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Rolling Stock and Manufacturers (part 1)

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Japan Railway & Transport Review 41 • October 200514

The Rolling Stock Manufacturing Industryin Japan

Masahito Mizoguchi

Introduction

Railway systems consist of integrated sub-systems of infrastructure and rolling stock.The infrastructure includes tracks, electricpower supply substations and feeder lines,signalling and train control systems,station facilities, maintenance depots, etc.Each of these component parts mustfunction as it is designed to do, and mustalso work together as a whole.While rolling stock is an important sub-system within the whole railway system,it also acts as the railway’s face to thecustomer and could be described as themain ‘actor’ on the rail transport ‘stage.’Rolling stock manufacturers must evolvewith the times by supplying operators withrolling stock using new technologies thatmeet both the local and specific needs ofra i lways a s we l l a s cus tomers ’requirements. A review of the industry’shistory shows that rolling stock productionhas always been influenced by the socialrequirements of the times.This article is divided in three sections;first, it examines the latest demand forrolling stock in Japan and the presentstatus of the rolling stock industry. Next,

it looks back in history to see how therolling stock industry changed over time,and finally, it looks ahead to futurepossibilities for the industry.

Rail Transport and RollingStock in Japan Today

Overall trendsIn Japan, rail ridership has been declining

generally over the last few years. This isprimarily due to years of economics t a g n a t i o n a n d c h a n g e s i ndemographics—birth rates are droppingfaster, and the population is aging fasterthan in most other countries.However, compared to motor vehicles,full trains are far more efficient users ofenergy, and their per passenger- and pertonne-km CO2 emissions are much lower

Figure 1 Freight and Passenger CO2 Emissions (FY2000)

178

819

1933

372

3094

21

40

1483

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500

Freight transport

Heavy commercialvehicles

Small commercialvehicles

Light commercialvehicles

Heavy privatevehicles

Small privatevehicles

Railways

Coastal shipping

Domesticair freight

CO2 Emissions per tonne-km

g-CO2 per tonne-km

188

152

414

32

94

111

17

16

36

27

0 100 200 300 400 500

Passenger transport

Private automobilesPrivate light automobiles

(≥ 660 cc)Taxis

Commercial buses

Charter buses

Domestic air travel

Railways

Subways

TramwaysGuided transport

systems

CO2 Emissions per passenger-km

g-CO2 per passenger-km

Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport

Note: Commercial and heavy private vehicles have a minimum capacity of 3000 kg

Series E231 running on Tokaido main line (JR East)

Japan Railway & Transport Review 41 • October 2005 15

than other modes (Fig. 1). Governmentpolicies have been trying to promote amodal shift from road to rail for bothpassenger and freight transport. Thesepolicies have had more bite sinceFebruary 2005 with the coming into forceof the Kyoto Protocol, binding Japan tocut its CO2 emissions. Clearly, it isimportant to promote measures to reduceemissions from vehicles and a modal shiftto railways even more than previously.The Japanese government is supportingrailway operators in projects to improveservices, which will favour a modal shiftto rail from cars, trucks and planes.

Passenger transportTable 1 shows the annual increases in themovement of people in Japan. Domestictravel kept expanding during the 1980sand 1990s, but has almost levelled offsince then. Rail ridership and railpassenger-km figures have stagnated sincethe mid-1990s and any increase in themovement of people is basically due tomore road and air travel. Average distancetravelled for each transport mode haschanged little since the 1980s. And, asFigure 2 shows, the share carried by rail(the JR passenger companies and otherprivate railways) is now slumping year-on-year. In major cities, rail transport stillenjoys a majority share (see Table 2 forGreater Tokyo data), although travel trends(all modes) has remained basically stablesince the early 1990s, with train and motorvehicle ridership remaining relativelyunchanged. New railway lines are beingconstructed in the Greater Tokyo andGreater Osaka areas, although not asenergetically as before, and this,combined with other improvements forthe convenience of commuting workersand students, is bound to ensure that railremains the main transportation mode inJapanese metropolises. Congestionremains a problem, and there is aconsensus that commuter rail servicesneed further improvements to reduce

overcrowding. Other improvementsbeing called for include offering transportinformation on board, easier connectionsto other trains and other modes, and awider range of services at stations andterminals. These improvements willr equ i r e new ro l l i ng s t ock andinfrastructure.

Airlines and railway operators arecompet i to r s , bu t they can a l socomplement each other’s services. Nineairports in Japan have air–rail links (ARLs).These have become popular access routesfor passengers who choose rail because itis dependable and fast. On the flip side,ARLs encourage more people to fly; more

Figure 2 Share of Passenger Modes in Japan (1989–2002) (passenger-km)

Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and TransportNote: Figures indicate percentage share

17.61989

1994

1999

2000

2001

2002

11.5 5.9 41.0 15.8

1.3

3.7

0.5 2.7

18.0 11.2 5.5 42.4 15.1

1.1

4.5

0.4 1.8

16.9 10.1 4.9 44.4 15.6

0.9

5.6

0.3 1.4

17.0 10.1 4.9 44.4 15.6

0.8

5.6

0.3 1.3

16.9 10.1 4.9 44.4 15.6

0.8

5.7

0.3 1.2

16.8

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

10.0 4.9 44.1 16.1

0.8

5.8

0.3 1.1

JRsPrivaterailways

Privateautomobiles

Light automobiles(≥ 660 cc), etc.

Commercialbuses Taxis

Passenger ferries Privatelyoperated buses

Planes

(Fiscal year)

Table 1 Passenger Transport in Japan by Mode

Number of passengers (millions)

Fiscal year Total Motor vehicles Railways (share) Passenger ferries Planes

1965 30,787 14,863 15,798 51.3% 126 5

1980 51,680 33,515 18,005 34.8% 160 40

1990 77,869 55,767 21,939 28.2% 163 65

1995 84,051 61,272 22,630 26.9% 149 78

2000 84,598 62,841 21,647 25.6% 110 93

2001 86,421 64,590 21,720 25.1% 111 95

Source: Summary of Land Transportation Statistics, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport

Table 2 Passengers in Greater Tokyo by Mode

Number of passengers (millions)

Fiscal year Total Railways (share) Buses Motor vehicles

1990 22,752 12,799 56.3% 2,197 7,756

1995 24,021 13,320 55.5% 2,025 8,676

2000 23,410 12,979 55.4% 1,769 8,662

2001 23,410 12,979 55.4% 1,769 8,662

Source: Urban Transport Yearbook, Institute for Transport Policy Studies



are on the drawing board, and we canexpect more airports to have railconnections soon.In today’s Japan, high-speed railways arethe main transportation mode for journeysup to around 900 km. Railways cancontinue playing a leading role in thissector, especially if they introduce newIT services, such as on-board informationtools, facilities for laptop users, andmonitors showing useful data such aslocation, weather, etc.

Urban commuter trainsIn major cities, rail is the primary modeof travel for commuting workers and

students. Rush-hour congestion isexpressed as a percentage of capacity,which is calculated as number of seatsplus floor area divided by the arearequired by one standing person. Typicalcongestion ratios are explained andillustrated in Figure 3. Efforts to reducecongestion aim for an average ratio of150% during the most crowded times, butmany lines in Greater Tokyo and othermajor cities have still not reached thislevel. The most congested sections in theJR East network—one on the circularYamanote Line, the other on the KeihinTohoku Line (both between Ueno andOkachimachi in Tokyo)—had congestion

ratios of 230% on weekdays between08:00 and 09:00 in 2001. Both sectionsare double-tracked, offering four paralleltracks for commuter trains. Between thesetwo stations, trains on the two lines carrieda total of 162,410 passengers per hour inone direction. These passengers travelledon a total of 48 trains—24 train sets with11 cars, and another 24 with 10 cars. Asanother example, during rush hour, TokyoMetro’s double-tracked Marunouchi Lineoffers 32 trains per hour in each direction.In Greater Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka, 28lines have at least 25 rush-hour trains perhour in each direction. Lines with at least30 trains per hour per direction are listedin Table 3.These figures indicate the unusually highdensity of commuter train operations inJapan’s major cities. High-densityoperations require reduced headwaybetween trains, and to accomplish thissafely, rolling stock must be able toaccelerate and decelerate quickly, andsignalling and other safety equipmentmust be reliable and up to date. Fasteracceleration requires lighter carriages andhigh motive power. Equipping AC motorswith a variable voltage variable frequency

Figure 3 Commuter Train Congestion Ratios

Table 3 Lines with 30 or More Rush-hour Trains in Each Direction (per hour)

Line Section Time period Number of Number of Number of Congestiontrains (one tracks passengers during ratio (%)direction) time period

JR East Chuo main line (rapid service) Nakano�Shinjuku 8:00�9:00 30 2 91,460 218

JR East Yamanote and Ueno�Okachimachi 8:00�9:00 48 2+2 162,410 230Keihin Tohoku lines

Higashiyama Line (Nagoya city subway) Nagoya�Fushimi 8:00�9:00 30 2 31,272 185

Midosuji Line (Osaka city subway) Namba�Shinsaibashi 8:00�9:00 30 2 59,521 154

Ginza Line (Tokyo Metro) Akasaka-mitsuke 8:00�9:00 30 2 30,863 169�Tameike-sanno

Marunouchi (Tokyo Metro) Shin Otsuka�Myogadani 8:00�9:00 32 2 37,575 158

Isezaki (Tobu Railway) Kosuge�Kita Senju 7:30�8:30 45 4 75,850 150

Keio Line (Keio Electric Railway) Shimo Takaido�Meidaimae 7:40�8:40 30 2 70,467 168

Inokashira Line (Keio Electric Railway) Shinsen�Shibuya 7:50�8:50 30 2 29,757 149

Sagami main line (Sagami Railway) Nishi Yokohama 7:29�8:29 30 2 57,349 140�Hiranumabashi

Nagoya main line (Nagoya Railroad) Jingumae�Kanayama 7:40�8:40 36 4 32,046 131

Keihan main line (Keihan Electric Railway) Noe�Kyobashi 7:50�8:50 46 4 60,448 144

Source: Railway Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport

FY2001

100% 150% 180% 200% 250%

Ordinary capacity (all seats occupied, all standing passengers holding strap or door-side grab bar)

Passengers can read open newspaper

Passengers can read only folded newspaper

Bodies touching and confined and can read nothing larger than folded magazine

Bodies sway with carriage and difficult to move arms freely


by shinkansen). The JRs continue topursue higher speeds for medium andlonger dis tances, hoping to lurepassengers from airlines. While such amodal shift would reduce Japan’s energyconsumption and CO2 emissions, highpopulation densities along lines linkingmajor cities, and the closeness of housesto the tracks in urban areas causeproblems with more noise and vibrationresulting from higher operating speeds,r e q u i r i n g e n v i r o n m e n t a lcountermeasures. Rolling-stock designers

(VVVF) control system offer lighter weightand smaller s ize, saving energy.Furthermore, in addition to plans tolighten the carriages themselves, there wasan increase in the number of EMUs withaluminium-alloy double-skin panelsformed by extrusion molding, which alsocuts process costs. In-carriage IT systemsare now being introduced to monitorconditions and conduct virtual inspectionswhile trains are running, which saveslabour costs as well. The high-techinspection system supplements otherimmediate-response inspections.

Air–rail links—two examplesTokyo International Airport (Haneda)offers a choice of ARLs for accessing theairport—the Tokyo Monorail and KeihinElectric Express Railway’s Airport Line(annual ridership, 50.341 million and 44.4million, respectively). In 2001, a total of59.504 million airline passengers used theairport. These figures show that not allARL users are air passengers—many areairport employees and other commuters.The Central Japan International Airport(Centrair) near Nagoya opened inFebruary 2005. Nagoya Railroad’s µ-Sky(pronounced mu-sky) limited expressoffers convenient, rapid (28 minutes)services linking the airport with MeitetsuNagoya Station.

Medium- to long-distancepassenger routesModal share for passenger travel betweenthe Tokyo and Osaka metropolitan regionsis 15.7% for air, 3.0% for motor vehicles3.0%, and 81.3% for rail. However, rail’sshare drops over longer journeys. Forexample, modal shares between Tokyoand Hiroshima Prefecture are 49.3% forair, 2.4% for motor vehicles, and 48.3%for rail, giving air and rail almost equalweight. The fastest shinkansen from TokyoStation to Hiroshima Station takes 3 hours50 minutes, while the fastest from TokyoStation to Hakata Station in Fukuoka City

takes 4 hours 58 minutes. Modal sharefor travel between Tokyo and Fukuoka isair 85.4%; motor vehicles 1.1%; rail13.5%, showing how rail loses out to airon long-distance routes. Travellers tendto fly when journey time exceeds 4 hours,although they consider other factors aswell, such as fare, comfort, existence ofother travel modes, and convenience(changing modes, airport access, flightfrequency, etc.). Rail will surely remainthe most popular and attractive mode fortrips of less than 4 hours (about 900 km

Series 253 EMU Narita Express, ARL between the cities of Tokyo, Yokohama, Omiya, etc.and Narita Airport (JR East)

Series E653 is used for the Joban Line's Fresh Hitachi (name of a region and a city) businessand tourist express services (JR East)



are working on a much lighter type ofhigh-speed shinkansen. At present, theseproblems have been partially solved byusing aluminium alloys to reduce carriageweight, and an EMU-type distributedtraction design for less vibration.Eng inee r s a re work ing on newtechnologies to cut the noise of high-speed operations, such as pantographcovers to cut pantograph whistle, andstreamlined noses to reduce aerodynamicnoise. A low-vibration bogie underdevelopment will maintain the same highsafety and comfort standards at higherspeeds. In-carriage information servicesusing more advanced telecommunicationdevices are also in planning.

Current situation and future forrail freightFreight volumes in general peaked in Japanin 1990 (Table 4) and then droppedconsistently, reflecting the downturn in theJapanese economy. Table 4 also shows howrail freight declined after peaking in 1965.Rail transport accounts for only about 4%of total domestic freight in tonne-km terms(Fig. 4). However, the average distancetraveled by road freight is only 50 km,compared to about 400 km for rail freight,demonstrat ing that rai l f reight isconsidered more suitable for longdistances. Trains emit far less CO2 pertonne-km than trucks (Fig. 1) and aremuch more fuel efficient. They are alsoless labour-intensive, an added benefitagainst the background of decliningnumbers of truck drivers. Due to theseadvantages of rail freight, some long-dis tance trucking companies areexperimenting with a combined truck-railcontainer system, and are consideringabandoning some long-distance truckoperations. To speed up its services, JRFreight brought an EMU-type freight traininto operation in 2004, and the ratifiedKyoto Protocol is expected to leadtrucking firms to launch more intermodalcontainer operations.

Table 4 Freight Transport Modes

Freight (million tonnes)

Fiscal year Total tonnage Road freight Rail freight Coastal shipping Air freight

1965 2,616 2,193 243 180 0.03

1980 5,981 5,318 163 500 0.03

1990 6,776 6,114 87 575 0.08

1995 6,643 6,017 77 549 0.09

2001 6,370.1 5,773 59 537 1.10

2002 6,158 5,578 59 520 1.02

2003 5,894 5,339 57 497 1.00

Source: Summary of Land Transportation Statistics, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport

Figure 4 Domestic Freight Transport by Mode (1989–2002) (tonne-km)

Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and TransportNote: Road freight includes freight on trucks using ferries

0 20

4.9 35.9 15.3 43.8

4.5 38.5 13.0 43.8

4.0 43.7 11.0 41.0

3.8 44.2 10.0 41.8

3.8 44.7 9.2 42.1

3.9 46.0 8.7 41.3

40 60 80 100

Railways Commercial road freight Private road freight Coastal shipping

1989

1994

1999

2000

2001

2002(Fiscal year)

Series 250 EMU with two powered cars at each end and 12 intermediate trailing flat wagons (JR Freight)


Freight wagon manufacturing in Japanpeaked at about 15,000 units in 1967, andnow only about 100 wagons are builtannually, reflecting the overall decline inrail freight operations. However, withtrucking companies interested in theabove -desc r ibed new me thods ,manufacturing of freight rolling stock—including locomotives—is slowlyrecovering.

Japan�s Rolling Stock Industry�From Beginning to Present

Japan’s first railway started operations in1872, linking Shimbashi in Tokyo toYokohama. In the early days, the maincomponents of the rail system, includinglocomotives, passenger carriages, freightwagons and even some constructionmaterials, were imported from Britain.Japan’s first domestically built rolling stockwas produced in 1875 at the government-owned Kobe Works. From then until the1930s, rolling stock manufacturing wasconsidered a vital element in the nation’sindustrial sector, and was promoted by thegovernment . Dur ing the chaosimmediately after WWII, one of the

government’s most urgent policies was toget the transportation system back on itsfeet. The government and private sectorcooperated in this effort, with bothmanufacturing new rolling stock. Japan’seconomy recovered and began expandingrapidly before long. Although rolling-stockproduction increased as a result, theeconomic boom also helped road transportcome into its own. Consequently, demandfor rail transport peaked and then begandeclining. This created unsupportablefinancial difficulties for Japanese NationalRailways (JNR), and caused a slump inrolling-stock production. JNR was a publiccorporation and ended up with annuallosses of around ¥2 trillion, making it ripefor breakup and privatization into the JRgroup of companies in 1987. The resultantJRs began operations with a clean slate andhave remained healthy ever since.However, today’s low birthrate and agingpopulation have crippled domesticdemand for new rolling stock. The marketis saturated and most orders come fromoperators just replacing aging stock. Thereis little possibility that the domestic marketwill return to its old golden growth years.As a result, rolling stock manufacturers

and their suppliers may find it impossibleto develop their businesses if they dependonly on the domestic market—the obvioussolutions is to expand into new, overseasmarkets.Table 5 shows data on rolling-stockproduction in Japan from 1945 to 2000and Table 6 lists freight wagon productionindices (1975 = 100).We can divide the history of Japan’s rollingstock manufacturing industry into thefollowing six periods• Formative years (1875–1926)• First growth years (1927–41)• War years (1942–45)• Second growth years (1946–68)• Doldrums (1969–87)• Era of JRs (1988–present)

Formative yearsUnder government leadership, Japanbegan building passenger carriages andfreight wagons in the mid-1870s. The firstJapanese-built steam locomotive wasmanufactured in 1893 at the government-railways Kobe Works and the privatelyowned Locomotive ManufacturingCompany (Kisha Seizo Kaisha) establishedin 1896 was building steam locomotives

Table 5 Japanese Rolling-stock Production (1945–2000)

Fiscal year Locomotives1) Passenger carriages EMUs & DMUs2) Freight wagons Total

1945 115 45 46 897 (1,103)

1950 104 244 605 2,354 (3,307)

1955 166 266 599 3,894 (4,925)

1960 242 275 1,489 8,742 (10,748)

1965 438 158 2,581 9,293 (12,470)

1970 382 435 1,380 4,727 (6,924)

1975 141 186 1,232 2,788 (4,347)

1980 83 390 1,765 1,517 (3,755)

1985 9 54 1,309 107 (1,479)

1990 21 73 2,253 791 (3,138)

1995 20 � 1,809* 416 (2,245)

2000 11 18 1,763* 195 (1,987)

Source: Japan Association of Rolling Stock Industries1) Total electric, steam and diesel locomotives2) Included electric and diesel railcarsNote: Figures include production by Niitsu Rolling Stock Manufacturing Factory

Table 6 Production Indices(1975 = 100)

Fiscal year Indices

1945 23.5

1950 64.1

1955 75.7

1960 141.1

1965 230.5

1970 159.1

1975 100.0

1980 120.0

1985 64.4

1990 128.8

1995 90.7

2000 97.9

2001 105.9

2002 96.2

2003 90.1

Source: Japan Association of Rolling StockIndustries



by 1901. Success in locomotivemanufacturing proved that Japan had thetechnical skills required for the nation’srail industry to stand on its own. By themid-1920s, electric locomotives were alsobeing made in Japan. New companiessprang up to design and manufacturerolling stock and parts. Some majorcompanies still in the industry todaybegan operations during these formativeyears (Table 7). Other businesses makingelectric equipment and rolling-stock partssoon came on the scene (Table 8).This was the time when the governmentrailways was extending its network. Afterit was clear that rail transport would playa growing role in the nation’s economy,the government launched a restructuringinitiative. Government responsibility forrailway affairs was wielded first by theRailway Board (Tetsudocho) and thenRailway Bureau (Tetsudokyoku) underministerial control. But in 1908, theRai lway Agency (Tetsudoin) wasestablished under direct control of the

prime minister. Then in 1920, the RailwayAgency became the independent Ministryof Railways under a cabinet minister.Shimpei Goto, the first Director-Generalof the Railway Agency decided that worksbelonging to the Railway Agency wouldcontinue to repair locomotives owned bythe government railways, but that newlocomotives would be purchased from theprivate sector. This arrangement remainedbasically unchanged until JNR wasestablished in 1949 and Goto’s decisionstill influences the development of Japan’srolling-stock industry.

First growth yearsJapan’s financial crisis of 1927 and the1929 Great Depression dampeneddemand for rolling stock. But Japan’sincreasing mil i tary expansion inManchuria in NE China, increased theneed for rail transport and pushedproduction levels ever higher until 1941when Japan entered WWII. At the time,almost all rolling stock and parts were

being manufactured domestically andstandards were as high as in otheradvanced countries.During the growth period beginning in1927, Japanese railways achieved hightechnical standards for reliability andsafety—standards that are still admiredtoday. As early as 1940, the governmentunveiled a plan to run a ‘bullet train’ onstandard-gauge double-track from Tokyoto Shimonoseki, at the western tip ofHonshu.Development was abandoned due toWWII, but the concept came to fruitionin 1964 as the shinkansen.The high-speed steam-powered expressAsia running on the South ManchuriaRailway symbolized the high level ofJapanese railway technology.The strong demand for rolling stock forcedthe companies established during theformative years to install more advancedmanufacturing equipment, expand theirfactories, and invest in new facilities.Some of the factories operating today cantrace their roots to this period.

War yearsWith war raging, the government urgentlyneeded more rolling stock to boostcapacity, but a scarcity of materialspushed production into decline as earlyas 1942. The situation worsened afterbombing in 1944 and 1945 destroyed onefactory after another. The destruction wasso extensive that production could notresume immediately after the war.Wartime austerity designs called fordevelopment of a standard electric trainconstructed with minimum materials,labour and financial resources, but theproject was abandoned after facilities andequipment were destroyed. About 13,000pieces of rolling stock, including freightwagons, were destroyed in the war, andmore than 20% of all steam locomotiveswere out of service by 1945 with no wayto repair them. For a while, rail transportwas in great difficulties.

Table 7 Rolling Stock Manufacturers established during Early Years

Year Company Notes

1986 Nippon Sharyo, Ltd.

1986 Locomotive Manufacturing Company later merged into Kawasaki Heavy(Kisha Seizo Kaisha) Industries, Ltd.

1907 Hyogo Works, Kawasaki Shipbuilding predecessor of Rolling Stock Division ofCorporation Kawasaki Heavy Industries

1910 Niigata Engineering Co., Ltd.

1920 Tanaka Rolling Stock Industries predecessor of Kinki Sharyo Co., Ltd.

1921 Kasado Works, Hitachi, Ltd.

1923 Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. Kobe predecessor of Mitsubishi HeavyShipyard Industries, Ltd.

Source: Japan Association of Rolling Stock Industries

Table 8 Parts Manufacturers established during Early Years

Year Company Notes

1893 Shibaura Engineering Works Co., Ltd. predecessor of Toshiba Corp.

1917 Hitachi, Ltd.

1920 Sumitomo Seikosho predecessor of Sumitomo MetalIndustries, Ltd.

1921 Mitsubishi Electric Corp.

1925 Nihon Air Brake K.K. predecessor of Nabtesco Corporation



Second growth yearsWhen WWII ended, Japan’s rolling-stockindustry was in ruins and reconstructionefforts created an urgent need for bothpassenger carriages and freight wagons.Production continued to rise during thisperiod with some fluctuations. The firststep, beginning in earnest in 1946, was torepair all recoverable rolling stock.Demand for new stock was intense, butmanufacturing facilities had beendestroyed during the war and there werenot enough engineers in the existingfactories to meet the demand for privaterailways other than JNR. Private railwaysestablished new manufacturing companieswith their own capital (Table 9).These newcomers also contributed to thepost-war reconstruction effort. Later, theywould go on to supply the rolling-stockmarket during Japan’s high-growth period,but when demand slumped later, theirpresence—combined with that of theolder manufacturers—would causeconcern that too many makers occupieda limited market.Around 1955, rolling-stock productionhad returned to its prewar level. The lateryears of high-economic growth boosteddemand and encou raged mo reproduction. Some companies built newfactories, although many just made moreeffective use of the facilities they hadoperated during the first growth years.T h e y i n s t a l l e d n e w, a d v a n c e dmanufacturing equipment to raiseproduction capacity and the boomingrolling-stock industry saw rising profits.Some profits went to marketing overseasand to expanding into other sectors. This

was the last ‘golden age’ for rolling stockmanufacturers and suppliers.It was also a time of transition from steamto electric and diesel power. JNR’s laststeam locomotive was built in 1948.Electrification of the Tokaido main linebegan in 1956 and other trunk linesfollowed suit before long. Electric trainsbecame increasingly more common andcompanies in the electric equipmentindustry had higher sales revenues thanrolling stock manufacturers. High-performance EMUs were developed forboth JNR and the private railways. JNR’sKodama (Echo), the precursor to theshinkansen, began operations on thenarrow-gauge Tokaido main line in 1958,and the Tokaido Shinkansen opened onstandard-gauge track in 1964. This was atime of exciting technological advances—

including small but powerful AC motors,new control systems, and l ightercarriages—making it possible to raisespeeds. The Tokaido Shinkansen was bornboth from the accumulated technologyand experience of people working in theindustry from Japan’s early railway daysand from the hard work, know-how andtechnical developments of modernengineers.The shinkansen’s success createdincreased demand for shinkansen trainsets, and the 1968 JNR timetable revisiondemonstrated the improved trunk-linecapacity, resulting in more demand fornew trains and continuing growth inrolling stock production. But surprisingly,the opening of the Tokaido Shinkansenand JNR’s major timetable revisions weresoon followed by the end of the secondg rowth yea r s f o r r o l l i ng s t ockmanufacturers.

DoldrumsRoad transport came into its own aroundthe time of JNR’s 1968 timetable revisions.Improvements in the road network luredpeople from trains and buses (except inlarge cities), and the nation’s adoption of

Table 9 Private Rolling Stock Manufacturers established soon after WWII

Year Company Notes

1945 Kinki Sharyo Co., Ltd. Kinki Nippon Railway Co., Ltd.

1945 Tokyu Car Corp. Tokyu Corp.

1948 Naniwa Koki name changed to Alna Koki Co., Ltd.Hankyu Corp.


Trains running on quadruple section on JR East�s Sobu Line (JR East)



the motor vehicle was remarkably swift—the number of vehicles increased byaround 10 million every 5 years or so untilthe mid 1990s (Table 10).As a public corporation, JNR couldsupport its huge deficits by tapping intothe public purse, but if it had been aprivate business, it could not possibly haveobtained sufficient capital to stay afloat.Management was unable to bring labourconditions in line with declining revenues,unable to rationalize operations andunable to improve passenger services. Itcontinued to lose passengers and freightbusiness and debts rose year-on-year.Worsening finances led to drops in rollingstock orders. The situation continued todeteriorate until JNR was broken up andprivatized in 1987 when rolling-stockproduction was 70% lower than in 1968.Naturally, these difficulties impacted allmanufacturers and suppliers. Somemerged, combined manufacturingoperations in fewer factories, or withdrewaltogether from the industry (Table 11).Due to advances in power electronics,some technological advances were madeduring this period, including developmentof a chopper control system for electricmotors. Otherwise, development of railtechnology stagnated; there was littleprogress in high-speed technologies. The

downturn led to staff reductions, and somecompanies could not hire new staff whowould have driven next-generationdevelopments. The entire industry founditself without sufficient engineers, and thisshortage created hurdles that still existtoday.

Era of JRsThe seven JRs born from JNR’s break upand privatization in 1987 all took steps toimprove operations. They set out toimprove services and during the first 2 or3 years ordered large quantities of rollingstock, mainly types that JNR had beenusing.Subway construction continued in urbanareas along with upgrades to permit moresubways and private railways to providethrough services on each other’s lines.These advances also boosted orders fornew rolling stock and production rose fora while.Before its demise, the impoverished JNRcould neither order new stock nor replaceexisting aging stock, placing the entirerolling-stock industry in a slump. But noworders were up, and soon the JRs wereordering new types designed to their ownspecifications. However, once thisdemand had been met, the industry as awhole experienced another slump.

Long nose and white body of JR Kyushu'sSeries 800 Tsubame (Swallow) (JR Kyushu)

Another trend was the greater variety indesigns for both shinkansen andconventional lines. This trend towardgreater variety raised design andmanufacturing expenses, boosting overallp roduc t ion cos t s . Meanwhi l e ,competition was so severe that companiesstruggled to cut costs in order to meetdemand for lower prices and evenaccepted orders with no prof i ts .Manufacturers found themselves on hardtimes yet again. The situation wasworsened by collapse of the ‘bubbleeconomy’ around 1992, which broughton a period of economic stagnation andrecession now known as the ‘lost decade.’This recession reduced transport volumes,forcing railway operators to make fewerinvestments in rolling stock.In 1995, the JR East Niitsu Rolling StockManufacturing Factory began buildingcommuter EMUs for JR East, which reducedthe number of outside orders. Rolling stockmanufacturers found themselves in adifficult business environment, and somewere forced to downsize or withdraw fromthe industry (Table 12).Today, there is little hope for increaseddomestic demand, so manufacturers areattempting to expand overseas. There aresome opportunities to export entirecarriages, but in many cases, overseasra i lway operators , especia l ly indeveloping countries, are looking to buyentire railway turnkey systems, and manyask for special financing too. Rolling stockmanufacturers cannot easily deal with thistype of market unless they first form apartnership with a railway operator withthe required expertise. To participate inthe global market, Japanese rolling stockmanufacturers generally find they mustpartner with other companies, oftenthrough the auspices of a tradingcompany. However, in order to competewell in the international market, they arereorganizing to develop staff withinternational business experience and aregradually solving the problems one-by-

Table 10 Number of MotorVehicles registered inJapan (1960–2000)

Fiscal year Number (1000)

1960 3,404

1970 18,919

1975 29,143

1980 38,992

1985 48,240

1990 60,499

1995 70,107

2000 75,525

Source: Summary of Land TransportationStatistics, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure andTransport


Masahito Mizoguchi

Mr Mizoguchi is Managing Director of the Japan Association of Rolling Stock Industries (JARI). He

joined the former Ministry of Transport in 1969 after graduating in Civil Engineering from the Tokyo

Institute of Technology. Before joining JARI, he was Manager of Rolling Stock Maintenance as well

as Manager of Infrastructure in the Railway Bureau.

one. Working in their favour is the factthat Japanese technology is strong inelectric traction motors, control systems,train information systems, etc. As a result,the industry is exporting these parts, andproducing higher volumes of electricdevices and rail systems.During this period, Japan has madeconsiderable technology advances,including the changeover from DC to ACmotors, and from gate turn-off (GTO) VVVFinverters for traction control to insulatedgate bipolar transistor (IGBT) systems.Other examples include IT for train-controlsystems, advanced diagnostic systems, andleading-edge technologies for fastershinkansen services.

Future of Rolling StockManufacturing Industry

The Japanese economy has finally startedshowing some signs of recovery from thelong-term recession, but growth rates arestill low, and some regions are still inrecession. For example, the Osaka regionis not doing as well as Greater Tokyo. Inthe Osaka region, private railway ridershiphas continued declining for 10 years,forcing down investment levels even forreplacing rolling stock, and depressingoverall demand to very low levels.However, the government has joined theinternational campaign against globalwarming and is committed to reducingJapan’s CO2 emissions. It is promotingprojects aimed at getting people out of theircars and onto rail-based transport. In thepassenger market, these efforts includepromoting tramways, a mode once thoughtout of date. In the freight market, policiesare promoting higher speeds and longertrains. Thus, the domestic rolling-stockmarket is experiencing some interestingstructural changes.On the negative side, the birthratecontinues to drop and the populationcontinues to age, so Japan’s populationwill decline. The domestic rolling-stock

market is already saturated and demandfor new stock will have to come fromreplacement requirements. We canexpect only a very slight increase over thep re sen t number o f un i t s be ingmanufactured and a small rise in today’sproduction value (now approximately¥300 billion). This explains why Japan’srolling-stock industry is eyeing the exportmarket even more keenly.However, any effort to expand globallywill face fierce international competitionand require considerable enthusiasm. Onthe positive side, a number of developingcountries have modernization plans thatinclude construction of railways and manyof these plans include urban rail systemsfor commuters and intercity high-speedpassenger services—fields in which Japanhas a lot of experience. Meeting largecapacity demand, expecially during rush

hours, requires high-density operationswhile maintaining safety and staying ontimetable. Locomotive-hauled trains areunsuitable for these types of operationsand Japan’s experience in EMUs offersexcellent marketing opportunities in thisbusiness area.Japanese rail technology is also ideal forhigh-speed passenger services and offersadvantage of high volumes without highnoise, vibration, or energy consumption.Countries planning to construct a high-speed passenger railway should surelyfind the expertise and products of Japan’srolling-stock industry attractive. Theindustry will have to meet requests forturnkey rail systems and financing, and istherefore poised to take advantage ofgrowing opportunities in the globalmarket. ■

Table 11 Restructuring During Doldrums (1969–87)

Year Notes

1968 Tokyu Car acquired Teikoku Sharyo Industries

1969 Kawasaki Heavy Industries merged with Kawasaki Kokuki and Kawasaki Sharyo

1972 Nippon Sharyo closed Warabi Works and concentrated operations at Toyokawa Works

1972 Kawasaki Heavy Industries absorbed Locomotive Manufacturing Company

1981 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries stopped manufacturing rolling stock


Table 12 Abandoned Production and Downsizing after JNR Breakup andPrivatization

� Niigata Engineering sold rolling-stock business after receiving approval under CompanyReorganization and Rehabilitation Act

� Fuji Heavy Industries stopped manufacturing rolling stock

� Alna Koki liquidated, reorganized, and stopped manufacturing new rolling stock

� Nabco, a brake manufacturer, was absorbed in the newly-founded Nabtesco


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