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The Role of Financial Markets and Innovation in Productivity and
Growth in EuropePhilipp Hartmann, Florian Heider,
Elias Papaioannou, Marco Lo Duca
European Central Bank
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Conference “Investing in Innovation: Promoting New Opportunities in the UN Economic Commission
for Europe Region”, Geneva, Palais des Nations, 10 April 2008
Disclaimer: This paper is based on internal and external research. Any views expressed are only the authors’ own and should not be regarded as views of the ECB or the Eurosystem or bind them in any form
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Introduction
• Large academic literature on finance and growth– King & Levine (1993), Rajan & Zingales (1998), Wurgler (2000)
• Complications, esp. from European policy point of view– No distinction between industrialised and developing countries
– Often using historical data
– Often analysing a very narrow issue
• This paper– Adopts a comprehensive view of financial systems
– Chooses from a large number of indicators and most recent data• Updates existing ones
• Introduces new ones
– Focuses on industrial countries and Europe/euro area
– Presents new econometric estimations
– Ambition to inform European policy
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Elements of the analysis
1) Conceptual framework based on an extensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on finance and growth– With a particular eye on what works for industrialised countries
2) Compilation of a comprehensive set of indicators of financial development– Embedded in the conceptual framework
– Firmly grounded in the literature
– Comprehensively checked for data quality and comparability
3) Econometric analysis of how financial development affects economic efficiency– Does a more developed financial system help Schumpeterian process
of “creative destruction”, i.e. speed up the reallocation of capital from declining to rising industry sectors?
– What indicators are particularly relevant for this process?
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Main results
• Total capital market size is a useful summary statistic– Captures overall financial development of an economic region
• Financial market framework conditions could be improved
1) Certain aspects of corporate governance– General shareholder rights have improved in Europe
– But it is still difficult to curb “self-dealing” of corporate insiders
2) Efficiency of legal system in resolving financial disputes– Having many formal steps that regulate legal disputes limits the
supply of capital
3) Structural features of European bank sectors– A small number of countries still have significant levels of
ownership of banks by the public sector
– Do these banks perform better than the average recorded in the literature (e.g. such banks distort competition)?
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Less strong results
• Information processing capacity of stock markets– Less pricing of idiosyncratic risk and greater uncertainty about
firm prospects in a few specific European countries
• Creditor rights– Bondholders’ say in reorganisations and secured creditors’
priority increases depth and breadth of capital markets
– But the overall strength is still unclear
• Ownership structures– More dispersed ownership of large publicly traded firms and more
institutional shareholders could improve corporate governance
• Financial regulation and supervision– Some aspects could be improved w.r.t. incentives for risk taking
and management
– Moral-hazard of deposit insurance and forbearance discretion
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Financial system concepts and their interrelation
Financial Stability
Financial Efficiency
Performance of the economy
Performance of the financial system
Fundamentals of the financial system
Market Infrastructures
Economic Stability•Price stability
•Financial Integration•Financial Development /Modernisation
Economic Efficiency•Economic Growth
Other Structural Features
Legal System, Financial Regulation and
Corporate Governance
Monetary Institutions
Financial Structure
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Size of capital markets
(% of GDP; sum of loans, equity and bonds, BIS, ECB, IMF, Eurostat, WFE)
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
450%
500%
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT EA CH SE UK JP US
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2005
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Enforcement of shareholder rights against self-dealing by corporate insiders
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT EA CH SE UK JP US
(high score = strong rights, anti-self dealing index, Djankov et al. 2006)
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Duration of enforcement
(calender days, Worldbank, data refer to 2005)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT EA CH SE UK JP US
10
State ownership of banks
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT EA CH SE UK JP US
1999 2002
(% of total assets, World Bank)
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Hypothesis
Argument (Bagehot, 1873; Schumpeter, 1911):
In financially developed countries capital flows to industries (as well as firms and entrepreneurs) with positive prospects
Financial Markets Productivity-Innovation (relevance for advanced economies)
Only one broad channel addressed, there are others
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Two-step procedure
1. Estimate country-specific speeds of inter-sectoral capital reallocationUsing industry-level data (in manufacturing), investment growth is regressed on value-added growth (industry prospects).
Control in the estimation for all possible sources of unobservedheterogeneity to precisely isolate the inter-industry response of industry investment to the emergence of growth opportunities (i.e. controlling for specialisation patterns; industry-specific global trends; common sector trends).
2. Examine the effect of capital markets size (financial development) on the estimated speed of capital reallocation and identify the sources of financial development.Two-stage least squares estimation.
Significant refinement of Wurgler (JFE, 2000)
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Data
• 65 countries – Industrial and developing
– We separate three groups, distinguishing high and low income countries
• 28 manufacturing industries
• 1963 to 2003
• Source: UNIDO, Industrial Statistics Database
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All Countries
AUS
AUT
BELBGD
BOL
BRB
CAN
CHLCMR
COLCYP
DEUW
DNK
ECUEGY ESP
ETHFINFJI
FRAGBR
GRCGTM
HKG
IDNIND
IRL
IRN ISR
ITA
JOR
JPN
KEN
KOR
KWT
LBYLKA
MAR
MEXMLT
MWI
MYS
NGA
NLDNOR
NZLPAK
PAN
PER
PHL
PRT
SGP
SLV
SWE
SWZ
TTOTUNTUR
TZA
URY
USA
VEN
ZMB
ZWE
-.50
.51
Inve
stm
ent-V
alue
Add
ed G
row
th E
last
icity
(b4)
0 .5 1 1.5Financial Development (FD)
Investment-Growth elasticity estimated:controlling for country, industry, year, country-industry, industry-year and country-year fixed-effects
AUS
AUT
BEL
BRB
CAN
CYP
DEUW
DNK
ESP
FIN
FRAGBR
GRC
HKG
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPNKOR
KWTMLT
NLDNOR
NZL
PRT
SGP
SWE
USA
-.20
.2.4
.6.8
Inve
stm
ent-V
alue
Add
ed G
row
th E
last
icity
(b4)
.4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4Financial Development (FD)
Investment-Growth elasticity estimated:controlling for country, industry, year, country-industry, industry-year and country-year fixed-effects
Speed of inter-sectoral capital reallocation and capital markets size: Plots
High Income
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Legal efficiency and capital market size
AUS
AUT
BEL
BOL
BRB
CAN
CHL
COL
CYPDEUW
DNK
ECUEGY
ESPFIN
FRA
GBR
GRC
GTM
HKG
IRLISR
ITA
JOR
JPN
KOR
KWT
LKA MARMEX
MLT
MYSNLD
NORNZL
PAN
PER
PHL
PRT
SGP
SLV
SWE
SWZ
TTO TUN
TUR
URY
USA
VEN
0.5
11.
5Fi
nanc
ial D
evel
opm
ent (
FD)
1 2 3 4 5 6Legal Formalism Index (LEXFORM)
Estimation: Excluding Low Income Countries
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Anti-self dealing and capital market size
AUS
AUT
BEL
BOL
CAN
CHL
COL
DEUW
DNK
ECU EGY
ESP FIN
FRA
GBR
GRC
HKG
IRLISR
ITA
JOR
JPN
KOR
LKA MARMEX
MYSNLD
NORNZL
PAN
PER
PHL
PRT
SGP
SLV
SWE
TUN
TUR
URY
USA
VEN
0.5
11.
5Fi
nanc
ial D
evel
opm
ent (
FD)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Anti Self Dealing Index (ANTISELF)
Estimation: Excluding Low Income Countries
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State ownership of banks and capital market size
AUS
AUT
BEL
BOL
CAN
CHL
COL
CYPDEUW
DNK
ECUEGY
ESPFIN
FRA
GBR
GRC
GTM
HKG
IRL
IRN
ISR
ITA
JOR
JPN
KOR
KWT
LBY
LKAMAR MEX
MYSNLD
NORNZL
PAN
PER
PHL
PRT
SGP
SLV
SWE
TTO TUN
TUR
URY
USA
VEN
0.5
11.
5Fi
nanc
ial D
evel
opm
ent (
FD)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Government Ownership of Banks (BGOV)
Estimation: Excluding Low Income Countries
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Venture capital financing (early investment stage)
(% of GDP, by country of management, EVCA, PWC, Eurostat)
0.00%
0.01%
0.02%
0.03%
0.04%
0.05%
0.06%
0.07%
0.08%
0.09%
0.10%
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT EA CH SE UK JP US
1995-1999 2000-2005
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Venture capital and innovation
• Generally significant economic effect of VC on innovation– Lerner and Kortum (RAND, 2000) find that in the US over 1983-
1992, VC has accounted for 8% of industrial innovation while being only 3% of R&D investment.
– Da Rin and Penas (NBER, 2007) find that unlike public funding, VC pushes portfolio companies towards more in-house R&D effort.
– However, little effect has been found of VC on Europe‘s most innovative firms‘ ability to raise equity capital, grow and create jobs (Da Rin and Botazzi [CEPR, 2002]), and several case studies show that VC has little impact on the innovation output of European firms (e.g., Peneder [SSRN, 2007] for Austria).
• Interpretation: VC promotes innovation, but only when coupled with available innovative technologies, highly trained workforce, infrastructure, and management expertise, and under the right public policies.
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Public policies promoting VC: Literature
• Taxes– Low capital gains tax is a crucial stimulus to VC investment;
– Tax advantaged stock options most noteworthy change of later years.
• Regulations– Integrated financial services market and a harmonized regulatory
network reduce the cost of capital and widen access to investors;
– Common accounting standards ensure transparency and promote confidence in prospective investors;
– At the same time, too strict anti-trust regulation may create hurdles where no competition issues are raised;
• Labour regulations– Hiring and firing restrictions hamper high-tech VC investments.
• Stock markets targeted at entrepreneurial companies positively affect the share of early stage and high-tech VC investments
21Source: Da Rin et al. (2005), Public policy and the creation of active venture capitalmarkets, ECB WP, no. 430, January.
Share of high-tech investment Share of early-stage investment(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
New market 0.090(0.049)*
0.085(0.045)*
0.088(0.046)*
0.087(0.033)***
0.089(0.033)***
0.088(0.033)***
Capital gains tax -0.014(0.003)***
-0.012(0.003)***
-0.015(0.003)***
-0.008(0.002)***
-0.008(0.002)***
-0.008(0.002)***
Per capita publicR&D
-0.004(0.006)
-0.001(0.006)
-0.002(0.006)
0.000(0.005)
0.001(0.005)
0.000(0.005)
Per capita VC funds -0.013(0.039)
-0.011(0.038)
-0.022(0.038)
0.017(0.028)
0.019(0.028)
0.021(0.028)
Last-year‘s per capita VC funds
0.006(0.048)
0.004(0.048)
0.001(0.048)
-0.003(0.035)
-0.000(0.035)
-0.001(0.035)
Aggregate barriersto entry
0.060(0.038)
-0.028(0.027)
Hiring and firingindicator
0.044(0.019)**
-0.009(0.014)
Immigration lawindicator
0.050(0.023)**
-0.002(0.017)
Observations 171 171 171 171 171 171
Panel analysis of VC determinants
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The end
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Securitisation
(% of GDP, by country of collateral, ESF, Eurostat, SIFMA)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT EA CH SE UK JP US
2000 2002 2005
24
Pricing of firm-specific information
(R2, high score = less pricing of idiosyncratic risk, own estimations/Datastream)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT EA CH SE UK JP US
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
25
Dispersion of analysts’ EPS forecasts
(standard deviation of EPS forecast/level of forecast, Thomson Financial)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT NL PT EA CH SE UK JP US
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
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Bank concentration
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT EA CH SE UK JP US
1998 2004
(Herfindahl index for total assets, Bankscope)
27
Supervisory forbearance discretion
(high score = strong discretion, World Bank and ECB)
0
1
2
3
4
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT EA CH SE UK JP US
1999 2002 2005
28
Empirical approaches
1. Pure Cross-Country Cross-Industry
Fisman and Love (2004a,b); Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006a)
Is industries that experience global investment-growth opportunities growing faster in financially developed countries?
2. Cross-Country (1)Bekaert, Harvey, Lundbald, and Siegel (forthcoming)
Do financially developed countries respond faster to shocks in the industries they specialize in?
3. Cross-Country (II)
Wurgler (2000)
Is industry investment more responsive to output growth (as a proxy for future growth opportunities) in financially developed countries?