the timing of feminism

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The Timing of FeminismAuthor(s): Robyn Ferrell

Source: Hypatia, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter, 1999), pp. 38-48Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810622

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The Timingof Feminism

ROBYN FERRELL

Ishistory category freason,or is reasona category fhistory?Theseopposing

questions avedividedhestructuralistromthematerialist-butneitherquestions

wrong.Analysisof the ogicof oppositionshallengeseminism,nparticular,ofinda logic-and apoetics-in which orendertsvalueswithouthistoricalrtheoretical

naivete.I explorehequestion f thetimingoffeminismhroughuliaKristeva nd

LuceIrigaray.

Not only can I not think time without thinking;I cannot

think it without also thinking thought.

(Genevieve Lloyd,Being n Time)

Feminism is broughtto bear on metaphysics throughthe analysisit must

make of difference.Of course,in the process, metaphysics s broughtto bear

on feminism. As logicaldifference,the concept of differencetakespartin the

logic of identity,which marksout beingbydistinguishing hat which it is not.But as sexualdifference,the effect of distinction in practicehas given riseto

subordinationandoppression.Contrast is experiencedas a kind of spacing,at workin producinganydif-

ference at all. This spacing(as an experience) is also a timing-the interval

which divides the entity and its difference.The analysisof the interval that

produces he differencebetweenanytwo terms s thereforeasrelevantto femi-

nist politics as to philosophical logic. But it also raisesscepticismabout the

necessityof any state of affairs,political or logical. It unsettlesmetaphysicalcertainty; eminismapplauds his unsettling,andin fact,feminismhad a hand

in the operationwhen it diagnosedthe fraternizing f oppositionslikesubjectandobject with masculine and feminine. Butthe analysisof the intervalalso

erodesclaims of feministnormativityto know the "truthof sexualdifference,"and for this consequence, deconstructivephilosophieshave sometimesbeen

condemned.

I wantto explorethe formalquestionsthat the logic of oppositionraises or

Hypatiavol. 14, no. 1 (Winter 1999) ? by RobynFerrell



RobynFerrell

feminist theory.Mine is not a desire to preserveor defend feminist certain-

ties-there no need to, since the historythat led to the challenge of sexualinequalitywas not bor of theory.The experience of subordinationhas its

own incontrovertiblepain. What oppositionallogic raises is the appearanceof a paradox: n relation to time, as to whether time will be determinedas the

exteriorcontingent event of history,or as the interior orderedoperationof

consciousness.

Timeappears bjective,never more so than in the sequenceof events called

history;and yet, it is the ineluctablecompanion of subjectivity.There is no

consciousnesswithout sequence,andconversely,without time we are uncon-scious,forthe reflex of self-consciousnessneeds two moments;there needs to

be a moment in which to reflect.

It is hardto conceive of what the pastcould be without invokingthe sub-

jective operation called memory.The difference between the past and the

futureis immense,since one hashappened,hasbeen madeobjective in all its

specifics.And yet, what is left of it afterthe event (the records,the objects)

appearas frail and inessential souvenirs of it. The past is cherished in the

memoriesof those who experiencedit, that is, in the subjectiverealm. Mean-while, the futurecan only be assumedby an act of faith. "The time will come

.. ,"the future s that which willhappen-this truthhas not yetbeen falsified,but it is still a hypothesis.The future exists only as a hypothesisbecause it is

not yet known as actual in its specificoccurrence.1

If time is bound up with consciousness,then it makessense that the un-

conscious has been said to be timeless. Sometimes,this meansonly that the

unconsciousis a mode of being without recourseto the orderingof chronol-

ogy.For the materialist,things in the unconscious areweightedaccordingtothe strengthof their impression; hese impressionsare rendered here like an

exhaustiveglossaryof one'sexperience.This is not to deny that the subjectis

subjectto the action of time, which can modifythis lexicon throughthe in-

troductionof furtherexperience.But it does claim that the interiorityof the

subjectexperiences necessity not from the direction of time as reason,but

from time ashistory.The force with which the event strikesus andthe angleof the blow producesignificance.2

At other times, there is held to be no time in the unconscioussince it is"full"only of potential andas-yet-unrealized ossibilitiesformeaning,as well

as of the moments that are ruled out by virtue of their being incompatiblewith the presentmoment.This structuralist iew understands he subjectionof time as an orderingand refers the problemof experience to the logicalterms set for it in the unconscious-structured like a language,as Lacanhasit-that is, the laws.

Is history a categoryof reason, or is reason a categoryof history?These

opposing questions have divided the structuralist rom the materialist-butneitherquestioniswrong.Analysisof the logicofoppositionschallengesfemi-

39



Hypatia

nism, in particular, o find a logic-and a poetics-in which to render its

values without historicalor theoreticalnaivete.

One wayin which this analysiscan be illustrated or feminism isbyconsid-

eringJuliaKristeva'sand Luce Irigaray'semarksabout time. As feministsof

difference,both bringthe resourcesof philosophyand psychoanalysis o the

problem.Feminism and psychoanalysisare common companionsin the practice of

many theorists, yet there is a deeply irreconcilablecontest between them.

The claimsof apolitical program n behalf of womencompetewith anepiste-mologicalclaim to masterthe field of subjectivityin general.

Feminismis a normativeproject, and normative projectsbegin from as-

sumptionsand prioritiesthat are not easily,or often maynot coherently be,

given up to an alternative.Feminismhas been as much a political demandas

it has a theory and the theory remainsin creative tension with the simpler

practicebuilt on the intuition of oppression.Of course,psychoanalysishas its own priorities,and the normativity in

psychoanalysis s only better disguised.In particular,psychoanalysisas a sci-entific aspirationmakesa better show of keepingaffectout of it. But psycho-

analysishas its own convictions and assumptionswhich, since they derive

more thoroughlyfrom the philosophicalcontext in which they come about,

are less visible. There are sustainedfeministcritiquesof the culturalassump-tions that psychoanalysisrelies on, for example, of the famousdiscussionof

femininity in the writingsof Freudandhis followers.

Yet,it ispossibleto take the hereticalsenseof these possibilities-feminist

theory and practice,psychoanalytictheory and practice-and to deduce atleast a kind of time in which these wouldcoincide.

Kristeva,in her analysisof the tides of feminism in her essay "Women's

Time"(1986), has given a diagnosisof the next moment that is yet to be

grappledwith (this despitethe piece firsthaving appearedn French n 1979).

Her vision takes in the panoramaof three kindsof time, whose coincidence

is both historical and conceptual. "There are three attitudeson the part of

European eministmovements towards his conception of lineartemporality,

which is readilylabeled masculineand which is at once both civilizationaland obsessional"(1986, 193). Presentedas a historical actuality,Kristeva's

descriptioncanneverthelessserveto describemoments n aconceptualscheme

that have an appearanceof necessity,or at least,have a logic to them.

Kristeva's nalysisbeginsfroma firstmoment,which she alsonominatesas

the firstgeneration."In tsbeginnings,the women'smovement,asthe struggleof suffragists nd of existentialfeminists,aspired o gain a place in linear time

as the timeofprojectandhistory" 1986, 193). Thisgeneration,wherein much

of the discussionremains,is

probablythe most familiarto

Anglo-Americanfeminists.These kinds of feminism,which in our own time encompassthe

40



RobynFerrell

aspirationsof equal opportunityand (whatIwantto characterizeas) "techno-

logical-rational" eminisms,are still very much extant and for good reason:they areprojects,and continue to have goals,that are worthpursuing n rela-

tion to women'smaterial-historical ircumstances.

Nevertheless,as Kristevanotes, it hasbeennecessarynpursuinghisprojectto adoptvaluesbelongingto the "time of projectandhistory" 1986, 193). In

particular,t has been conceptuallynecessary or these feminisms to accept a

versionof the nation-state,and the narrativeof the socialcontract,fromwhich

rightscan be derived.This can be summarized eatly:from when the rightsof

man arethinkable,then the rightsof womanare,too.But it seemsimportantto analyzewhat is contributedconceptuallyto up-

hold that particularcontract model, and thereby,that particularmoment of

feminism.3Most cogent for the discussionof the relation between feminism

andpsychoanalysis s the privilegegiven to consciousness andrationality.That particularcommitment leads this moment of feminism into its own

impasseand gives rise in Kristeva'sanalysisto a second time of feminism,a

second generation,which neverthelessdoes not want to associate itselfwith,

or identifyitself in, the morelinearor rational notion of time that she is pro-posing. "In a second phase, linked, on the one hand, to the youngerwomen

who came to feminism afterMay 1968 and, on the other, to women who had

an aesthetic orpsychoanalyticexperience, lineartemporalityhasbeen almost

totally refused,andas a consequence there has arisen an exacerbateddistrust

of the entire political dimension"(1986, 194).This secondgenerationof feminism has dwelt more in the realm of the un-

conscious,and it sometimes,throughits leftist leanings,has been understood

asfalse consciousness.In analysesof women'sposition, the secondgenerationhas sought theoretical inspirationin terms of (post)structuralist,psychoana-

lytic, or other "hermeneuticsof suspicion.""Essentiallynterested in the spe-

cificityof femalepsychologyandits symbolicrealization, hese women seek to

give a languageto the intra-subjectiveandcorporealexperiencesleft mutebyculture in the past"(1986, 194), and "bydemandingrecognition of an irre-

ducible identity, without equal in the opposite sex and, as such, exploded,

plural,fluid,in a certainwaynon-identical, this feminismsituates itself out-

side the linear time of identities .. ." (1986, 194).It is not surprisingo discover that these two moments in feminism,where

they occur together,are in conflict. This might even be predictedfromthe

simpleevidence that,bydefinition,the conscious-unconsciousdivision is con-

ceived asa conflictual structure.Kristeva ollows the trajectoriesof these gen-erationsin terms of what is perhapsmost alarmingabouteach of them.

For the feminism of consciousness,a kind of dissipationhas resulted from

the impotence of rationalityand the general "enlightenmentproject."Kris-

teva describes this dissipationas "acertain exhaustion of its potential as aprogrammeoranew social contract" 1986, 197), anexhaustionoccurring n

41



Hypatia

historicalterms(as a loss of impetusfor furthermoves to economic, political,

andprofessionalequality-the famed"backlash"), ut is better seen in termsof a conceptual limitation: Because this feminismshares with its enlighten-ment context (socialistand democraticgovernment)acommitmentto equal-

ity, "the specificcharacterof women could only appearas non-essential or

even non-existent to the totalising and even totalitarianspiritof this ideol-

ogy [i.e., the socialist ideology]" 1986, 197).For the second moment, the feminismof the unconscious encountersthe

constant magnetismof violence (rhetoricalandotherwise), in which the un-

consciousfindsexpression n a technological-rationalworld. Kristeva's naly-sis scans the attractionof certain kinds of separatism,and (worsematerially,and for the practiceof feminism) to certain kindsof terrorism she discusses

these attractionswith examplessuch as the Bader-Meinhoff,which wererel-

evant in Franceat the time of writingbut in no wayrenderher insightredun-

dant in the present).ButKristeva's xplanationof a "symboliccontract"detailswhythe second

moment, in retreatingfromequalityto specificity,may identifyvehemently

with the sacrificialaspectof sexualdifference,and break tself (andothers) inits frustration.ForKristeva,the metaphorologyof castration,which belongsto the imaginaryof psychoanalysis,neverthelessdesignatesa logical hypoth-esisfromwhich the characterof ourgeneralpsychosocialpredicamentcan be

deduced.

Kristeva's ymboliccontract is definedin contrast to the firstgeneration'ssocial contract:"... the social contract,farfrombeing that of equalmen, is

basedon an essentiallysacrificalrelationshipof separationandarticulationof

differenceswhich in this wayproducescommunicablemeaning" 1986, 199).Language,a "separationroma presumedstate of nature," ntroducesan "ar-

ticulatednetworkof differences,"a networkof substitutesfor the objects for

which its signsstand and throughwhich meaningcomes about (1986, 198).

This view she presentsas"Freudian,"ut it is more attributable n ourAnglo-context to JacquesLacan,andthe figureof sacrifice s sharedwith otherstruc-

turalistaccounts of culture and subjectivity.To the extent that feminismas apoliticalphilosophyinheritsthe problems

of liberalismandof the Enlightenment, it will encounteran intensificationofviolence alongsidethe intensificationof rationality,and is even consequent

uponit. Kristeva mpliesat the end of heressaythat one cannot guardagainsteither of those possibilities, in either of these moments-neither a hyper-

rationalitynor the irrationalas expressedviolently-while one remainsun-

consciousof them.Nevertheless, the demands of dismantling conceptualcommitments nvolvetransformation,maybeeven of cherishedpoliticalnorms,

and such transformationnaturallycauses anxieties. But anxiety is recogniz-

able as the other side of desire-in this case, a desirefor a certainmetaphysi-

42



RobynFerrell

cal view of the natureof thingsto be upheld.It mightmean that a repressed f

the theorycannot remain so-there will be the "bringingo light,"to use the

psychoanalyticmetaphor,of the unconscious of feministtheory,which would

be an awkwardand difficulttask,and one which the normativityof feminist

practicewould resist. But this resistancedemonstratesa feature of normative

theories in general-that they desire that their truth be accepted literally,rather than scrutinizedat a second order.

Where does Kristeva'sdiagnosisof our time leave us?Or, she puts it an-

other way:"What an be ourplacein thesymbolic ontract?"1986, 199). She

proposesa thirdgeneration,one that we areyet to inhabiteffectively,and onethat is not quite present,nor even quite a futureperhaps;certainlyit is uto-

pian.Feminisms,wherethey have alreadybroachedthis moment,have taken

other philosophies with them and have led the way.Kristeva describes the

third moment as the "demassification"f difference,the recognition of the

masculine/feminine-and allother kinds ofdistinction-as belongingto meta-

physics(1986, 209).

ForIrigaray,oo, anunderstanding f sexual difference eads to the critiqueof metaphysics hat isa featureof contemporaryphilosophy."Inorder o make

it possibleto think through,and live, this difference,we mustreconsiderthe

whole problematicof spaceand time" Irigaray1993b, 7).It leadsher to proclaim(in The Ethicsof SexualDifference):"Sexualdiffer-

ence is one of the majorphilosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age"(1993b, 5). Inphilosophical erms(andsheflags his when shementionsHeid-

eggerin her next sentence), this can be arguedbypointing uphow anorganic

difference within the human confounds humanist assumptions.Even if hu-manism is justa disguise orWesternchauvinism,it is still confoundedbythis

presence of difference within it-that the human species is made up of two

kinds,men and women.

Irigarayites moreutopianusesforherclaim:"Thinkof it [sexualdifference]as an approach hat would allow us to check the manyformsthat destruction

takesin ourworld; .. Sexualdifferencewouldconstitute the horizonofworldsmore fecund than any known to date-at least in the West-and without

reducingfecundityto the reproductionof bodies and flesh"(1993b, 5).In these polemics, Irigaraydrawsboth on Heidegger's ritiqueof technol-

ogy and on possibilitiessuggestedby Lacan's"imaginaryanatomy,"and she

brings logic and the erotic together as two partsof one project.This is a cap-tivating synthesisof philosophy,psychoanalysis,andfeminism-not to men-tion of the poeticsofphilosophyandpolemic.Indeed,shepromises hat sexualdifferencecan also create "anew poetics"fora new age.

"Thetransitionto a new agerequiresa change in ourperceptionand con-

ception of space-time,he inhabiting fplaces,and of containers, r envelopes f

43



Hypatia

identity.. "(1993b, 7). This is because the historyof space-timehasbeen the

history of the subject, as Irigaray ketches. Time with Kant becomes finally"the interiorityof the subjectitself,"and therebyconsciousness;while spacebecomes its exteriority. Irigaray ees that it will be necessaryto take apart,

then, the structures hat give things identity,in orderto get at this difference

without makingit exterior(and therefore,other).In presentsexualrelations,Irigarayells us, "what s missingis the double

pole of attraction and support,which excludes disintegrationor rejection,attractionanddecomposition,but which instead ensuresthe separationthat

articulatesencounter and makespossiblespeech, promises,alliances" 1993b,7). Here she makesuse ofpsychoanalyticpractice,of the "psychical ontainer"

that the maternalrelation, or the analytic situation, is said to offer to the

growingsubjectivity.The positive modelof "attractionandsupport"hat can

ensure mutual recognition between subjects is contrastedwith the subject

that, acting alone, finds anothersubjectto be merelyexteriorandexpels her.

Her critiquediagnosesthe theoretical problemfor the sexual relation. The

"doublepole"of attraction and supportdescribesambivalence in a positive

sense, as an operationthat allows both for identificationand for distinction.But this is not the notion of ambivalence asconceived, forexample,byFreud,who took a colderview.

Can this analysisbe extended to the problemof relation as such, as it oc-

curs in the logic of identity, i.e., areall oppositionalrelationsin need of this

moment of recognition?Becausethe maternalbond is an originatingevent in

the personalhistoryof subjectivity,contemporarypsychoanalysis,and femi-

nist psychoanalysis n particular,ends to make of the maternalthe historyof

the originof the subject.Thereby, t assumes hat the dichotomyof masculineandfeminine is an originalorfoundingopposition.Both Irigaray ndKristeva

assumea versionof this.

But while sexual difference (in the Oedipus complex) may emerge as ar-

chaic in the individual,asthat which in fact triggers he processof symboliza-

tion, it does not thereby give it conceptual priority, et alone makeit a causal

origin of dichotomous thought. In theory, the distinctions that carrysuch

psychical influence-self/world; subject/object; masculine/feminine-are

analogous,probablymutually reinforcing,but only causalas a matter of his-tory,not of time.

To imagine that historical time can make conceptual relationscausal in

this way (e.g., differencefrom the mother leadsto differencefromthe world)

is to confuse the genres of historical and theoretical time. Concepts do not

need history;we cannot findconceptual priority n originaldistinctions.Dis-

tinction itself is the problematicof the copula, the figureof logical distinc-

tion, andsexual differencealongwith logicaldifference indsits expression n

this proformaof identity.4

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RobynFerrell

Ourthinking is more than ourhistoryof thinking, since "thepast is never

past,"as Irigaray tates (1993b, 7). But not even the purelyconceptual struc-ture of identity could find its originatingdistinction, and it need not, since

althoughit is learnedcausallyasa personalhistory,our webof meaningsneed

have no beginningor ending,but rathermaybe seamless andcircular.5

The new age of sexualdifference,Irigaraywrites,"assumesand entails anevolution or a transformation f forms,of the relations of matterandformandof the interval between ... " (1993b, 7). Understandingthe economy of the

interval requiresa concept of time that will scrutinizeitself as the effect of

interval.Buthow, in this sense,can we have a "newage"at all?Where, in theeconomyof the interval,can we find the new,the novel, the utopian,and the

original?In Irigaray'swn polemic, this isnot resolved.She writes that sexualdiffer-

ence, as the bearerof differenceassuch,wouldprovokea revolution of some-

thing new, the defeatof the logic of identity,which is somethingwithout an

historical precursor.How can this be reconciled with, on the one hand, anhistoricalcontinuity of sexualrelations,and on the other, the logic of neces-

sity?Irigaray's newpoetics"will carry his paradoxicaldoubleburden.In her utopian vision of a moment in which difference is experienced as

attractionand offered as support,can Irigaray econcile her psychoanalyticinsight with her deconstructive one? It is a questionof a poetics-how that

partof her philosophywhich bringsus to a criticalunderstandingof the pro-duction of value, includingof sexualdifference,need not undermineher rhe-toricalsea-changetowardromance,metaphor,andpassionslike wonder.

The new of Irigaray'snewage"maybe autopiansolution of paradox.Andwhat might look like an attemptin Kristevaat synthesis-the generationsoffeminismexpressedin the classic logic of threes,which governs the dialec-

tic-may prove on closer inspection to be a chimera. If I use metaphorsof

improbability-utopia, chimera-in discussingKristeva's hirdmoment and

Irigaray's ew age, it is because it is importantthat these timely notions be

genuinely improbable,at least in logical terms.And it is importantthat theybe improbable,not as spectral impossibilities,but as living occurrences of

breachedlegibility.The utopic is a genre, and not a time or place, despite itsappearance.

How can a position simultaneouslydemand and refusea notion of historyor of reason?But it ispreciselythis unthinkablepositionthat is given to wom-

en, of course,in the paradoxof the symbolicorder.6As subject,she mustfindherselfonly as exterior to the subject."She" s a paradox.The conception oftime and/orreasonisboth impossibleandunavoidable,asareall metaphysicaloppositions,and this is preciselyhow the questionof the genre,that is, of the

representationasoppositional,comes to light. Therefore,one need not waste

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Hypatia

time seeking the coherence of this attitude within a usual rational scheme,

but rathertryto findotherphilosophicalresources o depict the occurrenceofparadoxdifferently.In their differencestyles, Kristeva's"symboliccontract"

and Irigaray's newpoetics"both approach he mirageof opposition.7The investigationof this metaphysicscalls for sexual differenceto be ana-

lyzedas a logic itself. Beyondthe Oedipus story,the castrationfigurewhich

Kristevaherself uses and which has preoccupiedtheoreticalattention to the

questionof this "symboliccontract,"there are other figures hat are less trac-

table but have potential in the processof theorizingdifference.The rhetori-

cal procedureknown to psychoanalysisas the disavowalparticularly uggestsitself, becauseof its special relation to the logic of opposition. In analyzingmasculine and feminine as partof that logic, it is necessaryto recruita con-

ceptual understanding hat can include that which is "repressed"y the dis-

tinction, i.e., that which it has excluded in orderto install itself.This cannot

be done within familiarphilosophicallogic, since it is itselfpartof the opera-tion of distinction. But the logic of the disavowalwouldhave as its whole pur-

pose the representationof the ambivalentmoment, one in which "it is and it

isn't."Whereas,ambi-valence sexactlywhatoppositionaimsto "fix,"n fixinga value. If logic, as Heideggerpromisesus, is to be about the thinkablepossi-

bility, we may reflect that the repressed s precisely the unthinkable-that

which mustbe obscured n orderfor the definition to go ahead.

It has been said of the case of "repressedmemory," or example, that the

incest victim is not living with the "unknownthought"so much as with the

"unthoughtknown."As a configurationof the repressed, t is a challenge to

renderthis as logic. Likewise,to renderthat "doublemovement"of the third

moment, or generation,of feminism,or the new age of sexualdifference,re-mains a rhetoricalhope ratherthan a conceptualevent.

To connect time with feminismwill also connect it to a historyof ideas.

Empirical eminismresiststhis connection; andyet, the connection is needed

to take up the notion of sexual differenceas a metaphysicalone. Forsexual

difference to have been revealed as a metaphysicalquestion is a significantmoment forfeminismand forphilosophy.It is a moment when an empirical

historyof sufferingdiscernsits theoreticalgravity,and the particularcontin-gent protestbecomes a generalconceptual challenge. Fromthis moment, an

account mightbegin of the startling conceptualvigorof feministphilosophy,which has had an influence well beyond the domesticatedsphere to which

the (male-dominated)philosophical institutiondesires to confine it.

But the failureto appreciate ime asparadox eadsto the intellectualtrun-

cation of feminism.The seductionof the objective andexternal look of time

leads to taking its progress iterally.This is to misunderstand he problemof

sexual difference completely.The revolutionary story of liberationfrom an

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RobynFerrell

oppressivepast into a betterfuture(preciousthough it is) can blindfeminism

into thinking itself as more than history,as a messianic moment in whichwomen'sstate is changedforever.The deepestand mostwoundingproblem n

sexual difference is the one expressedin the cry:"Why, n all times and all

places... ?"Sexualoppressionhas been reinvented at everymoment,andthis

is what makes sexual differencethe metaphysicalquestion of our age. But if

feminismis thoughtwithout thinking throughthis paradoxof time, the idea

of liberationseems less and less plausible.What would remain of a feminist moment that has conceded that its ob-

jects of enquiry-the feminine and the sexualrelation-are a kind of logicalfiction? Can the paradoxof the third generation and the new age happen

anyway,despitebeing implausible?Other modem revolutions show that lib-

eration is both an enduringhope andafleetingmoment in history.Such is the

irony of event-that sometimes what is released is no longer recognizable.What will the feminist moment, in time, have liberated?

NOTES

An earlier ersionof thispaperhasappeareds"Time"nAustralianeministtud-ies(Winter1997).

1. Metaphysicaliscussionsf time,especiallyrom he phemonologicaliew,in, forexample,HeideggerBeing nd Time 1962) andRicoeurTimeandNarrative

(1984-88),naturally rovidehephilosophicalorizon fmuchof thisessay'semi-nist discussion.

2. I discuss his in detail n chapter and3 of PassionnTheoryFerrell 996).3. ThisanalysisspursuednMoiraGatens 1996)andCarolePateman1988).4. Seemydiscussionn"Copula:heLogicofthe SexualRelation"orthcoming

inaspecialssueofHypatia: oingAustralian:econfiguringeministhilosophyFerrell,forthcoming).

5. No doubtphysics xpresseshiswhen it conceivesof timeascircular,n theclassicprojectionfasubjectiventerior nto theexternalworldwhichcharacterizesscientificdiscourse.

6. BothKristevaasrepresentedn thispaper)andIrigarayin variousources)arguehis.

7. Deconstructionndgenealogicaltyleshavemuch o contribute,whileat thesame imecontributingheirownhostilities, o thisfeministoperation.Theycreatebreachedoyalties,both dualanddivided, ealandimagined, mong eminists.Theaffectiveclimate s likelyto be energetic, hen, to put it mildly-this is alreadyfamiliar xperienceorfeminists aughtupin thistheoreticalmomentwhenever toccurs.Deconstructionndgenealogy lsoaresexistdiscourses,nd heir maginariescarryhoughtless nd evenaggressiveigures;heycall for a certain trategy n the

partoffeminist heory.

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Hypatia

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