the seductions of clarity - philpapers
TRANSCRIPT
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Theseductionsofclarity
C.ThiNguyenUniversityofUtah
(Thisisapre-print.Pleasecitethefinalversion,forthcomingintheRoyalInstituteofPhilosophySupplements)
Thefeelingofclaritycanbedangerouslyseductive.Itisthefeelingassociatedwithunderstandingthings.Andweusethatfeeling, intherough-and-tumbleofdaily life,asasignalthatwehaveinvestigatedamattersufficiently.Thesenseofclarityfunctionsasathought-terminatingheuris-tic.Inthatcase,ouruseofclaritycreatessignificantcognitivevulnerability,whichhostileforcescantrytoexploit. Ifanepistemicmanipulatorcanimbueabeliefsystemwithanexaggeratedsenseofclarity,thentheycaninduceustoterminateourinquiriestooearly—beforewespottheflawsinthesystem.Howmightthesenseofclaritybefaked?Let’sfirstconsidertheobjectofimi-tation:genuineunderstanding.Genuineunderstandinggrantscognitivefacility.Whenweunder-standsomething,wecategorizeitsaspectsmoreeasily;weseemoreconnectionsbetweenitsdis-parateelements;wecangeneratenewexplanations;andwecancommunicateourunderstand-ing.Inordertoencourageustoacceptasystemofthought,then,anepistemicmanipulatorwillwantthesystemtoprovideitsuserswithanexaggeratedsensationofcognitivefacility.Thesys-temshouldprovideitsuserswiththefeelingthattheycaneasilyandpowerfullycreatecategori-zations,generateexplanations,andcommunicatetheirunderstanding.Andmanipulatorshaveasignificantadvantageinimbuingtheirsystemswithapleasurablesenseofclarity,sincetheyarefreedfromtheburdensofaccuracyandreliability. Ioffertwocasestudiesofseductivelyclearsystems:conspiracytheories;andthestandardized,quantifiedvaluesystemsofbureaucracies.
Hereisaworryingpossibility:thereisasignificantgapbetweenourfeelingthatsome-
thingisclearandouractuallyunderstandingit.Thesenseofclaritycanbeamarkerofcog-
nitivesuccess,butitcanalsobeseductive.Oversimplificationsslipeasilyintoourmindsand
connivethemselvesintoourdeliberativeprocesses.
Inthatcase,thesenseofclaritymightbeintentionallyexaggeratedforexploitativeends.
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Outsideforces,withaninterestinmanipulatingourbeliefsandactions,canmakeuseofclar-
ity’sappeal.Seduction,afterall,ofteninvolvesaseducer.Romanticseduction, initsmore
maliciousform,involvesmanipulatingtheappearancesofintimacyandromanceinorderto
subverttheaimsoftheseduced.Thereisananalogousformofcognitiveseduction,where
hostileforcesplaywiththesignalsandappearancesofclarityinordertoleadourthinking
astray.
Thesenseofclarityisapotentfocalpointformanipulationbecauseofitscrucialrolein
managing our cognitive resources. After all, we only have somuchmental energy to go
around;weneedtoprioritizeourinquiries.Inparticular,weneedsomewaytoestimatethat
we’veprobablythoughtenoughonsomematterforthemoment—thatit’sprobablysafeto
moveontomorepressingmatters,evenifwehaven’tgottentotheabsoluterockbottomof
thematter.Oursenseofclarity,anditsabsence,playsakeyroleinourcognitiveself-regula-
tion.Asenseofconfusionisasignalthatweneedtothinkmore.Butwhenthingsfeelclear
tous,wearesatisfied.Asenseofclarityisasignalthatwehave,forthemoment,thought
enough.Itisanimperfectsignal,butitisoneweoftenactuallyuseinthequick-and-dirtyof
everydaypracticaldeliberation.Thisshowswhy,say,manipulativeinterestsmightbepar-
ticularlyinterestedinapingclarity.Ifthesenseofclarityisathought-terminator,thensuc-
cessfulimitationsofclaritywillbequitepowerful.Ifsomebodyelsecanstimulateoursense
ofclarity,thentheycangaincontrolofaparticularcognitiveblindspot.Theycanhidetheir
machinationsbehindaveilofapparentclarity.
Here’sanotherwaytoputit:themomentwhenwecometounderstandoftenhasapar-
ticularfeelto it—whatsomephilosophershavecalledthe“a-ha!”moment.Themoment
whenwecometounderstand,saysAlisonGopnik,issomethinglikeanintellectualorgasm
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(Gopnik,1998).And,asJohnKvanvigsuggests,itisourinternalsenseofunderstanding—
oursenseof “a-ha!”and“Eureka!”—thatprovidesasenseofclosure toan investigation
(Kvanvig,2011,88).The“a-ha”feelingisbothpleasurableandindicatesthatamatterhas
been investigatedenough. If, then,hostile forcescan learntosimulate that“a-ha” feeling,
thentheywillhaveaverypowerfulweaponforepistemicmanipulation.
Ioffertwosustainedcasestudiesofcognitivesubversionthroughtheseductionsofclar-
ity.First,Iwilllookatthesortsofbeliefsystemsoftenpromulgatedbymoralandpolitical
echochambers,whichoffersimplisticpicturesofaworldfullofhostileforcesandconspiracy
theories.Suchbeliefsystemscancreateanexaggeratedsenseofclarity,inwhicheveryevent
canbeeasilyexplainedandeveryactioneasilycategorized.Second,Iwilllookattheseduc-
tiveclarityofquantification.Iborrowmyuseof“seduction”fromSallyEngleMerry’sThe
SeductionsofQuantification(2016),astudyintohowglobalinstitutionsdeploymetricsand
indicatorsintheserviceofpoliticalinfluence.Merryfocusesonthegenerationofindicators
andmetricsontheglobalstage,suchastheHumanDevelopmentIndex,whichattemptsto
sumupthequalityoflifeacrosseachcountry’sentirecitizenshipinasingle,numericalscore.
TheHDIthencompilesthesescorestoofferasingleapparentlyauthoritativerankingofall
countriesby theirqualityof life. Suchsystemsofquantificationcanofferanexaggerated
senseofclaritywithoutanaccompanyingamountofunderstandingorknowledge.Theircog-
nitiveappealcanoutstriptheircognitivevalue.
It isstrikinghowquantifiedpresentationsofvalueseemtohaveaprofoundcognitive
stickiness. Themotivational drawof quantified values has beenwell-documented across
many terrains (Porter 1996;Merry2016;Espeland and Sauder2016). Thismotivational
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poweriswhysomanycompaniesandgovernmentshavebecomeinterestedinthetechnol-
ogies of gamification. Gamification attempts to incorporate the mechanics of games —
points,experiencepoints,andlevelingup—intonon-gameactivities,inordertotransform
apparently“boring”activityasworkandeducationintosomethingmoreengaging,compel-
ling,andaddictive(McGonigal2011;Walzetal2015;Lupton2016).Iamworried,however,
thatgamificationmight increasemotivation,butonlyat thecostofchangingourgoals in
problematicways.Afterall,stepcountsarenotthesameashealth,andcitationratesarenot
thesameaswisdom(Nguyen2020,189-215;forthcoming).Theseductionsofclarityare,I
believe,oneimportantmechanismthroughwhichgamificationworks.
Letmebeclear:thepresentinquiryisnotastudyinidealrationality,norisitastudyof
epistemicviceandcarelessness. It isastudy in thevulnerabilitiesof limited,constrained
cognitiveagents,andhowenvironmentalfeaturesmightexploitthosevulnerabilities.Itisa
forayintowhatwemightcallhostileepistemology.Hostileepistemologyincludestheinten-
tionaleffortsofepistemicmanipulators,working toexploit thosevulnerabilities for their
ownends.Wemightcallthestudyoftheseintentionalepistemichostilitiescombatepiste-
mology.Hostileepistemologyalsoincludesthestudyofenvironmentalfeatureswhichpre-
sentadangertothosevulnerabilities,madewithouthostileepistemicintent.Hostileenvi-
ronments,afterall,don’talwaysarisefromhostileintent.Hostileenvironmentsincludein-
tentionallyplacedminefields,butalsocrumblingruins,thedeepsea,andMars.Anepistem-
icallyhostileenvironmentcontainsfeatureswhich,whetherbyaccident,evolution,orde-
sign,attackourvulnerabilities.
Iwillfocusfortheearlypartsofthispaperoncasesofcombatepistemology.Ithinkthis
istheeasiestplacetoseehowcertainsortsofsystemshaveahostileepistemicfunction.The
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cases of intentionallymanufactured hostile environmentswill then help us to recognize
casesof theunintentional formationofhostileepistemicenvironments.Hostileepistemic
environmentscanarisefromentirelywell-intentioned,andevensuccessful,pursuitsofother
purposes.Aculinarilyextraordinarypastryshopalsopresentsanenvironmenthostiletomy
attemptsathealthyeating.Inmanybureaucraticcases,aswewillsee,systemsofquantifica-
tionoftenariseforverygoodreason:toefficientlymanagelargeandcomplexinstitutional
data-sets,or to increaseaccountability (Scott1998;Perrow2014).But theseverydesign
featuresalsomake them intoepistemicallyhostileenvironment.Becauseof themagnetic
motivationalpullofquantification,theveryfeatureswhichrenderthemgoodforefficient
administrationalsofunctionstoimbuethemwithseductiveclarity.1
Otherrecentinquiriesintohostileepistemologyincludediscussionsofepistemicinjus-
tice,propaganda,echochambers,fakenews,andmore(Fricker,2007;Medina2012;Dotson
2014;Stanley,2016;Rini2017;Nguyen2018b).Importantly,thestudyofhostileepistemol-
ogyisdistinctfromthestudyofepistemicvice.Thestudyoftheepistemicvices—suchas
closed-mindedness,gullibility,activeignorance,andcynicism—isastudyofepistemically
problematiccharacter traits. It is thestudyof failings in theepistemicagents themselves
(SullivanandTuana2007;ProctorandSchiebinger2008;Cassam2016;Battaly2018).Hos-
tileepistemology,ontheotherhand,isthestudyofhowexternalfeaturesmightsubvertthe
1IaminfluencedherebyA.W.Eaton’sdiscussionofartifactfunction,whichdrawsonanddevelopsRuthMilli-kan’snotionoffunction(Millikan1984,Eaton2020).Eatonarguesthattheintentofanartifact’sdesignerdoesnotdeterminethatartifact’sfunction.Shesuggestsamoreevolutionarymodel:Anartifactmaybeunintention-allyimbuedwithtrait,butinsofarasthattraitisselectivelyreproducedinfutureartifacts,thenitseffectispartofthoseartifacts’function.So,ifabureaucracygeneratesaquantifiedmetricforaccountingpurposes,butthatquantifiedmetricsurvivesandisreproducedinfurtherbureaucraticsystemsbecauseofitsseductiveeffect,thentheseductivenessispartofthosesystems’function.
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effortsofepistemicagents.Ofcourse,viceandhostilityareoftenentangled.Hostileenviron-
mentspressonourvicesandmakeiteasierforustofallmoredeeplyintothem.Butviceand
hostilityrepresenttwodifferentpotentiallociofresponsibilityforepistemicfailure.
Thisallmightjustseemlikecommonsense.Ofcoursepeoplearedrawntooversimplifi-
cations;what’snewinthat?Butthereareimportantquestionshere,aboutwhywe’redrawn
tooversimplificationandhowculpableweareforgivingintoit.Importantly,manytheorists
treatourinterestinoversimplificationasstraightforwardlyirrational.Inthepsychological
andsocialsciences,theappealofoversimplificationisusuallyexplainedasamistakewhich
canbeunderstoodintermsofindividualpsychologicaltendencies,suchasmotivatedrea-
soningortheundueinfluenceoftheemotions.Weacceptoversimplifications,itisthought,
becausetheymakeusfeelsmug,theycomfortus,ortheyreinforceoursenseoftribalidentity
(KahanandBraman2006;Sunstein2017).Similarly,manyphilosophicalaccountstreatour
susceptibility tooversimplificationas aproblemarisingwholly froman individual’sown
personal failuresofcharacter– fromtheirepistemicvices.QuassimCassam, forexample,
tellsthestoryofOlivertheconspiracytheorist,whobelievesthat9/11wasaninsidejob.
SaysCassam,thereisn’tagoodrationalexplanationforOliver’sbeliefs.Thebestexplanation
isafailureofintellectualcharacter.Oliver,saysCassam,isgullibleandcynical;helacksdis-
cernment(162-3).
Iwillpresentapicturethatisfarmoresympathetictotheseduced.Itisapictureinwhich
exaggerated clarityplaysupon specific structuralweaknesses inour cognition.As cogni-
tivelylimitedbeings,weneedtorelyonvariousheuristics,signals,andshort-cutstomanage
thecognitivebarrage.Butthesestrategiesalsoleaveusvulnerabletoexploitation.Seductive
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claritytakesadvantageofourcognitivevulnerabilities,whicharise,inturn,fromourper-
fectlyreasonableattemptstocopewiththeworldusingourseverelylimitedcognitivere-
sources.And,certainly, thepullofseductiveclaritywillbeworse ifwegive in tovarious
epistemicvices.And,certainly,oncewerealizeallthis,wewillwanttoactmorevigorously
tosecurethevulnerablebackdoorstoourcognition.Thegeneralpoint,however,isthatgiv-
ingintotheseductionsofclarityisn’tjustsomebruteerror,ortheresultofsheerlaziness
andepistemicnegligence.Rather,itisdriven,insignificantdegree,bysystemsandenviron-
mentswhichfunctiontoexploitthecognitivevulnerabilitiesgeneratedbythecopingstrate-
giesofcognitivelyfinitebeings.
Clarityasthought-terminator
Ihavebeenspeakinglooselysofar;letmenowstipulatesometerminology.Ontheone
hand,thereareepistemicallypositivestates:knowledge,understanding,andthelike.Onthe
otherhand,therearethephenomenalstatesthatareconnectedtothoseepistemicallyposi-
tivestate.Thesearetheexperiencesofbeing inanepistemicallypositivestate—likethe
senseofunderstanding,thefeelingofclarity.Loosely:understandingisoursuccessfulgrasp
ofpartsoftheworldandtheirrelationships,andthesenseofclarityisthephenomenalstate
associatedwithunderstanding.Forbrevity’ssake, letmeusetheterms“clarity”and“the
senseofclarity”interchangeably,torefertothephenomenalexperienceassociatedwithun-
derstanding.Idonotmeantobeusing“clarity”intheCartesiansense,whereitisaperfect
guaranteeofknowledge.Clarity,inmyusage,ismerelyanimpressionofacertainkindof
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cognitivesuccess—whatJ.D.Trouthascalledthesenseofunderstanding(Trout2002).Clar-
itymayoftenaccompanygenuineunderstanding,butitisbynomeansaperfectindicator
thatwedo, in fact,genuinelyunderstand.Soexternal forcescanexploit thegapbetween
genuineunderstandingandthefeelingofunderstanding–thatsenseofclarity.
Therearetwogeneralstrategiesforepistemicmanipulation.Thereisepistemicintimida-
tion:thestrategyoftryingtogetanepistemicagenttoacceptsomethingbymakingthem
afraidoruncomfortabletothinkotherwise.Thereisalsoepistemicseduction:thestrategyof
manipulatingpositivecognitivesignalstogetanepistemicagenttoacceptsomething.The
manipulationofclarityisaformofepistemicseduction.Itistheattempttouseourowncog-
nitiveprocessesagainstus,whisperingpleasantlyallthewhile.
Howmightclarityseduce?Therearemanypotentialpathways.Foronething,clarityse-
ducesbecauseitispleasurable.Butfortheremainderofthisdiscussion,I’llfocusanother,
evenmoredangerousfeature:thatthesenseofclaritycanbringustoendourinquiriesinto
atopictooearly.Thispossibilityarisesbecauseoftheprofoundlyquick-and-dirtynatureof
dailydecision-making.Wearefinitebeingswithlimitedcognitiveresources.2Indailylife,we
needtofigureoutwhattodo:wheretospendourmoney,whotovotefor,whichcandidate
toback.Wefaceaconstantbarrageofpotentiallyrelevantinformation,evidence,andargu-
ment—farmorethanwecouldassessinanyconclusivemanner.Soweneedtofigureout
thebestwaytoallocateourcognitiveresourceswhileleavingmostofourinvestigationsun-
finished,insomecosmicsense.
2Twoparticularlyrelevantdiscussionsoncognitivelimitationandepistemologyare(Wimsatt2007;Dallman2017).
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Whenpracticallyreasoningaboutthemessycomplexitiesoftherealworld,weareun-
likelytoarriveatanyconclusiveground-floor,wherewecanknowwithanycertaintythat
we’redone.3So,foreverydaypracticaldeliberation,weneedsomemethodfordetermining
thatwe’vethoughtenough.4Andthatbasisoftenneedstobefastandloose,tocopewiththe
fastandloosemannerofeverydaypracticaldeliberation.Weneedsomebasisforestimating
thatourunderstandingisprobablygoodenough,sothatwecanmakeadecisionandmove
on.Weneedsomethinglikeaheuristicforterminatingthought.
Here,then,istherulingsuppositionformyinquiry:thesenseofclarityisoneofthesig-
nalswetypicallyusetoallocateourcognitiveresources.(Idonotclaimthatitistheonly
signal, thoughIdoclaimit isasignificantone.)Weoftenuseoursenseofconfusionasa
3AsElijahMillgramputs it,practicalreasoningdoesn’tresult insettledargumentstofinalizedconclusions.Practicalreasoningproducesonlytentativeconclusions.Practicalconclusionsarealwaysopentodefeatfromunexpectedangles,andnewformsofdefeatmayalwayssurpriseus(Millgram1997).Theclosestwecangettoconclusivenessistothinkthatacertainpieceofpracticalreasoningseemsgoodenough,sofaraswecantell.AndevenifyourejectMillgram’sviewandbelievethattherewerefirmpracticalconclusionsthatwemighteventuallyreach—surely,findingsuchfirmconclusionsiswellbeyondthereachofmosthuman-scalepracticaldeliberationineverydaycircumstances.4Verylittlehasbeenwrittenonhowwedecidetoendourinquiriesinpracticaldeliberation.Andmuchofthatworkhasfocused,notonfast-and-loosedailyheuristicsforterminatinginquiry,butonwhenwecanconclu-sivelyterminateinquiry.See,forexample,AlanMillarandKvanvig’sdebateaboutwhetherweneedmerelyneedknowledgetoconclusivelyterminateinquiry,orwhetherweneedtoreflectivelyknowthatweknowinordertoterminateinquiry(Millar2011;Kvanvig,2011).Trouthimselfarguesthatthe“senseofunderstanding”—that“a-ha”feeling—isnotofparticularuseinthesciencesbecauseitisquitevulnerabletocognitivebiasesandothercorruptingpsychologicalinfluences.InTrout’sterms,themeresenseofunderstandingdoesn’tgrantuswhatwereallywantinscience,whichisgoodexplanations.Wehaveotherwaysofrecognizinggoodexpla-nations,farmoreaccuratethanmereinternalfeelings.Weknowwehaveagoodscientificexplanationwhenourscientificmodelmakesgoodpredictions.Weshould,saysTrout,thereforelargelyignorethevariousinter-nalsignalsofunderstanding,whichwillsimplyleadusastray.Weshould,instead,remainfirmlyfixedontheevidencethatourscientificmodelprovidesgoodexplanations,whicharemeasuredintheusualscientificmeth-ods:prediction,testing,andthelike(Trout2002,2017).Notice,however,thatthissortofapproachimaginestherelevantepistemicagentstobecognitivelyidealbeingswithessentiallyunlimitedresources.Itthenaskshowsuchcognitivebeingsshouldgoaboutgettingthingsrightonceandforall.Andthatmightbetherightidealizationforthinkingabouthowweshouldpursuelong-termepistemicprojectsaspartsof intergenera-tionalcommunities,aswedoinphilosophyandscience.Butthingslookverydifferentforcognitivelylimitedbeingsinthequick-and-dirtyofday-to-daydecision-making.Sometimeswemightbeabletoadoptsomemeth-odologywithapre-establishedthresholdforterminatingthought.Consider,forexample,thecognitivestrategyofsatisficing:takingthefirstsolutionwhichcrossessomepre-establishedminimalthreshold(Simon1956).Butwhatdowedowhenwearen’tsatisficing?Inmanycases,ourinvestigationsaremoreopen-ended,withoutanysortofpre-establishedminimalthreshold.Forthosesortsofinvestigations,weneedsomeheuristicbasisforattentionalmanagement.
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signal thatweneed to keep investigating, andour senseof clarity as a signal thatwe’ve
thoughtenough.5Oursenseofclarityisasignalthatwecanterminateaninvestigation.When
asystemofthoughtseemscleartous,thenwehaveaheuristicreasontostopinquiringinto
it.6
I’mnotclaimingthatthisheuristicisanecessarypartofallpracticalreasoning–only
thattheheuristiciscurrentlyundercommonusage.Afterall,heuristicsareusuallycontin-
genttendenciesandnotnecessarypartsofourcognitivearchitecture.Infact,someresearch
suggeststhatwecanslowlychangetheheuristicsweuse(ReberandUnkelbach2010).
Here’smyplan.First,we’llstarttothinkabouthowpowerfulitwouldbeifthissupposi-
tionweretrue,andthereweresuchapleasurableandthought-terminatingheuristic.I’lllook
atsomeevidencefromtheempiricalliteratureoncognitiveheuristicsthatsupportssome-
thinginthevicinityofmysupposition.I’llshowhowthesupposition,whichconcernshow
weuseourfeelingofunderstanding,emergesfromarecentdiscussioninthephilosophyof
scienceaboutthenatureofgenuineunderstanding.Then,I’llusethesuppositiontothink
aboutwhatsortssystemsandenvironmentsmightsuccessfullyexploitthesenseofclarity.
I’lldigintosomehistoricalandsociologicalliteratureonechochambersandonthesocial
5MydiscussionhereheavilyborrowsstructuralfeaturesfromElijahMillgram’sdiscussionofthefunctionofboredomandinterestinpracticalreasonandagency.Millgramarguesthatasenseofinterestisoursignalthatourvaluesaregoodonesforustohave,andasenseofboredomisoursignalthatourvaluesarebadforustohave,soweshouldchangethem(Millgram2004).6AsfarasIknow,JustinDallmanofferstheonlycontemporaryaccountofhowourcognitivelimitationsforceustomanageoureffortsofinquiry.Thebestproceduretocopewithcognitivelimitation,hesays,istosetupapriorityqueue.Weassignpriority levels toourvariousoutstanding investigations,andthenweproceed inorderfromhighestprioritytolowest(Dallman2017).Butwhatbasisdowehaveforassigningprioritylevels?ToputmysuggestionintoDallman’sterms,weneedsomeheuristicforquicklyestimatingpriorities,andoursenseofclarityfunctionsasaheuristicbasisassigningalowprioritytoitsinvestigation.Asenseofclaritycanthusterminatealineofinquiry—notconclusively,butbyloweringitsprioritybelowthebarrageofother,morepressingmatters.
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effectofsimplisticquantification.Thesuppositionwillturnouttoprovideaunifyingexpla-
nationformanyofthedocumentedeffectsofechochambersandquantification.Myargu-
mentinfavorofthesupposition,then,willbethatitprovidesaunifyingexplanationforvar-
ious observations from cognitive science, sociology, andhistory,while integratingneatly
withastandardaccountofthenatureofunderstanding.Butthismodeofargumentationcan
onlyrenderthesuppositionaplausiblehypothesis;moreempiricalinvestigationiscertainly
calledfor.
Clarityasvulnerability
Suppose,then,thatthesenseofclarityplaysacrucialroleintheregulationofourcogni-
tiveresources,functioningasasignalthatwecansafelyterminateaparticularlineofinquiry.
Obviously, thesenseofclaritycancomeapart fromactual fullunderstanding.7 Itmust, in
orderforittoplayaheuristicroleinquick-and-dirtydailydeliberation.8Inordertoknow
thatwefullyunderstoodsomething,wewouldneedtoconductanexhaustiveandthorough
investigation.Thesenseofclarityisfarmoreaccessibletous,sowecanuseittomakerough
estimatesaboutwhetherwe’veinquiredenough.
Ifahostileforcecouldapesuchclarity,thentheywouldhaveapotenttoolforgettingus
toaccepttheirpreferredsystemsofthought.Thisisbecausefalseclaritywouldprovidean
7Foranin-depthdiscussionofthispoint,seeTrout’sdiscussionofthegapbetweenthesenseofunderstandinginscience,andactuallypossessingagenuineunderstanding(Trout2002).Thereisausefulfurtherdiscussionin(Grimm2012,106-109),whichdefendsTrout’sclaimsagainstLindaZagzebksi’sclaimthatwealwaysknowwhenweunderstand(Zagzebski2001,247).Seealso(Strevens2013).8Iamdrawingherefromthecognitivescienceliteratureonheuristics.Keyrelevantmomentsinthatliteratureinclude(GigerenzerandGoldstein1996;Kahneman2013).
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excellentcoverforintellectualmalfeasance.Asenseofclaritycouldbringustoterminateour
inquiryintosomethingbeforewecoulddiscoveritsflaws.Itwouldbesomethinglikeanin-
visibilitycloak—onethatworksbymanipulatingourattention.Ourattention,afterall,is
narrow.Webarelynoticewhat‘soutsidethefocusedspotlightofourattention.Wecanmake
somethingeffectivelydisappearsimplybydirectingtheirattentionelsewhere.9Onewayto
make something cognitively invisible, then, isbymaking it signalunimportance.The spy
novelistJohnLeCarre—whohadactuallyworkedinBritishintelligence—describes,inhis
novelTinkerTailorSoldierSpy,whatagenuinelyeffectivespylookslike.Theyaren’tdashing
andhandsome,likesomeJamesBondfigure.Aneffectivespypresentsasentirelynormal,
bland,anddull.Theycandisappearbecausetheyhavelearnedtomagnifythesignalsofbor-
ingness.Similarly,thetechniquesofstagemagicinvolveattentionalmisdirection.Stagema-
gicianslearntosignalboringnesswiththeactivehandwhiledirectingsignalsofinteresting-
nesselsewhere,inordertocontroltheiraudience’sattention.Thesenseofclaritycanwork
inananalogousstrategyofattentionalmisdirection.Anepistemicmanipulatorwhowants
ustoacceptsomesystemofthoughtshouldimbuethatsystemwithasenseofclarity,sothat
cognitiveresourceswillbe less likelytobedirectedtowards it.Thestrategywillbeeven
moreeffectiveiftheysimultaneouslyimbuesomeothertargetwithasenseofconfusion.The
confusingobjectseizesourattentionbysignalingthatweneedtoinvestigateit,whichmakes
iteasierfortheclear-seemingsystemtorecedeintotheshadows.Themanipulatorcanthus
9ThelocusofthemoderndiscussionofthissortofattentionalblindnessisinChristopherChabrisandDanielSimons’sinfluentialexperiments,including,famously,anexperimentwherehalfofthestudysubjectsfailedtonoticeapersoninagorillasuitwalkingacrossaroom,andpoundingtheirchest,whenthesubjectswerein-structedtoperformarelativelysimplecountingtask(ChabrisandSimons2011).
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gaincontroloftheirtarget’sattentionbymanipulatingtheirtargets’priorityqueueforin-
vestigation.
Thus,hostileforcescanmanipulatethecognitivearchitectureofresource-management
inordertobypassthesafeguardsprovidedbythevariousprocessesofcognitiveinquiry.In
themovies,thecrooksarealwayshackingthesystemwhichcontrolsthesecuritycameras.
Epistemiccriminalswillwanttohackthecognitiveequivalent.
Easeandfluency
Theexperienceofclarityiscomplexanditsphenomenalmarkersmany.Let’sstartwith
acasestudyinonesmallandsimpleaspectofclarity—onewhichhasbeenrelativelywell-
studiedinthepsychologicalsciences.Considertheexperienceofcognitiveease—therela-
tivedegreetowhichitiseasytothinkaboutsomething.Intheliteratureoncognitiveheu-
ristics,cognitiveeaseispartofthestudyof“cognitivefluency”,whichisthe“subjectiveex-
perienceofeaseordifficultywithwhichweareabletoprocessinformation”(Oppenheimer
2008,237).Researchhasdemonstratedthatwedo,infact,oftenusefluencyasacognitive
heuristic. Ifwecomprehendan ideaeasily,wewillbemore likely toaccept it. Cognitive
difficulty,ontheotherhand,makesitmorelikelythatwewillrejectanidea.Thisheuristicis
notentirelyunreasonable:weoftenexperiencecognitiveeaseinadomainpreciselybecause
wehavealotofexperiencewithit.Cognitiveeaseoftencorrelateswithexperience,which
correlateswithskillandaccuracy.But,obviously,easeisseparablefromaccuracy.Studies
havedemonstratedthatone’smerefamiliaritywithanideamakesonemorelikelytoaccept
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it.Familiaritycreatesasenseofcognitiveease,butwithouttheneedforanyrelevantskillor
expertise.Studieshavealsoshownthatwearemorelikelytobelievesomethingwrittenina
morelegiblefont.Legibilityleadstoeasierprocessing,whichleadstoreadieracceptance.In
otherwords:weareusingourcognitiveeasewithsomepropositionordomainasaheuristic
forouraccuracywiththatpropositionordomain.RolfReberandChristianUnkelbachhave
arguedthatfluencyheuristicsare,infact,oftenquiteuseful.ThroughaBayesiananalysis,
theyconcludethatfluencyisagoodheuristicwhentheuser’senvironmentcontainsmore
truepropositionsthanfalseones—andthebettertheratiooftruetofalsepropositionsin
theirenvironment,thebetterthefluencyheuristicwillwork(ReberandUnkelbach2010).
Butthatheuristiccanbegamed.10
Supposethattheusualfluencyheuristicisinplace.Howmightitbeexploited?Togame
the fluencyheuristic, amanipulatorwouldwant tooffer their targets ideas expressed in
somefamiliarmanner,byusingwell-wornpatternsofthoughtandformsofexpression.This
exploitativemethodologyshouldbequitefamiliar:itexplainstherhetoricalpowerofcliched
slogansandInternetmemes.
Suppose that theworldhasmany suchepistemicmanipulators in it, andhasbecome
chockfullofmisleadingideasthathavebeenengineeredtoseemfamiliar.Ourbeststrategy
toavoidmanipulationwouldbetoupdateourheuristicstocloseoffthiscognitivebackdoor.
AsReberandUnkelbachshowed,wearecapableofchangingandupdatingourheuristics
whenwereceivedevidence that theyhave leadusastray.Themanipulators, then,would
wanttomaskfromusanyevidencethatouruseofthefluencyheuristicwasleadingusastray.
10Troutmakesasimilarpointaboutfluencyandthesenseofunderstanding(Trout2017),althoughhisconcernislargelywithattackingotheraccountsofunderstanding,andnotprovidingafullpictureofexploitation.Itakemyselftobefillinginthedetailsofhissuggestion.
15
Thisis,however,easiertodoinsomedomainsthanothers.Someepistemicdomainshave
obviouslitmustests.Itiseasytocheckformistakenreasoninginthembecausesuccesses
andfailuresareobvioustoanyonlooker.Forexample,wecantellthatourtheoryofbridge-
buildinghasgonewrongcorruptedifournewbridgeskeepfallingdown.Butotherepistemic
domainshavenosucheasylitmustests—likethemoralandaestheticdomains.Ifone’srea-
soninghasbeensystematicallysubvertedinsuchasubtledomain,thereisnoobviouserror
resultthatcouldfunctionasacheck.11Soifmanipulatorswantedtogaincontrolviatheflu-
encyheuristic,onegoodstrategywouldbetoperformtheirfluency-manipulationsover,say,
claimsaboutmoralityandvalue.Alternatively,theymaywanttodevotetheirfluency-ma-
nipulationstocomplexanddiffusesocialphenomenaormoreesotericscientificphenome-
non.Someempiricalclaimscannotbestraightforwardlycheckedbythelayperson,suchas
scientificargumentsforclimatechangeorsociologicalclaimshowoppressionperpetuates.
Ifthemanipulators’targetshavebeengivenaseductivelyclearexplanationwhichdismisses,
say,sociologistsandclimatechangescientistsascorrupt,thoseexplanationswillbequite
hardtodislodge.Mosttargetswillbeunabletoseethattheyhavebeenledastray,andso
won’tupdatetheirheuristics(Nguyen2018b;Nguyen2018c).
Apingunderstanding
Perhapsitseemsimplausibletoyouthatsomebodywouldterminateareallyimportant
inquiryjustbecauseoffluency.Thereis,however,anothermuchmoresophisticatedformof
11Foranextensivediscussionoflitmustestsandexpert-vetting,seeNguyen(2018a).
16
epistemic seduction which will more plausibly trigger the thought-terminating function.
Hostileepistemicmanipulatorscantrytoimitate,notjustease,butafullfeelingofunder-
standing.Theycanpresentthephenomenaassociatedwithapositiveandrichexperienceof
clarity.
Inordertoseehowonemightfakethefeelingofunderstanding,let’sstartbythinking
aboutthenatureofgenuineunderstanding.Forthat,let’sturntoarecentdiscussionofthe
natureofunderstandinginthephilosophyofscience.Accordingtoarecentstrandofthink-
ing,knowledgeisn’tactuallytheprimarygoalofmuchofourepistemicefforts.Knowledgeis
usuallyconceivedofassomethinglikethepossessionoftruefacts.Havingknowledge,bythe
usualaccounts,doesn’trequireanyparticularintegrationofthosefacts.Butmanyofourin-
tellectual effortsareaimedat getting somethingmore than justknowing somedisparate
facts.Weaimatsomethingmoreholistic:understanding.Theprecisenatureofunderstand-
ingisstillundersomedebate,butwecanextractsomecommonandlargelyuncontroversial
ideas.12First,whenweunderstandsomething,wenotonlypossessalotofindependentfacts,
butweseehow those facts connect.Understanding isof a system; it involvesgraspinga
structureandnotjustindependentnodes.Second,whenweunderstandsomething,wepos-
sesssomeinternalmodeloraccountof itwhichwecanusetomakepredictions,conduct
12Muchofthedebateinthatliteraturehasturnedonwhatisconstitutiveofunderstanding,andwhatismerelytypicallyassociatedwithunderstanding.Forexample,accordingtoStevenGrimmandHenkdeRegt,theskillofpracticalapplicationispartiallyconstitutiveofunderstanding(Grimm2006;deRegt2009;Wilkenfeld2013,2017).MichaelStrevens,ontheotherhand,deniesthisconstitutiverelationship;skilltypicallyfollowsfromunderstanding,butisn’tconstitutiveofit(Strevens2013).Notethatwedon’tneedtoresolvedebateslikethisforthecurrentinquiry.Sincewe’reinterestedwhatsignsareassociatedwithunderstanding,wedon’treallyneedtodistinguishcarefullybetweenwhatisconstitutiveofunderstanding,andwhatfollowsfromit.Finally,KareemKhalifahasargumentthattheseaccountsofunderstandingcanbereducedtotheideaofknowinganexplanation(Khalifa2012).MyaccounthereshouldbecompatiblewithKhalifa’sview–though,inhislanguage,Iwouldbetalkingaboutfakingthefeelofknowinganexplanation.
17
furtherinvestigations,andcategorizenewphenomena.13
Thatisanaccountofwhatitmeanstoactuallyhaveanunderstanding.Sowhatarethe
experientialphenomenaassociatedwithunderstanding?Whatdoesitfeelliketounderstand
something?Thereareseveraldistinctphenomenatoconsiderhere.First,therearetheex-
periencesassociatedwithcomingtounderstand.AsCatherineElginputsit,whenwecome
to understand, ourway of looking at things suddenly shifts to accommodate new infor-
mation.Understanding,shesays,“comesnotthroughpassivelyabsorbingnewinformation,
butthroughincorporatingitintoasystemofthoughtthatisnot,asitstands,quitereadyto
receiveit”(Elgin2002,14).Whenwecometounderstand,oursystemofthoughtchanges
and pieces of information thatwe could not accommodate before suddenly find a place.
Kvanvigoffersasimilaraccount:tounderstand,hesays,istograspacoherencerelationship.
Itistobeawareofhowtheinformationfitstogether(Kvanvig2003,202).Theexperienceof
comingtounderstand,then,involvesanexperienceofgraspinganewandimprovedcoher-
ence.Letuscallthisthephenomenonofcognitiveepiphany.And,asGopnickpointsout,cog-
nitiveepiphaniesareincrediblypleasurable.
Next,therearephenomenaassociatedwithhavinganunderstanding.Understandingin-
volvesacertainfacilitywiththeterrain.AsKvanvigputsit,
…Tohavemasteredsuchexplanatoryrelationshipsisvaluablenotonlybecauseitinvolvesthefinding
ofnewtruthsbutalsobecausefindingsuchrelationshipsorganizesandsystematizesourthinkingon
asubjectmatterinawaybeyondthemereadditionofmoretruebeliefsorevenjustifiedtruebeliefs.
Suchorganizationispragmaticallyusefulbecauseitallowsustoreasonfromonebitofinformationto
13Thisdiscussionconstitutesafast-growingliterature.IamparticularlyinfluencedbyCatherineElgin’sac-count,StephenGrimm’susefulsurvey,andMichaelStrevens’andMichaelPatrickLynch’sdiscussions(Elgin2002,2017;Grimm2012,Strevens2013;Lynch2018).
18
anotherrelatedinformationthatisusefulasabasisforaction,whereunorganizedthinkingprovides
nosuchbasisforinference.Moreover,suchorganizedelementsofthoughtprovideintrinsicallysatis-
fyingclosuretotheprocessofinquiry,yieldingasenseorfeelingofcompletenesstoourgraspofa
particularsubjectmatter.(202)
Whenweunderstandacognitiveterrain,wecanmovebetweenitsnodesmorequickly
andeasily.Wecanuseourunderstandingtoeasilyandpowerfullygeneraterelevantexpla-
nations.Andifourunderstandingisfecund,thesenewexplanationswillservetocreateeven
moreusefulconnections.And,asMichaelStrevenssays,havinganunderstandingalsoin-
volveshavingthecapacitytocommunicatethatunderstanding—toexplaintohowthecon-
nectionswork(Strevens2013).Let’scallallthesethephenomenaofcognitivefacility.14And,
atleastinmyownexperience,thepleasureofclarityliesnotonlyinGopnick’smomentof
comingtounderstand,butalso in thecontinuing joysofapparent facilityand intellectual
power. It feels incrediblygoodtobeabletoswiftlyexplaincomplexphenomena. It is the
pleasureofengagingourskillsandcapacitiestopowerfuleffect.15
Let’senterintothemindsetofthehostileepistemicmanipulator.Ourgoalistoseduce
withapparentclarity—togameotherpeople’scognitiveprocessesandheuristicssothat
theywillacceptourpreferredsystemofthought.We’llwanttoengineerthatsystem,then,
tocreatethefeelingofcognitiveepiphany.We’llwanttomaximize,foroursystem’sadopters,
thesensethatunexplainedinformationisslidingintoplace,thefeelingofnewfoundcoher-
ency.Sowe’llwanttogivethesystemeasy-to-applycategorizationswhicharereadilycon-
nectedintoacoherentnetwork.And,oncethatsystemhasbeenadopted,we’llwant itto
create the feeling of cognitive facility.We’ll want to engineer it so that, once somebody
14IowemyframingtoLauraCallahan’s(2018,442)usefuldiscussionofunderstanding.15Formoreontheaestheticpleasureofone’sownskillfulaction,seeNguyen(2020,101-120).
19
adoptsthesystem,thinkinginitsterrainwillseemdistinctlyeasierandmoreeffectivethan
before.We’llwant it togiveadoptersaheightenedsensationof formingconnectionsand
movingeasilybetweenthem.We’llwantittocreatetheimpressionofexplanatorypower,
quicklyandeasilyexplaininganynewphenomenathatcomeup.Andwewouldwanttodo
allthatwhilesimultaneouslymaskingitsepistemicfaults.
Thismightseemlikeanoverwhelminglydifficulttaskfortheaspiringmanipulator.We
manipulators,however,havesomeverysignificantadvantages.First,wedon’tneedtosuc-
cessfullyimitateunderstandingallthewaydown.Wesimplyneedforoursystemtotrigger
the clarityheuristic early enough, before its adopters stumble across anyof the flaws. If
you’rebuildingaPotemkinvillage,youdon’tneedtoactuallybuildanyactualhouses.You
justneedtobuildthefacades—solongasthosefacadesconvincepeoplenottotryandenter
thebuildings.Wemanipulators,then,canhideoursystem’sweaknessandinferiorperfor-
mancebehindaveilofapparentclarity.16
Butourmostsignificantadvantageisthatweareunburdenedbytheconstraintsoftruth
inengineeringourextra-tastysystemofthought.Epistemicallysinceresystems—thatis,
systemsofthoughtgeneratedforthesakeofrealknowledgeandgenuineunderstanding—
areheavilyconstrainedbytheirallegiancetogettingthingsright.17Wemanipulatorsareun-
boundbyanysuchobligations.Wearefreetotweakoursystemtomaximizeitsappealing
clarity.Thisissimilar,inaway,tohowunhealthyrestaurantsarefreetoappealmoredirectly
tooursenseofdeliciousness,becausetheyarefreedfromconsiderationsofhealth.(Or,at
16Thisstrategyexploitsacognitiveerrorofover-weightingearlyevidence.Foradiscussionofwhythisisacognitiveerror,seeKelly(2008).Foranapplicationofthatdiscussiontoconspiracytheoriesandechocham-bers,seeNguyen(2018b).17Elgin(2017)defendstheuseofidealizationsandnon-truthsaspartsofthemodelsthathelpustounderstand.However,thechoiceofmodelsisstilldrivenbyanorientationtowardsgettingtheworldright,inamoreholisticway.
20
least,that’showmymothersawit.)Wemanipulators,then,canoptimizeoursystemtooffer
thesenseofeasilymadeconnectionandexplanations.Wecanbuildacartoonofunderstand-
ing.Andthatcartoonwillhaveacompetitiveadvantageinthecognitivemarketplace.Itcan
beengineeredforthesakeofpleasure,anditwillcarrywithitasignalthatinquiryisfinished,
andthatweshouldlookelsewhere.
Twosystemsofcognitiveseduction
Let’slookattwocasestudiesoftheseductionsofclarity:echochambersandinstitutional
quantification.Thefirstcasestudyofechochamberswillstrikemany,Isuspect,asaplausi-
bleandfamiliarcaseoftheseductionsofclarity.Thediscussionofquantificationmayprove
moresurprising.AndIhopethatthedifferencesbetweenthesetwocasestudieswillhelpus
tohoneinonthephenomenon’smoregeneralqualities.
Let’sstartwithechochambers.Mostsocialscientistsandjournalistsusetheterms“echo
chamber”and“epistemicbubble”synonymously.But,asI’veargued,ifwelookattheoriginal
sourcesoftheseterms,wefindtwoverydifferentphenomena.Anepistemicbubbleisaso-
cialphenomenonofsimpleomission.It’sbadconnectionsinyourinformationnetwork–like
ifallyourfriendsonFacebookshareyourpolitics,andyousimplyneverrunacrossthear-
gumentspresentedbytheotherside.Anechochamber,ontheotherhand,isasocialstruc-
turewhichdiscreditsalloutsiders.Whenyouareinabubble,youdon’theartheotherside.
Whenyou’reinanechochamber,youdon’ttrusttheotherside.Echochambersdon’tcutoff
21
linesofcommunicationfromtheoutsideworld;rather,theyisolatetheirmembersbyma-
nipulatingtheirmembers’trust(Nguyen2018b).
Whatmattersforthepresentstudyistheparticularcontentofthesystemsofthought
whichechochambersusetomanipulatetrust.I’mdrawinghereonKathleenJamiesonand
JosephCappella’sempiricalanalysisoftheechochamberaroundRushLimbaughandtheFox
Newsecosystem(JamiesonandCappella2010).AccordingtoJamiesonandCappella,Rush
Limbaughoffersaworld-viewwithsomeverydistinctivefeatures.First,Limbaughpresents
aworldofsharplydividedforceslockedinalife-or-deathstruggle.Therearenoonlookers
orreasonablemoderates.Eitheryou’reaLimbaughfollower—andsoonthesideofright—
oryouareoneofthemalevolentforcesouttounderminethesideofright.Limbaughthen
offersanexplanatorysysteminwhichmostmoralandpoliticalactioncanbeunderstoodin
termsofthatall-consumingstruggle.DisagreementwithLimbaugh’sworldviewcanberead-
ilyexplainedastheproductofsomeorganized,malevolentactiontoblockthesideofright.
Mostimportantly,forourpresentpurposes,theunderminingfunctionandtheexplanatory
functionareoftenaccomplishedwiththehelpofconspiracytheories,whichprovideaready
explanationfordisagreementfromoutsiders.Theliberalmediaisinthegripofanefarious
networkofelites,asareuniversities,andtheacademicsciences.Theseconspiracytheories
offertoexplaincomplexfeaturesoftheworldintermsofasinglecoherentnarrative.
Thisisanobviousdeploymentoftheseductionsofclarity.First,Limbaugh’sworld-view
offersthesensationsofepiphany.Oncehisworld-viewisaccepted,difficult-to-categorizeac-
tionssuddenlybecomeeasilycategorized.Previouslyhard-to-explainfacts—liketheexist-
enceofsubstantivemoraldisagreementbetweenapparentlysincerepeople—suddenlybe-
comeeasilyexplicableintermsofasecretwarbetweengoodandevil.Second,theworld-
22
viewoffers the sensations of cognitive facility. The conspiracy theory offers a ready and
neatlyunifiedexplanationforallsortsofbehavior.Andthoseexplanationsareeasytocreate.
Theworldsuddenlybecomesmoreintellectuallymanageable.This isparticularlyvivid in
someofcommunitiesaroundthewilderconspiracytheories.CNNrecentlyconductedsome
quite telling interviewswithsomemembersof the fast-growingcommunityofFlatEarth
conspiracytheorists.ManytheoristsdescribethesatisfactionsofbeingaFlatEarththeorist
inintermsofcognitivefacility.AsFlatEarththeoristandfilmmakerMarkSargentputsit,
"Youfeellikeyou'vegotabetterhandleonlifeandtheuniverse.It'snowmoremanageable.”
AndFlatEarththeoristDavidWeisssays, “WhenyoufindouttheEarth is flat…thenyou
becomeempowered”(Picheta2019).
Furthermore,well-designedechochamberstypicallyhavesystemsofbeliefwhichcan
reinterpretincomingevidenceinordertoavoidrefutation.Forexample,manyechocham-
bers include sweeping scientific claims, such as denying the existence of climate change.
Echochambermembersmayhaveadoptedbeliefsystemswiththehelpoftheclarityheuris-
tic.But,onemightthink,heuristicsaredefeasible—andcontraryscientificevidenceshould
surelybringmemberstoabandontheirsettledacceptanceoftheirbeliefsystem.However,a
cleverechochambercanpreemptivelydefusesuchcontraryevidence.Awell-designedecho
chambercaninclude,initsbeliefsystem,aconspiracytheoryabouthowthemediaandthe
institutionsofsciencewereentirelycorruptandinthegripofavastmaliciousconspiracy.
Thisexplanationperformsakindofintellectualjudo.AsEndreBegby(2020)pointsout,such
abeliefsystemtransformsapparentlycontraryevidenceintoconfirmationsofthebeliefsys-
tem—aprocesswhichhecalls“evidentialpre-emption”.IfLimbaughpredictsthatthelib-
23
eralmediawillaccusehimoffalsifyinginformation,thenwhenhisfollowershearsuchaccu-
sationsfromtheliberalmedia,theywillhavereasontoincreasetheirtrustinLimbaugh—
sincehispredictionshavebeenfulfilled!Butnoticethatthereisasecondaryeffect,beyond
thesimpleconfirmationBegbydescribes—aneffectthatarisesfromtheseductionsofclar-
ity.Thebeliefsystemmakesiteasytocreateanexplanationforincomingcontraryevidence
andtoprovideexplanationsthatunifyandconnectthateventwithmanyothers.Thispro-
videsanexperienceofcognitivefacility—whichshouldtriggertheclarityheuristic.Thisis
anextremelywell-designedepistemictrap,inwhichcontraryevidencetriggerstwodifferent
defensemechanisms.First,theconspiracytheorypreemptivelypredictsthepresenceofcon-
traryevidence,andsoconfirmsitself intheprocessofdismissingthatcontraryevidence.
Second,theeasewithwhichtheconspiracytheoryperformsthatpredictionanddismissalis
anexperienceofcognitivefacility—whichcreatesthesenseofclarity,which,inturn,trig-
gersthethought-terminatingheuristic.
Suchdefensiveconspiracytheoriesareanobviouscaseoftheseductive,manipulative
useofclarity.Let’snowturntoalessobviouscase.Considertheappealofquantifiedsystems.
Consider,especially,thewayinwhichlarge-scaleinstitutionstrytoreducecomplex,value-
ladenqualitiestosimplemetricsandmeasures.InTrustinNumbers,ahistoryoftheculture
ofquantification,TheodorePorternotesthatquantifiedsystemsarepowerfullyattractive.
Thisiswhy,hesays,politiciansandbureaucratslovetocitetheauthorityofquantifiedsys-
temsofanalysis.Numbers,hesays,smellofscience.Theyhavetheringofobjectivity,andso
theywillbeusedininappropriatecircumstancesinattemptstogainpoliticalcontrol(Porter
1996,8).IthinkPorterisentirelyrightaboutthecredibilityadvantageofnumbersandtheir
scientificfeel—butIdon’tthinkthisisthewholestory.Thedetailsofhisstudyofferusthe
24
opportunitytobuildasecondaccountoftheappealofnumbers,alongsidehiscredibilityac-
count,intermsoftheseductionsofclarity.
Thereare,saysPorter,qualitativewaysofknowingandquantitativewaysofknowing.
Porterisnotheremakingthecrudeclaimthatquantitativewaysofknowingareinherently
bad.Rather,he is interested in therelativeadvantagesanddisadvantagesofeachwayof
knowing.Qualitativewaysofknowing,hesays,aretypicallynuanced,sensitive,andrichin
contextualdetail,buttheyarenotportableoraggregatable.Whenwetransitiontofromqual-
itativetoquantitativewaysofknowing,westripoutmuchofthenuanceandmanyofthe
contextualdetails. Inreturn for this lossof informationalrichness,weget toexpressour
knowledge inneatpackages: in the formof numbers,whosemeanings areportable, and
whichcanbeeasilyaggregatedwithothernumericalresults.Thiscanbeveryvaluable.Ob-
viously,quantificationisvitalformodernscience.Andtherearemanyadministrativefunc-
tionswhichquantificationmakesfarmoreefficient.But,saysPorter,contemporaryculture
seemstohavelostsightofthedistinctivevalueofqualitativewaysofknowing.Wetendto
reachforquantitativewaysofknowingcompulsively,evenwhentheyaren’tmostappropri-
ateforthetaskathand.
InTheSeductionsofQuantification,MerryappliesPorter’sanalysistotherecentriseof
quantifiedmetrics in international governance. She is interested in indicators— simple,
quantifiedrepresentationsofcomplexglobalphenomena.OneindicatoristheUN’sHuman
DevelopmentIndex,whichgivescountriesasinglescorefortheirperformanceinsupporting
thequalityoflifeoftheircitizens.AnotherindicatoristheUSStateDepartment’sTrafficking
inPersonsReports,whichgivescountriesascoreontheirperformanceinreducingsextraf-
25
ficking. Indicatorspresent themselves in the formofa single, easy-to-use,easy-to-under-
standnumericalscore.These indicators,shesays,hidethecomplexityandsubjectivityof
theirmanufacture.And thatconcealment ismuchof thepoint. Theirpower, saysMerry,
comesinsignificantpartfromtheirappearanceofunambiguity.Andoncetheseindicators
havebeenmanufactured,theyinvariablybecomecentralinvariousgovernments’andpoli-
ticians’decision-makingprocesses.Theveryqualitieswhichmakethemsopowerfulalso
makethembluntinstruments,missinginmuchsubtletyanddetail.But,saysMerry,theyare
incrediblyhardtodislodgefromthemindsofthepublicandofpolicy-makers(Merry2016,
1-43,112-60).
Whyarequantificationssosticky?Theseductionsofclarityofferanexplanation.Quanti-
fiedsystemsare,bydesign,highlyusableandeasilymanipulable.Theyprovideapowerful
experienceofcognitivefacility.Itismucheasiertodothingswithgradesandrubricsthanit
iswithqualitativedescriptions.Wecanofferjustifications(“Iaverageditaccordingtothe
syllabus’directives”;“Iappliedtherubric”).Wecangenerategraphsandquantifiedsummar-
ies.And thesenseof facility isevenstronger in large-scale institutions,where theuseof
numbershasbeenstringently regularized.Becauseof theportabilityofnumbersand the
constancy and enforced regularity of typical institutional deliberation procedures, inside
suchinstitutions,itisvastlyeasiertousenumberstoproducepowerfulandeffectivecom-
munications.Andtheyarecommunicationsintermswhichweknowwillbeunderstoodand
actedupon—becausethemeaningsandusesoftheseinstitutionaltermshasbeensoag-
gressivelyregularized.
InauniversityforwhichIonceworked,alldepartmentshadtoproduceyearlyassess-
mentdatawhichwassupposedtodemonstrate,inquantitativeform,thequalityofeducation
26
thatourstudentshadreceived.Ourassessmentsresultshadtobecodedaccordingtocertain
institutionally specifiedEducational LearningOutcomes (ELOs). So, the fact thatour stu-
dentsscoredwellthisyearintheircriticalthinkingmultiplechoicetestsgetscodedanden-
teredintothesystem.Thosescoresnowsupportourclaimthataparticularclasssucceeds
insupportingcertainuniversity-widelearning:theCriticalThinkingELO,theWritingSkills
ELO,theMoralReflectionELOandtheMathematicalReasoningELO.Andthedataforeach
particularclass,inturn,isusedtosupporttheclaimthatourdepartmentasawholesupports
theuniversity-widelearningoutcomes.Andthatclaim,inturn,isusedassupporttheclaim
that theUniversity issucceeding in itsmission,andachieving itsstatedCoreValues: like
Communication,Community,andEngagement.Andthewayinwhichclass,departmental,
anduniversityELO’s linkuparecodedexplicitly intoourdatabasingsystem,sothatnew
datacantravelautomaticallyupthechain.WhenIenterthelatestbatchofscoresfrommy
students,itproducesanimmediateeffectintothesystem:allthereportedELOsupthechain
willchange.AndthisispossiblepreciselybecausethedataI’veenteredhasbeenrendered
portableandbecauseouroutcomesreportingsystemhasbeensetuptoautomaticallytake
advantageofthatportability.
Noticethatallthisgivesmetheexperienceofanenormousamountofapparentlyeffec-
tivecognitiveandcommunicativeactivity.Ihaveasenseofgraspingconnections.Icansee
exactlyhowmyclass’sELOssupportmydepartment’sELOs,whichinturnsupportmycol-
lege’sELOs,which inturnsupporttheuniversity’sELOsand, inturn, theUniversityCore
Values.Andmygraspofthissystemcangivemeacertainsenseofcognitivefacility.Ican
easilygenerateexplanationsofcoursecontentandgenerateevidenceofteachingsuccess.
AndIcanknowthat theywillbeunderstood,since theyhavebeenexpressed in thepre-
27
prepared,standardized,andexplicitlyinterconnectedlanguageoftheinstitution.Iknowthat
myjustificationswillbeincorporatedintolargerinstitutionalaggregates,becausemyjusti-
ficationsoccurinthoseintentionallystabilizedterms.AndIknowthatwhenIgivejustifica-
tionsinthosedesignatedterms,theywillusuallygeneratepre-specifiedsortsofactions—
oneswhichIcanusuallypredictwithsomesuccess.Astabilized,explicitsystemofquantified
andsystemizedinstitutionalvalueisdesignedsothatitsuserscanmakethemselveseasily
understoodandtheirpronouncementsquicklyintegratedintoinstitutionalsystemsofinfor-
mationprocessinganddecision-making. In short,byusing theprovided termsof institu-
tionaldiscourseinsidetheinstitution,myspeechandthinkingwillseemclear,preciselybe-
causetheyfitsowellintoapre-establishednetworkofcommunicationandjustification.That
pre-engineeredfitcreatesasenseofcognitivefacility,withallitsassociatedpleasures.And
the ring of clarity can trigger the thought-terminating heuristic in otherswho have also
boughtintotheprovidedsystemofinstitutionaldiscourse–endinginquiryintotheappar-
entlyclearclaim.
Ofcourse,I’llhavegenuinecognitivefacilityifmyvariousmentaleffortsactuallytrack
realelements intheworldandprocesstheminsomeepistemicallyvaluableway.And,as
CharlesPerrowandPaulDuGayhaveargued,bureaucraciescertainlyneedregularmethods
andquantifiedsystemsinordertofunctionandtoadministratefairly(DuGay2000;Perrow
2014).Theworry,though,isthatwemightsetupsystemsthatareusefulforcertainvery
specificdata-collectionandmanagerialfunction—butthatcanalsoexertamagneticpull
onourthinkinginnearbydomains.Forexample:GPAsandcitationsratesmightbeuseful
forcertainparticulartasksofbureaucraticadministration.But,becausetheyaresoseduc-
tive,studentsandscholarsmaystartusing themas theprimary lens throughwhich they
28
evaluatetheirowneducationandoutput.18AndsurelyGPAsarenotperfectindicatorsofa
goodeducation,andcitationsratesarenotperfectindicatorsofgoodscholarship.Aparticu-
larquantificationcangetanexcessgriponourreasoning,evenincontextswhenitisless
appropriate, by presenting an appealing sense of clarity. And we will fail to investigate
whetherthisquantifiedmetricisthemostappropriateformofevaluationtouse,precisely
becauseitsclarityterminatesourinvestigationsintoitsappropriateness.
Sofar,we’vebeenconcentratingonsystemsofthoughtwhosecontentsthemselvesare
seductivelyclear.Buttheseductionsofclaritycanalsoaffectourjudgmentsoftheexpertise
andauthorityofthesourcesofthosecontents.Theseductionsofclaritycangetustoaccept
asystembymakingitsusersandauthorsseemmorecredibleorexpert,preciselybecause
theyseemmoreclear.Recallthatoneofstandardsignalsofexpertiseiscommunicativefa-
cility.Non-experts trust purported expertswhen those experts are able to communicate
theirunderstanding—whenthepurportedexpertscanexplaintotheiraudiencesthecon-
nectionsbetweennodes,generatejustifications,andthelike.Butconsiderwhathappensto
theappearanceofcommunicativefacilityinsideabureaucratizedsystemofeducationalas-
sessment.Thoseuserswillingtoexpressthemselvesinthedesignatedtermsofthatsystem
haveaconsiderableadvantageindisplayingcommunicativefacility.Theycaneasilygenerate
justifications.Theycaneasilymaketheirreasonsandrequestsunderstoodandactedupon
ininstitutionalsettings.Theywillseemclearbecausetheircommunicationwillbereadily
takenupandactedupon.Theirapparentfacilitywillseemespeciallyimpressivetooutsiders,
whoareoutofcontactwiththesubtlervaluesinvolvedwitheducation.Thisis,obviously,a
18Iofferafullerdiscussionofhowsimplifiedandquantifiedsystemsofvaluecangivetheiradoptersthegame-likepleasuresofvalueclarityinNguyen(2020).
29
formofepistemicinjustice(Fricker2007).Here,itisaformofepistemicinjusticewhichgives
asignificantcredibilityadvantagetoanybodywillingtospeakinthetermsprovidedbybu-
reaucracies and institutions, which provide regularized systems of justification and lan-
guagesofevaluation.Andsincetheabilitytocreateanddisseminatesuchsystemsisusually
heldbythosealreadyinpower,thebureaucratizationoflanguagewilltypicallyservetoam-
plifypowerdifferentialsbygrantingmorecredibilitytothosewhoacceptthosebureaucratic
termsofdiscourse.
ToputitinKristieDotson’sterms,epistemicoppressionoccurswhenagentsaredenied
theopportunitytousesharedepistemicresourcestoparticipateinknowledgeproduction
(Dotson2014).Bureaucraticandinstitutionalizedlanguagecanenableaparticularkindof
epistemicoppression. Ideas thatcanbeeasilyexpressed in the institutional languageare
readilyenteredintothesharedknowledgebase.Butthestandardizationoflanguageputsa
special oppressive power in the hands ofwhoever creates the standardization.Once the
standardizationisinplaceandwidelyaccepted,anybodywhousesitwilldemonstratecog-
nitivefacilityanddemonstratecommunicativefacility.Theywillseemclearpreciselybecause
theyareusinglanguageforwhichasystemofreceptionhasbeenpre-prepared.
Thesenseofclarityisaterminatorforinquiry,andideasexpressedinthatregularized
institutionallanguagewillbearthatsenseofclarity.Soideasexpressedinthatlanguageare
morelikelytobeacceptedwithoutquestion.Informationthatisn’tplacedintoinstitutional
language,ontheotherhand,willtendtobedisappear.Suchrecalcitrantexpressionswillbe
lesslikelytobeaccepted,transmittedandrememberedwithinthesystem.Attheveryleast,
sincetheyseemconfusingratherthanclear,thoserecalcitrantexpressionswillbesubjectto
constantquestioningandinquiry,ratherthanquicklyaccepted.Inastandardizedsystem,
30
non-standardized informationwillbesubject to incredible friction.Thiscreatesa further
competitive disadvantage. By the very fact that such information transmits slowly and
poorly,theinformationanditsauthorswillseemtohavelesscommunicativefacilityandso
seemlesscredible.Thosewhoseideasdon’tfitcomfortablyintotheregularizedinstitutional
languageareatasignificantdisadvantageinparticipatingintheproductionanddissemina-
tionofknowledge.
Nuanceandclosure
Thepointhereisnottoclaimthatquantifiedsystemsandconspiracytheoriesarealways
bad.Scienceandbureaucracyneedquantification,andwecertainlyshouldacceptconspiracy
theorieswhenthereareactuallyconspiracies.19Thepointis,rather,thatthesesortsofideas
andmethodologiesareamongthechoicesttoolsforepistemicsubversion.Aruthlessepis-
temicmanipulator, freed from the constraintsof genuine inquiry, can re-formulate these
sortsofsystemstomaximizetheirpotentialforseductiveness.
Andthisalsooffersusinsightsintounintentionalcognitiveseduction.Bureaucraciesand
institutionshaveverygoodreasontodevelopinternallyconsistentandquantifiedsystems
ofevaluation.Suchsystemsmaketheadministrationofcomplexorganizationspossible.But
insofarassuchsystemsshareasignificantnumberofthetraitsandeffectsasthosesystems
19Thereisaveryusefuldiscussionoftheoccasionalusefulnessofconspiracytheoriesin(Coady2012,110-137;Dentith2018,2019).
31
madeforintentionalmanipulation—andespeciallyinsofarassuchsystemsperpetuatebe-
causeoftheirseductiveeffects—thensuchsystemsalsofunctionasseductivelyclear.
Thissuggestsanotherreasontoresisttheseductionsofclarity.Sometimes,weneedto
dwellinunclearsystemsofthoughtbecausewehavenotyetearnedtherighttoclarity.In
herstudyofmetaphors,ElizabethCamp(2006)suggeststhatmetaphorsaremostappropri-
atewhenwearestillintheprocessofcomingtounderstand.Metaphorsareunclearbyde-
sign.Theyare,saysCamp,aspecialwayofpointingtotheworld.Wedefinesimplenouns
throughsimpler formsofpointing. “Red”wedefineas looking like that.Metaphors letus
pointwitharough,wavinggesture.
Thereasonwemightwanttodoso,saysCamp,isthatsuchpointingletsusaccessthe
richnessoftheworldinourtalk.WhenIsay,“Idon’tunderstandwhat’sgoingonwithRobert
verymuch,buthisneurosisseemsalotlikeLiza’s,”I’mnotusingsomewell-definedabstract
predicatetodescribeRobert.IampointingtoLizaandtoalltherichfeaturesofrealitythat
areboundupwithher.IamsayingthatIdon’tknowwhatitisaboutLizathatmatters,ex-
actly,butit’ssomethingoverthere,where“there”isagestureinthedirectionofalltherich-
nessofLiza’sactualself.Andthissortofvaguegestureisespeciallyuseful,saysCamp,when
wearetryingtograpplewiththingswedonotyetadequatelyunderstand.Withmetaphors,
shesays,wearegesturingvaguelyatparttheworlds.
Intentionallyandopenlyvagueformsofcommunicationareveryimportant.Theyremind
usthatourthinking—ourconcepts,ourinquiries,ourunderstanding—isnotyetfinished.
Clarityiscompelling,butsignalsustoendourinquiries.Seductivelyclearsystemsmaskthe
factthatweshould,infact,beconfused,andshouldbepressingonwithourinquiries.They
32
presentthemselvesasfinalized.Ontheotherhand,metaphorsandtheirkinweartheirun-
finishednessplainlyontheirfaces.Theyarehardtouse,andthatdifficultyremindsusthat
thereismoreworktobedone.Theyleavethebasementdooropen,soweknowthereismore
toexploredownthere.Whenclarityseduces,itcanpreventusfrompushingon,fromfinding
anddwellingonourconfusions.Seductiveclaritypresentsuswithafalsefloorforourinves-
tigationsintotheworld.
Howdoweresisttheseductionsofclarity?Onepossibledefensivestrategyistodevelop
newcounter-heuristics,designedtosniffouttheseductivemanipulationofouroriginalheu-
ristics.Here’saroughanalogy:acertainkindofculinaryyumminesswasonceadecentheu-
risticfornutritiouseating.Butournutritiveenvironmentchanged,especiallywhenvarious
corporateforcesfiguredoutourheuristicsandtendenciesandstartedtoaggressivelygame
them.Inresponse,wehavehadtoadaptourheuristics.Wehaveneededtobecomesuspi-
ciousof toomuchyumminess.Manyofushave already trainedourselves tonoticewhen
thingsarejustalittletoodelicious.Thecrunchy,sweet,saltystuffthathitsusjustso—we
havelearnedtotasteinthemtheengineer’smanipulativetouch.Wehavedevelopedanin-
tuitivefeelfordesignedcraveability.Thisisacounter-heuristic,designedtotriggerinre-
sponsetosignalsthatoutsideforcesaretryingtomanipulateourmoreprimitiveheuristics.
Sweetness,crunchiness,saltiness—ourcounter-heuristicmakesasimmediatelysuspicious
whenwefindtheseinplenty.
Infightingtheseductionsofclarity,weneedtodevelopnewcounter-heuristicsinasim-
ilarkey.Thesenseofclarityissomethinglikecognitivesugar.Onceuponatime,usingour
senseofclarityasasignaltoterminateourinquiriesmighthavebeenagoodandusefulheu-
ristic.Butnowwe live inanenvironmentwherewearesurroundedbyseductiveclarity,
33
muchofitdesignedtoexploitourheuristics.Wenowneedtotrainourselvestobecomesus-
piciousofideasandsystemsthatgodownjustalittletoosweetly—thatarepleasurableand
effortless and explain everything so wonderfully. Systems of thought that feel too clear
shouldmakeusstepupourinvestigativeeffortsinsteadofendingthem.Weneedtolearnto
recognize,byfeel,theseductionsofclarity.20
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