The "Socialist Revolution" in the North Korean CountrysideAuthor(s): Chong-Sik LeeSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 2, No. 8 (Oct., 1962), pp. 9-22Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3023599Accessed: 14/11/2009 17:44

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THE "SOCIALIST REVOLUTION" IN THE NORTH KOREAN COUNTRYSIDE

CHONG-SIK LEE

Major changes have been taking place in the North Korean countryside since the end of the Korean war. The process of "agricultural cooperativization" initiated in 1953 (the year of the truce) has been pushed in a most determined fashion. By the end of 19585 the entire North Korean countryside was under strict party regimentation. Our purpose here is to examine the process of "cooperativization" with particular emphasis upon its motives, implementation, socio-political significance, and future pros- pects.

Let us first clarify the meaning of the term "cooperative." Although the North Korean regime has consistently used the term in describing the socialization program in the countryside, in fact, there have been three types of cooperatives, each quite distinct in its socio-political and economic characteristics. The Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea issued a "Directive Concerning the Organization of Cooperative Economy" in January 1954, defining the three types of agricultural cooperatives:1

The first type was defined as the permanent mutual aid team, the most "primitive" form of rural socialism. Throughout the year, including the off-farming seasons, each member of the team was supposed to render services to other members whenever the demand arose. Work was to be done in common, but the land, draft animals, and farm implements were to remain under private ownership. This type, as well as the second type of cooperative, was regarded as preparatory for a higher stage. And as preparation for this progression, the mutual aid teams were required to accumulate common funds, carry out constructions in common, and op- erate subsidiary or "sideline" projects in common.

The second type of cooperative has been regarded by the North Korean regime as a "semisocialistic" system. Under this type, the farmers "contribute" their land and labor for common production, but theo- retically the land is still their private property. They are also allowed to retain some fruit trees and garden plots for themselves. After the harvest, the cooperative deducts a certain proportion of the produce to pay for seeds, fertilizer, use of machines and irrigation facilities, other production ex- penses, tax-in-kind (22.4%/c until 1959 when it was reduced to 8.4%) ,2 for

1 Agricultural Cooperativization in, D.P.R.K., Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Pub- lishing House, 1958, pp. 26-28. (D.P.R.K. stands for Democratic People's Republic of Korea.) See also Kim Il-song's speech at the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, Nov. 3, 1954, Kim lI-song sonjip (Selected Works of Kim Il-song), Pyongyang, Korean Workers' Party Press, 1960, Vol. IV, p. 184.

9

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common reserves (5% of net income in 1956, 10% in 1957, 15% and up after 1958), and cultural and social funds (2-3%). The farmers share the remainder of the harvest according to the area and quality of their land and the labor contributed by them in connection with production. More than 80% of the net income is distributed for labor contribution and 20% or less for the land. If a farmer fails to earn 120 workdays a year, however, he forfeits his share for the land he contributed and is paid only on the basis of his workdays.

The third type is still called "cooperative," but in fact it is very similar to the system known as "collective farms" in the Soviet Union or communes in Communist China. Under this system, land, draft animals, and major farm implements of farmers are turned over to cooperative ownership. All farm work is done collectively, and subsidiary production by the farmers is integrated with the cooperative system. The deductions by the cooperatives are the same as in the second type, but the farmers no longer receive any credit for the land they contribute. They are paid solely on the basis of workdays. Under the 1954 directive, the farmers under this system are allowed to own a private garden plot, fruit trees, cattle and bees.

Despite the official proclamations that the cooperative movement was to be based on voluntarism and the official criticisms that have been issued against leftist deviations among the cadres for "competitiveness with other areas"7 or subjective desires for higher stages of cooperatives, all the evi- dence leads to the conclusion that the North Korean regime has been intent on bringing about the third type of cooperatives as rapidly as possible. After the early stage of experimentation, cooperatives of the first type have not been registered in official statistics. Although cooperatives of the second type represented 46% of the total number in June 1954, they were rapidly converted to the more advanced third type, constituting only 3% of the total in June 1956. By the end of August 1958, when all farms. in North Korea were placed under the cooperative system, all cooperatives were recorded as being of the third type. Table I, compiled from official reports, illustrates the official policy.

It is not difficult to find the motives for the collectivization program. As

is well known, the North Korean Communists suffered a heavy blow during the Korean war. Not only were the industries and cities devastated during the three years of that war, but the farm villages suffered equally. The food shortage resulting from the war was severe; according to a North

Korean report, 42.3% of the farming households suffered food shortages.3

2 Report of Vice Premier Yi Chong-ok (or Li Jong Ok), Nov. 22, 1960, Documents

on the 8th Session of the 2nd Supreme People's Assembly, Pyongyang, Foreign Lan- guages Publishing House, 1961, p. 262.

A Agricultural Cooperativization in D.P.R.K., p. 46. The same publication reports the decrease of agricultural production in North Korea during the war years as

follows (p. 8): 1948 1951 1952 1953

Sown area .... ........ 100 89.2 95.6 97.4 Grain output ...................... 100 84.9 91.9 87.2

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TABLE I

Growth of Agricultural Cooperatives in Various Types4

Total Number Percentage Second Type Third Type Average Size of of (Percentage (Percentage of Cooperatives

Cooperatives Farmers of Total) of Total) (Households)

Dec. 1953 806 1.2 June 1954 1,091 2.0 46.0 54.0 18 Dec. 1954 10,098 31.8 21.5 78.5 33 June 1955 11,529 44.0 11.0 89.0 Dec. 1955 12,132 49.0 7.8 92.2 42 June 1956 14,777 70.5 3.0 97.0 Dec. 1956 15,825 80.9 2.5 97.5 55 Mar. 1957 15,893 2.2 97.8 Dec. 1957 16,032 95.6 1.2 98.8 64 Aug. 1958 13,309 100.0 100.0 80 Dec. 1958 3,843 100.0 100.0 300

To rehabilitate industry and the general North Korean economy, it was of paramount importance for the Communist regime to produce more food.5

The Communists were faced with an added problem of limited human resources. Despite extensive propaganda during the prewar period be- littling the opposing government in the south, and notwithstanding the so- called democratic land reforms carried out in 1946 "to bring about a better life for the farmers," a large number of farmers chose to desert the regime and seek freedom in South Korea. Many young men from agricultural areas were also conscripted before and during the war into the North Ko- rean Army, and a great proportion of these were killed or wounded during the war. Rapid development in industry also demanded a greater number of

Compiled from Agricultural Cooperativization in D.P.R.K., pp. 29, 64; Yi Chong- p'al, et al., Nodong hyoptong chohap ui chongch'i kyongiejok konggohwa rul wihon 7nyotgaji munje (Various Problems in the Process of Political and Economic Con- solidation of the Agricultural Cooperatives), Pyongyang, Korean Workers' Party Press, 1960, p. 10; and Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. VI, p. 185.

"Campaign speech" of Kim Il-song at the electoral district of Mundok, August 2, 1957. (Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. V, pp. 130-131.) North Korea reportedly received 50,000 tons of flour in 1951 from the Soviet Union to alleviate the food shortage in that year. An official publication attributes this shortage to the worst flood in sixty years. Communist China is also reported to have sent a "large quantity" of grain be- tween 1954 to 1957. (Valluable Aid from Peoples of Fraternal Countries, Pyongyang Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958, p. 9.)

ASIAN SURVEY / 12

workers; the farms had to supply these workers.6 Thus, the regime was faced with a very acute labor shortage. Furthermore, most of the draft animals and farm tools were destroyed during the war, and replacements for these were not easily attained.

To the North Korean leaders, therefore, collectivization was an ideal choice. Amalgamation of small-scale farms (the average farm was reported to be 400-500 p'yong) , would eliminate ridges, footpaths and other ob- stacles. Elimination of such barriers would not only increase the area of arable land, but would also permit mechanization, irrigation, and fertiliza- tion on an increased scale. The hope was that agricultural production would be increased under this system with less manpower employed.

The problem confronted by the Communists, however, is not merely that of production. After production, agrarian produce must be collected by the government in maximum amount if it is to be harnessed to the process of industrialization. To collect such produce, the regime has employed two means: compulsory purchase and tax-in-kind. The Korean farmers, how- ever, accustomed to the compulsory purchase programs of the Japanese, were skilled at hoarding and concealing actual production from prying officials. How seriously this historic propensity of Korean farmers affected the agricultural program of the North Korean regime cannot be determined. Collectivization of farmers, however, would supposedly eliminate or dras- tically reduce this problem. The cadres are presumably able to measure the production accurately in each area and carry out the compulsory purchase program effectively.

In addition to economic factors, agricultural collectivization is sanctioned -indeed, demanded-by the Marxist-Leninist principles to which the Korean Communists pay homage. The models of the Soviet Union and China have been set before them, the "correct path" laid forth. A wealth of Communist writings provide theoretical justification to the policy of agrarian collectivization.

North Korean theoreticians have utilized Soviet experience extensively in supporting their program. Although Kim Il-song failed to mention the ex- perience of collectivization in China in his January 5, 1959 speech at the All-Nation Agricultural Cooperatives Conference, he did state that "as Marxism-Leninism teaches us and the experience of the Soviet Union

Occupational division of North Korean population is reported to be as follows:

1946 1949 1953 1956 1960 Workers and office employees ....... 18.7 26.0 29.7 40.9 52.0 Farmers ...... . ... 74.1 69.3 66.4 56.6 44.4 Others ......................... 5.0 2.9 2.4 2.0 3.3

Total .... ............... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Facts About Korea, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961, p. 9. According to the same source, the annual population increase in North Korea is 2.8%.

7 Agricultural Cooperativization inl D.P.R.K., p. 79. One p'yong is equivalent to 3.306 square meters.

13 / ASIAN SURVEY

demonstrates, the farm problem can be ultimately solved only through the individual farm management to socialistic cooperativization . Of course, there has been no mention of the failure of the advanced cooper- atives in Russia during the 1930's, nor of recent Russian failures in the agrarian sector of the economy.

To defend and advance the cooperative movement, North Korean Com- munists have accused some of the farmers of engaging in "capitalistic exploitation and profiteering." According to North Korean statistics, "rich peasants" made up 2 to 3% of total farm households after the land reform of 1946 and their share of arable land was only 3.2%. During the war, rich peasants' share of the agricultural economy declined from 5.6% of prewar years to 0.6%. But the Communist writers attacked this small seg- ment of Korean society as the source of all evils.

The land reform dealt a severe blow at rich peasants, but they still remained as a class. Accordingly, exploitation in various forms was to be seen in the countryside, and new rich peasants emerged, although small in number. Some peasants who became rich after the land reform would practice usury, hire workers instead of doing their jobs them- selves, and indulge in the worst types of profit seeking.9

The totalitarian government in North Korea could easily have liquidated this segment of "rich peasants," thereby eliminating the source of "evil." Indeed, it may be doubted as to whether any such class truly existed after the land reform. However, the "rich peasant class" continued to be useful as a scapegoat in the face of continuing agrarian problems.

Today the North Korean Communists view the 1946 land reform as essentially a "bourgeois democratic revolutionary transformation," which, by itself, could not liberate the agricultural productive forces. Instead, said the Communists, "the existence of small-scale farming naturally produced capitalism and bourgeoisie on a large scale, day by day and hour by hour."10 Furthermore, although the government claimed to have been assisting the poor peasants who constituted approximately 30 to 40% of the entire farming population, it was admitted that their condition did not improve. The blame was placed upon retarded farming methods, the poor lands being tilled by them, and the individual farming system." Thus, the Communists asserted that the continued existence of poor farmers on the one hand, and the emergence of new, capitalistic farmers on the other hand, brought about class struggles in the rural areas. The conclusions were clear: any system that breeds capitalism and perpetuates the poverty of the poor peasants must be eradicated. Hence the individual ownership system had to be replaced by a collective ownership system. Only the third type of cooperative was suitable for this purpose. Thus did Kim Il-song and his

8 Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. VI, pp. 164-165. 9 Agricultural Cooperativization in D.P.R.K., p. 16. 0 Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. VI, p. 164.

Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 179.

ASIAN SURVEY / 14

subordinates defend complete collectivization in the agrarian sector of the Korean economy.

The collectivization of agriculture also abetted the regimentation of farmers, thereby enabling the party to indoctrinate, mobilize, and super- vise them more easily:

The technical revolution in the farms would create a working-class corps in rural areas and would play a positive role in heightening the level of working-class consciousness among the farmers.12

Like their counterparts elsewhere, the Korean farmers are conservative in nature. They are not prone to respond to the Communist appeals under normal conditions. The land reform of 1946, which according to North Korean sources involved the confiscation of some one million chongbo (2,450,000 acres) of land and the distribution of 980,000 chongbo to more than 700,000 families, no doubt won the Communists some enthusiastic supporters and sympathizers. However, the Communists clearly failed to win the support of the rural masses in the period before the Korean war. The mass exodus of peasants during that war constitutes irrefutable evidence of that fact. North Korean Communists were forced to admit the problem by saying that individualistic and "decadent capitalistic thoughts" were still strong among the farmers.13

But once the farmers were placed under the cooperative system, particu- larly of the third type, they came under the constant supervision of the party cadres. They no longer worked as individuals. Neither did they live as individuals scattered in the countryside. A farmer would be a part of a working team or brigade during the day and a part of an organized educa- tional or cultural group at night. Under this situation, privacy was not allowed either in thought or action. Since the farmers were deprived of individual ownership of land and reduced to the status of property-less workers, it was also theoretically possible for "workers' consciousness" to develop within them.

It is not certain when the North Korean regime actually drew up the plan for the collectivization of agriculture. But as early as 1951 the gov- ernment organized some agrarian groups that were later converted into cooperatives. These were primarily the Front Joint Work Teams near the war front. Although the background of these teams is not known, a North Korean source has identified team members as young persons whose fam- ilies had been evacuated to places of safety. The members of these teams were supposed to have worked on the land cooperatively while also assisting at the front. Since the North Korean regime inducted every available young man into the army both before and during the war, one must doubt the accuracy of this statement. At any rate, these teams, whose membership ranged from 50 to 200, are reported to have acquired a definite organiza- tion and discipline and to have assumed the character of a cooperative.14

12 Yi Chong-p'al, et al., op. cit., p. 76. 13 Ibid., p. 76. 14 Agricultural Cooperativization in D.P.R.K., p. 11.

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By July 1953, there were 80 cooperatives in Kangwon province which con- stituted the eastern war front. It is safe to assume that most of these were the outgrowth of the Front Joint Work Teams.

Another aspect of the early cooperative movement was the so-called "side-line" or subsidiary cooperatives. Farmers in these cooperatives carried out their own farming on an individual basis, but initiated some joint projects (e.g. stock raising) on the side. By July 1953, when the total number of agricultural cooperatives reached 174 (with 2,300 families), there were 72 subsidiary cooperatives. Since 1951 the regime has also emphasized the use of ox-share teams and labor-exchange teams to meet the shortage of draft animals and labor. Seasonal exchange of labor and farm animals has been common among the Korean farmers, but no doubt the effects of the war necessitated intensification of these practices. These programs rising out of the necessity of the war paved the way for a full- scale adoption of the collectivization program.

With the conclusion of the truce in July 1953, the North Korean regime began to take active steps toward collectivization. In the realm of industry, the regime adopted a three-year rehabilitation and development program, with priority on heavy industry. (This program was formally adopted by the seventh session of the Supreme People's Assembly, April 1954.) While the party's total capital investment during the three-year period amounted to 80.6 billion won (49.6% or 39.9 billion was allocated to industrial recon- struction), it allocated only 120 million won for agricultural development and an additional 243 million won for loans to economically weak co-ops and poor peasants.15 Thus the party, while placing major emphasis on the reconstruction and development of industry, turned to collectivization in the hope of increasing agricultural production.

This initial stage of collectivization was labeled by North Korean Com- munists as an experimental stage. It coincided with the "preparatory period for all-around reconstruction of the war-ruined economy," a phrase used by the sixth plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (August 1953).16 The plenum decided that several cooperatives of various types should be established in each county (kun) during this period.

Although the party's declared policy was the gradual development of cooperatives both in type and size, "from an elementary type to an ad- vanced one and from a small-scale one to a large-scale one," the cadres were instructed not to interpret the principles mechanically. Cooperatives of the advanced type on a comparatively big scale could thus be established at the discretion of the cadres "if the level of consciousness of the farmers and the preparation of the managerial personnel warranted them." This

" Kim Sang Hak, Development of Socialist Industry in the D.P.R.K., Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958, p. 35, and Kim Han Joo, Great Victory in Agricultural Cooperativization in D.P.R.K., Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959, p. 32.

16 The preparatory stage was to last from six months to a year. See Valuable Aid from Peoples of Fraternal Countries, p. 4.

ASIAN SURVEY / 16

seemingly flexible policy encouraged the cadres to establish cooperatives of advanced type while allowing the central leadership an opportunity to criticize and blame the cadres for whatever excesses might be discovered later. The aim was to advance at all possible speed while, at the same time, protecting the "correctness" of the party decision and providing at least a limited channel for the expression of grievances on the part of the farmers.

Apparently, the party exercised moderation in the first year of experi- mentation. The party chose the "progressive peasants" and poor peasants to form the core of the initial-stage cooperatives. "The majority of the middle peasants were hesitating and sitting on the fence," according to an official source.17 By June 1954, 1,091 cooperatives, with an average of 18 households each, had been established. It is very likely that the North Korean regime utilized lands abandoned by farmers fleeing to South Korea during the war to the maximum extent for the collectivization program. One North Korean source called these lands "leaseholds" and ascribed "particular importance" to them in the success of the initial stage of the cooperative movement.

After the land reform, the North Korean regime had adopted a system of transferring the ownership of land to the local government if a farmer could not work the land allotted to him.

During the peaceful construction period after the land reform, the lease of the land which fell under the category of state-owned land increased. During the war time, it was extended still further owing to the confiscation of the land from the subversive elements in rural villages, and owing to other circumstances caused by the war.18

The combination of "leaseholds" and poor farmers must have provided a reasonably smooth beginning for the collectivization program. Later the regime reported that the per hectare yield of grain in cooperatives was 10 to 50% greater than that from individually operated farms, and the cash income two to seven times as much.

The one-year experimental period was quickly followed by the "mass cooperative movement" of the following autumn. The November 1954 plenum of the party's Central Committee officially endorsed the movement, but the instructions seem to have been sent to the local governments earlier. By the time the plenum was held, 21.5% of the farmers were al- ready in the cooperatives.'9 Only 2% (1,091 families) had been so or-

17 Agricultural Cooperativization in D.P.R.K., p. 37. Although North Korean sources do not specify the meaning of different classes of peasants, the following division of peasants in North Korea according to acreage suggests a method of differentiation: As of July 1953, the average acreage of a farming family was 1.8 chongbo. Of these, 32.9% had less than 1 chongbo; 41.7% had 1-2 choongbo; 19.1% had 2-3 chongbo, and only 6.3% had more than 3 chongbo. (Yi Chong-p'al et al., op. cit., p. 12.)

1 Agricultural Cooperativization in D.P.R.K., p. 67. 9 Kim Il-song, "Concerning Our Party's Policies on the Development of Rural

Economy," speech at the plenum, Nov. 3, 1954. Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. IV, p. 177.

17 / ASIAN SURVEY

ganized at the end of June, but by the end of the year, 31.8% of the farmers had been incorporated into more than 10,000 cooperatives.

North Korean farmers are supposed to have been suddenly awakened from their slovenliness and joined the cooperatives with enthusiasm:

. . . A radical change took place in the autumn of 1954. In a word, earnest zeal for organizing the cooperatives began to emerge and grow among the middle peasants . . .

Communist leaders elsewhere, especially in East Europe would have been envious of Kim Il-song if the above assertions were true. But in fact, the North Korean farmers required strong "coaxing" and outright intimidation before their "enthusiasm" was aroused. The same official source that commended the enthusiasm of the farmers revealed that:

In some places, organizational work was undertaken in a bureaucratic manner or as a campaign, on the pretext of overtaking and surpassing those areas where the cooperative movement had advanced faster. In so doing, the degree of preparedness of the peasants was not taken into consideration and various unfair methods were used in drawing some irresolute peasants into cooperatives. . . . They (the local func- tionaries) regarded the cooperatives of the first and second types as very backward and tried only to organize cooperatives of the third type. Such deviations were also to be seen in the practice of showing contempt for individual farmers and encroaching upon their interests under the pretext of consolidating and developing cooperatives.21

Some of the farmers, uncertain about the government's intentions and re- luctant to part with their farms, seem to have resorted to evasive tactics. Relatively solvent farmers organized exclusive cooperatives restricting the membership to those of similar economic background. The acreage of pri- vate plots in these cooperatives was set above the officially prescribed maximum. Only part, and not all, of the family members were enrolled into the cooperatives. The evaluations of draft animals, farm implements, and other materials that the farmers contributed to the cooperatives were raised, and the term of payment for these contributions was shortened so that prompt payment might be assured.

Although the regime labeled all who made derogatory remarks about cooperatives as demagogues and reactionaries, it is very likely that reported remarks such as the following reflected the feelings of a large number of North Korean farmers:

"You will lose all your cattle and property once you join the co-ops." "Backbreaking toil and no rest are all you'll enjoy when you join the

co-ops. "Co-op members are doomed to degenerate into beggars. "22

But the hesitation, reluctance, or fears of the farmers could not alter government policy. "As. far as the people who hesitate or are reluctant to

2 Agricultural Cooperativization in D.P.R.K., p. 37. 21 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 22 Ibid., p. 32,

ASIAN SURVEY / 18

joint co-ops are concerned," a North Korean publication declared, "no efforts should be spared in remolding their ideology. On the contrary, the hostile elements who attempt to destroy or disorganize the co-ops must be brought under control."1'23 Here the so-called rich peasants served as convenient scapegoats. Communist leaders proclaimed the necessity of liquidating the rich farmers from farm villages so that Korean agriculture could undergo a socialist transformation.

Some evidence of the difficulties confronting the Communists in obtain- ing peasant support for cooperatives can be seen in treatises justifying the use of force in connection with the program. Paraphrasing Stalin's no- tion of "encirclement of capitalism," North Korean spokesmen have as- serted that the socialist transformation of agriculture cannot be always conducted in a peaceful atmosphere, especially under conditions of external threat. They have insisted that "a high degree of revolutionary vigilance" is necessary to bring cooperativization to a successful conclusion.

The difficulties encountered by the regime, moreover, were not confined to reluctant farmers. The regime had to contend with ill-trained and ill- prepared managerial personnel who, it is admitted, hampered the progress of the collectivization program. Some executives in the experimental stage, we are told, "had no deep understanding of the inner life of co-ops, . . . and fell short of the experience and knowledge necessary for guiding co-ops. This state of affairs gave rise to a conservative tendency."24 The same source also cited such common practices as violating democratic manage- ment principles, inadequate planning, poor utilization of co-op property, and financial mistakes. "What is worse," the official report added,

among the managerial personnel of some cooperatives were found subversive elements who had crept their way into the cooperatives and managed to occupy the leading positions. The defects of officials not only led to a waste of labor but also a drop in the rate of co-op mem- bers' attendance at work, causing a hindrance to important farm work.25

Apparently, the difficulties encountered by the regime, both in terms of farmer resistance and the inadequacies of managerial personnel, were serious. The fourth session of the presidium of the party Central Committee, held in June 1955, adopted a resolution restricting temporarily the numer- ical growth of cooperatives and at the same time instructing the existing cooperatives to reorganize and consolidate. The problem of resistance also received special mention by Kim Il-song:

Enemies of the class slandered our party's policies and spread reac- tionary rumors opposing the agricultural cooperativization movement. They also fought to destroy our agricultural cooperatives by damaging common properties or obstructing production. Especially when agri-

23 Ibid., p. 82. 24 Ibid., p. 34. 25 Ibid., p. 43.

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cultural cooperativization was near completion and socialist victory was becoming more consolidated in cities and farms, the anti-revolu- tionary elements' infestation, destruction, and obstructive behavior became more vicious.26

In spite of all obstacles, however, the regime relentlessly pushed the collectivization program. One-half of all farmers were enrolled in coopera- tives only a year after the so-called mass movement had been launched. It took only two more years for the remainder of the farmers to "see the benefits of cooperatives over individual farming" and to "volunteer" to join the cooperatives. By August 1950, no farm in North Korea remained in private operation.

Not only did the regime hasten the process of collectivizing the country- side, but it wasted no time in moving toward a higher stage of collectiviza- tion as all the farmers were brought into the cooperative system. In October 1958, two months after the announcement of the "victorious completion of the agricultural cooperativization movement," the regime announced a reorganization of the cooperatives into larger units. Henceforth, the ri (local government unit roughly equivalent to a precinct) would serve as the unit of a cooperative. Owing to the "heightened political zeal of the farmers," Kim -Ilsong later announced, "the difficult task of reorganization was completed within two months." This reorganization reduced the number of cooperatives from 13,309 to 3,843 and enlarged the size of the average cooperative from 80 to 300 families. Average acreage expanded from 130 to 500 chongbo. Since as late as January 1957, Kim Il-song had considered 40 to 100 families as the ideal size of agricultural cooperatives in North Korea, the transformation in 1958 was of a revolutionary character.

The amalgamation of cooperatives in effect equalized the economic con- dition of the farmers in different areas. Kim Il-song had reported in 1957 that some of the farmers strongly objected to amalgamation for this very reason. One cooperative in Hamgyong Namdo, according to Kim, destroyed 90% of its pigs when it was announced that the cooperative was to be amalgamated with another one.27

Identification of the ri with the cooperatives simplified administrative responsibilities in North Korea, but it also increased the regimentation of the farmers. Under the new setup, the ii officials can supervise not only the political but also the economic aspects of life for all farmers. Since the farmers are allowed to trade only with the state stores, and since the agricultural and consumers' cooperatives as well as the credit cooperatives in each ri are amalgamated into the new cooperatives, there is no way for individual farmers to avoid party supervision.28

Regimentation of the farmers is facilitated further by the establishment of "agro-cities." Many farmers were relocated from their previously scat-

26 Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. VI, p. 175. 27 Ibid., Vol. V, p. 26. 28 See the report of Vice Premier Yi Chong-ok (Nov. 22, 1960), Docunments on the

8th Session of the 2nd Supreme People's Assembly, p. 266. In 1960, farmers were

ASIAN SURVEY / 20

tered habitations to newly constructed agro-cities-ostensibly for sanitary and other reasons. Administrative boundaries were disregarded in the relocation program. The exact plans regarding the construction of agro- cities are unknown, but substantial progress seems to have been made in some areas of North Korea. For example, a 1960 publication refers to an agro-city to be constructed in Chaeryong-gun, Hwanghae Namdo, com- monly known as the granary of North Korea. Here eight ri in the vicinity are to be put into one location encompassing 5,220 households. In addition to residence buildings, the city is to have theaters, clubs, schools, hospitals, parks, kindergartens, nurseries, laundries, barber shops, and dining rooms. On the productive side, the city is to have common barns and barnyards, sericultural rooms, warehouses and rice cleaning plants. In the words of North Korean theoreticians, this "great agro-city will be a completely socialistic cultural farm both internally and externally."729 Already more than 400 buildings have been put up and another 1,000 buildings are being constructed. Many other cooperatives also have reportedly begun work on similar cities. It might be noted in passing that the large-scale agro-city construction program and the mass relocation program in neighboring Communist China appear to have broken down at this point rather com- pletely. Will this failure have repercussions in North Korea?

The internal organization of the amalgamated agricultural cooperatives is designed to bring about maximum efficiency in production and to enhance the degree of political control:

Consolidation of agricultural cooperatives is not only important in increasing production and promoting the standard of living of the co-op members, but also in preparing for the gradual transition to communism. In order for us to construct communism in the future, we must advance the collective ownership system to that of all people's ownership.30

The new cooperatives are divided into a number of working teams. The party ruled that a working team in plain areas should consist of 40 to 50 workers. In larger cooperatives (mostly in Hwanghae Narndo and Pyongan Namdo) a working team consists of all the working population of a hamlet. Although the chairmen and members of the cooperative committees and the inspection committees are in theory to be elected by either the cooperative general assembly or the representative assembly, they are in fact designated by the party. Kim Il-song in his speech of January 1957 criticized prefec- tural (kun) party and government officials for frequently transferring in-

allowed to keep 400 kg. of grain for each member of the family. (See ibid., p. 263.) The following figures represent the food allotted each rural household:

1956 1957 1958 1960 (estimate)

Grain (kg.) ... ............ 1616 1742 1826 2100 Potatoes (kg.) ....... ....... 357 434 501 540 Cash (won) ....... ......... 95 137 203 300

29 Yi Chong-p'al et al., op. cit., p. 178. 3 Ibid., p. 224.

21 / ASIAN SURVEY

competent cooperative bureaucrats to other positions.3' Apparently the pre- fectural officials, who are directly above the ri level, have the final authority on appointments. Heads of working teams under the supervision of the chairmen of the cooperatives are responsible for the members of their teams fulfilling their allotted work-load and imbuing them with Marxist-Leninist doctrines.32

If one were to judge the "cooperativization" movement in North Korea solely on the basis of its goals and proclaimed achievements, one would be obliged to agree with Kim Il-song that it has been a success. The regime mobilized thousands of students, troops, and even workers to help carry out the program. Complaining farmers have been silenced or suppressed. The regime has been boasting about a rapid increase in production since 44cooperativization," and now it even predicts the abolition of taxes. In fact, however, the regime's demands upon the farmers have been constantly increasing and whether the farmers will be allowed to enjoy the fruits of their increased labor is highly questionable. The premium in North Korea today is upon industrialization, and peasant sacrifice is essential to that goal. The publicized rise in the amount of "common funds" accumulated by the cooperatives leads one to anticipate a barrage of "voluntary" reso- lutions for donations of these funds to some designated cause.

One of the stated purposes of the cooperative movement has been to bring the lagging rural economy up to the level of the advanced socialistic economy of urban industry. With the completion of the "cooperativization" program, particularly the 1958 reorganization, the North Korean country- side has been brought closer to a socialistic economy. This fact cannot be denied. In reality, one can no longer find any difference between the lot of the urban workers and that of the peasants. In the theoretical realm, however, the cooperatives still belong to the members of each cooperative rather than to the people at large. It will not be surprising if the regime suddenly decides to eliminate this final discrepancy between the urban and rural economy and declares that henceforth the farmers shall be called the rural proletariat. It is relevant to note in this connection, that state-operated farms occupied 8%o of the entire farm area in North Korea as of 1959, and that the products of these farms constituted 11% of the total agricul- tural production in 1960.33 One North Korean economist stated that the party has significantly improved the leading position of the state-operated

31 Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. V, p. 22. 32 Under the reorganization plan announced at the Central Committee Plenum (Nov.

27-Dec. 1, 1961), "management committees" would be established at the kun level to direct farm policy. These committees, staffed by agro-technicians from central gov- ernment organs, are to guide the cooperatives. (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, Research Memorandum, RSB-105, June 21, 1962, p. 4.)

3 Chon Yong-sik, Chonhu itri dang kyongje konsol iti kibon noson (The Basic Line of Our Party's Post-war Economic Construction), Pyongyang, Korean Workers' Party Press, 1961, p. 72. State-operated farms constituted only 1.9% of the total farm area in 1949.

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farms in farm management, and the state-operated farms have begun to play an important role in the development of agricultural production.

The collectivization of farms in North Korea is a matter of great signifi- cance both for the farmers and for the regime. But the accelerated program in North Korea also sheds some light on intra-bloc relations. It is a matter of general knowledge that Soviet leaders have been critical of the massive, accelerated development of the communes in Communist China. Disagree- ment on this subject has been cited as one of the major issues in the recent Sino-Soviet dispute. It is significant to note, therefore, the striking simni- larities in the content and the timing of the collectivization programs of Communist China and North Korea. Both regimes began to take active steps toward collectivization in 1953 and moved toward larger cooperatives (or communes) in 1958. Although Communist China seems to have encoun- tered more difficulties than North Korea, this can probably be attributed to the smaller territory and population in the latter state.

Collectivized farms in North Korea are still called cooperatives, but in fact they differ very slightly from the much-publicized Chinese communes. Although the North Koreans did not publicize the common dining facilities as did the Chinese Communists, public dining halls are a standard part of model agro-cities. These facts lead one to suspect that the North Korean regime is receiving considerable advice and assistance from the Chinese Communists and planning to enter the "Communist stage" along with her immediate neighbor.

CHONG-SIK LEE is an Instructor in Great Issues at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.