the russia-ukraine conflict identity construction in russian foreign policy

Running head: IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Identity Construction in Russian Foreign Policy

(Carlos Latuff, 2014)

Jim Drew Bailey III

The American University of Rome

International Relations and Global Politics Programme

IAPO 499 International Relations Senior Thesis

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Eszter Salgó

May 2015

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Dedication: This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my mother Victoria Joseph who I miss

everyday and to my father Jim Bailey Jr. who has sacrificed everything to provide me with

the opportunity to succeed in life.

Acknowledgments: I would like to thank all of my professors at The American University of

Rome for sharing their knowledge with me.

Special thanks to my advisor, Professor Eszter Salgó, for her time and guidance during the

drafting process.

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Table of Contents

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………….4

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..5

Methodology…………………………………………………………………………..8

Theoretical Framework………………………………………………………………10

Literature Review…………………………………………………………………….11

Chapter 1: Foundations of Russian Foreign Policy………………………………………19

1.1 Philosophical Foundations of Russian Foreign Policy…………………………...20

1.2 Russian Identity and the Role of the West……………………………………….27

1.3 The Construction of Russian Foreign Policy…………………………………….31

Chapter 2: Ambition and Application of Russian Foreign Policy……………………….33

2.1 Russia’s Current Foreign Policy…………………………………………………34

2.2 Russia’s Foreign Policy Decisions: 2008 Georgia Conflict……………………...35

Chapter 3: Russia-Ukraine Conflict……………………………………………………….37

3.1 Russia-Ukraine Conflict Overview………………………………………………38

3.2 Sources and Implications of Russia Intervention in Ukraine…………………….39

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………...45

References…………………………………………………………………………………...48

Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………….51

2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation……………………...52

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Abstract

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of Crimea has put the

international community on alert over the decision-making and the political ambitions of

Putin's Russia. Drawing from constructivist notions that indicate international relations are

social constructs of identity and the environment, this thesis examines Russian foreign policy

by surveying the philosophical foundations and the internal and external influences that

govern Russia’s decision-making. The main internal forces manifest themselves through the

ideals of Russia’s traditional schools of foreign policy and the construction of Russian

national identity while the external influences originate from Russia’s interactions and

perceptions of the Western World. Ultimately this investigation aims to demonstrate that the

Russia-Ukraine Conflict is a manifestation of these internal and external forces as shaped by

the constructed international community rather than an exhibition of power politics.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Russian foreign policy, constructivism

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Introduction

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In November 2013, the former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych cancelled the

European Association Agreement sparking mass demonstrations against his decision to

forego European cooperation. Existing as a buffer state between Russia and Europe, Ukraine

finds itself trapped between the on-going ideological feud between Russia and the West.

While assuredly there are other aspects of Yanukovych’s refusal of European alignment, the

current entanglement in Ukraine is clearly the most recent exhibition of this political divide.

As a result, the West has become apprehensive about Russia's intervention in Eastern Ukraine

and the subsequent annexation of Crimea. This apprehension is further exacerbated by

Russia’s combative stance against international sanctions, a damaged credit rating, and

widespread condemnation, which provokes the question, what is Russian foreign policy and

what influences its construction? Addressing this question will provide the reasoning as to

why Putin’s Russia is disregarding its precarious reputation and economic security to fight so

defiantly for a portion of Ukraine’s rust belt. Through a comprehensive analysis of Russian

foreign policy, this investigation considers the philosophical foundations as well as the

internal and external forces that govern Russian decision-making. The relevant internal forces

include the sources of Russian identity, and the external forces consider the role of the

Western World in Russian foreign policy. The aim of this investigation is to determine if

Russian intervention in Ukraine is an indication of new behaviour in Russian foreign policy

or the continuation of embedded ideals that reflect Russian identity and perceptions of the

Western World.

This thesis contains three chapters with sub-sections and a conclusion. The first

chapter carefully surveys the foundations of Russian foreign policy and is separated into three

sections. The first section provides a philosophical overview of the foundations of Russian

foreign policy by examining the three traditional schools of thought that influence Russia’s

decision-making. The second section discusses the implications of Russian identity and the

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influence of the Western World on Russian foreign policy. The final section of Chapter 1

discusses the formation of Russian foreign policy, as well as the features that have either

changed or endured throughout history. Through the analysis of the philosophical foundations

of Russian foreign policy, as well as the internal and external forces of influence, this chapter

provides the underlying framework and historical implications of Russian decision-making.

The second chapter presents the declared socio-political ambitions and application of

Russian foreign policy within the international community. This chapter contains two sub-

sections. The first section analyses the objectives and implications of Russia’s 2013 Concept

of Foreign Policy and the following section explores the implementation of Russian foreign

policy through the case example of the 2008 Georgia Conflict.

The final chapter of discussion surveys the Russian-Ukraine Conflict, specifically

looking at the motivations and implications of Russia’s involvement. This chapter examines

the link between the philosophical foundations, Russian identity, and Western influences to

the on-going Russia-Ukraine Conflict. The chapter consists of two sections. The first

provides an overview of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict within the context of Russian foreign

policy and the second addresses the causes and motivating factors for Russian involvement

through the consideration of the internal and external influences on said policy.

In contemporary international relations, Russia appears to be conducting itself in an

unpredictable manner that features the notions of realism and power politics; however, this

thesis claims that Russia’s foreign policy is a historical and social construct of the changes

and continuity in Russian identity. This argument suggests that Russia’s decision-making is a

reflection of the state’s unique identity, an identity that has been shaped by the internal

ideological foundations and external influences from the West. The Russia-Ukraine Conflict

endures as merely the latest exhibition of Russia’s constructed identity in practice. This thesis

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concludes by restating the research questions followed by a concise exposition of the

investigation’s results.

Methodology

The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the Russia-Ukraine Conflict is a

manifestation of a new direction in Russian foreign policy or the logical continuation of an

entrenched ideology. This investigation utilizes a qualitative methodology with a

constructivist approach. In this case, qualitative research denotes the historical observation of

Russia within the context of the international community in order to understand or interpret

the ‘why’ and ‘how’ behind Russian decision-making. This qualitative research employs a

constructivist approach to a grounded theory research design that will seek to generate an

explanation of a process, action, or interaction shaped by the views of a large number of

participants (Creswell, 2006). Constructivism in international relations universally converges

on the belief that the world order is a construct of inter-subjective and collectively significant

structures and developments. For this investigation, the focus of constructivist analysis has

shifted towards the formation of Russian identity and its impact on Russian foreign policy.

Data collection will include the compilation of, both, primary and secondary data. The

primary data comprises of official policy documents and speeches given by Russian leaders.

The secondary data includes analyses of the ideological foundations of Russian foreign

policy, changes and continuity in Russian identity, and the sources and implications of the

state’s decision-making. A case example of Russian foreign policy in action accompanies this

data in order to form connections between the research and actuality. These connections can

then be used to answer the research questions and further support the thesis. The research

questions are as followed;

1) What are the main characteristics of Russian foreign policy?

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2) What are the philosophical foundations of Russian foreign policy and their

effects on Russian identity?

3) How has Western influence facilitated the construction of Russian identity

and the formulation of Russian foreign policy?

The initial step of this investigation requires the collection of relevant data on the

philosophical foundations of Russian foreign policy. This data serves as the basis for

identifying which aspects have endured or changed over time. The sources of this information

are compiled primarily from Andrei P. Tsygankov’s book Russia Foreign Policy Change and

Continuity in National Identity with additional viewpoints from Ray Taras’ Russia's Identity

in International Relations: Images, Perceptions, Misperceptions and the Rand Report on

Russian Foreign Policy Sources and Implications. These sources also contain relevant

analyses regarding Russian identity and perceptions of the West, which forms the basis of

discussion in sections 1.2 and 1.3.

In collaboration with the first chapter’s comprehensive overview of Russian foreign

policy, which includes the ideological foundations as well as the internal and external

influences, the next step in the investigation explores Russia’s officially declared foreign

policy and examples of that policy in practice. This is completed through the analysis of the

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian

Federation, as well as, Russia's decisions and implications within the international

community since the fall of the Soviet Union. This analysis provides the content for Chapter

2 while also revealing patterns in Russian decision-making. Ultimately this chapter illustrates

how the unique ideological foundations and identity highlighted in Chapter 1 are visible

through Russia’s actions within the international community.

The final Chapter of discussion scrutinizes the on-going Russia-Ukraine Conflict with

a constructivist approach. This chapter begins with an overview of the conflict to

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contextualize it within previous applications of Russian foreign policy as investigated in

Chapter 2. Subsequently, the sources and implications of the conflict are then considered, in

regards to the discussion in Chapter 1, for the purpose of determining how the changes and

continuity in Russia’s identity have ultimately governed the state’s decision-making.

Research on the overlying topic of Russian foreign policy is wide-ranging and

encompasses many schools of thought. Therefore, this investigation narrows the research to

the subtopic of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict while employing a constructivist approach to the

sources and implications of Russian decision-making after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Russian foreign policy and the current Russia-Ukraine Conflict remain a relevant topic for

research, as the desire to understand Russia’s decision-making and ambitions are at a

premium in the international community.

Theoretical Framework

This thesis employs a constructivist approach to the investigation of Russian foreign

policy and affirms that the inherent characteristics of international relations are constructed

socially through the interaction of states and their environment. The common ground for

constructivist thought in international relations converges on an ontology that depicts "the

social world as intersubjectively and collectively meaningful structures and processes where

material resources only acquire meaning for actions through the structure of shared

knowledge in which they are embedded" (Carlsnaes, Risse, Simmons, 2012, p.121). This

common ground implies that the international community composes of states that each have

individual understandings of their own and each other’s interests. Furthermore, the literature

on the norms of constructivist research is based on the idea that identity dictates the interests

of states. For example, “states face security choices and act upon them, not only in the

context of their physical capabilities but also on the basis of normative understandings”

(Carlsnaes et al., 2012, p.126). This idea challenges the notions of realist thought, in which

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the structure of the international system is prioritized at the expense of history. Realism

suggests that international relations are the reflection of power politics and balance of power

imperatives while constructivism incorporates the realist notion and further argues the

significance of identity and subjective norms. Ultimately this theoretical framework will

provide the foundation for this thesis to demonstrate that the Russia-Ukraine Conflict is the

result of Russia’s uniquely constructed identity due to its ideological roots and interactions

with the Western World rather than simply being an act of power politics. The constructivist

approach is the most appropriate theoretical framework for this investigation as it observes

international relations in three main ways, that is, in terms of the role actors and

bureaucracies play in shaping foreign policy, the process of decision-making, and the effect

of international system or society on the conduct of foreign policy by states (Behravesh,

2011). In regards to the topic of Russian foreign policy, a constructivist approach minimizes

the significance of military power or material possessions and instead focuses on the social

implications. While some Constructivists would accept that States are self-interested, rational

actors, they would stress that varying identities and beliefs belie the simplistic notions of

rationality under which States pursue simply survival, power, or wealth (Slaughter, 2011).

Literature Review

There is an abundance of literature on the topic of Russian foreign policy; however,

this thesis will focus on Russian foreign policy within the context of the Russia-Ukraine

Conflict by examining the philosophical foundations of Russian foreign policy, as well as the

formation of Russian identity. It should be noted that much of the literature overlaps as it is

focused on the same period of post-Soviet Russia and the historical analyses of the internal

and external influences that govern the State’s decision-making. This literature review

separates the relevant sources into two groups: foreign policy foundations and Russian

identity, and foreign policy decisions and implications.

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Foreign Policy Foundations and Russian Identity

Andrei P. Tsygankov’s Russia’s Foreign Policy Changes and Continuity in National

Identity (2013) provides this investigation with three traditional schools of thought in Russian

foreign policy: Westernism, Statism, and Civilizationism. Furthermore, this book explores the

development of Russian national interests and identity as the state transitioned between these

traditional schools of thought. Tsygankov claims that the Westernist school of thought

accentuated Russian similarities to the Western World while furthermore suggesting its

civilizational superiority. This claim implies the support for Western tenets of constitutional

liberties and equality. He further argues that Soviet-era Westernists believed Russia to be in

accordance with many of the social democratic norms of European society. The Statist school

of thought places importance on Russia’s aptitude to manage and uphold internal socio-

political structures. Tsygankov argues that this school of thought is the most influential of the

foundations of Russia’s foreign policy and that the notions of independence, power, and

stability take precedence over freedoms. Tsygankov further dictates that Statists are not

innately against Western ideals but rather desire acknowledgment through the means of a

powerful military or economic success. Political initiatives that were beneficial to

consolidating state power coincided with Statist ideals, which further suggests, as the leaders

of Russia changed so did their actions and interpretations of what empowers the state. The

Civilizationist school of thought suggests that Russia’s norms and beliefs are inherently

different from those of the Western World. Tsygankov claims Civilizationists are

continuously promoting the Russian norms and beliefs internationally. This argument

includes the notions of a Russian Empire and the movement of Slavophilism. Russian

Civilizationists fervently strived for expansion and during the Soviet Era and challenged the

Western World directly. “Born out of the agony of two Europes, Soviet Russia saw itself as

superior to the decadent and rotten Western capitalist civilization” (Tsygankov, 2013, p.8).

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This book also looks at Soviet and Russian international relations by comparing the

differences in foreign policy under Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin.

This comparison aids the thesis by providing a basis for understanding the changes and

continuity in Russia’s foreign policy from the Cold War to contemporary Russia. This source

also implies that global instability has led Russia to strive for a new political direction, which

in regards to this investigation is very relevant when analysing Russia's present-day

behaviour and the conflict in Ukraine. Tsygankov further argues that the notions of national

interest are contingent on the national identity and that identity is born from a combination of

history and domestic politics.

In Elena Morenkova Perrier’s The Key Principles of Russian Strategic Thinking

(2015) report, Russian foundations of strategic thinking as well as the main schools of

thought are contextualized within the modern debate on Russian decision-making. Perrier

highlights the main schools of thought as the sovereign democracy doctrine, Neo-

Eurasianism, and Westernism in regards to the foundations of Russian foreign policy. She

further argues that the sovereign democracy theory was the first ideological movement that

structured Russian strategic thinking during a conservatism revival following the year 2000.

This doctrine indicates the desire for Russian independence from participation within the

international community. Essentially this implies the traditional notion of neither an Eastern

nor Western Russia but instead a unique Russian state between both. In regards to Neo-

Eurasianism, Perrier states this ideological trend is based on three key affirmations: 1)

Russian History is unique, and her experience renders Western models inapplicable. 2)

Russia’s destiny is to remain faithful to her Eurasian roots and to reject an imitation of

Western models. 3) The development of Russia can be explained by external factors: climate,

geographic position, and geopolitical situation. Eurasianism is similar to Slavophilism due to

the idea of a unique Russian path for development. Lastly marginalised Westernism

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according to Perrier was the dominant ideological trend in the first half of the 1990’s that

eventually phased out of Russia by the year 2000. This school of thought included

intellectuals and academics that viewed collaboration with the Western World as beneficial

for Russia.

Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (2009) by Jefferey

Mankoff, updates and examines the progression of Russian foreign policy, in the aftermath of

the cold war, by repositioning its development within the broader context of Russia’s political

and ideological history. This book provides this thesis with an account of Russia's foreign

policy that considers the identity of the state, as well as its formation and evolution through

history. Mankoff argues that behind Russia’s tough rhetoric within the international

community is the deeply rooted ambition to identify itself and restore the state’s major power

status rather than directly acting to challenge the Western World. Mankoff labels this

ambition as a foreign policy reawakening (Mankoff, 2009, p.293). It is worth remembering

that Russia never existed as a self-contained national state but rather one that lacked natural

frontiers and ethnic unity (Mankoff, 2009, p.294). As a result of this, the establishment of a

foreign policy has been strategically planned since the fall of the Soviet Union. Mankoff

supports this argument by examining these notions through the scope of the 2008 Georgia

Conflict. “The conflict highlighted Russia’s resurgence as a major power, at least in its own

region, capable of employing overwhelming force to protect its perceived interests even in

the face of international condemnation, and cemented Russia’s identity as a state outside the

confines of the collective known as the West” (Mankoff, 2009, p.293). Furthermore, this

source provides valuable insight into the goals and ambitions of post-Soviet Russian Leaders.

Foreign Policy Decisions and Implications

Putin again: Implications for Russia and the West (2012), a Chatham House report,

examines Russia’s economy and policy decisions for the purpose of projecting the state’s

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behaviour in the aftermath of the 2012 Russian elections. This report provides this thesis a

detailed look into Putin’s instruments of government and through retrospect, a Western

perspective of Russia’s political ideology and direction in the years prior to the Russia-

Ukraine Conflict. This report also recommends a set of principles that European and United

States leaders should base their relationship with Russia. These recommendations prove

useful when examining the role that Western countries may have had in the eventual outbreak

of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. The aforementioned principles are: help Russia by integrating

them into the liberal world system, refusal to accept the premise that Russia has special rights

over former Soviet states, hold Russia accountable for its promises, collaborate with the

European Union to better understand Russia’s bilateral relations, persist in the applying the

Third Energy Package, take Russia’s view of the world into account, and lastly encourage

Russian compliance with Western standards regarding private interests.

Marcel van Herpen’s book, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism

(2014), analyses various Russian conflicts. This investigation utilizes the analyses of two

recent Russian conflicts; the 2nd Chechen War and the 2008 Georgia Conflict. Van Herpen

employs a historical perspective derived from original Russian sources for the purpose of

exhibiting how Vladimir Putin’s Russia legitimized and consolidated itself through the means

of the previously mentioned conflicts while simultaneously fighting a domestic ‘Internal

War’. This source provides the relevant organizational dynamics of Putin’s Russia in addition

to being credited with accurately predicting the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Van Herpen

explores the role of empire building in Russian history and compares it to present-day empire

building in Western Europe and how the legitimization of such activities differs for the

respective sides.

In Alexander Lukin’s “What the Kremlin is Thinking” (2014), Lukin investigates

Russia’s desired political direction in the aftermath of the Cold War. Lukin claims that the

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Russia-Ukraine Conflict is a direct consequence of the West’s effort to assimilate Russia into

the norms and values of the Western World. "It remains hard to say whether a different

approach to the post-Soviet states would have produced a better result for the West. What is

obvious is that the course Clinton and Bush took empowered those Russians who wanted

Moscow to reject the Western system and instead become an independent, competing centre

of power in the new multipolar world” (Lukin, 2014). Lukin argues that this attempt of

assimilation forced Russia’s hand to react against being encircled by ideas that do not match

their own, thus fostering the collision course that ultimately collided in Ukraine. This source

provides a valuable point of view of Russia’s political state of mind and desires in relation to

the opposing containment practices of the West.

John J. Mearsheimer’s “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault” (2014) presents

the assertion that Russia’s desire to resuscitate the Soviet Empire is a fearful misconception

from the West. Mearsheimer argues that Russia’s recent aggression and defiance in the

international community can be attributed to The United States and its European Allies for

their roles in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) enlargement and its

coinciding efforts to move Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of influence. In the aftermath of

these initiatives from the West, Mearsheimer further claims that Russia’s actions in Ukraine

should not have been a surprise, due to its perception as a direct threat to Russian ambitions.

Possible solutions to the on-going Russia-Ukraine Conflict and future conflicts are suggested

on the grounds that The United States and Western World should stop its efforts to

Westernize countries within Russia’s sphere of influence and instead respect the buffer states

between the separate parties.

The New Russian Foreign Policy Concept: Evolving Continuity (2013), a Chatham

House report by Andrew Monaghan, investigates the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’

new Foreign Policy Concept revealed in 2013. This report is incredibly relevant as it is the

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self-proclaimed foreign policy direction of Russia in the year prior to Russia’s involvement in

Ukraine. Monaghan further validates the relevance of his report and investigation by claiming

the lack of attention from The United States and Western Europe upon the Russian Foreign

Policy Concept’s release. He argues that Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept can provide

significant insight on Russia’s stance on the many changes within the international

community since 2008. By utilizing Russia’s vantage point, the concept could serve the

purpose of understanding Russian ambitions more clearly. Monaghan’s report argues that

there are flaws within the Russian Foreign Policy Concept but maintains Russia’s intent to re-

establish itself as an international power and to not be surprised to see the state acting more

prominently within the international community through the promotion of its interests and

employing traditional hard power to safeguard and assert those interests.

“The Sources of Russian Conduct” (2014) by Alexander Motyl references George F.

Kennan’s “X” article, regarding the Western World’s necessity to contain Russia, for the

purpose of reiterating Kennan’s past arguments as contemporarily relevant. Kennan's

argument states that Russia’s political identity is a by-product of ideology and environmental

circumstances. Motyl suggests that Kennan's claim implies that Russia’s contemporary

actions in Ukraine are a result of the international community and the political ideals and

initiatives of Putin (Motyl, 2014). Motyl further argues that in order to combat Russian

actions and future aggression, a long-term policy is the answer. This includes having

strategies in the form of Russian containment, such as restricting Russia’s capability of using

energy as a political weapon as this exists as an important factor in the Russia-Ukraine

Conflict. This source further provides this thesis with a Western viewpoint on Russian

motivations while also highlighting the notions and practice of Russian containment.

Russian Foreign Policy Sources and Implications (2009), a RAND Corporation report

led by Olga Oliker, comprehensively evaluates Russia’s strategic interests both domestically

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and internationally in addition to the causes that influence Russian foreign policy. In

collaboration with the United States Air Force’s Strategy and Doctrine Program, this

investigation is carried out for the purpose of providing a plan of action for US policy choices

regarding Russia. This report provides this thesis with an American vantage point on a wide

range of aspects regarding Russia and their initiatives. Ultimately the report recommends a

strategy that resembles a containment policy of Russia. This approach is evident in the

chapter "Managing Discord" which suggests letting the European Union directly deal with

Russia while maintaining amicable relations with states within Russia's sphere of influence.

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Chapter 1: Foundations of

Russian Foreign Policy

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1.1 Philosophical Foundations Russian Foreign Policy

To understand the present-day relations between Russia and the international

community, the foundation of what governs the Eurasian state’s decision-making requires the

examination of its ideological origins. Due to the state’s enormous size and geographic

positioning, Russia has continuously throughout history been faced with security threats and

an unstable internal environment. These difficulties, which included threats of invasion and

the preservation of the ruling authority’s legitimacy, fostered the development of three

separate yet traditional foreign policy ideologies; Westernist, Statist, and Civilizationist.

“Throughout centuries, Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists sought to present Russia’s

international choices in ways consistent with the schools’ historically established images of

the country and the outside world” (Tsygankov, 2013, p.4).

The Westernist school of thought accentuates Russia’s parallels with the Western

World. In this mindset, Russia would see itself conform to Western ideals by embodying the

European civilization’s archetype, as they were perceived to be the most enlightened. This

first instance of Westernist thought in Russia can be linked to Peter the Great and his

observable admiration for the West’s – at that time consisting of only Europe – technology

and political intrigues. Peter the Great’s affinity to Westernist notions are apparent through

his annexation of a significant portion of the Baltic Coast, effectively opening Russia’s door

to Europe and establishing the state on the European scene. As Russia interacted within the

European community, the appropriation of Western technologies and norms became the

foundation for change in Russia’s political values. The traditional nature of European-

Russian relations and policy at that time was non-existent, as Russia had no interest in

Western proceedings until the middle of the eighteenth century. This change brought about a

period of political reform under Alexander II that saw Russia adhere to the Western ideals of

constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is the idea, often associated with the political theories of

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John Locke, where governments have limited powers and are dependent on the observation of

these limitations for legitimacy (Waluchow, 2001). This adherence manifested itself in

Russia’s decision to remain involved in the First World War as an active participant in the

Allied efforts to stop Germany’s military coalition. Despite the fact that the war had

fundamentally crippled the state, Russia continued the fight in a display of European

fellowship. However, the economic and societal expenses of remaining in the Great War

ultimately pushed Russia to revolution and fostered the subsequent birth of the Soviet Union.

Westernism remained dormant under several decades of Soviet politics that elicited a

different relationship with the West, which centered on the Marxist notions of class conflict.

In the waning years of the Soviet Union, Westernist thought resurfaced under the Perestroika

movement, which called for the restructuring of the Soviet Union’s governing Communist

Party. This political movement essentially became the beginning of the end for the Soviet

Union. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the last president of the Soviet Union, foreign policy

became directed at the concepts of mutual security agreements, “a series of revolutionary

arms-control agreements with the United States, as well as over the Soviet military

withdrawals from Europe and the third world. By introducing the idea of ‘common European

home,’ Gorbachev meant to achieve Russian-European integration based on the principles of

European social democracy” (Tsygankov, 2013, p.5). The ‘common European home’ concept

is best defined in former President Gorbachev’s 1987 speech in Prague, Czechoslovakia

when he declared:

We assign an overriding significance to the European course of our foreign

policy.... We are resolutely against the division of the continent into military

blocs facing each other, against the accumulation of military arsenals in

Europe, against everything that is the source of the threat of war. In the spirit

of the new thinking we introduced the idea of the "all-European house"...

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[which] signifies, above all, the acknowledgment of a certain integral whole,

although the states in question belong to different social systems and are

members of opposing military-political blocs standing against each other. This

term includes both current problems and real possibilities for their solution.

(Svec, 1988)

During this time, Westernizers viewed Russia as a provisional supporter of the social

democratic mind-set of the West. As a result of this, the Westernist school of thought became

one of the prevailing philosophical movements of the early 1990’s. After the fall of the Soviet

Union, Westernist ideals called for Russia and the West to cooperate on the shared principles

of universal human rights, competitive economy, and democracy while also implying the

avoidance of relations with ex-Soviet states. The Westernist ideology saw integration with

the Western World as the best possible solution to the political and economic complications

that arose from the Soviet Union’s collapse. This discourse would clash with the opposing

anti-Westernist camp throughout the 1990’s which affirmed ‘The West is the inimical other.’

According to this view by anti-Westernists, “the West strives to impose its system of values

on Russia in order to weaken it” (Taras, 2012, p.77). As a polar opposite position to the West,

anti-Westernism focused on similar aspects of the Western World but with negative

implications. This viewpoint saw the West as a primarily exploitative presence. Upon

Vladimir Putin’s first Presidential election in 2000, Putin employed a balanced approach to

the West equating it to a competitive partner. Putin accentuated competition within the

international community and that pursuing economic interests is the natural path for Russia.

This approach coincides with Westernist thought as the West conducts itself in a similar

matter when pursuing its interests. However the 2000’s would see Putin become increasingly

frustrated with the West due to its influence within the international community. Westernist

thought would again take a back seat until the years 2008 and 2012 when Russia experienced

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a political turning point under Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev presented the state with the

initiative to modernize through the employment of organizational changes for the purpose of

pushing Russia into line with the Western model. This initiative is visible in the Moscow-

based Institute of Contemporary Development (Gontmakher et al., 2011) report; Attaining the

Future Strategy 2012, which reveals the proposals of the liberal Westernist faction

responsible to Russia’s then President, Medvedev. The aforementioned report discloses, “The

change in values (the deconsecration of the State and development of individualism) must be

accompanied by global changes in institutions, democratization, and the establishment of a

state based on the rule of law. Furthermore, innovation in the economy and, in particular, its

diversification are presented as the only way to face the challenges of the Twenty-First

Century” (Perrier, 2014, p.33). Traditionally, these changes in values and democratic

engagements are features of Westernist thought that suggests Russia will follow the model

and direction of the west. This ideological trend would fade by the end of the decade, but

certain influences within the philosophy would have continuity, such as international

collaboration and globalization, which are still evident in contemporary Russia’s political

behaviour.

Following the expiration of the Soviet Union, the necessity for Russia to select a

sociopolitical direction was crucial. Initially, the above-mentioned Westernist school of

thought took precedence in Russian politics but by the mid-1990’s the political challenges

that the state was facing were piling up. These changes forced Russia to reconsider the state’s

foreign policy, which ultimately reintroduced Statism into Russian politics. Statism

emphasizes the government’s capacity to control all aspects of a state’s socio-political

structure. Statism further implies the preference of state sovereignty and stability instead of

individual liberty and democracy. According to Tsygankov, the notion of external threats to

Russia’s security have developed a psychological complex of insecurity and a readiness to

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sacrifice everything for independence and sovereignty (Tsygankov, 2013, p.6). This is largely

due to Russia’s extensive history of external conflicts and desire to not allow such events to

repeat themselves. Statism became the opposition to the Westernist movement but did not

characteristically signify anti-Westernist ideals. For Russia, the Statist school of thought

desired acknowledgment from the West through the development of a strong military and

economic prowess. The first instance of Statist thought in Russian foreign policy coincides

with that of Westernist thought and is correspondingly linked back to Peter the Great. While

Westernist thought focused on the similarities and European characteristics of Russia, Statists

emphasized the military capabilities of the state. During the existence of the Soviet Union,

the Statists school of thought focused on providing the ruling Communist Party with the

power to dictate the sociopolitical system in an effort to prevent influence from the West.

Within Soviet governance, Statists remained cautious of any non-Communist political

activity and openly resisted the previously mentioned reforms brought about by Gorbachev.

In regards to foreign policy, the camps of Statist thought within the Soviet Union were

divided with some supporting partial integration with the Western World and the remaining

Statists believing in a more balanced approach to international relations. Before Stalin had

eradicated the Russian Ministry of Jewish people, the People’s Commissar for Foreign

Affairs Maksim Litvinov was a strong advocate for collective security. Collective security

implies the avoidance of power blocs within the international community and the

marginalization of those not included in those blocs. For Russia, this denotes that the state

could act as is its proprietor without the necessity to compromise its sovereignty, which

coincides with Statist ideals in preserving the power of the state. The other faction of Statists

supports the notion of balancing potential threats against each other. This notion itself

through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, more commonly called the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The

Nazi-Soviet Pact was an agreement of non-aggression between Hitler’s Nazi Germany and

24


Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union with the intent from the Russian side to detach the state from

World War II. By counteracting Western ideals with those of Nazi Germany, Statists believed

they could minimize external threats. All Statists shared the collective goal of maintaining

Russia’s independence within the international community and keeping the ruling

Communist Party in power, but these notions would disappear with the dissolution of the

Soviet Union. Post-Soviet Statism saw the end of the one-party state and instead shifted its

focus to the significance of democracy and a healthy free-market economy. This new focus

maintained its connection with the traditional philosophy of a strong state in order to counter

any and all external threats. There are two distinct strategies in post-Soviet Statist thought,

and these strategies are discernable through Yevgeny Primakov and Putin’s policies. In-line

with Statist thought, both Putin and Primakov looked to restore Russia as a world power.

Primakov elected to control large corporations while Putin took this initiative a step further in

his governing of all aspects of the socio-political system. Where the two leaders differentiated

was in their respective foreign policies. Primakov desired to reconstruct the Soviet Union and

oppose the West through containment agreements with India and China. Putin’s approach to a

foreign policy focused on the relationships with Russia’s neighboring countries, as well as

collaborating with Western countries to curb terrorism.

Lastly, the Civilizationist school of thought focuses on the relationship of cultural and

religious identity rather than the more traditional foreign policy themes of economics and

politics. In the international community, this signifies that each respective state remains

within its sphere of influence and does not interfere with the cultural jurisdiction of others.

This school of thought insinuates that the so-called universal view of humanity, democracy,

and separation of church and state are simply concepts that are exclusively pertinent to the

Western World and irrelevant in differentiating spheres of influence. Civilizationists view

Russia as the natural opposition to the Western World and maintain that Russian values are

25


inherently distinctive from Western norms. In regards to Civilizationist foreign policy, the

first manifestations can be traced to Ivan IV and his conquests for land that saw Russia

transform into a religiously and ethnically diverse state. This transformation coincided with

the original Civilizationist initiatives for expansion and the pursuit of a Russian empire.

Civilizationist school of thought was aware of the Western-centric international community

and, as a result, supported the idea of Russia spreading its borders as far as possible to create

a unified cultural identity under the characteristics of Pan-Slavism. In the socialist faction of

Civilizationist thought, competition with the West became a central part of the ideology. This

became evident in Leon Trotsky’s concept of permanent revolution, which suggested that

socialist revolutions could arise in states that had yet to realize capitalism. This idea would

remain legitimate within the Soviet political apparatus until 1921 when Vladimir Lenin

elected to share the international community with the states that practice capitalism. Another

faction of Civilizationist thought called Eurasianists considered Russia to be an ever-

expanding empire in close competition with the growth and containment from the West, most

notably with the United States. Soviet Russia believed itself to be of a higher-class than the

rest of the international community and vindicated their foreign policy of territorial expansion

by challenging the West in a direct fashion with the belief that Russia was a Eurasian power

that existed in-between the Eastern and Western civilizations and posses its own sphere of

influence (Kasymov, 2012, p.61). In regards to post-Soviet Civilizationism, it remains to be

seen how Russia's political behavior will take shape (Tsygankov, 2013, p.8).

Russia has endured many different regimes and ideologies throughout its history that

are fundamentally different. The present-day Russia that has forced itself back into the

forefront of the international community is virtually unrecognizable compared to the Soviet

state of the 1900’s. Today’s Russia is a legitimate foreign policy adversary to the United

States and a growing sphere of influence in between Europe and Central Asia. Russia’s

26


current foreign policy is focused on bolstering Russia’s prestige, supporting economic

recovery and growth, and more effectively demonstrating power to keep Russia secure and

able to pursue its policy goals (Oliker, Crane, Schwartz, Yusupov, 2009, p.xv). Although this

current shape of Russian foreign policy is unique, the leaders of the various regimes in

Russia’s history were all faced with significant challenges initiated by the Western World.

The differences remained in the selected approach to those challenges.

In regards to the topic at hand, Putin’s Russia, within the context of philosophical

foundations, has adopted a unique vision of national interest, which balances Russia’s great

power status with the need to cultivate special relationships with the Western World. This

concept places Putin within the Liberal Statist school of thought, which stresses the

importance of the Western ideals of democracy and free-market economy while

simultaneously maintaining traditional Russian values of a strong state. Russian Liberal

Statists argue that liberal values should be established to strengthen, not weaken, the state as

Russia continues to be exposed to many external threats and must remain a great power

capable of responding to those threats anywhere in the world (Tsygankov, 2013, p.8).

1.2 Russian Identity and the Role of the West

With the foundations and history of Russian foreign policy highlighted, this section

addresses the internal and external influences that govern its formation. Although there are

many, the primary sources of influence stem from the development of Russian identity and

the Western World. Within a constructivist approach, identity remains a fundamental aspect

of international relations, as each nation’s identity establishes their role within the

international community. This is due to the constructivist notion that in order for a nation to

make decisions based upon their interests, that nation must have an understanding of their

role within the international community and how the pursuit of their interests will affect that

community. “By interacting with other members of international society, nations develop

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affiliations, attachments, and ultimately their own identities” (Tsygankov, 2013, p.15). In

regards to Russia, the combination of influence from the West and the fluctuation of internal

ideologies have constructed a unique Russian identity in international politics. The West has

also undergone ideological changes throughout Russian history, but the aspect that makes the

above-mentioned theme unifiable is the fact that the Western World has always been present

to affect Russia’s decision-making when interacting with the international community. The

relationship between Russia and the West has seen alternating periods of alignment and

divergence throughout history. This is due to “many Russian leaders, as well as a significant

proportion of the Russian public, seeing themselves and their country as European” in

addition to a differing faction that argues that “Russia should look more, or at least equally

toward the East (Oliker, Crane, Schwartz, Yusupov, 2009, p.105). Culturally and historically

Russia has undeniable connections to Europe and the Western World. Russian perception of

Western Europe can be broken down into three separate scopes. The first of which being, as

briefly highlighted in the previous section, Western Europe provided Russia with an

enlightened society to admire and seek to emulate. This model society comprised of

democracy, representative government, and constitutionalism. Contemporary Russia may be

a long (and widening) way from this ideal, but this vision of Europe, and of Russia as

European in this way, has always appealed to the progressive and liberal elements of Russian

society as a goal for their own country (Stent, 2007). However, this notion of the West being

a model society is rejected under Putin’s leadership, as it is perceived to be counterproductive

to Russian interests due to the competitive nature of their relationship with the United States.

Secondly, Russia also understood Western society as a model for economic development.

This notion provided the framework for a Russian alternative for economic progress and

modernization, but it would not have been possible without the influence derived from the

Western model. Lastly, Russian interaction with Western States is almost exclusively

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bilateral and for the sole purpose of advancing national security and achieving economic

objectives. With these perspectives of the West in mind, the discussion on what influences

Russian foreign policy is externally underlined as Russia’s perception of its international

neighbors and internally how Russia identifies itself within the international community.

The United States, as part of the Western World, maintains diplomatic relations with

Russia; however the political ambitions of America often clash with Russian interests. This

conflict of interest is evident in both Russian and United States foreign policy. In the

aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks of 2001, The United States under George W.

Bush opted for a unilateral approach to international relations. Although the terror attack had

led to a temporary improvement in United States-Russia relations, America’s new ambitions

were undergoing an aggressive transformation, which ultimately resurfaced tensions with

Russia. This transformation is evident in America’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic

Missile Treaty in 2002 for the purpose of installing a missile defense system in Eastern

Europe and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These actions taken by the United States are

perceivable intrusions into Russia’s sphere of influence as well as threats to Russian security.

At the 20th Russia-European Union Summit, Putin’s confirms this position when asked if

Russia would respond positively to the United States initiative for missile defense in Europe:

“I recall how things went in a similar situation in the mid 1960s. Similar

actions by the Soviet Union, when it put rockets in Cuba, precipitated the

Cuban Missile Crisis. For us the technological aspects of the situation are very

similar. We have removed the remnants of our bases from Vietnam and

dismantled them in Cuba, yet such threats for our country are today being

created on our own borders.” (Putin, 2007)

With the United States occupying a hegemonic role within the international community,

Russian foreign policy is reactionary in nature. This is evident in essentially every escalation

29


of tension between the two states. An example that holds value in this investigation was the

planned installation of additional missile defense systems and NATO bases in Ukraine. As a

response to this initiative, at the Kremlin’s Annual Big Press Conference of 2008, Putin

threatened the retargeting of Russian missiles at the proposed missile systems and NATO

basis.

“We are asking that this not go ahead, but no one is listening. We are giving a

clear warning right from the start… We will be compelled to aim our missiles

at facilities that we consider a threat to our national security, and I am putting

this plainly now so that the blame for this is not shifted later.” (Putin, 2008)

Putin’s stance on the West is comparable to the philosophical works of Ivan Ilyin, which

coincide with Russia’s responsive decision-making through the notions of protecting the

nation's identity. Ivan Ilyin was a Russian political philosopher who was a proponent of

conservatism and the ultra-nationalist Pochvennichestvo moment, which coincided with

Slavophile notions of a Russian Empire founded on the beliefs and traditions of early Russian

history. Ilyin’s ideas of nationalism were fundamental to his philosophy in which Russian’s

should always prioritize Russian interests and promote the image or identity of a strong

Russian state. This philosophy suggests that Russia exists as a unique actor within the

international community and is entitled to progress in a similarly unique manner. Putin

appears to the international community as an unpredictable operator due to his constant

pursuit of Russian interests. However, the Russian leader's true intent lies in the promotion of

the traditional values and identity of the Russian nation. “He is convinced that liberalism is

contagious and that Western mores and institutions present a real danger to Russian society

and the Russian state” (Kratsev, 2014). This quote serves the purpose of validating the notion

that national interests are not unanimously about power politics, security, and new behaviors,

but rather it is the adaptability to the ever-changing internal and external environments.

30


Therefore, Russian national identity appears to be shaped by perceived domestic anxieties

and the current relationship with the Western World.

1.3 The Construction of Russian Foreign Policy

It is evident in the previous sections that Russia is a country wedged in-between the

influences of the Western World and its own ideological and political turbulences. This

makes the coherent formulation of a foreign policy difficult to define. Historically, Russia has

been a state with a volatile internal structure, which is evident in instances such as the

Bolshevik Revolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Russia transitioned between

these stages of political rule, the state remained unstable as certain aspects from previous rule

clashed with the new characteristics of the current authority. For example, “even as the

Russian political system evolved under Presidents Yeltsin and Putin, it failed to develop the

sturdy institutions that would lend a degree of continuity and predictability to its behaviour”

(Mankoff, 2009, p.53). This failure to develop a sound political structure ultimately

culminated in a central government with all of its power vested in a handful of individuals

with no checks and balances to keep them responsible. This means that national interest, as

well as the creation of Russian foreign policy ultimately, rests with the few individuals that

sit at the top of the centralized government. In contemporary Russia’s system of government,

the above-mentioned individuals who make up the top are situated within the Presidential

Executive Office rather than Russia’s legislative body. To this day, the Russian Federal

Assembly remains appointive and responsible to the political elite located in the Presidential

Executive Office. The centralization of foreign policy making within the Kremlin

(Presidential Executive Office) was part of a process that Putin called “strengthening the

power vertical” (Hanson, Nixey, Shevtsova, Wood 2012, p.5). This centralization allowed

Putin to impose a fairly coherent vision of national interest in a way that was not consistently

possible during the Yeltsin-Primakov years when regional and sectoral interests often took

31


predominance (Mankoff, 2009, p.55). Putin was able to achieve the centralization of foreign

policy by maintaining his relevance in Russian politics over an extended period of time.

Marcel Van Herpen argues this was possible due to two conditions:

“The first of these was the unhampered continuation of his (Putin’s) regime in

order to be able to realize his long-term projects. The second condition was the

necessity of upholding a formal democratic façade to facilitate the acceptance

of his regime in the West, thus avoiding the West mobilizing against the

emergence of a new “Russian danger.” (Van Herpen, 2014, p.129)

In practice, this signifies Putin’s adherence to Russia’s constitution but not necessarily the

ideals behind it. This indicates that the Russian Government possesses all of the necessary

features of a functioning democratic regime but in reality Putin has successfully consolidated

foreign policy decision-making for the foreseeable future. In regards to the international

community, this consolidation of policymaking indicates Putin’s desire to remain in power.

With the influence of internal factors as well as the external role of the West, Russian foreign

policy is principally a reactionary construct of Russian identity. The identity takes material

form through Russia’s interests and anxieties regarding the international community.

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Chapter 2: Ambition and Application

of Russian Foreign Policy

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2.1 Russia’s Current Foreign Policy

Russia’s current foreign policy is viewable through the Russian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs’ Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. This concept was

commissioned during Putin's time as prime minister and then later approved by Putin as

president on 12 February 2013. This foreign policy concept has received little attention in the

West, where it has been dismissed as either a bureaucratic formulation or a simple reiteration

of previous documents (Monaghan, 2013, p.2). However, this document does provide

valuable insight into how Putin’s Russia views changes in the international community since

its previous Foreign Policy Concept of 2008. From a constructivist approach, this shows how

Russia identifies itself within the international community and how it will seek to act. The

concept contains five sections with 104 points of interest. The five sections are labeled: I)

General Provisions, II) Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation and the Modern World, III)

Priorities of the Russian Federation for Addressing Global Problems, IV) Regional Priorities,

V) Development and Implementation of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. The

section on general provisions outlines the foreign policy concept as a comprehensive report

on the fundamental principles, priorities, goals and objectives of the Russian Federation.

Grounded in the values of the constitution and international norms, this section stipulates that

the points of interest exist as the guiding notions of Russian foreign policy up until the year

2020. In collaboration with Russia’s national security policy, the title of the five sections can

be equated to the current aims of Russian foreign policy (See Appendix A). While these

ambitions are overstated, the concept does provide an indication of Russia’s understanding of

the contemporary international community, as well as a warning of the country’s intent to

consolidate itself as a global center of influence. The concept further serves as a warning for

the apparent differences in how Russia and the West see the world and the various challenges

in international affairs. These points are not mutually defined – i.e. the nature of the

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problems, their causes and approaches to resolving them are differently understood,

preventing true cooperative partnership between the two sides (Monaghan, 2013, p.7). The

constructivist approach directs attention to the notion of a Russian sphere of influence

through the establishment of its post-Soviet identity. Russia’s current relations within the

international community are evident through the understanding that both, Russia, and the

international community, are in the midst of an ongoing formative process. Therefore, the

current declared foreign policy of the Russian state carries inter-subjective implications for

both parties. For Russia, the current stated foreign policy concept is an indication of their

understanding of the current international environment while also declaring the state’s

interest to consolidate itself as a sphere of influence. As the concept notes, Russia “will work

to anticipate and lead events” within the international community (Monaghan, 2013, p.8)

2.2 Russian Foreign Policy Decisions: 2008 Georgia Conflict

This section examines the 2008 Georgia Conflict as an application of Russian foreign

policy within the international community. The 2008 Georgia Conflict was an armed

skirmish primarily between Russia, Georgia, and the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia. The battle lasted five days and ultimately resulted in a Russia, Abkhazia, and

South Ossetia victory over the Republic of Georgia. Outcomes of the conflict included

Russian state recognition of participating members Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the

establishment of Russian military bases in the newly recognized nations. Russia’s

participation and interests in the conflict were founded on the strategic location of the

Georgian state and the refusal to allow NATO expansion into a neighbouring country. This

conflict is relevant to this investigation due to the strikingly similar characteristics to the on-

going Russia-Ukraine Conflict. The most apparent similarities are; they are conventional

wars, European interstate conflicts, and perceived violations of sovereignty by the

international community. Further similarities exist in the motivations behind Russia’s

35


intervention. Russia stressed the importance of action in Georgia and classified the initiative

as a ‘peace enforcement operation’ while also promoting an underlying objective “to curb the

threat which was coming at the time from the territory of Georgia” (Van Herpen, 2014,

p.326). The strategic location of Transcaucasia between the Middle East and the North

Caucasus acts a buffer zone and a security interest for Russia. Authority over the

Transcaucasia region would allow Russia to curb Western intrusion into their desired sphere

of influence. This is evident in a statement from Medvedev in which he claims “if we had

faltered in 2008, the geopolitical arrangement would be different now and a number of

countries in respect of which attempts were made to artificially drag them into the North

Atlantic Alliance, would have probably been there [in NATO] now” (Van Herpen, 2014,

p.326). With respect to the previous chapters’ discussion of the construction of Russian

foreign policy, this conflict was a clear indication of said policy in action. From a

constructivist stance, the Georgia Conflict is the summation of Russia’s self-perceived

identity as a sphere of influence and the security threat within their sphere of influence, which

was Georgia’s potential accession to NATO. This conflict in international relations is not just

definable as predetermined power politics but rather of an exhibition of constructed Russian

identity. Russia perceives itself as an established influence within the international

community. This self-identification as an influence prompted Russia to take a hard-line

stance towards Georgia due to the potential threat to their perceived sphere of influence.

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Chapter 3: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

37


3.1 Russia-Ukraine Conflict Overview

In the wake of former Ukrainian President Yanukovych’s refusal to sign a European

Union Association Agreement, (that would have seen Ukraine become more politically and

economically linked with Western Europe), supporters of the treaty and European integration

sparked a wave of political protests and civil unrest in Ukraine. These demonstrations would

ultimately develop into the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, driven by the perception of

governmental corruption and Russian partiality. After the Ukrainian Government refused to

recognize the demands brought forth by the protesters that would see the Ukrainian

Constitution revert to the amended 2004 form, violence broke out that culminated in

government officials fleeing Ukraine and demonstrators gaining control of governmental

administration. Yanukovych’s subsequent removal from office instigated a chain reaction that

saw the factions of pro-Russian Eastern Ukraine look to Russia while protesting the newly

founded government. In response to the Ukrainian Revolution and the growing pro-Russia

protests, Putin deployed unmarked Russian troops that were ultimately able to appoint a new

government in Crimea and call for a referendum that fostered the territory's annexation. This

action by Putin has invited widespread condemnation from the international community and

has paved the way for the plethora of sanctions that Russia continues to face. However due to

the ever-increasing ideological differences between the West and Russia, it is a possibility

that the Russia-Ukraine Conflict was inevitable due to physical and conceptual location of

Ukraine in between Russia and the West. This conflict originally ensued amongst internal

Ukrainian political blocs with one side promoting the previously mentioned Association

Agreement with the European Union and the other advocating for Ukrainian membership in

the Eurasian Customs Union. Therefore, the former Ukrainian President Yanukovych

decision to opt against signing the treaty with the European Union was the manifestation of

this conflict at the international level. The West perceived this decision as an antagonistic

38


Russian effort that promoted an alternative regional integration to the Western World, similar

to the traditional structure of the Soviet Union. However, Alexander Lukin argues that

Western leaders are incredibly misled regarding the ideals of Eurasian integration:

“Neither Russia nor any of the states seeking to join a Eurasian system wants

to restore the Soviet Union or openly confront the West. They do, however,

believe that in a multipolar world, free nations have a right to create

independent associations among themselves. In fact, the ruling elites of many

former Soviet republics have long favored the idea of maintaining or re-

creating some form of association among their states” (Lukin, 2014).

Out of the fifteen former Soviet states, very few have disregarded their traditional

connections to the former Soviet Union in favor of the Western World’s socio-political

structure. However these states have not all formally aligned with Russia either. This leaves

buffer states in between the constant battle for influence. In regards to the topic at hand, the

ideological disconnect between Russia and the West, in addition to the misunderstanding of

each other’s ambitions, has left the Russia-Ukraine Conflict in a problematic condition.

3.2 Sources and Implications of Russian Intervention in Ukraine

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia and the West have seen an increase in

cooperation within the international community. However, the recent annexation of Crimea

has effectively halted this post-Soviet trend of conformity and vehemently disregarded the

international norms of the Western World. This is due to a deeper conflict of interest between

Russia and the West. From the Russian vantage point, the origins of the Russia-Ukraine

conflict can be traced to the culmination of the Cold War. After the Soviet Union collapsed,

the West essentially had two options: either make a serious attempt to assimilate Russia into

the Western system or wrest away piece after piece of its former sphere of influence (Lukin,

2014). Scholars in favour of the assimilation of Russia into the West believed that the anti-

39


Russian option would instigate further conflicts of influence over the former Soviet states and

ultimately provide few benefits for all involved. However, the latter option would prevail

under United States Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush as they ignored the

agreements made with Gorbachev, which specified that NATO would not expand into

Russia’s sphere of influence. NATO added “12 new members, including former parts of the

Soviet Union, while trying to convince Russia that the foreign forces newly stationed near its

borders, in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, would not threaten its security.

The EU, meanwhile, expanded as well, adding 16 new members of its own during the same

period” (Lukin, 2014). This expansion by the West put Russia in a position of retaliation as

they had anticipated progress in international cooperation that would see both sides paying

respect to the ambitions of the other. By ignoring the promises to Russia, the West indicated

that they were more interested in promoting their own goals while Russia was under the

impression of cooperation. Essentially the United States and Western Europe continued the

Cold War conflict and mind-set towards Russia without the presence of Russian retaliation,

which in turn made post-Soviet Russia feel vulnerable. This perceived vulnerability laid the

foundation for Russia to retract their cooperation with Western ideals and in its place adopt

an independent set of norms for the purpose of establishing an opposition to the Western-

centric world. The West’s continuing advancement of its goals has caused immense problems

in Russia’s neighbouring states. Territorial separations in Georgia, Moldova, and the Ukraine

are a testament to these problems. The inherent cultural differences within Russia’s

neighbours are split between the desire for European integration and the preservation of

societal structure and the historical connections with Russia. The Western World’s

encouragement of pro-Western groups in the former Soviet states has influenced the

governing bodies of these countries to subjugate the pro-Russian inhabitants, many of which

do not posses the basic entitlements and privileges of citizenship (Lukin, 2014). Russia

40


considers these encouragements from the West to be threats to the wellbeing of its people. In

regards to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, due to the impending threat of Ukraine becoming

more closely affiliated with the West and more specifically NATO, Russia moved to protect

its own interests and ethnic populations. With the majority of Crimea being ethnic Russians

and the implication of NATO’s intrusion into the Black Sea, Russia had no choice but to

annex the territory. NATO maintains an underlying principle that stipulates that states with

internal conflicts are not eligible to join the coalition. This principle guides Russia's intrusion

into West-Leaning buffer states, and the establishment of breakaway regions under Russian

influence, as this proves useful in preventing the expansion of NATO. In regards to the

Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Russian intrusion into Ukraine provides a beneficial outcome as the

annexation of Crimea and a divided Ukraine not only provides an additional buffer space, but

also deters Ukraine from NATO membership. To be put concisely, Russian intervention in

Ukraine addresses the economic and security threats associated with NATO and the European

Union’s intrusion into Russia’s sphere of influence.

A different perspective, regarding the motivating factors of Russia’s involvement in

Ukraine, stems from the idea of Russia rejecting the Western world model. The first instance

of this rejection is visible in the 2000 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, which claims the

existence of a new multipolar world order rather than the longstanding Western-centric order

(Gonzalez, 2013, p.2). This position suggests that all states have the authority to select their

own development model, the Western World’s democratic principles were no longer

comprehensive, meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign states was unacceptable, and

lastly that Russia would then be able to step into the forefront of the international community

as an alternative power to the West (Perrier, 2014, p.35). Putin clarifies this position in the

2007 Parliamentary address where Russia’s resistance to the West’s ideological impositions

are evident through the state's pursuit of Russian interests and the utilization of any

41


international advantages. With this resistance to the Western World in mind, Russia

reinforces itself as a counterweight in the development of a multipolar world. The notion of

Russia being an alternative to Western society allows the state to act as an arbitrator between

other communities that reject the Western model. The ‘Russian Federation and the Modern

World’ section within the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept states:

“Desire to go back to one's civilizational roots can be clearly seen in recent

events … where political and socioeconomic renewal of society has been

frequently carried out. Similar processes can be observed in other regions as

well (Ukraine), which makes it a priority for world politics to prevent

civilizational fault line clashes and to intensify efforts to forge partnership of

cultures, religions and civilizations in order to ensure a harmonious

development of mankind. In these circumstances imposing one's own

hierarchy of values can only provoke a rise in xenophobia, intolerance and

tensions in international relations leading eventually to chaos in world affairs.”

(Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013)

The guiding principle behind this statement is the guarantee from the Russian government to

protect its people domestically and abroad. On the grounds of this principle, Putin justified

Russia’s intervention in Eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea despite widespread

international disapproval.

The Ukraine’s Soviet links also play a role in Russia’s motivations for intervention.

The desire to perpetuate the economic relations between former Soviet states has seen Russia

enter into many international agreements with its neighboring countries. This desire has

seemingly intensified recently with the creation of The Customs Union of Belarus,

Kazakhstan, and Russia, in addition to the successive Eurasian Economic Union, which came

into effect on January 1st, 2015. With the Ukraine potentially becoming more integrated into

42


the Western World, Russian economic and political interests are at risk. The struggle for

influence over Ukraine between the West and Russia carries a zero-sum inclination as both

sides pursue their interests in the region at the expense of Ukrainian society.

Analyses of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine Conflict, from the Western World, suggest

that the Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine are an act of aggression on a sovereign state. The

underlying argument from this point of view insinuates that Putin annexed Crimea due to the

ideological ambition to regain territory from the former Soviet Union. From this perspective,

Russia’s exercise of power in Ukraine is a display of aggressive behavior in relation to the

states previous conduct in the international community. This perception of Russian

aggression originates from the ideological notions of the Cold War. George Kennan’s “X”

article, which is grounded in a similar assertion, states “the political personality of Soviet

power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances” (Motyl, 2014).

Kennan’s article was written in July of 1947, however, a case for its contemporary relevance

its evident by paralleling the Civilizational ideals of the Soviet Union to Putin’s present-day

Russian initiatives.

“Like the Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia fosters antagonism to the West, and,

like the Soviet Union, it feels impelled to expand, but not immediately and

unconditionally or against unassailable barriers. It is under no real threat:

NATO has been in decline, Europe has been cutting its defense budget, and

the United States has been distracted by the Middle East and domestic

priorities. Instead, Putin’s neoimperial ideology and his standing as Russia’s

all-powerful leader require him to gather former imperial territories.”

(Motyl, 2014)

This argument indicates that Putin’s actions in Ukraine are inline with Russia’s desire for

material power and territorial expansion. These actions are the social construct of Russia’s

43


disdain of the Western World and the ambition to consolidate the identity of a sphere of

influence.

John Mearsheimer argues against the Western interpretations by shifting the blame to

the NATO enlargement initiatives of the United States and its European allies. Dating back to

the mid-1990’s, the Russian Government has continuously resisted the expansion of NATO

into former Soviet states. As mentioned in the previous chapters, contemporary Russia made

it abundantly clear that there will be repercussions if NATO or a missile defense system

compromises their sphere of influence. However, the United States and Europe elected to

encroach on Russian strategic interests by enlarging NATO through the addition of twelve

new member states since 1999. Six of the new member states were under the old Soviet

sphere of influence, and three were former Soviet Republics. Mearsheimer hypothetically

equates this to China building an impressive military alliance and then attempting to include

Canada and Mexico (Mearsheimer, 2014). The culmination of European Union and NATO

expansion set the stage for conflict. It was the former Ukrainian President’s rejection of the

European Association Agreement that ultimately sparked the conflict, as the West’s attempt

to pull Ukraine westward failed, igniting a Western-supported revolution. As a result, Putin

annexed the predominately ethnic Russian Crimea further validating the many instances in

which Russia had warned the Western World that infringing upon their sphere of influence is

unacceptable and will carry repercussions. While the Motyl and Mearsheimer arguments

differ, one unifying theme is clear, and that is the understanding that Russia would act if

threatened.

44


Conclusions

Russian foreign policy is a complex and ever-developing feature of the international

community. Characteristics of this policy have evolved from the respective ambitions of the

45


Westernist, Statist and Civilizationist schools of thought, with each representing a different

construct of Russian identity. The unifying aspect remains in the dynamic construction of

said identity in relation to Russia’s perceptions of the West. This indicates a sense of

otherness that Russia manifests in its ambitions and declared policy.

Russia currently sees itself and the West as two separate spheres of influence with

their own values and perceptions of the international community. This viewpoint shapes the

role of Russia’s decision-making within the international community.

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict endures as a manifestation of the ideological clash

between Russia and the West. This is valid due to the idea that the international community,

as well as the notions of democracy and sovereignty, are socially and culturally defined.

Therefore Russian foreign policy, from a constructivist vantage point, is determined by the

relationship between Russian identity and national interests. Due to the centralization of

Russian foreign policy decisions, Vladimir Putin principally decides Russia’s political

interests. Putin’s 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation highlights

Russia’s self-identification as a commanding sphere of influence in addition to the objectives

of consolidating this identity within the international community by protecting security

interests.

The above-mentioned ideological conflict subsists in Ukraine due to the clash of

socially constructed values between Russia and the West as both spheres of influence

maintain a presence within the state. The Western influence is appropriately present in

Western Ukraine while Eastern Ukraine positions itself with Russia. Russia and the West's

different positions on the socio-political future of Ukraine have prompted the respective

spheres of influence to act accordingly for their promotion. For the Western World, this

included NATO expansion initiatives and the negotiations for European alignment from the

European Union. Russia responded to these movements with a military response of their own,

46


subsequently annexing Crimea to protect Russian identity as a sphere of influence and the

security threat of having another NATO member in a neighbouring state. Therefore, Russia

acts as an alternative or ‘other’ to the Western centric international community. Russia as the

'other' shapes its role in the Russia-Ukraine crisis by prompting the state to act reactively to

the historical implications and security threats related to NATO’s past expansions. Russia's

role in Ukraine possesses the characteristics of realism and power politics, however; Russia’s

involvement can only be defined through the constructivist understanding of socially and

historically constructed norms that indicate Russia acts in response to instances of Western

encroachment. Materialistic control of Ukraine is not the motivation but rather a by-product

of Russia protecting its identity as a sphere of influence and the corresponding role within the

international community.

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Appendix

Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013

a) Ensuring the security of the country, protecting and strengthening its sovereignty and

51


territorial integrity, and securing its high standing in the international community as one of

the influential and competitive poles of the modern world;

b) Creating favorable external conditions for a steady and dynamic growth of the Russian

economy and its technological modernization with a view to putting it on the innovation-

based development tracks, as well as for improving the quality of life, strengthening the rule

of law and democratic institutions, and ensuring human rights and freedoms;

c) Active promoting of international peace and universal security and stability for the purpose

of establishing a just and democratic system of international relations based on collective

decision-making in addressing global issues, on the primacy of international law, including,

first of all, the UN Charter, as well as on equal, partnership relations among nations with the

central coordinating role of the UN as the principal organization regulating international

relations;

d) Promoting good-neighborly relations with adjoining states and helping to overcome

existing and prevent potential tensions and conflicts in regions adjacent to the Russian

Federation;

e) Developing mutually beneficial and equal bilateral and multilateral partnership relations

with foreign states, interstate associations, international organizations and forums on the basis

of respect for independence and sovereignty, pragmatism, transparency, multi-vector

approach, predictability and non-confrontational protection of national interests; promoting

broad international cooperation based on the principle of non-discrimination and facilitating

the formation of flexible non-bloc network alliances with Russia's active involvement;

f) Strengthening Russia's positions in the global trade and economic system, providing

diplomatic support to national economic operators abroad, preventing discrimination against

Russian goods, services or investments; making use of the potential of international and

regional economic and financial institutions to that end;

52


g) Ensuring comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens

and compatriots residing abroad, and promoting, in various international formats, Russia's

approach to human rights issues;

h) Promoting the Russian language and strengthening its positions in the world,

disseminating information on the achievements of the peoples of Russia and consolidating the

Russian diaspora abroad;

i) Facilitating the development of a constructive dialogue and partnership relations between

civilizations in the interests of enhancing accord among various cultures and confessions and

ensuring their mutual enrichment.

53

the russia-ukraine conflict identity construction in russian foreign policy

Documents

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identity construction

russian federation

russias decisionmaking

social constructs of

russias interactions

georgia conflict

abstract russias intervention