in the water up'to

your chest. You must not retreat. Either way you are already wet

a :third quari{er.of.,yourbo~y. You must stay to block tpe radicals.

The world is placing its hope for a peaceful solution for the Timor

problem on people like you moderates." this writer counseled him.

Alarico did not utter 8 word for quite a while and then he said:

"You maybe right. But the situation within FRETILIN is getting worse.

Yesterday I received reports from my men in Baucau that several

thousands of our members had discarded their membership and that they

later defected to APODETI. And to think that Baucau is my turf! Before

coming to Dili to settle I lived in Baucau and helped build FRETILIN

there."

Two days prior to that when this writer quitely visited the

headquarters of APODETI in Dili, he observed that beside the APODETI

membership .cards stacked neatly following the alphabet, there was also

a large carton full of FRETILIN membership cards. According to the

APODETI official on duty there, those cards belonged to people who

were once forced to accept FRETILIN membership but recently they

submitted their cards to APODETIto: shQw they were ..no members. of

FRETILIN and that on the' other hand they asked to be registered as

I

APODETI members.

One week later after returning to Jakarta, this writer was

informed by reliable sources that a week before, 4 000 FRETILIN

members in Baucau had defected to APODETI. So Alarico was telling

the truth when he complained about the ~aucau incident.

The collapse of the FRETILIN membership involving l.arge numbers

ot people was followed by the abolition of the short-lived UDT­

FRETILIN coalition which was unilaterally done by UDT and other

embarrassing incidents like the public beating~of Carvarino by a

group of UDT members and the subsequent rescue of Carvarino's wife

by a group of APODETI men who sheltared her in the house of an APODETI

activist and another public beating, this time of Alarico by a member

of UDT at Dili airport.

According to Lopez da Cruz (who is now a member of the

Indonesian Supreme Advisory Council in Jakarta), Alarica gave someone

money to kill an APODETI member. Alas. the would-be assassin did not

only fail to carry out the conntract, he went to see ~is'would-be

victim and told; him about the whole plan. On the day the UDT

delegation was to depart from Dili airport for Macau, Alarico also

came to the airport and came face to face with the man he ordered

to be killed. A'heated argument broke out followed by a fist fight.

When at a certain monent during the fight Alarico was about to kick

his smaller and shorter adversary. the UDT man grabbed Alarico's

le~ and smashed' him to the floor. The well-bodied FRETILIN Secretary

General was forced to leave in shame.

IIA FRETILIN top leader fought in public. It waa devastating

to his dignity.1I said da Cruz.

It was indeed difficult to imagine how FRETILIN fared in the eyes

of the people in Portuguese Timor. Its boycott of the Macau Meeting

as a defensi\ve manoeuvering appeared, more like an act of escapism IWith its crushed dignity in the eyes of the people and officials

of Portuguese Timor. FRETILIN apparently came to realize its own

weakness and felt that it did'not have enough spirit and strength

to come face to face inrMacau with :the.1representa.t.ives.of the

government of Portugal, UDT and APODETI, the latter two its enemiesnow.

APODETI

Although like UDT and FRETILIN, APODETI did not officially

appear in Portuguese Timor politics until April 1974, its stru~~les

and aspirations were recorded since a long time ago, long before

April 1974.

Martins, who waa vice-President of APODETI at that time spent

26 years in a Portuguese prison in East Timor after his failure in

the people's uprising against Portuguese colonisation in 1959.

I

(

Page ~enty-six

And Guilherme Goncalves, the King of Atsabe, was a prominent

figure of ,rebellion who had long fought the Portuguese. But

APODETI's main streng~h , is' the fact that almost all of its

members and sympathizer~ as well as its whole leadership in allareas and at all levels were Timorese natives. There were no

half-breeds among its e~tirehcie~~ership.

" The people of mixed ancestry may say what they like. They

told the people they wanted to fight for the independence of East

Timor, for the freedom of the people. Thev could not deceive them.

We told the people: the UDT and FRETILIN crowd are not Timorese

natives. They are half-casts with Portuguese blood in tneir

veins. They do not own this island. It belongs to us, the

natives of Timor. Only we can fight for the inte~estsof this

region." said Casim~~o laughing.

In a press conference in Macau on June 18, 1975, responding.. ,

to a question asked by a IIdmgkong-based reporter "Why'does APODETI

want integration with Indonesia?", Casimiro firmly stated :" Before

the white people came to that part of the world, Timor was a wliole,

undivided island, an integral part of what was called Nusantara

or Indonesia. Then came the Dutch to colonise the other parts of

the archipelago, including the western part of Timor. The Portuguese

followed and colonised the eastern part of the island~ So the people

of East Timor wa;s kept separate from the people of We~t Timo1:'"byWestern colonialism. At the be~inning we were one nation. From

Aus~st 17, 1945, the other parts of Indonesia, including the western

part of.Timor, became independent. Now Indonesia has become a more

advanced independent nation. We in the eastern part of the island

who remained under Portuguese colonialism for so long want to return

to our familr'fold, the Indonesian family. That's why APODETI wantsto inte~rate Portuguese Timor with the Republic of Indonesia in order

that the eastern part of T~mor which for 400 years had been severed

from the western part of the island and from t~e rest of the Indonesian

archipelago, could be,reunified'with Indonesia."

That~3is'~the~',truth,the ultimate truth about East Timor!

The eastern'part of the Island of Timor Which for more then

400 years remained a Portuguese colony was indeed a part of Indonesia

since time immemorial and was situated at an important location.

rr the Indonesian archipelago were a human body, the Island of

Timor was not an ear, the nose, a'knee'"or an elbow. Timor constitutes

a vit~l part on the Indonesian~body~' If it is stabbed there, the

wound would be serious, threatening and endangering the whole bodyl

"Would. Indonesia use force to annex Portuguese Timor?" one

of the·:·Macau-based Chinese reporters asked this writer who was

attending the press conference as an Indonesian reporter •. ,

"Indonesia would not use anything to annex Portuguese Timor

I--------------------~..- .

.- Page Twenty-seven

because, truthfully, Indonesia does not have the slightest desire

.to annex Portuguese Timor, by whatever means." answered this writer.

He further told 'the Chinese journalist that the Republic of Indonesia

was based on the five principles called Pancasila, which includes

democracy. Hence Indonesia's firm committment to honour the right

of any nation or any people anywhere in the world to determine their

own future according to~the democratic rules of the game.

Consequently, Indonesia has no territorial ambitions toward Portuguese

Timor. On ,the other hand, if the people of East Timor decide to

reunify themselves with the rest of the Indonesian peoplft, Indonesia

would welcome ,the decision with open hands. That would only be natural,

because no one would refuse a brother or a sister who wishes to return

to the family fold after being separated by alien forces for so long.

Talking again about the big family, about rejoining the family,

that was the main theme in APODETI's struggle, a theme based on.- ,- .. '..

historical, cultural and geographical, considerations ~hi~h placed

the people of East Timor as a part of the Indonesian nation.

That was also the subject discussed by this writer and Xavier

Amaral in Dili.

In February and March 1975 small disturbances broke out in Dili

and several other centers in Portuguese Timor when FRETILIN gangs

mounted a campaign of terror against APODETI activists and supporters.

On the walls ,of buildings and houses~even the official residence of

a Catholic priest, the FRETILIN terrorists wrote slogans.8nd~ther

writi~gs, some of those condemning what they termed TRAIDORES, or

traitors. By that they meant APODETI activists. APODETI's aspiration

to inte~ate with Indonesia and to return into the fold of the big

family was interpreted by FRETILIN as selling the people, as an act

of treason against the people of East Timor.

" UDT wants to be independent but still within a certain bond

with Portugal and it rejected APODETI's aspiration to integrate

theregionrith Indonesia. 'FRETILIN wanted full independence for thisregion as a souvereign state and opposed integration with Indonesia.

So both UDT and FRETILIN rejected the idea about the reunification

of the people of Portuguese Timor with their comp8tr~9ts_liying:on

the western part.,of Timor and the other parts. of the Republic of

Indonesia. UDT and FRETELIN went even further. They branded APODETI

which merely aspired to reunify the 'people who were once separated

by Western colonialism as TRAIDORES, traitors. Try ~o think quietly.

Like the people of APODETI, the followers of UDT and FRETELIN

claimed they were Timorese. But the difference is that UDT and

FRETILIN refused~to accept the idea about the reunification of the

people of.the Portuguese colony of East Timor with the people of

Indonesia, who are their brothers and sisters. UDT said it wanted

independence but still under the protection of the Portuguese flag.

And FRETILIN said it wanted to build a separate nation without any/

--------.-----.-.,

l<

Page Twenty-eight

links with Indonesia. Only APODETI wanted to'be reullitied,with

its root, the Indonesian nation. Well, Xavier, now tell me: who are

the TRAIDORES? The people of APODETI who wanted to return to the

family fold, the family of the Indonesian nation? Or the people of

UDT and FRETILIN who rejected the idea?" this writer asked Xavier,

pinning him down. He never gave a firm answer, saying only: "We

only want to follow in the footsteps of our broth,ers and sisters

in Indonesia. They had fought against Dutch colonialism and became

an independent nation. We in East Timor also want to fight to

gain independence."

Betore th~ discussion moved to other matters, this writer

interjected:

" The situation faced by our brothers and sisters in Indonesia

when they confronted the Dutch colonialists were different ~rom

the situation faced.by our brothers and s{ste~s in East Timor now.We in Indonesia then had to really wr~8tleindependence from the

Dutch. Portugal had d~clared its willingness to leave East Timor

and to submit the region's future and political status to the

people. The easiest way for you, if you really want to become

independent, would be the one suggested by APODETI, namely to

inte~rate yourselves with your brothers and sisters who are already

independent. That would be the easiest and safest way."

There was.~no guarantee that· the whole mass of APODETI supporters

had understood it. The main thing that bound them together was the

fact that it was the political party of Timorese natives while UDT

and FRETILIN belonged to the half-casts who for hundreds of years

had never established any lin~s with the natives and even kept them

at a distance from themselves.

Viewed ~ithin the scope of a larger persp~ctive such ethnical

sentiment mat be considered unhealthy and even irresponsible. But

when all other means of persuasion could not be used to move the

people of East Timor to support APODETI in its struggle to inte~rate

the region with the Republic of Indonesia, such primordial sentiment

would become the most effective weapon to battle other themes to be

launched by UDT and FRETILIN.

It 'should also be admitted in the final analysis that nationalism

'and patriotism which for so long had been the moving factor in many

struggles for freedom and independence everywhere sprang from such

ethnical sentiment. And when the choice was between the use of armed

force or persuasion, then the employment of ethnical sentiment for

the solution of the East Timor problem could still be accepted

and condoned.

Fortunately there were signs showing that APODETI's real

strength and influence could be counted on, Its membership system

which was support~d by the distribution of real membership cards as

Page Twenty-nine

observed by this writer at the party's headquarters in Dili

clear17 indicated that APODETI was determined to carry on real

and realistic work, unlike UD~ and F~~T~I~ which issued large

but unconfirmed figures and used pressures and coercion to gain

mass support.

Lisboa's policy

The government of Portugal in Lisboa had made it clear that

its only ambition was to get out of Portuguese Timor and submit

the future of the colony to the will of the majority of its people

in October 1978 at the latest.

One should not allow oneself to be caught by the illusion that

Lisboa was motivated by something lofty. Quite likely, money was

the main consideration. Every year, Portugal had to give a subsidy

of not'.•les8:",thanUS$lO million to East ~imor. The sooner Lisboa

could shake off that committment the better for its n~tional economy

which· was in disarray~' As of March 1975 Portugal cut the number of

its military personnel in East ~imor and gradually repatriated them.

1!he move was made under its austerity program but also in connection

with its efforts to strengthen the Revolutionary Council's position

and power because it still had to cope with various problems that

included those between the Socialists and the vommunists. As recorded

previously, there were suspicions 'that the FR.l!;TILINboycott of the

Macau Meeting was the 1!'esult,of a conspiracy between F1tETILIN~and

Lisboa or at lea~t between FKETILIN and certain figures or e1emtts

'within the government of Portugal. No proof had been found so far but

several things should be noted as the source of the suspicion.

Although there were reports that an agreement had been reac~ed

by Indonesia, and Portugal that integration was "the most logical

and the best'solution fo~ the Timor problem.", one could not easily

forget the fact that the government of Portugal at that time was

dominated by Communists or Communist sympathi~ers who did not conceal

their strong sympathy toward the Soviet Union. If the drastic

measu~es it had takenJlike the nationa1isation of companies couldn~t be of much help and iI~finally economic aid must be accepted

from,~other;~countries, the ...most logical choice would be the Soviet

Union.

Meanwhile, in Asia and the Pacific, the competition between

Moscow and Beijing to establish their influence continued. ~he

conclusion of the war in Indo-China did not'in any way weaken the

fierce efforts. On the contrary it intensified it.

The formation of a new independenZ state in south-west Pacific

if FRETILIN succeeded in its struggle to create an independent East

Timor, would provide the Soviet Union with a welcome opportunityto gain a foothold to spread its influence in the region.

_____ ,.,.-.,."A ...

t·

Page Thirty

Its main aim could be quite likely just to counter Beijing's

similar moves, but surely Moscow would take advantage of its

presence in East Timor to work on Indonesia cnnvenientlyfrom

behind its:.back! and 'Australia directly from under its !lose!

That was why the holders of power in Lisboa had declared that

if it could be proved that there were Maoists at wor~ in East Timor

they would take ,firm actions.

If the decolonisation process of East Timor was truely

carried out according to the accepted peaceful machinationsi •

through certain phases, including the Macau Meeting, it would be

qui~e possible'that F~E~ILIN would suffer a complete failure in its

efforts. The latest developments in East Timor discussed in previous

parts could not 8scap.'Lisboa's observation·and considerations.

By then Lisboa's concern must have grown so serious about the

possi'qd.lity of a complete F.H~:.L'ILINdefeat if a truely peaceful and

democratic'referendum~should be held in East Timor, because Lisboa

knew that FKETlLIN did not enjoy sufficient ~upport from the people.

It should have become clear for· Lisboa that a better way to avoid

a FRE~ILIN defeat was to sabotage the peaceful and democratic

decolonisation process by allowing chaos to happen in East Timor.

The F~TILIN boycott of the Macau Meeting could provide the first

step in such a strategy.

A high-ranking officer of the Indonesian Armed Forces in Java,..

told this writer in early July 1975 that incidents kept occuring

more frequently along the border between Portuguese Timor and

Indonesian Timor. According to the Army general, those inci~ents

were designed to provoke lndonesia into reacting. Of course·

Indonesiana were ~ot so· gullible to fall into such a.~rap.

But thi~gs would become c~ear if Lisboa took real actions againstFRETILIN. It had become a glaring fact that FHE~ILIN had

deliberately sabotaged the Macau Meeting. Because it did not only

mea~ that FHETILIN had trampled on the right of self-determination

of the people of East Timor but also that it had slapped Lisboa's

face in public since the FHETILIN boycott had become an obstacle

for Portugal's decolonisation policy which had now become a victim of

the. FHE~ILIN boycott, the world expectpd Lisboa to take firm

.punitive actions against FRETILIN.

Portugal's sincerity pertaining to the implementation of the

decolonisation process in East Timor, including Lisboa's commitment

that ..it would give the people of East Timor the complete freedom

to d~cide their own political status through a referendum to be

held in October 1976, should be reflected in the actions it would

take. against FKETILI~ before the implementation of the results

of the Macau Meeting.

It had;'b'e'eomehis.~~now that Portugal did nothing at all r

Page ~hi~;y-one

Dili's role

As a provincial administration the Portuguese government in

Dili was to function as Lisboa's extended hand/Which shouldconsequently implement all policies decided by the central ~overnment

in Lisboa •.But pertaining to the decolonisation process of East

Timor, there were occasional deviations by the local holders' of

power which reflected the lack of seriousness and truthfullness

of the Dili officials.

Information was obtained in April 1975 from sources in Dili

that the provincial government gave financial subsidies to the amount

of' 50 000 escudos to the three political parties to help finance

their operations. It was reported that both UD'l'and .ltit~·J.·ELll~had

received the money. APODETI claimed it had not received a single

escudo!

When this writer wanted to know about the matter in a written

interview (the mode of interview was decided by the governor's

Office) with the ~overnor, the response did not nirectly touch on

the issue. '.l.'heGovernor Claimed it was just s·rumour.

Since the emergence of the three political parties in East

~imor, they were each g~ven the opportunity to launch campaigns

to attract sympathizers and members. On certain days the parties..staged public gatherings at severel places to sell their ideas

and to calIon the people to support them.

The implementation of this particular program for APODETI

was not always smooth.

During this writer's visit to Liqui~a he was informed that

a week before UDT performed such a meeting in Maubara, another

small town West of Liqui~a. When a few days later APODETI wanted

, to do the same thing in Maubara, a telegram was suddenly received

by the District Officer of Maubara from the Regent of Liqui~a,

8 Portuguese, banning the APODETI meeting.

Once ,again, when this writer wanted to get information about

the incident in his second written interview with the Governor in

Dili, the ,answer was vague. He :was told again that "those were. I

only rumours and Timor was full of rumours".

According to the information gathered by this writer in Dili,

the provincial administration's attitude was mostly influenced by

.the two assistants to the Governor, Major Mota and Major Jonathans

who were reported to be active members of the Communiat Party of

Portugal (PCP)!

. The failure of a gaod-will mission from Indonesia with two

Indonesia~avY ships carrying 75 Indonesian youths and universitystudents to Dili to carry out programs for social activities and

sport .games with the local youth was also caused by the

Governor's decision who was under the influence of Major Mota.

--- ••.1 ••.•••..•i __ "." •.•.••~...•..••..•.,_

•\

~ Page Thirty-three

The sympathetic church

'-.

One of the buildings whose walls'were plastered'by FRETII,IN

activists with the legend KILL THE TRAITORS .was the official

residence of the Bishop of Dili, not far from the office of the

Governor. of Dili. The head of the Catholic Church became the target

of FRETILIN's anger because it had by then become a public secret in

Dili that the Catholic Church quitely endorsed and supported. the

APODETI aspiration to inte~rate Portuguese Timor with Indonesia.

This writer found it very difficult to interview the Bishop

who had issued a pre-condition that he would be willing to meet

'with the journalist from Jakarta but would refrain from talking

about politics I But according to APODETI ffgures in Dili, the

Church quitely supported the APODETI position.

When APODETI celebrated its anniversary on May\27, 1975

and plans were made to conduct an open-air Mass in Dili, the Bishop

sent a message to the APODETI leadership: wouldn't it be dan~erous

to conduct Mass in the open?· What if FRETILIN interfered to create

disturbances? Wouldn't.it b~ better to conduct'Mass indoors?

The Mass to celebrate APODETI's anniversary was conducted in

the Dili cathedral.

Indonesia's interest

Annually Portugal spent no less than ten million US dollars

to subsidize East Timor. If the region was inte~rated with Indonesia

that money must come from a new s~urce, Jakarta,: at least during the

initial ye~rs until the time comes when the local sources of income

could be exploited like the ones in the other provinces of the

Republic of Indonesia.

Anyway accepting the inte~ration of Portuguese Timor ·into the

territory of the Republic of Indonesia would mean the assumption of

new burdens.

Is such a policy accountable?

It harlbeen recorded previously that considering its strategic

location on the Indonesian body, Timor is of vital iMportance to

Indonesia's defense.

That was the reason why during the meeting between Jose Ramos

Horta and the mana~ement of the Indonesian Center for Strategic and

International Studies (C8I8) in Jakarta in April 1975, it was pointed

out to Horta that Indonesia could not tolerate chaos in the region

and that Indonesia could also not allow it to be developed into

a Communist power center or sphere of influence because ·that· would

constitute a direct threat to the stability and safety of the

Republic of Indonesia.

Another point of interest for Indonesia was the raFt that the

people of Portu~ue8e Timor were a p~rt of thp. n;~ Tn~~nf~;~n ~nm;lv.

P~ge Thirty~four

Hence I11done8i8'13 dotormination that while it would not

annex East Timor b;r wlwtover means, i t',."ould only be happy towelcome the ]leoulo or bhn ro~ion should they decide, democratica1',y,

to come home to thf';l old f8[1]5.1;r raId I

Jlbout the v!r:l.t~r

Jussac NR Wirosoebrot0 '~as hetween January 1966 ond October 1979

Deputy Publ ish o;r and Cb:taf ;~d.i1;01.' of PEV:WOR YOGYA da i ly in

Yoe;ya karta, Ind one s ia. Almo:=l; eluring thE! same period he \'laR

Chairmall of th'? local ;lOUrn!ll iS1:8' 138sc·ciati.on (PWI) and vice­

Ch,3irmcJIl of th·:; Yop::yekarta chapter of the Inr:Jonesian ne\-v'ST/llner

put'1ishcrs' associ3tiC<Il U;P:;). From October 1977 to October1()82 h9 wa~ a member cf the Indonesian People's Consultative

Assembly (MPR) and of COTImi~sion I (Infor~ation, Defence, ForeiFD

Aff,girs) of th':; Indonesi9n Yarli:3ment (DPR). From March 1982 toDecemb"?r 1 c?,?-? ],9 atteDr1cj trle prestigicus Indonesian Institute

+',..,Y> "T~+-~O"'3-' ""'''''''ence (T'~\'rrt."!'TAS'\ anrl rTI'''d'uated on December 5 ]9~2..:..v_ ':"G..,~_ .•.J,. ~ ,:~;:-t.. U.lJ:lJ..t .•.•.'.f.l..• / '- b 0._ , .

8fter v,'riting, presenting a-rld defending his paDer entitled THESOI!IET UNIJrJ'S PRESENCE AT NAINL.t\ND ASIA'S PERIMETER: A SOURCE OF

POTEN'l'IJ\L THREAT TO A::mAN i:iECURITY.

Between July 1959 and August 1963 he was a Translator/Announcer

for tlle Indonesian Section of Radio Australia, the OverseasService of the Australian Broadcasting Commission in Me1bournA.

From J(X.l1uary 1962 to J\usp-;ust 1963 he was sponsor, co-founder and

ChairITIBll of the INDONp:BIAN INFORMATION TEAM-NON GOVERNMENTALinMelbourne, Australia.

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1'he writer with Xavier ,)''i

Amaral, Fretilin Presidentat roadside in Dili

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The writer visiting Alfonsados Santos, FretilinChairman, Liqui9a branchFront ~ right to left:Alfonso dos Santos, thewriter, Mrs. dos Santos.Back row right to left:Fretilin member, two

Apodet members accompanYingwriter from Dili and twoFretilin memb0rS.

The writer with AlaricoJorge Fernandes (center)andJose Ramos Horta, Fretilin ,Secretary ueneral and c ~Fretilin Secretary for .~.Foreign Affairs respectivelJ~in Kupang before leavingfor Dili.

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