the social life of illegal drug users in prison: a ...aoleynik/docs/brill.pdf · the social life of...

European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/15718174-21022026

brill.com/eccl

The Social Life of Illegal Drug Users in Prison: A Comparative Perspective

Anton Oleinika,b,*

a) Department of Sociology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, P.O. Box 4200, St. John’s, NL, Canada A1C 5S7

b) Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, the Russian Federation

AbstractDifferent degrees of criminalization of illegal drug use influence the overall composition of prison populations across countries. Individuals convicted of illegal drug-related crimes represent a significant part of the prison population in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. These convicts are not a part of the traditional criminal milieu, but a product of the perception of certain acts as crimes in particular contexts (e.g., an increasing social distance, the state’s control over potentially dangerous groups, etc.). The experience of incarceration might cause important changes in their life after release. The idea that prison contributes to the interiorization of criminal norms rather than preventing deviant behavior in the future seems especially fruitful in regard to illegal drug users. Elements of prison subculture are described on the basis of an empirical research conducted in 1996-2003 in Russian prisons (N = 769 (49 of these were convicted in relation to illegal drugs) in 2000-2001; and N = 214 (24) in 2003). The social organization of everyday life of inmates convicted of drug-related offences in Russia, Kazakhstan (N = 396 (76) in 2001) and Ukraine (N = 208 (26) in 2003) is compared with that of other convicts to test the hypothesis about the lack of significant differences between the two groups.

KeywordsIllegal drugs; criminalization; prison social climate; prison subculture; comparative approach; Russia; Kazakhstan; Ukraine

* E-mail: [email protected]. A first draft of this paper was presented at an international conference on Reducing the Use of Incarceration in June 2007 (Tehran, Iran). The author thanks an anonymous reviewer of the European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice for useful suggestions and comments on its later version. However, all remaining errors and inaccuracies are solely attrib-utable to the author.

186 A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206

1. Introduction: Particularities of Drug-Related Crimes

Drug-related offences differ from other types of crime — terrorism, violent crimes (homicide, rape and robbery), crimes of passion, white-collar crimes, etc. — by the fact that they do not necessarily have victims. All parties involved — drug producers, smugglers, distributors, sellers and users — in general make transac-tions on a voluntary basis. ‘We are here in the area of free exchanges’.1 The volun-tary character of transactions makes the approach of ‘natural law’ hardly applicable to the case of drugs.2 Both law and intuitive common sense define murder as a crime, whereas they may diverge as far as different aspects of drug uses and abuses are concerned.

Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie argues that the power of labeling drug use a crime derives from the priority given to the task of strengthening control by the state over potentially dangerous classes, not from the dangerousness of the activity itself.3 This reasoning suggests that those convicted of drug-related crimes violated a law but not a social norm (cf. a murderer transgresses both a formal law and a universal social norm).

The career of a drug user diverges accordingly from that of a typical criminal personality. Before being apprehended, the former does not necessarily have regu-lar contacts in the criminal milieu, he or she does not know its particular norms and values. It is in prison that the drug user gains knowledge of the criminal and prison subculture. It ‘comprises norms, customs, rituals, language and manner-isms which depart from those required by penal laws and prison rules’.4 All coun-tries with significant prison populations have particular prison and criminal subcultures embedded in the prison milieu. For instance, the list of elements of the prison subculture in the US comprises songs of Johnny Cash (who toured American prisons in the 1960s), hip-hop music, baggy-style clothes, slang, and movies about the experience of prison and incarceration (between 1929 and 1995 Hollywood produced 101 such dramatic films, which amounts to 1% of its total production5).

1) M. Cusson, Criminologie actuelle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), p. 50. This assump-tion does not apply to crimes committed for pecuniary gain to sustain a drug habit.2) The doctrine of natural law argues that definitions of crime and delinquency are entailed by the nature of the world and the nature of human beings. From the perspective of natural law, common sense and everyday practices turn out to be the best guiding principles for the justice system (A.-J. Arnaud, ed., Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de sociologie du droit (Paris: L.G.D.J., 1999), p.199).3) N. Christie, Crime Control as Industry: Towards GULAGs, Western Style (London: Routledge, 2000).4) M. Platek, ‘Prison Subculture in Poland’, 18 International Journal of Sociology of Law (1990), 459-472; see also V. Anisimkov, Rossiya v zerkale ugolovnyh traditsii tyurmy (Russia in the mirror of prison criminal traditions) (St-Petersburg: Yuridicheskii tsentr Press, 2003), p. 12.5) D. Cheatwood ‘Prison movies: Films about adult, male, civilian prisons: 1929–1995’, in F. Bailey, D. Hale (eds), Popular culture, crime, and justice (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1998), pp. 209-231.


However, the prison subculture in countries using imprisonment in groups (the barrack system) seems relatively stronger than in countries where prison is based on confinement in individual cells. The time convicts spend together, day and night, in the latter case gives them far more occasions for interacting and elaborating their own codes of conduct.6 Confinement in individual cells allows some privacy and an escape from the social dimension of everyday life, at least at night. Three post-Soviet countries, the Russian Federation (RF), Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which were the primary sites of the proposed analysis, keep most of their convicts in groups.

For persons convicted of drug-related crimes, prison becomes a place of re-socialization. Not in the sense of rehabilitation, one of the three missions assigned to prison (rehabilitation, retribution and custody), but in the sense of initiation into norms and patterns of the criminal subculture. ‘The more people pass through penitentiary institutions, the more bearers of the criminal subcul-ture’.7 The scholarly literature on the criminal subculture and its re-socializing effects is particularly abundant in the countries that practice imprisonment in groups.8 Imprisonment in cells prevails in Western Europe and North America where the academic interest in studying the prison subculture is relatively weaker. There are several notable exceptions, however, namely a famous study of the ‘society of captives’ in the United States and the literature that it has inspired.9

The proposed analysis aims to answer the research question as to whether the social behavior of individuals convicted of drug-related crimes in prison differs from that of other convicts. If the above hypothesis about re-socialization is true, then the comparison of two groups of prisoners, those convicted of drug-related crimes and those convicted of other crimes (all crimes combined), will not pro-duce substantially (and statistically) significant differences. In what follows I will test this hypothesis and simultaneously describe the legal framework related to uses and abuses of drugs as well as penitentiary systems in the three above men-tioned countries.

In Section 2 I will discuss sources of information, both primary and secondary, used in this study for purposes of description and analysis. Section 3 has a descrip-tive character: penal policies in regard to drug users are compared, with emphasis on their impact on crime rates. A short overview of the institutional organization of penitentiary systems in the three countries follows. In Section 4 I compare the

6) A. Oleinik, Organized Crime, Prison and Post-Soviet Societies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 45-48.7) V. Anisimkov, loc. cit., p. 176.8) See, for instance, an account of the situation in post-socialist Poland: M. Platek, loc. cit.9) G.M. Sykes, The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958); A. Liebling, Prison and their Moral Performance: A Study of Values, Quality, and Prison Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).


group of inmates convicted of drug-related crimes with that of other inmates using a series of social indicators highlighting the organization of everyday life and their behavioral patterns. This allows testing the hypothesis about the social closeness of the two groups as a result of the progressive re-socialization of mem-bers of the former group. Some normative implications of the proposed analysis are put forward in the Conclusion.

2. Sources of Information

This paper is based on primary and secondary sources of information. The list of secondary sources includes official statistics on the number of registered crimes, prison population rates (PPR), the number of persons convicted of drug-related crimes. I also refer to legal documents (Penal Codes and anti-drug laws).

A series of surveys conducted in penitentiaries of the Russian Federation (two surveys), Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the first half of the 2000s serve as a source of primary data. In all cases cluster sampling techniques were used. The penitentiary administration of a particular country gave permission to visit prisons located in a particular region or a number of regions. No randomization at this stage was pos-sible for administrative and financial reasons (the geographical scope of Russia, for instance, makes extremely difficult geographical cluster sampling even in the case of public opinion polls: as of today, this country has 83 regions). However, the choice of a unit(s), otryad, to be surveyed within the particular prison was randomized. The otryad is commonly composed of individuals sentenced for various crimes (i.e., the variable ‘article of Penal Code under which one was con-victed’ does not necessarily explain his or her placement in a particular unit). As for the sentence conditions, usloviya (Article 87 of the Criminal and Correctional Code (Ugolovno-Ispolnitel’nyi Kodeks) of the Russian Federation, for instance, defines three types of conditions: regular, strict and facilitated), they do vary across the detachments. The detachment was randomly chosen among those in regular sentence conditions (the absolute majority). When visiting individuals placed in strict conditions was allowed, efforts were made to interview a few of them too.

All members of this unit available at the time of my visit were requested to take part in the survey. The participation had a voluntary character, yet the decision to administer the survey in groups (questionnaires were filled out individually but at a session where everyone was present) contributed to extremely low levels of refusals, varying from zero to 15%. As a rule, a minimum of 30-35 inmates per peni-tentiary filled out the questionnaires. All completed questionnaires were simulta-neously submitted to the researcher. This, together with the fact that no information revealing the identity of the participant was requested, ensured the protection of anonymity. No staff member was present inside the room where the


survey took place. In-depth interviews, also conducted by the author, comple-mented the data collected through the surveys.

The collection of all primary data by the same person helps control the impact of the researcher’s personality, although this might decrease reliability of the pre-sented findings. The researcher’s personality has an especially important impact in the context of total institutions where speculations that one is working for the administration can destroy trust necessary for obtaining valid results. The author was introduced to inmates as an independent university researcher and, in fact, a reputation of reliability has been built in the process of the survey as the informa-tion freely circulates in the post-Soviet prison world by word of mouth and other informal yet sometimes highly sophisticated and efficient channels (according to an informant, a message originating in Moscow can easily reach the region of Arkhangelsk located 1,500 km North of the capital city in just one or two days10).

The survey in Russia was organized in two waves, in 2000-2001 and in 2003.11 In 2000-2001 29 penitentiaries (N = 769) — all regimes, minimum, medium and max-imum security, combined — located in five regions (Ivanovo, Moscow, Murmansk, Perm and Sverdlovsk) were visited. In 2003, the survey was conducted a second time in six penitentiaries in the Moscow region (N = 214). The sample in Kazakhstan is composed of 12 penitentiaries located in two regions (Kazakhstan includes in total 14 regions), Oskemen (Ust-Kamenogorsk) and Akmola (N = 396). Finally, the Ukrainian sample included five prisons located in the region of Kharkiv. A caveat concerning the limited representativeness of the sample in this country has to be put forward. First, the data collected in one region can hardly be generalized to the country as a whole (Ukraine has 24 regions). Second, I did not manage to ran-domize the choice of respondents within a particular penitentiary as a sample of inmates who took part in a cultural event (a theatre show) filled out questionnaires.12

The data used in the reported study have an important limitation which the reader has to bear in mind when considering its outcomes. The available data do not differentiate between drug-users and drug-traffickers: both of these categories are included in the category ‘persons convicted for illegal drug-related offenses’. On the one hand, the existing literature suggests that in the West drug-users are often involved in drug dealing. This involvement — regular or occasional — allows them to generate personal income and to cover the cost of their own drug use. A study conducted in Canada reports that every fifth active drug user engaged

10) A. Oleinik, loc. cit., pp. 60-61.11) Results of the 1996-1999 wave were discussed in detail in A. Oleinik, loc. cit.12) The show was attended by inmates placed in different detachments, representatives of one of them were invited to stay after its end and assist in the research — in this case a number of questions dealt with the show and its perception by convicts.


in drug dealing during the six months prior to their interview.13 An American study produced similar figures: twenty-nine percent of participants reported deal-ing an illegal drug that they consume in the past two months.14 The empirical evidence in this regard in the post-Soviet countries is scarcer, but it also suggests that drug dealers turn often out to be current or past drug users. Namely, drug users can commonly be found at the lowest and most exposed to law enforcement levels of the distribution system.15

On the other hand, the law both in the West and the post-Soviet countries treats drug users differently from drug dealers. Those who fall in the latter category are expected to receive heavier sanctions. In reality, however, the situation is clear-cut neither in the West nor in the post-Soviet countries. For instance, an analysis of trends in drug user and drug dealer arrest rates in Australia produces a rather unexpected result: provider-type offences lead to fewer arrests (20-30% of all drug-related arrests) than consumer-type offenses (70-80%).16 A case study of the relevant law enforcement practices in a Russian region suggests an opposite pic-ture: the number of drug dealers receiving prison sentences is almost twice as high as the number of prosecuted drug users.17 Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether these findings could be generalized to other Russian regions.

In these circumstances, I considered the fact that most respondents failed to clearly indicate the particular drug-related offense for which they had been sen-tenced18 as a factor that does not undermine the overall validity of the findings reported in this paper. The principal objective, it should be recalled, consists in demonstrating the re-socializing effects of prison incarceration as a result of which people, who committed victimless crimes, interiorize criminal norms and values. The existing contradictions in the law and in law enforcement practices

13) T. Kerr, W. Small, C. Johnston, K. Li, J.S.G. Montaner and E. Wood, ‘Characteristics of Injection Drug Users Who Participate in Drug Dealing: Implications for Drug Policy’, 40 Journal of Psychoactive Drugs (2008), 147-152, at p. 150.14) S.J. Semple, S.A. Strathdee, T. Volkmann, J. Zians and T.L. Patterson, ‘“High on My Own Supply”: Correlates of Drug Dealing among Heterosexually Identified Methamphetamine Users’, 20 The American Journal on Addictions (2011), 516-524, at p. 518.15) L. Paoli, ‘Drug trafficking in Russia: A form of organized crime?’, 31 Journal of Drug Issues (2001), 1005-1034, at pp.1016-1019; R.E. Booth , J. Kennedy, T. Brewster and O. Semerik, ‘Drug Injectors and Dealers in Odessa, Ukraine’, 35 Journal of Psychoactive Drugs (2003), 419-426, at p. 422.16) D.A. Bright and A. Ritter, ‘Australian Trends in Drug User and Drug Dealer Arrest Rates: 1993 to 2006–07’, 18 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law (2011), 190-201.17) V.I. Kuznetsov, ‘Primenenie sudami Irkutskoi oblasti “antinarkoticheskikh” statei Ugolovnogo Kodeksa RF’ (The application of ‘anti-drug’ articles of the Penal Code of the RF by the courts in the region of Irkutsk), 2 Sibirskii yuridicheskii vestnik (2006), p. 73.18) One reason for this failure refers to the grouping of provider-related and consumer-related offenses in a single article (for example, in Russia Article 218 of the Penal Code refers to drug-users, whereas Article 228.1 refers to drug dealers).


make a finer distinction desirable (especially in further research), but not abso-lutely necessary.19

3. Anti-Drug Laws and Policies

The three countries under consideration adapted restrictive drug policies. They dif-fer in degree rather than in kind. An overview of Penal Code norms referring to drug-related crimes and anti-drug laws show a high degree of consistency between the three post-Soviet countries (Table 1).20 Variability concerns mainly the amount of fines, which reflects differences in income levels (all fines are converted into euros using the exchange rate in 2007; in legal documents they are set in national currencies). When interpreting these figures, it is worth keeping in mind that in 2001 Gross National Income per capita amounted to €815 in Ukraine, €1507 in Kazakhstan and €1987.5 in the Russian Federation (converted to euro from 2007 US$ using yearly average exchange rates).21 So the ratio was 1:1.85:2.44 (1:1.94:2.96 in 2006).

Table 1. Drug-related offences and corresponding punishments: a comparison of policies in Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

Type of offence Penal Code of the Russian Federation

Penal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Penal Code of Ukraine

Unlawful purchase, storage, transporta-tion, production and processing of drugs or narcotic sub-stances (with no intention to sell)

Substantial quantity (see Table 3): fine up to the equivalent of €1150 OR compulsory work up to 2 years OR imprisonment up to 3 yearsVery large quantity: imprisonment from 3 up to 10 years OR fine up to €14350 (Article 228)

Substantial quan-tity: fine up to €55700 OR compulsory work up to 2 years OR imprisonment up to 3 yearsVery large quantity: imprisonment from 3 up to 7 years (Article 2591, 2592)

Restriction of freedom up to 3 years OR imprison-ment up to 3 yearsSubstantial quan-tity: imprisonment from 2 up to 5 yearsVery large quantity: imprisonment from 5 up to 8 years (Article 309)

19) Indeed, the eventual decriminalization of drug use also undermines the character of drug traf-ficking as a crime. Being decriminalized, drugs are a regular commodity like many others.20) This description provides a snapshot of the situation in the first half of the 2000s when the sur-veys were conducted.21) World Bank, World Development Indicators, available online at: http://data.worldbank.org/data -catalog/world-development-indicators.

(Continued)





Unlawful production and sale of drugs or narcotic substances

Imprisonment from 4 up to 8 yearsSubstantial quan-tity: imprisonment from 5 up to 12 years WITH a fine up to €14350Very large quantity: imprisonment from 8 up to 20 years WITH a fine up to €28 700 (Article 228.1)

Substantial quan-tity: imprisonment from 7 up to 12 yearsVery large quantity: imprisonment from 10 up to 15 years (Article 259.3, 259.4)

Imprisonment from 3 up to 8 years Substantial quan-tity: imprisonment from 5 up to 10 years WITH seizureVery large quantity: imprisonment from 8 up to 12 years WITH seizure (Article 307)

Transgression of norms regulating the turnover of drugs or narcotic substances

Fine up to €8615 OR imprisonment up to 3 years (Article 228.2)

Fine up to €2800 OR imprisonment up to 1 year (Article 265)

Fine up to €150 OR restriction of freedom up to 4 years OR imprison-ment up to 3 years (Article 320)

Theft of drugs or narcotic substances

Imprisonment from 3 up to 7 years (Article 229)



Involving a new person in drug consumption

Restriction of freedom up to 3 years OR impris-onment up to 5 years (Article 230)

Restriction of freedom up to 3 years OR impris-onment up to 4 years (Article 261)

Restriction of freedom up to 5 years OR impris-onment from 2 up to 5 years (Article 315)

Unlawful cultivation of plants containing drugs

Fine up to €8615 OR imprisonment up to 2 years Substantial quan-tity: imprisonment from 3 up to 8 years (Article 231)

Fine up to €4000 OR imprisonment up to 2 years Substantial quan-tity: imprisonment from 3 up to 8 years (Article 262)

Fine up to €150 OR restriction of freedom up to 3 years Substantial quan-tity: imprisonment from 3 up to 7 years (Article 310)

Organization of drug dens

Imprisonment up to 4 years (Article 232)



Table 1. (Con’t).


The similarity of legal frameworks with regard to drug-related offences does not necessarily involve uniformity in the application of the law. The ratio of drug-related crimes to the total number of registered crimes varies over time and across countries (Table 2). In the Russian Federation, the share of drug-related offences rapidly increased during the 1990s, but it has been declining since the start of the new century. The official data for Kazakhstan show a similar pattern, yet at the peak of this trend, in 2000, illegal drug transactions constituted almost every fifth crime.22 In Ukraine the upward trend has been less manifest, yet it continues to the present. The lack of agreement as to how to enforce anti-drug laws aggravates controversies related to the labeling of drug abuse and dependence a crime. So, elements of arbitrariness seem inevitable both at the stage of drafting the laws and that of enforcing them.

Practices — not uncommon in the post-Soviet context — of counting on anti-drug laws if the police cannot collect enough evidence about a suspect’s involve-ment in more serious crimes serves a practical illustration of the arbitrariness of law enforcement. If the suspect, who is believed dangerous by the police, cannot be sent to jail due to lack of evidence, an accusation of illegal drug possession sometimes becomes a strategy of ‘last resort’ for putting him or her behind bars.23 In contrast to




Falsification of documents entitling the bearer to get drugs or narcotic substances

Fine up to €2300 OR compulsory work up to 1 year OR imprisonment up to 2 years

Fine up to €2800 OR compulsory work up to 2 years

Fine up to €150 OR restriction of freedom up to 3 years (Article 318, 319)

Unlawful turnover of tools used in processing of drugs and narcotic substances


Fine up to €530 OR restriction of freedom up to 3 years (Article 313)

Smuggling in or out drugs and narcotic substances

Imprisonment from 3 up to 7 years OR a fine up to €28700 (Article 188.2)

Imprisonment up to 5 years (Article 250.1)


22) The author thanks Gesa Walcher of Penal Reform International for providing some secondary data on the Kazakhstan case.23) Similar practices have also been used in the US, at least in the past, where Al Capone was eventu-ally jailed for tax evasion, not for the organization of a criminal syndicate, see P. Buckley and

Table 1. (Con’t).


the task of looking for hard evidence of the suspect’s involvement in a serious crime, that of proving his or her possession of illegal drugs — taking into consider-ation the minimal quantities specified in the by-laws (the ‘substantial quantity’ can be as small as 0.0001 gram in the case of LSD) — seems far easier. A ‘thief-in-law’, i.e., a highly respectable individual outlaw in the Russian milieu (their high status makes it unnecessary for them to transgress the law on their own), witnesses:

Table 2. Total number of registered crimes, thousands, selected years.

1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2005 2006

Ru ssian Federation

1839.5 2755.7 2581.9 3001.7 2952.4 2968.3 2756.4 3554.7 3855

In cluding drug-related crimes

16.3 79.9 190.1 216.4 243.6 241.6 181.7 175.2 212

% of drug-related crimes

0.1 2.9 7.4 7.2 8.25 8.1 6.6 4.9 5.5

Kazakhstan 173.9* 183.9 142.1 139.4 150.8 152.2 118.5 109.3 105In cluding

drug-related crimes

4.6 13.2 18.7 21.1 23.3 17.4 11.7 5.3 6


2.6 7.2 13.2 15.1 15.5 11.4 9.9 4.9 5.7

Ukraine 369.8 641.9 576 559 567.8 514.6 566.4 491.8 428.2In cluding

drug-related crimes

7.2 38.2 39.9 42.7 45.75 47.9 57.4 65 64


1.9 5.95 6.9 7.6 8.1 9.3 10.1 13.2 15

Sources: Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki, Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Russian Statistical Yearbook) (Moscow, 2006) Table 10.1; Y. Gilinski, Kriminologiya: Teoriya, istoriya, empiri-cheskaya baza, sotsial’nyi kontrol’ (Criminology: Theory, History, Empirical Base and Social Control) (St. Petersburg: Piter, 2002), p. 278; Agenstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike, Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Kazakhstana (Statistical Yearbook of Kazakhstan) (Almaty, 2002), p. 126; A. Samailov (ed.), Kazakhstan 1991-2002 (Almaty, 2002), p. 195; Derzhavnyi Komitet statistiki Ukrainy, Statistuchnyi Shchorichnyk Ukrainy 2005 (Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine 2005) (Kyiv: Konsultant 2006), pp. 515-516; Derzhavnyi Komitet statistiki Ukrainy (available online at: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/).* Data for 1991.

M. Meese, ‘The Financial Front in the Global War on Terrorism’, in R. Howard and R. Sawyer (eds), Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the New Security Environment (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 58.


‘They (the police) put stealthily illegal drugs or weapons to many thieves (in-law)… I met here (in prison) Khobot (another thief-in-law, A.O.), he didn’t ever smoke even hashish! Yet he was sentenced to three years of prison. He was really furious: other thieves-in-law got six months of prison at maximum in a similar situation. He doesn’t smoke even poppy, not to speak about heroin. They pretend to have found heroin in his pocket…’ (October 2000, a high-security prison in the region of Murmansk).

It is worth mentioning that the minimal quantities are specified by decrees of the government, not by the law. They are subject to more frequent changes, thereby providing the executive with a venue for exercising the power of labeling (Table 3). Even the procedure for calculating the quantities varies. The ‘substantial’ and ‘very large’ quantities replaced ‘average’ ones in Russian law enforcement prac-tices in 2006.

An analysis of the dynamics of the share of prisoners convicted of drug related offences (Table 4) shows further divergence in the policies of law enforcement. Chances of receiving a sentence in cases involving drug-related offences are higher than average in Kazakhstan whereas in the Russian Federation such cases result in a sentence less frequently than average. This divergence might be due to different priorities set in police investigations, depending on the type of offense to variability

Table 3. Quantities of illegal drugs the possession of which leads to criminal prosecution, selected illegal drugs, the Russian Federation, 2004 and 2006.

Quantities (g) May 2004 Quantities (g) February 2006

Average Substantial Very large

Marijuana, dried 2 6 100Marijuana, non-dried 14 n.a. n.a.Cocaine 0.15 0.5 5LSD 0.0003 0.0001 0.005Opium 0.5 1 25Hashish 0.5 2 25Heroin 0.1 0.5 2.5

Sources: Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii No.231 ot 6.5.2004 ob utverzhdenii srednih razovyh doz narkoricheskih i psikhotropnyh veshchestv dlya tselei statei 228, 228.1 and 229 Ugolovnogo Kodeksa Rossiiskoj Federatsii (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No.231 from May 5, 2004 on average doses of narcotic and psychotropic materials specified in Articles 228, 228.1 and 229 of Penal Code of the Russian Federation) and Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii No.76 ot 7.2.2006 ob utverzhdenii krupnogo i osobo krupnogo razmerov narkoricheskih i psikhotropnyh veshchestv dlya tselei statei 228, 228.1 and 229 Ugolovnogo Kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No.76 from February 7, 2006 on substantial and very large quantities of narcotic and psychotropic materials specified in Articles 228, 228.1 and 229 of Penal Code of the Russian Federation).


in the level of tolerance to particular delinquent acts. At any rate, the divergent trends confirm that law enforcement in the area of drug-related offences depends less on their nature than on priorities in social control and a number of other external factors. In function of a particular context, the same use of drugs might or might not lead to a sentence, all other things, e.g., the legal framework, being equal.

From the point of view of a drug user or addict, the chances of landing in prison are the question of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ luck. Unlike professional criminals, they do not see any reason in including prison in their ‘curriculum’ and they do not prepare themselves for such ‘course’. After arriving in prison, they must start to adapt to a

Table 4. Number of convicted, thousands, selected years.

1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2005

Ru ssian Federation

537.6 1035.8 1071.1 1223.3 1183.6 1244.2 773.9 878.9

In cluding convicted of drug-related offences

7 38.6 101.5 115.2 99.1 126.9 84.4 61.2

% 1.3 3.7 9.5 9.4 8.4 10.2 10.9 7Kazakhstan n.a. 93 58.4 66.3 78 70.9 50.3 38.4In cluding

convicted of drug-related offences

n.a. 8.3 10.2 15 19.8 13 9.3 n.a.

% n.a. 8.9 17.5 22.6 25.4 18.4 18.5 n.a.Ukraine 104.2 212.9 232.6 222.2 230.9 202.6 201.1 176.9In cluding

convicted of drug-related offences

n.a. n.a. 21.6 24.4 25 25.4 30 32.3

% n.a. n.a. 9.3 11 10.8 12.5 14.9 18.3

Sources: Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki, loc. cit., Table 10.6; Y. Gilinski, loc. cit., p. 279; Ministertstvo Vnutrennih Del, Prestupnost’ i pravonarusheniya: 1996-2000 (Crime and Delinquency: 1996-2000) (Moscow, 2001), p. 156; Agenstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike, loc. cit., p. 127; Agenstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike, Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Kazakhstana (Statistical Yearbook of Kazakhstan) (Almaty, 1999), pp. 110-111; Derzhavnyi Komitet statistiki Ukrainy, loc. cit., p. 516; Derzhavnyi Komitet statistiki Ukrainy (available online at: http://www .ukrstat.gov.ua/); Verkovnyi Sud Ukrainy, Analiz stanu zdiisnennya sudochinstva sudamy zagal’noi yurisdiksii v 2005 r. (Survey of court decisions in 2005) (Kyiv, 2005); Verkovnyi Sud Ukrainy, Sudymist’ osib ta priznachennya mir kriminal’nogo pokarannya u 2003 r. (Convictions and criminal penalties in 2003) (Kyiv, 2003), Verkovnyi Sud Ukrainy, Rozglyad sudamy sprav pro zlochiny u sferi obigu narkotuchnyh zasobiv u 2001-2002 r. (Legal practice in regard to drug-related offences) (Kyiv, 2002). Estimated figures in italics (incomplete data on the number of some drug-related offences).


new life and to learn new norms of behavior. Prison has its own ‘constitution’ com-posed of both formal and informal norms. The latter often contradict the former (set in the Correctional Code, by-laws and internal regulations). Hence, a significant part of the population — its relative size can be assessed with the help of Prison Population Rate (PPR, the number of inmates per 100 000 of the national popula-tion) — lives under a constitution which departs from the official one (Table 5).

Prison subculture as an alternative system to officially imposed norms reaches a high level of sophistication in post-Soviet countries, especially in Russia. Its ori-gins go back to the 1930s, i.e., to the period of large-scale mass imprisonment in labor camps. The administration was unable to control such large prison popula-tions day and night. Informal leaders — organized in a hierarchy topped by thieves-in-law24 — started to perform functions of everyday management and

Table 5. Relative size and composition of prison populations, 2006.

% of prisoners convicted of drug related crimes

Russian Federation

Republic of Kazakhstan Ukraine

Official data

Survey sample

Official data

Survey sample

Official data

Survey sample

n.a. 6.4 n.a. 19.2 n.a. 12.5% of female prisoners 7.0 19.7 7.0 3.8 6.3 22.219 years old or less 22.7 15

27.2

n.a.

9 5.1 1.620-25 years old 25.5 40.1 24.426-30 years old

53.6

22.9 25.5 31.131-35 years old 11.9 14.7 26.7 20.736-40 years old 9.4 11.4 10.941-45 years old 6.3 9 1.5 5.246-50 years old 3.4 3.3 2.651-60 years old

1.33.50.3

1.10.8

2.161 years old and older 0.5 1.6

{

{ {

{ {{

{ {Sources: Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki, loc. cit., Table 10.10; R. Walmsley, World Prison Population List (6th edition) (London: International Center for Prison Studies, 2006); Derzhavna Penitentsiarna Sluzhba Ukrainy (available online at: http://www.kvs.gov.ua/peniten/control/main/uk/index); International Centre For Prison Studies (available online at: http://www .prisonstudies.org/). Dates of survey: Russian Federation, December 2005; Republic of Kazakhstan, August 2006; Ukraine, September 2006; total number of prisoners: Russian Federation, 869 814; Republic of Kazakhstan, 49 292; Ukraine, 165 716; PPR: Russian Federation, 611; Republic of Kazakhstan, 340; Ukraine, 356.

24) See more on informal leaders and their justice in A. Oleinik, loc. cit., pp. 71-101.


conflict resolution enforcing particular norms, the ponyatiya. The ponyatiya derived from criminal traditions and common sense (from this point of view, one can argue that they lie close to the logic of natural law), in contrast to the codified system of rules and norms imposed by the penitentiary administration.

In most cases those convicted of drug-related crimes serve their sentences together with those convicted of other crimes. Even if the latter tend to be sent to particular penitentiaries (e.g., specialized labor camps in Kazakhstan), the separa-tion is never perfect. Professional criminals and other delinquents, including drug users, interact on a daily basis. To adjust one’s actions to others’ behavior, they need to refer to the same norms.

Officially imposed norms can hardly serve this purpose since inmates associate them with punishment and lost freedom. For this reason, the rejection of official norms characterizes everyday life of inmates in most total institutions,25 even if drug users and drug addicts are housed separate from other delinquents. Social action in prison appears embedded in the ponyatiya and the mechanisms for their enforcement personified by informal leaders. ‘Action is “social” insofar as its sub-jective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course’.26 If both parties of a conflict respect the ponyatiya, this gives them a chance for finding a common language and mutual understanding.

4. Comparing the Social Organization of Two Groups of Inmates

The idea of interiorization of the ponyatiya by everybody who has acquired expe-rience of life in total institutions, which leads to the spread of a particular subcul-ture in the society as a whole, seems neither new nor too radical. For instance, Yuri Levada and his associates indicate that the experience of compulsory military ser-vice in the Soviet army contributed to re-socialization of young men in the sense of their rejection of official values and norms. Recruits must learn to substitute informal norms, this learning is commonly called dedovshchina (the priority of submission to the older rather than the formal superior) in post-Soviet countries, for official ones deriving from army regulations.27

The scope of this study does not allow me to analyze mechanisms of this re-socialization in total institutions, specifically in prison. The question as to whether

25) I. Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968).26) M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology Vol. 1 (New York, NY: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 4.27) Y. Levada, Entre passé et l’avenir: L’homme soviétique ordinaire. Enquête (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993), pp. 139-144, see also F. Daucé and E. Sieca-Kozlowski (eds), Dedovshchina in Post-Soviet Military: Hazing of Russian Army Conscripts in a Comparative Perspective (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2006).


the re-socialization results from ‘contamination’ of newcomers by their contact with professional criminals28 or from the institutional organization of total insti-tutions, e.g. particular characteristics of power relationships causing the rejection of official authority by those subject to it,29 calls for additional inquiries. My task will simply consist in testing the hypothesis about the similarity of social organi-zation of two groups of inmates: those convicted of drug-related crimes and those convicted of all other crimes combined.

The separation between the two groups is never perfect. They partly overlap in at least three manners. First, drug users often commit other offenses, e.g., thefts, in order to sustain their drug habit. According to the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development, drug use is one predictor of a criminal career.30 In the UK, 65% of all arrestees tested positive for drugs in 1999-2002.31 In the reported study, the per-centage of respondents convicted of other crimes in addition to drug-related ones varies from 5% (in Kazakhstan) to 21% (in Russia in 2003).

Second, as in the above discussed case of the thief-in-law, non-drug users can nevertheless be sentenced for drug-related offences. The procedure chosen for placing the respondent in one of the two groups, when the group of drug offenders is composed exclusively of those who have only an illegal drug-related sentence, addresses the first of these issues only partly (addressing the second would require access to the personal data of convicts), which somewhat limits validity of reported findings.

The level of measurement of several variables relevant for testing this hypoth-esis is nominal, which explains the use of chi-square (χ2) statistics, unsophisti-cated and imperfect, yet the most appropriate measure of association or the lack thereof between the membership in one of the two groups of prisoners and a series of social indicators describing the organization of everyday interactions. Statistically significant values of χ2 are reported separately for sections of the tables corresponding to particular countries (i.e., the unit of analysis is the group of convicts in a particular country, individual convicts being the unit of observa-tion). The choice of χ2 statistics can be further justified by the fact that I aim to demonstrate the absence of association, whereas the ‘null hypothesis’ states that

28) This thesis is explored in V. Anisimkov, loc. cit.29) See A. Oleinik, loc. cit.30) D. Farrington, J. Coid, L. Harnett, D. Jolliffe, N. Soteriou, R. Turner and D. West, ‘Criminal Careers and Life Success: New Findings From the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Behavior’, Findings Volume 281 (London: The Home Office, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 2006).31) K. Holloway, T. Bennett and C. Lower, ‘Trends in Drug Use and Offending: the Results of the NEW-ADAM Programme 1999-2002’, Findings Volume 219 (London: The Home Office, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 2004).


the association exists (χ2 statistics are powerful enough to detect the association yet it fails to assess its strength and direction).

Let us examine whether the social indicators show statistically significant vari-ability between the two groups of prisoners in all four cases (I consider results of the two surveys conducted in Russian prisons separately for the sake of increasing the reliability of findings). For instance, both drug offenders and other offenders equally reject the system of official authority (members of the penitentiary admin-istration are vested in this type of authority). Their willingness to take part in mass protest actions does not vary across the groups (Table 6). Only in one case (the Ukrainian sample) the modal answer is ‘no’,32 whereas in the three other cases a majority of respondents from both groups declare their readiness to join mass protest actions either unconditionally or on the condition that they are led by persons respectable in the prison milieu. It is worth noting the projective charac-ter of this question: such actions are explicitly prohibited by the law (Article 321 ‘Disorganization of the work of penitentiary institutions’ of the Penal Code of the Russian Federation; Article 392 of the Penal Code of Ukraine and Article 361 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan). The readiness to participate in prison riots mainly serves as a proxy indicator for the perception of official authority and the degree of obedience/disobedience to its representatives.

A second indicator useful for evaluating the perception of official authority refers to the level of trust in the penitentiary administration. Both Russian surveys show no statistically significant difference between the group convicted of drug related crimes and that of other convicts (Table 7; here and in what follows

Table 6. Are you ready to take part in mass protest actions? % of valid responses.

Russia 2003

Russia 2000-2001

Kazakhstan 2001

Ukraine 2003

N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720 N = 76* N = 320 N = 26* N = 182

Yes 17.39 22.65 2.13 12.86 13.16 14.01 3.85 3.43It depends on

requirements39.13 39.23 51.06 50.43 67.11 53.19 30.77 16

It depends on participants

21.74 6.63 14.89 10.57 6.58 10.51 3.85 1.71

No 8.69 13.26 19.15 13.43 2.63 10.19 42.31 60.57Don’t know 13.04 18.23 12.77 12.71 10.53 12.10 19.23 18.29Missing 4.35 4.97 4.26 2.86 0 1.91 0 4

* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.

32) The analysis of some other indicators also suggests the ‘deviant’ character of the Ukrainian case. This might be due to particularities of the sample in Ukraine mentioned in Section 2.


statistically significant differences are indicated in italics). In Kazakhstan and Ukraine the two groups differ (in the former case — at the margin of statistical significance), yet, somewhat counterintuitively, drug users tend to trust the prison administration even less than other convicts! They seem to exercise a kind of ret-ribution toward official authorities for the arbitrary definition of their crime. The question of institutional trust at the higher level, namely trust in the national gov-ernment, has the same pattern of responses (Table 8): convicts for drug-related crimes either do not differ from the rest of the prison population or trust the gov-ernment even less than their fellow inmates.

As for the endorsement of the ponyatiya (the alternative to the official norms imposed by state representatives) by the informal leaders in the prison milieu, convicts for drug-related crimes are again on the same side as the rest of the prison population. For instance, they appear in full support of one of the key elements of the informal constitution of life in reclusion, the norm ‘Don’t do anything that might be harmful to all of us’ (Table 9).33 The respect given to the unofficial con-stitution at the expense of the official one is further exemplified by the high level of trust in the informal leaders. Members of both groups of respondents trust the informal leaders more than members of the prison administration in all countries except Ukraine (Table 10). Only in one case (the 2000-2001 Russian survey) there is a statistically significant difference in the level of support given to the informal leaders between the two groups.

More general social indicators, like the level of generalized trust (the percent-age of those who believe that ‘people in general can be trusted’) and the level of trust in fellow inmates (the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates the lack thereof), also show a high degree of agreement between members of the two groups. Except for Ukraine, where convicts for drug-related crimes trust other

Table 7. Do you trust the prison administration? % of valid responses.

Russia 2003 Russia 2000-2001 Kazakhstan 2001 Ukraine 2003

N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720 N = 76* N = 320 N = 26* N = 182

Yes 36.36 22.7 27.66 19.23 17.81** 28.62 40*** 73.53No 63.64 77.3 72.34 80.77 82.19 71.38 60 26.47Missing 9.09 16.56 4.26 6.51 4.11 5.26 30 7.06

* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.** χ2 = 3.5 at p = 0.06.*** χ2 = 9.57 at p = 0.002.

33) For a list of particular ponyatiya and the level of support that inmates give to each of them see V. Anisimkov, loc. cit., p. 28; A. Oleinik, loc. cit., p. 80.


people and fellow inmates less than convicts for other crimes, there are no statisti-cally significant differences between them (Tables 11 and 12). These findings con-firm the commonsense wisdom that prison teaches mistrust; after all, this is the major lesson of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Not surprisingly, prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes do not necessarily believe that life outside prison walls is easier than in reclusion. After learning rules of a new game, they gain the full rights of citizenship in the prison community.

Table 9. Do you agree with the principle that “One should not do anything that might be harmful to all of us”? % of valid responses.


N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720 N = 76* N = 320 N = 26* N = 182

Yes 91.3 88 93.18 92.68 98.63 97.1 92 93.17No 8.7 12 6.82 7.32 1.37 2.9 8 6.83Missing 4.35 13.77 11.36 19.8 4.11 15.94 4 13.04

* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.

Table 10. ‘Do you trust the informal leaders? % of valid responses’.


N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720 N = 76* N = 320 N = 26* N = 182

Yes 50 55.86 25.64** 45.6 46.48 45.33 18.18 12.95No 50 44.14 74.36 54.4 53.52 54.67 81.82 87.05Missing 71.43 31.03 25.64 15.2 7.04 10.73 18.18 30.94

* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.** χ2 = 5.92 at p = 0.015.

Table 8. Do you trust the government? % of valid responses.


N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720 N = 76* N = 320 N = 26* N = 182

Yes 10.53 6.88 4.17 11.18 5.33** 20.07 17.39*** 37.42No 89.47 93.12 95.83 88.82 94.67 79.93 82.61 62.58Missing 26.32 18.75 2.08 8.76 1.33 8.84 13.04 11.66



Results of the 2000-2001 Russian survey deserve a more detailed discussion in this regard. On the one hand, they indicate the only instance of statistically significant difference between the two groups in answers to the question as to whether life is easier in reclusion than outside prison walls (Table 13). On the other hand, the same survey shows that 88% of convicts for drug-related crimes believe that they can influence decisions taken in prison compared with 70.4% of convicts in the second group who share this opinion (the difference is not statistically significant).

The reported similarities in the organization of everyday life of both groups might raise doubts on the validity of the assumption that the group convicted of drug-related crimes is mostly composed of delinquents who landed in prison because of ‘bad luck’ as opposed to career criminals. Nevertheless, the composi-tion of the 2000-2001 Russian sample, the most representative of the four, suggests that newcomers represent indeed an absolute majority of this group of respon-dents (Table 14).

The structure of the sample in Kazakhstan gives a completely different picture: here recidivists for whom the current sentence is fourth, fifth or sixth form a modal group among those convicted for drug-related crimes. This fact brings us back to the discussion of particularities of enforcement of anti-drug laws in

Table 11. Do you believe people in general can be trusted? % of valid responses.


N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720 N = 76* N = 320 N = 26* N = 182

Yes 9.09 14.84 10.2 15.75 14.67 20.28 4.35** 25.82No 90.91 85.16 89.8 84.25 85.33 79.72 95.65 74.18Missing 9.09 4.4 0 4.05 1.33 9.97 13.04 0


Table 12. Do you trust other inmates in this penitentiary? % of valid responses.


N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720 N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720

Yes 27.27 25.53 16.33 14.79 11.84 15.43 7.69** 23.33No 45.46 35.11 53.06 43.24 38.16 43.09 61.54 40.56Don’t know 27.27 39.36 30.61 41.97 50 41.48 30.77 36.11Missing 9.09 1.06 0 1.41 0 2.89 0 1.11



Kazakhstan. Here chances of being sent to jail for a drug-related offence are higher than in the two other post-Soviet countries. More rigorous policies of law enforce-ment and attempts to segregate convicts for drug-related crimes from other crimi-nals in specialized camps do not prevent the former, in the period of time under consideration, from interiorizing norms of the prison subculture during their mul-tiple yet short-term stays in prison (62% of sentences in this group of respondents do not exceed 2 years compared with only 6.6% of such sentences in the second group of respondents in Kazakhstan). In short, the two groups of respondents have different legal status and profiles in Kazakhstan too, yet their social profiles nevertheless converge.

5. Conclusion: Should States De-Criminalize Drug Use?

This article offers a tentative demonstration of the thesis that prison re-socializes individuals convicted of drug-related crimes. As a result of serving their prison terms, the behavior of convicts becomes uniform regardless of the nature of the

Table 14. Is the current sentence your first prison term? % of valid responses.

Russia 2003

Russia 2000-2001

Kazakhstan 2001

Ukraine 2003

N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720 N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720

Yes 58.33 65.73 60** 35.15 10.53*** 32.75 30.77 22.93No, 2nd 20.83 22.47 17.5 29.48 25 25.44 34.62 36.93No, 3rd 12.5 8.43 17.5 17.69 30.26 22.3 26.92 23.57No, 4th 5th etc. 8.33 3.37 5 17.69 34.21 19.51 7.69 16.56Missing 0 6.74 22.5 63.26 0 11.5 0 15.92


Table 13. Do you believe that life is easier in prison than outside prison walls? % of valid responses.


N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720 N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720

Yes 27.27 27.67 17.02** 30.69 20 26.1 37.5 38.73No 72.73 72.33 82.98 69.31 80 73.9 62.5 61.27Missing 9.09 19.5 4.25 7.78 1.33 8.48 8.33 5.2



crimes that they committed. Individuals convicted of drug-related crimes and thieves or murderers refer to the ponyatiya and interiorize the values of the prison subculture. Instead of being rehabilitated, drug users get closer to the traditional criminal milieu. The arbitrariness in the enforcement of anti-drug laws further aggravates the situation.

The findings of this study can be generalized to individuals convicted of other types of victimless crimes and, even more generally, to any newcomers in the prison milieu. As time in reclusion passes, they acquire characteristics specific to the behavior of career criminals. A common solution to this problem — separate detention of different classes of detainees — does not suffice, arguably (as the case of Kazakhstan suggests). On the one hand, inmates interact on many occa-sions (for instance, separation can hardly be achieved in pretrial detention or dur-ing transfers between prisons). On the other hand, all inmates, regardless of the nature of their crimes, are subject to the same institutional constraints, alienated official authority being one of them.

The article focuses on the example of the three post-Soviet countries, Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The post-Soviet countries have a very similar legal framework in regard to illegal drug use. However, the proposed overview of their policies aimed at enforcing anti-drug laws shows divergent paths. The chances of being sent to prison because of drug-related offences are higher in Kazakhstan (as of the first half of the 2000s) than in Ukraine and especially in Russia. Accordingly, Kazakhstan has the highest share of prisoners convicted of drug-related offences in the total prison population.

These differences seem especially noteworthy taking into consideration simi-larities in the cultural background of the three countries and their common ‘point of departure’ (the Soviet system of justice and law enforcement). The divergent paths in law enforcement indicate that the amount and type of punishment depends less on the nature of the delinquent act itself, as ‘natural law’ or the ‘eco-nomics of crime and punishment’34 would suggest, than on the particular socio-economic context and priorities set by state representatives in a more or less arbitrary manner. The arbitrariness in the application of anti-drug laws and the re-socializing effects of prison prevent the rehabilitation of drug users and com-plicate their return to normal life instead of facilitating it. Findings about the impact of partisan politics on variability in state-level law enforcement practices in the USA35 indicate that the discrepancy between the nature of the offence and the amount of punishment is not a country-specific phenomenon.

34) The economics of crime and punishment assumes that ‘some individuals become criminals because of the financial and other rewards from crime compared to legal work, taking into account of the likelihood of apprehension and conviction, and the severity of punishment’ (G.S. Becker, ‘Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior’, 101 Journal of Political Economy (1993), 385-409, at p. 390).


While the first stages of the demonstration had a descriptive character, the next stage involved the tentative analysis of the organization of social life of two groups of inmates, those sentenced for drug-related crimes and those sentenced for other crimes. The research hypothesis consists in assuming the lack of significant differ-ences in the social organization of the two groups. The collected data do not refute it, which means that drug users interiorize norms of the prison subculture and undergo re-socialization during their stay in prison. Prison teaches mistrust, espe-cially of official authorities. It also teaches how to refer to illicit norms (the ponyat-iya) instead of the law in organizing everyday interactions and solving conflicts.

A research design with elements of a cohort study seems desirable to assess the degree of durability of new orientations and ‘habitus’ acquired by drug users in reclusion. Such a study would help assess the impact of the experience of incar-ceration on their life after release from prison (or, speaking more realistically, between consecutive imprisonments). Do they continue to refer to norms and values of the prison subculture in their life outside prison walls? Does their ‘drift into delinquency’, to use David Matza’s expression,36 only strengthen as a result of their stay in prison?

There exists an alternative explanation for the reported findings. The similarity in the social organization of the two groups can be attributed to the spread of criminal values and norms in the post-Soviet society as a whole. If this is true, then one can familiarize him or herself with the prison subculture even prior to going to prison. A deep mistrust in the government and official authorities, the substitu-tion of informal norms for laws and the other elements of the prison subculture then characterize the behavior of first-time offenders — and also the general population. A large-scale survey research conducted on nationally representative samples would be needed to test this hypothesis.37

The preceding analysis had a normative dimension: it indicates that criminaliza-tion of illegal drug use has numerous side-effects that are ignored or not taken seri-ously into consideration by policymakers. Instead of contributing to the creation of a better society, criminalization of illegal drug use widens the gap between the state and some groups of the population. Hence, a priority given to minimizing harm rather than to maximizing benefits seems to be a better approach towards answer-ing the question as to what degree the state should criminalize illegal drug use. Approaches not involving incarceration38 seem promising from this point of view.

35) T. Stucky, K. Heimer and J. Lang, ‘A Bigger Piece of the Pie? State Corrections Spending and the Politics of Social Order’, 44 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency (2007), 91-123.36) D. Matza, Delinquency and Drift (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990).37) For a first attempt to explore it, see A. Oleinik, loc. cit.38) Including strategies of legalization of currently extralegal and criminal practices, see, for instance, H. de Soto, The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002).

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