the state of the transatlantic world 2015

8/9/2019 The State of the Transatlantic World 2015

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THE STATE OF THE

TRANSATLANTIC WORLD

2015


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© 2015 Transatlantic Academy. All rights reserved.

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without permission in writing from the Transatlantic Academy. Please direct inquiries to:

Transatlantic Academy

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This publication can be downloaded for free at www.transatlanticacademy.org .

About the Transatlantic Academy

The Transatlantic Academy is a research institution devoted to creating common approaches

to the long-term challenges facing Europe and North America. The Academy does this by each

year bringing together scholars, policy experts, and authors from both sides of the Atlantic

and from different disciplinary perspectives to research and analyze a distinct policy theme

of transatlantic interest. The Academy was created in 2007 as a partnership between the

German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und GerdBucerius. The Robert Bosch Stiftung and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation joined

as full partners beginning in 2008, and the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung joined as a full partner in

2011. The Joachim Herz Stiftung and the Volkswagen Stiftung joined in providing additional

support in 2011, as did the Aurea Foundation and the Hungary Initiatives Foundation in 2013.

On the cover: German Chancellor Angela Merkel stands next to U.S. President Barack Obama

at a press conference at the White House, February 9, 2015. © Michael Kappeler/dpa/Corbis


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Cn From the Executive Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii

n Russia, Ukraine, and the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Russia and the West: Looking Ahead

James Goldgeier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Crisis in Eastern Europe: Will the Transatlantic Alliance

Be Up to the Challenge?

Hanns W. Maull . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

The State of the Crisis in Ukraine

Kateryna Pishchikova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

n EU Europe and the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Galapagos Europe

Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Germany’s Learning Curve: Transiting from Restraint

to Responsibility

Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Italy’s Foreign Policy Activism: The Quest for Sustainability

Nathalie Tocci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Polish Foreign Policy: End of the “Golden Years”

Bartlomiej E. Nowak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

No Solidarity? Growing Refugee Inflows and the Need

for EU Asylum Policy Reforms

Steffen Angenendt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

n The European Union: Internal Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The EU: Made in Britain

Michael Leigh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

An Illiberal Polity in the Euroatlantic World: Lessons

from Hungary’s Backsliding

Gábor Halmai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

The Eurozone in 2014: Some Improvements,

But More Must Be Done

Thomas Straubhaar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

At Last, A European Energy Union?

Tim Boersma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42


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n Challenges in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

A Dangerous and Bloody 2014 in the Middle East

Geoffrey Kemp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Consociationalism: The Last Best Hope for the Middle East?

Michael Bell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Russia, the Islamic State, and Emerging Non-Traditional

Security Challenges for NATO

Christina Lin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

The Growing Transatlantic Divide on Israel

Michael Barnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

The Islamic State Group, Saudi Arabia, and the

Recurrent Purification Impulse in the Arab World

Janice Stein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

The Islamic State Group and the Tragedy of the Yazidis

Pavol Demeš . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

n Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Turkey and the Euro-Atlantic Community: Turbulenceand Ties of Interest

Kemal Kirişci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Turkey and the European Union: Cooperating on

Asylum and Migration, For All the Wrong Reasons

Juliette Tolay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

n The World at Large . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Canada in the Transatlantic WorldDavid Cameron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Self-Inflicted Wounds: The War on Terror’s

Continuing Toll on Liberal Values

Clifford Bob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Climate & Energy Politics: Brussels & Washington

on the Road to Paris

Stacy D. VanDeveer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 China’s Rise Continues

Martin Jacques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90


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N F E D

Iam pleased to introduce the second edition of The State of theTransatlantic World . As with last year’s edition, we have assembledessays from a number of current and former fellows of the Transatlantic

Academy to offer their insights on significant developments in transatlantic

relations over the past year and offer some glimpses on what to expect in the

year to come. Last year, the focus was on the impact of the Edward Snowden

revelations, especially on the U.S.-German relationship and the challenge to

the transatlantic community posed by the excesses of a burgeoning national

security state in the United States. The so-called Pacific pivot of the Obama

administration was also a central topic, as were problems of democracy and

governability in Europe and the United States. Developments in Turkey and

in the fields of energy and natural resources also received a lot of attention.

In contrast, the year that just ended, 2014, was dominated by Russia’s actions

in Ukraine and their implications for the post-Cold War European order,

the eurozone crisis as exemplified by the crisis in Greece, and the rise of

the so-called Islamic State group and the terrorist threat it poses in Europe.

This edition looks at these three major issue areas as well as developments

in Turkey and broader global changes. Turkey’s seeming retreat from the

development of a liberal democracy paralleled developments in Hungary

and Russia and has made a question posed by Michael Ignatieff — “are the

authoritarians winning?” — a central one for the Western liberal order.

Essays by James Goldgeier, Hanns W. Maull, Kateryna Pishchikova, Klaus-

Dieter Frankenberger, and Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard focus on the

complex of issues surrounding this geopolitical earthquake caused by

Russia’s actions and its implications for the transatlantic alliance. It is clear

that the Russian challenge to both the European security and liberal orders

will be one that will require a long-term Western strategy in response, and

the Transatlantic Academy will indeed take up this topic in the coming year.

Russia’s actions, the rise of the Islamic State group, and the eurozone crisis

all have profound implications for the foreign policies of both the EU and

some key member states. Nathalie Tocci offers a consideration of the revival

of Italy’s foreign policy role, while Bartlomiej E. Nowak looks at Polish

foreign policy’s “golden years.” Sir Michael Leigh delves into the problematic


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relationship of the United Kingdom to the EU and the possibilities of

“Brexit.” Insights into additional central challenges facing the European

project are provided by Thomas Straubhaar on the eurozone, Tim Boersma

on a European energy union, Steffen Angenendt on refugee flows, andGábor Halmai on Hungarian illiberalism.

The continued and escalating turmoil in the Middle East is more directly

felt in Europe than in North America, given the continent’s proximity to

this volatile region. Essays by Geoffrey Kemp, Michael Bell, Christina Lin,

Michael Barnett, and Janice Stein provide insights into the regional impact

on a variety of European policies as well as areas of both divergence and

convergence with the United States. Pavol Demeš’ photo essay about theYazidis gives a human face to the turmoil in the region.

Turkey has always been a special interest for the Academy, which devoted

its second fellowship year in 2009-10 to Turkey’s evolving role in its region.

Essays by Kemal Kirişci and Juliette Tolay explore this pivotal country’s

changing relationship to both the United States and Europe.

Finally, global developments outlined by Martin Jacques on the continuedrise of China, David Cameron on Canada’s role in the transatlantic world,

Stacy D. VanDeveer on climate and energy policies, and Clifford Bob on the

costs on anti-terror policies on the liberal order conclude the volume.

Running through all these issues are questions for Western leadership. The

United States, for a variety of both domestic and international reasons,

has not played the role in this new Europe that it did in the post-war era.

Europe, with a new set of leaders and faltering economies, will now haveto step up and take on more responsibility while maintaining the cohesion

it has shown so far in its response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s

challenge. The new year, 2015, has already seen major changes in Greece

after its elections and is awaiting the outcome of elections in the United

Kingdom, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Portugal, and Estonia, while the EU

has a new leadership team in both the Commission and the Council. The

Greek election result has set off a major crisis in the eurozone, and Russia’s

intentions remain unclear while the viability of Ukraine is very much inquestion. The first two months of 2015 have also seen lethal terrorist attacks

in Paris and Copenhagen, which brought home the issues of freedom of

speech, freedom of religion, immigration, social and economic inequality,

racism, and anti-Semitism in a toxic mix that confronts the Western liberal


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order, most immediately in Europe. Although the Obama presidency is

winding down, its efforts to reduce and alter the U.S. foreign policy footprint

have been undone by the Islamic State group and Russia. The United States

and Europe may wish that the world would leave them alone but the worldhas other intentions. We hope these essays will prove stimulating, and we

welcome your comments.

I would like to thank Ted Reinert for his excellent editing of this volume and

Jessica Hirsch and Christine Chumbler for their work in bringing the online

and print editions to fruition. Thanks as well to all those who contributed

their time and thoughts in their essays. This volume is a testament to

the Academy’s network of current and former fellows who continue tocontribute to the ongoing discussion of the transatlantic relationship.

Stephen F. Szabo

Executive Director

The Transatlantic Academy


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N R, U, W


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R W:

L A

J G

Relations between Russia and the West have not been this poor in

three decades, since before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in

Moscow in March 1985.

A major reason for the turnaround three decades ago was the new Soviet

leader’s cognizance of the country’s economic weaknesses. Oil prices weredeclining in the early 1980s and then plummeted in 1986; with a stagnating

economy the Soviet Union could not afford to support a global foreign

policy to counter the West. In fact, Gorbachev needed Western cooperation

to revive his country’s economic fortunes. That sense of weakness continued

during the Boris Yeltsin years, as Russia’s post-Soviet economy went into free

fall, and Yeltsin eagerly sought Western assistance to build a market-oriented

democracy.

When Vladimir Putin became president of Russia in 2000, he set about a

new course correction, desiring to bring Russia back as a global power that

could stand up to the West rather than try to join it, an objective enabled

by the rise in oil prices during his initial two terms as president. In his drive

to stop what he viewed as the humiliation of Russia prior to his coming

to power, Putin sought to prevent the West from promoting its vision for

a Europe whole and free, a vision he believed undercut Russia’s national

interests.

A decade ago, Russia accused the West of fostering the “color revolutions”

in Georgia and Ukraine, and in 2008, after NATO announced those two

nations would someday be members of the Atlantic Alliance, Putin went to

war in the Caucasus. When Ukraine flirted with closer ties to the European

Union a year ago and the pro-Russian government in Kyiv collapsed, Putin

moved first to seize and annex Crimea and then to foster instability in

eastern Ukraine.

Over the course of 2014, in the face of Western sanctions and falling oil

prices, Putin has only grown more publicly defiant. In his end of the year

state of the nation address, he denounced those in the West who were trying


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to bring Russia to its knees, complained that the declining ruble was not the

result of sanctions or the fall in oil prices but rather currency speculators,

and placed Crimea’s importance to Russia on par with that of the Temple

Mount in Jerusalem for Muslims and Jews.

Going into 2015, how should the West and Russia assess their policies and

what are the prospects for their relations in the new year?

In the West, the focus has been on ratcheting up sanctions in response

to Putin’s actions in Ukraine by going after the elites around Putin, and

targeting key sectors of the Russian economy. The goal of the sanctions

policy is to create enough discomfort among Putin’s top supporters that theywill put pressure on their boss to change course. Given that the oil price

decline does provide an assist to the West’s sanctions approach, the United

States and its allies should maintain their pressure, and follow the same

principle that underpinned the Cold War strategy of containment: keep

Russia from undermining Western objectives in Europe’s east any further

by shoring up the Baltic countries and Poland, in particular, and maintain

pressure on the Russian government as a long-term strategy to foster a

change in direction.

Putin, however, has used Western actions to bolster his internal popularity;

his policy appears predicated on the belief that Russia can hold out longer

than the West as sanctions take their toll on both sides. Putin has acted as if

he believes the Russian people and elites can endure more pain than Western

investors, and his hope is that the latter will put enough pressure on their

governments to soften the policy.

The central problem for 2015 is that there is no sign that either side’s goals

are realistic in the short term. Putin’s loyalists are in too deep. The Russian

president cannot change course without looking weak, the one thing he

cannot abide. The greatest chance for Russia to break the West’s united front

was with German business elites, given the strong economic ties between

the two countries, but Chancellor Angela Merkel has taken a tougher course

to date than anyone thought imaginable, stiffened in part by the horrific

shootdown of MH17 over Ukraine in July.

As we assess whether changes in direction might occur, one wild card is

oil prices. Their steep decline in 2014 hurt Russia badly, but they would

have to drop significantly further for Russia to change policy. It is worth

remembering that Russia’s aggressive foreign policy after 1973 correlated


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with a steep jump in oil prices and then became much more conciliatory in

the late 1980s after oil prices sank. But prices are still higher than they were

when Gorbachev and Yeltsin were in power. If oil prices continue to decline,

then Putin might have to make an adjustment, particularly if the rublecontinues to fall; but for the moment, we should expect him to maintain his

current policy.

The other wild card is Ukraine itself. Will the government of Ukraine be

able to move forward with a serious economic plan? Successive governments

since independence have failed to put forward real reforms and root out

corruption. If the Ukrainian government somehow were to prove more

successful than its predecessors, that might enable it to change the dynamicson the ground. But without additional Western assistance, it will continue to

struggle and might yet default early in 2015.

As the new year gets underway, the West should maintain its firm policy

against Russian aggression in Ukraine and strengthen its efforts to bolster

the eastern members of NATO. This strategy may require a long-term

application, given Putin’s potential to remain president until 2024, but a

continued drop in oil prices and/or successful Ukrainian governance mayyet produce opportunities for change earlier than currently seems possible.

James Goldgeier is the dean of the School of International Service at AmericanUniversity and was a Transatlantic Academy senior fellow during the 2010-11

Academy year on “Global Shift: The Transatlantic Community and the NewGeopolitics.”


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C E E:

W T

A B U

C

H W. M

Europe may have been “whole and free” for a while after the end of the

Cold War, as U.S. President George H.W. Bush famously proclaimedin his speech given in the German city of Mainz on May 31, 1989.

There can be no doubt, however, that after the Russian annexation of Crimea

and its destabilization of eastern Ukraine, it is now deeply split again. Then,

as now, Europe was divided by fundamentally divergent conceptions of

political order, involving different perspectives on individual dignity, rights,

and freedom and different conceptions of how to organize the economy,

society, and foreign relations.

In the Marxist-Leninist worldview, communist societies were to be built on

the new man; economies were to be based on collectively shared means of

production and central planning; and politics were to follow the principles

of democratic centralism and socialist internationalism. In today’s East, the

Russian regime cultivates a cynical belief that people can be manipulated and,

if necessary, coerced at will. The economy is to provide the spoils for those who

run the country. And in their pursuit of wealth and power, they are entitled to

use the levers of state intervention whenever it suits their purposes. In politics,

too, the ultimate goal is control — the exercise of power for its own sake.

In international relations, this translates into a claim for an exclusive sphere

of influence around Russia’s borders in which Moscow’s writ will not be

challenged. Then, as now, the pan-European order ultimately lives under the

Damocles sword of threat and use of force, either through traditional military

instruments or through subversion, and of deterrence and defense against

such threats. Relations between East and West are once more dominated by

mutual distrust, perceptions of hostility and zero-sum thinking.

All this is not to deny that there are important differences between the old

Cold War in Europe and the new split between Russia, the West, and the rest.


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During the Cold War, economic interaction was limited; today Russia finds

itself deeply intertwined with the global economy, and it will have a hard

time extricating itself from this dependence. In the past, by the mid-1950s at

the latest, political systems had consolidated along ideological lines. Whilethey ultimately turned out to be quite brittle, states in the Soviet sphere of

influence appeared to be as solidly entrenched as those in the Western half

of the continent. Today, weak and dysfunctional statehood prevails across

much of eastern Europe, including even some member states of the European

Union, and a weak state syndrome certainly is one, if not the, root cause ofthe Ukraine crisis and the foreign policy behavior of a Russian president who

seems to be strangely afraid of his own people. This weakness of Russia as a

state makes Moscow behave much less predictably than it used to during the

Cold War. The icy stability of Mutual Assured Destruction thus has given way

to a volatile and blurred but still highly risky picture.

Lastly, while the United States was the unchallenged leader of the West and

the main antagonist of the Soviet Union in the past, Washington’s position

in the newly divided greater Europe is much less certain. The United States

is still deeply absorbed, politically and militarily, by its efforts to extricate

itself from the Middle East and to refocus its strategic priorities on the East

Asian region. Moreover, its foreign policy performance is suffering from

pernicious political infighting between the president and Congress, between

Democrats and Republicans. While the United States nevertheless will

almost certainly remain involved in Europe, at best it will lead from behind,

at worst be a distracted and uncertain ally. This time, much more will have

to be done by the Europeans themselves to manage this new Cold War, both

in terms of security policy and of creative diplomatic footwork.

What has to be done now by the West seems clear in principle. First,

the West needs to reassure those of its members who have reason to feel

threatened by Moscow’s ambitions by providing effective protection.

Second, the states caught between the two blocks need to be strengthened

and consolidated in ways that are acceptable to all concerned. Third, a new

modus videndi will have to be hammered out diplomatically for all parties

in the newly divided Europe — in other words, a contemporary equivalentto the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE) process

launched in the late 1960s.

Will the Transatlantic Alliance be up to this challenge? That remains

to be seen. To rise to the occasion, the alliance would need to revive an


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increasingly dormant sense of solidarity and community and take its

own convictions, principles, and values more seriously than it has tended

to do recently. This effort to mobilize foreign and security policies in

and for Europe around a common purpose will have to include not onlygovernments and politics but also societies; without strong social support

and a firm sense of priorities, it will be impossible to conduct the kind of

foreign and security policies that the new situation in Europe will require.

There are signs that such a change of mood may be happening, at least in

parts of Europe. In Poland and the Baltic states, of course, suspicion and

distrust of Russia was never far from the surface; it is therefore not very

surprising that both governments and public opinion have reacted quitestrongly to events in the Ukraine. Defense expenditures have already been

revised upward significantly. Perhaps the most remarkable shift, however,

has happened in Germany, which traditionally favored close economic

cooperation and political détente, or even entente. Now, attitudes toward

Russia have turned distinctly skeptical among both the elite and the broader

public, and German business seems about to reassess its previously cozy ties

with Putin’s world as well. It would not be a great surprise if this changing

mood would eventually also support increases in defense spending in

Germany. Similar shifts have taken place in northern Europe and in the

Netherlands. In southern Europe, however, support for tougher policies

toward Russia is lukewarm. At the same time, political parties of the Left, but

also of the populist and extremist Right across Europe have expressed open

sympathy and support for Russia, its policies, and its strongman politics.

Even with public support, however, walking the fine line between robustly

defending Western interests and values on the one side and avoiding

unnecessary and counter-productive moves to pressure Moscow into

submission on the other will be a tough act for the Alliance. It would require

solid analysis, rather than preconceived notions about what Putin is up to, and

cautiously calibrated responses and initiatives combining credible deterrence

and defense with persistent efforts to test, and if possible develop, moves

towards détente and the reconstruction of a sustainable pan-European order. It

looks like a tall order for this rather wobbly and rickety alliance.

Hanns W. Maull is a senior distinguished fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft undPolitik in Berlin and was a Transatlantic Academy senior fellow during the 2010-11 Academy year on “Global Shift: The Transatlantic Community and the NewGeopolitics.”


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T S C

U

K P

It has been more than a year since a series of turbulent events started in

Ukraine that dramatically changed not only the country’s course but

also the broader geopolitical situation in Europe’s eastern neighborhood.

When taking stock of the difficult situation in Ukraine by early 2015,

two daunting challenges stand out: its loss of territorial integrity with theannexation of Crimea and an ongoing military conflict in the country’s east,

and its dire economic situation.

The first blow to Ukraine’s territorial integrity came in March when Russia

annexed Crimea, the only autonomous region of Ukraine and home to the

Russian Black Sea Fleet. While the occupation of Crimea was quick and

bloodless, Russia’s involvement in the military insurgency in Donbas (an

area that comprises two provinces, Luhansk and Donetsk) involved morenefarious tactics, ranging from pro-Russian propaganda and support to anti-

Kyiv groups to direct supply of weapons, intelligence, military personnel,

and training. More than 4,000 people have been killed since the beginning of

the conflict and there are an estimated half a million refugees.

Moscow’s position has become clear — it is prepared to intervene militarily

to keep Donbas in limbo and outside of Kyiv’s control. What is less clear at

the moment is whether it has an interest in expanding the zone of conflict.

The border along the conflict zone has been unstable and porous. The cease-

fire agreement signed in September has not been respected so far. Moving

further south and west would provide Russia with a land corridor to the

annexed Crimea. The benefits of such a move are not to be underestimated.

For now, the peninsula remains almost fully dependent on Ukraine’s

mainland for its supplies of energy and water. Its only direct link to Russia,

via the Kerch Strait, has proven ineffective. Building a bridge over thestrait may be a solution in the long term but would be a costly and possibly

insufficient one.

The costs of escalation, however, are also high. This kind of large-scale

military operation will involve heavy fighting with Ukrainian forces, and


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more resistance from the local population than has been the case in Crimea

and Donbas. It will most likely trigger additional sanctions by the West.

Russian President Vladimir Putin may not be interested in further escalation

in the immediate future. Yet the long-term implication is that Ukraine willcontinue to live under the constant threat of a possible expansion of the

military invasion.

Being at war puts a huge burden on Ukraine’s already failing economy and

increases the risks of further polarization in the country.

Ukraine’s GDP is predicted to fall by 10 percent, inflation has risen to almost

20 percent, and its currency has devalued 50 percent against the U.S. dollar.Central Bank reserves are below $10 billion. Experts agree that despite an

IMF bailout, default remains a real possibility.

External assistance is vital at this point. While Western solidarity with

Ukraine’s pro-European aspirations may be high, impatience with Ukraine’s

lack of reform and rampant corruption is also on the rise. There is little

appetite in the West for financing another round of aid pilfering in a country

of its size. Concrete progress with comprehensive reform should be shownquickly; the current government will not be getting a second chance.

The government also needs to walk a fine line and avoid exploiting

nationalist sentiment in the face of Russian invasion. That would only

reinforce the divisions within Ukraine that are constantly exploited by

Russian propaganda. While a stronger sense of belonging in the face of

an external threat is a welcome development, it should not be coached in

extreme nationalist terms. Although the majority of Ukrainians in the eastand south oppose Russian military intervention, many speak Russian as

their mother tongue and have relatives in Russia. Their primary concern

is with Kyiv’s inability to provide stability, order, and prosperity. Their

anti-Russian sentiment is more nuanced. They may be outraged with

Putin’s policies but most do not share the deep-seated mistrust of Russian

imperialism that is more common in the center and west of the country for

obvious historic reasons.

The top priorities for the Ukrainian government are therefore progressing

with deep and comprehensive reform and providing security. The focus

should be on state-building, pluralism, and kick-starting the economy, as

well as on decisive action against corruption and incompetence, which


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citizens in every region can relate to. After all, these priorities were at the

heart of the so-called Euromaidan agenda at the height of the protests.

On the positive side, the political process in Ukraine has improved

considerably after the Euromaidan revolution. Both presidential and

parliamentary elections, though not flawless, were free and fair and

accurately reflected the changed political landscape in the country.

Even more importantly, in contrast to the slumber that followed the Orange

Revolution a decade ago, today’s post-revolutionary phase is characterized

by the strong involvement of civil society in all spheres of life. People did not

demobilize when the street protests stopped. There is more civic activismin the regions as well as in Kyiv. This translates into more healthy societal

pressure on the political institutions and demands for structural change.

So what about the long-term transatlantic strategy toward Ukraine?

Unfortunately, the West’s behavior has been largely reactive so far. What

remains missing is a broader strategy toward the eastern neighborhood as a

whole that would factor in Russia as a regional power distrustful of the West.

The politics of confrontation is not something the European Union

is equipped for or interested in in the long term. Immediate threat

containment is also insufficient for addressing the underlying causes of

the Ukrainian crisis. Even though there would have been no violence

without Russian meddling in Ukraine, it is Ukraine’s own corrupt politics

and the mismanagement of relations between the center and regions that

provided the fertile ground for the crisis. Dealing with Ukraine’s governance

deficiencies remains the only way to a sustainable long-term solution.

The current Russian leadership, on the other hand, clearly benefits from the

newly enforced status quo in the region. “Frozen” and “reheated” conflicts,

limited sovereignty, and dysfunctional states benefit the Russian model

of regional dominance and prevent the eastern neighborhood states from

transforming themselves.

The EU and United States therefore need to find a delicate balance betweenaddressing the immediate security threats and pursuing a long-term

strategy that remains principled and engaged. Such a strategy has to be

driven by cooperation, not confrontation, but should not degenerate into

simply appeasing Putin. That would fail the aspirations of the pro-reform


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constituencies in Ukraine and elsewhere in the region and damage Western

interests in the long term.

Kateryna Pishchikova is an associate fellow at FRIDE and a visiting scholar atCornell University and was a Transatlantic Academy fellow during the 2012-13

Academy year on “The Future of the Western Liberal Order.”


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N EU E W


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G E

I K M L

In March 2014, Europeans woke up in Vladimir Putin’s world: a

place where borders can be changed by force, where international

institutions are powerless, where economic interdependence is a source

of insecurity, and predictability is a liability rather than an asset.1 Russia’s

intervention in Ukraine forced the European Union to recognize that its

idea of postmodern European order had dissolved. Instead of spreading

osmotically to encompass a continent — and eventually a whole planet —

Europe’s postmodern order was suddenly in retreat. Just as the break-up of

Yugoslavia ended the Cold War European order, the Crimea crisis marked

the end of the post-Cold War European order.

The fact that Europeans saw themselves as a model for the world is hardly

surprising. For the past 300 years, Europe was at the center of global affairs.

In 1914, European order was world order, shaped by the interests, ambitions,

and rivalries of the European empires. World War I was also known as

the European war. In 1919, although it was the U.S. President Woodrow

Wilson who reordered the world, his vision for global peace was primarily

an attempt to reorder Europe. Even during the Cold War — when the global

superpowers were non-European powers — order was still centered around

control of Europe and the contest between democratic capitalism and Soviet

communism as a battle between European ideologies.

It was not until 1989-91 that a European model for international conduct

emerged that was based on a set of assumptions and practices radically

different from the global order. “What came to an end in 1989,” wrote British

diplomat Robert Cooper, summarizing the new situation, “was not just the

Cold War or even the Second World War. What came to an end in Europe

(but perhaps only in Europe) were the political systems of three centuries: thebalance of power and the imperial urge.”

The key elements of this new European order were a highly developedsystem of mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs and security

based on openness and transparency. The new postmodern security system

did not rely on a balance of power, nor did it emphasize sovereignty or

1 This piece is based on the authors’ essay “The New European Disorder,” European Council on

Foreign Relations, November 20, 2014.


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the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. It rejected the use of force

as an instrument for settling conflicts and promoted increased mutual

dependence between European states. The postmodern European order was

not interested in changing the borders of Europe or in creating new states,like after World War I. It did not attempt to move people in order to secure

these borders, like after World War II. After 1989, Europe’s ambition was

instead to change the nature of borders themselves, to open them for capital,

people, goods, and ideas.

The new European order was different from all previous post-war

settlements. The Cold War ended without a peace treaty or a victory parade.

It was heralded as a common victory of the West and the Russian people.It was also meant to be a transformative order. The remaking of Europe

took the shape of extending Western institutions, most of them created

for a bipolar world. The unification of Germany became the model for the

unification of Europe. Maps went out of fashion, displaced by economic

graphs documenting the financial and commercial interdependence of

Europe and the well-being of European nations.

Europeans were aware of the distinctive nature of their order but they werealso convinced of its universal nature. From the World Trade Organisation

to the Kyoto Protocol and from the International Criminal Court to the

Responsibility to Protect, European norms seemed to be in the ascendant.

Europeans were convinced that economic interdependence and converging

lifestyles would be the dominant source of security in the world of

tomorrow.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea made Europeans suddenly realize thatalthough the EU’s political model is admirable, it is unlikely to become

universal or even spread to many in its immediate neighborhood. Europeans

had mistaken Russia’s failure to block the creation of the post-Cold War

order as assent. Weakness was taken for conversion. This experience is

similar to that experienced by Japanese technology companies. A few years

ago, these companies became aware that although Japan made the best 3G

phones in the world, they could not find a global market because the rest of

the world could not catch up with the technological innovations to use these

“perfect” devices. This became known as Japan’s “Galapagos Syndrome.”

Takeshi Natsuno, who teaches at Tokyo’s Keio University, told the New YorkTimes that “Japan’s cellphones are like the endemic species that Darwinencountered on the Galápagos Islands — fantastically evolved and divergent


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from their mainland cousins.” Rather than being too big to fail, Japan’s

phones had become too perfect to succeed.

Now it is Europe that is facing its “Galapagos moment.” It may be that

Europe’s postmodern order has become so advanced and particular to

its environment that it is impossible for others to follow. It evolved in a

protective ecosystem, shielded from the more muscular, “modern” world

where most people live. After Crimea, Europeans were forced to think about

how to counter Russian aggression; they also were forced to imagine what a

European order can be now that Europe’s universalism has become a kind of

exceptionalism.

But the end of the post-Cold War European order does not mean that

Europe is back in the Cold War. During the Cold War, the confrontation

between Moscow and the West was about who owned the future and who

could offer a “better” world. Today’s conflict between Russia and the EU is

about who lives in the “real” world.

Ivan Krastev is chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria. Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on ForeignRelations. Both were Bosch Public Policy Fellows during the 2012-13 Academy yearon “The Future of the Western Liberal Order.”


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G’ L C:

T R

R

K-D F

In the old days, the Munich Security Conference was a semi-religious

congregation of U.S. and European stalwarts of Atlanticism. In recent

years, it has become a bell-weather for global security matters. But while

the conference has enlarged its scope and participation, one thing has notchanged: it is the place for German leadership to present itself as a credible

force for international security, a place where friends, allies, and competitors

look for clues of change in German attitudes toward its role in the Atlantic

arena and in the world beyond. In February 2014, political leaders, military

chiefs, and security specialists were in for a nice surprise.

President Joachim Gauck laid out what could be read as a new German

foreign policy manifesto. “We cannot assume that we will be spared theconflicts of the world simply by staying out,” he admonished his citizens.

The German president explicitly rejected what German historian Heinrich

August Winkler called a dubious right to look away, arguing Germany

needed to act earlier, more forcefully, and more substantially, sometimes

with the use of military power.

For many in the audience, it seemed Germany had gotten rid of the ghosts

of the past and overcome its Cold War mentality: grow economically, but donot take risks politically. Many still remembered Germany’s abstention in the

United Nations Security Council on the vote to impose a no-fly zone over

Libya in March 2011.

The impression that Germany was moving from its cherished “culture of

restraint” to a “culture of responsibility” was reinforced by two key members

of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cabinet who seconded Gauck’s call. Foreign

Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said that the culture of restraint should

not be abused as an excuse for doing nothing. Defense Minister Ursula von

der Leyen said indifference is not an option for Germany, adding: “If we

have the means and the capabilities, then we have the obligation and the

responsibility to act.”


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With respect to means, Von der Leyen would soon find out that the state of

the German armed forces was very bleak indeed: choppers do not fly, fighter

jets are grounded, transport aircraft break down on routine missions. This

is a restraining factor that needs to be addressed. Defense spending mustbe increased. Germany has repeatedly failed to meet the NATO target of 2

percent of GDP. Merkel, like other allied heads of state and government, has

promised to do more. This commitment must be kept.

The German public is another restraining factor. It overwhelmingly

disagrees with the proposition that Germany should sharpen its

international profile and is highly critical of the use of military force to

solve international problems, including crisis management. Large segmentsof the German public want to see the country confine itself to being a “big

Switzerland” in terms of what it does and how it acts internationally. The

public is not a source of support for a government that is ready to stick its

neck out.

But at least on the elite level, there is a growing willingness and readiness to

carry a greater political burden for Europe and the Atlantic alliance. After

all, during the years of the euro crisis, Germany had become the undisputedpolitical leader of Europe, adding political clout to its economic dominance.

In other words, there is a convergence of what others expect Germany to

do, which is to provide leadership, and Germany’s self-defined role in the

world. There is still a gap between the two, and not all expectations are

met. Some are explicitly rejected, particularly in the field of international

economic policy. But in a more general sense, the gap is narrowing. The

United States has been particularly pleased with this narrowing process,

even though it wishes to see it advance more rapidly — and eventually

disappear completely. For Washington, a strong Germany acting robustly

and providing positive leadership in a world that is in disarray comes as a

big relief.

In practice, there were two major conflicts in 2014 where Germany did not

retreat to its old seat in the grandstands, but decided to get involved and take

risks, even at considerable domestic cost: Iraq and Ukraine.

When the terror militia of the so-called Islamic State advanced with

lightning speed in Iraq, when large-scale atrocities were reported and

genocide seemed imminent, the Merkel government made a bold decision to

send weapons to Kurdish militias. This went against a well-established policy


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guideline not to export weapons to high-intensity conflict areas. While

critics accused the government of stoking the flames of violence, Germany

even looked at the possibility of setting up military training camps in Iraq.

The real test of Germany’s willingness to shoulder burdens and show

leadership is in Ukraine. So far, Berlin has shown the willingness to review

the relationship with Russia and no longer do business as usual, at least for

a while. Given the complex nature of the German relationship with Russia,

this has not been easy. The public was against any escalation over Ukraine

and is wary of a new period of confrontation with Russia as NATO beefs up

the defense of its eastern European members. Actually, more than just a few

Germans, including former chancellors, put the blame for what happened inEastern Europe on allegedly misguided Western policies that had provoked

Russian President Vladimir Putin to intervene in Ukraine.

This view is also a reflection of the corrosive effect of growing anti-

Americanism in Germany, which is moving from the margins to the

center. The business community was, and continues to be, strongly against

economic sanctions against Russia, the chosen form of response to Russia’s

aggression first in the Crimea and later in eastern Ukraine. As Germanyhad by far the biggest commercial relationship with Russia among Western

nations, it had the most to lose. But to the chagrin of major business

interests, Merkel made clear who is in charge and agreed to impose Western

sanctions against an aggressive, revisionist Russia. On the European

level, she acted as a moderator and a facilitator. On the Atlantic level, U.S.

President Barack Obama deferred to Merkel’s leadership more than once.

She has combined a determination to increase the costs for Russia of its

aggression with repeated calls for dialogue with the Moscow leadership.

While many argue that Germany is still a risk-averse, post-military trading

state, the Ukraine/Russia crisis shattered old concepts and exposed illusions.

It was not easy for the Merkel government to chart a course between

domestic politics and economic interests on one hand and political,

strategic, and alliance considerations on the other. For some, this may not

be forceful enough. Others accuse Germany, the major power in Europe,

of not investing enough in the Western alliance. But Berlin is moving from

restraint to responsibility, without completely letting restraint slip away. The

trick is to balance the principles and lessons learned from an inglorious past

with the necessities of today, which are to maintain and recreate order and

stability. More profoundly, it is closing the gap between rhetoric and reality.


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Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger is foreign editor of the German newspaperFrankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and was a Bosch Public Policy Fellow during the2010-11 Academy year on “Global Shift: The Transatlantic Community and theNew Geopolitics.”


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I’ F P A:

T Q S

N T

After years of foreign policy sclerosis, Italy is making a noticeable

comeback on the international scene. While confirming its

traditional attachment to European integration and to the

transatlantic alliance, Rome is playing an increasingly active role in

the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Much of this activism can be

explained by personalities, be they those of former Foreign Minister EmmaBonino and her team, of her successor Federica Mogherini, now EU high

representative, or of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi himself. And yet to

make a lasting foreign policy impact, developing more articulate long-term

strategies premised on both greater political stability and a deep-rooted

structural reform of the foreign policy apparatus in the country will be of the

essence.

Italy’s more active stance began in 2013 with the government headed

by Prime Minister Enrico Letta. The seeds were sown with Bonino’s

nomination to the foreign ministry, backed by a solid team of deputies

including Marta Dassù and Lapo Pistelli. Notwithstanding Italy’s spiraling

economic crisis, which endures to this day, Rome resumed punching its

weight in the international arena under Bonino’s leadership. Notably, in

the second half of 2013, Italy took a strong stance against Western military

intervention in the war in Syria, manifested its openness toward Iranfollowing the election of President Hassan Rouhani, sealed the agreement

over the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline carrying Azerbaijani gas to Europe, and set

in motion a long-awaited reform of its development policy, in the process

revamping relations with sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, Italy

redoubled its commitment to deeper European integration, in particular by

backing plans for a banking union, as well as to a revamped transatlantic

partnership, strongly supporting negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and

Investment Partnership (TTIP).

With the fall of Letta’s government came the rise of Matteo Renzi and

Federica Mogherini. While lacking a strong agenda of her own, as Bonino’s

successor at the foreign ministry Mogherini added to Italy’s visibility on the

foreign policy scene. She was ubiquitous in her presence both in Europe


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and the United States, in Italy’s immediate neighborhood to both east and

south, and in Latin America. Italy has been a prime player in the attempted

resolution of the Libyan crisis; it has been the principal whistleblower —

through the save-and-rescue Mare Nostrum mission — on the migrationcrisis in the Mediterranean; it was the first European country to ring the

alarm bells on the Islamic State group’s threat in Iraq; and it has capitalized

on improved relations with African countries both for “quick wins” —

such as the liberation of the Sudanese woman Meriam Yahia Ibrahim

Ishag, convicted for apostasy — as well as for more long-term results, for

instance the launching of an EU-Horn of Africa dialogue on migration

and development under the Italian EU Presidency. Mogherini, her deputy

Pistelli, and Prime Minister Renzi and Italian diplomacy as a whole all

deserve credit for these accomplishments.

Italy’s increased activism is indisputable. Some of this activism automatically

dovetails with U.S. positions and approaches, for instance with regards to

Libya, European integration, the Southern Gas Corridor, or TTIP. On other

issues, namely Russia-Ukraine, Iran, and Syria, while interests converge,

views may occasionally be somewhat different. And yet even when positions

differ, a more internationally active Italy making its voice heard, particularly

on the issues closest to its foreign policy interests, means value added for

Europe, for the United States, and for the transatlantic partnership as a

whole.

The quest now is that of sustainability, and, connected to this, of lasting

foreign policy influence. In order for Italy to make not only its voice

heard but its actions felt in international affairs, it is of the essence for

Rome to create sophisticated strategies grounded upon deep knowledge of

developments on the ground as well as alliance building with friends and

partners. In the case of Libya, for instance — perhaps the top foreign policy

priority for Italy at the current juncture — it is not enough to have deep

understanding of developments on the ground, which Italy does, not least

because Rome’s is the only large Western embassy left in Tripoli, because

of the significant presence of ENI, and because of the large Italian-Libyan

community. In order to make its influence felt, Italy must elaborate uponinternational strategies to move the UN’s troubled mediation efforts forward

and build sound international coalitions to back these up. To do so, an active

foreign minister or prime minister is necessary, as is political courage and

vision. But it is not sufficient. If Italy wants to translate its greater visibility

into actual influence, personal vision and courage must filter down into


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institutions and the development of a strategic culture across the various

foreign policy stakeholders in the country. What is needed for this to happen

is a degree of political stability — over the last two years Italy has had no less

than four foreign ministers — along with a sorely needed restructuring ofthe country’s foreign policy apparatus.

Nathalie Tocci is deputy director at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome andwas a Transatlantic Academy senior fellow during the 2009-10 Academy year on“Turkey and Its Neighborhood.”


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P F P: E

“G Y”

B E. N

From 2008 until recently, Polish foreign policy enjoyed “golden

years.” Once Poland was firmly anchored in Western institutions

like the European Union and NATO, Warsaw’s voice started to gain

prominence and respect across Europe and even globally.

A number of factors contributed to Poland’s credibility. First, its economywas growing at a time of near zero growth or recession in other EU

countries. Polish governments were very cautious in their management of

public money and Warsaw safely navigated the European financial crisis.

The monitoring of Polish banks proved to be very efficient and the article in

the Polish constitution that capped the level of public debt was even adopted

as a European solution. Though Poland has not entered the euro zone and

has so far averted a decision on joining while the EU’s economic crisis

continues, Warsaw has successfully secured its voice on major solutions

concerning monetary integration.

Second, Poland has started to play the “Brussels game” very effectively. It

has closely allied with Germany (despite many policy differences like on

the future of euro zone, energy and climate policy, and Eastern policy)

and learned how to build coalitions. Both the Visegrad group (with

Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) and the Weimar Triangle (with

Germany and France) were reinvigorated. These steps bore fruit in Poland’s

presidency of the European Council in 2011, which appeared to be a big

success and added to Polish visibility across the world. Not less important,

it was followed by effective preparations for the UEFA Euro 2012 soccer

championships held in Poland and Ukraine.

Third, Poland’s Eastern policy gained prominence. With the creation of

the EU’s “Eastern Partnership,” initiated by Poland and Sweden, the policy

effectively became Europeanized. Poland’s credibility was vastly enhanced

by a very pragmatic policy toward Russia under the Civic Platform of

Donald Tusk’s government, which treated “Russia as it is, not as we wish it

to be.” Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, even attended the meetings

of Weimar Triangle, visited the annual summit of Polish ambassadors,


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and created the so-called “Kaliningrad Triangle” jointly with his German

and Polish counterparts. Poland had gotten unstuck from its “Post-Cold

War warrior” label and, for the first time in its history, did not feel that

its geographic location between Germany and Russia was geopoliticaldeterminism.

Fourth, Poland’s foreign policy horizon became much more globalized

than in the past. It appeared that Poland’s model of successful post-1989

transition could be a good trademark and it attracted interest during

the Arab Spring of 2011. The Community of Democracies, which is

headquartered in Warsaw, gained more ground in international politics

and played an important role in a peaceful political transition in Myanmar.Poland initiated the European Endowment for Democracy, headquartered

in Brussels, and founded “Go China” and “Go Africa” programs for the

global expansion of its business sector. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao

visited Poland in 2012 to meet leaders of 11 Central and Eastern European

countries. Furthermore, Poland became an object of interest of world energy

investors due to its vast shale gas potential.

But 2014 marked the end of Poland’s foreign policy “golden years.” All thefactors that so strongly contributed to the Polish success story were put

into a very different context, primarily due to Russian aggression against

Ukraine. For Poland, this is not just the issue of instability in its immediate

neighborhood. It is also a challenge for the liberal world order that was so

beneficial to its own rise after the peaceful revolution of 1989. Events both

to the east and the south of Europe have proven an obvious weakness of

the two major organizations that underpin the institutional framework of

Poland’s foreign policy: the EU and the NATO. These organizations did

not help to deter the Russian annexation of Crimea and the presence of

Russian soldiers in the Donbas. Poland is aware that the Russian problem

will be a major issue of foreign policy for at least the next decade and that

the EU and NATO are not in good shape internally. The perception of

danger has reached a post-1991 high in Polish public opinion. For the last

couple of years, Poland invested heavily in the reinvigoration of Europe’s

sluggish defense and security policy. However, it assumed that this was onlyin response to the potential U.S. pivot to Asia. The 2012 GMF TransatlanticTrends found that only 38 percent of Poles considered U.S. leadershipdesirable and 45 percent thought that NATO was essential for national

security. This was one of the worst results across the EU countries. But the

Polish push toward making Europe a stronger foreign policy player has

http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdfhttp://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdfhttp://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdfhttp://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdfhttp://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdf


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clearly failed. Other EU countries did not even aspire to update Europe’s

security strategy.

Today, according to 2014 Transatlantic Trends, 78 percent of Poles see theUnited States positively while two-thirds of them think that NATO is again

essential for our own security. If Europe is incapable and demilitarized, the

United States is again considered as a key ally. However, this is in a very

specific context. President Bronisław Komorowski has openly declared the

end of “foreign military adventurism.” But Poland cannot assume that a

NATO concentrated around its core territorial defense function will remain

relevant for the United States if the European allies do not really share the

burden. Therefore, territorial defense dominates Polish thinking now, aswas expressed in the recently approved national security strategy. Some

have even jokingly called this a “Polish pivot to Poland.” This is not a big

overstatement.

At the same time, when the East is in flame, the EU is struggling with

disintegration processes in many areas. France and Italy have openly

declared their hostility to the Fiscal Pact that is fundamental for the future

of euro zone. Great Britain is on the verge of withdrawal from the EU. FromPoland’s perspective, its cherished anchor in the world — a stable EU and

NATO — in disarray. Warsaw cannot stop this process. It is much more

aware now that at least in order to have influence over it, Poland should

finally decide to join the euro zone. It may be now in the core interest of

Poland’s foreign policy, despite all the problems that are still looming on the

horizon for the ill-designed monetary union.

If the selection of former Prime Minister Donald Tusk for the post ofpresident of the European Council was the jewel in the crown of Polish

foreign policy’s “golden years,” it symbolizes the beginning of a new period

as well. For many years, Poland struggled to join the key institutions of the

Euroatlantic area. Now it will have to work on the larger responsibility of

keeping them relevant.

Bartlomiej E. Nowak is chair of international relations department at the Vistula

University in Warsaw and was a Joachim Herz Stiftung fellow during the 2013-14 Academy year on “The Future of International Liberal Order.”

http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_complete.pdfhttp://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_complete.pdfhttp://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_complete.pdf


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N S G R

I N EU

A P R

S A

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR), the global number of refugees has significantly

increased during the past five years. By the end of 2013, the agency

reported there were 51.2 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide,including 33.3 million internally displaced (IDPs), 1.2 million asylum-

seekers, and 16.7 million refugees under UN protection. In addition,

between January and June 2014, 5.5 million new forcibly displaced persons

were registered. Although most refugees are living in other parts of the

world (with Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, and Jordan among the major

refugee-hosting countries), an increasing number tries to find protection

in Europe. In 2013, 435,000 new asylum seekers entered the EU, a 20-year

peak. This imposes serious policy challenges on the member states: an

increasing number of deaths at the external EU borders, a general lack of

solidarity between member states with regard to the reception of refugees,

and an overall lack of coherent asylum and migration policies.

With a further increase of inflows to the EU to be expected — currently

mainly from Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Serbia, and Iraq — new approaches

in national and EU policies are necessary. On EU level, three major

questions must be addressed: 1) How can the responsibility for refugees

be shared? 2) How can humanitarian disasters at EU external borders be

prevented? 3) And how can overburdened refugee-hosting countries like

Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan be supported? In addition, member states will

have to reconsider their national refugee policies. It should be anticipated

that many refugees are going to stay for a long period of time, or for the rest

of their lives. But if they become immigrants, integration must become a

central ambition.

Later this year, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is scheduled

to enter into force. It should provide refugees with equal asylum procedures,

and conditions of reception and living in all EU member states. At present,

these procedures and conditions are not in place, and it is unlikely that


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this goal will be reached in 2015. The EU external border countries find

themselves disadvantaged by the 1990 Dublin Agreement pursuant to which

a refugee’s country of first entry to the EU is responsible for the respective

asylum procedure. De facto, these states let refugees travel to other EU states.Clearly, the European asylum regime based on the Dublin regulations is

malfunctioning, with few member states (Germany, Sweden, Italy, France,

and the U.K.) hosting the overwhelming majority of refugees. It is now time

for a debate on the distribution of responsibility considered fair by all EU

states.

A first step would be an agreement on criteria on the basis of which member

states determine refugee distribution. Criteria could include population size,economic strength, and unemployment ratios, as well as “humane” factors

such as family members or a diaspora living in the respective member

state. In a second step, a procedure for the distribution of refugees could be

established. A mechanism of financial compensation or incentives would

be less bureaucratic than a physical redistribution of refugees. It should be

taken into account that refugees are likely to seek protection in member

states where a diaspora provides support structures.

Compensation can only work when EU provisions regarding the

harmonization of asylum standards are followed and member states are

prevented from designing their asylum standards in such a way that they

are less attractive for refugees. The debate on distribution should provide

incentives for countries such as Greece to improve their asylum system.

For ethical, humanitarian, and political reasons, EU member states cannot

turn a blind eye to the present grave situation at their external borders.According to NGO estimates, since 2000 more than 23,000 irregular

immigrants have lost their lives in transit.

To effectuate a long-term solution, cooperation with neighboring countries

— above all the North African states — is required. These states need to

be persuaded to prevent refugees from crossing the Mediterranean Sea by

dangerous means. Such cooperation is possible with Tunisia and Morocco.

But currently, most refugee boats start from the Libyan coast. Becausestate structures in Libya have collapsed, neither cooperation on refugee

protection nor migration management is possible. The Italian operation

“Mare Nostrum,” which rescued shipwrecked persons close to the Libyan

coast, illustrates the EU’s dilemma. From a humanitarian perspective, the


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operation was highly successful. At the same time, it produced a pull effect

and strengthened traffickers. Surely, and contrary to the hope of politicians,

the dismissal of humanitarian missions would not lead to a decrease in

numbers of people trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea — migratorypressure remains too high. In November 2014, the Italian government

terminated “Mare Nostrum” and engaged in the new Frontex operation

“Triton.” But the mandate of “Triton” is limited to border protection in EU

coastal areas and will therefore save fewer people.

Truly effective external border control in the Mediterranean comprises

three efforts. Firstly, EU states should support North African states in

building up comprehensive asylum and migration policy capacities. Thecapacity of those countries to manage the increasing immigration from

sub-Saharan Africa and other regions is a precondition for cooperation

with Europe. Secondly, EU states need to provide the North African

states with incentives for cooperation in the form of possibilities of legal

migration for their nationals. In many EU states, labor demand is increasing.

Within the framework of the so-called EU Mobility Partnerships, the EU

could offer more migration programs. Refugees should also be offered

more legal migration channels. Thirdly, external border control should be

complemented by an effective rescue program in the Mediterranean area,

shouldered by all EU states.

Integration of refugees becomes a crucial issue, especially with regard

to a fading welcome in some member states for refugees and (Muslim)

immigrants. Currently, the protection of refugees is based on the assumption

that they should return to their home countries once the situations there are

considered safe. This idea also shapes public perception and explains why

integration has up to now in many countries only played a minor role in

refugee policy. A fundamental change in thinking is necessary, facilitating

labor market access for refugees. The concept of the refugee as a pure

recipient should be set aside. Many refugees want and have the capacities to

meaningfully participate in their host country.

Generally, the accommodation of refugees is crucial for their integration.

Isolated housing and special schooling is harmful to integration. Given

the complexity and urgency of the issue, national asylum summits with

public actors and civil society actors should be convened. Thereby, active

citizenship to this cause and networking between refugee integration

initiatives would be strengthened.


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The refugee question presents all EU states with great challenges. It can be

anticipated that in some states in fragile economic situations and with the

fear of extremism, calls for “walling-off” will grow louder among the public.

Nevertheless, a further increase of refugees can be managed if the policyreforms mentioned are introduced. EU states need to pursue a common

migration policy. They need to agree on a fair distribution of responsibilities.

They need to engage increasingly in refugee integration. And they need to

communicate the necessity of acting in a way that enhances, rather than

undermines, the commitment of their citizens to assist those in need.

Steffen Angenendt is a senior associate at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in

Berlin and was a Bosch Public Policy Fellow during the 2008-09 Academy year on“Immigration and Integration.”


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N T E U:

I C


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T EU: M B

M L

Britain is in the grip of a prolonged political crisis concerning its

own constitutional order and its membership in the European

Union, exacerbated by acrimonious and misleading arguments over

immigration. As in other European countries, a demagogic anti-EU, anti-

immigration movement has driven the established parties into a defensive

posture. The current prime minister, David Cameron, felt compelled

to promise an “in/out” referendum on Britain’s EU membership if his

Conservative Party returns to power after the May 2015 general election. As

a further gesture to the populists, he is now hinting at advancing the date of

this referendum.

But such efforts at appeasement have proved futile, provoking ever-

increasing demands. At the same time, British leaders have upset natural

allies within the EU and missed an opportunity to become the leading

European voice advocating forward-looking policies such as completing the

single market, strengthening Europe’s global competitiveness, and building

an energy union. The government has also failed to explain to voters that

the EU today bears strong signs of British design and as such serves Britain’s

interests well.

Over the past four decades, the EU has been transformed from a relatively

small “Community” of nine member states to a “Union” with 28 members

embracing much of the European continent. What was once an inward-

looking, largely Francophone, club has become a broad-based Union that

is Anglophone, outward-looking, and open to trade. The United Kingdom

is largely responsible for the EU’s predominantly liberal ethos and present

geopolitical dimensions.

From the outset, Britain backed both enlargement and extending the EU’s

global outreach. British commissioners, including Leon Brittan, Chris

Patten, Pater Mandelson, and Catherine Ashton, piloted the EU’s tradepolicies and external relations at crucial moments in their development.

Britain was among the most consistent advocates of enlargement in Central

and Eastern Europe after the fall of communism. Today Britain supports

EU assistance for democratic transition in the Balkans, Ukraine, and


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other former Soviet states as well as sanctions against Russia following its

annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine.

British membership in 1973 led to closer EU links with the European Free

Trade Association (EFTA), which paved the way for Sweden and Finland

to join the Union in 1995. Britain championed new forms of association

with African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (many its former colonies),

now incorporated in the EU-ACP “Cotonou agreement.” This is widely

considered a model for development assistance — a key British foreign

policy priority.

Margaret Thatcher joined forces with Commission President Jacques Delorsin the late 1980s to eliminate restrictions on the free circulation of goods,

services, capital, and workers — the original goal of the common market.

The commissioner in charge at the time, Arthur Cockfield, as well as the

then secretary-general, David Williamson, were both British. For decades,

the single EU market has favored British exports of goods and services,

especially financial services. Since 2010, the most senior EU official in

charge of the single market and services has been British. Jonathan Hill,

the commissioner appointed in 2014 to regulate the single market, is alsoBritish. The Danish and Swedish commissioners for competition policy

and trade, who took office last November, support a liberal agenda in line

with British thinking. Today they are engaged in challenging negotiations

with the United States for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

Efforts by euroskeptics to detract from the EU’s trade-friendly track record

have not convinced British business leaders.

Britain has played a key role in shaping other core EU initiatives fromthe Regional Development Fund to the Common Fisheries Policy. Britain

and the Nordic countries that entered the EU in 1973 (Denmark) and

1995 (Sweden and Finland) transformed the EU’s administrative culture.

New EU officials are now trained in ethics, integrity, and sound financial

management, part of the reforms named after the former British Labour

Party leader, Neal Kinnock, who served as commission vice-president from

1999 to 2004. Today, transparency and accountability are the rule in the

institutions. In any event, “question time” in the European Parliament, a

practice imported from Britain, is there to keep commissioners on their toes.

For decades, British officials have been sought after as chiefs of staff,

advisers to commissioners and assistants to directors-general of different


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nationalities because of their reputation for probity and efficiency. But

uncertainty about future British membership has discouraged young Britons

from applying for EU jobs. In the last few recruitment competitions, the

proportion of successful candidates from Britain has fallen to 1 or 2 percent.Some 45 percent of U.K. staff are now over 55 years old and scheduled

to retire in the next 10 years. Instead of looking over its shoulder at the

euroskeptics, the government should do more to channel British officials to

the EU institutions before they become a wasting asset.

To be sure, not all EU policies are to the liking of British governments. But

their officials have proved adept in negotiating opt-outs from the euro, the

abolition of border controls, and certain labor market rules, as well as policeand judicial cooperation. Indeed, Britain has been so successful in this that

it now seeks to opt back into certain EU arrangements, like the European

arrest warrant. Britain’s budget rebate is a precedent that other member

states seek to emulate.

Buoyed by Britain’s success in Europe, the country’s politicians should have

the courage to articulate a coherent vision of how they would like the EU to

develop. Instead of making impossible demands on their European partners,they should mobilize Britain’s redoubtable political skills to negotiate further

reforms, cut red tape, and make the EU more competitive. This is the best

answer to the euroskeptics and the best way to secure votes for continued

British EU membership.

Sir Michael Leigh is a senior advisor to The German Marshall Fund of the UnitedStates and is currently a Transatlantic Academy senior fellow for the 2014-15

Academy year on “Religion and Foreign Policy.”


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A I P

E W: L

H’ B

G H

Following the 1989-90 democratic transition, Hungary experienced

two decades of solid liberal democracy until 2010, when the Fidesz

Party gained a two-thirds majority in the parliament and introduced

a new constitutional system eliminating checks and balances and guaranteesof fundamental rights. After a second two-thirds victory in 2014, Prime

Minister Viktor Orbán publicly insisted he aimed for an illiberal democracy,

naming Russia and China as models among others.

Until the fall of 2014, the Hungarian public seemed to be unconcerned

about the government’s illiberal politics, while the first anti-government

demonstrations were either apolitical (against a planned Internet tax), or

the consequence of an external action (the United States’ diplomatic stepto deny entry to corrupt Hungarian officials). Even though most of the

demonstrators requested the resignation of the current government, some

of the speakers at the “Day of Outrage” in Budapest on November 17 also

spoke out against the 1989 liberal democratic transition, rejecting all of

its political actors and requesting a real “regime change.” In other words

the protests are directed both against illiberal and liberal democracy. The

demonstrations were accompanied by a serious slide in the popularity of

both Fidesz and Orbán. The party had lost 12 percent of its sympathizers, or

900,000 voters, while the prime minister himself lost 16 percentage points of

support, within one month.

This argument will not focus on the reasons for four years of silence

from the public. Instead, the focus is on two interrelated and seemingly

conflicting issues: firstly, the very characteristics of the 1989-90 transition

and the role of the political and intellectual elite in these changes, andsecondly, the public perception of liberal democracy in Hungary.

Whatever the speakers of the November 17 demonstration think about it,

the 1989-90 “rule of law revolution” put in place the institutions of a full-

fledged liberal democratic system. This institutionalization was a top-down


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elite process, where two differently but equally illegitimate actors, namely

the Communist Party and the newborn opposition movements, agreed

upon the new constitutional order. One can argue that having democratic

elections first would have been a better way to proceed, but actually bothparties to the National Roundtable negotiations had good reasons to be

afraid of the victory of the other.

But even if understandable, the lack of any kind of public participation in

the design of the new system was certainly instrumental for the population

not to identify itself with the idea of liberal democracy. The elite failed

to finish this “post-sovereign” constitution-making process later with a

democratically enacted new constitution. This gave Fidesz the opportunityin 2010 to falsely argue for a real “change of regime” and the replacement of

the “Stalinist” constitution.

The Constitutional Court and some public intellectuals (myself included at

least until a certain point) have their own responsibility for not taking the

legitimacy issue seriously by arguing that the comprehensively amended old

constitution with the active interpretation of the Court provided an effective

“living constitution,” and that there was thus no need for a legitimate newone. Even if some critics of the “legal constitutionalism” seem to forget

the important role of the Constitutional Court (at least in the first nine

years), the current disappointment with 1989 and with the ideal of liberal

constitutional democracy is partly due to the lack of any participatory

element in this process. This is the failure of the entire elite, not exclusively

that of the political parties, because convincing the public to accept a set of

“proper” values is a historic responsibility of elites.

The second point is the degrees to which the values of liberal democracy

were accepted by the Hungarian population in 1989 and to which are they

now.

Regarding 1989, even though the transition to democracy in Hungary was

driven by the fact that a large share of the population gave high priority

to freedom, one of the lega

the state of the transatlantic world 2015

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