the self-help group approach in afghanistan

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THE SELF-HELP GROUP APPROACH IN AFGHANISTAN REPORT PREPARED FOR PEOPLE IN NEED (PIN) CONSULTANT: ANNIKA SCHMEDING

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THE SELF-HELP GROUP APPROACH IN AFGHANISTANREPORT PREPARED FOR PEOPLE IN NEED (PIN)

CONSULTANT: ANNIKA SCHMEDING

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 5

1. Introduction 9

1.1. Research Rationale 9

1.2. DefinitionofSelf-HelpGroups 9

1.3. SHGphilosophy 10

1.4. Structure 11

1.5. HistoryofSHGsinAfghanistan 11

1.5. Differencestoothercountries 12

2. Methodology 15

2.1. Desk Based Review 15

2.2. Primary Data Collection 15

2.2.1. KeyInformantInterviews 15

2.2.2. FocusGroupDiscussion(FGD) 15

2.3. Limitations and Problems 16

3. Evaluation/DACCriteria 19

3.1. Relevance 19

3.1.1. Consistency/Relevance 19

3.1.2. NeedsAssessment 21

3.1.3. ComparisonofAlternatives 24

3.1.4. Inclusion/InternallyDisplacedPeopleandReturnees 25

3.1.5. NationalPoliciesandGovernmentStructure 27

3.2. Effectiveness 29

3.2.1. OutsideImpact 29

3.2.2. InfluencingFactors 34

3.2.3. Financial Processes 41

3.3. Efficiency 43

3.4. Sustainability 44

3.4.1. ContinuationandIndependencevs.Dependencies 44

3.4.2. Exit Plan 45

3.4.3. Link to Clusters and Federations 46

3.4.4. LinktoMicrofinanceInstitutions 47

3.5. Impact 53

3.5.1. EconomicImpact 53

3.5.2. SafetyNetworkandTrust 55

3.5.3. SocialImpact 56

3.5.4. NegativeImpact 59

3.6. SummaryofDACCriteria 60

4. ConclusionofEvaluation 63

4.1. Socialdevelopment 63

4.2. Economicdevelopment 63

4.3. Institutional stability 64

4.4. ConclusionsforCross-CuttingIssues 65

4.4.1. GenderDynamics 65

4.4.2. AfghanContext 66

4.4.3. TargetGroup 67

4.4.4. Urban Context 67

4.4.5. DisplacementandUprootedPeople 68

4.5. LessonsLearnedandGoodPractices 68

Bibliography 71

Annexes

ManualsandAnnualReports 72

AppendixA –QuestionnairesandFocusGroupDiscussionsGuides 73

InterviewGuideforkeyinformantinterview1(KII−1):

ImplementingOrganisations 73

InterviewGuideforkeyinformantinterview2(KII−2):

Community Leaders and Members 74

OverviewSheettoFilloutforeachFGD 76

QuestionsforFocusGroupDiscussions 76

3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ThisreportwasproducedbyAnnikaSchmedingfor

PeopleinNeed(PIN).Specialthanksare

duetoPIN’sstaffaswellastonationalinterviewers

andFGDfacilitatorsinallsurveyedcities,without

whomthisprojectwouldnothavebeenpossible.

Thanksareaswellduetoallparticipatingorgani-

sations,whogenerouslysharedtheirexperiences

withthisapproach,andofferedaccesstotheirSHGs

andClusters/Federations.Participatingorganisa-

tionswereAfghanAid,AREDP,ChristianAid,Handin

HandAfghanistan,AREA,OP-Mercy,RAADA,Serve,

UN-Habitat,Zardozi,andZOA. Theiranswershave

beenanonymizedinthisreportwithrandomletters,

ifnottakenfromwrittensources,becausethereport

aimstofurtheranunderstandingoftheapproachas

suchandnotanevaluationofindividualperformanc-

es.MicrofinanceInstitutionsthatkindlyofferedin-

sightsintotheirfunctioningwereFinca,Mutahidand

theAfghanistanMicrofinanceAssociation(AMA).

Thanksareaswellduetotheindividualexperts,who

advisedonIslamicfinance.

ACRONYMS

AFN Afghani/OfficialCurrencyofAfghanistan

CDC CommunityDevelopmentCouncil

CF Community Facilitator

CLA ClusterLevelAssociation

FGD FocusGroupDiscussion

IDP InternallyDisplacedPerson

KIS KabulInformalSettlements

KNH Kindernothilfe

MFI Micro Finance Institution

NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisation

PIN PeopleinNeed

SHG Self-HelpGroup

USD CurrencyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica

FinancedbytheEuropeanUnion

Self-Help Group members participating in vocational skills training

5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ThisreportoffersanoverviewofhowtheSelf-Help

Group(SHG)approachhasbeenusedintheAfghan

urbancontext,witha focusonitsthreemaincom-

ponents—socialdevelopment,economicdevelop-

mentandinstitutionalstability.Theresearchwascon-

ducted in November/December 2017 commissioned

byPeopleInNeed(PIN)togainanunderstandingof

howvariousapproacheshavebeenimplementedand

whichhavebeenmostsuccessful.Thestudycovers

theurbancentresofKabul,Herat,Mazar-eSharif,and

JalalabadwheretheSHGconcepthasbeenrolledout

by PIN or other relevant actors.

Self-HelpGroupsarevoluntary(financial)sav-

ingassociationscomprisedofa smallhomogenous

groupofpeopleina localcommunity.Thebasicidea

isfora smallgroupofpeopletocometogetheratreg-

ularintervals(weekly,bi-weeklyormonthly)andto

contributea smallamountofmoneycollectively(for

example20,50or100AFNperperson)toa commu-

nalfund.Thismoneyiskeptina savingbox,recorded

ina ledgerandcanbeloanedouttomembersofthe

groupwithagreeduponconditions.

ThecentralideabehindtheSelf-HelpGroup

approachistotacklepoverty,enablesocialandeco-

nomicempowermentandsupporttheadvancement

ofgenderequality.OneofthereasonsthatSHGsbe-

comeeffectiveina broadergeographical(region-

al/national)orsocio-politicalsense,apartfromtheir

individualempowerment,istheirembeddinginto

a largerstructureofclustersandfederations.Afghan

SHGsareincomparisontoothercountriesrelatively

un-connected:SHGsinbothIndiaandBangladesh,for

example,areregularlylinkedupfurthermorewiththe

generalbankingsystemandwithMicrofinanceInsti-

tutions,aswellaswithgovernmentalentities.

TheSelf-HelpGroupapproach,ifimplement-

edwithenoughsupportduringestablishmentand

witha viableexitstrategyinmind,isespeciallysuit-

edtosupportAfghancommunities,especiallywom-

en,intheirsocialandeconomicdevelopment.One

ofthemaincharacteristicsthatsetstheSHGap-

proachapartfromotherdevelopmentapproachesis

thetimeframenecessarytomakeSelf-HelpGroups

sustainable.Manypositivesocialimpactsarevisi-

bleinthefirstyearsofimplementation,suchasthe

developmentofgroupsolidarityandsocialaswell

aseconomicnetworksthatcansupportindividu-

alsandfamilies.However,toguaranteethelong-

termsustainabilityoftheSelf-HelpGroups,especial-

lywithscalingupinClustersandFederationstohave

a broadercivilsocietyimpact,a longertimeframe

suchasa 5–10-yeartimehorizon,isdesirable.While

thetimetoestablishthesupportivestructureandef-

fecttheoverallchange,doesnotfitneatlyintothe

project-based,grant-dependentbusinessmodelsthat

mostNGOsfunctionunder,itmightbetimetothink

inAfghanistanratherinthesemediumtolongterms

ofdevelopmenttoachievelastingchangesrather

thanquickfixes.

Summary of key points of the report:

— Theapproachisespecially suited for women to

bringthemintotheworkforcewithsmallbusi-

nessesandtoenablethemtodevelopa socialand

economicnetworkthatcansupporttheirbusiness

development

— EstablishmentofSHGsfor men posed particu-

lar challenges,reportedbyallorganisationswho

triedtoimplementtheapproachwithbothgen-

ders.Men’savailabilityandtheirgeneraldemands

forhigherfinancialinputsfromtheorganisa-

tions,bringsintoquestionwhetherthisapproach

shouldbeimplementedformeninAfghanistan.It

seemsthattheapproachcanonlybeimplemented

withmaleparticipantsiftheorganisationsarenot

bringingupfinancialassistanceatallinthefirst

place,oriftheyarewillingtoacceptfinancialim-

balancesbetweengenders.

— SocialnetworksoftheSHGsprovide the flexibil-

ity and fall-back support neededtodevelopbusi-

nessesandprovideresiliencythroughtheirde-

velopmentstages.Whenbuddingbusinessesface

difficulties,theyknowthattheycancountonso-

cialandeconomicsupportoftheirSHGmembers,

whichgivesthema safetynetworkwhiletaking

theirfirststeps.

— ClusterLevelAssociationsofferanopportunity

for community engagementinsocialandpoliti-

calissues.Theyarea productive interface for lo-

cal and regional politicians,especiallywiththefe-

malepopulation.

6

— Development of sustainable SHGs takes time

and sustained support,especiallyintermsof

trainingandsupervision.Thetime-horizonfores-

tablishingnotonlySHGs,butalsoClusterswhich

cansupportthepermanenceandsustainabilityof

SHGs,ismuchlongerthanmostprojectcyclesand

lieswiththreeyearsforSHGsandadditionalyears

withClustersina timeframeofrather5–7years.

— Opinion on financial support of SHGs by organi-

sations is split.Thesupportersofa‘pure’approach

suggestonlygivingtrainingandinsomecasesma-

terialsupport,butnofinancialsupport,asthis

wouldperpetuatea hand-outculturethatleadsto

dependencies.Supportersofgivingloansor‘top-

ups’maintainthatthiswouldenablea fasterbusi-

nessdevelopmentasthebiggerrevolvingfundsen-

ablebiggerloans.Thedecisionforeitherapproach

mightliewiththetimehorizonthatanorganisation

choosesforpursuingtheSHGapproach.

— A developedexit strategyisa musttoensurethat

theSHGsaresustainableinthefuture.Mostor-

ganisationssawa combination of a structural em-

bedding (in clusters and foundations) together

with established market linkagesasthebestop-

tiontoensuresustainabilityoftheSHGs.

— Afghanistanhasatpresentno governmental

structure to effectively deal or interface with

SHGs.Unlikeothercountries,whichofferde-

partmentsthatdealwithSHGs,Afghanistan

lacksanynationalpolicy,guidelineordepart-

mentwithcontactpersonstooversee,stream-

lineorguidetheprocessofSHGestablishment.

Itwouldbeadvisabletolobbyfortheestablish-

mentofa responsibleunitina department.An

embeddingofSHGsinthegovernmentalstruc-

turebringsthepossibleriskofa formalizationin

bureaucratic structures that can make the im-

plementationinflexible.Instructively,govern-

mentalsupportwasgenerallyrequestedbyor-

ganisationseitherinthefunctionofgivinginitial

guidanceandinformation,orforthefinalhand-

overofexistingSHGs,ClustersandFederations,

tooffera counterpart.Governmentalsupport

wasnotthoughtofasrunning,regulating,orlim-

itingSHGs,butratherasa pointofcontactto

provideinformationanda networkingpointfor

SHGimplementersandSHGsthemselves.

— OnlysomeSHGimplementingorganisationshad

experienceswithMicrofinance Institutions and

banksandmostunequivocallysawitnotasa via-

bleoptionduetothepracticewithinMicrofinance

toworkwithanaddedinterest.However,recent

developmentswithintheMicrofinancesector

inAfghanistanandgloballyhaveseentheintro-

ductionofIslamicfinancingtools,whichcreated

a sub-sectorofIslamicMicrofinance.Thissector

offers,especiallywiththeMurabahasalestrans-

action,a viableoptiontoextendsmallbudding

businessesina Shariahcompliantway.

Meeting of a female Self-Help Group

Many income-generating projects, such as custom-made tailoring, are the outcome of the support of the Self-Help Groups

9

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Rationale

Thisreportassessestheimpactandeffectivenessof

theSelf-HelpGroup(SHG)approachasusedinthe

Afghanurbancontext,witha focusonits3maincom-

ponents—socialdevelopment,economicdevelop-

mentandinstitutionalstability.Thestudyaimstoim-

provetheunderstanding,anddocumenttheimpact,

oftheSelf-HelpGroups(SHGs)approachinAfghan-

istan,toidentifybestpracticesaswellaschallenges

incurrentSHGmethodologiesusedbyselectedNGO

facilitators.Theultimategoalistoprovidepractical

recommendationstooptimisetheSHGapproach’s

relevanceandeffectiveness.Whilethereportwas

commissionedbyPeopleInNeed(PIN)theintention

isnottoevaluateorreviewtheperformanceofPINor

otheractorsindividually,buttogainanunderstand-

ingofhowvariousapproacheshavebeenimplement-

edandwhichhavebeenmostsuccessful(orcouldbe

overallimproved).Thestudycoversurbancentres

wheretheSHGconcepthasbeenrolledoutbyPIN

orotherrelevantactors,whiletakingintoconsidera-

tiontheaccessandsecuritysituation.Therefore,the

studyfocusesonthefollowingcities—Kabul,Her-

at,Jalalabad,andMazar-e-Sharif.Thestudywasalso

designedtoconsiderthedifferentAfghancontextsin

whichtheSHGapproachcouldbeapplied,withmod-

ifications,suchasIDPcommunities,femaleversus

maleSHGs,aswellasthedifferencesinurbanandru-

ralsettings.

1.2. Definition of Self-Help Groups

Thebaseconceptofa Self-HelpGroupisrelative-

lystraightforward:establishinga voluntary(finan-

cial)savingassociationcomprisedofa smallhomoge-

nousgroupofpeopleina localcommunity.However,

therealityofhowtheSHGapproachisimplemented

andwhatthisimplementationentails,variesgreatly

amongorganisations.1

Fromtheeconomicsperspective,thebasic

ideaisfora smallgroupofpeopletocometogetherat

regularintervals,suchasweekly,bi-weeklyormonth-

ly.Eachmembercontributesa smallamountofmon-

eytoa communalfund,forexample20,50or100

AFNperperson.Thismoneyiskeptina savingbox,

recordedina ledgerandcanbeloanedouttomem-

bersofthegroupwithagreeduponconditions.Most

savinggroupsinAfghanistanhandletheloanswith-

outcharginganyinterest.Theparticipantscanbuild

upwiththeseloanssmallenterprises.However,much

morethanthemerefinancialfunction,italsoenables

participantstobuildupa socio-financialsafetynet-

work,onwhichtheycanrelywhenexperiencingso-

cialoreconomicdifficulties.

Oncethegroupsareestablished,Self-Help

Groupscanrunbythemselvesinsavingandaccumu-

1 Seealsoforthisfroma theoreticalperspective:Murria,Priyanka,

andSatishVerma.“MicrofinancethroughSelf-HelpGroups:

A ThematicPerspective.”Productivity54,no.3(December2013):

302–10.

latingmoney,givingloansandcollectingthemon-

eyback.Trainingsthroughorganisationsthates-

tablishedthemenablecontinuouslearningnotonly

ofaspectssuchasbusinessdevelopment,andlead-

ership,butalsooftenoftangibleskillsthatcanbe

usedindevelopingbusinesses.Whetherskillswillbe

taughtsuchasthroughvocationalskilltrainings,or

onlyenhancedthroughdiscussionsonhowtomarket

them,dependsontheorganisations.

Thisorganisationalsupportsuggestssever-

aldynamicsthathavethepotentialtocontradictor

underminetheintendedpurposeoftheSHG. While

SHGsareusuallydefinedassmall,homogenousaffin-

itygroupsofpeople,formedtoattaincertaincollec-

tivesocialandeconomicgoals,inpracticethegroups

mightbemorediverseintermsofethnicityorso-

cio-economicstatus.Theideabehindhomogenous

groupsistocreatea platforminwhichpeoplewith

similarneedscanmeet,exchangeandfindstrategies

tonurturea commongoalofeconomicandsocialde-

velopment.Itshouldpreventbuildingofhierarchical

structuresinwhichthemoreknowledgeableorbetter

offdominateothergroupmembers.Diversegroups

canplayoutinmultiplewayswitheither‘stronger’

groupmembersmanipulateordominatethelessfi-

nanciallyliterate,oronthecontrarythroughstrong-

ermemberssupportingweakermemberstodevel-

optheirstanding.However,withinstronglydiverse

groups,itisuptothegroupdynamicandnotthefacil-

itatorhowtheheterogeneityplaysout.Astheexam-

10

pleofotherheterogeneouscharacteristicsshows,di-

versitymustnotalwaysbea drawback,butcanonthe

contraryhelpintheintegrationofIDPsandreturnees.

However,thismightrequiremoreinitialsupportby

theorganisationinsettinguptheSHG(see:3.1.4. In-

clusion/InternallyDisplacedPeopleandReturnees).

Anotheraspectisthevoluntarynatureofthe

groups:whilethegroupsarefreeassociationsofpeo-

plewhocometogetherfora mainpurposeandwho

canleaveatanytime,thisdefinition“fail(s)todescribe

theroleplayedbyNonGovernmentOrganisations

(NGOs)intheformation,stabilisation,trainingand

functioningofSelf-HelpGroups(SHGs).”2Organisa-

tionsareusuallynotonlyresponsiblefordefiningthe

characteristicsofwhocanjointhegroup,butalsofor

thestructuralparametersinwhichtheyfunction.Fur-

thermore,mostadditionaltrainingsthatthegroupre-

ceivesaregivenbytheorganisationsthatestablish

theSHGs.

1.3. SHG philosophy

Likeinitsphysicalstructure,theoverarchingphilos-

ophybehindtheSHGconceptmayseemstraight-

forwardonthesurfacebutinitsimplementationwe

encountera greatdealofvariety.Thecentralideabe-

hindtheSelf-HelpGroupapproachistotacklepov-

erty,enablesocialandeconomicempowermentand

supporttheadvancementofgenderequality.While

alloftheseaspectsplayeda rolefortheinterview

partners,eachorganisationstresseddifferentfoci

2 Murria/Verma,2013,p.304.

Phot

o Ja

n M

rkvičk

a

Organizations are offering training components to enhance already existing skills, such as tailoring.

11

withinthesethreeareasastheirmainobjectivein

their work.

HandinHandAfghanistan,forexample,ar-

guesthatSHGsarepartofcreatingmicro-enterpris-

esattheindividual,householdandcommunitylevels,

whichcontributestoeconomicgrowthatthefurther

regionalandnationallevels.Thiseconomicimpact

alsohasa genderedsocialimpact,contributingto

women’seconomicindependenceandsocialstanding

ashouseholdincomecontributors,leadersandcom-

munitydecision-makers”.3OP-Mercydescribeshow

SHGsnotonlyprovidethepoorsectionofsociety

witha‘voice’,buthowtheirempowermentfeedsinto

a“grassrootsmovementtoempowerAfghanwom-

ensocially,economicallyandpolitically”.4 Kindernot-

hilfe(KNH)5evenframesitfurtherindefiningeco-

nomicdevelopmentandpovertyalleviationthrough

SHGsasa rights-basedapproachinwhichpovertyis

framed“asthedenialofrightsandpovertyalleviation

asa processofreclaimingone’sright”.6

Allthesedifferingdefinitionsseeanintertwin-

ingofeconomicdevelopmentandsocialwell-being

ofcommunities,thatstrengthensespeciallypoorand

vulnerablegroups.

3 See:HandinHandAfghanistan,AnnualReport2016,p.11.

4 See:OPMercy,SelfHelpApproachReport11–2017,p.IVandV.

5 TheapproachofKNHisimportanthereastheyhavesupported

otherorganisationsinAfghanistantoestablishSHGsandtheir

SHGmanualisusedbymanyorganisationsasa guidelinetostart

SHGs.

6 See:Self-HelpGroupApproachManual,2nd Edition,by

Kindernothilfe,p.7.

1.4. Structure

OneofthereasonsthatSHGsbecomeeffectivein

a broadergeographical(regional/national)orso-

cio-politicalsense,apartfromtheirindividualem-

powerment,istheirembeddingintoa largerstructure

ofclustersandfederations.

OnceindividualSelf-HelpGroupsareestab-

lishedwiththeeconomicmechanismsandstrongso-

cialsupportnetworks,severalSHGstogethercanbe

formedintoa cluster.Generally,8–10strongSHGscan

cometogetherintoa ClusterLevelAssociation(CLA)

throughselectingtwomembersofeachSHGtorepre-

senttheirgroupattheCLA. Whilethemaineconomic

focusoftheSelf-HelpGroupsistoenablesavingaswell

asprovidingloanswithinthegroup,thefocusofthe

CLAistomobiliseresourcesfortheneedsoftheover-

allcommunityfrombroadersources,includinggovern-

mentandnon-governmentorganisations.7

ThegreaterthenumberofSHGs,themore

CLAsthatcanbeformed.Theyinturncancometo-

getherontheFederationLevel.WhiletheCLAsarere-

sponsibletoaddresstheissuesina specificcommunity,

thegoaloffederationsistoensure“thattheprinciples

andfeaturesoftheSelf-HelpGroupapproacharerec-

ognisedandfindtheirwaysinlocal,regional,andna-

tionallawsandpolicies”.8Likeinmostothercountries,

Afghanistanalsolegallyregistersfederationsinthe

governmentwithintheMinistryofJustice.9

7 KHNSelf-HelpGroupManual,p.16.

8 KHN,p.15.

9 Interviews,HandinHand(Mazar-eSharif)andOPMercy(Kabul).

Source:http://aeerwanda.rw/stories-from-the-field/playground-or-bust/

1.5. History of SHGs in Afghanistan

TheintroductionoftheconceptofSelf-HelpGroups

canbetracedbacktotheearlypost−2001yearsin

whichinternationalorganisationsbeganworkinginAf-

ghanistan.KNHandOP-Mercyappeartobethepio-

neersoftheconcept(2002),10withothersfollowing

soonafter(AfghanAid2004).11OP-Mercyhasbeenin-

strumentalinsharingitsknowledgewithotherorgani-

sationsandinspiringthemovertheyearstostartSHGs:

10 See:Self-HelpGroupApproachManual,2ndEdition,by

Kindernothilfe,p.7,InterviewwithOPMercy,Kabul2017.

11 Cramer,Sarah,HervéNicolle,andNassimMajidi.“Self-Help

GroupProgrammeEvaluation.”Kabul,Afghanistan:SamuelHall,

2012.

12

“In2002a consultantcamefromIndia,Thom-

asPaul,andheintroducedtheconceptofSelf-Help

Groupstointernationalorganisations.Atthattime,

mostcountrydirectorsandmanagerswhopartic-

ipatedinthetrainingstoldhimthatthisisnotpos-

siblehereinAfghanistan.Butatthattimeouror-

ganisationparticipatedaswellandwesaid,ifitis

workingforotherpoorcountries,itcanworkinAf-

ghanistan,too.Wewerethefirstorganisationto

startSelf-HelpGroupshere.ThetrainerforSelf-

HelpGroupscamefromIndiaandthefirstfunding

camefromGermany.Aftera firstmonthtrainingfor

facilitatorswestartedtoworkintheKarteNawarea

inKabul.”(Khalida,OP-Mercy)

WhiletheformalisationoftheSHGapproach

canbetracedtoinputsfromIndiaandBangla-

desh,wheremostliteraturecanbefound,12saving

groupshavebeenanindigenousconceptwellknown

tomanyAfghans.SavinggroupsexistinsomeAf-

ghancommunitiesamongextendedfamilies,where

a monthlycontributioniscollectedaccordingtoabil-

ity.Thecontributioncanbeeithermoneyormateri-

als,suchastoolsforcommunityuse(includingpots,

crockeryorbricks).Themoneycanberequested

12 Seeforexample:Seibel,HansDieter.“SHGBankinginIndia:The

Evolutionofa RuralFinancialInnovation.” Cologne, Germany:

University of Cologne, Development Research Center, 2005;

Shukla, O P. “ImpactofSelf-HelpGroupsandFlowofCreditto

RuralSectorinUttarPradesh.”Indian Journal of Agricultural

Economics62,no.3(2007):384;Patil,Sandeep,andKiranKokate.

“IdentifyingFactorsGoverningAttitudeofRuralWomentowards

Self-HelpGroupsUsingPrincipalComponentAnalysis.”Journal

of Rural Studies55(2017):157–67;Varman,Mahendra.“Impact

ofSelf-HelpGroupsonFormalBankingHabits.”Economic and

Political Weekly40,no.17(April23,2005):1705–13.

frommembersofthesavinggroupforsocialocca-

sionssuchasfunerals,payinghospitalbillsorbuild-

ingcommunityinfrastructure,andwillberepaidin

agreeduponintervalstothegroup.

Therefore,whiletheoverallconceptofSHGs

assistedbyoutsideorganisationsandtheirextension

tolargerstructuresofassociationsandfederations

mightbea noveltyinAfghanistanpost−2001,thegen-

eralideaofsavinggroupsandactivesocialnetworks

thatsupportfamilyandrelativesinneedhaveexisted

muchlongerandoffera foundationfortheimplemen-

tationofSHGs.

1.5. Differences to other countries

Self-HelpGroupsinothercountriesareofteneither

linkedupwiththeMicrofinancesector,and/orwithgov-

ernmentalentities.SHGsinbothIndiaandBangladesh,

forexample,areregularlylinkedupwiththegeneral

bankingsystemandwithMicrofinanceInstitutions.13

SHGsinIndiaforexample14arelinkedup

withthegovernment,andsince2000/01included

intheannualstrategyofthegovernmentofIndia.15

Thisbringswithitsupportandstreamlining,though

13 See:Fernandez,AloysiusP.“HistoryandSpreadoftheSelf-

HelpAffinityGroupMovementinIndia/TheRolePlayed

byIFAD.”IFAD—InternationalFundforAgricultural

Development,2007.Accessedunder:https://www.ifad.org/

documents/10180/35979b08–2323–487c-a6b6–320a3ddee34c

14 See:”Self-HelpGroups(SHGs)inIndia”,accessedunder:

http://www.ipekpp.com/kp/W%26G/Brief_Paper_SHG_Ethipian_

Delegation_(3rd_Sept)%5B1_new%5D.pdf

15 See:p.8:https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/35979b08–

2323–487c-a6b6–320a3ddee34c.

alsoguidanceintermsoftheimplementationofthe

SHGs.ItisforexampleprohibitedinSriLankato

givedirectfinancialsupporttoSHGs.Theonlysup-

portthatisgiventotheSHGsistrainingandconnec-

tivitytothelabourmarket.InSriLankatheseSHGs

havehistoricallyalsobeenconnectedtocoopera-

tives.Thismeansthattheydon’tonlyhavetheirown

savingswithintheirgroups,buttheycanalsoexpect

a shareattheendoftheyear.16

Anotherdifferencetosomeothercountriesis

Afghanistan’sspecificreligiouscontext.TheSHGap-

proachaccommodatesinmanyplacesthecharging

ofinterest,whichcancontributetoa bettereffectiv-

ityofthefunctioningofthegroupsthrougha faster

growingcommunalfund.However,mostcommuni-

tiesinAfghanistanrejectthepayingofinterestasitis

seenasun-Islamic.Thereareexceptionstothisrule,

assomegroupsdecidethemselvestolevya‘service

fee’orgivefinancialgiftsasa‘thankyou’gifttothe

groupforenablingthesuccessoftheirsmallbusiness

inthefirstplace.However,mostSHGsthatweresur-

veyedforthisreportrefuseda general,determined

interest.

16 InterviewUN-Habitat,Kabul,December2017.

Illiterate Self-Help Group members participate in the literacy training courses offered by organisations

Illiterate Self-Help Group members participate in the literacy training courses offered by organisations

15

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. Desk Based Review

ThestudyoftheSelf-HelpGroupapproachbegan

witha desk-basedreviewofexistingsecondaryliter-

ature.Thisreviewincludedacademicsources,offi-

cialreports,relevantgovernmentalpolicydocuments

andstrategies,publishedandunpublishedstudies,

documentarysources,aswellasthetrendsanddevel-

opmentsoftheindicatorsusedintheprogramming

ofPINandotherstakeholders.Thereviewofthein-

ternaldocumentationofPIN,suchasprojectpropos-

als,interimandfinalevaluationreports,interimnar-

rativereports,M&Edataandmanualsprovidedan

understandingofPIN’sstrategyandapproachtothe

concept,whichcouldthenbecontrastedwithexter-

naldocumentationfromotherorganisations.What

emergedfromthereviewwasa frameworkwhiches-

tablisheda baseforlaterdatacollectionandanalysis.

Ithelpedtofine-tunethemethodologicaltoolsand

theanalyticalframeworkforthesurvey,aswellas

showinformationgapsintheexistingliterature.

2.2. Primary Data Collection

2.2.1. Key Informant Interviews

Keyinformantinterviewswerecriticalindevelop-

inganin-depthunderstandingofthesubject,and

toofferingcontextualinformation.Theconceptu-

alframework,whichwasdevelopedintheperiodof

thedesk-basedreview,provideda basisforthein-

terviewguides.Keyinformantinterviewswerequal-

itativeinnature,andsemi-structuredthroughthe

useofinterviewguides,whichoutlinedtopicsandis-

suestobecoveredduringthesession(forInterview

GuidesseeAppendix).Theinterviewerframedthe

actualquestionsduringthecourseoftheinterview

alongthelinesoftheinterviewguide,butwasfreeto

followuponanyrelevantissuesastheyaroseduring

theinterview.Thisflexibilityallowedfortheexplora-

tionofnewideasandissuesthathadnotbeenantici-

patedbutwererelevanttothestudy,especiallyinthe

developmentofsuggestionsandrecommendations.

Aninvestigatorwasabletocarryouttwoorthreein-

terviewsa day,dependingonavailabilityoftheinter-

viewees.Groupsandindividualswhoqualifiedforthe

selectionaskeyinformantswere:

— Humanitarian/DevelopmentActorsimplement-

ingtheSHGapproachintargetcitiessuchaspro-

grammeandprojectmanagers,projectadminis-

trators,SHGcoordinators,SHGfacilitatorsand

community mobilisers

— CDCs,shurasandcommunityleadersincommuni-

tiesinwhichSHGswereimplemented

— GovernmentStakeholdersinrelevantministries

andcorrespondingregionaldepartments17

17 Governmentstakeholderswerereachedouttoasoutlinedinthe

study,forexampleintheMinistryofFinanceandtheMinistry

ofJustice.Unfortunately,asthereiscurrentlyonlyselective

cooperationinprojectpartsbutnooverallembeddingintoany

statestructureforSHGs,noresponsiblepersoncouldbereached

forcomprehensivecomments.

— Community Stakeholders such as community

leaders,keymembersofSHGs,clusterledasso-

ciationleaders,federationledassociationlead-

ers,etc.atthecommunitylevelineachofthetar-

getcities

— Micro-credit/micro-financeinstitutionsinKabul

aswellasintheprovinces

— ScholarsandotherexpertsonMicrofinanceand

Islamic Finance

2.2.2. Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

FocusGroupDiscussionstypicallyinvolve6–12partic-

ipants,withtheidealsizebeing7–8.Though,inprac-

tice,thenumberofFocusGroupparticipantsvaried

from8to30,astheFGDwereconvenedwithintheex-

istingSHGsinfamiliarmeetingplaces.Therefore,of-

tenmorewomenwerepresentthanplannedfor.Ide-

ally,participantsshouldbematchedasa homogenous

grouporganisedalonglinesofgender,ageandsocial

position.Thisallowsforanatmosphereinwhichthe

participantsfeelfreetoexchangeandexpresstheir

genuineopinions.Whileideallyparticipantsshouldnot

knoweachotherbeforehand,associalpressurescan

significantlyskewstudyresults,thiswasnotpossible

intheSHGcontextgiventhesegroupswerealready

establishedandmembersacquaintedwitheachoth-

er.Instead,theFocusGroupsfunctionedasanenvi-

ronmentforreflectiononwhatwasalreadygoingwell

orcoulduseimprovement.A moderator,supportedby

a secondpersonasnotetaker,ledthefocusgroups.

16

Theproposedformatincludedfocusgroups

withSHGsthatwereestablishedbyPIN(min.15)and

SHGsestablishedbyotheractors(25),includingboth

maleandfemaleSHGs(targetratio:70/30female/

male).However,duetoavailabilityandaccess,thera-

tiobetweenFGDswithPINandotherorganisations

offeringsSHGswasratherreversedwith27FGDs

throughPINand11additionalFGDswithotherac-

tors(with76/24female/maleratio).Thefocusgroup

discussionswereconductedindifferentgeographi-

calareaspre-determinedinconsultationwithPIN,to

betterunderstandthefunctionalityofSHGsinvar-

yingsocio-economiccontexts.Theresearchdesign

alsoincludedSHGsatdifferentstagesofdevelop-

ment(newlycreated,stabilised,andSHGslinkedup

withclustersand/orfederations).

TheFocusgroupswererecordedandlateron

translatedandtranscribed.Thenotetakingfunc-

tionedasmarkersforwhospokewhenandtoretain

anoverviewofthediscussion.Thequestionsforthe

focusgroupswereorganisedastohavemainques-

tionsandpossiblefollow-upquestions.Thequestions

weredesignedtobefewerthanintheKIIasmore

participantswereansweringthemanditisdesira-

bleforthefocusgroupnottoexceeda maximumof

twohours.Furthermore,itwashopedthatthefocus

groupquestionswouldbesimpleenoughforevery-

onetoparticipate,butengagingenoughtofoster

meaningfuldiscussionandreflectionamongpartici-

pants.

2.3. Limitations and Problems

— Size of FGD: SizeofFGDsexceededtheenvi-

sionednumbersastheFGDswereconvenedwith-

intheexistingSHGsinfamiliarmeetingplaces.

Therefore,oftenmorewomenwerepresentthan

plannedfor.WhilesmallerFGDsareadvisableto

integrateallparticipantsintothediscussion,wom-

enkeptarrivingandcallingeachothertopartici-

pate,usuallyinthefemaleFGDs.

— Pre-Knowledge: Usually,FGDsareusedingroups

ofpeoplewhodonotknoweachotherbefore-

hand.Inthisresearch,however,FocusGroups

wereusedtoresearchpre-existinggroupssuch

astheSelf-HelpGroups.Therefore,FocusGroups

functionedratherasanenvironmentforreflec-

tiononwhatisalreadygoingwellorcoulduseim-

provement,ratherthanananonymousdiscussion

space.

— Presence of Facilitators: InmostFGDs,facilita-

tors,whoaretheorganisationalcontactpointto

theSHGs,werepresent.Thiscolouredpartici-

pants’responsesinthehopeofgarneringfurther

supportfromtheorganisation,asevidencedin

statementsthatexpressedhopeforcontinuingfi-

nancialsupport.

— Rural/Urban: SomeOrganisationsthatwerein-

terviewedwererunningSHGs,butonlyinruralar-

eas. Theirexperiencewastakenintoaccountto

contrasttheinformation,whereapplicable,tour-

banSHGsandtounderstanddifferingconstraints

betweenthesetwosettings.

Learning book keeping enables the groups to track their progress and to keep members accountable

The groups are also knowledge hubs in which the women can learn from the trainers and from each other how to build up small enterprises

19

3. EVALUATION / DAC CRITERIA

ThestudyappliedtheDACcriteria18forthedevel-

opmentoftheresearchframeworkandthedifferent

questionnaires,19aswellastheevaluationofthefind-

ings.Thefiveevaluationcriteria(relevance,effective-

ness,efficiency,impact,sustainability)weredevel-

opedbytheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operation

andDevelopment(OECD).Theyhavebeenoneofthe

mostwidelyadoptedcriteriausedforaidevaluation

byinternationalnon-governmentalorganisations(IN-

GOs)aswellasbymostbilateralandmultilateraldo-

noragencies.20

3.1. Relevance

Thecriterionofrelevancemeasures“theextentto

whichtheaidactivityissuitedtotheprioritiesand

policiesofthetargetgroup,recipientanddonor”.21

Thequestionsinthispartfocusonaccessingwheth-

ertheactivitiesandoutputsoftheapproachare

consistentwiththeoverallgoalandtheattainment

ofitsobjectives,aswellaswiththeintendedimpacts

andeffects.

18 Fora critiqueofthecriteriaandsuggestionsforfurther

development,see:Chianca,Tomaz,TheOECD/DACCriteria

forInternationalDevelopmentEvaluations:AnAssessmentand

IdeasforImprovement,accessedat:http://evaluation.wmich.edu/

jmde/

19 See:AppendixQuestionnaires

20 See:Chianca,p.41.

21 See:http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/

daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

3.1.1. Consistency/Relevance

Mostorganisationsinterviewedforthisresearchsaw

theSelf-HelpGroupapproachasa waytoaffectso-

cialchangethrougheconomicdevelopment.Theyde-

scribedtheideabehindtheSelf-HelpGroupapproach

astacklingpoverty,enablingsocialandeconomicem-

powermentandsupportingtheadvancementofgen-

derequality.Intheirownwords:

“Weworkinthreesectors,namelywomen’sem-

powerment,humanitarianresponse,andadvoca-

cy.Ourmainobjectivesarethedevelopmentof

resilience,genderwork,andsocialaswellaseco-

nomicempowerment.TheSHGapproachofficial-

lyfallsundertheeconomicempowerment,but

itisofcourseconnectedwiththeseothergoals.”

ORG. K., HERAT, INTERVIEW

ThisissimilarlydescribedintheSelf-Help

Groupmanualsandreports,inwhicheconomicim-

pactislinkedwitha genderedsocialimpact,contrib-

uting“directlytoimprovingwomen’seconomicinde-

pendenceandsocialstandingashouseholdincome

contributors,leadersandcommunitydecision-mak-

ers”.22Forsomeorganisations,however,thefocus

thatisperceivedbytheirimplementersmightbein-

itiallyonlytheeconomicimpactwhilegenderissues

emergeasaby-productratherthantheinitialpriority:

22 See:HandinHandAfghanistan,AnnualReport2016,p.11.

“Ourcolleaguesmightnothaveseenitimmediate-

lylikethis,butactually,thisprojectisaboutem-

powerment.Notonlyeconomic.Often,thewom-

eninthegrouponlytalkabouttheirbusinesses,

butitcomesoutthatwomenwiththisindepend-

encecanoftenaddressmanyothersocialissues,

suchasforexamplegender-basedviolence(GBV).

Oncetheyaremobilised,theycanaddressthese

otherissues,too.” ORG. H., INTERVIEW, KABUL

Whileallofthesurveyedorganisationsfocus

oneconomicdevelopmentofthepoorestofthepoor

communities with an inclusive and sometimes exclu-

sivefocusongenderdevelopmentandwomen,PIN’s

approachisuniqueinthattheynotonlyviewtheSHG

approachintermsofsocio-economicempowerment,

butapplyitto“contributetothesustainableeconom-

icandsocialintegrationofuprootedpeopleandhost

communitiesinAfghanurbaninformalsettlements”.23

Whileotherorganisationsfocusonpovertyandgen-

der,PINhasaddedanotherintersectionalcategory

withtheaimofusingtheSHGasanintegrationtool

betweendifferentgroupsinanurbancommunity.

Thecommonthreadthroughoutthesediffer-

ingdefinitionsseeanintertwiningofeconomicde-

velopmentandsocialwell-beingofcommunities,that

strengthensparticularlypoorandvulnerablegroups.

Theinterviewedorganisationsstatednearunanimous-

lythattheirfocuswereespeciallypoorcommunities.

23 See:PINinternaldocumentation,projectapplication.

20

Whileorganisationsvariedinstrictnesscon-

cerningtheeconomicbackgroundandselectioncri-

teriaofbeneficiaries(see3.1.5. fora discussionof

exceptions),allbutonesawtheSelf-HelpGroupap-

proachasa waytoaffectbotheconomicandsocial

advancementforpoorcommunities.Theoneorgani-

sation,whichhadabandonedtheapproachaltogeth-

erwaspessimisticabouttheuseofSelf-HelpGroups

intheworkwithverypoorcommunities,atleastfor

shorttomedium-termoutcomes:

“Youhavetoworkwiththemforatleast2yearsto

makethiswork.Weworkwiththepoorestcom-

munitiesinAfghanistanandI don’tbelieveinthe

Self-HelpGroupapproachanymore.Itisverydif-

ficulttowaitthatlong,tobetoldthatmaybeaf-

ter2 or 3 yearsyouwillhavesomethingforthem.

Theirneedistohavemoneyfortheshortterm.”

ORG. B., HERAT, INTERVIEW

Itneedstobeaddedthatthisorganisationat-

temptedtoestablishSHGswithina (too)shortatime

frameofonly6monthswithoutanyadditionalfinan-

cialincentives.Theyimplementedtheapproachonly

withsupportoftrainings,butsawSHGsdiscontinue

theirworkoncetheorganisationpulledout.Asdis-

cussed in part3.2.2.,timeisofessencefora success-

fulimplementation.

Almostallorganisationsstressedthattheirfo-

cuswaspoororeventhepoorestofthepoorincom-

munities.However,mostalsohadanintersectional

focusonworkingwithwomen,andfelttheapproach

waswellsuitedforwomeninAfghanistan.Rationales

forworkingwithwomenrangedfromeconomictoso-

cialorevenpoliticaljustifications.Economically,one

ofthemainargumentsforworkingwithwomenwas

thattheyareanuntappedworkforceanda morereli-

abletargetgroup.

“Womenaredependentona singlesourceofin-

come,whichtheyaccessthroughthesegroups.

Menarenotsatisfiedwiththis.Theywantto

havemoreincomefromdifferentsources.Some

ofthemleavethegrouptogotoIran,Pakistan,

orwesterncountries,somecometothecityto

searchforanotherjob.That’swhytheydon’tfocus

a lotonthesegroupslikewomendo.”

ORG. E., JALALABAD, INTERVIEW

Socially,organisationsdescribedSelf-Help

Groupsaspowerfulvehiclesofchangeforwomenthat

developedtheirspatialmobilityandsocialcapital:

“Inthebeginningstagewewerefacingmanychal-

lenges.Thewomenofthevillageswerenotal-

lowedtovisitus,evenwithourfemalestaff,be-

causeofthetraditionalcultureintheareaswhere

wework.Aftersometime,inwhichtheygotto

knowtheconceptoftheprogram,theychanged.

Theycametogether,theylistenedtotheobjec-

tiveofourprogram.Nowtheyfreelycontactus

andcometoouroffice.Evenourmalestaffgoes

totheseareas,andthefemalemembersofthe

groupsvisitus.Fromthisperspective,thereis

a hugedifferencethatwecanperceive.”

ORG. E., JALALABAD, INTERVIEW

“Wehada ratioof60%femaleand40%maleSHGs.

Wefoundthatthewomenweremoreattentive

tothegroupsandtheoverallidea.Thismightbe

duetofemalenature,buttheyalsobenefitteda lot

fromtheparticipationintheSHGs.Throughthe

SHGsthewomencoulddeveloptheirownnet-

works.Thisistraditionallymorelimitedforwom-

eninAfghanistanascomparedtomenwhocan

moreeasilygooutandconnecttootherpeople

andmarkets.IntheSHGsthewomenhavea hub,

andtheycandrawonthatintheirdevelopmentof

their own network” ORG. I., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Furthermore,theSelf-HelpGroupswereseen

asa pathtopoliticalempowerment.Atthestageof

developmentwherewomenwerenotonlyactivein

Self-HelpGroups,butalsoinClustersorFederations,

theywereina positiontoadvocateforareasorfor

wholesectionsofthepopulation.Thesegroupswere

describedbytheimplementersasdoorwaysinto

communitydevelopmentinwhichthegroupsthem-

selvesdecidedwhichaspectswerelackingintheir

communitiesandgotengagedina kindofcivilsociety:

“Therearemanychangesinthelivesofwomen.If

younowgo,thewomenhavevoicesintheirhous-

es,theyhaveimprovedeconomically.Atfirstitwas

importanttosave20Afghani,nowtheyhave5000

dollarsintheirsavingboxes,whichtheyareusing

forbusinesses.Inmanycommunitiestheyprovid-

edwaterfortheircommunities.Inothercommuni-

ties,likeinMazar-eSharif,wherewomenbrought

waterintotheirdrycommunities,theybrought

21

3 waterpumps,andotherwomenheardaboutit

andwonderedhowwomencoulddothis.They

thenalsoindividuallycametogetherandalsogot

water in their own community.” ORG. A., KABUL

“WestartintheSHG,butwecarryitonintothe

ClusterLevelAssociation.Thatisimportantbe-

causetheyrepresenta lotoffamiliesinoneClus-

ter.Atthetimewhenthereisanelection,forex-

ample,politiciansarekeentogettheirvotes,and

theClustersareina goodpositiontobargainfor

watersuppliesorforotherthingsandservicesin

their community.” ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Someorganisationssolelyfocusedonwomen

intheestablishmentofSHGs,befittingtheirfocuson

women’sempowerment.Otherorganisations,how-

ever,followeda holisticapproachinattemptingtoof-

ferSHGsforbothmenandwomen:

“Wealsohaveprogramswiththemen.Unlessyou

don’tchangetheattitudesofmenyoucannot

changetheattitudewithinthefamily…Withoutfa-

cilitationwiththemenandelders,womencan’tbe

reached.” ORG. K., HERAT, INTERVIEW

EstablishmentofSHGsformenposedparticu-

larchallenges,reportedbyallorganisationswhotried

toimplementtheapproachwithbothgenders,andvis-

ibleinmostFGDscountrywidewithmaleSHGs.Men

demandedmoremoneyfromtheorganisationtostart

theirbusinessesasa topuptotheirownrevolving

fund.Notably,mostorganisationswhosolelyworked

withwomendidnotofferfinancialsupportfortheir

SHGs,whileallorganisationsworkingwithbothmale

andfemaleSHGshadoptedforgivinga monetaryor

materialincentiveforstartingbusinesses.Manyso-

cialorganiserscomplainedthatthemalegroupswere

moredifficulttosuperviseastheirmeetingschedule

wasusuallyafterworkhours,andthereforealsoafter

theirownorganisations’workhours.24

Men’savailabilityandtheirgeneraldemands

forhigherfinancialinputsfromtheorganisations,

bringsintoquestionwhetherthisapproachshouldbe

implementedformeninAfghanistan.Itseemsthat

theapproachcanonlybeimplementedwithmalepar-

ticipantsiftheorganisationsarewillingtoofferfinan-

cialincentives,insomecasespossiblyhigherthanfor

femaleparticipants.Theapproachthereforeseems

tobebettersuitedforwomentobringthemintothe

workforcewithsmallbusinessesandtoenablethem

todevelopa socialandeconomicnetworkthatcan

supporttheirbusinessdevelopment.

Despitethesedifficultiesandshortfalls,most

organisationsintegratedtheSHGapproachseam-

lesslyintotheiroverallportfolioandsawitasa rele-

vanttooltosupportcommunitiesinAfghanistan.

3.1.2. Needs Assessment

Intermsofneedsassessments,itisimportantto

bemindfulofthefactthatmostorganisationsare

fundedthroughprojectcyclesandthereforere-

spondtocallforproposalsfromfundingagencies.

Geographicalareaswheretheydecidetowork,are

24 Asopposedtothewomenwhomeetduringthedaywhensocial

facilitatorscaneasilyjointhemeetingsandsupportthegroups.

thereforeofteninfluencedbythefundingagencies’

interesttoworkina certaingeographicallocation

ofthecountrycombinedwithwherethesecurity

situationisdeemedadequatelysecure.Onlya cou-

pleoforganisationsthatwereinterviewedforthis

research,hadcommunitiesinmindinwhichthey

hadworkedpreviouslyandwheretheyfacedneeds

whichledtheorganisationtoadopttheSHGap-

proach.Thisreverseapproachdoesnotmeanthat

theSHGapproachwouldnotreachtheneediest

partsofa givencommunity,butonlythatthechoice

ofcommunityinthefirstplacemightbeinfluenced

bytheseparameters.

Mostorganisationsconductedvulnerability

and/orpovertyassessmentsintheareaswherethey

hadchosentoworktodecidewhichpartsofthecom-

munitytofocuson.Theneedsassessmentcanbe

conductedwithsimpleindicatorsorthroughmulti-

ple-stageassessments.Anexamplefora cost-effec-

tiveandparticipatoryassessmentisdescribedinthis

interview:

“Weintroduceourselvesandsaythatwehave

somethingtosayaboutissuesonwomen,butwe

donotexplaintheconcept.Weonlyaskthem

tocomeandparticipate.Wetargetonehouse,

whereallwomencancometogether.Thenextday

wehaveoneexercise:weask,whoispoorinyour

community.Thenthewomenthemselvessay,‘she

isreallypoor’andthenthiswomanagainintro-

ducesanotherwoman,forexamplesaying‘shehas

manychildrenandsheislivingina poorhouse’.

Wedrawthreecircles.Rich,middle,poor.And

22

weencouragethemtoselect,intowhichofthese

threecirclestoputher.Wecontinuetodothisand

that’showwecatchtheverypoorwomen.Weare

notallowedtosay,youseempoor.Thepeoplein

thecommunityjustintroducethembythemselves.

Onthisday,wejustsay‘thankyouverymuch’and

wetakethenameofthepoorestwomen.Forthe

otherswejustsaythankyouforyourparticipa-

tion.” ORG. A., KABUL INTERVIEW

Otherorganisationsapplymultiple-stageas-

sessments,includingdata-sourcingfromthirdor-

ganisationsandrankingcommunitymembersac-

cordingtotheirvulnerabilityorresilience.Some

useda ParticipatoryVulnerabilityCommunityAs-

sessment(PWCA),25combinedwithadditionalques-

tionsregardingtheircommunities.Othersbaseiton

availablecommunityinformationandaddanaddi-

tionalassessmentofallidentifiedpossiblecommuni-

tiesandparticipants:

“InitialdatawasreceivedfromUN-Habitat.Based

onthat,beforeapplyingfortheprojectwedidan

assessmentwheretherewassupposedlybeing

hiddenIDPsanduprootedpeople.Afterthepro-

jectwasapprovedbythedonortherewasanother

assessmentin40CDCsineachcity.Thecriterion

wasmainlytheresiliencescore,basedontheresil-

ienceindex.Wefocusedontheareawiththemost

25 Seeforexample:ActionAid,FieldGuideforParticipatory

VulnerabilityAssessment/A stepbystepguideforfieldstaff.

Accessedat:https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_

lib/108_1_participatory_vulnerability_analysis_guide.pdf

vulnerablepeople,whodon’thaveincomeearn-

ers,orhavedisabledpeople,orwhowerenoten-

gagedbeforewithotherorganisations,plushaving

a lowresilience.Outof40CDCs,20wereselect-

ed.” ORG. J., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Themajorityoforganisationsapproacheda spe-

cificlocalcommunitythroughthecommunityassembly

(shura)orCommunityDevelopmentCouncil,CDC26:

“Wetargetandworkwithfamiliesthathavewid-

ows,orphans,disabled,orfamiliesthatweredis-

placed.Wemadeagreementsintheprojectbe-

tweentheorganisers,thecommunityandthe

shura.Wesittogetheranddevelopedtheagree-

mentwiththem.Themainaspectisthatweselect-

edvulnerablemembersofthecommunitythrough

shuramembers,thecommunityandourproject

staff.” ORG. E., JALALABAD, INTERVIEW

Ifthiscommitteesignalledwillingnesstolet

theorganisationworkina certainplacewiththe

community,thentheorganisationsproceededtoas-

sessit.Economicaswellassocialempowermentwas

seenbyallorganisationsasa desirablegoal,which

anycommunitywouldliketoattain.Ultimately,the

areas that were assessed were the ones in which

localshurasorCDCsgavetheirconsent,andnot

basedonanentirelyobjectiveneedsassessment.

26 CDCstandsforCommunityDevelopmentCouncil.A body

setupinitiallybytheNationalSolidarityProgram(NSP)ofthe

MinistryofRuralRehabilitationandDevelopment(MRRD).The

advantagesanddrawbacksofthisapproacharediscussedinPart

3.2.1,see:Effectiveness,OutsideImpact.

Theneedforthedevelopmentofneweconomicin-

comestrategiesandsocialempowermentwereseen

asa given,withthemainrequirementtoidentifythe

communitymembersmostinneed.However,most

organisationsstressedthatequallyimportantasvul-

nerabilityandpovertyassessmentsweremarketas-

sessmentstotailortheprojectaccordingtothelocal

andregionaldemands:

“Ifyouwanttodoa livelihoodproject,youshould

startwitha marketassessment,otherwiseyouare

imposingvocationsforwhichtheremightbeno

demand.Westartedwiththat,althoughthemar-

ketassessmentconfirmedwhatwealreadyhad

intheproposal,witha couplemore.Thenweap-

proachedgroupstoseewhetherthewomenhad

already some skills and what their interests were.

Mostgroupswantedtailoring,andwetriedtotell

themthatwecan’talldotailoring.Oneoftheskills

that the women were very interested in was knit-

ting,butinthemarketassessmentitshowedthat

therewasnodemand.Sowedida fewofthose,

buttheywereonlyforhouseholdconsumption.”

ORG. L., KABUL, INTERVIEW

“Thentwoorthreemembersamongthe8or10

havesomeideastoinvest,forexampleinbakery,

poultry,livestock.Theyactuallyneedanassess-

ment what actually are the needs and what the

peopleofthisvillagewant.Basedonneeds,wants

anddemandsofthisspecificvillagetheystartto

investintheseideasandwehelpthemwiththat.”

ORG. C., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

23

Overall,thecommunitiesrespondedpositive-

lyduringallFGDsconcerningtheeconomicandsocial

impactoftheSHGsintheirfamiliesandcommunities

(see3.5.Impact).Someoftheresponsesshowhow

especiallypoorcommunitieshavea needfora col-

lateral that enables them to take loans that they oth-

erwisemightnotbeabletotake.Respondentsespe-

ciallystressedthattheyfeltaloneandstressedabout

theireconomicsituationpriortojoiningtheSHGs:

“Ourneedsarecommunicatedthroughconsulta-

tion.Forexample,ifwehaveproblemswecome

togetherandbasedonconsultingeachotherwe

resolveit.BeforegettinginvolvedwithSHGs,we

werealoneandstressedaboutproblems;nowitis

different.Wewanttoimproveoureconomicsit-

uationthroughtheseloans.Ourneedshavenot

changedmuchexceptforthefactthattheSHGs

helpsusresolveourproblemsinstantaneously.

Forexample,ifthereisanurgentsicknessinthe

family,wecancometothesegroupsandaskfor

a loan.Ifwedon’thavemoneyandtrytogeta loan

fromotherindividuals,theywon’tgiveusany

money.ButwiththeSHGwehavea senseofbeing

stable.” FEMALE FGD, KABUL

Someorganisationspointedoutthatneeds

alsohada genderednature:menusuallyalreadyhave

jobsorvocations,whilewomenaremostlyinvolvedin

householdchores.Theirexpectationstowards(addi-

tional)incomegeneratingactivitiesvary,dependingon

theirownexperiencesaswellassocietalexpectations

towardsmenorwomentoprovidefortheirhousehold:

Photo Jan Mrkvička

The record books show how much money was paid into the books in the regular meetings and how

many loans were taken by the members

24

“Theactualdemandandexpectationsfrommen

andwomenaredifferent.Men’sexpectationisto

havea higheramountofcapitalwithwhichthey

should start the business. But with women that is

notthecase.Eveniftheyonlyhave5000or4000

Afghani,andtheybuya tailoringmachine,they

starttheiractivities.Buttherequirementofmen

istohavea car,ora taxi,ora shoptostarttheir

business,whichrequiresa biggeramountofmon-

ey.Theconceptaswearecurrentlyassessingit,is

morerelevanttowomen.Womenarenotveryin-

volvedinbusinessdevelopmentsofar,andthey

don’tgooutmuchyet.ThisiswhatSHGscan

change.” ORG. J., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Especiallywomenwitha vulnerableback-

ground,suchasorphaned27woman,expressedgrat-

itudefortheSHGsupportingtheirindividualneeds

thatwerenotattendedtopreviously:

“I ama memberofthisgroup,andI havealsoat-

tendedliteracyclasses.Myfatherdied,I have

nobrother,andI supportmyfamilyalone,my

threesistersandmymother.I tooka loanfrom

thebox,andI supportthemthroughtailoring.I’m

thankfulforthisopportunity.Withsomecloth-

ingI canmake1000,2000oreven3000Afghani.

Ina monthit’smaybe10,000or12,000Afghani.

Thishelpsuswheretherewasnoassistancebe-

fore.” FEMALE FGD, JALALABAD

27 InAfghanistan,childrenwhohavelostoneoftheirparentsare

consideredorphaned.

SomeFGDparticipantspointedoutbiggeris-

suesthatwerenotaddressed,suchasschoolsor

clinics.However,thelong-termvisionoftheSHGs

(Clusters,etc.)wouldbeabletoaddressthesemore

structuralneedsinthecommunitythroughlobbying

forthem(see3.4.3. On Clusters and Federations).

OneindicatorofwhethertheSHGapproach

isofrelevancetoa communityandsuitstheirneeds

iswhethermembershaveleftandhowmanySHGs

havedissolvedaftertheirinitialestablishment.Most

oftheSHGsthatweresurveyedinthisreporthave

beenstablesincetheirestablishment,withnomem-

berleavingthegroup.A minorityoforganisationsre-

portedthecollapseofSHGs:

“Wefaceda lotofproblemsinthisonearea.

Therewastensionbetweendifferentfamilies.

Duetotheirowntensionssomegroupmem-

berscametoparticipateandothersdidn’tcome.

That’swhywedecidedtofinishthisgroup.We

havealsosometimesexperiencedthatpeo-

plejoingroups,butduetosomeproblems,they

havetomoveandwehadtofinishthegroup.It’s

nottosaythatallgroupsrunwell.Wealsofaced

problemsindifferentareas.”

ORG. E., JALALABAD, INTERVIEW

Theseexamples,however,weretheexcep-

tion.MostSHGsseemedtoberunningwelloncethey

wereacceptedandestablishedwithinthecommunity,

whichmightalsobeduetothetirelessworkoftheen-

gagedsocialworkersandcommunityfacilitators:

“Sometimeswhenwomenjoinlateron,thenthey

don’tunderstandwhattherationaleofthegroup

is.Theydon’tunderstandthereasonforthegroup

andhowsavingworks.Butwearesocialworkers,

sowegorepeatedlytogivethemtraining.Thisis

a bigproblemforus.Thishappensa lottous.Peo-

plehavetheirownhomes,buttheymove.Many

peopleliveinrentedhomes,whenthetimeisfin-

ishedoftheircontractstheymoveandleavethe

area.Therefore,theyalsoleavethegroups.

FEMALE FACILITATOR, JALALABAD

Theexamplesofgroupinconsistencythatwere

givenbyfacilitatorsorevenwithintheFGDswere

usuallyduetopeople’sdecisiontomovetoanoth-

erpartofthecityortomovefromonecitytoanother.

Thoughtheydidnotindicatedisagreementwithinthe

communitiesaboutthegeneralestablishmentofthe

SHGs.OnlyoneSHGreportedthattheyhadreplaced

memberswithotherparticipantsbecausethelatter

werenotabletopaybacktheirloansandhadtaken

advantageoftheSelf-HelpGroup.

3.1.3. Comparison of Alternatives

TheabilityofSelf-HelpGroupstoreachandempow-

erpoorsegmentsoftheAfghansocietyisuniqueinthat

ithelpsthemtoestablishandstrengtheninterdepend-

entcommunitiesoftrustwhichcanalsobeconverted

intocollateral.Askedforalternativestothisapproach

inaccessingloans,participantsunilaterallyanswered

thatloansfrombankswouldtakeinterest,whichthey

judgedun-Islamic.AlternativessuchasMicrofinance

loanswereeithernotwellknowninthecommunity(for

25

anexplorationofthisoption,see3.4. Sustainability)or

judgedtobeequallyun-Islamicasotherbankingoptions.

IntheabsenceofanyviablealternativesforAf-

ghanstoaccessinterest-freeloans,ithastobepoint-

edoutthatsavinggroupshavebeenanindigenous

conceptwellknowntomanyAfghans.Asmentioned

intheintroduction,savinggroupshavea longhisto-

ryinAfghanistan,whereextendedfamiliespoolre-

sources—monetaryaswellasmaterial—fortheben-

efitofthecommunity.Themoneycanbeusedfor

a varietyofpurposes,fromfundingweddingstocov-

eringemergencymedicalexpensestoprovidingloans

forsmallbusinessventures.

“Thegroupinmyfamilymeetstwicepermonth.In

themeetingtheydecidetogetherontheloanis-

sues.Eachloanisfortheindividualgroupmem-

bers,notfamilyunits.Bothmenandwomencan

takeloans.Thegroupmostlygivesloansbetween

6000to15000AFN. Therepaymentisininstal-

ments,forinstance500or1000AFNperweek.

Mostlypeoplegetloansfortheirmedicaltreat-

ment,purchasingnewmachinesintheirshopsor

tostarta smallbusinesslikesellingcreditcards.”28

Theseculturally-embeddedgroupsoffer

a pre-existingfoundationuponwhichtheSHGconcept,

anditsClusterandFederationsextensions,canbegraft-

ed.Thelimitationsofindigenousstructures—servic-

ingonlyextendedfamilymembers—providesanarea

ofopportunity.TheSelf-HelpGroupapproachismuch

28 InterviewRafiRasuli,Herat,December2017.

vasterinitsscopeinthatitreachespeoplefromdiffer-

entethnicgroupsandbuildssocialnetworksoftrustbe-

tweenthem,whichalsoofferfinancialsafetynetworks.

TheexistenceofsavinggroupsintraditionalAfghan

frameofreferenceunderscoresthatitisa conceptthat

isacceptabletotheAfghancontext,and,asotherac-

ceptablealternativesarelacking,clearlyneeded.

3.1.4. Inclusion/Internally Displaced People

and Returnees

OneaspectforassessingwhetherSHGscanbe

a meaningfultoolofeconomicandsocialinterven-

tionintheurbanAfghancontext,isthequestionon

howtheapproachisaffectedbytheinclusionofIDPs

and returnees. AccordingtotheInternalDisplacement

MonitoringCentre,75%ofallAfghanshaveexperi-

enceddisplacementatleastonceintheirlifetime,with

400Afghansonaverageperdayleavingtheirhomes

since2006,29andwitha currentestimateofmorethan

1‚553‚000IDPsinAfghanistan,outofwhichmorethan

653‚000weredisplacedin2016alone.30

Thefindingsofthisreportshowregionaldiffer-

encesintermsofinternalmigrationandreturneeex-

periences.Whileallcitiesinthisstudyaremarkedby

internalmigrationfromprovincesintotheprovincial

centresandintoKabul,thecapital’spatternismark-

edlydifferentfromotherareasduetoitsspecificin-

tertwiningofpoliticsandaid.

29 See:InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre(IDMC):

“Afghanistan/Durablesolutionsfarfromreachamidescalating

conflict”.

30 Bothnumbers:http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/

afghanistan.

AccordingtotheUNHCR,Kabulalonehas51

recognisedIDPcampsorKabulInformalSettlements

(KIS).TheKIShousesover7‚892families31ona mixture

ofprivatelyandgovernment-ownedland.32Thepeo-

plelivingintheseinformalsettlementsareclassified

asa mixtureofIDPsandreturnees.33Whilea number

ofIDPs“haveresettledwithfriendsorfamilies”34 and

arethereforenotpresentinofficialcounts.TheKISre-

ceivessupportfromdifferentaidagenciestargeting

a varietyofneeds.Whilethissupportwasnecessaryat

theinitialemergencystagesofneedsithasnowturned

inmanyofthecampsintoanaiddependency,reflect-

edinanattitudinalchangeintheinhabitants.Theex-

pectationofaidfromoutsidehasledsomeoftheinter-

viewedorganisationstoshunworkwiththem:

“Thisisoneofthebiggestproblemthatweface,

thatthepeoplegetsupportfromallsides,hand-

outs.Thefirstthingtheyaskiswhatthey’llget

fromus.That’sthehardestpart,whenwesaythat

31 See:KabulInformalSettlement(KIS)WinterNeedsAssessment

November2015,accessedunder:https://reliefweb.int/report/

afghanistan/kabul-informal-settlement-kis-winter-needs-assessment-

november−2015-final-report

32 Governmentalincludesherebymunicipallyandministerially

owned land.

33 See:UNHCR“returnees”:http://www.unhcr.org/

pages/49c3646c1ca.html,also:IRIN2008,AFGHANISTAN:

Returneesmaybecomerefugeesagain—ministry:http://www.

irinnews.org/report/78822/afghanistan-returnees- may-become-

refugees-again-ministry;IRIN2012,AFGHANISTAN:Towards

moresustainablesolutionsforreturnees:http://www.irinnews.

org/report/94965/afghanistan-towards-more-sustainable-solutions-

for-returnees.

34 http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Asia/

Afghanistan/pdf/Afghanistan+July+2003.pdf

26

wewillsupportthembutnotwithmoneyorpre-

sents.That’swhyit’scalledSelf-HelpGroup.In

Kabul,thereareforexampletheInformalSettle-

mentsandthereyouhavewinterisation,35 there’s

alwayssomething.Therewetried(towork)with-

outsuccess.Theysaidtheywouldn’tgainanything

fromit,theywanteda minimumofmoneyfrom

us.So,wedecidednottoworkthere.Everything

isvoluntary,buttoparticipatemeansthatyou

needtocometothemeetingsandtogivea cer-

tainamount.Thatisnewforthestaffaswell.They

also say that maybe it would be easier to make

Self-HelpGroupswhenwewouldoffereachone

ofthema sackofrice.36ButasI said,it’sa nogo.”

ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

ThisstatementwasmirroredbyotherKa-

bul-basedorganisationswhoarguedthattheSHG

approachgenerallywouldnotbeproblematicinap-

plicationwithmixedhostandmigrantcommunities,

however,notpossiblewithintheKIS. Thereason

forthisseemstobemorecloselyconnectedtothe

cultureofaidand‘handouts’fosteredbythecom-

parativelyhigherdensityofKabul-basedaidagen-

ciesthanbythephenomenonofIDPsorreturnees

themselves.

35 Manyaidorganisationshaveparticipatedpost−2011inso-called

winterisationprograms,inwhichinhabitantsoftheKISwere

equippedwithmaterialtobetterwithstandthewintertime,after

anespeciallyharshwinter2011inwhichseveralchildrendiedin

thecamps.

36 Thesackofricereferstoa commonpracticeamongaidagencies

to‘pay’participantsforcomingtoworkshopswithfoodorother

items.

Inotherprovinces,thepresenceofIDPsand

returneeswithinthecommunities,whowerepartic-

ipantsintheSHGs,wasnotseenasproblematic.The

numbersweredescribedascomparativelylowand

thereforethehostcommunitieswereabletoabsorb

thearrivalseasierintotheexistingsocialstructures:

“IDPsandreturneesarenota realproblem.There

arenotthatmany.Whentheycome,theycangetin-

tegrated.Andthentheystay.Eveniftheyleavethe

group,theycanstillhavecontactwitheachother.

Wetoldthemthattheycanstillcome,evenifthey

areinanotherplace.Theycanhavecontactwith

theiroldSHGs.” FEMALE FACILITATOR, MAZAR-E SHARIF

Sometimestheestablishmentofthesemixed

IDP/hostcommunitygroupstakesmoreeffortthanes-

tablishingothergroups,asoneSHGcoordinatorex-

plains:“thetargetistheintegrationofIDPsintothe

hostcommunity,tobringthembothtogether.InGulba-

hartheysaidthattheydon’tsupportthisbecausethese

peoplewerenotfromtheirarea.Ittooktwotothree

visitsandtalkswiththehostcommunitytopersuade

them.”(Herat,Interview).A casestudyfromHeratillus-

tratestheimpactofSHGsinthelifeofanIDPfamilyand

theirintegrationintothelocalhostcommunity:

Example of Integration, Herat

Shugufa37hascome12yearsearlierfromRobat

Sangi,westernProvince,toHeratcity.Herhusband

isa driver,butthemoneyheearnsisnotenough

37 NameChanged

tofeedthefamily.SoShugufastarteda homebu-

sinessofherown.Shemakesflowerdecorations

forthehome,forweddingsandbirthdays.Bitby

bit,thewholefamilybecameinvolved.Herfather

bringsthematerialfroma townclosetotheAf-

ghan-Pakistaniborder,Shugufamanufacturesat

home,andsometimesevenwiththehelpofher

daughterandhusband.Theproductsgetsoldfrom

herhousedirectly,aswellasthroughshopsinHe-

ratandinKabul.Theamountsthatshemakesvary,

dependingontheitemssoldandthemarket:custo-

mersinKabulpaymorethaninHerat.Thesame

itemthatmightbring150–300AFNinHeratcou-

ldsellinKabulfor400–600AFN. Shugufaestima-

testhatsheusuallymakes2000AFNsurplusper

month.Themoneygetssharedinthefamilyforex-

pensessuchasschoolneedsofthechildren.This

homebusinesswasmadepossiblebyShugufa’spar-

ticipationina localSelf-HelpGroup.Whileaninitial

smallloanestablishedShugufa’scapacitytobuythe

materialtostartthebusiness,consecutiveloans

keepthebusinessgoingandstableinthefaceoffi-

nancialfluctuations.Furthermore,thegroupismi-

xedbetweenIDPsandhostcommunity.Thecashi-

erisa womanwhoistheheadofthefemaleCDCin

thearea,fromthehostcommunity,whileShugufa

andherfamilyhavefoundsupportandconnection

throughparticipationintheSelf-HelpGroup.

Onbothendsofthecountry,HeratandJala-

labadrespectively,theissueofinternallydisplaced

populationsiseclipsedbytheexperienceofre-

turneesfromIranandPakistan.However,issuesof

27

whetherandhowtointegratethereturneesintothe

SHGsvariedbythevariousorganisations.Someor-

ganisationsmadetheirworkwithIDPsandreturn-

eesdependentontheirgeneralbeneficiarycriteria.

TheyincludedIDPsandreturneeswhentheyfitthe

standardizedselectioncriteriathatweresetforthe

project,however,thesegroupswerenotspecifical-

lytargetedforrecruitment.Mostfacilitatorspoint-

edoutthatthereturneesespeciallycomebackto

Afghanistaneitherwithbetterfinancialbackingor

withalreadymorerefinedskillsets.Theirsocio-eco-

nomicstatuspositionedthembettertoestablish

businessesinthenewplace,however,theystillof-

tenlackedthebackingofsocialnetworksthattheir

host community could draw on more easily. Some

highlightedthatthereturneesfromIranwerenotin

needofVocationaltrainings,duetotheireducation

abroad,buttheyneededloansandtheembedding

intothesocialstructure.Theirneedsthereforedif-

ferfromthehostcommunities.

However,visitingseveralSHGsduringthe

FGDsinJalalabadandHeratshowedthattheintegra-

tionofIDPsandreturneesintothehostcommunities

workedwellandwassupportedbytheestablishment

ofSHGs.Whilemovementmightfluctuateinoth-

ercountriesmorestronglyamongIDPsandmigrants,

themigrationflowwithinthecitiesseemtosupport

a morestablemigrationpatterninwhich,afterinitial

movement,a familyremainsinthesameplaceforpro-

longedperiodsoftime.MostSHGmemberswhohad

migratedarenottobeconsideredasshort-termdis-

placed;theyratherlookedtosettleintheurbanset-

tingmorepermanentlyastheydidnotseea chance

tosafelyreturntotheirplaceoforiginintheshort-to

mediumterm.Thisoutlookenablestheirparticipa-

tioninSHGsasnormalmembers,whocancontribute

justasanyothermember.

“Basedonourassessments,themainfactorsarese-

curity,employmentandaccesstoservices.That

means,iftheycomefromtheruralareasinHerat

totheurbanareas,mostofthemsaythattheywill

stayinthecity,becausetheywanttohaveaccess

tobetterservices,theywanttobesecureandhave

accesstoemployment.Initially,theideawassome-

howdifferenttowardsIDPs,that’swhywearefo-

cusingonintegration.Theythoughtthattheyare

justcomingfor3–4yearsandtheywillbegoing

back.Buttheyarenotgoingback.Theideaofthe

projectisthattheseIDPsarenowlivinginthiscity

andtheyshouldbeconsideredasHeratipeople.It

wastheideainitiallytohavemixedgroupssothey

cangettoknoweachother.Theservicestheypro-

videarenowvisibleandtheymeeteachother,so

thatpeoplecanseethattheyarebringingsome-

thingpositivetothecommunityandtheyarenot

onlya burden.Theycanbringskills,products,ser-

vices.” ORG. J., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Whilethemovementpatterndoesnotseemto

harmtheestablishmentofmixedIDP/hostcommuni-

tygroups,thegroupsconverselyenabletheIDPfam-

ilies to establish social connections to their new sur-

roundingcommunity.Thisoffersthemstabilityand

a supportnetwork,whichtheyotherwisewouldhave

lacked:

“TherearesomeIDPsinourgroup,withpeo-

plewhocamefromotherdistrictsorprovinc-

es.I camefromKunar,wherethesituationwasn’t

good.TherewasfightingbetweenANAandthe

Taliban.I came2yearsagowithmyyoungerbroth-

er.I startedstudyingatuniversityhere.Before

comingI didn’tknowanyoneinJalalabadcity.But

nowI knowthegroupandwesupporteachother.”

MALE FGD, JALALABAD

Overall,onlyoneorganisationinthisstudyhas

usedtheSHGapproachtonotonlyaddressquestions

ofpovertyandgender,butalsoofmigrationdirectly.

ThefindingsfromthemixedgroupsconsistingofIDP/

returneepopulationsandpermanentresidentsare

encouragingandshowhowtheapproachcanbeused

asanintegrativetool.Whiletheestablishmentof

mixedIDP/hostcommunitygroupssometimestook

moreeffortinitially,theoutcomeshowsviablesocial

andeconomicsupportnetworksandintegrationbe-

tweenbothgroups.

3.1.5. National Policies and Government Structure

Afghanistanhasatpresentnogovernmentalstruc-

turetoeffectivelydealorinterfacewithSHGs.Un-

likeothercountries,whichofferpoliciesandguide-

linestodealwithSelf-HelpGroups,Afghanistan

lacksanynationalpolicy,guidelineordepartment

withcontactpersonstooversee,streamlineorguide

theprocessofSHGestablishment.Organisations

complainedaboutthislackasitwouldsupportthe

sustainabilityofexistingSHGsafterthepull-outof

anorganisation:

28

“Usually,wealwaysdoanofficialhandoverto

a governmentministryorgovernmentbodyto

makesurethattheprogramissustainableand

willbemaintainedinthefuture.Wehavepartner-

shipswiththegovernmentandlineministries.But

inAfghanistan,thereisnodepartmentandnoen-

titytotakethisoffer.Welacka structuretodeal

withthis.Wewantedtoadditina governmental

ministry,buttherewasnointerestfromtheirside.”

ORG. I., KABUL, INTERVIEW

“TheSHGsarea newconcept.Itwouldbegreat

ifwehadsomegovernmentalinstitution,where

theywouldhavesomesectorialmeetingwith

theNGOsatthecentralorprovinciallevel.Orif

theycouldprovidesomematerialsforrunningor

sustainingSHGs,thatwouldbegreat,too.This

wouldalsomeanthataftertheprojectisfinished,

thereshouldbeatleastthegovernmentthat

theycanrelyon.Iftheyneedsomethingorthey

wantsomeconsultation,iftheywanttobelinked

withMicrofinanceInstitutions,iftheywantliter-

acycourses,thereshouldbea governmentchan-

nelthroughwhichtheycanaccesssuchservices.

Thiscouldbethemaingoalofthegovernment,to

supporttheSHGs’sustainability.”

ORG. J., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Whilethereseemstobenooverallstrategy

withintheAfghangovernmentconcerningthein-

tegrationofSHGs,thereareseveralgovernment

policiesthatapplytopartsandaspectsoftheSHG

implementation,suchastheAfghanistanNation-

alDevelopmentStrategyfor2008–2013,38 the Na-

tionalActionPlanfortheWomenofAfghanistan

2007–2017,39andtheAfghanistan’sNationalAction

PlanonUNSCR1325—Women,Peace,andSecuri-

tyfor2015–2022.40Thesepolicesaimatthedevel-

opmentofpoorandmarginalisedpartsofsociety,

withanemphasisonpoorhouseholdsandwomen.

IntheimplementationofSHGssurveyedbythisre-

port,mostorganisationsfocusedonfemaleSHGs

andontheimplementationofSHGswithinpoor

communitiesorwiththepoorestsectionofa com-

munity.Onecouldthereforeargue,thattheiref-

fortsareinlinewiththesepoliciestoa considera-

bleextent.Howeverduetothedifferentfociofthe

organisationsthatareimplementingtheapproach,

relevancecouldmeandifferentthings:relevance

in economic terms could be overshadowed by rel-

evanceasa socio-politicalempowermenttool.Not

allorganisationschosetoworkexclusivelywiththe

poorestofthecommunitiesthattheyentered,but

tosupporttheoneswhoweremostsusceptibleto

theidea,asthisexampleshows:

38 Withkeyprioritiessuchasreducingpovertythroughgenerating

employmentopportunitiesandincreasingincome,aswellas

buildinga strongandrapidlyexpandingeconomythatenables

theprivatesectortodevelop.

39 Withkeyprioritiessuchaseliminatingallformsofdiscrimination

againstwomen,developingwomen’shumancapitalandensuring

women’sfullparticipationandleadershipinallaspectsoflife.

40 Thisplanprioritiseswomen’sactiveparticipationinpolitics,

women’saccesstoanaccountablejusticesystem,increase

ofeconomicsecurityforvulnerablewomenandincreasein

accesstoeducationforgirlsandwomen,especiallyforIDPsand

returnees.

“Therearerichwomenthatareoppressedand

therearepoorwomenthatarequiteindependent.

Youcouldsay,youcaneatthreetimesa dayand

nowyoucan’tgetintotheSelf-HelpGroup.But

theyalsohavetheirownsocialproblems.We

thereforesaid,ok,let’snotonlyfocusonthepoor-

est;butwedon’twanttoexcludesomeonewho

hasa bettereconomicbackground.”

ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Theeconomicassessmentwiththegoalof

reachingthepoorestsegmentofa communityandyet

offeringsocialadvancementforallcommunitymem-

bers,canthereforesometimesseematoddswith

eachother.Organisationsvariedinstrictnesscon-

cerningtheeconomicbackgroundandselectioncri-

teriaofbeneficiaries(see 3.1.1. fordifferentfociand

criteria),butmostsawtheSelf-HelpGroupapproach

asa waytoaffectbotheconomicandsocialadvance-

mentforpooranddisadvantagedcommunities.

Intermsofinstitutionalembeddingorganisa-

tions,whichestablishedassociationsandfederations

areabletoregisterthelatterintheMinistryofJustice.

Mostorganisationsworkedselectivelywithdifferent

ministries,dependingontheprogramcomponentthat

thesedepartmentswereresponsiblefor.Thevocation-

altrainingcomponentwasusuallyalignedwiththeMin-

istryofLabour,SocialAffairs,MartyrsandDisabled

(MoLSAMD)andorganisationsreceivedsupportfrom

theMinistryofWomen’sAffairsandtheMinistryofAg-

riculture.OntheFederationLevelongoingcooperation

withtheLiteracyDepartmentforliteracycourseswere

reported,orexamplesofcontractingtheMinistryofAg-

29

riculturetofundwomen’sbusinessesingardening.The

groupthencollectedservicechargesperperson,which

inturnfinancedotheractivitiesoftheFederation.

Theseselectivecollaborationsareencourag-

ingintermsoffutureengagementbetweengrass-

rootslevelorganisations’workandpossiblefuture

linkstogovernmentagencies.However,itcouldbe

advisabletolobbyfortheestablishmentofa respon-

sibledepartmentdealingwithMicrofinanceorspe-

cificallywithsavinggroupssuchastheSelf-Help

Groups.ThiscouldbepossibleintheMinistryofFi-

nance(whichmightoverseemicrofinanceinthefu-

ture),MinistryofJustice(wherefederationscanget

registered),MinistryofLabour,SocialAffairs,Mar-

tyrsandDisabled(MoLSAMD)(whichoverseesvo-

cationaltrainings)orMinistryofEducation(which

wouldalignwithothergoalsoftheSHGs).

Thisresearchisalsoidentifiedpreliminarypro-

gresstowardsthesedevelopmentsinthisdirection,at

leastintermsofformalisationofguidelines,asanin-

terviewwiththeheadoftheAMAshows:

“Themicrofinancesectorisnotregulated,that’s

whynotmoreofthemarelinkedwiththegov-

ernment.Thereareregulationsforcommercial

banks,theyareusingtheguidanceandpoliciesof

thegovernment.ThesamewillhappenforMicro-

financeInstitutionsanditwillextendtoSHGsas

well,becausewewillbepartofthosediscussions

and we will tell them that not only MFIs are our

members,butwehaveNGOsworkingonSHGs,

sotheywilltakethemintoaccountaswell.The

timeframeofthisisunknown.Inthelastfewyears

theyaretalkingaboutit,andnowitseemsmore

serious.Theyarequitehopefulthatwewillhave

regulationsin2018.” INTERVIEW AMA, KABUL

AnembeddingofSHGsinthegovernmental

structurebringsthepossibleriskofa formalizationin

bureaucraticstructuresthatcanmaketheimplemen-

tationinflexible.Instructively,governmentalsupport

wasgenerallyrequestedbyorganisationseitherin

thefunctionofgivinginitialguidanceandinformation,

orforthefinalhandoverofexistingSHGs,Clusters

andFederations,tooffera counterpart.Governmen-

talsupportwasnotthoughtofasrunning,regulating,

orlimitingSHGs,butratherasa pointofcontactto

provideinformationanda networkingpointforSHG

implementersandSHGsthemselves.

3.2. Effectiveness

Thecriterionofeffectivenessmeasures“theextent

towhichanaidactivityattainsitsobjectives”.41The

questionsinthispartfocusonassessingtowhatex-

tenttheobjectiveswereachievedorarelikelytobe

achievedinutilizingthisapproach.Furthermore,itis

anattempttoevaluatewhatthemajorfactorsinflu-

encingtheachievementornon-achievementofthe

objectiveswere.

3.2.1. Outside Impact

CDC and community connection/relations

TheeffectivenessoftheSelf-HelpGroupapproach

41 See:http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/

daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

liespartlyinitsgrassrootsengagementwithlocal

communities. Only when the communities them-

selvesembracetheapproachashelpfulandaccept-

ablecanithaveanyviableeconomicorsocialimpact.

However,howdoesanorganisationaccesslocalcom-

munitiesinwhich,forthemostpart,theyhavenever

workedbefore?

Mostorganisationschoosetoenterlocal

communitiesthroughvillageelders,traditionalvil-

lageassemblies(shuras)ortheCommunityDevelop-

mentCouncil(CDC).42 CDCs are councils that were

mainlyestablishedthroughtheNationalSolidarity

Program,locatedattheMinistryofRuralRehabilita-

tionandDevelopment.43Thesecouncilswereintro-

ducedtodraft“community-developmentplansand

develop…proposalsforvillage-leveldevelopment

projectswhich,subjecttobasiccriteriabeingmet,

havebeenfundedbyNSPthroughthedisbursement

ofblockgrants”.44WhileCDCsaredistinctfromtra-

ditionalshurasinthattheysupposedlycreategen-

42 “NSPhascreatedgender-balancedCommunityDevelopment

Councils(CDC)throughsecret-ballot,universalsuffrage

elections.Onceconstituted,CDCshavedraftedcommunity-

developmentplansanddevelopedproposalsforvillage-level

developmentprojectswhich,subjecttobasiccriteriabeingmet,

havebeenfundedbyNSPthroughthedisbursementofblock

grants.”See:Beath,Fotini,Enikolopov,2015.

43 MansuriandRaoevaluateintheirbookdecentralization

attemptswitha specificfocusonparticipatorydevelopment

projects,suchastheWorldBankfundedCDCsinAfghanistan.

Theyrefertobothaspectsofcommunityparticipationand

governmentstructure/donorinputs,pointingespeciallytothe

differencesinorganicversusinducedparticipation.See:Mansuri,

Ghazala/Rao,Vijayendra.2013.LocalizingDevelopment:dies

participationwork?TheWorldBank,WashingtonD.C.

44 Ibid.

30

der-balancedthroughsecret-ballotandestablished

a newinterfacewiththevillages,inmostcasesthe

interviewedorganisationsusedthetermsvillage

shuraandCDCinterchangeablyandsawthemasso

closelyconnectedthatitmadenodifferencewhich

onetoapproach.Thismirrorsthefindingofa recent

NSPevaluationreportthat“thereisnoevidence

thatNSPchangesthecompositionoflocalleader-

shiporintroducesnewleadersintothecoregroupof

villagedecisionmakers”.45

“Mostofthetimewewentthroughthemaliks

(leaders)orCDCs,theyareidentical.Wetell

themabouttheapproachandweaskthemfor

permission,becauseotherwiseitbringsprob-

lemsifyoudon’tgothroughthem.”

ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

SomeorganisationscontactedtheCDCs

throughtheregionalgovernororthroughthedistrict

governmenttoachievea favourableintroduction.

Somefoundithelpfultoconductaninceptionwork-

shopwithdifferentstakeholdersfromthegovern-

mentandotherregionallyactiveNGOs:

“Itstartsfromthemobilizationstage,whereweget

anofficialletterfromthegovernor’sofficetothe

CDC. TheCDCsconsistoffamilymembers,most-

lymen.Whenthefacilitatorsgoandtalkwiththe

CDC,theycarrythismessageabouttheprogram

totheirfamilymembers,bothmaleandfemale.

45 See:Beath,Fotini,Enikolopov,2015,p.7.

Andaftermobilizationandmanymeetingswith

theCDCstheyacceptandagreetotheprogram.“

ORG. C., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

WorkingthroughtheCDCsorlocalshuraswas

mainlyseenasamiableandsupportive,astheCDCis

embedded within the community and knows the com-

munitymembers,theirneedsandcapacities.Howev-

er,itwasalsobelievedbymanyorganisationsasthe

onlywaytoproperlyentera community:

“I reallybelievethatifyoudon’tworkwiththe

CDC,youcannotworkinthevillage,becauseyou

willhavenosupportinthecommunity.TheCDC

hastheirownlistofwhoisvulnerableinthecom-

munity.Weaskedthemtoprovidethelistand

comparedwithourlistofcriteriawhetherthey

wereeligible.” ORG. L., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Whilethiswastheopinionthatwassupported

bythemajorityofinterviewees,oneorganisationdecid-

ed to circumvent the shuras/CDCs and went directly to

families,askingthemwhetherthewomenlivingonone

streetcouldgatherinoneofthehouses.Theorganisa-

tion,whichchampionedthisapproachexperiencedno

negativeeffectsincircumventingthecommunitylead-

ership.Accordingtotheirnationalcoordinator:

“Westarta surveyinonestreetwitharound30–

40houses.Butthisisnotofficial.Wedonotgive

penorpaper,nothing,justknockingonthedoor

andaskingtoparticipate.Weintroduceourselves

andsaythatwehavesomethingtosayaboutis-

sues on women and we would like to come tomor-

rowandtalk.Butwedonotexplaintheconcept.

Weonlyaskthemtocomeandparticipate.We

alsotargetonehouse,whereallwomencancome

together…Onthethirddayweproposeourcon-

ceptandaskthemtogohomeandtalkwiththeir

husbandsandfamiliestogetpermissiontopartici-

pate.” ORG. A., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Whilethisorganisation’sapproachappearsto

betheexception,thesizeoftheirSHGprogramsand

thelengthoftimetheyhavebeenimplementingthem

(morethana decade)suggeststheapproachisworka-

ble.Itthereforeseemsthattherearemultiplewaysto

approacha community,eitherthroughthelocalshu-

ra/CDC,ordirectlybyaddressingthetargetgroup

(forbeneficiaryselection,see3.1.2. Relevance/Needs

Assessment).

Interestingly,thoughitisthemostpopularap-

proach,workingthroughthelocalshuras/CDCsap-

peartohavesomeseriousdrawbacks.Sometimes,

theCDCswereseenasdomineeringtheselection

ofbeneficiaries.Anopendiscussionaboutthedomi-

nanceofleadersorCDCswasseenasa difficultbal-

ancingact,whichwasnotalwayspossibletoachieve:

“Oneoftheproblemsiswheneverwewenttothe

communities,theheadofshurawillselecttwo

peopleofthisfamily,twoofthisfamily.Thiswill

createa problem,becausethesepeopledonot

trusteachother.Itwouldbebetteriftheselec-

tionoftheSHGwouldbedonebyus.Ifwewereto

chooseourselves,thenwecouldseewhoneeds

31

Photo Annika Schm

eding

Supply material for decorations that are made at home and sold in the bazaar in Herat and Kabul

32

thisprogramandwhohastheabilitytoimple-

mentit.Butunfortunately,itistheheadofshura

whochoosesandthiscreatesproblems.Ifwesay

somethingagainstthatselection,thenmaybeoth-

ersfromthecommunitywon’tcomeandthepro-

jectwillcollapseinthiscommunity.Themostim-

portantthingistheselectionofgoodbeneficiaries.

Theproblemisthattheinterferenceoftheshu-

raandthecommunitywillarrest(bind)ourhands

andwillnotallowustodogoodwork.”

ORG. B., HERAT, INTERVIEW

“Ofcourse,therewereinstanceswhentheCDCs

werepushingfortheirownpeople.Butweexperi-

encedthatfromthegovernmentaswell.Therewas

a headofdepartment,whotoldus,‘gotothisone

villageandhereisa listof20womenandyoucan

workwiththem.’Peoplewereintervening,butwe

triedtominimizeit.I reallybelievethatifyoudon’t

workwiththemyoucannotworkinthevillage.”

ORG. L., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Someintervieweestracedproblemsinwork-

ingwiththelocalshuras/CDCstoa cultureofaid

dependencyinwhichCDCswereusedtoreceiv-

ingcashormachineryfromorganisationsorgovern-

mentagencieswithwhichtheyinterface.Pastexpe-

rienceofsupportbyinternationalorganisationscan

makeworkingthroughlocalCDCs,aswellaswork-

ingmoregenerallywithlocalcommunities,morecom-

plex.Managingexpectationsmeanstheimplement-

ingorganisationswillneedtofocusmorestronglyon

a goodmobilizationphaseinwhichtheyexplainthe

projectanditsbenefitswell.Someorganisationsex-

periencedinitialresistanceinsomecommunitiesas

theydidnotbringwiththemfinancialsupport(espe-

ciallyinthepureapproachwheretheorganisation

givesneitherfinancialnormaterialinputs).Butlater,

uponseeingthepositiveimpactinneighbouringcom-

munities,somecommunitiesreturnedtotheorgani-

sationoftheirownvolition:

“Aftera longmobilizationprocessandaftermany

discussions,theyacceptedwhatwehadtoof-

ferthem.Ourprogramdidn’thaveanythingphys-

icaltogivetothem,justtheformationofthesav-

inggroup.Aftersometime,somepeopleleftthe

groupbecausetheysaidthatitdoesn’thaveany

benefitforourpeople.Butsomeothersaccepted

toworkwithus.Nowafter4years,theyhavecome

andrequestedbylettertostarttheprogramin

theirvillage,too,becausetheyhadseeninanoth-

ervillagehowitworked.Itneededthesuccessthat

theycouldseeforthemtorealizewhattheycould

winfromthis.” ORG. C., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Oneofthekeyelementsincommunicatingsuc-

cessfullywiththeshura/CDCseemstobeclarityinvi-

sionfortheprojectanda willingnesstopulloutandim-

plementitina differentcommunity.Inthisway,the

communitycanlearnabouttheadvantagesofthepro-

jectandweighwhethertheeffortisworththeirwhile.

“Wefirstcompleteourinformationgatheringand

thenwesitwiththem.Wegettheirideas,butwe

keepallourworkinourhand.Itdoesn’tbelong

totheCDCorthevillageshura.Weworkclosely

withthembecauseinthefutureweneedtowork

throughthem…Wekeepallourworkaccordingto

ourcriteriainourhands.Insomeareas,thereare

districtgovernorsorCDCsthatarecreatinga mo-

nopoly.Everythingwillbeundertheircontrol.In

sucha situation,I cannotwork.Weclearlyneed

toexplaintherulesandregulationsandourmain

goaltothem.Iftheyagree,weworkintheirsector,

iftheydon’tagree,wegoandworkina different

place.Therefore,itisimportanttoclearlyexplain

theprojecttothem.” ORG. E., JALALABAD, INTERVIEW

Problemsininterfacingwiththevillageshu-

ra/CDCwereonlyreportedintheKIIs,butnotin

theFGDs,whereallparticipantswerepositive

aboutthesupporttheyreceivedfromtheircommu-

nityshuras/CDCs:

“WedidnotfaceanyoppositionfromtheCDC. In

fact,theyhelpeduswhenwefacedproblems.

Womenwereharassedandcouldn’tcometothe

weeklymeetings.Theyspokewiththemenand

supportedus.” FEMALE FGD, JALALABAD

“WeliketheSHGsinourneighbourhood.Theysup-

portthewomenandtheirfamilies.I thinkthere

shouldbemoreofthem.” FEMALE CDC, HERAT

Whilethisflawless,positiveimagemirrors

manyplaceswhereSHGsweresuccessfullyestab-

lishedwiththehelpofCDCs,itisclearlyduetoa se-

lectionbias:theFGDswereconductedwithinfunc-

33

tioningSHGs,whichmeansthatinmostofthecases

the community shuras/CDCs would have had to

besupportiveforthecreationandfunctioningof

theSHGinthefirstplace,whichwouldhavebeen

achievedthroughanorganisationnegotiatingwith

theshura/CDCfirst.ThisissimilarfortheCDCs,

whichwereinterviewedinareaswheretheyhadsup-

portedtheestablishmentofSHGs.

Thisresearchshowsthatalthoughaddress-

inga communitythroughtheshura/CDCisportrayed

throughmostorganisationsasthebestway,itisnot

theonlyviableaccesspoint,anditcanalsoofferseri-

ousdrawbacksasevidencedintheexamplesabove.

Theotherwayofgoingdirectlytothecommunityis

possibleaswell.However,circumventingexisting

powerstructuresdoesnotcomewithoutrisks,andit

seemsbestfeasiblewhena whole-communityinclu-

siveprocesscanleadtoanendresult.

Community Acceptance of Women’s Participation

OneofthemainpointsforworkingthroughtheCDC/

shuras that was stressed by the interviewees was to

gainthetrustofthecommunitysoastolettheorgan-

isationworkwiththewomeninthecommunity.The

community leaders and the CDC were thereby seen

asthegatekeeperswhoenableanorganisationtoac-

cessthepossiblefemaleSHGparticipants:

“Atthecommunitylevelwefirstneedtotalkwith

themullah,withthearbab,toconvincethem,that

thewomenshouldhavetheirownproject.Ifyou

don’tchangetheattitudesofmenyoucannot

changetheattitudeswithinthefamily.Yousee

thatinthecommunity,evenwhenyouworkwith

theSHG,theylooktowardstheshuraforguid-

ance.Theytakecaretoprotecttheircommunity.

Sotheywillbetheonetofacilitatemeetingswith

thecommunity.Withoutfacilitationwiththemen

andelders,womencan’tbereached.”

ORG. K., HERAT, INTERVIEW

Inothercases,theshurasthemselvesactedas

overallconservativebarriers,preventingorganisations

fromenteringtheircommunities.Thisseemstohave

beenespeciallyconnectedtoorganisations’attemptsto

focustheirworkonwomeninthecommunity:

“Firstwetalkwithleadersandthevillageshura,

thenweneedthefamiliestoagreewithwomen

goingtothemarket.A lotoftimesthereisa neg-

ativeresponsefromthem,butin15–20%there

isa positiveresponsefromthem[theshura],and

thenwecanselectthatarea.Forexamplea month

agowewantedtocoveronemoreprovince.There

theysaid,ifmywomancomesintoyourbenefi-

ciarylist,I willshootyou.Wereceiveda lotofneg-

ativeresponsesthere.Sowewillnotworkthere.

Theysaidthattheyareworking,noneedforthe

womentowork.Wedon’twantthemtogotothe

market.” ORG. D., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Theimpactofexistinggenderrolesthere-

bymanifestsinthedecisionofNGOstoaccesswom-

enintherespectivecommunitiesthroughthe(mostly

male)CDCsorthroughgainingapprovaltoworkwith

thewomenfirstfrommalefamilymembersandrel-

atives.NGOsstatedthattheywerenotabletowork

withthewomenofa givencommunitywithouttheex-

plicitsupportofthemalemembersofthatcommunity,

a statementthatwasmirroredunanimouslybyFGD

participantsinthatallofthemhadtoobtainmalefam-

ilymemberapprovalbeforewomenwereabletoat-

tendtheregularSHGmeetings.

“Inthepast,thewomendidn’tgooutofthehouse.

Itwasa goodwaytogetthewomentocomeout-

sideoftheirhouses.Brothersandfathersfirst

didn’tallowthis,butwhentheylearntaboutthe

project,theyagreedandnowtheyaregladabout

theproject.” FEMALE FACILITATOR, JALALABAD

Furthermore,occasionalthreatsagainstSHG

participantswerealsoreported.However,eachex-

ampleshowedthatmostlylocalcommunityengage-

ment was able to overcome the threats that were

made,whichmightalsobeduetothefactthatthese

threatswereusuallylinkedtolocals’disagreement

withtheprogramandnotwithanoverallassaultfrom

insurgents:

“Sometimesithashappenedthattheyhavebeaten

womenofthegroups.Sometimesmenhavegiv-

enwarningstocommunityfacilitators.Sometimes

theydon’thaveanyopinionaboutbusinessesand

women are not allowed to start businesses. It de-

pendsonthecommunity.ButnowtheCLAwom-

en work in many communities and they are do-

inga greatjobinthecommunitythatevenI cannot

believe it.” ORG. A., KABUL, INTERVIEW

34

“WehavecontactwiththelocalfemaleCDChere.

Theymeet3timesinthemonthandwecango

thereaswelltoshareproblemswiththem,ifthey

occur.Sometimestherewereproblemswhen

womenwantedtocometobringmoneytothebox,

menweredisturbingthem,tellingthemnottogo

tothegroup,wonderingwhattheyaredoingthere.

Thesekindsofproblemswithrelativesweshared

withtheCDC. Theythenhelpedusandtoldthe

men that they should let the women attend the

gatherings.” FEMALE FGD, JALALABAD

Organisationsstatedthatthemainingredient

toovercomecommunityreservationswaspersistent

communityengagement,andshowingsuccessfulpro-

jectsinwhichwomenhadbeenempoweredina way

thatwasseenasculturallyacceptable.

Security

Anotheraspectthatcanseriouslyaffectthesuc-

cessofanSHGproject,ortobefair,anyprojectin

Afghanistan,isthequestionofsecurity.Somein-

tervieweespositedthatsecuritywasa determin-

ingfactorinhowwelltheywereabletosupervise

thegroups,andthatthelackofsupervisiondueto

securitydiminishedtheeffectiveestablishmentof

well-functioninggroups:

“ThemodelworkedbetterinMazar-eSharifand

HeratthanininsecureareassuchasFarahand

Kunduz.I wouldalsosaythatinsecurityaffect-

edtheimplementationoftheprojectasproject

staffcouldnotsoeasilygorepeatedlyintoin-

secureareastocheckonthegroupsandtogive

themguidance.” ORG. I., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Oneorganisationdetailedhowtheychanged

theircommunityengagementstrategyandwhom

theyemployedduetopracticabilityandsecuritycon-

cerns.Theyoptedforexclusivelyemployinglocalsas

SHGfacilitators,astheywouldknowtheareabest

inwhichtheywouldwork,andtheywouldbeableto

navigatesecurityrisksmoredelicately:

“OurfacilitatorsallcamefromMazar-eSharifbe-

fore.Butthatwasnotpracticalwiththetravel

backandforth.Sowestartedhiringthemfromthe

community.That’salsobetterbecausetheyknow

the security situation and the community well.”

ORG. F., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Generally,however,organisationsseemedto

workwithoutseriousthreats,whichmightbedueto

thefactthattheychosetoworkinurbanareas,where

theyaregenerallymoreprotected,andtoengage

closelywiththecommunity,whichgiveslocalsupport

insecurityconcernsaswell.Onlya veryfeworganisa-

tionsworkingoutsideofregionalcapitalsinruralare-

asreportedincidentssuchasthisinterviewee:

“WehavecontactwiththeTalibanandweeven

workinareaswheretheTalibanareincontrol.

Theythreateneduswitha threatletterbecause

wewereworkingwiththewomen.ButthenI re-

spondedtothisandtoldthemthatwearecom-

ingtoexplainabouthygiene,abouthealth,howto

regulatenumbersofchildren.AfghanistanisanIs-

lamicandreligiouscountry.Thesearesensitiveis-

sues.Wejusttoldthemthatwereceivedfund-

ingfromthepeopleandthat’showweworkinthe

community.” ORG. B., HERAT, INTERVIEW

Theorganisationwasultimatelygivenpermis-

sion to continue its work.

3.2.2. Influencing Factors

Oncetheseoutsidefactorsaretakencareofwithes-

tablishinga supportiverelationshipwiththecommu-

nitycouncilorthecommunityoverall,andthecom-

munityissituatedina geographicallocationthatcan

besupervisedsafelybytheorganisation,otherpro-

ject-internalaspectscomeintoviewfora successful

implementationoftheSHGapproach.Thefourmost

relevantinfluencingfactorstoaneffectiveimplemen-

tationaretime,financial/materialsupport,training

componentsandviablemarketlinkages.

Time

OneofthemaincharacteristicsthatsetstheSHGap-

proachapartfromotherdevelopmentapproachesis

thetimeframenecessarytomakeSelf-HelpGroups

successfulandsustainable.Inadditiontoeffective

trainingcomponentsanda well-definedexitstrategy

linkedtoa viablefuturemarketforparticipants’prod-

ucts,timewasseenastheAchillesheeloftheSHGap-

proach,whichcanmakeorbreaktheproject,asexpe-

riencedinthisexample:

35

“It’sdifficulttomakea Self-HelpGroupina short

time.First,wehad8SHGs,establishedin2009/10.

Wesupportedthem.Theyhadsomesavings.Af-

tertheystartedsomesmallbusinesses.Wetrained

them.Whenwestoppedsupportingthem,these

SHGsbecameweakanddisappeared,becausewe

stoppedtosupportthem.Whydiditdisappear?

ThereasonisthatthoseSHGswereinremotear-

eas,thepeopleareilliterate.Secondly,thereisno

trustamongthesepeople,soitisdifficulttokeep

theSHG. Furthermore,thesavingisverylowifyou

onlycollect20AFNperweek.Howlongshould

theycollectthemoneyuntiltheycanuseitfortheir

businesses?That’swhywhentheorganisationdid

notsupportthem,theydisappeared.Ifyouwantto

makea Self-HelpGroup,thesupportshouldbelong

term.Ifyoutryitinshortterm,thentheywilldis-

appearwhenyoupullout.Whenyousupportthem

forlonger,thentheywillhavemoresaving,they

canhavebusinessplansandwiththeirsmallbusi-

nessestheirproblemscanbesolved.Wesupport-

edthemfor6months.Thatwasnotenough.We

had15 workshopsessionswiththem,butnowthey

don’t exist.” ORG. B., HERAT, INTERVIEW

Carefuldiscussionwithallparticipatingparties

showsthattimeisofessenceastheSHGapproachis

notonlygivingouta materialgoodsuchasloans,but

isaimingateffectingbehaviouralchangeinitsmem-

bers:toseethemselvesaspartofa socialsupportnet-

workthatcanhelpitselfthroughitsowncapacity

withoutbeingdependentonanoutsideorganisation

(see 3.5.2.SafetyNetworkand3.5.3.SocialImpact).

Twodifferenttimeframesweresuggestedby

theinterviewedorganisations:thetimenecessaryto

establisha strong,independentSelf-HelpGroup,and

a longertimeframenecessarytoestablishbroader

structuresthatcansupportSHGsinthefuturesuch

asClustersandFederations,andmaketheSHGssus-

tainablethroughtheembeddingintoa widerregion-

alandstructuralnetwork.Generally,mostorganisa-

tionsthoughtthat3yearswasa feasibletimeframe

forestablishingstrong,independentSHGs.

Someintervieweessuggestedthattheneces-

sarytimedependedonthelevelofexposureofben-

eficiariestoeducation,literacyorfinancialtransac-

tions.Thiswasseensometimesincontrasttoother

countrieswhereorganisationswereimplementing

theSHGapproach.Itwasfurthermorealsoseenasan

obstaclethattheorganisationsattemptedtoaddress

withadditionaltrainings:

“Everyyearwehavemeetingswithourdonors.

Ourdonorsareinvitingusandsaythatoneyearis

enough.Whenyouwanttotalkaboutsustainable

work,ifyouarethinkingthatthisisa long-termpro-

ject,youshouldthinkatleast3years.For3 years,

wecandoitinAfghanistan.Wecanestablish

a strongSHG. Oneyearisnotworkingwiththiscon-

cept.Andtheyacceptit.Inothercountriesitiseasy

because the women are literate. But here are illiter-

atewomen,thereareculturalbarriers,hereiswar

andconflict,it’sdifficult.” ORG. A., KABUL, INTERVIEW

“Thetimeframeisdifferentfromeachgroup,de-

pendingontheirliteracy.Youcanseethatinthe

bookkeeping.Whenyousay,1,000,writesaving,

writeloan,andtheyarenotable,thentheyneed

moretime.Wehaveonthejobtrainingforthis.And

eachtimefacilitatorscomes,theycheckinwith

themandhelpsthem.Wevisitthemmore.Literate

groupswevisitonceina monthandilliterateones

wevisitonceina week,wheneveryoneinthegroup

is illiterate.” ORG. C., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Whilethe3-yeartimeframestillfitsintonor-

malprojectcycles,mostintervieweessuggestedthat

theSHGapproachneededa long-termcommitment

oforganisationsanddonorstofullysucceed,which

liesratherina 6to10-yeardevelopmentframework.

Manypositivesocialimpactsarevisibleinthefirst

yearsofimplementation,suchasthedevelopmentof

groupsolidarityandsocialaswellaseconomicnet-

worksthatcansupportindividualsandfamilies.How-

ever,toguaranteethelong-termsustainabilityofthe

Self-HelpGroups,especiallywithscalingupinClus-

tersandFederationstohavea broadercivilsociety

impact,a longertimeframeisdesirable:

“TheSelf-HelpGroupsarenota quickfix.Itis

nota targetorientedbuta process-orientedap-

proach.Stepbystepwehandovertheresponsi-

bilitiesandtasksforthemtobeself-sustainable.

7–8yearsisa goodtimeframe,butthatdepends

on whether you are in urban or rural areas.”

ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

“Thisapproachneedstime,becausethegoalsthat

areenvisionedtaketimetomaterialize.5yearsis

36

maybenotenoughtoreallysuccessfullyestablish

it.Itmaybetakes10yearstosetthisupsustaina-

bly.I feelbadfortheoneswhobecameorganised

andthentherewasnofollowuporfurthersup-

portforthem.Thereshouldhavebeeneitheran

organisationorgovernmententitytotakeonthe

facilitationandsupportofthisotherwiseverysuc-

cessfulapproach.” ORG. I., KABUL, INTERVIEW

SHGsinthemselvescanbesetupratherquick-

ly.However,toachievetheneededbehavioural

changes,toembedthesavingstructurewiththecom-

munitiesandtoofferthema viablefutureoutlookin

regionalconnectivitythroughCLAsandFederations

takeslongertime.Thiscomparativelylongtimeframe

of6–10yearsmirrorswhatoneintervieweedis-

cussedasa generalshiftintheoutlookofhisorgani-

sationfroma projecttoa program-basedperspective

ondevelopment:

“In2007,weshiftedfromprojecttoprogram,

whichmeansina projecttheywoulddig10wells

andthengoout.Ina program,wegotoa commu-

nityandidentifyalltherisks,lookatthebudget

andthendesigntheprogram.Forexample,wesay

thatwewillestablisha livestockprogramorsilk

productioncompanyonlyafterestablishinga Self-

HelpGroup.” ORG. K., HERAT, INTERVIEW

Funding

Oneofthemainpointsofdisagreementamonginter-

vieweesinthisstudyhasbeenwhethertheorganisa-

tion,whichsupportstheSHGs,shouldpayadditional

fundingtothegroupswhichtheycanthenuseasa re-

volvingfund.

Thedefendersofa‘pure’SHGapproachal-

legethatpayinganykindofmoneytothegroupswill

leadtoincreaseddependenceandexpectationsfrom

thebeneficiaries.Theyadvocateforplayingthelong

game,andtoworkwithwhatevercommunityre-

sourcesareavailableinbuildingupthefinancialbase

inthesavingbox.Thismightinvolvethefacilitationof

contactstosellersandmarkets,offeringinformation

concerningthepurchaseofmaterialandskilltraining,

butthentrustinginthecommunities’abilitytohelp

themselvesinrunningsustainablesmallbusinesses.

Inthisview,thepaymentoftop-upsorfinancialaddi-

tionstothecommunity-internfundingdiminishesthe

community’sintrinsicfeelingofownershipandmoti-

vationtosafemoney:

“Weprovidedthetraining.Weprovidedthefacil-

ities.Weareresponsibleforthis,providingthe

transportationcostorotheraspectsofthis.That

belongstous,wesupportthis.Butwhenthey

starttheirownbusiness,it’stheirownmoney,and

itwillbetheirownincomethattheyget…Wejust

transfertheskills,butthenitistheirjob.Afterthat

they can run by themselves.”

ORG. E., JALALABAD, INTERVIEW

“Wedon’tgivethemmoney.Ifwegiveevenone

penforanSHG,thenwesendthemthemes-

sage‘youareverypoor’.Eventhoughweprovide

somenotebooksatthebeginning,wetellthem

thatthisisa giftfromtheorganisation,andafter-

wardsyouwillberesponsible.OurSHGsarebuy-

ingtheirownbooks.” ORG. A., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Ontheotherendofthespectrumaretheor-

ganisationsthathavedecidedtogivemoneytothe

self-establishedrevolvingfundofthegroup,whichen-

ablesbeneficiariestotakebiggerloansfasterthanthey

wouldhavebeenabletodowithoutthefunding.The

moneyisusuallygivenbytheorganisationsintheform

ofa one-timegrantora multiple-timetop-upoftheex-

istingcommunity-fund.Allinterviewedorganisations

statedthattheygavethemonetaryinputafterthe

groupshadshowntheabilitytosavetheirownmoney

forseveralmonths.Inthisway,theSHGshadalready

demonstrateda feelingofownershipandcompetence

torepaytheloansthatindividualshadtaken.

“Theyarepoorpeople,andtheywanttostartbig

businesses,too.Withtheirownmoney,theycanonly

startsmallbusinesses.Onceourorganisationgave

themmoney,theywereabletostartbiggerbusi-

nessesthathavea strongerimpact.I thinkit’sgood

tohavethefinancialsupportbyourorganisation

becausethebusinessestheycanestablish,change.

Theystillhavethesameprojects,butwiththebigger

loans,theirbusinessesgrow.Oneofourbeneficiar-

iesiscalledKazima.Shehasa smallbusinessinher

house to make clothes and sell in the city. Now with

a biggerloanherhusbandmadea shopinthecity.

Shehasbigmachinesandshesellsclothesnotonly

throughherhusbandbutalsotoothershops.”

SOCIAL ORGANISERS, JALALABAD, GROUP INTERVIEW

37

However,thegivingofmoneywasunanimous-

lyreflectedinbeneficiaries’demandsformoremon-

ey—whichcontrastswiththeFGDsconductedin

SHGsthatdidnotreceiveadditionalfunding.46

“Itwouldbegoodiftheamountofmoney

fromtheorganisationwouldbemore.Maybe

60,000AFN. It’snotgoodthatwewantsomething

fromanorganisation,butwhatwewantistohave

a sustainableeconomicsystem.Ifwehavevoca-

tionaltrainingandthenecessarytoolsthenwe

can sustain ourselves.” MALE FGD, JALALABAD

“Weneedsupport.WeneedmoreVocation-

alTrainingCourses,suchassewing,carpetweav-

ingandconfectionaryforthewomen.Butwealso

needmorefundsinourtreasuryboxtoexpand

ourbusiness.Ifwehavemoremoneywecanhave

a goodbusiness.” MALE FGD, HERAT

A feworganisationstakethemiddleground

betweena‘pure’approachandthedecisiontogive

money,byofferingpackagesthatcontainthenec-

essarymaterialfortheskillsthattheytaughtinthe

trainings.Thiscaneithertaketheformofsched-

uledsharingofmaterialthatanorganisationprovides

amonga groupofseveralparticipants,orinreceiving

individualtoolkits:

46 Thelatterdidnotvoiceanyexpectationfromtheorganisations

toprovidethemwithadditionalfunds,butunderscoredtheirown

independence.

“Wegiveinformation,trainingandprimarygoods.

Theydon’thavethemoneytobuythose.To5

womenwegive1carpetloom,andthentheycan

workinshiftsonit.3inthemorning,3intheafter-

noon.Itdependsonthecultureofthecommunity

as well.” ORG. K., HERAT, INTERVIEW

“Creditgivingwastriedoutbutthatdidn’twork.

Nowwearegivingouttoolkitsdependingonthe

enterprise.Includedinthetoolkitsareforexam-

plemachines,butnotconsumableitems.”

ORG. F., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Eithercamphastheirrationalefordecidingto

giveorwithholdfunding:Thesupportersofa‘pure’

approachsuggestonlygivingtrainingandinsome

casesmaterialsupport,butnofinancialsupport,as

thiswouldperpetuatea hand-outculturethatleads

todependencies.Supportersofgivingloansor‘top-

ups’maintainthatthiswouldenablea fasterbusi-

nessdevelopmentasthebiggerrevolvingfundsen-

ablebiggerloans.Thedecisionforeitherapproach

mightliewitheitheranethicalconvictionorthetime

horizonthatanorganisationchoosesforpursuing

theSHGapproach.

Trainings

WhilethequestionofoutsidefundingfortheSHGs

hasbeena contentiousissue,allorganisationswere

ofthesameopinionwhenitcomestoofferingtrain-

ingstotheSHGs.ThebasicconceptofSHGsistosave

moneyandtoofferloanstotheirmemberswhichcan

berepaidininstalmentswithoutaddedinterest.The

economicrationaleforofferingthesesmall(andwith

time,increasing)loansistoestablishsmalltomedium

enterprisesforpartsofthepopulationthatwerepre-

viouslyjobless.Thetrainingsareprovidedmainlyto

women,whomighthavea marketableskillbutnoex-

pertiseinrunninga business,marketingtheirprod-

uctsorconnectingtoa customerbase.Itisnecessary

toteachtheseskillstothebeneficiariestoeffectively

supportthesuccessofthesebuddingbusinesses:

“Itwasnotonlyaboutmakinga savinggroup,but

alsoaboutthetechnicalskills,aswellastheenter-

priseandmarketingskillsweprovided,thesenet-

worksthatofferedinputs.”

ORG. L., KABUL, INTERVIEW

“WhenI wenta fewdaysagotothecommuni-

ty,a womanhadtakena loanfromtheboxbut

she didn’t understand how to contact the mar-

ketandreachcustomers,howtostarta business.

Bothmeandthegroupmembersgaveheride-

asonhowtodoit.Nowsheisstartinga business

ina lowstage,butsheisonherway.Shedoestai-

loringbutshedidn’tknowwheretobuythema-

chine,howtoconnectwithcustomers.Nowshe

understandsit.Itisnecessarytogivebusiness

training,butatthetimewhenwegaveit,shewas

absentinthegroup.That’swhywehadtogiveher

extratraining.”

SOCIAL FACILITATOR, JALALABAD, INTERVIEW

Someorganisationsnotonlyofferedbusiness

trainingsbutwentwitha moreholisticapproachthat

38

includedtrainingsonwater,sanitation,andhealth

aswell,orwhichtaughtthetechnicalskillswhichare

marketablethemselves:

“Weorganisedtrainingsforwomenandmenin

WASHandalsohealtheducation,birthandsafethe

lifeskills,andalsobusinessdevelopmenttraining.

Wearrangedtechnicaltrainingsaboutembroidery

andbeadworking.Thatgivesthemwhattheyneed

to succeed.” ORG. E., JALALABAD, INTERVIEW

This,however,hasbeena questionamongor-

ganisations:whetherandhowmanyvocationalcours-

estooffer.Whilethereisa greatnumberofwomen

who already have marketable skills that can be en-

hancedorusedforproduction,othersneedcourses

inwhichtolearnskills.Offeringvocationalcoursesis

a financialquestionasboththetrainingsthemselves

andtheprovisionofmaterialareexpensive.Theinter-

viewedorganisationshavedealtverydifferentlywith

thisquestion.Somedecidedtosetstrictselectioncri-

teriatofocusonthemostvulnerablehouseholdsand

onlytraina smallpercentageoftheiroverallbeneficiar-

iesintheskills,whowillbeabletobenefitthemostand

who will be able to establish additional income streams

fortheirfamilythroughparticipationinthesecourses.

However,theinterviewedbeneficiariesof

thisorganisationgenerallydemandeda higherper-

centageoftheirmemberstobetakenintovocation-

alcourses,a pointofcritiquevoicedbothwithinthe

FGDsaswellasinindividualinterviews:

“TheneedsinourcommunitiesareVocation-

alTrainingCoursesformenandwomen.Wehad

sometrainingcoursethatwereveryuseful.Un-

fortunately,thetrainingcoursesfinishedandwe

wanttheofficetorestartthetrainingcoursesin

our community.” MALE FGD PARTICIPANT, HERAT

Otherorganisationshaveattemptedtoap-

proachthisproblemindifferentways.Twoofthe

interviewedorganisationsdecidedtoformsav-

inggroupsbasedonunderlyingvocationaltraining

themes:eachsavinggrouphadtodecidefora specif-

icskillthattheywoulddevelopandthenpracticethis

skilleitherindividuallyorasa group:

“Thesavinggroupswerebasedonthevocation-

altrainingsthatwewereproviding:savinggroup

inconfectionary,savinggroupinembroidery,sav-

inggroupintailoring.Butwedidn’tpushthemto

worktogether.Theycouldbuttheydidnothaveto.

Whiletheyweredoingthesavingtogether,they

alsosharedknowledgewitheachother,whichwas

reallyhelping.” ORG. L., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Alternatively,anorganisationcouldidentify

oneortwopeopleduringtrainingsessions,whoshow

specialskillsandthenlaterofferthemextratrain-

ingsotheycaneventuallytakeoverthetrainingrole.

Thentheycancontinuethetrainingthemselvesand

thetrainerscouldreceivea littlemoneyaspayment

forconductingtrainingsessions.

“Thankstoyouroffice,nowweknow,nowwehave

learntit.Wetookthesmallbusinesstrainingaswell

andnowweknowhowtostartsucha smallbusi-

ness.I’mthankfultomyteachers.I wanttohave

sucha groupindifferenthouses.NowI amgoodin

myprofessionallife.I’dliketoworkasa teachermy-

self,iftheorganisationgavemetheopportunity.

I wouldcreatea grouplikethisinmyhouseandsup-

portit.” FEMALE FGD PARTICIPANT, JALALABAD

Anotherorganisationdidnotoffervocation-

altrainings,butorganisedexposurevisitstodiffer-

entsmallbusinesses,inwhichthespecificideasofthe

businesswerediscussedandinwhichallparticipants

couldlearna skillthatwastransferrableintoa pos-

siblehomebusiness,suchasmakingjam,orpickling.

Overall,beneficiarieswereoverallthankfulforboth

thebusinessandvocationaltrainingsthattheyre-

ceivedandfoundthattheseenabledthemtosetup

andleadtheirbusinesseseffectively:

“Wehavebeenofferedtrainingsthroughtheor-

ganisationasoneofthenewinitiatives.Wehave

gottentrainingonhowtomakesoaps.Wethinkit

wouldhelpusiftherewasmoretraining.Trainings

suchas:tailoring,sewing,beadsewing,preserv-

ingfood,pickling,anda bitmarketingtofindmar-

ketforourproducts.Someofthechangesthatwe

experiencedthroughthegroupsandtrainingsare:

Wehavea stablesavingprocedure,weareableto

savemoney,andwearealsofeelingmorestable,

that we have money here.”

FEMALE FGD PARTICIPANT, KABUL

39

“Mydaughtergraduatedfromthevocationaltrain-

ing.Shetooka loanfromtheboxandshehas

a smallbusinessathomewithembroiderywith

which she can make money. She makes clothes

andsellsthemtoneighboursandinthemarket.

Oureconomicsituationisimproving.”

FEMALE FGD PARTICIPANT, JALALABAD

Market Linkage

Lastbutnotleast,a viablelinktoa targetmarket,

whereproductsfromSHGbeneficiariescanbesold,

wasseenasa majorcomponentininfluencingtheef-

fectiveness,successandultimately,sustainabilityof

Self-HelpGroups.Oneaspectofestablishingthemar-

ketlinkageisa marketassessmentthatshouldhave

takenplacebeforethestartoftheprojectandbefore

beneficiarieswereadvisedabouttheproductionof

certainitemswithintheirbusinesses(see 3.1.2. Rele-

vance/NeedsAssessment).Anotheraspectisthehu-

mantohumancomponent—introductiontotraders

ortopeopleintheprivatesectorwherebeneficiar-

iescanselltheirproducts.Someorganisationslinked

theproducerstosupermarkets,otherstocompanies,

whichcollecttheproducefromthem:

“Accordingtoourlessonslearnt,afterphasingout

after2to3years,wehavelearntthatinsomear-

easwhentheprojectfinishes,theSHGcollapses,

whenthereisnostrategywiththecommunityto

preparea phaseoutstrategy.Meaning,whenthis

projectgoesout,howcanitbesustainable?Saving

box,training,andmarketing,especiallya linkage

tothemarket,a linkagetothecooperativeinthe

district,anda linktotheprivatesector,thoseare

important.Ifyoufollowtheseimportantpoints,

thenyourSHGwillbesustainable.Ifyoujustes-

tablisha Self-HelpGroupandthenlikea blindper-

son,whodoesn’tknow,goout,thenitwillcol-

lapse.” ORG. K., HERAT, INTERVIEW

Lackingtoestablishsuchmarketlinkageswas

pointedoutascontra-productivetotheoverallpro-

jectandapproach.Notonlyaretheproducersnot

abletoselltheirproductsandmakea profit,itcanfur-

thermoreaffecthowtheprojectisseenbythecom-

munityandotherneighbouringcommunities.Ifmem-

bersiftheSHGssavemoneyandestablishbusinesses,

butarenotabletoreacha market,theywilllosemon-

eyandmightnotbeabletopaybacktheirloans.Fur-

thermore,assuccessfulimplementationofSHGsis

alsolinkedtotheoverallperceptionofSHGsandsuc-

cessfulimplementationhasbeenshowninthisre-

porttobelinkedtocommunities’opennesstotheap-

proachoverall.

“It’snotonlyimportanttotransfertheskills,butalso

todevelopthechainofmarketingfromtheirprod-

ucts,tothebazaar.Wehelpthemtosignagree-

mentswithtradersinthebazaarinJalalabadcity.

Theyprovidematerial,andbeads,theyhavetheir

owntechniqueandplan,theycanorderthetchador

orclothes,andthebenefitbelongstothem.They

needspecifictrainingstoincreasetheircapacity

andtoletthemunderstandthemarket.Ifthereis

nomarketforwhattheyproduce,theirmainwork,

itwillhavea negativeimpactontheirwork,be-

causetheyspendtheirmoney[withoutreceiving

anythinginreturn].Themarketinglinkisimportant.

Theyneedtorecognizeandanalysethemarketand

thedemandofthepeople.Afterwards,theycan

usetheircapacityandtheirskillstomarkettheir

products.” ORG. E., JALALABAD, INTERVIEW

Whileallofthesepartsindividuallysupport

aneffectiveimplementationoftheSHGapproach,

oneoftheintervieweesunderlinedthatthesediffer-

entaspectsalsoneedtobeconsideredfroma holistic

perspectivetoensurethesuccessofanSHGproject.

Itwasneitherthesavingitself,northetrainingcom-

ponentsinisolation,butratherthewholeengage-

mentandlearningexperiencewithintheSHGcontext,

whichmadetheapproachsuccessful:

“Formeit’slikea puzzle.Youneedallthosepiec-

estoputittogethersoitworks.I haveanimpres-

sionthatsomeorganisationsareonlydoingitfor

thesavinggroups,butweweregivingthemthose

technicalskills,onenterprisedevelopment,etc.

Sooverthetimetheyfounditusefultosharein-

formationnotonlyontechnicalskills,butwe

foundthatithada hugeimpactonthereduc-

tionofdomesticviolence.Theevaluationreport

showedthatithada hugeimpactonself-confi-

dence…Butforthat,youneedtodomorethan

establishsavinggroups,youneedtheotherlay-

ers,thesupport,thetrainings,that’swhatmakes

itsuccessful.Youneedthewholepackageto

makeitsuccessful. ORG. L., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Herat: Shoes of the participating SHG members at a meeting next to a weaving loom

41

3.2.3. Financial Processes

TheresearchsurveyedSHGsindifferentstagesof

maturation,fromrecentlyestablishedSHGsthathad

justbeenrunningfora fewmonthstoestablished

SHGsthatwerewellnetworkedwithCLAsandFed-

erations.Howwellthefinancialprocesses(loans,sav-

ings,investments,etc.)wereestablisheddepended

bothonthetimetheyhadbeenrunning,theatten-

tionandsupporttheyhadreceivedfromtherespec-

tiveorganisationaswellthecommunity’sowndrive

toparticipate.

TheamountsthatwereusedbytheSHGsei-

therforsocialorforeconomicinvestmentsvaried

vastlybetweenthesurveyedorganisations.Some

organisationsarrangedagreementswiththeirben-

eficiariesinwhichthemoneythattheparticipating

membersputintothesavingboxwouldbefreetouse

eitherforsocialoreconomiccauses,whilethemon-

eygivenfromtheorganisationscouldonlybeusedfor

businesses.Otherorganisationshaveseta specific

amountoftheSHGssavingsitselfwhichneedstobe

utilisedforbusinesspurposes,whileagainotheror-

ganisationsleftitcompletelyuptotheSHGstodeter-

minewhattousethemoneyfor:

“TheSelf-HelpGrouphasmonthlymeetings.And

aftereachmeeting,theytransfer40%oftheirsav-

ingstothecommunitybankandthisisonlyfor

businesspurposes.Theremaining60%ismostly

usedforsocialwelfare,whensomeonebecomes

ill,theygetmoneyfortreatmentfromthesaving

groupsandtheypayitbackaftera whilewithout

interest.” ORG. C., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Generally,financialprocessesseemedwelles-

tablishedintheSHGsthatwerevisitedandinwhich

theFGDswereconductedwithonlya sparseminority

oftheFGDsreportinganyproblemsinrepaymentof

loans or in the loan cycle overall.

“Wedon’tfaceanyproblemswiththis.Wecanpay

itback.Onewomantookmoneyforthetreatment

ofherfather,butnowheisfineagainandthey

paidbackthemoneythatshetookforhismedical

expenses.” FEMALE FGD, JALALABAD

“Theprocessofloangivingandsavingisgoodand

wehaven’tfacedanyproblemsyet.SomeofSHG

memberswhohavetakenloansrepaidwithout

anyproblemsbutsomeotherrepaidwithdifficul-

ties.Theydidn’tbringthemoneyontime.They

claimedthattheyforgotorthattheydidnothave

money.” FEMALE FGD, HERAT

ThefewFGDsthatdidreportproblemsinloan

repaymentnotedtheproblemwasusuallysolvedby

givingmoretimetotheborrowertorepaytheloan.

Insomecases,especiallywhentheeconomicbase

oftheloanrepaymenthadbeendamaged(forexam-

plethroughthedeathofananimal),thegroupdecid-

edtoextenda secondloantoenablethegroupmem-

bertorepaytheloanamount.Theestablishedtrustin

thegrouptherebyhelpedtoovercomeadversitythat

inothercases,forexamplewithconventionalloans,

mighthaveledintoa loanspiralfromwhichitmight

bedifficulttorecover.Loanrepaymentproblems

seems to have only led in very rare cases to the re-

movalofparticipantsfromthegroups,whichinthese

caseswasa decisiontakenbythegroupitself:

“Theyextendthetimeifsomeoneislateinpay-

ingback.Extensiondependsonthesector.Ifthey

workinagriculture,thenwegivethemtimetosell

theirproductsbeforetheypayback.Forexample,

ifthecowdied,andtheycannotgetthemilktosell

inthemarket,thentheygivemoretimeorthey

mightgiveanotherloanforbuyinganotheranimal.

Ifwepressurethemand,forexample,theyhave

boughtonekilogram[ofa good],thentheywillsell

thisonekilogramunderpriceandthatwillnotbe

goodforthem.Weworkoneconomicdevelop-

ment,andifwepressurethem,thenwearenotgo-

ingtoseeanydevelopment.”

ORG. C., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

“Theyareverypoor,that’swhysometimesthey

takelongertime.Theirbusinessmightnotalways

improvedirectly.Sometimesittakeslonger,6or8

months.Afterwardstheypayback.”

FEMALE FACILITATORS, HERAT, INTERVIEW

Oneofthechallengestotheefficacyoffinan-

cialprocessesisliteracy.Afghanistanhasanover-

allliteracyrateaslowas39%,accordingtoWHO.47

Inurbanareas,however,theliteracyrateishigher,

around53.5%forurbanresidents,68.7%formales

47 See:WHOCountryCooperationStrategyAfghanistan,2017,

http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/136852/1/ccsbrief_afg_

en.pdf

42

and37.9%forfemales.48Thegenderdisparityinthe

literacyrateisreflectedinmanyorganisations’ex-

periences.Howtheyrespondtotheoverwhelming

numberofwomenintheirgroupswhocannotreador

write,differsfromorganisationtoorganisation.Some

decidetocoupletheirgeneralSHGtrainingswithlit-

eracytraining,whileothersdecidedtogivemoredi-

rectlyfacilitatedsupport:

“Thetimeframeisdifferentfromeachgroup,de-

pendingontheirliteracy.Literategroupswevisit

onceina monthandilliterateoneswevisitoncein

a week.” ORG. C., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

“I seethreekindsofbenefitsthatI getfromat-

tendingthisgroup.OneisthatI didn’tknowhow

towriteandlearn.NowI know,becauseI attend-

edtheliteracyclassesprovidedhere.Thesecond

profitisthatI didn’tknowhowtosowsomething,

likedresses,butnowI knowitandI candoit.And

thethirdprofitisthatnowI cantakea loan.”

FEMALE FGD, JALALABAD

Otherorganisationsdecidedagainstprovid-

ingliteracytrainingstotheirSHGs.Ontheonehand

itwasseenasa hugefinancialinvestment.Onthe

otherhand,someorganisationsarguedthateven

theilliterateSHGswereabletofindsolutionsto

theseproblemsiftheyweregiventheopportuni-

tytoapproachitcreativelythroughactivatingfam-

ilyresourcessuchasliteratesonsordaughtersof

48 See:NationalRiskandVulnerabilityAssessment2011(NRVA

2011),p.78.

SHGparticipants.Thiswasfurthermoreportrayed

byorganisationsasoneoftheaspectsinwhichSHGs

showedtheirownproblem-solvingskillsandinde-

pendenceasa group:

“Wesometimeshavetrouble.Therateofliteracy

isverylowinAfghanistanandmostofthewomen

areilliterate.Butweencouragethewomentoask

forhelpfromtheirownchildren,daughterswho

cometothegroupstovolunteer.Somegroups

saytheirchildrenaretoobusy,butthenthey

givesmallmoneytoboysandgirlstocometothe

groupsandhelpthem.Theyfindtheirownway.”

ORG. A., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Anotherdevelopmentthatwasfoundespecial-

lyamongfemaleSHGsinJalalabadwasthatwhilefi-

nancialprocessesweregenerallystableandworked,

however,loanswerenotusedbythewomenthem-

selvesbutbytheirmalefamilymembersandrelatives.

Whilethisissuesurfacedinothercitiesaswell,49 the

frequencywithwhichitoccurredwassubstantially

higherinJalalabad.Whilethehigherfrequencymight

beduetoa samplingbiasoftheFGDs,facilitatorsalso

supportedtheimpressionthatwomenoftentookthe

loanfortheirmalefamilymembers,orifnotdirectly

forthem,thenfora familybusinessinwhichthemen

wereinvolvedtoa substantialdegreeintheproduc-

tionormarketlinkage:

49 ExamplessurfacedalsointheFGDsinKabulforexamplewith

womentakingloansfortheirsonsandhusbands.

“I tookloansforcreditcardsformybrotherto

sell.Shegota loanforhersonstosellvegetables

intheirshops.Thisothermembertooka loanfor

hersonsfora newbusiness.Shecooksriceinthe

houseandthesonsellsitinthebazaar.”

FEMALE FGD, JALALABAD

“I tookitformyselftomakemilk,andthenmysons

sellitinthemarket.Theloanwas20,000AFN.” FE-

MALE FGD, JALALABAD

“Myfatherisverypoorandweak.I helpedhim

throughbuyinga rickshawwiththeloan.Wetook

moneyfromtheloantogetherwithothersavings

inourfamily.” FEMALE FGD, JALALABAD

Projectorganiserswithlong-termexperience

inimplementingSHGs,however,arguedthatwhile

theyhadexperiencedthisphenomenoninthepast

themselves(inKabulandMazar-eSharif),theysaw

itasa stageintheempowermentofwomen,which

willbesurpassedwithsufficienttimeoncethefami-

lyhasestablisheda betterfinancialbase.Thewomen

arethenalreadyimplicatedinthebusinessesthrough

takingtheloansandthroughparticipatinginin-

come-generatingactivities,sothatfurtherstepsofin-

volvingthemastheproducersareeasiertotakethan

fromthestart:

“Anotherdilemmathatwehavehadwasthatthe

womensaid,forexample,thattheirhusbands

wereshoemakersandhewantedtoopena shop,

they’dneeda machineforhim.Sothenthewoman

43

wouldgettheloanfortheman.Ontheonehand,

itistheirmoney.Ontheotherhand,theyshould

startbusinessesthemselves.Youcancriticize

both.Inthelongrun,thewomenshouldgetactive

themselves.” ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

3.3. Efficiency

Thecriterionofefficiencymeasuresthequalitative

andquantitativeoutputsinrelationtotheinputs:“Itis

aneconomictermwhichsignifiesthattheaidusesthe

leastcostlyresourcespossibleinordertoachievethe

desiredresults”.50Thequestionsinthispartfocused

onassessingwhethertheactivitieswerecost-effi-

cient,whetherobjectiveswereachievedontime,and

lastly,whethertheapproachwasimplementedinthe

mostefficientwaycomparedtoalternatives.

Oneofthedifficultiesinevaluatingwhetherthe

SHGapproachiscosteffectiveistheunevennessof

fundinginvestedintoSHGs.Someorganisationssup-

porting‘pure’SHGapproachesarguethattheyare

cost-effectivesolutionstowide-spreadfinancialand

socialproblems.Otherorganisations,whichdealwith

a combinationmodelofthegroups’ownsavingsto-

getherwithfinancialormaterialinputbytheorgani-

sationitself,pointoutthatboththeadditionalfunding

andthetrainingcomponentsareexpensiveadditions

toanotherwisesimplefinancialprogram.However,

theystillevaluatetheseadditionsasimportant,worth-

whileandcomparedwithotherprojects,cost-effective.

50 See:http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/

daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

ThecostforsettingupSHGscanbeconceptu-

alisedindifferentcategories:communitymaterialfor

savingandrecordkeeping(cashbox,passbooks,re-

cordkeepingbook),salariesforcommunityfacilita-

tors,salariesandmaterialfortrainings,costofaddi-

tionalfundingfromtheorganisation(alsocalledtop

up,additionalrevolvingfund,grant,capitalseed),and

generaladministrativecosts.

Thecostofthephysicalinputs(cashbox,pass-

books,recordkeepingbook)arerelativelysmallin

termsofset-up.Thecashboxwithlocksisonlya one-

timeinvestment,andthecostofthepassbooksandre-

cordkeepingbookarenegligible.Inmostcases,organ-

isationsboughtthefirstonesfortheSHGsasa starter

giftwiththeclearunderstandingthattheSHGswould

havetobuytheirownbooksinthefuture.

Thesalariesforcommunityfacilitatorsvaried

markedlyduetocompletelydifferentsalaryscales,

dependingonwhethertheywereemployedbya lo-

cally-basedNGO(firsttwoexamples)orpartofa gov-

ernmentorUN-facilitatedproject(lastexample).This

makesthem,unfortunately,incomparable:

“Thewholeapproachbecomesveryefficientmon-

eywise,becausethefacilitatorsget5000AFNto

6000AFN(equalling71–86USD)andtheyhave

15–20groupswhomtheyfacilitate.”

LOCAL NGO, ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

“Formanycommunityfacilitators,nowtheirsalary

isaround8000AFN. Inthebeginningitwas2000

or3000AFN.” LOCAL NGO, ORG. A., KABUL, INTERVIEW

“Wehavea provincialfacilitatoranda villagefacil-

itator,trainers,M&E,MIS,CED,Islamicbanking

trainer,accesstofinancestaff.Andthenwegive

themonaverage50,000AFNpermonth.Wepay

around40,000AFNforourcommunityfacilita-

tors.” ORG. C., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Whiletheaforementionedcostsvariedwidely,

sodidthebudgetsforeachorganisationtoimplement

theSHGapproach.Oneorganisation,whichhasa more

than10-yearsofexperienceinsettingupSHGsinAf-

ghanistan,pointedoutthat,astheprojectgrew,their

overallbudgetforimplementingSHGshaschanged

markedly.Theyinitiallyonlyemployeda coupleofcoor-

dinatorsandcommunityfacilitators,butwitha marked

increaseofoverallSHGs(around1000currentlyrun-

ning),theyarenowemploying16coordinators,a gender

anda childrenspecialist,andtheoveralladministration.

Otherorganisationsmentionedinthelitera-

turethatwassurveyedforthisreporthaddeveloped

cost-sharingagreementswiththeSHGsthattheyset

up,inwhichresponsibilityisconsecutivelyshifted

fromimplementingorganisationtotheSHGgroups,

whichtakeonsharesinthesalarypayment.51Noneof

theorganisationsinterviewedforthisreporthadde-

velopedcost-sharingagreementslikethis.

51 See:Cramer,Sarah,HervéNicolle,andNassimMajidi.“Self-

HelpGroupProgrammeEvaluation.”Kabul,Afghanistan:Samuel

Hall,2012,p.25:“(Theyhave)anestablishedpaymentsharing

structureforthesalariesofCommunityFacilitators(CF)that

graduallyshiftsresponsibilityforCFsalariesfromMissionEast

totheSHGs…Itisstructuredinsucha waythatgroupsbeginby

makingsmallcontributionstotheCF’smonthlysalary(2‚000

AFN/40 USD),andeverysixmonthsthesharethatgroups

contributeincreasesandMissionEast’ssharedecreases.”

44

Thecostforsalariesoftrainers,material

fortrainingsaswellasthecostofadditionalfund-

ingfromtheorganisationfortherevolvingfundof

theSHGs,varieddependingonthetrainingsgiven,

theneededmaterialandtheamountofthegrant.52

Noneoftheinterviewedorganisationshadmadeany

costbenefitanalysisperSHG,usuallyduetothefact

thattheyreceivedanoverallbudgetfortheproject

inwhichtheindividualprojectitems(suchassalaries

ortrainings)werespecified,butnotbrokendown

tothecostofeachSHG. However,allorganisations

thatwerestillrunningSHGscurrentlywereofthe

opinionthattheSHGswerea cost-effectivechoice

toaffectsocialandeconomicdevelopmentintheir

partnercommunities:

“SHGsarecomparativelycosteffective.Youonly

needa projectcoordinator,a fewfacilitatorsand

youcanstart.Ifyoualreadyhaveotherprojects

andyouhaveanofficesetup,thenitissomething

easytoaddtoyourrunningprojects.”

ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

3.4. Sustainability

Sustainabilitymeasures“whetherthebenefitsofan

activityarelikelytocontinueafterdonorfundinghas

beenwithdrawn”.53Sustainabilityisthoughtofhere

52 Forananalysisofthesedifferingchoices,see3.2.2.

Effectiveness/InfluencingFactors.

53 See:http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/

daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

bothintermsofinstitutionalstabilityaswellasfinan-

cialsustainability.Partoftheevaluationwastode-

terminewhichfactorsinfluencedtheachievement,

ornon-achievement,ofsustainabilityofprogrammes

designedwiththeSHGapproach.

3.4.1. Continuation and Independence

vs. Dependencies

Oneofthemainquestionsintermsofsustainability

iswhethertheproject-based,grant-dependentbusi-

nessmodelsthatmostNGOsfunctionunder,allowfor

long-termself-sustainabilityoftheSHGsthattheyes-

tablish.Thegeneralperceptionoforganisations’staff

suchasorganisersandmanagersofSHGswasthat

theyarea sustainablemodelthatsupportstheinde-

pendenceofbeneficiaries,becausetheyprovidetools

toorganisethemselvesintheircommunitiesandto

buildsupportsystemsovertime.

“I learnedinprojectsbeforethatpeoplebecomede-

pendentonprojectsandmoney.Theydidn’tcare

aboutwhattheyspenditon.Butwedecidedhere

thatit’simportantwhatwillhappenafterphaseout.

Weknowthatinthefuture,moneywillnotalways

beavailable,andtohavemoneyisjustoncechance.

Buthowcanyouusethisopportunitytomakeyour

communitysustainable?ThatisthroughSelf-Help

Groups!” ORG. K., HERAT, INTERVIEW

Onemajorweaknessintheperceptionthat

SHGswereself-sufficientwasanassumptionamong

organisationsthathavehadSHGsinthepast,butare

currentlynotestablishingoroverseeingthem,that

theirSHGswerestillrunning.Inallbutonecasethere

wasnofollow-uptoverifytheassumption:

“Thedesignoftheprojectitselfwasperfect,but

theimplementationfacedchallenges,depend-

ingonwherewetriedtoimplementit.Forexam-

ple,aftertheconclusion,after5years,therewas

nofollowup,thatwasoneoftheflaws,andthatof

courseaffectswhetherthiskindofsystemstays.

Ourorganisationcontracteda localNGOtocon-

tinuefollowingupwiththegroupsandtheydid

thatfora while.Webelievethattherearestill

somepeoplewhodothesavingsandwhohave

continued” ORG. I., KABUL, INTERVIEW

“Itwasnicetoseethatmostofthegroupstookown-

ershipanddevelopedtheserulesanddecisionson

theirown.Afterthefirstphasetheevaluatorsaid

thatthesavinggroupshadreachedtheirmaturi-

tyandthefinalevaluatorsaidtherewasnoneedto

talkaboutthesavinggroupsastheywereworking.

Thesesavinggroupsaresupposedtogoon.Every

nowandthenI checkwiththem,ourformercol-

leagueswhoarestillthere,andtheytellusthatthey

arestillmeeting.” ORG. L., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Indeed,theSHGsthatwerevisitedespecial-

lyinMazar-eSharifandKabul,whichdidnotreceive

supportfromanyorganisationanymore,werestill

activeandrunningbythemselves.Thewomenwere

meeting,puttingmoneyasideforsavingsandsup-

portingeachother’sbusinessventures.Italsoap-

pearsthatwhenthereisa certaingroupspiritestab-

45

lished,thattheeffectmightspread:notonlywere

groupsinMazar-eSharifstillactiveafterphase-out,

buttheyalsogavetheirknowledgefurthertooth-

erwomenandsupportedneighboursinestablishing

theirownSHGswithoutanyorganisation’sinput.This

spiritofownershipwasevidentinonewoman’sstate-

mentfromanSHGinJalalabad:

“Eveniftheorganisationwouldnotgivemoney

anymore,wewouldstillmeetwitheachotherand

helpeachother.Weareonefamilynow.Weare

closefriends.” FEMALE FGD, JALALABAD

Otherorganisations,however,maintainthat

itisimportanttostayincontactwiththeSHGsand

tosupportthem,alsotolearnforfutureimplementa-

tionsoftheapproach.

“WestoppedtheformationofsavinggroupsinJan-

uary2015.Wefirstwanttogettheresultofthe

SHGgroupsandthenwewillstartinthenextphase

oftheprogramwiththeformationofnewSHGs.

From2011to2016weprovidedsavingbooks,loan

booksandnowtheybuyitthemselves.Oneofour

indicesistransactions.Iftheydo8–10transac-

tionssuccessfully,thenweknowthattheyknow

howtodoit.Therearegroupsthattellus,nomatter

whetheryoucomeoryoudon’tcome,wewillmeet

and save.” ORG. C., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Assessingsustainabilityisfurthercomplicat-

edbytherelationshipbetweenfacilitatorsandhost

community.Someorganisationspointedoutthatthis

relationshipcandevelopintoa dependencyinitself,

especiallywhenthefacilitatortakesontheroleofthe

community’sbookkeeperintheabsenceofliterate

SHGmembers.

“Wehadgroupsestablishedbutthenitshowed

upthatthefacilitatorsweredoingthebooks.The

booksweredonenicely,buttheyweredepend-

entonthem.Weaskedandtherewere4–5wom-

enwhocouldreadandwritesowetoldthefacili-

tatorthatsheneededtoteachthemhowtokeep

thebooks.Thentheycandoitthemselves.Ourfa-

cilitatorssometimesfeltthattheymightlosetheir

jobsiftheytraintheotherstoowell.Maybethat’s

alsoa problemwithusthatwehavenotseta time

targetonhowlongtheprojectwilllast.Theymight

wanttheprojecttogoonforeverandever,like

a governmentjob.Butthereshouldbea time-

frame,5or6years.That’swhatweinitiallymissed.”

ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Asmentionedinthisexample,theimplemen-

tationoftheSHGapproachnotonlynecessitates

a changeinthethinkingofbeneficiariesbutalso

inthestaffoftheimplementingorganisation.This

hasbeena constantthemeinonewayoranother

ofthisresearch,emphasisingthatSHGmovesboth

communitiesandorganisationsawayfromanen-

trenched‘handout’culture,inwhichorganisations

providefinancesormaterialtoneedycommunities.

“Theimplementationcanbedifficultaswellwith

thestaff.Usuallytheremightbetheestablishment

ofshelterorhandoutsandeveryoneishappy.But

thisisa totallydifferentapproach.Whatwefight

with,thestaffmightthinkthattheyarethefacil-

itatorsforthegroups,buttheymakethegroups

dependentonthem.That’swhatwearecurrently

fightingagainst.” ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

3.4.2. Exit Plan

Mostorganisationspointedoutthata clearlydefined

exitstrategyisa majorcomponentofestablishing

SHGsassustainableentitiesafterphasingoutexter-

nalinputsandassistance.Thisstrategyshouldfur-

thermore be communicated clearly with the commu-

nityinwhichtheSHGsarebeingimplementedsothat

thecommunityisawareofthescopeandtimeframe

andendingoftheproject,aswellashowtocontinue

aftertheorganisationhasleft:

“Whenwetalkedwiththecommunityweclari-

fiedintheagreementwhatisourresponsibilityis

andwhatistheirresponsibility.Wementionedthe

phaseoutplanrightthenatthebeginningaswell,

becausewecannotstayforeverinthecommunity.

Attheverybeginning,wediscussedwiththemthe

duration,afterwhichthecommunitycanaccept

ownership.” ORG. E., JALALABAD, INTERVIEW

Twomainpointsemergedduringinterviewsas

vitaltoa successfulexitstrategy.Thefirstaspectisthe

establishmentofa viableaccesstoa markettoensure

thattheproduceofthebeneficiariesreachescustom-

ers.Thewaystoestablishthisconnectiontothemar-

46

ketsvaried(seealsopart3.2.2. Effectiveness/Influenc-

ingFactors).Someorganisationsdevelopedcollection

centreswheretheproducewascollectedforredis-

tributiontoshops(suchasdairycentresandmilkcol-

lectionpoints).Someotherorganisationsconnected

producersandtradersdirectlytoestablisha business

relationship.Oneorganisationopenedshopsinwhich

theproductsfromdifferentSHGscouldbesoldcollec-

tively,puttingonewomaninchargewhoisa memberof

anSHGgroup.Theorganisationorganisedexitwork-

shopsinwhichshopkeeperswereinvitedtolinkthem

withtheproducinggroups.

Thesecondaspectthatemergedasa vitalcom-

ponentofa successfulexitstrategywastheestablish-

mentofoverarchingstructuressuchasCLAsand/or

FederationsthatcansupporttheSHGsintheirweek-

lyfunctioningevenwhentheimplementingorganisa-

tionhaspulledout.

WhiletheestablishmentofClustersoroverar-

chingfederationswasseenbyintervieweesasanim-

portantpart,onlya handfuloftheorganisationshad

successfullyestablishedthesestructuressofar.This

mightbeduetothefactthattheClustersandFeder-

ationsarethenextlevelinthedevelopmentafterthe

establishmentofmature,self-sufficientSHGs,which

byitselfalreadytakesa considerableamountoftime.

Clusters are not immediately stable institutions with-

inthemselves,butrequiretrainingandsupporttoget

themintoa stablepositiontosupporttheSHGs.

“Iftherewasanotherfunding,I wouldfocuson

that,butthetimingwastooshort.Ittook3years

tobuildupthegroupsandmakethemsustainable.

Youdon’twanttoconfusethemandbuildthemup

intosomethingelsebeforeyouhavethemina sta-

blephase.I knowmanyorganisationsdoit,but

with the women you need twice as much time as

withmenandit’sa longprocessbecauseofthe

mobility and illiteracy.” ORG. L., KABUL, INTERVIEW

WhileCLAsandFederationshavea stabilising

forceontheirunderlyingstructuresontowhichthey

arebuilt,theytaketimeandefforttoestablish,and

shouldbefactoredintotheinitialprojectplanning

with time and resources.

3.4.3. Link to Clusters and Federations

OnceindividualSelf-HelpGroupsareestablished

withtheirrespectiveeconomicmechanismsandas

strongsocialsupportgroups,severalSHGstogeth-

ercanbeformedintoa cluster.Generally,8–10strong

SHGscancometogetherintoa ClusterLevelAssoci-

ation(CLA)throughselectingtwomembersofeach

SHGtorepresenttheirgroupattheCLA. Whilethe

maineconomicfocusoftheSelf-HelpGroupsistoen-

ablesavingaswellasgivingofloanswithinthegroup,

thefocusoftheCLAistomobiliseresourcesforthe

needsoftheoverallcommunityfromgovernmentand

non-governmentsources.54

Withthedevelopmentofa greaternumber

ofSHGs,moreCLAsbegintoform.Theyinturncan

cometogetherontheFederationlevel.Whilethe

CLAsaddresstheissuesina specificcommunity,the

goaloffederationsistoensure“thattheprinciplesand

54 KHNSelf-HelpGroupManual,p.16.

featuresofSHGarerecognisedandfindtheirwayto

local,regional,andnationallawsandpolicies”.55 Like

inmostothercountries,Afghanistanalsolegallyreg-

istersfederationsinthegovernmentwithintheMinis-

tryofJustice.56

“Ourprojectis36months,whichisenoughtimeto

workwiththeCDCsandestablishtheSHGs.We

alsostartedestablishingassociations57(e.g.:fed-

erations)lastyearbutthatwastoolate.Register-

ingeachassociationwiththeMinistryofJustice

takesabout3months.Wewouldadvisetomaybe

establish the associations earlier.”

ORG. F., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

JustlikewiththefirstlevelofSHGs,thecon-

secutivelevelsofClustersandFederationsshouldbe

approachedwithseveralcaveatsinmind.

Thefirstaspectisthatindividualswhoen-

terClustersandFederationsneedtheirownspecif-

ictraininginadditiontotrainingprovidedattheSHG

stage.Duetothedifferentrationalesfortheirexist-

enceandhowtheyfunction,eachlevelisnotself-ex-

planatory.Itwasfound,thatSHGmemberswhohad

notbeenconnectedwitha Clusteryetweregeneral-

ly less aware or articulate about their wider communi-

55 KHN,p.15.

56 Interviews,HandinHand(Mazar-eSharif)andOPMercy(Kabul).

57 HandinHandregisteredwhattheycalled‘associations’,while

allotherorganisationsthatregisteredanyoftheirgroups,

registeredtheir‘federations’.HandinHanddidnothaveany

otherlevelofinstitutionsabovetheassociationlevel,andbytheir

functiontheycanbeequatedwithfederations.

47

ties’problemsthanwomenwhohadbeenintroduced

totheideaofClustersandFederations.Thisintroduc-

tioncanthereforebeconceptualisednotonlyasedu-

cational,butalsoasawarenessraisingandultimately

as(socio-)political.WhilethefocusofSHGs’engage-

mentarethefamilyneeds,theCLAsattempttotackle

communityproblemssuchaswatershortages,forex-

ample.WhiletheCLAisfocusedonitsparticularcom-

munity,theFederationlevelisfocusedonbroaderad-

vocacywiththegovernment.

Inadditiontothetrainingsthataregearedto-

wardsbuildingtheunderstandingofthemembersas

totheirresponsibilityinparticipatinginClustersand

Federations,organisationsoftendecidetoofferaddi-

tionalskills-buildingtrainingsandexposurevisitsfor

Clusters.Thisdoesnotonlyenablethemembersof

theClusterstolearnnewtechniques,butalsotorelay

thesebacktotheirownSHGsandtospreadinforma-

tiontoa wideraudience:

“Itdependsontheparticipationandthemixof

womenwhoareengagedinit,howlongittakesfor

a Clustertomature.Everyweektheyhavemeet-

ingsandtrainings,andthenweorganiseexposure

visits,forexampletocompanies,howtomake

soymilkontheirown,howtomarketandpack-

agethings.Smallinformation,justpracticalthings.”

ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

AnotheraspectofestablishingClusterLev-

elAssociationsisthatnotallSHGsmightbeinterest-

edingettingengagedintheadditionalvolunteerwork

thata ClusterorFederationlevelmembershipentails:

“FirstitwaseasytoestablishSHGs.Thenwesaidwe

wantedtostartCLAstoo.Let’sselecta representa-

tive. But then we realised that the women had no in-

terestinthiskindofwork.Somanytimesweworked

withthemandthendissolvedtheCLA. Itisimpor-

tantthatthewomenfeelthattheCLAisimportant

forthem.Theownershipfromthebeginningisvital.

Ownershipiskey.” ORG. A., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Whileitcannotbewholesalefabricatedand

needstocomefromthewomenthemselves,ownership

canalsobeenhancedthroughsupportivemeasuresby

theorganisationthatestablishestheCLAsandFeder-

ations.Tofurthertheestablishmentofa groupidentity,

organisationstooktheirClusterandFederationmem-

bersouttocelebrateimportantmilestonesandtoexpe-

rienceeachotherina supportivegroupsetting.

Conversely,womencanbeinterestedinjoin-

inga Cluster,thoughtheSHGlevelhasnotmatured

enoughtomerittheadditionalestablishmentofClus-

terLevelAssociations.

Clearly,CLAsandFederationsarepartofanim-

portantevolutionaryprocessoftheSHGconceptbut

justasimportantisensuringthesuccessfulcompletion

oftheSHGphase,inwhichCLAscanhavea stabilis-

ingforceontheirunderlyingstructures.Allstagestake

timeandefforttoestablish,andshouldbefactored

intotheinitialprojectplanningwithtimeandresources.

3.4.4. Link to Microfinance Institutions

Thinkingaboutsustainabilitybringsupthequestion

ofembeddingofSelf-HelpGroupsintootheroverar-

chingstructuresofsupportandfinance.Othercoun-

tries,especiallyIndiaandBangladesh,wheretheSelf-

HelpGroupapproachhasblossomed,showlinkages

ofSelf-HelpGroupswithlargerfinancialbankingsys-

temsandespeciallyanintertwiningwithMicrofi-

nanceInstitutions.Thisbringsupthequestionofthe

definitionofMicrofinancegenerally,andinparticular

intheAfghancontext,aswellasitsviabilityinlinking

SHGswiththissectorinthefuture.Toassessthislink

itiscrucialnotonlytounderstandwhatMicrofinance

standsfor,butalsohowMicrofinanceoverlapswith

IslamicFinanceinAfghanistan.

Microfinance

InDecember2006theBangladeshieconomist,Mo-

hammad Yunus was awarded with the Nobel Peace

PrizetogetherwithhiscreationtheGrameenBank

“fortheireffortstocreateeconomicandsocialdevel-

opmentfrombelow”.58Hisinnovationwasto“find

a waytolendtothepoorestofthepoorwhohave

nocollateral—nohouse,nocar,notangibleasset

againstwhichtoborrow.Peoplewhoseonlynomi-

nalpersonalwealthwouldprobablybeintheformof

land,wherethecollateralisundocumentedandle-

gallyunenforceable.”59Thefoundationalideawasto

taketheselocalcommunitiesofinterdependence

andtrustandtoconverttrustintocollateral.Accord-

ingtotheGrameenbank,theyarecurrentlyservic-

ing8.92millionborrowersin81‚399villagesallover

58 see:TheNobelPeacePrize2006,Website,

https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/.

59 See:Moyo,Dambisa.2009.DeadAid.p.126.

48

Bangladesh.60Manycountriesworldwidehaveadopt-

edtheMicrofinanceapproachsinceitsinceptionin

1983.Since1995,theGrameenBankitselfdecided

nottoreceiveanymoredonorfunds,andtodayfunds

itself100%throughitsowndeposits.61

ThewaytheGrameenmodelofMicrofinance

functionsisrathersimple:Thebanklends100USDto

a groupoftraders.Thefirsttradergetsthemoneyfor

oneyearandpaysbackthemoneyusuallywithinoraf-

teroneyearwithaninterest(between8–12%).This

firsttraderissolelyresponsibletopaybacktheloan.

Whentheloanispaidback,thenextloanismadetothe

grouptothenexttrader.Ifthefirsttraderdoesnotre-

pay,thenthebankdoesnotgivefurtherloansforthe

group.62ThebasemodelofMicrofinancedoesnoten-

taila jointgroupliability,wherethegroupasa whole

wouldberesponsiblefortherepaymentofonemem-

ber’sloan.However,asthebehaviourofonemember

affectsthegroup’sfutureabilitytoreceiveloans,the

grouphasa self-interesttokeeptheloancycleactive.

Inpractice,groupmembersmightcontributefortheir

groupmemberswhendifficultiesarisewiththeinten-

tion to collect the money later.63

60 See:GrameenBankWebsite,numbersfromSeptember2017:

http://www.grameen.com/introduction/.

61 See:Moyo,Dambisa.Dead Aid/Why Aid Is Not Working and How

There Is Another Way for Africa.London:PenguinBooks,2009,p.128.

62 Exampleadoptedinsimplifiedformfrom:Moyo,p.126f.

63 However,astheMicrofinancemodelhasbeenadoptedinother

countries,jointliabilityhasbecomeoneofthetoolsthatisbeing

usedbyfinancialinstitutions:“InZambia,asinotherAfrican

countrieswheremicro-financehasstartedtoblossom,theriskof

lendingtothemostriskyisoftenreducedthroughjointliability—

thenotionthatmembersofa groupofborrowersareallliablefor

anyloansthata micro-financelendermakestothem”(Moyo,p.129).

Thiswayofthinkingaboutlendingprocedures

revolutionisedthinkingonhowtolendtothepoorest

insociety,andhasenabledmanypoorcommunities,

especiallywomen,totakeloansandstartbusinesses.

Microfinance in Afghanistan

MicrofinancehasexistedinAfghanistansince2003,

withaninitiallywidearrayofMicrofinanceInstitu-

tionsthatwereofferingservices.Overtheyears,the

numberofinstitutionshasshrunktohalfa dozen.64

Anumbrellaorganisation,the‘AfghanistanMicrofi-

nanceAssociation’(AMA),establishedin2005,65pro-

videsservicessuchascoordinationandnetworking

betweendifferentMicrofinanceInstitutions(MFIs)

andorganisationssupportingSHGs,66 as well as advo-

cacy,lobbying,capacitydevelopmentandknowledge

sharingbetweendifferentactors.ThesectorofMi-

crofinancewas“initiallystartedwiththehelpofthe

government,throughtheMinistryorRuralRehabili-

tationandDevelopment,andthentheresponsibility

washandedfromMRRDtotheMinistryofFinance”.67

64 Forexample:FirstMicrofinanceBank,Finca,Mutahid,Oxus,

IIFC. Whilethereweremanymoreinstitutionsinthebeginning,

someclosed,othersmergedtogether.AccordingtotheAMA,

themicrofinancemarkethasnowstabilisedwiththesefinancial

institutions.

65 WhiletheAMAwasestablishedearly,itwasrelativelyinactive

andlaydormantuntilitsrejuvenationpost−2010.See:AMA

AnnualReport2016.

66 NotonlySHGsthough,butgenerallycommunity-based

financemodels,whichcanrangefromVillageSavings&Loan

Associations(VSLAs),Self-HelpGroups(SHG),Community-

BasedSavingsGroups(CBSGs),toSavingsandCreditGroups

(SCG).

67 Interview,AMA,Kabul.

TheinitialfluctuationinthequantityofMicrofinance

Institutionsandtheirqualityofservicedeliverymight

havebeenduetothefactthatthesectorhasnotbeen

regulatedyet,whichisalsoevidencedinthelackof

anycentralgovernmentauthorityorguidinglawsfor

MicrofinanceInstitutionsinAfghanistan.68

Asoftheendof2016,themicrofinancesec-

torinAfghanistanhada grossloanportfolioof

9‚898.2millionAFN,with227‚429activeborrow-

ers,and11‚826.2millionAFNloandisbursement

duringtheyear2016.69Togeta loan,anindividu-

alneedstoprovidea physicalguarantee,whichisan-

otherperson,whocanguaranteerepayment.Incase

ofhighamounts(morethan1millionAFN),titledeeds

ofpropertyarealsoneeded.Furthermore,clients

whoalreadyhavea businessareusuallypreferred.

Intermsofexistingcapital,“theircapitalshouldbe

twicetheloanamountthattheyareasking,iftheyal-

readyhavea business.ButsomeMFIshavestartedto

giveloanstostart-upbusinessesaswell.”70Theloan

amountsofMicrofinanceInstitutionscanvarybe-

tween100 USDto200,000 USD. Loanscanbetaken

eitherindividuallyoringroups.

68 TheAMAwasoptimisticthatthesediscussionsaboutregulating

themicrofinancesectormightalsoextendtoSHGsaswellinthe

future:“ItwillextendtoSHGsaswell,becausewewillbepartof

those discussions and we will tell them that not only MFIs are our

members,butwehaveNGObasedworkingonSHGsaswell,so

theywilltakethemintoaccountaswell.”InterviewwithAMA,

Kabul,December2017.

69 See:AMAAnnualReport2016.Attimeofwritingthe2016

AnnualReportwasthelatestavailable.

70 InformationinthisparagrapharebasedoninterviewwithAMA

inKabul,December2017.

49

“Oneloancategoryisindividualloans.Theoth-

eroneiswhentheycomeasa group,like10or

15ofthem(morethan10),entrepreneurs,ei-

thermenorwomen.Iftheycometogether,then

guarantorsarenotneeded.Becauseinthegroup

loan,everyoneisguaranteeingeachother.Inthat

concept,everyonecanreceive10,000,15,000,

30,000AFN.” INTERVIEW, AMA, KABUL

“Wegiveindividualloansortogroups.Therecan

beforexample3women,whoforma groupwith

eachothertoreceivea loan.Inthatcase,noguar-

antorisneeded.Theirwakil-eguzarorheadof

theshuraconfirmswheretheylive,andthehead

oftheirfamily,forexampletheirhusband,gives

a photoofhisIDcard(tazkera)andoftheheadof

thehousehold.Theydon’tneeda bankaccount.”

FINCA, MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

“Ourgoalistoimprovetheeconomyoftheso-

cietythroughsupportingsmallandmedium

enterprises.Wehaveindividualloansfrom

50,000–500,000AFN,andgrouplendingwith

10,000–50,000AFN. Thecriterionisthatthe

personshouldbea businesswomanorbusiness-

manwitha fixedincome.Werequireguaran-

tors,butnobankaccountisneededaswegive

chequesthatworkwithmobilebanking.”

MUTAHID, MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Many income-generating projects, such as custom-made tailoring, are the outcome of the support

of the Self-Help Groups

50

Oneofthemaincritiquesthatmicrofinance

facesinAfghanistan,71andwhichhaspreventedmost

interviewedbeneficiariesofSHGprojectstoreach

outtoMicrofinanceInstitutionstodeveloptheirbusi-

nesses,isthequestionofinterest.Thischargeislev-

elledagainstnormalbanksasmuchasagainstMicrof-

inanceInstitutions:

“Ifwetakeloansfrombanks,thentheywantinter-

estandyouneedproperty.Ifyoudon’thaveprop-

erty,thenyoucannotgetanything.Wehavenot

approachedmicrofinancebanks.Theyalsoaskfor

interest,justliketheotherbanks!”

MALE FGD, JALALABAD

“Whenweneedtohavemoneyurgentlyeitherfor

medicaltreatmentorotherimportanteconomic

issues,wehadtotakea loanfromthebankandre-

payitbyinstalmentswiththeextrainterests.And

ofcourse,thisinterestwasagainstIslam.Butsince

theSHGwasestablished,weneverreferredback

to the banks.” MALE FGD, HERAT

MicrofinanceInstitutionshave,however,start-

edtoreacttothiscritiqueandareofferingalterna-

tives,especiallythroughdiversifyingtheirfinancial

productsthroughtheinclusionofShariahcompliant

products.

71 NotonlyinAfghanistanhasthiscritiquebeenlevelled,butalso

byMuslimsinothercountriessuchasIndia,see:Sabi,Manijeh.

“AwarenessandPerceptionsofIslamicMicrofinanceamong

MicrofinanceClientsinKyrgyzstanandTajikistan.”Central Asian

Survey35,no.1(2016):27.

“Wearestrugglingwiththatcritique.Thereare

scholarsagainstmicrofinance,becausetheysayit

isinterestbasedanditisillegal,basedonIslamit

shouldn’tbeallowed.ThesedaysMFIsarereact-

ingtothisandtheyareprovidingIslamicloansas

well.TheystartedofferingtheIslamicloansinthe

last7years.Theyhavea paletteofproductslike

Mudarabah,Musharaka,andotherones.Tosome

extentthishaschangedfromthefirstdaysofMi-

crofinancetonowinAfghanistan.”

AMA INTERVIEW, KABUL

“WestartedtoofferIslamicloansabout1.5years

ago.Wehaveabout1000clientsbynowwhoare

financingtheirbusinessesthroughthisway.”

MUTAHID, MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

Islamic Finance

IslamicFinancedifferentiatesitselffromconven-

tionalbankingattheconceptualandsocio-religious

level,intheirbusinessmodelandgoverningframe-

work72aswellasontheproductlevel.73 Conventional

banksofferloansbasedoninterestandallindustries

arefinanced,withexceptionofbusinessesdeemedil-

legalbytherespectivelawsinthecountrieswhere

theyfunction.Islamicbanks,however,aredescribed

72 Islamicbanksusuallyhavea Shariahgoverningframeworkin

termsofa shariahadvisorand/orShariahSupervisoryBoard,

whichapprovesthetransactionsandproductsinaccordanceto

Shariahrulingssee:Usmani,MohammadImranAshraf.Islamic

Finance.Karachi:MaktabaMa’arifulQuran(QuranicStudies

Publishers),2015,p.212).

73 Usmani,p.212.

attheconceptuallevelastrading/investmenthous-

esthat“workunderthesocio-religiousguidelinesthat

prohibitchargingandpayinginterestandavoidallim-

permissibletransactionslikegambling,speculation,

shortselling,…saleofdebtsandreceivables”.74They

arefurthermorenotpermittedtofinance“industries

thatcauseharmtothesocietysuchasalcohol,tobac-

coetc.”75Whileconventionalbanks“treatmoneyas

a commodityandlenditagainstinterestasitscom-

pensation”,76Islamicfinanceproductsareusuallyas-

setbackedandalloftheirgivenloansmustbeinter-

estfree.77

The question of interest (Riba)

“One of the forms of capitalism, that has been flour-

ishing in non-Islamic societies of the world is the inter-

est-based investment. There are normally two partic-

ipants in such transactions. One is the Investor who

provides capital as on loan against interest and the oth-

er is the Manager who runs the business. The investor

has no concern whether the business runs into profit

or loss, he automatically gets an interest (Riba) in both

outcomes at a fixed or variable rate on his capital.”

USMANI: 21

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 ThoughcriticsoftheIslamicfinancearchitecturehave

pointedoutthat“nowadaysribāisanessentialfactorintheIslamiceconomicandbankingsystem”andthatthisfinancial

architecturedoesnotescapetheembeddingwithinthelarger

globalfinancialarchitecture.See:Dagestani,2017,PhDthesis,

p.105.

51

Oneofthemainaspectsthatsetconvention-

albanksandIslamicbanksapartistheirviewonand

(non)usageof“interest”.Indeed,someanalystshave

setthe“verystrongdislikeofinterestbyitsexpo-

nents”asthestartingpointof“theenterprisecalled

Islamiceconomics”.78InIslamicfinance,theArabic

termthatisusedforinterestis“riba”,whichmeansex-

cess,increase,oraddition.79 Riba “should be under-

stoodasanyinterestchargedona loan,regardlessof

thewillingnessoftheborrowertoenterintoanagree-

mentbywhichheorshewillhavetorepayinterestas

wellasprincipal”.80

RibaismentionedbothintheQur’anandHa-

dith,81andhasgenerateda livelydebateamongIs-

lamic scholars.82Althoughnospecificreasonhas

beenpointedoutintheQuranorintheHadithfor

theprohibitionofRiba,83“itsnegationliesatthevery

78 See:Azhar,2010,p.279:“Itperhapswillnotbelostonany

studentofIslamandeconomics,orIslamiceconomy,thatthe

enterprisecalledIslamiceconomicsbeganasa resultofa very

strongdislikeoftheinstitutionofinterestbyitsexponentsonthe

presumptionthatitwaspreciselythesamethingasribā. So much

sothatonecanevenconcludethattheenterprisestandsorfalls

onthevalidityorotherwiseofthatpresumption.”

79 Usmani,p.61.TherearetwotypesgoRiba,called‘RibaAn

Nasiyah’and‘RibaAlFadl’:“‘RibaAnNasiyah’isdefinedasexcess,

whichresultsfrompredeterminedinterest(sood)whicha lender

receivesoverandabovetheprincipal(RasulMaal)inanyloan

transaction.ThisistherealandprimaryformofRiba.”

80 See:Tripp,Charles.Islam and the Moral Economy/The Challenge of

Capitalism.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006,p.126.

81 See:Usmani,chapter4,p.49–59

82 See:discussiononchangesininterpretationwhatinterestisand

whenitshouldbeforbidden:Tripp,128–133,Also:Azhar,2010,

chapter9.

83 See:Usmani,p.65

heartofIslamicviewsofa moraleconomy—justas

itloomslargeintheideasofmanyMuslimintellectu-

alsconcerningthefundamentalinjusticeofcapital-

ism”.84ClassicalscholarsofIslamperceivedeconom-

icbehaviouraspartofmoralbehaviour,whichwas

embeddedina moralcosmologyinhowtobea good

human.85Inthisview,interestisanexpressionof

“animbalanceinpowerandwealthbetweenthelend-

erandtheborrower”,which“allowedthelenderto

exploittheneedsoftheborrowerandtodictatethe

rateofreturn,maximisingprofitsbyfurtherimpov-

erishingtheborrower.”86Thisexploitationofanother

person’sneedsormisfortunewasthereforereject-

ed.87Ribaisforbiddenduetoitsassociateddistri-

butionofwealth,asit“causeswealthtoaccumulate

amonga handfulofpeopleanditresultsinevitablyin

creatingmonopolies,openingdoorsforselfishness,

greed,injusticeandoppression”.88

WhileRibameansliterallyincrease,thereis

a cleardistinctionbetweenaninterestchargeandthe

profitsthatwouldaccruefromaneconomictransac-

tion.89Whilethefirsttype,interest,isforbiddenand

84 See:Tripp,p.126

85 SkypeInterviewwithIslamiceconomicsexpertSamiDagestani,

January 2018.

86 See:Tripp,p.127.

87 Usmani,p.65.

88 See:Usmani,22.

89 See:Tripp,126.

renderedharam,thesecondtypeispermissible.90

ThisisanimportantpointinunderstandingIslamicfi-

nancesystemsandproducts,andthedifferentiation

madebetweendifferenttypesofmonetaryadditions.

Islamic Microfinance

AsalreadypointedoutbytheAMA:theMicrofinance

landscapeinAfghanistanhasbeenchanging,especial-

lyintermsofincludingIslamicfinancialproducts.This

isanalogoustoa growingtrendthatseestheinclu-

sionofIslamicfinanceinstrumentsintoMicrofinance,

nowadaysalsosometimestermedIslamicMicrofi-

nance.A recentarticledetailsthisnewdevelopment

anditsimpacteveninnon-Muslimcountries:

“IslamicMicrofinanceisa confluenceofMicrofi-

nanceandIslamicFinance.Microfinance,byitsveryna-

ture,isperceivedtobecompatiblewithIslamicFinance

principles;bothareaimedatempoweringthemar-

ginalized…ThefeaturesofIslamicMicrofinancemake

it attractive even to those who do not insist in Shar-

iacomplianceoftheMicrofinanceproductstheyuse.

Profit—andloss—sharingproductsavailableinIslamic

Microfinancearebeneficialtothosewhocannotafford

thefixedinterestproductsoftraditionalmicrofinance.”91

ThephenomenonofIslamicMicrofinanceisrath-

ernewintheMicrofinanceliterature,justasthemarket

90 See:Usmani,62.Seealsoforthis:Dagestani,PhDthesis,

p.102. mentioningforthisdistinction:Qur’an2:275.Sealsosūra

2(al-Baqarah)verses275,276,278,sūra3(‘Ali‘Imrān)verse130,sūra4(al-Nisā’)verse161,sūra30(al-Rūm)verse39.

91 See:“WhyNon-MuslimNationsareAdoptingIslamic

MicrofinanceInstitutions”,October23,2014,https://www.

technavio.com/blog/why-non-muslim-nations-are-adopting-islamic-

microfinance-institutions.

52

ofIslamicMicrofinanceisstillcomparativelysmall:itis

estimated that there were only 1.28 million Islamic Mi-

crofinanceclientsin2013,andabout82%ofthemlived

inthreecountries:Bangladesh,Indonesia,andSudan.92

Types of Islamic microfinance

AdoptedfromKhan(2008)andUsmani(2015)

Term Description

Murabaha Cost-plus-markup sale contract: as-

set-based sale transaction used to fi-

nance goods needed as working capital

Musharaka Equity participation in a business

venture, in which the parties share

the profits or losses according to

a predetermined ratio. Musharaka

can be used for assets or for working

capital

Ijarah Leasing contract typically used for fi-

nancing equipment, such as small

machinery.

Mudaraba Trustee financing, in which one par-

ty acts as financier by providing the

funds, while the other party provides

the managerial expertise in execut-

ing the project.

Qard-hassan Interest-free,‘benevolent’ loans, of-

ten offered as a form of charity rather

than supporting a business from one

person to another

92 See:Riecke,J.2015.“SetToGrowIn2015:IslamicMicrofinance.”

CenterforFinancialInclusionBlog,January12. https://cfi-blog.

org/2015/01/12/set-to-grow-in−2015-islamic-microfinance/.

Whilethereisa wealthofdifferentIslamicfinancing

toolsthathavebeendevelopedandrefinedoverthe

pastdecades,onlya fewofthemhavetakenrootso

farintheproductpaletteofbanksandMicrofinance

InstitutionsinAfghanistan:

“InIslamicbasedloans,therearemanydifferent

financialproducts.ThisoneiscalledMurabaha.

There’salsoMushabaka,whichislikea partner-

shipbetweenclientandMFI. Whateverbene-

fitordeficittheyaregettingfromthatbusinessis

sharedbetweenthetwo,thebankandtheclient.

Thepercentageisbasedontheirnegotiationand

a contract.ButthisisnotpopularinAfghanistan.

Murabahaisthemostpopular,especiallyinthe

provinces.” AMA, INTERVIEW, KABUL

Indeed,Murabahaisgenerallyoneofthe

mostcommonlyusedmodesoffinancingbyIslamic

banksandfinancialinstitutionsoverallwithapprox-

imately66%ofallinvestmenttransactions.93 Mu-

rabahaisinthedirectsensenota loanwithinter-

est,buta particularkindofsale.Inthiskindofsale,

thesellerdisclosesthecostofthecommodityand

theaddedprofitmargin.Commoditypriceinclud-

ingprofitmarginarepayedbackbythebuyerinde-

ferredpayment/instalments.94However,thebuyer

doesnotreceivethemoneyitself,butthecommodi-

tythathewantstopurchase:

93 See:Usmani,p.145.

94 InterviewIslamicFinanceExpertJalalKhan,January2018.

“Murabahainbanksinvolvesthepurchaseof

a commoditybya bankonbehalfofa clientandits

resaletothelatteroncostplus-profitbasis.Under

thisarrangement,thebankdisclosesitscostand

profitmargintotheclient.Inotherwords,rather

thanadvancingmoneytoa borrower,whichishow

thesystemwouldworkina conventionalbank-

ingagreement,theIslamicbankwillbuythegoods

froma thirdpartyandsellthosegoodstothecus-

tomerata pre-agreedprice.” USMANI: 145

Evaluation of Microfinance Offer for SHGs

Onlysomeorganisationsthatwereinterviewedfor

thisresearchhadexperienceswithMicrofinanceIn-

stitutionsandbanks.However,mostunequivocal-

lysawMicrofinancenotasa viableoption.Somehad

contemplatedlinkingtheirSHGswithMicrofinance

Institutions,butshiedawayfromitduetothepractice

withinMicrofinancetoworkwithanaddedinterest.

However,recentdevelopmentswithintheMi-

crofinancesectorinAfghanistanandgloballyhave

seentheintroductionofIslamicfinancingtools,which

createda sub-sectorofIslamicMicrofinance.This

sectorhasestablisheditselfinAfghanistan’surban

areasandoffers,especiallywiththeMurabahasales

transaction,a viableoptiontoextendsmallbudding

businessesina Shariahcompliantway.

ApartfromtheconcernsofShariah-compli-

ance,communitiesthatsofarbenefitfromSHGsare

usuallylargelyilliterateandhavenopriorexperience

inevenopeningbankaccounts.Forthemitisdiffi-

culttoevaluatethedifferentcontractsonofferandto

53

navigatethelandscapeofdifferentoffersfromMicro-

financeInstitutionsandbanks.Anorganisationthat

wantstolinktheirbeneficiarieswithanyoftheseop-

tionsinthefutureshouldkeepinmindthatthispro-

cessmightneedmorethana formalintroductiontofi-

nancial institutions.

A feworganisations,thataresupportingSHGs

inAfghanistan,arealreadylinkedupina network

throughtheAfghanistanMicrofinanceAssociation

(AMA),whichofferspossibilitiestoexchangeinfor-

mationwitheachother,notonlyabouttheMicrofi-

nanceoptionitself,butalsoaboutexperiencesines-

tablishingandsupportingSHGs.

MicrofinanceInstitutionsseemtobegeneral-

lypositiveabouttheoutlookofhavingSHGmembers

asfutureclients:

“ItispossibletolinkSHGswithMicrofinance,we

havedoneitbefore.MFIsarehappywiththose

clients,becausetheyarewelltrained,theyknow

abouttheloans,abouttherepaymentsandlotsof

othermechanisms.It’sa pieceofcakeforthem.”

AMA INTERVIEW, KABUL

WhiletherearepossibilitiestoconnectSHGs,

especiallywiththebuddingIslamicMicrofinancesec-

tor,manycommunitiesaresuspiciousnotonlyofMi-

crofinance,butofbankingingeneral.Afghanistan

hasexperienceda numberofbankingscandalsinthe

lastdecade,mostnotabletheembezzlementof1bil-

lionUSDoffundsintheKabulBankalone.Asa result,

thereisa generalmistrustofthebankingsector.This

willbeanadditionalhurdletoovercomeifanorgan-

isationwantstosuccessfullyconnectSHGswiththe

IslamicMicrofinancesector.

3.5. Impact

Thecriterionofimpactmeasures“thepositiveand

negativechangesproducedbya developmentinter-

vention,directlyorindirectly,intendedorunintend-

ed”.95Impactrelatestherebytopositiveandnegative

outcomesinthesocial,economic,orenvironmental

areas.Thequestionsinthispartfocusonaccessingon

whathashappenedasa resultoftheimplementation

oftheapproachandwhatrealdifferencehastheac-

tivitymadetothebeneficiaries’lives.

3.5.1. Economic Impact

TheSHGapproachsetsouttosupporteconomicde-

velopmentandsocialwell-beingofcommunities,that

strengthensespeciallypoorandvulnerablegroups.

Theeconomicimpactwasfeltdifferentially,

dependingonhowlongtheSHGshadbeenoperating,

howmuchcapitalhadbeenbuildingupandcouldbe

usedintherespectivegroups.Inthebeginnergroups

whichhadonlybeenoperatingfora fewmonths,the

amounts that the members could borrow were com-

parativelysmall.Somegroupsthereforedecidedthat

onlya fewgroupmemberswouldtakea loanand

otherswouldwaituntiltheirloanwasrepaidorun-

tilmoremoneyhadaccumulatedthroughtheweekly

andmonthlysaving.Thisreflectsthelogicalprocess

howtheSHGsystemworksanditalsointerlinkswith

95 See:http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/

daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

thequestionoftimeneededbefore“change”isvisi-

ble-firstmemberscantakesmallloansalreadywith-

infewmonthssincetheinceptionofthegroup(e.g.

theoneswhohavealreadya businessideatakesthe

loan,othersapproveofit)-therestwaits.Thisalso

fuelsthesharedresponsibilityandinherentcontrol

mechanisms,asitiseveryone’sinterestthattheloans

aretakenforviablebusinessideas,whichenablesthe

loantoberepaid:oncethemoneyisbackinthecash-

boxthenextpersoncantakea loanforhis/herbusi-

nessidea:

“TheSHGisveryhelpfulforus.Myhusbandisvery

old.ThroughtheSHGI cansupportmyfamily.”

FEMALE FGD, HERAT

“Mostofourproblemshavebeenresolvedthrough

SHGs.Thebeautyoftheseisthattheproblems

areresolvedthroughus;byus.Nota lotofushave

beenusingthesefundsforbusiness;mostofus

havebeenusingitforpersonalissuesbutthere

arealsosomeofuswhoaredoingbusinessbut

theyareless.Wearemuchmorecomfortablein

termsoflivingnow,wheneverwehavea prob-

lemandareeconomicallystressed,weareableto

comeandresolveourproblems.”

NEWLY ESTABLISHED, KABUL, ORG. H.

“Yes,itimprovedourlivesa lot,bothinoureconom-

icandsociallife.Everyoneofusknowssomething

inwhichweareprofessionals,buthowcanwestart

a businesswithoutmoney?Throughourgroups,we

cantakeloansfromthesavingboxandcanstart

54

a smallbusiness.Thisishowweimprovedoureco-

nomic situation.” JALALABAD, FEMALE FGD

AllFGDparticipantsspokeofa diverserange

ofjobsandoccupationsthattheyhadstarteddueto

theinterest-freeloansthatthememberscouldbor-

rowfromtheSHGs.Thelistofoccupationsthatwere

takenonbybeneficiarieswasclearlygendered.

Womenwereengagedinfoodproductionsuch

asyoghurt,picklesorjamproduction.Somewomen

had businesses in which they made bolani or soy milk.

Manywerefurthermoreengagedinrunningbeauty

parlours,producinghandicrafts,tailoring,orcarpet

weaving.Therewasanoverlapwithmalecorrespond-

ents’occupationsintailoring,livestockandsaffron

production(thelatterhoweveronlyinHerat,andalso

embeddedina cooperativestructurethatexceed-

edtheinitialSHGgroups).Menwerefurthermoreen-

gagedinmotorbike,carormobilephonerepair,and

workedasgeneralmechanics.

“Webringthematerialfromthecityfroma bulk

producerandthenwemakethehandicraftand

giveitbacktothem.Eachoneofusknowssome-

thingeithersewingsleeves,tailoring,ordifferent

things.” MAZAR-E SHARIF, FEMALE FGD

“Somepeopletookloansfromthegroup.Onetook

a loanof5000AFNtostarta smallbusinesstosell

creditcardsinthecity,dependingwhetherI sell

theminAfghaniorPakistanirupees,I canmake

moremoneyifI selltheminPakistanirupees.”

MALE FGD, JALALABAD

“I havestartedtailoring,a lotofpeoplehavestart-

edtailoring.Bytailoring,I havebeensewingcloths

andgettheprofitforsewingthecloths.Somehave

startedbeadsewing.Shehasstarteda Beauty

parlourhere.” MAZAR-E SHARIF, FEMALE FGD

“Wehavegottentheloanandhaveboughta cow

andtheentirevillageisusingthemilkproducts.

Wehaveboughtanimalsforlivestockandthe

neighboursarebuyingtheproducts.”

MAZAR-E SHARIF, FEMALE FGD

ThedifferencesinfemaleandmaleSHGswas

perceptibleintheeconomicrealmespeciallyconcern-

ingexpectationsthatmenexpressedtowardsorgan-

isations’supportfortheirgroups.Mostwomenwere

satisfiedwiththelevelofsupportthattheyreceived

throughtheorganisation,becausetheywereable

to establish small businesses that they could mainly

runfromhome.Occasionally,FGDsbroughtoutdis-

cussionsonwhethermoremoneyshouldbegiven

bytheorganisation,andwomenweregenerallyinfa-

vourofthat.However,moreoftenthannotthewom-

en also said that they would meet no matter whether

theywouldgetfurtherfinancialinputs,andthatthey

themselvesweretheirgreatestresource.

Men,however,expressedgreaterlevelsofdis-

satisfactionwiththeSHGapproach,demandingmore

moneyfromtheorganisationtostarttheirbusinesses

asa topuptotheirownsavedrevolvingfund.Notably,

mostorganisationswhosolelyworkedwithwomen

didnotofferfinancialsupportfortheirSHGs,while

allorganisationsworkingwithbothmaleandfemale

SHGshadoptedforgivinga monetaryincentivefor

startingbusinesses.

Asalreadydiscussedin3.2.3.(Effectiveness/

FinancialProcedures),financesthattheSHGssaved

wereusedbytheSHGseitherforsocialorforeco-

nomicinvestments.Thepercentagesusedforeither,

however,variedvastlybetweenthesurveyedorgan-

isations.Someorganisationsarrangedagreements

withtheirbeneficiariesinwhichthemoneythatthe

participatingmembersputintothesavingboxwould

befreetouseeitherforsocialoreconomiccauses,

whilethemoneygivenfromtheorganisationscould

onlybeusedforbusinesses.Otherorganisationshave

seta specificamountoftheSHGssavingsitselfwhich

needstobeutilisedforbusinesspurposes,while

againotherorganisationsleftitcompletelyuptothe

SHGstodeterminewhattousethemoneyfor.

Themoneythatwasusedforinvestmentsoth-

erthanbusinessdevelopment,however,alsohada sta-

bilisingfactor.Someintervieweesstatedthattheyhad

usedthemoneytobuildhouses,payrentortofinance

medicalsupportfortheirfamily.Whilethesearenotdi-

rectlyeconomicinvestments,theyenablethebenefi-

ciaries to stay stable with their businesses and to use

theSHGfundsasfall-backplansintimesofcrisis:

“I tooka landtomakea buildingonit.I amwor-

riedifI don’tbuilda buildingtheywilltakethe

landfromus,therefore,I neededmoneyforthat”

MAZAR-E SHARIF, FEMALE FGD

“Anothercriterionthatwassoftenedoverthe

years:theideawasthatthemoneyisonlyforbusi-

55

nessinvestments.Womenweresayingwhatdoes

therepairofmysewingmachinehelpmewhen

mychildisillandneedsmedicinerightnow?We

discussedit,anddecidedtoput10%foranemer-

gencyfund,whichalsoneedspayingback.Inthe

pastitwasnotpossible,butwechangedthis.One

needstobepracticaltoimplementitsuccessfully.”

ORG. H., KABUL, INTERVIEW

“Forexample,I hadtodoa surgeryformydaughter,

I havebeenabletotakecareofthisthroughthis

loansystem.Whenthereisnocashathome,then

we come here.” MAZAR-E SHARIF, FEMALE FGD

Whilealloftheseaspectspointtoa positiveim-

pactintheeconomicrealm,oneneedstobecautious

aboutover-emphasisingtheabilityofSHGstotake

careofcommunities’needs.Ontheonehand,thees-

tablishmentofa sufficientrevolvingfund(especially

withoutinputfromanorganisation)takestime,andthe

businessesthatcanbesetupinthefirstyearsarerath-

ersmall.A possibilitytoextendthefundingplatform

forthesebuddingbusinessesmightbeIslamicmicro-

financeloans(see 3.4.4. Sustainability/Link to Micro-

financeInstitutions).However,manybeneficiariesof

SHGsareilliterateandfaceconsiderabledifficultiesin

accessingthebankingsectororunderstandingthedif-

ferentloansystemsthatareonoffer.

3.5.2. Safety Network and Trust

OneofthemainimpactfulaspectsoftheSHGs,which

combineseconomicandsocialimpact,isthecreation

ofa safetynetwork.Thesafetynetworkwithina Self-

HelpGroupoperatesontwodifferentlevels:group

membersgettoknoweachotherandbuildupknowl-

edgeofeachother’ssocialandeconomicsituation

aswellasofeachother’sbehaviour.Thisknowledge

whichisgeneratedthroughinteractionandexchange,

andthroughseeingeachotherbehavingresponsi-

blywitheveryone’sfinancialinputscreatestrust.This

communityoftrustandinterconnectednesssupports

eachindividualperson’seconomicventuressocial-

lyandeconomically.Incasetheindividualexperienc-

esdifficultiesintheirbusiness,theyhavetheability

toaskforsupportfromthegroup—eitherinmone-

tarytermsthroughaskingfordeferredpaymentor

anadditionalloan,orinsocialtermsofknowledgeex-

changetosupporteachotherwithinsightshowtoad-

dressa specificdifficulty.

Usually,SHGmembersdidnotknoweachother

beforejoiningtheSelf-HelpGroups,eventhoughthey

hadlivedinclosevicinitytoeachother.Thismightbe

duetotheurbancontextinwhichneighbourlytiesare

muchweakerthaninruralareas,andinsomecasesas

wellconnectedtolimitedfemalemobility:

“ByparticipationintheSHGwehavebecomeaware

ofeachother.Wegotknowledgeofeachmember’s

economicalsituation.Throughthatinformation,we

couldhelpmemberbymemberofthisSHGbygiv-

ingloanstothemfromthetreasurybox.”

HERAT, MALE FGD

“Beforethegroupstarted,wedidnotknoweach

other.Weknoweachotherthroughthisorgani-

sationandthisgroup.Nowweevenmeetoutside

ofthegroup,whenwearefree.Wework,butin

theeveningoronweekends,wemeeteachother.”

JALALABAD, FEMALE FGD

Thedevelopmentoftrustwasrepeated-

lybroughtupasa positivedevelopmentthroughthe

establishmentoftheSHGs.Trustistherebydefined

bothasdirecttrustinparticipatingintheloan-cy-

clethatwasestablishedbytheSHG,aswellasbroad-

ercommunitytrust,whichenabledthereciprocalreli-

anceinemergencysituations.Somegroupsdecidedly

emphasisedthatthistrustdidnotexistbeforegroup

establishmentandthattheywereevensceptical

whethersucha bondcoulddevelopinsucha group

thatwascreatedbyanoutsideactor:

“Wedon’tliehere,wetrust.Wearenotgivingany

moneytoanyoneoutsideofthegroupbecausewe

don’t trust them.” MAZAR-E SHARIF, FEMALE FGD

“Thegoodthingthatwelearntistotrusteach

other.Forstance,ifoneoftheSHGmemberbe-

comessickduringthelatenight,andifherefers

totheleaderorcashierofthegrouptogeta loan

formedicaltreatment,theytrusthimandsolvehis

problemduringthenight.Thisisa positiveaspect

thatwehavelearntthroughtheparticipationin

thisSHG.” HERAT, MALE FGD

“Oneyearago,wewerenotsosureaboutthis

group.Wewerewonderingifthiswillgowellor

not but now we are here and we trust each other

andwearea team.Wecanresolveourdailyprob-

56

lems,oursmallproblems,andwearesatisfied.We

aremoresocialandweknowthesociety,weknow

theneighbourhood,andtherea strongsenseof

trustbetweenus.Weareoneteambothinhappi-

nessandsadness,weareonebodynow.”

FEMALE FGD, KABUL

Thisdevelopmentoftrustwasseenasa major

assetinaddressingpersonalproblemsthatthemem-

bersfacedintheirdailylives.Livinga lifeinpovertyat

thebarefinancialminimumalsomeansinAfghanistan

thatfamiliesfinditdifficulttoaddressproblemssuch

ashealthcare.Asthereisnoestablishedorwell-func-

tioninghealthinsurancesysteminAfghanistan,fam-

iliesareleftontheirowntofindthefinancialsupport

topayformedicalexaminations.Thisisoneofthe

pointsinwhichSHGshavebecomeanadditionalsafe-

tynetwhenevera medicalemergencyhits:

“Somekneweachotherbeforethegroupforma-

tion,butnowweknoweachotherbetter.And

somewedidn’tknowatall.Mysmallsonisa new-

bornbutheissick.Wedon’thavemoneyforthe

examination,butallgroupmemberscollected

moneyformybaby.WewentwithmybabytoPa-

kistanandnowheisfine.Wecoulddiscussthis

inourweeklymeetingsandI amhappyfromour

groupmembersthattheyhelpedmewiththis.We

areclosefriends.Weareonefamilynow.”

JALALABAD, FEMALE FGD

MembersreportedintheFGDsthattheywere

abletoaskthegroupforsupportandfavoursevenout-

sideofthenormalmeetingtimesifnecessary.Thiswas

seenasanindicatorofa developedsocialnetwork,

whichextendsitssupportoutsidethenormalgrouppa-

rametersinwhichmembersmeetandengage.Thissup-

portnetworkstabilizeseconomictransactionsandso-

cialaswellaseconomicstandingofindividualfamilies:

“TheSHGisaddressingourneeds,forexample,

I neededmoneyduringtheweekandwasable

togeta loanwithoutthegroupmeeting.I didnot

havetowait:I cameandgotthemoney.I gathered

all the members and took the money in the middle

oftheweekandI solvedmyproblem.”

FEMALE FGD, MAZAR-E SHARIF

“TheSelf-HelpGroupshelpustoresolveourprob-

lemsonaninstantbasis.Forexample,ifthereisan

urgentsicknessinthefamily,wewouldcometo

thisgroupandaskfora loan,samegoesforprob-

lemsandchallenges.Wehavea senseofbeingsta-

ble,becauseifwedon’thavemoneyandtrytoget

loanfromotherindividuals,theywon’tgiveusany

money.” KABUL, FEMALE FGD

3.5.3. Social Impact

TheimpactoftheestablishmentofSelf-HelpGroups

cannotonlybemeasuredineconomicterms.Asal-

readypointedtoinpart3.5.2.(SafetyNetwork)the

socialaspectofSHGsontheonehandsupportsthe

economicventuresoftheSHGmembers.Ontheoth-

erhandtherearefurthersocialchangesperceptible

inthecommunitiesinwhichtheSHGsoperate.

Somechangesaredirectbehaviouralchang-

es,suchaslearningabouttheimpactofsavingandim-

plementingsavingproceduresnotonlyforthegroups

butwithintheirgenerallives.MostoftheAfghans

reachedwiththisapproachhadneverhada bankac-

countintheirlivesandwereusingasmuchmoneyas

theyhadatanygiventime.Theyhoweverremarked

thatthelearningexperienceinthegroupenabled

themtoseethepositiveimpactthatsavingcanhave

andtorealisethatwhiletheywerepoor,theyhad

withinthoselimitedfinancialmeansstillsomere-

sources that they could mobilise.

“ThepositiveimpactoftheSHGisthatwepay50

AFNperweekwhichisnota bigmoney.Andnow

afteralmost2years,eachofusaretheownerof

5000AFN. Thisisa positiveimpact.Welearnt

howtosavemoneyandgettheknowledgehowto

increase our money.” HERAT, FEMALE FGD

“ThroughparticipationtothisSHGwelearntto

be more economic and learnt how to do our dai-

lyexpenses.Forstanceinthepast,whenwegot

20‚000AFNsalary,weusedtospenditall.But

now we think economically and use the money in

the best economic way where needed.”

HERAT, MALE FGD

Furthermore,someparticipantsreported

thattherehadbeena collectiveshiftinwhatgroup

membersfocuson.A newfocusonlearning,work

anddevelopmenthasemerged.Theyseethegroup

asa placetoexchangeknowledgeandlearnfrom

57

eachother,orevenasa placetogaincouragetomake

changesintheirsurrounding:

“Thesegroupscanbringsocialchangeintoour

lives.Weseedifferentpeopleandlearnaboutvar-

yingideas.Wesitwiththemandgetdifferentide-

asaboutbusinessoraboutoursociety.Before

westartedcomingtothegroup,wedidn’tknow

each other. Now we meet and we talk with each

other.Weusedtositonthestreetwithoutwork,

butwhenwejoinedthisgroup,wefocusonbusi-

nessandeducation,andhowtoinviteothersto

thisgrouportojoinourgroup.Beforewewerenot

working,andwhenfamilymembersaskedusfor

help,wecouldn’thelpthem.Butnowweareable

tohelp.” FEMALE FGD, JALALABAD

“Someofthepeopledidnotallowgirlstogoto

school.Forexample,myself,mybrotherdidnot

letmestudyandwastellingthattill9thgradeis

enoughfora girl.Thenmymomjoinedthisgroup

and was able to convince my brother and now we

arealmostgraduatingHighSchoolandeventhink-

ingofgoingtotheuniversity.” KABUL, FEMALE FGD

Thegrouphasbecomeformanymembers

a knowledgehub,wheretheycanbringtheirquestions

andgetsupportfromotherswhomighthavethenec-

essaryexpertisethattheyarestilllacking.Somepar-

ticipantshadpriorknowledgeofrunningbusinesses

orhowtoconnecttodifferentcustomerbases.Meet-

ingregularlyandexchangingwitheachotherabout

theideasforthebuddingbusinessesopensupnotonly

a platformtoexchangewitheachotheraboutthefi-

nancialtransactionssuchastakingloans,butalso

aboutquestionsandproblemsfacedintheprocess.

Thispeer-to-peerknowledgetransferenableslearn-

ingnotonlyfromoutsideactorssuchasNGOsbutalso

withintheirowngroups,whichbecomesa resourcein

itself.OnemalegroupinJalalabaddescribedthemost

importantimpactofthegroupas“becomingunited”as

a group,whichcangivesupportbothwithinandout-

sidethegroupandactasa nodepointforinformation

andexchange.OtherFGDsphraseditinthisway:

“Wesittogethereveryweek,weshareourideas.

Forexample,I havethemoneyandI studieda lit-

tle,butI don’tknow,howI cancontactanddeal

withthecustomers,howcanI connecttothemar-

ket?Butthegroupmembersgaveideasforme,

andI followeduptheirideasandnowI’ma good

seller.I knowhowtodealwiththecustomerand

I’mincontactwiththemarkets.Thisisa social

profitforme.” JALALABAD, FEMALE FGD

“Wehelpeachothertosolveourproblems.When

someoneneedssomething,anotherpersonor

weasa group,help.Thatisoursociallifenow.We

areexpertsonthisnow,weknowhowtorunthe

groupandtoshareproblemsandideastosolve

theproblems,too.” HERAT, FEMALE FGD

TheSHGgroupsfurthermorehavea gendered

impact.First,visitingtheSHGmeetingsextendsthe

movementradiusofmanywomen.Mostwomenwho

arebeingreachedwiththeSHGapproachdon’thave

a jobforwhichtheyleavetheirhomes,andinmore

conservativecommunities,womenmainlystayat

hometolookafterthechildrenandthehousehold.

TheassociationwiththeSelf-HelpGroupsandtheir

regularmeetingsthereforealreadyexposethewom-

entoanextendednetworkofotherwomenintheirvi-

cinity.Thisnetworkalsoledtomeetingsofwomen

outsideoftheSHGcontext,throughmutualinvita-

tions to social occasions.

“Previouslywedidnowhavepermissiontogetout

ofthehouse,nowweareabletocomehereandgo

toneighboursandactuallygetoutofthehouse.”

KABUL, FEMALE FGD

“Sometimesit’sdifficulttoseethechange,but

whenothersfromtheoutsidepointitout,then

wesee,howfarwehavecomewiththisapproach.

Onemanasked‘whathappenedinthisarea?In

thebeginning,nowomancouldwalkandnowitis

a crowdofwomenhere!’Hesaid,‘youknowhere

area lotofwomen,andtheorganisationstarted

thisprogram.Thesewomenareveryclevernow.

You cannot deceive them.’” ORG. A., KABUL, INTERVIEW

“Beforeourinterventionintotheruralareas,the

womenwerenotallowedtogotothesociety,togo

tomeetings,togooutforshopping,fortrainingsor

workshopsandconferences.Butnowallofthem

comeoutfortheworkshops,seminarsandtrain-

ings.Theyevengooutofcountryforexhibitions

andtrainings.Lotsofsocialchangesarethere.”

ORG. C., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

58

Anotheraspectthatwaspointedoutbysev-

eralorganisationswastheperceptionthattheSHGs

helpedindecreasinggender-basedviolence.While

thisfindingisinthisreportanecdotalthroughthein-

terviews,itmeritsa morethoroughinvestigationin

thefuturewhether,andhowthesocio-economicin-

volvementinSHGschangesthesocialenvironmentin

householdstodecreaseviolenceagainstwomen.One

ofthelinkagesthatwasdrawnfromtheengagement

withinSHGsandthereductionofgender-basedvio-

lencewasthedevelopmentofassertivecommunica-

tionskillsandbeingabletodrawona supportnetwork

ofotherwomen:

“Itwasa women’seconomicempowermentpro-

gram,butthesocialimpactthatithadontheside

wasjustbeautiful.Itwassomethingwedidn’tin-

tend.Itwascalledwomen’sempowermentpro-

gram,andthenwesawthatithadsucha socialim-

pactthatweintroducedsomesocialmeasures

intothelogframe,too.Onethirdofthewomenre-

portedsomeformofdomesticviolencepriorto

theproject,andofthis¹/³rd,95%reporteda re-

ductioninviolence,whichisbrilliant.Ifyouhave

programsthatfocusonsocialempowerment,you

won’thavethiskindofoutcomeaswehaveseenin

thisproject.” ORG. L., INTERVIEW, KABUL

“Therearewomenthataresoshythattheycan’t

evengetupandsaytheirname.Itisimmensetosee

themaftera year.It’sa greatsuccesstoseethem

engaged,andtoevensharewitheachotherand

usthatthereareproblemswithgender-basedvio-

lence.Youneedtrusttovoicesomethinglikethat.It

givesthemcourage.” ORG. H.; KABUL, INTERVIEW

Womenarefurthermoreenabledtoengagein

incomegeneratingactivities.Asalreadynoted,most

womendidnothaveincomegeneratingjobsbefore

participatingintheSHGs.Whilethisgivesthemon

the one side an additional burden next to their house-

holdchores,theysometimesexperiencea changein

perceptionbytheirmalefamilymembersorcommu-

nityatlarge:

“TheCDCmembersstartedtoturntoourwomen

foradviceastheybecameknowledgeable,because

theyknewabouttechnicaltopics,savings,human

rights.Itflipped,theCDCmembersstartedtoap-

proachthesavinggroupmembersforadvice.The

mensawthattheirwivesknewsomethingandthis

changedtherelationshipsbetweenhusbandand

wife,aswellasfathersanddaughters.Becausesud-

denly they were not considered useless at home

anymore.Theystartedtoproducesomethingthat

wasvaluableathome,theystartedtosellorbar-

terit,therewassomeincomeandallofthesudden

theyknewthings.Inthelivestockarea,thesewere

thingsthatnoteventhehusbandsknew.Wegot

feedbackfromthewomen,forexamplewhena cow

gotill,andthewomancameandsaid,thecowhas

thesesymptomsandyouneedtogetthismedicine,

gotothedoctortogetthisvaccine.Themenwere

dumbfoundedthattheygainedthisknowledge.”

ORG. L., KABUL, INTERVIEW

Whiletheseexamplespointtoa developmentin

theirsocietalrole,thisstudyfoundthattheimpacton

thechangesindecisionmakingwasnotaspronounced

asexpectedonthebaseSHGlevel.Womenwereem-

poweredtobebreadwinnersaswellandtoengagewith

theotherwomenintheirgroups.Thismighthaveledto

a changeintheirassertivenesswithintheirfamilies:

“Theprogramhashadanimpactondecisionmak-

ing.Thewomeninourprojecthavereportedinour

last assessment that they can make decisions in

theirhouseholdsandthattheyfeelempowered.”

ORG. F., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

However,itgenerallydidnotleaddirectlyto

a differentpositionforwomenwithintheircommuni-

tiesatlarge.Womenreportthattheparticipationin

theSHGshasgiventhema heightenedsenseofpur-

poseand(group)identity,andfacilitatorsobserved

thatwomenhavebecomemoreself-assertiveover

timeastheyengageinSHGactivities.Thesedevelop-

mentscanbeseenasprecursorsofthedevelopment

thatisvisiblewithintheClusterandFederationstag-

es,inwhichwomenbecomecommunitychangersand

civil society aware due to their involvement in local and

regionalproblems.Whilethebaseisbeinglaidonthe

SHGlevel,wherewomenbecomeself-assertiveand

seethemselvesasactiveagents,theyseethecollective

impactthattheycanhaveontheircommunitiesonce

theystarttogetorganisedontheClusterLevel.

A developmentinsocialroleswasthenpercep-

tibleontheClusterandFederationLevel,wherewom-

enweremadeawaremoreabouttheimpactthatthey

59

canhaveconcerningtheircommunities’problems.At

thislevel,womensawthattheycaneffectchangeif

theygetorganisedwitheachotherandapproachgov-

ernmentofficesordecisionmakersinthepublicrealm.

Thisexpressesitselfinchangesofthewomen’sposition

withinthecommunity,wherewomenareempowered

toapproachlocalauthoritiestoaddresscommunity

problems.Manywomenwereproudtohaveachieved

changesintheircommunityinfrastructure(roads,pro-

tectivefloodwalls,mobileclinics,forexample)that

menwerenotabletobringbefore:

“IntheSHGswemainlyfocusonourownhouse-

holdsandonourbusinesses.Whenwecometo

theClustermeetingswetalkaboutproblemsthat

wefaceinourcommunities.Manyissueshave

beenresolvedthroughtheinitiativeofourCluster.

InDaste-eBarchiweorganiseda mobileclinicthat

iscomingtherenow.” FGD WITH CLA, KABUL

“Theassociationwithinthatdistrict/areahasa lotof

power.Mostofchangeshappenthroughtheassoci-

ation.Whenproblemscomeup,itisusuallyshared

withtherepresentativeofthearea.Therehasbeen

a problemwiththeirrigationattheriverwherewe

liveintheChillsetoonarea.Theproblemwasthat

theriverwastoobigandinwinterwhenitwasrain-

ing,itstartedflooding.Peoplewereaffectedbythe

floodandhadtorunawayfromit.Soourgroupde-

cidedtotalkwiththerepresentativeofthearea,

andwemanagedtogettotheofficialsandtoaffect

thattheybuilttwowallssothatwhenitisraining

andfloodcomes,everyonecanbesafe.Thisprob-

lemhadbeentherefora verylongtimeandmen

hadnotbeenabletodoit.Therewasfunds,money,

gatherings/jirgas,butnoonewasabletogetaction

topreventthisproblem.Itwasthroughuswomen

comingtogether,thatwebroughtchangetothis.”

FGD WITH CLA, KABUL

A changeinpositionintermsofleadership

mightonlybecomevisibleattheClusterorFedera-

tionlevel,however,thebasesforitneedstobelainon

theSHGlevel,wherewomenbecomeself-assertive

andseethemselvesasactiveagents.

Apartfromthisgenderedimpact,someorgan-

isationsalsodescribedthattheSHGswereengines

ofsocialcohesionina societyasdiverseasthatofAf-

ghanistan,inbringingtogetherdifferentethnicities

andbridgingsectariandivides:

“InAfghanistantherearetworeligioussects,

Shi’a andSunni,andwehavedifferentethnic

groups,likePashtun,Uzbek,Tajik,Hazara.Now

theycometogetherunderonerooftodiscusswith

eachotherinmeetingswithoutanydiscrimination.

That’shappeningintheSHGs”

ORG. C., MAZAR-E SHARIF, INTERVIEW

3.5.4. Negative Impact

Thereareonlya fewnegativeimpactsthatareper-

ceptibleconcerningtheSelf-HelpGroupapproach.

Onenegativeimpactcanbethechoicetoei-

thergothroughthelocalshuraorCDC. Whilea lotof

organisationsreportedpositiveexperiencesinutilis-

inglocalpowerstructurestoentercommunities,these

shuras/CDCscanfunctionasgatekeeperstoresources.

Anorganisationneedstobewellsetupintermsoftheir

socialfacilitatorsandtheircontacttothelocalcommu-

nitytonavigatethelayersofhierarchysuccessfully.It

liesoutsidethescopeofthisresearchtoassesswheth-

erthedealingwiththeshuras/CDCsisenablingthees-

tablishmentorentrenchmentofmonopoliesofpower

inthesecommunities,butitshouldbepointedoutthat

itisa possibility.Thefactthatmostorganisationsfindit

impossibletootherwiseaccesslocalcommunities,and

haveselectivelyfacedtheabuseofthispower,isindic-

ativeofanunderlyingtension.

A possibleshortfalloftheSHGapproachis

theamountoftimeandsupportitneedstogetup

runningandsustainitself.Whilethegeneralset-up

iscost-effectiveandprettystraightforward,theap-

proachreallyonlyunfoldsitsfullpotentialwhen

usedasa long-termdevelopmenttool.Someorgan-

isationshavetermedthisa ratherprocess-orient-

edapproach,orhavedescribedthechangethatthey

haveundergoneasonefromprojecttoprogram.

Boththetimeframenecessarytoeffectbe-

haviouralandperspectivechangeinbeneficiar-

ies,aswellastheinputintermsoftraining,should

notbeunderestimated.TheSHGapproachcannot

bethoughtofasa short-termfix.Ifanorganisation

triestoestablishthesegroupswithshorttimeframe

inmindandwithoutthinkingthroughanembedding

intoa sustainableoverarchingstructure,theyrun

therisktoseetheireffortsfallapartuponpulling

out,andbecomingjustanotherwell-meantdevelop-

mentprojectlikeAfghanshaveseenmany.

60

Anothernegativeimpactcanbetheinconsist-

encybetweenorganisationsthatgivemoneyasseed

money,grants,ortopups,andotherorganisations

thatarenotgivingthiskindoffinancialsupport.

Thedefendersofa‘pure’SHGapproachallege

thatpayinganykindofmoneytothegroupswilllead

toincreaseddependenceandexpectationsfromthe

beneficiariestowardsorganisations.Theyadvocateto

playthelonggametime-wise,andtoworkwithwhat-

evercommunityresourcesareavailableinbuildingup

thefinancialbaseinthesavingbox.Ontheotherend

ofthespectrumaretheorganisationsthatdecidedto

givemoneyasanadditiontotheself-establishedre-

volvingfundofthegroup,whichenablesbeneficiaries

totakebiggerloansfasterthantheywouldhavebeen

abletodowithoutthefunding.However,thegivingof

moneywasunanimouslyreflectedinbeneficiaries’de-

mandsformoremoney—whichcontrastswiththe

FGDsconductedinSHGsthatdidnotreceiveaddi-

tionalfunding.Themiddlegroundbetweena‘pure’ap-

proachandthedecisiontogivemoney,istakenbyor-

ganisationsthatdonotpaymoneybutofferpackages

thatcontainthenecessarymaterialfortheskillsthat

theytaughtinthetrainings.

AstheSHGapproachisspreadinginAfghani-

stan,thisdifferentialinitsimplementationiscreating

differentexpectationsinbeneficiaries.Inothercoun-

tries,wheretheSHGapproachisalreadymoreformal-

ised,governmentshavetakena leadinmakingthose

decisionsuniform.ForexampleinSriLanka,organisa-

tionsthatimplementtheSHGapproacharenotallowed

togivemoney.96Theyareonlyallowedtooffertrainings

andtosupportthegroupswithmaterialssuchastool-

kitsthatmightbeneededtostartsmallbusinesses.

3.6. Summary of DAC Criteria

Relevance

— Theapproachwasofhighrelevancetomostcom-

munitiesthattherespectiveorganisationsin-

terfacedwith.Thecommunitiesthatwerecho-

senbythedifferentorganisationsweremostly

poorandhadnoassetswithwhichtobackthees-

tablishmentofnewbusinessesorgainingcredits

frombanks.TheSHGapproachthereforeoffered

a greatopportunityforthemtocreatea stable,fi-

nancial base.

— Duetothedifferentfocioforganisationsimple-

mentingtheapproach,relevancecouldmeandif-

ferentthings:relevanceineconomictermscould

beovershadowedbyrelevanceinsocio-politi-

calempowerment.Notallorganisationschoseto

workexclusivelywiththepoorestofthecommu-

nitiesthattheyentered,buttosupporttheones

whoweremostsusceptibletotheideaorthat

wereapproachablethroughtheirshura/CDC.

— Theapproachhada higherrelevanceforwomen

thanformen.Whilesomeorganisationsworked

withbothgenders,itwasfoundthattheamountof

supportprovidedbytheorganisationswasbetter

tailoredtotheneedsofwomenthanformen,to

empowerthemsociallyandeconomically.

96 InterviewUN-Habitat,Kabul,December2017.

— ThestudypointstowardstherelevanceofSHGs

inintegratingreturnees/IDPswithhostcommu-

nity.However,duetothefactthatonlyPINhad

a strongfocusonthisissue,andotherorganisa-

tionsjustservicedIDPs/returneesiftheyhap-

penedtobepartofa community,comparative

findingsarelacking.

Effectiveness

— TheeffectivenessoftheSelf-HelpGroupapproach

liespartlyinitsgrassrootsengagementwithlocal

communities. Only when the communities them-

selvesembracetheapproachashelpfulandac-

ceptablecanithaveanyviableeconomicorsocial

impact.Mostorganisationschoosetoenterlocal

communitiesthroughvillageelders,traditionalvil-

lageassemblies(shuras)ortheCommunityDevel-

opmentCouncil,whichtheysawasaneffective

waytogetintroducedtolocalcommunitiesinan

amiableway.However,ina considerablenumberof

instances,goingthroughtheshuras/CDCswasex-

periencedasproblematiceitherforbeneficiaryse-

lectionorforenteringthecommunityoverall.Al-

thoughaddressinga communitythroughtheshura/

CDCisportrayedthroughmostorganisationsas

thebestway,itisnottheonlyviableaccesspoint.

Asoneorganisationdemonstrated,goingdirectly

tothecommunityanditswomenispossibleaswell.

However,circumventingexistingpowerstructures

doesnotcomewithoutrisks.Bothstrategiesbring

theirowndifficultiesandneedcarefulconsidera-

tiontomaketheapproacheffective.

— Someintervieweespositedthatsecuritywasa de-

61

terminingfactorinhowwelltheywereabletosu-

pervisethegroups,andthatthelackofsuper-

visionduetosecuritydiminishedtheeffective

establishmentofwell-functioninggroups.Gener-

ally,however,organisationsseemedtoworkwith-

outseriousthreats,whichmightbeduetothe

factthattheychosetoworkinurbanareas,where

theyaregenerallymoreprotected,andtoengage

closelywiththecommunity,whichgiveslocalsup-

portinsecurityconcernsaswell.

— Timing:SHGsinthemselvescanbesetuprath-

erquickly,witha generaltimeframeof3yearsfor

a stable,matureSHG. However,toachievethe

neededbehaviouralchanges,toembedthesaving

structurewiththecommunitiesandtoofferthem

a viablefutureoutlookinregionalconnectivity

throughCLAsandFederationstakeslonger.This

comparativelylongtimeframe,6–10years,mir-

rorswhatoneintervieweediscussedasa general

shiftintheoutlookofhisorganisationfroma pro-

jecttoa program-basedperspectiveondevelop-

ment.

— FundingAddition:Theoverallflexibilityofthe

SHGapproach,intermsofguidingphilosophyand

beneficiaryprofiles,translatesintoa flexiblestrat-

egy.SomeSHGsadvocatedforseedgrantstohelp

speedupthecapitalaccumulationforbusiness-

es,whilesomearguedavoidingoutsidefunding

wasimportanttopreventdependencies.Those

whoreceivedgrantsweremorepronetoasking

formoregrantsbutintheabsenceofthese,their

SHGsdidnotcollapse.Itseemsmanagingexpec-

tationsprovedvaluableforthoseorganisations

offeringgrants:i.e.clearlystatingfromtheout-

setthatgrantwouldbelimitedtooneandperhaps

onemorefollow-up.

Efficiency

— Thecostofthephysicalinputsisrelativelysmallin

termsofset-up.

— Thesalariesforcommunityfacilitatorsvaried

markedly,dependingonwhethertheywereem-

ployedbya locally-basedNGOorpartofa govern-

mentorUN-facilitatedproject.

— Noneoftheinterviewedorganisationshadmade

anycostbenefitanalysisperSHG,usuallydueto

thefactthattheyreceivedanoverallbudgetfor

theprojectinwhichtheindividualprojectitems

(suchassalariesortrainings)werespecified,but

notbrokendowntothecostofeachSHG. Howev-

er,allorganisationsthatwerestillrunningSHGs

currentlywereoftheopinionthattheSHGswere

a cost-effectivechoicetoaffectsocialandeco-

nomicdevelopmentintheirpartnercommunities.

Sustainability

— SHGsthatwerevisitedespeciallyinMazar-eSha-

rifandKabul,whichdidnotreceivesupportfrom

anyorganisationanymore,werestillactiveand

runningbythemselves.Thewomenweremeet-

ing,puttingmoneyasideforsavingsandsupport-

ingeachother’sbusinessventures.Italsoappears

thatwhenthereisa certaingroupspiritestab-

lished,thattheeffectmightspread:notonlywere

groupsinMazar-eSharifstillactiveafterphase-

out,buttheyalsogavetheirknowledgefurtherto

otherwomenandsupportedneighboursinestab-

lishingtheirownSHGswithoutanyorganisation’s

input.

— Insomeorganisationstherelationshipbetween

facilitatorand(illiterate)SHGshowedtobedevel-

opingintoa dependencyinitself,especiallywhen

thefacilitatortakesontheroleofthecommuni-

ty’sbookkeeperintheabsenceofliterateSHG

members.Ontheonehand,trainingofkeypeo-

plewithinthegroupsuchascashier,grouplead-

er,etc.facilitatedthehandoveroftheskillstothe

groupthemselves.Ontheotherhand,developing

a clear-definedphasingouttime-frameandstrat-

egyforthefacilitatorsarekeytoenableboththe

facilitatorandthegrouptoretainmorewell-de-

finedroles.

— Mostorganisationspointedoutthata clearlyde-

finedexitstrategyisa majorcomponentofestab-

lishingSHGsassustainableentitiesafterphasing

outexternalinputsandassistance.Thisstrate-

gyshouldfurthermorebecommunicatedclear-

lywiththecommunityinwhichtheSHGsarebe-

ingimplementedsothatthecommunityisaware

ofthescopeandtimeframeandendingofthepro-

ject,aswellashowtocontinueaftertheorgani-

sationhasleft.A successfulexitstrategyincludes

theestablishmentofa viableaccesstoa market

toensurethattheproduceofthebeneficiaries

reachescustomers,thesecondvitalcomponentis

theestablishmentofoverarchingstructuressuch

asCLAsand/orFederationsthatcansupportthe

SHGsintheirweeklyfunctioningevenwhenthe

implementingorganisationhaspulledout.

Products made by Self-Help Group members

63

4. CONCLUSION OF EVALUATION

ThereportanalysestheSelf-HelpGroupapproach

throughtheapplicationoftheDACcriteria(seepart

3).ThispartoffersanevaluationoftheSHGapproach

againstthethreethematicareasofinstitutionalsta-

bility,socialdevelopmentaswellaseconomicde-

velopment.Additionally,theconclusionsummarises

findingsinthecross-cuttingtopicsthatweread-

dressedwithinthereport,suchasgenderdynamics,

suitabilityfortargetgroup(s)includingIDPs,andthe

urbanaswellasspecificallylocal—i.eAfghan—con-

text.

4.1. Social development

ThefindingsofthisreportindicatethattheSHGap-

proachleadstothesocialempowermentofitsmem-

bersthroughbuildingcommunitiesofinterdepend-

enceandmutualtrust,whichdevelopa socialsafety

networkthatsupportstheeconomicventuresofits

members.

Usually,SHGmembersdidnotknoweachoth-

erbeforejoiningtheSelf-HelpGroups,eventhough

theyhadlivedinclosevicinitytoeachother.This

mightbeduetotheurbancontextinwhichneigh-

bourlytiesaremuchweakerthaninruralareas.The

developmentoftrustwasseenasa majorassetinad-

dressingpersonalproblemsthatthemembersfaced

intheirdailylives.Livinga lifeinpovertyatthebarefi-

nancialminimumalsomeansinAfghanistanthatfami-

liesfinditdifficulttoaddressproblemssuchashealth

care.Asthereisnoestablishedorwell-functioning

healthinsurancesysteminAfghanistan,familiesare

leftontheirowntofindthefinancialsupporttopay

formedicalexaminations.Here,Self-HelpGroups

oftenfunctionedasa kindofinsuranceplan,where

memberscouldimmediatelyreceivesupportandpay

backexpenseslater.

Thesafetynetworkdevelopedwithina Self-

HelpGroupoperatesontwodifferentlevels:group

membersgettoknoweachotherandbuildupknowl-

edgeofeachother’ssocialandeconomicsituationas

wellaseachother’sbehaviour.Thisknowledge,which

isgeneratedthroughinteractionandexchangeand

throughseeingeachotherbehavingresponsiblywith

everyone’sfinancialinputs,createstrust.Thiscom-

munityoftrustandinterconnectednesssupports

eachindividualperson’seconomicventuressocial-

lyandeconomically.Incasetheindividualexperienc-

esdifficultiesintheirbusiness,theyhavetheability

toaskforsupportfromthegroup—eitherinmone-

tarytermsthroughorinsocialtermsofknowledgeex-

changetosupporteachotherwithinsightsintohow

toaddressa specificdifficulty.

TheSHGgroupsfurthermorehavea gendered

impact.First,visitingtheSHGmeetingsextendsthe

movementradiusofmanywomen.Mostwomen

reachedwiththeSHGapproachdon’thavea jobfor

whichtheyleavetheirhomes,andinmoreconserva-

tivecommunities,womenmainlystayathometolook

afterthechildrenandthehousehold.Theassociation

withtheSelf-HelpGroupsandtheirregularmeetings

thereforealreadyexposethewomentoanextend-

ednetworkofotherwomenintheirvicinity.Women

arefurthermoreenabledtoengageinincomegener-

atingactivities.Apartfromtheeconomicimpactthat

thishasontheirfamilies,theysometimesexperience

a changeinperceptionbytheirmalefamilymembers

orcommunityatlarge,wheretheyareseenasa re-

source.However,thisstudyfoundthattheimpact

onthechangesindecisionmakingwasnotaspro-

nouncedasexpected.Womenwereempoweredtobe

additionalbreadwinnersbutitgenerallydidnotlead

toa differentpositionforwomenwithintheircom-

munities.A changewasonlyperceptiblewiththesuc-

cessfulintroductionofClustersandFederations.

Thegrouphasbecomeformanymembers

a knowledgehub,wheretheycanbringtheirques-

tionsandreceivesupportfromotherswhomight

havethenecessaryexpertisethattheyarestilllack-

ing.Thislevelofgroupnessfurtherextendstothe

perceptionofmembersoftheSHGasa placetogain

couragetomakechangesintheirsurroundings.How-

ever,actualchangesintheirrespectivecommunities

andproblemsolvingonthemoreextendedlocaland

regionallevelbeyondindividualincomegeneration

againonlystartedformostwomenwhentheybe-

cameengagedinClustersandFederations.

4.2. Economic development

TheSelf-HelpGroupapproachcanleadinthemedi-

umtolongtermtotheeconomicempowermentof

itsmembers.WhileithastobesaidthattheSHGap-

64

proachisnota quickfix(see 4.3ontimeframe),SHG

membersweregenerallysatisfiedwiththefinancial

supporttheyreceivedandthestabilitytheyexperi-

encedthroughparticipatingintheirrespectiveSelf-

HelpGroups.

Theeconomicprocessesofloans,savingsand

possibleinvestmentsweredecidedwithinthegroups

intheirregularmeetingsandwerefoundbytheSHG

memberstobefairandtransparent.Thegroupscol-

lectivelydecidedwhomtogiveloans,inwhichinter-

valstopaybackandwhethermemberswereableto

deferrepaymentifneeded.Generally,financialpro-

cessesseemedwellestablishedintheSHGsthatwere

visitedandinwhichtheFGDswereconducted.The

fewFGDsthatdidreportproblemsinloanrepayment

notedtheproblemwasusuallysolvedbygivingmore

timetotheborrower.Insomecases,especiallywhen

theeconomicbaseoftheloanrepaymenthadbeen

damaged(forexamplethroughthedeathofanani-

mal),thegroupdecidedtoextenda secondloantoen-

ablethegroupmembertorepaytheloanamount.The

establishedtrustinthegrouptherebyhelpedtoover-

comeadversitythatinothercases,forexamplewith

conventionalloans,mighthaveledintoa loanspiral

fromwhichitmightbedifficulttorecover.Loanre-

paymentproblemsseemstohaveonlyledinveryrare

casestotheremovalofparticipantsfromthegroup.

TheabilityofSelf-HelpGroupstoreachand

empowerpoorsegmentsofAfghansocietyisunique

inthatithelpsthemtostrengtheninterdependent

communitiesoftrustwhichcanalsobeconverted

intocollateral.Askedforalternativestothisapproach

inaccessingloans,participantsunilaterallyanswered

thatloansfrombankswouldtakeinterest,whichthey

judgedun-Islamic.Furthermore,banksusuallyre-

questsomesortofcollateral,whichthesepoorcom-

munitiessimplydidnothave.AlternativessuchasMi-

crofinanceloanswereeithernotwellknowninthe

communityorjudgedtobeequallyun-Islamicasoth-

erbankingoptions.

Onlysomeorganisationsthatwereinterviewed

forthisresearchhadexperienceswithMicrofinance

Institutionsandbanks,andhadlinkedtheirSHGsto

commercialMicrofinanceInstitutions.However,most

unequivocallysawMicrofinanceasnota viableoption.

SomehadcontemplatedlinkingtheirSHGswithMi-

crofinanceInstitutionsbutshiedawayfromitdueto

interest-bearingpracticeswithinMicrofinance.This

mightbealsoduetothefactthatMicrofinanceinAf-

ghanistanfunctionsinthesenseoftheinitialGrameen

bank’sapproachtopovertyalleviation,butsometimes

resemblesmorea standardloanapproachwithsmall-

erloans.However,recentdevelopmentswithinthe

MicrofinancesectorinAfghanistanandgloballyhave

seentheintroductionofIslamicfinancingtools,which

havecreateda sub-sectorofIslamicMicrofinance.This

sectorhasestablisheditselfinAfghanistan’surbanare-

asandoffers,especiallywiththeMurabahasalestrans-

action,a viableoptiontoextendsmallbuddingbusi-

nessesina Shariahcompliantway.

4.3. Institutional stability

OneofthemaincharacteristicsthatsetstheSHGap-

proachapartfromotherdevelopmentapproachesis

thetimeframenecessarytomakeSelf-HelpGroups

successfulandsustainable.Inadditiontoeffective

trainingcomponentsanda well-definedexitstrategy

linkedtoa viablefuturemarketforparticipants’prod-

ucts,timewasseenastheAchillesheeloftheSHGs,

whichcanmakeorbreaktheproject.

Generally,mostorganisationsthoughtthat

3 yearswasa feasibletimeframeforestablishing

strong,independentSHGs,thoughtheypointedout

thata longertimeframeisnecessarytoestablish

broaderstructuresthatcansupportSHGsinthefu-

ture,suchasClustersandFederations,whichmake

theSHGssustainablethroughtheirembeddinginto

a widerregionalandstructuralnetwork.Mostinter-

vieweessuggestedthattheSHGapproachneeded

a long-termcommitmentoforganisationsanddonors

tofullysucceed,whichliesratherina 6to10-yearde-

velopmentframework.

Preconditionsforsuccessfullyestablishing

ClustersandFederationsaretheexistenceofstable

andmaturedSelf-HelpGroups,thatshowa willing-

nesstogetinvolvedinfurthervolunteerworkonthe

ClusterandFederationLevel.SimilarlytoSHGs,Clus-

terandFederationmembersneedtheirownspecif-

ictraininginadditiontotrainingprovidedattheSHG

stage.Inadditiontothetrainingsthataregearedto-

wardsbuildingtheunderstandingofthemembersas

totheirresponsibilityinparticipatinginClustersand

Federations,organisationsoftendecidetoofferad-

ditionalskills-buildingtrainingsandexposurevisits

forClusters.Thisdoesnotonlyenablethemembers

oftheClusterstolearnnewtechniques,butalsotore-

laythesebacktotheirownSHGsandtospreadinfor-

mationtoa wideraudience.Oneofthekeyaspectsof

65

buildingupsuccessfulClustersandFederationswas

establishinga groupidentityasmembersofthesedif-

ferentassociationallevels.Tofurtherthisaspect,or-

ganisationstooktheirClusterandFederationmem-

bersouttocelebrateimportantmilestonesandto

experienceeachotherina supportivegroupsetting.

Self-HelpGroupsweregenerallyfoundtobe

mainlyfocusedontheirowneconomicandsocialde-

velopment.Thedevelopmentofa groupconscious-

nessthattranscendsthelocalgroupandtakesaction

withintheirwidercommunitywas,understandably,

seenattheClusterandFederationlevel.Thosere-

gionalassociationsofferthepossibilityforactivepar-

ticipationwithincivilsociety.

However,Afghanistanhasatpresentnogov-

ernmentalstructuretoeffectivelydealorinterface

withSHGs.Unlikeothercountries,whichofferde-

partmentsthatdealwithSelf-HelpGroups,Afghan-

istanlacksanynationalpolicy,guidelineordepart-

mentwithcontactpersonstooversee,streamlineor

guidetheprocessofSHGestablishment.Organisa-

tionscomplainedaboutthislackasitwouldsupport

thesustainabilityofexistingSHGsafterthepull-out

ofanorganisation.

Mostorganisationsworkedselectivelywith

differentministries,dependingontheprogramcom-

ponentthatthesedepartmentswereresponsible

for.Thevocationaltrainingcomponentwasusually

alignedwiththeMinistryofLaborandorganisations

receivedsupportfromtheMinistryofWomen’sAf-

fairsandtheMinistryofAgriculture.Theseselective

collaborationsareencouragingintermsoffutureen-

gagementbetweengrass-rootslevelorganisations’

workandpossiblefuturelinkstogovernmentagen-

cies.Itcouldbeadvisabletolobbyfortheestablish-

mentofa responsibledepartmentdealingwithMicro-

financeorspecificallywithsavinggroupssuchasthe

Self-HelpGroups.ThiscouldbepossibleintheMin-

istryofFinance(whichmightoverseemicrofinance

inthefuture),MinistryofJustice(wherefederations

cangetregistered),MinistryofLabor(whichoversees

vocationaltrainings)orMinistryofEducation(which

wouldalignwithothergoalsoftheSHGs).

Itneedstobestressedthatanembeddingof

SHGsinthegovernmentalstructurebringsthepossi-

bleriskofa formalizationinbureaucraticstructures

thatcanmaketheimplementationinflexible.Instruc-

tively,governmentalsupportwasgenerallyrequest-

edbyorganisationseitherinthefunctionofgiving

initialguidanceandinformation,orforthefinalhand-

overofexistingSHGs,ClustersandFederations,to

offera counterpart.Governmentalsupportwasnot

thoughtofasrunning,regulating,orlimitingSHGs,

butratherasa pointofcontacttoprovideinformation

anda networkingpointforSHGimplementersand

SHGsthemselves.

4.4. Conclusions for Cross-Cutting Issues

4.4.1. Gender Dynamics

ExistinggenderrolesinAfghansocietyhada reciprocal

effectontheimplementationoftheSHGapproachin

Afghanistanbothintermsofchallengesandoutcomes.

Theimpactofexistinggenderrolesmanifests

inthedecisionofNGOstoaccesswomeninthere-

spectivecommunitiesthroughthe(mostlymale)

CDCsorthroughgainingapprovaltoworkwiththe

womenfirstfrommalefamilymembersandrelatives.

NGOsstatedthattheywerenotabletoworkwith

thewomenofa givencommunitywithouttheexplic-

itsupportofthemalemembersofthatcommunity,

a statementthatwasmirroredunanimouslybyFGD

participantsinthatallofthemhadtoobtainmalefam-

ilymemberapprovalbeforewomenwereabletoat-

tendtheregularSHGmeetings.

Once contact was established with the women

andtheSHGswererunning,however,theapproach

showeda directimpactinthefirstyearsofestablish-

ment,connectedwithmobilitywithintheircommu-

nities.Putquitesimply,visitingtheSHGmeetingsex-

tendstherangeofmobilityofmanywomen.Most

womenwhoarereachedwiththeSHGapproach

don’thavea jobforwhichtheyleavetheirhomes,and

inmoreconservativecommunities,womenmainly

stayathometolookafterthechildrenandthehouse-

hold.TheassociationwiththeSelf-HelpGroupsand

theirregularmeetingsthereforeexposethewomen

toanextendednetworkofotherwomenintheirvicin-

ity,whomtheynotonlyseeattheSHGsbutalsovis-

itforothersocialoccasions.Furthermore,starting

a businessventureoftenbringsthewomenincontact

withsellersinbazaarsorwithothermiddlemen,and

offersopportunitiestoacquaintthemselveswithoth-

erbusiness-relatedplaces,whichisa clearextension

oftheirspatialmobilityandsocialcapital.

Subsequently,manypositivesocialimpacts

develop,suchasthedevelopmentofgroupsolidari-

ty and social as well as economic networks that can

supportindividualsandfamilies.Formanymembers,

66

theirgroupshavebecomea knowledgehubwhere

theycanbringtheirquestionsandreceivesupport

fromotherswhomighthavethenecessaryexpertise

thattheyarestilllacking.Thispeer-to-peerknowl-

edgetransferenableslearningnotonlyfromoutside

actorssuchasNGOsbutalsowithintheirowngroups,

whichbecomesa resourceinitself.

Womenstatedthattheydeveloped“a sense

oftrust”amongeachotherthroughwhichtheycould

shareprivatemattersaswellaseconomicgrievanc-

es.Someorganisationsalsoreportedthattheempow-

ermentofwomeninthesegroupsenabledthemto

addressorevenminimizegender-basedviolence.How-

ever,thefindingsinthisreportareratheranecdotal

andrequirefurtherresearchtosubstantiatetheclaims.

Womenreportthattheparticipationinthe

SHGshasgiventhema heightenedsenseofpurpose

and(group)identity,andfacilitatorsobservedthat

womenhavebecomemoreself-assertiveovertimeas

theyengageinSHGactivities.Thesedevelopments

canbeseenasprecursorstothesocio-politicalde-

velopmentthatisvisiblewithintheClusterandFed-

erationstages,inwhichwomenbecomecommunity

changersandcivilsocietyawareduetotheirinvolve-

mentinlocalandregionalproblems.Whilethefoun-

dationisbeinglaidattheSHGlevel,wherewomen

becomeself-assertiveandseethemselvesasactive

agents,theyseethecollectiveimpactthattheycan

haveontheircommunitiesoncetheystarttogetor-

ganisedattheClusterLevel.Thishasalsoledinsome

casestochangesofthewomen’spositionwithinthe

community,wherewomenareempoweredtoap-

proachlocalauthoritiestoaddresscommunityprob-

lems.Manywomenwereproudtohaveachieved

changesintheircommunityinfrastructure(roads,

protectivefloodwalls,mobileclinics,forexample)

thatmenwerenotabletobringbefore.

Generally,differencesbetweenmaleandfe-

maleSHGsareperceptibleinexpectationsthatthe

genderedSHGshavetowardsthesupportcoming

fromNGOs.Whileformostwomentheparticipation

inSHGsleadsthemtotheirfirstincome-generating

enterprise,menhavemostlybeenpartofthejobmar-

ketpriortoparticipatinginSHGs.Thisexperienceand

theexpectationwithinAfghansocietytowardsmen

toprovidefortheirwholefamilymakestheSHGpar-

ticipationanadditionalincomesource,butmostoften

nottheonlyone.Menusuallyexpressedmorestrong-

lythattheyneededadditionalfundingforlargeren-

terprisesandthatthesupporttheyreceivedfromthe

NGOwasa goodstartingpoint,butultimatelynot

enough.Men’s(un)availabilityandtheirgeneralde-

mandsforhigherfinancialsupportfromtheorgani-

sationsshowsthatotherinputsareneededtoimple-

mentthesameprojectsformencomparedtowomen.

4.4.2. Afghan Context

Theresearchshowsthattheconceptofsavingand

mutualsupportgroupsinAfghanistanpre-dates

theintroductionoftheformalsystemofSelf-Help

Groups.SavinggroupsexistinvariousAfghancom-

munities,thoughmainlyamongextendedfamilies.

TheconceptofSHGsasintroducedthroughNGOs

cangraftitselfontotheexistingunderstandingand

extendthereachthroughitsinclusionofnon-family

membersandadditionaltrainingsthatbuildcapacity.

AnotheraspectoftheimplementationofSHGs

intheAfghancontextistheworkthroughgatekeep-

erssuchasCDCsandshuras.Mostorganisations

choosetoenterlocalcommunitiesthroughvillageel-

ders,traditionalvillageassemblies(shuras)orthe

CommunityDevelopmentCouncil(CDC).Working

throughtheCDCsorlocalshuraswasmainlyseenas

amiableandsupportive,thoughsomeorganisations

reporteddifficultiesinestablishinginitialrapport

withtheCDCs/shurasandhadtocancelworkingwith

certaincommunitiesastheywerepreventedfromen-

gagingwiththecommunityundertheirownterms.

Oneorganisationdecidedtocircumventtheshuras/

CDCsaltogetherandwentdirectlytofamiliesina cer-

tainneighbourhood,askingthemwhetherthewomen

livingononestreetcouldgatherinoneofthehouses.

Thisresearchshowsthatalthoughaddressinga com-

munitythroughtheshura/CDCisportrayedthrough

mostorganisationsasthebestway,itisnottheonly

viableaccesspoint,anditcanalsoofferseriousdraw-

backs.Theotherwayofgoingdirectlytothecommu-

nityispossibleaswell.However,circumventingex-

istingpowerstructuresdoesnotcomewithoutrisks,

anditseemsmostfeasiblewhena community-inclu-

siveprocesscanleadtoanendresult.

Anotheraspectofpresent-dayAfghancon-

textistheexpectationbysomeAfghancommunities

ofmaterialandfinancialinputsfrominternationalor-

ganisations.Pastexperienceofsupportbyinterna-

tionalorganisationscanmakeworkingthroughlocal

CDCs,aswellasworkingmoregenerallywithlocal

communities,morecomplex.Managingexpectations

meanstheimplementingorganisationswillneedto

67

focusmorestronglyona goodmobilizationphasein

whichtheyexplaintheprojectanditsbenefitswell.

Someorganisationsexperiencedinitialresistancein

somecommunitiesastheydidnotbringwiththem

financialsupport(especiallyinthepureapproach

wheretheorganisationgivesneitherfinancialnorma-

terialinputs).Butlater,uponseeingthepositiveim-

pactinneighbouringcommunities,somecommunities

returnedtotheorganisationoftheirownvolition.

Oneofthemaindifferencesbetweentheim-

plementationoftheSHGapproachinAfghanistan

comparedtoothercountriesistheissueofinterest.

Whileinothercountriesinterestisoftenaddedto

theloanthatanSHGparticipantpaysback,inmost

Afghancommunitiesinterestisseenasun-Islamic.

Whilethereareexceptionstotherule,whereAfghan

SHGshavedecidedtolevya voluntary‘servicefee’

orallowforfinancialgiftstothegroup,mostSHGs

thatweresurveyedforthisreportrefuseda general,

pre-determinedinterestpayment.

4.4.3. Target Group

TheSHGapproachisusedbyvariousactorstoad-

dresseconomicdevelopmentandthesocialwell-be-

ingofcommunitiesthatstrengthensparticularlypoor

andvulnerablegroups.Theinterviewedorganisa-

tionsstatednearunanimouslythattheirfocuswas

thepoorestofpoorcommunitiesandthattheysaw

theapproachworkingwellforthistargetgroup.Some

ofthefindingsindicatethatespeciallypoorcommuni-

ties lack the collateral that would enable them to take

loansin“normal”bankingtransaction.TheSHGap-

proach,ontheotherhand,offersthemtheopportuni-

tytogeneratetrustascollateralwithwhichtheycan

buildupeconomicandsocialbackingfortheirbusi-

nessenterprises.

Whilepoorcommunitieswerea toppriority,

mostoftheorganisationsalsohadanintersectional

focusonworkingwithwomen,andfelttheapproach

waswellsuitedforwomeninAfghanistan.Rationales

forworkingwithwomenrangedfromeconomictoso-

cialorevenpoliticaljustifications.Economically,one

ofthemainargumentsforworkingwithwomenwas

thattheyareanuntappedworkforceanda morere-

liabletargetgroup.However,theSHGapproachwas

usedbymanyorganisationstotargetsocialempow-

ermentofwomen(see4.1. and4.4.1. formorede-

tailedresults).MeetingintheSHGgroupsshowedan

impactonwomen’smobility,ontheextensionoftheir

socialnetworksandthedevelopmentofmoreasser-

tivenessthroughtheacquisitionofskillsandmone-

taryresourcestohelpthemsupporttheirfamilies.Es-

peciallywomenwitha vulnerablebackground,such

asorphaned1woman,wereabletoaddresstheirin-

dividualneedsthatwerenotattendedtopreviously,

throughparticipationintheSHGgroups.

4.4.4. Urban Context

Theresearchfoundseveralaspectsinwhichtheur-

bancontextinfluencedtheimplementationofthe

SHGapproachinparticularways.

DependingonwhethertheSHGswereestab-

lishedinruralorurbanareas,thereweredifferenc-

esintheoccupationalfocusofparticipants’enter-

1 InAfghanistan,childrenwhohavelostoneoftheirparentsare

consideredorphaned.

prises.Mostimplementersinruralareas,predictably,

hadstrongercomponentsoflivestockandagriculture

thantheirurbancounterparts.

Moreimportantly,socialdifferencesinboth

settingsinfluencetheimplementationandimpact

oftheSHGapproach.Inmostinstances,SHGmem-

bers in urban contexts did not know each other be-

forejoiningtheSelf-HelpGroups,eventhough

theylivedinclosevicinitytoeachother.Thisislike-

lyduetotheurbancontextinwhichneighborlyties

aremuchweakerthaninruralareas.Whilethisas-

pectinfluencedthetimeneededtoestablisha func-

tioninggroupwhereindividualstrustoneanother,it

alsoresultedina strongerimpactindevelopingso-

cialcohesion.Thegroupsreportedbeingsurprised

byhowclosetheyhadbecomewitheachother,even

‘likea family’.Whilethiswasthecaseinmosturban

groups,NGOsworkinginruralsettingsreportedthat

pre-existingsocialriftsinfluencedthegroupdevel-

opmentinnegativewaysthatsometimeseveninhib-

itedgroupcohesion.Bringingthesegroupstogether

inurbanareasmighttherebysupportthecreationof

newsocialnetworksthatcanhelpparticipantstonav-

igatetheurbanenvironment,especiallyconsidering

Afghanistan’spaceofurbanization,withIDPsarriving

incitiesfromincreasinglyinsecureruralareasandre-

turneesfromabroad.

Thereseemstobegenerallymoremovement

withinurbansettings—i.e.peoplemovingdueto

housingcostsandavailability—whileinruralareas

peoplearemorefixedintheirlocalenvironment.This

hassometimesledtomorefluxinthecomposition

oftheSHGs.However,onceparticipantshadunder-

68

stoodandmadeuseoftheideaofSHGssufficiently,

theysometimes‘tooktheideawiththem’toestab-

lishnewgroups,ortheydecidedtostayintouchwith

theiroldgroups.

Structurally,workinginanurbanenvironment

offersopportunitiesforinstitutionalengagement,

suchaswithMicrofinanceInstitutions.InAfghanistan,

MicrofinanceInstitutionsmainlyoffertheirservic-

esinurbanareas.Thismeansthatafterorganisations

havephasedout,participantsofSHGscouldpoten-

tiallymakeuseofbiggerloansthroughaccessingMi-

crofinanceInstitutions.

4.4.5. Displacement and Uprooted People

Whilemostorganisationssurveyedinthisreportin-

cludedIDPsandreturnees,whoinmanycasesfitthe

standardizedselectioncriteria,thesewerenotspe-

cificallytargetedforrecruitment.Mostorganisations

thatarebasedinKabulshiedawayfromworkingwith

IDPcommunitiesbasedonnegativeexperienceswith

theKabulInformalSettlements(KIS)population.The

organisationsstatedthatattitudesofKISinhabitants

showedanaiddependencywhichresultedinunman-

ageabledemandsformaterialandfinancialsupport

fromimplementingorganisations.

Onlyoneorganisationinthisstudy,name-

lyPIN,hasusedtheSHGapproachtonotonlyad-

dressquestionsofpovertyandgender,butalsoofmi-

grationdirectly.Thefindingsfromthemixedgroups

consistingofIDP/returneepopulationsandperma-

nentresidentsareencouragingandshowhowtheap-

proachcanbeusedasanintegrativetool.Whilethe

establishmentofmixedIDP/hostcommunitygroups

sometimestookmoreeffortinitially,inpartbecause

ofstrongbiasesagainsttheminthehostcommunities,

theoutcomeshowsviablesocialandeconomicsup-

portnetworksandintegrationbetweenbothgroups.

CasesinJalalabadandHeratshowedthatthe

integrationofIDPsandreturneesintothehostcom-

munitiesworkedwellandwassupportedbythees-

tablishmentofSHGs.Whilemovementmightfluctu-

ateinothercountriesmorestronglyamongIDPsand

migrants,themigrationflowwithinthecitiesseem

tosupporta morestablemigrationpatterninwhich,

afterinitialmovement,a familyremainsinthesame

placeforprolongedperiodsoftime.Thisenablestheir

participationinSHGsasnormalmembers,whocan

contributejustasanyothermember.Participationin

theSHGgroupsenabledtheIDPfamiliestoestablish

socialconnectionstotheirnewsurroundingcommu-

nity,offeringthemsocialandeconomicstabilityand

a supportnetwork,whichtheyotherwisewouldhave

lacked.

4.5. Lessons Learned and Good Practices

Unlikeotherreportsthatevaluateonespecificpro-

jectorprogram,theevaluationofanapproachwith

differingprojectimplementationsthatvaryconsid-

erably,bringsthedifficultyofoutlininglessonslearnt

andgoodpracticesfromprojectswhoseinsights

sometimescontradicteachother.Thissectionthere-

foredoesnotclaimuniversality,butattemptstogive

optionsthatcanbeimportanttoconsiderinthees-

tablishmentanddevelopmentofa viableSHGimple-

mentation.

Background

— WhiletheformalisationoftheSHGapproachcan

betracedtoinputsfromIndiaandBangladesh,

thegeneralideaofsavinggroupsandactivesocial

networksthatsupportfamilyandrelativesisan

indigenousconceptwellknowntomanyAfghans.

Thisoffersanideationalfoundationfortheimple-

mentationofSHGs

Start

— Basetheskilldevelopmentthatisofferedonan

actuallocalmarketassessmenttofindoutwhat

theneediswhichtheSHGscanfill

— Needs assessments can be conducted either

throughcost-effectiveandparticipatoryprocess-

esorthroughmultiplestageassessmentsinclud-

ingdata-sourcingfromthirdorganisationsand

rankingcommunitymembersaccordingtotheir

vulnerability and/or resilience

— ClearcommunicationwiththeSHGaboutthe

timeandsupportscopeoftheprojectaswellas

theexitstrategyiskeytoa clearunderstandingof

expectationsandlimitsofsupport

— Itcanbegoodtoleada thoroughdiscussionwith

thecommunityaboutanynegativeexperiences

thattheymighthavehadinthepast,bothinterms

ofotherNGOsimplementingSHGsorwithMi-

crofinanceInstitutionstodetermineexpectations

andexperiences

— SHGscanbetoolsforsuccessfulintegrationof

IDPsandreturneesintohostcommunities.This

oftennecessitatesa longer,plannedoutcommuni-

tymobilizationandengagement

69

— Organisationschosetogaintrustandapprov-

althroughmalefamilyandcommunitymembers

firsttobeabletoworkwiththewomenofa given

community

Facilitation

— FemaleFacilitatorsforfemalegroups,malefacili-

tatorsformalegroups

— EnteringcommunitythroughShura/CDCisoften

practiced,thoughitcanbedonedirectlyaswell

— ClearguidelinesforbothfacilitatorsandtheSHGs

arehelpfultoinformeachpartyoftheirroleinset-

tingupandrunningtheSHGs

— Uponvisitfromthefacilitatortothegroup,thefa-

cilitatorshouldasktheparticipantstonamethe

amountofmoneyinthesavingboxandtomake

sure that each member knows how much they

haveputinandhowmuchmoneyiscurrently

available.Thishelpsinkeepingtheaccountability

ofthescribeofthegroup

— Choosingandtrainingfacilitatorsfromthecom-

munitythemselvesenablestosupportthecom-

munitydirectlyandcanhelptoworkinmoreinse-

cure areas

— Organisationscanfindcost-sharingagreements

withcommunitiestograduallyletthecommunity

paya partofthesalariesforthecommunityfacili-

tatorsiftheywanttheircontinuedsupport

— Additionalfundingfortherevolvingfundinformof

a one-timegrantortop-upmoneycansupportthe

fastergrowthoftherevolvingfund.However,this

decisioncanfurthertheexpectationsofcommuni-

ties.Someorganisationschosetogivematerialtool

kitsinsteadtosupportthebusinessdevelopment.

Ifnoneofthesupportmechanismsaregiven(Fund-

ingormaterial),a longertimeframeneedstobeen-

visionedforestablishingviablebusinesses

Running the SHG

— ‘Passport’BooksforeachmemberofanSHGtore-

cordhowmuchtheyhavepaidin,howmuchthey

haveloanedandwhentheyrepaid

— SHGlogbookskeepoverviewsonhowmuchmon-

eyexistsinthecashboxandwhichparticipantof

thegrouphastakenoutwhatamountasloans

— Thereshouldbeanagreementwiththecommu-

nityatthebeginningthattheSHGbooksandlogs

area one-timedistributionandconsecutivebooks

needstobepurchasedbytheSHGthemselves

— Usingcommunityresourcestoovercomehurdles:

askingdaughtersorsonsofSHGmemberstohelp

withthefinancialledgersandrecordkeepingifall

membersoftheSHGareilliterate

— SettingupaSHGisdonequickly,witha gen-

eraltimeframeof3yearsfora stable,mature

SHG. However,toembedthesavingstructure

withthecommunitiesandtoofferthema viable

futureoutlookinregionalconnectivitythrough

CLAsandFederationstakeslongertime(5–8

yearsoverall)

Market Facilitation

— SHGscangetintroduceddirectlytotradersin

a bazaar.Conversely,anNGOmightdecidetosup-

portanSHGtoopenuptheirownshop,eitherin-

dividuallyorcollectivelywithotherSHGs

— Beneficiariesshouldbemadeawareofallpossible

marketsorNGOs,privatesectorbusinessesand

governmentdepartmentsthatcouldoffersupport

fortheirbusinessesevenwhentheestablishing

organisationhaspulledout

Registering/Government Interface

— Thereiscurrentlynoregistrationprocessfor

SHGsorassociations

— FederationscanberegisteredwiththeMinistryof

Justice.Theprocesstakesroughlythreemonths

— Thereiscurrentlynodepartmentthatisre-

sponsiblefortheoverallmanagementofSHGs

inAfghanistan.However,NGOshaveoptedto

selectivelyreceivesupportfromministries/de-

partmentsforpartsoftheSHGimplementation

(VocationalTrainings,LiteracyCourses,etc).

Focus Group Discussion among Self-Help group members

71

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Sabi,Manijeh.“AwarenessandPerceptionsofIslamicMicrofi-

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72

MANUALS AND ANNUAL REPORTS

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Kindernothilfe(KNH)

73

APPENDIX A – QUESTIONNAIRES AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS GUIDES

Interview Guide for key informant interview 1 (KII −1): Implementing OrganisationsCriteria / KII — Organisations

General

— Inception:Forhowlonghaveyoubeenusing

SHGs?Inhowmanycommunities?Howmany

SHGswereestablished(m/f),andhowmanyare

currentlystillrunning(inwhichstageofmaturity)?

— Definition:WhatisyourconceptofSHGs,asim-

plementedinyourprojects?Whatisyourprimary

aimwhenestablishingSHGs?

Cross-cutting Issues

— Target Group:Whatisyourtargetgroupforimple-

mentingtheSHGs?Haveyouworkedwiththese

communitiespreviously?Howhaveyouidentified

yourprimarybeneficiaries?Howhasthecommu-

nityunderstoodandacceptedthechoiceoftarget

beneficiaries?Areyoutargetinganymarginalized

groupsexplicitly(whichones?Howdoyouidentify

these communities and are there any assessments

donebeforehand?Howdoyouincludethem?)?

— Gender:Doyouseedifferencesbetweenmale

andfemaleSHGs?Ifso,whatarethey?Haveyou

heardofanyproblemsorsuccessstoriesconcern-

ingwomenmainlyrunningtheSHGs?Whatim-

pactdoesthegenderofbeneficiarieshaveontheir

participationintheSHGs?Whatisthepercentage

offemaletomaleSHGsthatarecurrentlyactive?

— Local Context:(How)haveyouadaptedtheSHG

approachtothelocalcontext?Ifso,canyougive

someexamplesofthecustomizationofthepro-

gram?

— Urban Context:Doyourunanequalnumberof

SHGsinurban,peri-urbanandruralsettings?If

not,inwhichsettingdoyouprimarilyfocus,and

why?IfyouhaveSHGsinmultipleplaces,doyou

seedifferences?Howdoestheurbancontextin-

fluencetheuseoftheSHGapproach?

— Displacement:Doyouworkwithinternallydis-

placedcommunities?Ifso,whatarethemainben-

efitsofSHGmembershipforthedisplacedand

uprootedpeoplelivinginurbanareas,ifany?Are

thereanynegativeimpacts?

Relevant

— Consistency/Relevance:Whatisyourobjective

whenusingSHGs?Whataretheintendedimpacts/

effects?Doyouseethemsuccessfullyreached?(if

yes,how?Ifno,wheredotheyfallshortandwhy?)

HowdoestheuseofSHGsfitintoyourorganisa-

tions’overallaims?Arethebeneficiariesawareof

theobjectivesoftheSHG?

— Needs Assessment:Whichneedshaveyouidenti-

fiedinthecommunitiesinwhichSHGsareimple-

mented?HowdotheSHGsaddresstheseneeds?

— AretheSHGsregularlymeeting/usedbymem-

bers?HavememberslefttheSHG,ifso,why?

Whatreasonsaregivenbymemberswhochoose

toleaveSHGs?Afterhowmanyyearshavethey

left?Whoaretheoneswholeft?(newcomers,

women,men,IDPs)?

— Comparison of Alternatives:Arethereothervia-

blealternativesourcesofcreditavailableinthese

communities,andhowdotheycomparetothe

SHGlevelloansystem?

— Inclusion:ArethereanyIDPsthatparticipatein

theSHG?Aretheoperationalrequirements,im-

pactsandeffectsofSHGsdifferentwhenworking

withIDPsvsnonIDPs?

— National Policies:Arethereanynationalpolicies

oreffortsthatyourSHGapproachfallsunderor

addresses?Ifso,which?

Effective

— Achievement:Whichobjectiveshaveyoureached

throughtheestablishmentoftheSHG?Which

otherobjectiveshavenotbeenachieved(yet),and

howdoyouplantoachievethem?Howmanyben-

eficiariesdidyouenvisionvs.howmanyreached?

— Influencing Factors:Whatwerethemajorfactors

influencingtheachievementornon-achievement

oftheobjectives?

— Financial Processes:Inwhichstageofmaturation

aretheSHGsyouarecurrentlyrunning?Howwell

establishedarefinancialprocesses(loans,savings,

investments,etc.)?Howmanyloansarebeinggiv-

en/repaidandforwhat?

— Outside Impact:Doyouseeanimpactofthelocal

74

context(security,groupdynamics,history,local

powerstructuressuchaseldersorCDCs)affect-

ingtheoutcome?

Efficient

— Cost Efficiency:Whatistheamount(perSHG/per

beneficiary)tosetup,trainandmaintaina SHG?

Howarethesecostsmonitored?

— Improvement:Howcouldtheapproachbeim-

proved?

Sustainable

— Structure and Impact:Whatdoyouseeaslong-

termpositiveimpactinthelivesofSHGmembers

andhowdoyoumeasurethis?

— Dependencies:DoestheSHGprogramcreateany

dependenciesamongmembers,ordoesitempow-

erthemtobeself-sufficient?

— Exit Plan:Iffundingisstillongoing,istherea clear

planforphasingoutexternalinputsandassis-

tance?

— Continuation:HaveSHGscontinuedtoexistafter

outsideassistancehasstopped?Towhatextent

didthebenefitsoftheprogramcontinueafterdo-

norfundingceased?

— Independence:Arethegroupsabletooperate

independentlywithoutthefacilitator’sinvolve-

ment?Arethereanybeneficiarieswhoyouwould

categorizeasdependentontheSHGforhelp,and

whowouldratherbenefitfromanothermoresus-

tained/substantialsupport?

— Link to Federation:Istherea plantolinkupthe

SHGsona clusterornationallevel?Ifyes,howfar

isthedevelopmentoftheseplans?Ifno,whynot?

— Link to Microfinance Institutions:Istherea plan

toincrease/decreasetheloanvolumeandlinkup

theSHGstomicrofinancebanksorinstitutions?Is

yes,howfaristhedevelopmentoftheseplans?If

no,whynot?

Impact

— Social Impact:Whatpositivesocialimpactdo

youseeonthelivesofthebeneficiaries(person-

al,household,community,regionallevel)?Canyou

giveexamples?

— Group Impact/Trust:Haveyouwitnessedanim-

pactongroupinteractionsinthecommunities

whereyouimplementedSHGs?Doyouseeanim-

pactonmutualresponsibilityandtrustbuildingat

a grouporcommunitylevel?

— Safety Network:DoestheSHGapproachcon-

tributetotheestablishmentofsocial/safetynet-

works?

— Decision Making:HaveSHGsimpactedhousehold

orcommunitydecision-makingandengagement?

— Problem Solving:DoestheSHGapproachef-

fectivelyhelpgroup/communitylevelmembers

tosolvetheproblemstheyface?Ifyes,inwhich

wayshasthishappened(meetings,linkuptoshu-

ra/jirgas)?

— Economic Impact:Howmanyoftheloanswere

usedtoestablisha business?Whattypesofbusi-

nesses are most commonly established with these

loans?[Sustainability:howmanyofthesebusi-

nesses can run or sustain themselves without the

ongoingsupportoftheSHGs?]

— Negative Impact:Havetherebeenanynegative

impactsona householdorcommunitylevelfor

membersofSHGs?

Interview Guide for key informant interview 2 (KII−2): Community Leaders and MembersCriteria / KII — Organisations

General

— Inception:Forhowlonghaveyoubeenusing

SHGs?Inhowmanycommunities?Howmany

SHGswereestablished(m/f),andhowmanyare

currentlystillrunning(inwhichstageofmaturity)?

— Definition:WhatisyourconceptofSHGs,asim-

plementedinyourprojects?Whatisthemainfo-

cusofestablishingSHGs?

Cross-cutting Issues

— Target Group:Whentheorganisationapproached

youforestablishingSHGs,hadyouheardabout

thisapproachbefore?Whatdidyoufirstthink

abouttheapproachandwhomtheychosetopar-

ticipate?Howhavepeoplereactedtotheimple-

mentationofSHGswithintheircommunity?

— Gender:Doyouseedifferencesbetweenmale

andfemaleSHGs?Ifso,whatarethey?Haveyou

heardofanyproblemsorsuccessstoriesconcern-

ingwomenmainlyrunningtheSHGs?Whatim-

pactdoesthegenderofbeneficiarieshaveontheir

participationintheSHGs?

— Local Context:DoyouthinkthattheSHGis

a goodprogramforAfghancommunities/your

community?Ifyes,why?Ifno,whynot?

75

— IDP:Ifyourcommunityhasbeendisplaced(addi-

tionalquestion):Haveyoufacedanydifficulties

concerningholdingSHGsandimplementingSHG

loansystems,duetopeople’suncertainstatusin

theirplaceofresidence?Arepeoplemovingor

droppingoutofthegroup?

Relevant

— Consistency/Relevance:Whatisyourreason/

goalforusingSHGs?Inyouropinion,doyouthink

thattheSHGsaresuccessfulinachievingthis?(if

yes,how?Ifno,hownotandwhy?)

— Needs Assessment:Whataretheneedsinyour

community?DotheSHGshelpinaddressingthese

needs?

— Participation/Drop Out:AretheSHGsregular-

lymeeting/regularlyusedbymembers?Have

memberslefttheSHG,isso,why/(What)arerea-

sonsformemberstoleaveSHGs?Afterhowmany

yearshavetheyleft?Whoaretheoneswholeft

(newcomers,women,men,IDPs)?

— Alternatives:Arethereotherviablesourcesof

creditavailableinthecommunities,andhowdo

theycomparetotheSHGlevelloansystem?Do

youusethem(ifyes,whoandforwhat,ifyoudon’t

usethem,whynot)?

— Inclusion:ArethereanyIDPsthatparticipatein

yourSHG(s)/Isyourcommunityinternallydis-

placed?Ifyes,doesthishaveanimpactontheuse

oftheSHG(peoplehavingtomove,stabilityofthe

SHG)?

Effective

— Achievement:Whatarethesuccessesthatyou

haveseenthroughtheSHGsworking?Where

doyouthinktheSHGdoesnotachieveitsgoals?

Whatcouldbedonebettertoachievethesegoals?

— Influencing Factors:Whatwerethemajorfactors

influencingtheachievementornon-achievement

oftheobjectives?

— Financial Process:Howwellwouldyousaythe

SHGsfunctionfinancially?Arefinancialprocesses

(loans,savings,investments,etc.)wellestablished

ordoyoufaceproblemsinthisregard?Howmany

loansarebeinggiven/repaid?

— Outside Impact:Doyouseeanimpactofthelocal

context(security,groupdynamics,history,local

powerstructuressuchaseldersorCDCs)affect-

ingtheoutcome?Howistherelationshipbetween

SHGs,elders,CDCsandothercommunitymem-

bers?

Efficient

— Time satisfaction:Areparticipantsandcommu-

nitymemberssatisfiedwiththetimeofestablish-

ment,disbursement,identificationofprojectsand

supporttohandlethem?

— Improvement:Howcouldtheapproachbeim-

proved?

Sustainable

— Structure and Impact:Whatdoyouseeaslong-

termpositiveimpactinthelivesofSHGmembers,

andyourcommunity?Canyougiveexamples?

— Continuation/Dependencies:IsyourSHGre-

ceivinganysupportfromtheorganisationtosus-

tainSHGactivities?IstheSHGoperatinginde-

pendentlyfromfacilitatorsortheorganisationor

doyouneedsupport?Ifyouneedsupport,what

kindofsupportisnecessary?

— Collective Action/Link to Federation/Microfi-

nance:Hasthesocialnetworkandproblemsharing

inthegroupledtoanycollectiveactiontochange

a problemthatindividualsorthecommunityexpe-

riences?Arethereproblemsyoudiscussedwhich

wouldneedbiggerloansormoreoutsidehelp?

Impact

— Social Impact:Doyouseepositivesocialdevelop-

mentsconnectedtotheSHGsinthehouseholds,

communityorgenerally?Doestheexistenceand

workoftheSHGshaveanimpactontheoverall

community?Doesthecommunityoverallbene-

fitfromhavingtheSHGs?HowdoSHGmembers

interactwithothermembersofthecommunity?

Canyougiveexamples?

— Decision Making:HavetheSHGsinfluencedany

decisionmakinginindividualhouseholdsorinthe

communityatlarge?Ifso,canyougiveanexam-

ple?Ifnot,whynot?

— Problem Solving:DoestheSHGapproachhelp

tosolvegroup/communitylevelproblemsthatits

membersface?Ifyes,inwhichwayshasthishap-

pened(meetings,linkuptoshura/jirgas)?

— Economic Impact:Howweretheloansused?

Whatkindofinvestments/projectswereyouable

tosupport/enableduetogivingloansintheSHG?

76

Weretheyone-timeinvestmentsoraretheystill

ongoingprojects?Havetheloanshada positive

economicimpact?Howmanyoftheloanswere

usedtoestablisha business?

— Negative Impact:Havetherebeenanynegative

impactsonpersonalhouseholdorcommunitylev-

elformembersornon-membersofSHGs?

Overview Sheet to Fill out for each FGD

NameofOrganisationthatsetuptheFGD:

PlaceofCommunityCity:

PlaceofCommunity/AreaName:

GenderofFGD:

IDPCommunityYes/No:

DateofFGD:

Facilitator:

NoteTaker:

Questions for Focus Group DiscussionsCriteria / Category / FGD Questions

Relevant

Consistency/Relevance/ Needs Assessment/Com-

parison of Alternatives:

A)HowlonghaveyoubeenpracticingSHGs?(B)

Whatkindofoutcomes/effectsdoyouseeasa re-

sultofparticipatingintheSHGs(1)socially(2)eco-

nomically?(C)Whataretheneedsinyourcommuni-

ties?AreSHGsaddressingtheseneedsadequately?

Whichneedsdoesitaddressandwhichonesdoesit

notaddress?Arethereanyotheroptionstoaddress

theseneedsorareSHGthebestoption?

EXTRA FOR IDP COMMUNITY:

Inclusion and Target Population:

ForFGDsinIDP-communities:Doesyourcurrent

statusasanIDPaffectyourinvolvementintheSHG

(peoplehavingtomove;stabilityoftheSHG)?What

aresomeofthepositive/negativeaspectsthataffect

participationintheSHGs?

Effective

Financial Processes:

Aretheprocessesofloans/savings/investments/re-

paymentsworkingwell,orhaveyoufacedanyprob-

lemswiththem?Whatkindofinvestments/projects

wereyouabletosupport/enableduetogivingloans

intheSHG?Weretheyone-timeinvestmentsorare

theystillongoingprojects?

Outside Impact:

Whatareproblemsthatyouhavefacedinconvening

theSHGsandinimplementingtheregularproceed-

ings?Werethereanyproblemsintermsofsecurity?if

so,whatwerethey?Whatistherelationshipbetween

SHGsandcommunityelders,CDCsorothercommu-

nitymembers?Didyoufaceanyinterference/prob-

lemsinthisregard?

Sustainable

Structure and Impact:

Doyouseelong-termpositiveimpactoftheSHGs?

Whathaveyoulearntanddevelopedthroughpartici-

pationintheSHGs?

Continuation/ Independence:

IsyourSHGreceivinganysupportfromanoutsideor-

ganisationtosustainSHGactivities?IstheSHGoper-

atingindependentlyfromfacilitatorsandtheorgan-

isationordoyouneedsupport?Ifyouneedsupport,

whatkindofsupportisnecessary?

Link to Federation/Problem Solving/Possible link to

Microfinance Banks

Hasthesocialnetworkandproblemsharinginthe

groupledtoanycollectiveactions/solutionstoprob-

lemsthatindividualsorthecommunityexperiences?

Arethereproblemsyoudiscussedwhichwouldneed

biggerloansormoreoutsidehelp?

Impact

Social Impact/ Group Impact and Trust/ Safety Net-

work:

Hasthesocialnetworkandproblemsharinginthe

groupledtoanycollectiveactions/solutionstoprob-

lemsthatindividualsorthecommunityexperiences?

Arethereproblemsyoudiscussedwhichwouldneed

biggerloansormoreoutsidehelp?

Decision Making/ Problem Solving:

Whatareproblemsthatyouhavefacedasa group?

Howhaveyoudealtwiththem?Haveparticipants

droppedoutoftheprogram?Ifso,why?Andhowhas

thegroupdealtwiththis?

Photo Annika Schm

eding

Savings Box in Jalalabad, female Self-Help Group

Phot

o Ja

n M

rkvičk

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