the sovereign state of language: a reading of lonnie carter's the sovereign state of boogedy...

The Sovereign State of Language: A Reading of Lonnie Carter's The Sovereign State ofBoogedy BoogedyAuthor(s): David PrattSource: Callaloo, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 706-715Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2932297 .

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THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF LANGUAGE A Reading of Lonnie Carter's

The Sovereign State of Boogedy Boogedy

By David Pratt

At one point in Lonnie Carter's The Sovereign State of Boogedy Boogedy Danielle says, "The Judge is obfuscating." ' This sense of frustration reflects the one we feel upon entering the realm of "Boogedy Boogedy." For much of the play, Carter seems to obfuscate at the reader's expense. It affords some, but little, comfort to recognize that the author deliberately fosters, even nurtures, the play's confusion. The confusion serves, if anything, as a starting point.

The Sovereign State of Boogedy Boogedy, as the title tells us, is first and foremost, literally and figuratively, sovereign. Everything that comes to pass within this "liberated emirate o' Boogedy-Boogedy" (54) is subject to its own peculiar laws. It seems Carter wants to reign over as much literary license as he can, to remind the audience or reader that literature in general, and drama in particular, operate under a different set of laws from reality. In stretching the distance between the real and the imaginary, the actual and the creative, Carter preserves that distance. In addition, the overall confusion is itself an important part of the effect the play works to achieve. The play pushes the audience's or the reader's willing suspension of disbelief to its limit. "Suspension of disbelief" in Boogedy Boogedy does not refer to coincidence or to the transcendence of time and space on stage, but to the role and meaning of language. It is not surprising, therefore, that the play's main element of confusion revolves around the different uses of the many facets of language.

If Carter deliberately uses language to lead us into his confusing creation, Boogedy Boogedy, he must, in the end, lead us out by the same pathway. In what appears to be a contradiction then, the road to understanding means traveling with confusion, as Carter asks us to do. Fortunately, he limits the play to the boundaries of his sovereign state, which are also the boundaries of language. Nevertheless, when Shadrach says,

On de playgroun' 'fore dawn drivin' fo' de bunny shots, switchin' han's Like some dudes switchin' blades Frazier behin' de back through de legs all two o' dem fas' breakin' top o' de key leap you jungle bunny off de rim up fo' de tip swisshhh Dr. J. all the way red white blue b-ball bounce hit de open man run n' shoot grab de boards Alcindor-block Kareemin' off de iron ... (77-78),

it is clear that everything within bounds is fair play. Beneath the excesses of language lie a simple three act structure and an explicit

borrowing of words as well as substance from the Biblical Book of Daniel. Carter takes the

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play's characters from this source and, by placing them in Boogedy Boogedy, controls their symbolic roles and representative value. Each of the play's three acts corresponds roughly to one of the play's principle characters, Abed-nego, Shadrach, and Meshach, in that order. By correspond, I mean that the form or "character' of each character's language sets the tone and pace of the act. Further, the acts all begin and end, except for a significant variation in the last act, with the same scenario. The beginnings are monologues from Abed-nego, Shadrach, and Meshach, in that order, and each character's monologue has a consistency of theme and language. The first two acts end in judgment scenes in which the three Judges ask the accused, King Nebuchadnezzar, to plead guilty or not guilty to a charge. The ending of the third act varies from the pattern, and that variance illustrates the function of the play's structure. The structure is highlighted by a close adherence to repetition of farcical legal procedure and that repetition's subsequent breakdown. In other words, structure serves as a coherence off which Carter can "play" the play's confusion and reversals. Furthermore, the direct analogy to the Book of Daniel provides another constant against which Carter creates variations and reversals for emphasis and irony. The most conspicuous example of this reversal is the transformation of Daniel to Danielle.

For all intents and purposes, the "Sovereign State of Boogedy Boogedy" has been reduced to a court of law. The only other specific reference to events in Boogedy Boogedy-outside the court-occurs when Shadrach speaks about other courts:

Judge Solomon Skybumskybum has ruled dat de fathah is de chile to de man. In de appellate procedyah, Justice Choo-ChooJustice has found dat de man is de chile to de fathah. In de suuperior court o' de firs' districko' deDistricko' de gem o' de OceanjudgeJudJudge has declared dat the chile is de fathah to de man. In de suupremest body o' de most exalted division o' de Prime Movah o' all Poobahs i' de liberated emirate o' Boogedy-BoogedyJustice Learner Hot Dog has decreed dat de man is de fathah to de chile... Justice Feline Braunsch- weiger has decided i' de upprest halls o' de Justice Blindness dat de muthafrigger he not only NOT de fathah o' de chile he not de man eidder. (54,55)

In its circular, nonsensical manner, this passage goes to some length to arrive at nothing, suggesting or foreshadowing that a clear resolution in this case is also unlikely. But not only does the passage say something about the nature of Boogedy Boogedy, it says something about the nature of law itself. Law, with all its rhetorical trappings, is essentially language. Like so many other fictions, law is a system of principles and ideas that, in and of themselves, do not exist. Law exists only in the words and language with which we represent it. The words do not even represent objects directly, but, rather, the thoughts summoned around those objects or principles. Ultimately, "rose" is not a rose, nor is it the name of a rose, but what we call the name of a rose. Echoing famous lines, Shadrach says, "Wha's in a name? A posey by any othah name n' Ah'd sniff you jus' de same" (79). These problems associated with naming surface throughout the play and, without becoming endlessly tangled in semantics, simply mean that language is inevitably removed, by its very nature, from its source in reality. The space between what language represents or "means" and what it actually is-the space between the literal and the figurative-marks the realm of Carter's Boogedy Boogedy. Because of this middle

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ground, it is possible to manipulate language and, by extension, law or anything else we hold to have a certain meaning. An exchange between Danielle and Shadrach demon- strates this point:

Danielle: Beside the point. Binding him as if he were a dangerous psychotic is patently illegal. Shadrach: Ah's heard o' de bald eagle, but de ill-eagle, dat's a mighty sick bird. You say you got a patent on dis disease? Ah'm callin de U.S. Reg. Pat. Off. HE pulls out a toy phone. Hello, Reggie? (56)

As this exchange shows, Shadrach possesses what we might call a "literal" impulse. He is literal in terms of attaching meaning to words, but more ostensibly in terms of phonetics. What Shadrach hears is what he understands. This hardness of hearing is aggravated by his questionable sobriety and demystifies language, especially in its exalted, legalistic form. For language to retain a semblance of meaning, it must at the least be heard as it was spoken.

If we understand that Shadrach's use of language is informed by, or represents, a literal impulse, the attributes of language associated with Abed-nego and Meshach may also be simplified or conceptualized. Abed-nego represents a normal or, more precisely, "normative" impulse; Meshach represents a "metaphoric" impulse.

"It'sjust, I said. It'sjust what, she said. It'sJust-tice, I said. It'sjust this, she said..." (53). With this line in Abed-nego's opening monologue in act one, Carter introduces the theme of justice alongside the theme of language. What is justice and what does it mean? We can be sure that the answer to these questions is not one and the same. We discover in the beginning of the play that Abed-nego, Shadrach, and Meshach have a problematic relationship with justice, in that not one of them can claim to embody or represent justice or its principles. This problematic relationship becomes one of the play's central ironies because of the mens' role as judges. It appears that, at some time in the past, Abed-nego has molested a child. He says, "Then I force her. Or does she force me?" (53). For Shadrach, the question is one of legitimacy. He is a bastard child looking for a father. He sings, "Iz you iz / Or iz you ain't / Mah baby" (54). Meshach is troubled and confused by what truth means. He is unable to reconcile that, as he says, "Everything is true and false" (55). The form and content of the monologues indicate the characters' approach to language, which dictates the movement of the act. More precisely, the characters equal their respective relationships with language.

Abed-nego's first monologue is a relatively straightforward account of an event, relatively straightforward in relation to his later monologues and to those of the other characters. Borrowing from Shadrach, "Dese n' dose distinckshuns distinckly distink" (56) concerning the clarity of events and the use of language collapse by the end of the play. The first act, corresponding to Abed-nego, sets up the roles and relations of the characters and establishes the analogy with the Book of Daniel in a direct manner. I mean 'direct" in the sense that the play's situation is, in many ways, a direct reversal or antithesis of the Biblical parable. Abed-nego, Shadrach, and Meshach have become the judges and Neb- uchadnezzar the accused, and Daniel has become Danielle, who fittingly serves as the king's counsel. At the center of the analogy, we find the relationship between Danielle and

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Nebuchadnezzar preserved intact. Nebuchadnezzar fills the role of the dreaming visionary and Danielle is the dreamless interpreter, each needing the other to be complete. As Danielle says, "Your headaches will be worse. You will not dream. Then I cannot tell you what your dreams portend" (59). The analogy is more carefully played out in the following acts, but it remains that Nebuchadnezzar has a clear conflict with justice involving his Biblical persecution of Abed-nego, Shadrach, and Meshach, and, more importantly, involving his relationship or conflict with language. Nebuchadnezzar is confined to his "Biblical script." Through much of the first act he is able to express himself only by growling, an allusion to his banishment from human society and period of "madness" in the parable. He can speak only when the text of the Bible, read by Abed- nego, reaches his lines. He tries to break out of this restriction but is frustrated, and finally exclaims: "I WANT MY OWN JOKE!" (93). Perhaps this is a reflection on the play itself, for we see the characters, especially Shadrach, not waiting to speakbut interrupting, or ad- libbing. The confusion produced by this speaking out of turn is part of the larger confusion of language with which the play resists convention. For language or conversation to make sense, some sequence of question and response must be established. Nebuchadnezzar's inability to speak and respond freely indicates he cannot control language as his accusers do, thereby putting him at a disadvantage. Because he cannot manipulate language he cannot manipulate the law or its substance, the principle of justice.

Overarching this principle of justice manifest in the courtroom of Boogedy Boogedy, we find its origin: God and religion. With so much adorning and distracting language, it is almost easy to overlook the fundamental comment Carter makes regarding religion. Above all else, religion and its myths are fictions upheld by language. The function is, however, mutual, for traditionally the basis and sustenance of language has been the religious text. If the nature of language is inherently problematic, so, too, must be the nature of religion. This problematic nature of religion comes to bear in the form of a paradox central to the play. If religion, as set forth in the Bible, is the definitive statement on man's existence, how is it that the statement itself must inevitably break down on the mundane level of language? The truth of the Bible must inevitably contain falsity, for how can language represent something as definitive as the truth if it is ultimately removed from that truth? Within the realm of language, it seems possible that "Everything is true and false." Perhaps faith canbe defined as the tacit disregard of this paradox. In any event, The Sovereign State of Boogedy Boogedy attempts to expose this contradiction. This problem manifests itself most immediately in the question of how literally one should take the words of the Bible. That is, how do they apply, and what use are they, to the present? At one point, in response to Abed-nego's reading directly from the "Good Book," Danielle says, "Objection. The charges, not the entire account as we have it from the book of Daniel." To which Abed-nego replies, "Overruled. The scene must be set" (61). This exchange suggests that the Bible's purpose, at least in this case, is only to provide extraneous information without giving insight. Here, the "traditional" significance of the Bible is effectively reversed. The ending of the first act solidifies this reversal. Abed-nego asserts that he will be the one to mete out Nebuchadnezzar's punishment and, in so doing, effectively and symbolically usurps power ultimately reserved for God. Danielle says:

When the Lord God on High did not see fit to destroy the King. In fact, your Honors, the Lord forgave him and the King prospered for

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many years after. Would you in the name of Justice pretend to do what the Lord would not? Are you saying that the Lord is unjust? (71)

This unanswered rhetorical question probes the problem of secular justice. How does one separate the principle of justice from religion, and how does one separate the invocation of "justice" from the invocation of God? Significantly, the charge against Nebuchadnez- zar, put forth in the first act, is "forcing his religion on those who hold another God sacred" (71). We are left to believe that the imposition of religion and the imposition of justice are really interchangeable, reversible.

The second act falls under Shadrach's aegis and is subject to his antics. These antics are part of the larger, vaudevillian nature of the play's action. We see the characters breaking into songs, dances and other routines alongside the underlying routine of the trial. In this manner, the play's discordant dramatic action "plays" a similar role to language, namely satire. Together, the action and the language undermine the sanctity and seriousness of religion and the law (and perhaps drama), both institutions which attempt to distinguish right from wrong, truth from falsity. The play's action and language deny that such distinctions can be made. In light of this on-going breakdown, Shadrach's literal impulse, begun in the first act, develops into something we might qualify as "lyric." Shadrach's lyricism is apparent in his singing and in his spontaneous character changes. The literal and the lyric go hand in hand, for each involves the direct, unfettered translation or voicing of sentiment into words and/or actions.

Concurrent with Shadrach's lyricism, we may also describe the movement of the second act as lyric. The lyricism of Shadrach's language translates into a series of spontaneous free associations in which Nebuchadnezzar becomes a mythic historical villain. He is accused of a series of crimes, summed up as "causing crippling, blinding and cruelty for maximum financial profit" (87). Shadrach equates Nebuchadnezzar with the idea of "state" as a monopoly on violence, freedom and, most importantly, language. The "point o' disorder n' disjustice" (75) that Shadrach brandishes is language in the written form, the literal and figurative possession of which is significant. But Shadrach's "lyricism" outruns itself, to the point where it is in danger of losing its meaning. The litany of charges ends with this outburst:

Yo' preservative laboratories doin' research on de elimination o' de misfits, de marginal misfits n' anybody anywhere doin anythin' you don' like or considahs a threat to what you hold profane. Profanity, Massa' Neb, you iz de one who puts polysorbate 80 in my Velveeta n' de BHA in mah Mazola n' knows it's gonna kill me befo' Ah learns to pronounce mono-polydiglicerides. You iz de god o' Triage, baby, but it's endin' here n' now. (84)

Here, Shadrach effectively says he will no longer be daunted by language. We may conclude from this that control of language in its different forms is the key to authority and liberation. But language can also turn on its user, returning us to the question of semantics. Just as it is difficult to attach a single, fixed meaning to a word, the meanings or thoughts associated with a word must somehow be circumscribed, otherwise, in meaning every-

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thing, a word would mean nothing. This describes the predicament of Shadrach's lyricism, which is essentially a paradox of language. By nature, words resist definition. We may say they embrace meaning. Words are difficult to define because they ultimately represent not things but, rather, ideas about things. At the same time, however, without definition or circumscription, a word loses all relation to the original object it is meant to represent, and ceases to mean. Closing the door at one end inevitably leaves the other open, through which meaning can escape. In the second act, we find Shadrach subject to the same paradox. In making uncensored and free association of personae and their representative value, Shadrach inflates meaning until it collapses. Nebuchadnezzar becomes a generic scapegoat and Shadrach becomes a number of stereotypical figures: the wounded veteran, the basketball player, the blind musician. The notion of a stereotype fits into our understanding of the act because a stereotype is a figure so common that, upon encoun- tering one, we immediately summon up a set of associated ideas without second thought. In this sense the stereotype has a lyric quality, but one which is so laden with static meaning that the meaning loses force.

In the Biblical parallel to the second act Nebuchadnezzar reaches the zenith of his power, only to fall from grace as Danielle foresees in her interpretation of the King's dream:

o King, it is the decree of the Most High that thou shall be driven from men and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field and thou shalt be made to eat grass as oxen and shall be wet with the dew of heaven and seven times shall pass over thee til thou know that the Most High ruleth in the Kingdom of Men and giveth it to whomso- ever He will. (83-84)

Hubris is the reason for Nebuchadnezzar's downfall. In the play the situation is reversed, with Shadrach, a drunken and illegitimate antithesis of the King, stepping to the fore and assuming power. This irony is brought to bear at the end of the act when Danielle again rhetorically asks: "Would you in the name of Justice pretend to do what the Lord would not? Are you saying the Lord is unjust?" To which Shadrach responds, "It was not the Lord God on High who was maimed n' blinded n' beaten wid an ivory cane!" (87-88). This suggests that Shadrach senses religion's inherent weakness as being words on a page that are, by nature, removed from the real existence upon which they are supposed to confer meaning. In the line "As de bishop said to de actress" (76) and its reverse, "As the actress said to the bishop" (93), perhaps Carter is implying that theater, or the arts, have as much ability to express meaning and truth as religion.

The third and final act belongs to Meshach, who represents language's metaphoric, or "literary," impulse. Meshach is primarily concerned with the meaning derived from the relationship between the object to be represented and its representation. Abed-nego embodies a movement toward the representation or the words themselves. He appears to have some confidence in the sanctity of words, for we see him relying on the literal text of the Book of Daniel to establish the case. In so doing, Abed-nego accepts words at face value and uses them in a "normative" way. Shadrach, on the other hand, embodies a movement toward the object represented, or the meaning behind the representation. As a result, he always seeks to invest representations with meaning. In this sense he is "lyrical." Meshach

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embodies the middle ground between the two. That middle ground is the place of metaphor, the space in which the paradoxes of language are mitigated by a balance between the purely literal and the purely figurative. Above all, it is the creative realm. I understand metaphor to be drawn neither to the object, nor its representation, but to be concerned only with the meaning created from the relation between the two. The product of metaphor is not the strict identification of object with meaning, nor is it the meaning laden symbol. It is an understanding in which contradictions and paradoxes can be reconciled, an understanding in which, as Meshach says, "Everything is true and false" (55).

In his monologue at the beginning of the third act, Meshach tells the following story:

A man calling himself poet met a woman calling herself worker at a demonstration for more food at lower costs. When some of their demands had been met, the two shared a meal. At the end of the food, he broke his pen and she threw down her hammer. Looking for the rest of the answer, they then built a fire with his notes and made love in the bed she built. As they spoke to each other in loving ways, he remembered driving the nails and she the oaths she had cried. (90)

Here, Meshach himself plays the role of story-teller and, because we understand him to represent a "literary impulse," we can associate him with the poet figure. We can likewise associate the woman worker with Danielle. Throughout the play we have noted a relationship between Meshach and Danielle. This relationship is evident when Meshach pulls a knife on Shadrach, who has made suggestive comments towards Danielle; we also note it in the short, prophetic exchanges between Meshach and Danielle, in which the two seem to complement each other. For example:

Meshach: If Beauty is in the eye of the beholder... Danielle: Truth is in the pupil somewhere too. (64)

Assuming that Meshach wants to form a relationship with Danielle, the story then represents his ideal vision of a realization of that relationship, in which his creative, metaphoric impulse forms a union with Danielle's "creativity." By "creativity" I mean her ability to take impulse and give it form and, hence, meaning. "Creativity" is the actual realization of the impulse to be creative. Creativity is essentially formative and form, in this reader's understanding of the play, means language. We see in the play that Danielle is able to take the pure, meaningless thought of dreams and give it meaning through the medium of language. Meshach recognizes Danielle's potential and we may say he wants to take Nebuchadnezzar's place as the visionary for whom Danielle interprets meaning. This potential in Danielle explains the play's most obvious reversal from the Biblical analogy, the transformation of Daniel into Danielle. As a woman, Danielle represents the vital link between the ideal of creation and the act of creation itself.

The Biblical episode of the Book of Daniel analogous to the third act is "the writing on the wall," corresponding to Meshach's primary concern: the translation or interpretation of meaning into language and understanding. In other words, he is concerned with the act

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of metaphor. In light of the principles we understand Danielle to represent, we find Meshach trying to reach an understanding with Danielle:

Meshach: Ms. Danielle, may I call you such? Danielle does not answer Now, Ms. Such, is it true? Is it false? Danielle: Everything. Meshach: That you are a prophet that you are a prophet true or false? Danielle: True and false. (92)

This exchange indicates a communication breakdown between the two on the level of language. Danielle tries to evade the true nature of Meshach's questions. She does this precisely by using the confusion and problematic nature of language illustrated so well by Shadrach. According to the Biblical parable, Daniel has visions which portend the future, although in the play's reversal Danielle denies that she has such visions. Nevertheless, Meshach asks:

Meshach: Is it not so you have dreams which you believe forecast the future? Danielle: Forecast? Weather? Meshach: Whether or not, what is your answer? Danielle: I wish we didn't have any. Meshach: Weather?

Here, the breakdown is further demonstrated. The point of this illustration is that the language breakdown exhibited here is part of, and indicates, a larger breakdown which consumes the play's ending. How can we explain this? The play has raised questions about justice: what does it mean and in whom does it reside? We have noted that Abed-nego, Shadrach, and Meshach all have a specious claim to possess justice, each for his own reason. They also share one "crime" in common that resides in the Biblical story: "Therefore because the king's commandment was urgent and the furnace exceeding hot the flame of the fire slew those men that took up Shadrach Meshach and Abed-nego" (67). This passage means that innocents died for Abed-nego's, Shadrach's, and Meshach's righteousness. The same is true for Daniel or Danielle. The third charge against the King is that he threw Daniel into the lions' den. The force of this charge is, however, thrown onto Danielle. Nebuchadnezzar throws Daniel into the lions' den, but Daniel remains un- harmed, as he says, "for innocence was found in me" (97). As a result, Daniel's accusers are thrown into the den, along with their wives and children, and quickly devoured. The writing on the wall, "God hath numbered thy kingdom and brought it to an end; thou art weighed in the balances and found wanting; thy kingdom is divided" (94), becomes, in many ways, literally true in the play's ending. We see another indication of the play's self- reflection when Danielle says, "The stories you tell about others are not about others. Parables usually boomerang" (102). With this irony exposed, the play's already tenuous pretense of justice and semblance of order crack and fall apart.

Before all the "distinckshuns distinkly distink" (56) crumble into confusion at the end of the play, one final element that has been conspicuously avoided needs to be addressed:

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Nebuchadnezzar's dreams. In all his dreams a woman figure appears embodying conflict- ing attributes. She is something he is compelled to run from and also to which he must always return. As the King says, "I will hit her I will hate her I will sob I will want to love her" (69-70). I have suggested that Meshach wants to foster a union or reconcile himself with Danielle, who represents a certain potentiality. Female presence, or the presence of feminine principles, in the play are suppressed. Danielle's femininity or womanhood has little consequence aside from drawing a few suggestive comments from Shadrach. In a sense, then, Danielle's presence, as opposed to Daniel's, emphasizes an absence, not only in the play'sjustice, but perhaps in Biblical justice. The relations between man and woman in the play have no potential. They are perverse or exist only in dreams. We see Abed-nego succumb to an Eve complex, and the temptations of a child who is not fertile. We see a diseased Sapphire P. Divine give birth to a blind Ray Wonder, perhaps as the result of a rape. At the heart of the play's breakdown we find a failure to make a natural and "just" restorative connection with what we may call the "feminine impulse." The need and desire for a new formulation is finally expressed when Meshach says, "Show me the ordinary womb" (100).

In the end of The Sovereign State of Boogedy Boogedy, the questions raised by the play appear unresolved. Meshach asks, "What have we to celebrate?" and Abed-nego replies, "The dispensation ofjustice" (103). The confusion of the play's ending seems to contradict the notion of justice served, amounting not to a resolution but an evasion. But the play's ending without a conviction is a more profound statement. It suggests that certain distinctions of guilt and innocence cannot be made. The confusion, which appears to be purposeless until the ending, works to blur distinction. The play's complication and complexity try to do justice to a complexity that goes beyond the attempt of secular justice and religion to define right from wrong. Carter suggests that an essential element is missing from the metaphor, or the relation between principle and reality. That element is the "feminine impulse" capable of reconciling the contradictions and paradoxes which characterize the human need to express and communicate meaning and, ultimately, the desire to communicate one's dreams. Communication means language, and language is the medium of metaphor or, more generally, literature. When the relationship behind language-the relationship between object and representation-falls apart, meaning is lost and confusion reigns. That confusion becomes the reigning power in the end of the play:

This presentation comes to you courtesy of and is known in the trades Backstage Showbiz Variety hix nix stix plays and pix you pays us money and we gives you choice grade A number 1 high detergent 10 W 50 entertainment brought up here and now with the sound of OrangeJulius and the Garbanzos Polish Power best believe it we'll Crackow your hams and suck your gelatin dry. Make us all lovely, mah honies. Verily and Amen, I say to you-this is the Sovereign State of Boogedy Boogedy. (103)

Language itself and language alone has the last word and, just as Carter led us into his realm by way of confusion, so he leads us out.

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Notes

1. Lonnie Carter, The Sovereign State of Boogedy Boogedy and Other Plays (West Cornwall, Connecticut: Locust Hill Press, 1986): 75. All subsequent references appear parenthetically within the text.

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the sovereign state of language: a reading of lonnie carter's the sovereign state of boogedy...

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