This is a work in progress. Please contact the author before citing.

The Role and Legitimacy of Former Liberation Movements in Democratic Societies:

A Comparative Study of South Africa and Poland

By

Kate Gunby

ABSTRACT

What is the role and legitimacy of former social movements in democratic societies? How do their pasts as movements influence them as political parties or trade unions? I examine the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Solidarity movement in Poland – two social movement organizations (SMOs) that have entered into formal politics as parties after overthrowing the former non-democratic regimes. This paper is based on interviews with current and former activists, supporters, and members of these movements, party and union employees and officials, political analysts, and academic experts in both countries. It was necessary for both the ANC and Solidarity to enter politics as they were the dominant opposition to the past regimes and both transitions relied on these movements to create order and unity. The ANC party has been significantly shaped by its liberation movement past, and in several ways this history has limited the party’s accountability. Despite its electoral advantage, the ANC has not lived up to public expectations during its time in office. The political parties that came out of Solidarity were short lived and prevented the union from promoting workers rights. Now that Solidarity is operating solely as a union, it has begun to rebuild its legitimacy in Polish society. These results demonstrate the complicated role of emotions in determining social movement outcomes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................1 Methodology........................................................................................................................4 Defining Terms ...................................................................................................................6 Literature Review.................................................................................................................8

What are the Outcomes of Social Movements?.....................................................10 What is Success and Can it be Achieved? ............................................................11 What is the Relationship Between the State and Social Movements?...................13 What are the Categories of Success? ....................................................................14Are Success and Failure the Only Options? .........................................................15 How Do Movement Outcomes Impact Politics? ..................................................18

Previous Case Studies of Movement Outcomes ...............................................................20 Brazilian Workers’ Party ......................................................................................20 Mississippi Civil Rights Movement......................................................................21 Chilean Shantytown Dwellers...............................................................................22 African National Congress and Palestinian Liberation Organization....................22 Indian Political Parties ..........................................................................................23 Czech Republic and Sloviakia ..............................................................................23 What Theories Do Previous Case Studies Uphold?...............................................24 How Does the Literature Influence This Paper?....................................................25

CHAPTER 2: AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS CASE STUDY.........................................30 History of the Movement...................................................................................................30 Key Documents..................................................................................................................37 Traditions ..........................................................................................................................39 Political Structures and Party Cohesion.............................................................................42Leaders...............................................................................................................................46Membership, Public Opinion, Emotions, and Elections....................................................50 Service Delivery.................................................................................................................58 Interactions with Civil Society and Political Society .......................................................63 Accountability....................................................................................................................73

CHAPTER 3: SOLIDARITY CASE STUDY...............................................................................77History of the Movement...................................................................................................77 Key Documents..................................................................................................................85 Traditions ..........................................................................................................................85

Political Structures and Party Cohesion.............................................................................86 Leaders...............................................................................................................................88 Membership, Public Opinion, Emotions, and Elections…………....................................90 Service Delivery.................................................................................................................92 Interactions with Civil Society and Political Society .......................................................94 Accountability....................................................................................................................98

CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS .........................................................................................................100 History of the Movements ..............................................................................................100 Key Documents................................................................................................................101 Traditions ........................................................................................................................101 Political Structures and Party Cohesion...........................................................................102 Leaders.............................................................................................................................104Membership, Public Opinion, Emotions, and Elections..................................................106Service Delivery...............................................................................................................108 Interactions with Civil Society and Political Society .....................................................109Accountability..................................................................................................................111

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION....................................................................................................112

Interviews and Group Meetings...................................................................................................121 References....................................................................................................................................123Appendix A. South Africa Interview Questions..........................................................................142Appendix B. Poland Interview Questions ...................................................................................144

This is a work in progress. Please contact the author before citing.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This paper is about two striking examples of social movements achieving their goals, the

African National Congress (ANC) and Solidarity. The ANC was a liberation movement in South

Africa that was created in 1923 and led the struggle against apartheid. In 1994, ANC leader

Nelson Mandela became South Africa’s first democratically elected president. Solidarity was

formed in 1980 as an anti-communist trade union in Poland, and led a coalition government after

the first semi-free elections in 1989. Yet their stories do not end with the birth of democracies in

their respective nations. The power of the ANC that led to the end of apartheid in 1994 has not

faded away since this great success. The ANC is now the ruling political party but the

organization’s history as a movement continues to influence how South Africans vote and how

ANC politicians rule. Solidarity has been in and out of political office, supported and formed

coalitions with right wing groups, and experienced a steep decline in membership and public

support. During their stint in politics, Solidarity essentially abandoned the interests of the

workers they had earlier fought to protect. Since 2001, Solidarity has once again served solely as

a trade union and has begun to represent laborers once more.

What happens to a social movement after it is victorious?  Most movements never

achieve their goals, but some do so well that their “raison d’être” is no longer relevant.   The way

that social movement organizations (SMOs) proceed once they have reached this level of success

can cement the changes in their society or allow their progress to slip away.  Yet it is uncommon

for social movement researchers to study social movement success.  The bulk of social

movement literature deals with how movements are created and maintained.  When researchers

do examine the outcomes of social movements, they tend to focus on biographical consequences

for activists or the methods of measuring policy effects and institutionalization.  Mixed results

are typical for most social movements, yet there are a growing number of cases in which social

movements are able to achieve their primary goals.  Social movements focused on liberation,

suffrage, human rights, and other social changes sometimes lead to successful revolutions and

reforms.  Issues of power and class, and the effects of past oppression linger, but these are not

regarded as shortcomings of the movements, since their principal purposes have been achieved.

Returning to the example of liberation movements, we can assume that the process of

liberation requires drastic political, structural, and societal transformations.  Once these changes

have taken place, the SMO involved in bringing about the liberation must adapt to the new

landscape to stay relevant. Few studies have examined what happens to movements in these

situations and most academics who mention these scenarios conclude that one of three things

occurs: the movement changes its goals, the leaders are institutionalized and leave the realm of

social movement studies, or the SMO ceases to exist (Zald and Ash 1966).  Yet these are not the

only possible results of movement success, and the scholars who limit their studies to these

options ignore the power of the legacy of liberation movements.  Even in the cases where the

leaders are institutionalized or the organization dissolves, the movement still has a powerful

position in the hearts and minds of the citizens, supporters, and members who benefited from the

liberation.  It is important when movements are successful that their leaders and members

understand the lasting power they hold, even when their work is done, and make a conscious

effort to move forward in a way that will preserve the changes they fought for.

Two fundamental questions about movement success guide this paper. First, how have

their pasts as movements influenced them as political parties and, in the case of Solidarity, as a

union? I examine how traditions and organizational tactics have been carried forward from their

social movement pasts, and how key documents, political structures and party cohesion, leaders,

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membership and public opinion, and interaction with civil and political society have been

influenced by their history. Second, what is the role and legitimacy of these successful former

liberation movements in the new democracies they helped to create? Here I look at political

structures and party cohesion, leaders, public opinion polls, election data, membership statistics,

service delivery, interactions with other leaders and institutions, and accountability.

I show that it was logical for both the ANC and Solidarity to enter politics because they

were the dominant opposition to the past regimes and both transitions relied on these

movements’ abilities to create order and unity. In South Africa, though, it appears that the power

of the ANC has gone too far and without legitimate opposition to keep the party in check,

corruption and empty promises abound. They have seemingly brought a hollow version of

democracy to South Africa. The country has free elections, but that does not mean much when

the opposition parties are not viable alternatives and the public is so disenchanted that fewer

citizens show up to vote each year. Civil liberties are extremely limited and anyone who

questions the ANC is seen as “anti-democratic.” Poland, with much help from the European

Union (EU), fares slightly better. It is still one of the poorest countries in the EU, less than half

of registered voters show up at the polls, and its civil society is rather limited. Currently,

Solidarity has very little power, only operates as a trade union, and is battling to regain for

workers the rights that the parties coming out of Solidarity ignored.

Both former liberation movements have not kept their promises, and both have lost a

great deal of legitimacy. The ANC has more power than ever before and thus rarely sees their

undelivered promises, silencing of dissidents, and large inter-party rifts as a problem. Solidarity,

on the other hand, has very little power. The organization worked to limit its scope in order to

increase its legitimacy as a trade union, and has also spawned a variety of break-away parties and

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unions that have similarly enjoyed limited success. These outcomes are linked to the role that

emotions, both attachment and disappointment, have played in these new democracies.

METHODOLOGY

The theoretical foundation for my paper is limited to works that are relevant and

scholarly, but I did not rule out sources by their academic field or publication date.  Thus my

research involves books, journal articles, and manuscripts.  My research spans several disciplines

that study social movements, including sociology, political science, social psychology,

anthropology, and history. It is important to examine studies across the social sciences because

all of these disciplines have done work on social movements, yet they do not always heed the

findings of other fields.

My case studies involve a combination of primary and secondary sources. The primary

sources for this research are eight personal interviews I conducted while studying in South

Africa, and a series of three group meetings and one personal interview I had while studying in

Poland. I have supplemented this research with secondary sources, using books, scholarly

articles, and the newspaper articles to provide a more full account for my case studies.

The South African interviews are with individuals who are critical of the ANC—most,

but not all, of the people I interviewed were ANC activists before South Africa became a

democracy. I interviewed people of diverse occupations who are involved with a variety of

organizations. My interviews were with eight individuals of different races, ages, and sexes.

Five are male, three are female, five are African, two are Indian, one is white, and their ages

range from late 20s to 80s. I tried to seek-out people with different political experiences,

locations, and opinions. All of the people I interviewed were recommended to me by my onsite

research advisor Richard Pithouse, the SIT Reconciliation and Development Academic

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Coordinator John Daniel, or someone I interviewed. I was based in Durban, South Africa for my

study abroad program, so my research was confined to people in the Durban area. I asked all of

the people I interviewed the same guiding questions (see Appendix A), though I often changed

the order to best follow the flow of the conversation, and I occasionally added questions for

further clarification or when something they said was particularly intriguing. All of the

interviews were tape recorded and I also took notes by hand; both of these resources were used

for my interview write-ups.

I was able to conduct one personal interview while I was in Poland, with Solidarity’s

Public Relations and International Relations Representative for the Małopolska region (see

questions in Appendix B). We met in his office, and as in South Africa, I both tape recorded the

interview and took notes by hand. My study abroad class met with this same representative, as

well as the Co-Vice Presidents of a union. The meetings were in the form of lectures followed

by question and answer sessions, and my notes from the proceedings of these meetings were

taken by hand. These primary sources were not from a diverse group—as all were white, Polish,

male, and middle or upper-middle class—but they offered differing viewpoints regarding

Solidarity. All were conducted in Krakow, Poland.

This research project has several major limitations. The first is the language barrier.

English was the second language of several of the people I interviewed in South Africa, and

though it was seldom an obvious limitation, this factor cannot be ignored. In Poland, the class

meeting with the Co-Vice Presidents of the union was conducted through a translator, and the

remainder of class meetings and my interview were in English which was not the first language

of the respondent. The second limitation is the very selective sample of informants. My primary

data comes from eight individuals in Durban, South Africa and three individuals in Krakow,

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Poland, and neither provide a representative sampling of their respective countries. All of the

group meetings were facilitated by my program director in Poland, and all of the interviewees

were recommended to me by my advisor, my program’s academic coordinator, or someone I

interviewed. While I managed to achieve some artificial diversity by seeking people of different

sexes, races, socio-economic statuses, and ages in South Africa, and differing perspectives in

Poland, these factors do not imply true diversity.

DEFINING TERMS

The definition of social movements has been highly contested and changes frequently as

new movements take on different forms. David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow offered a good

starting point for the definition when they described social movements as “collective challenges

to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with common purposes and

solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities” (1998:4). However,

there is an important distinction between social movements and social movement organizations.

Social movement organizations (SMOs) are formal, coherent groups that make organized

decisions and lead activities that may involve the broader social movement (Oliver and Myers

2002:2; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988:716-7). The ANC and Solidarity were SMOs

within broader social movements.

Revolutions also have a variety of forms. Goodwin defines revolution as “any and all

cases in which a state or political regime is overthrown, supplanted, and/or fundamentally

transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extraconstitutional, and/or violent fashion”

(2005:404). This kind of revolution requires the broad participation of citizens in overthrowing

the existing regime. The narrower types of revolutions are social in nature and require a “more

or less rapid and fundamental social, economic, and/or cultural change during or soon after the

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struggle for state power” (Goodwin 2005:405). These social revolutions require more from the

people fighting against the regime, and are consequently more difficult to create. Both South

Africa and Poland went though this type of broad revolution.

Both types of revolutions can be the product of revolutionary movements. While most

social movements try to influence the decisions of the existing power holders, revolutionary

movements are a subset of social movements that try to fundamentally change who holds the

power. Goodwin explains that the extent of change promoted by revolutionary movements

varies, with some seeking power and others fighting for more fundamental transformations

(2005:405). The ANC sought power early on, but Solidarity originally wanted nothing to do

with politics.

A more specific type of social movement and revolutionary movement is a movement of

national liberation. There are entire books that attempt to define liberation movements, which

were classically described as groups that opposed colonial domination (Quaye 1990). Yet both

the ANC and Solidarity are considered liberation movements, and neither South Africa nor

Poland were colonies of the regimes these movements opposed. These national liberation

movements involved political freedom and autonomy, and combated undemocratic governments.

Furthermore, the term liberation movement is not limited to national or human political

struggles, as the women’s liberation movement, gay liberation movement, and animal liberation

movement demonstrate. These examples lead to a broad definition: a liberation movement is a

group that seeks to end oppression and exploitation, and strives for “the basic moral principle of

equal consideration” (Singer 2002:xxi).

Democracy is another difficult term to define because with each new government, new

variables are created and its definition is questioned. The definition of democracy is debated not

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only by academics, but by people involved in political struggles and citizens of many countries,

making it particularly hard to decide on one universal definition (Markoff 2005:396).

Furthermore, democracy should not be regarded as a system that is either present or absent, but

should instead be analyzed on a spectrum (Glenn 2001:10). Just because a government holds

free and democratic elections does not mean that its country is democratic in all spheres. For

example, many democracies are procedurally democratic and hold regular free and fair elections,

but are substantively undemocratic and punish people and groups that dissent.

While there is no universally applicable definition of democracy, the idea is still central

to the study of social movements. Most research on social movement and SMO outcomes

involves changes made within a democracy, changes made to the way the democratic system

works, or revolutionary movements that resulted in some form of democratization. If scholars

settle on one definition of democracy, they delegitimize the work that movements have done to

improve civil society, equal rights, individual freedoms, and the like. In this paper I refer to

democracy broadly, showing how important the idea is for many social movements. This

understanding that democracy is not a dichotomous variable is perhaps most important in

instances where a revolutionary movement leads to democratization. While the movement has

created a new democracy, there is still much work that can be done to improve the quality of

democracy.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Social movement success was neglected by academics until recently. Theories of

movement trajectories provide the foundation for studies of social movement success to focus on

changes based on resources, political power, and decisions made by leaders. The result has been

academic works that ignore the broader effects of social movement victories, and instead focus

8

on how specific environmental factors and decisions have created certain policies, or impacted

members of the movements. This section traces the development of theories of movement

outcomes, states common themes, highlights gaps in theories and research, and shows how they

have influenced case study research on social movement outcomes.

The relationships of movements to state and social politics have been largely

underdeveloped in social movement theory.  As Buechler explains:

Social movements were not granted political status for decades because collective behavior theory defined them as psychological, noninstitutional, or irrational; each of these formulations obscured the political status of social activism.  At the same time, prevalent theories of the state left very little theoretical space for social movements as agents of state politics. (1999:165)   

There are four basic schools of thought regarding the trajectories of social movements and

revolutions (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001:193).   The first three schools were defined by

Jack Goldstone (1980a).  Goldstone said that the first “generation” of social movement theories

focused on the development of social movements as organizations with rigid stages of producing

routines and oligarchy, and was popular from about 1900 to roughly 1940 (see Goldstone 1980a;

McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001:193).  The second collection of theories, dominant from about

1940 to 1975, focused on structural strains, and includes the works of Blumer, Kornhauser,

Selznick, and Smelser  (Goldstone 1980a; Buechler and Cylke 1997; McAdam, Tarrow, and

Tilly 2001). The third series of theories tried to compensate for the shortcomings of the previous

two by offering a more comparative analysis that examined the impact of political, economic,

and demographic factors (Goldstone 1980a; McAdam et al. 2001; Skocpol 1979).  While

portions of the case studies fit with theories that came out of these first three groupings, my

thesis ultimately aligns with a more recent group of theories.

The fourth and youngest “generation” of social movement theory is critical of the

exclusive focus on structures, and calls for a more human approach to understanding social

9

movements.  Desai explains that these scholars are “calling for a better understanding of the role

of emotions, culture, and the creative and innovative capacity of leaders” (2002:622; see also

Aminzade et al. 2001; Flam and King 2005; Goodwin and Jasper 1999 and 2003; Goodwin,

Jasper and Polletta 2001; McAdam et al. 2001).  Furthermore, they view activists and movement

leaders as rational decision makers who are participating in collective action to create political

and social change.  This focus on human emotion is also a step towards incorporating public

opinion, an aspect Burstein and Linton have championed because it is particularly important

when studying the impacts of social movements in democratic countries (2002:395-6).  This

collection of theories allows scholars to begin to address social movement success without

simply measuring quantifiable changes and trying to prove causality.

Studies of social movements and emotions have followed two major trends. One group

has attempted to integrate emotions into more traditional social movement theories such as

framing, identity, political opportunity structure, and repertoires of action (Yang 2007:1390).

The other group has tried “to bring emotional dynamics into the explanation of all aspects of

collective action and social movements. Emotions are considered to affect recruitment processes,

movement emergence, the internal dynamics of a movement, as well as movement demise”

(ibid). However these studies have not explored the role of emotions in the positive outcomes of

social movements.

What are the Outcomes of Social Movements?

While social scientists disagree on many aspects of collective action, most concur that the

discipline has neglected the effects of social movements (Berkowitz 1974; Gurr 1980; McAdam

et al. 1988; Tarrow 1993; Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander, 1995; Giugni, 1998, 1999;

Lofland, 1993:347-8). This is particularly surprising, since change has usually been regarded as

10

the reason for forming and continuing collective action (McAdam and Snow, 1997:xviii-xxv;

McCarthy and Zald, 1997:1217-18; Tarrow, 1998:4-6). Burstein (1999) suggests that this area of

study was neglected because academics held contradictory beliefs about the power of social

movements. Though academics believed that social movements were valuable endeavors and

worthy of being studied, academics also believed that collective action rarely had an impact

(Burstein 1999:3). This was exacerbated by movement trajectory theorists who saw collective

behavior as a way for psychologically abnormal people to cope with their situation. It is difficult

to justify studying social movement outcomes when most scholars think movements are based on

“magical beliefs” (Smelser 1962:8) that will not create successful social changes. While scholars

have now moved beyond that framework, the collection of social movement literature that came

out of that framework stunted the development of theories and studies on movement outcomes

through the mid 1970s.

Fortunately, social movement outcomes have not been completely overlooked, and have

gained attention in recent years. As Marco Giugni points out, “a striking disparity exists

between the large body of work on political and policy outcomes and the sporadic studies on the

cultural and institutional effects of social movements” (1998:373). When scholars have studied

the outcomes of social movements, they have generally focused on policy effects and

biographical consequences for activists, but failed to examine the broader framework of social

and political change (Jenkins and Form 2005:331). This paper addresses work done in both

areas, using research on social movement outcomes so that we can better understand how to

study broader social movement change.

What is Success, and Can it Be Achieved?

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Regardless of how possible or frequent movement success is, the belief that collective

action can achieve some form of victory is crucial for movements to be effective. Most social

movement members participate because they believe that their actions will result in success

(Klandermans 1984,1992). These expectations are social constructions and can be self-fulfilling

because they influence the participation of members and thus can impact the outcomes. Zald and

Ash said in 1966 that when a movement actually manages to achieve its goals, there are two

major possible responses: an SMO can either create new goals, or simply cease to exist

(1966:333). They offer a third, less likely option of ex-movement organization using the

example of the Townsend Movement, a group that remained relevant after achieving the policies

they set out to implement (ibid; see also Messinger 1955).

Other studies on movement effects examined specific policy successes, indirect outcomes

including public perceptions and countermovements, and activist careers and biographies

(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988:727-8). More recent studies on movement success and

failure still tend to focus either on the structural factors that facilitate or hinder movement

success, or on the strengths and weaknesses of the SMO (Younis 2000:7). Yet there has been a

shift in the way scholars think about movement outcomes, with a new appreciation for the

“importance of broader patterns of change in culture, opinions, and lifestyles” (Oliver, Cadena-

Roa, and Strawn 2003:219). This line of thought includes the possibilities of “nonlinear”

outcomes that go beyond achieving goals and analyzing various actions and reactions (Gusfield

1981; Oliver 1989; Giugni 1999; Tilly 1999:268). Like social movements, each revolutionary

movement has a different level of success, and very few manage to seize power (Goodwin

2005:405). This is because the success of a revolutionary movement depends on the failure of

the state. Since there are revolutions that can be studied, we can assume that radical change is

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possible, even if the movement is not the only reason for the breakdown of the state (Goodwin

2005:409).

What is the Relationship Between the State and Movements?

Most SMOs, and the people who study them, regard the state as the target of their actions

(Wolfson 2001:7-8). Since the state controls social goods and has a monopoly on legitimate

violence, it is “simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as

the organizer of the political system and the arbiter of victory” (Jenkins and Klandermans

1995:3). Particularly in democracies, social movements are required to interact with the state in

order to attain any lawful and lasting outcomes. Wolfson (2001:9) outlines three relationships

between the movement and the state including government facilitation, government co-optation

or goal repression, and active government facilitation or repression (see also McCarthy and Zald

1977; Piven and Cloward 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Gamson 1975; della Porta 1995).

These categories make more sense when linked to their correlation with degrees of movement

success. Government facilitation is success, government co-optation is partial success, and

government repression is failure.

Some movements seek formal entry or acceptance from authorities while others seek

concessions (Gamson 1975; Tilly 1978). Movements are considered challengers, which are

different from polity members who are able to consult with government leadership habitually (Lo

1992:230). This improves the chances that polity members are able to influence authorities in

comparison to challenge groups who do not have the same access (Tilly 1978:53-4, 117). As

Wolfson explains, “It is argued that entry into the polity, and consequent access to

institutionalized means of influence, represents a qualitative change in the potential influence of

groups on government decision making” (2001:8). However, Burstein and Linton’s (2002) study

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of social movements from 1990 to 2000 found that there is little reason to assume that political

parties actually have a significant amount of power over public policy. They conclude that: “The

impact of political organizations is significantly different from zero, by conventional statistical

tests, only about half the time, and important in policy terms (as assessed by the authors) in just

over a fifth. There is little evidence that parties have more impact than other organizations”

(385). This study indicates that social scientists who only assess the policy impacts of political

parties with movement pasts are limiting their research to a variable that might not be

significantly affected by the organization’s movement to party transformation.

What are the Categories of Success?

The Strategy of Social Protest by William Gamson offered one of the first comprehensive

definitions of movement success. He also asked many of the big questions that scholars have yet

to answer:

What of the group whose leaders are honored or rewarded while their supposed beneficiaries linger in the same cheerless state as before? Is such a group more or less successful than another challenger whose leaders are vilified and imprisoned even as their program is eagerly implemented by their oppressor? Is a group a failure if it collapses with no legacy save inspiration to a generation that will soon take up the same cause with more tangible results? And what do we conclude about a group that accomplishes exactly what it set out to achieve and then finds its victory empty of real meaning for its presumed beneficiaries? (1975:28)

Gamson began to answer these broad questions by creating a system of determining movement

outcomes. He defined four kinds of social movement outcomes, based on the movement’s

abilities to gain acceptance and new advantages. These four categories are (1) a full response:

acceptance and new advantages, (2) co-optation: acceptance without new advantages, (3)

preemption: new advantages without acceptance, and (4) failure: neither acceptance nor new

advantages (Gamson 1975:29). Acceptance can be assumed when a movement is engaged in

consultations or negotiations, receives formal recognition, or is included in the power holding

organizational structure (Gamson 1975:32). It must be noted here that revolutionary groups are

14

unique because they attempt to overthrow the existing power holders, and thus the only way they

can be “accepted” is by taking over the role of power (Gamson 1975:32-3). For a movement to

receive new advantages, it does not have to be the cause of these benefits. Rather than getting

caught up in trying to prove causality, or the worthiness of these benefits, Gamson simply asked

if the new advantages a movement sought after are actualized (1975:34).

Through Gamson’s systematic study of a large sample of American SMOs, he found that

co-optation was most common (Gamson 1975, McAdam et al. 1988:727). Giugni notes that

Gamson’s classification system has not been used to its fullest extent by quantitative researchers,

and that when Gamson’s model has been utilized by social scientists they are limited to studying

organizations and ignoring the influence of broader cycles of protest (1998:382-3, see also

Tarrow 1994). A variety of scholars built off of Gamson’s theory in the decades following his

model for movement success (Skocpol 1979, 1982; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995; Rochon and

Mazmanian 1993; see also Giugni 1998:384). Essentially, these scholars all agreed that

acceptance and new advantages are important variables in determining movement outcomes, but

they offered additional factors based on either structural effects (Kitschelt and Kriesi) or social

values (Rochon and Mazmanian).

Are Success and Failure the Only Options?

Judging a movement based on the dichotomy of success and failure assumes the

movement has unified goals, raises the problem of subjectivity, and exaggerates the objectives of

movement participants (Giugni 1998:383). Furthermore, social movement outcomes can be

unintentional, do not necessarily benefit movement participants, and are not always immediately

apparent (Jenkins and Form 2005:331-2; Amenta and Young 1999). Despite these flaws, many

scholars have analyzed movement success and failure, and effects continue to be framed in this

15

way (Giugni 1998; see also: Piven and Cloward 1979; Goldstone 1980b; Gamson 1975; Amenta

et al. 1992).

The idea that the success/failure dichotomy is insufficient is not new, and social

movement scholars have gradually developed theories of many varied outcomes. These

outcome theories include: defending achievements, reformulating goals, losing chances or

relevance and becoming becalmed (Hiller 1975:355); political or economic change, the creation

of institutions or organizations, and changes in public attitudes (Marx and McAdam 1994:112-

3); co-optation, which has been used to represent an effect of the movement upon the state

(McCarthy and Wolfson 1992:189) or when an institution gains power over the movement

(Wolfson 2001:9; McAdam 1982; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Helfgot 1974; Piven and Cloward

1977); incorporation into existing structures in the form of institutionalization or preemption,

transformation through a redistribution of power, democratization when there is both a transfer

of power and change in the government and society, and democratic adjustment when the rights

and obligations between citizens and the state change without a transfer of power (Giugni 1998;

Giugni, McAadam, and Tilly 1998:xv; Oliver, Cadena-Roa and Strawn 2003:218-9).

Institutionalization has received much attention in social movement literature. Hopper’s

work on revolutionary movements offered only two outcomes: revolutionaries could either stay

“rebels” or institutionalize (1950). He defined institutionalization as legalizing or organizing

power to fit within the structure of political power, and when this happens the revolution is

complete and a new society may be formed (1950:277). Mauss (1971) and Hiller (1975) viewed

institutionalization not as an outcome by itself, but instead as the key turning point for a

movement. Seippel offered three routes of institutionalization (2001). A movement may (1)

undergo a traditional transition to a bureaucratic structure, (2) become a vibrant organization

16

that preserves its values and norms while incorporating new organizational structures, and (3)

transform into a non-contentious movement by changing their normative foundation without

creating an organized structure.

Lounsbury compared the notion of institutionalization in social movement theory with

organizational theory, finding that “both literatures have tended to invoke an imagery of

incremental change that focuses on how existing social structures maintain stability and elite

positions become reproduced” (2005:73; see also Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Strang and Soule

1998). This has evolved into a new focus on qualitative shifts in the logics, institutional beliefs,

and core practices of movements (Lounsbury 2005:73; Scott 2001). These scholars have found

that institutionalization is not inevitable, and instead look at the importance of historical variation

and elements of stratification when a movement creates new organizational structures. He

concludes, "Drawing attention to the role of broader logics and contexts of action is also

consistent with recent directions in social movements research that have extended the resource

focus of the political process perspective by creating a more cosmopolitan framework that takes

cultural processes seriously – especially through the study of framing" (Lounsbury 2005:74; see

also McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Moore and Hala 2002; Zald 2000).

Democratization is another possible movement outcome. It is peculiar that the

relationship between movements and democratic development has not received more attention,

particularly since democratic transitions are usually coupled with a “resurrection of civil society”

and the transition to democracy or improving democracy are often goals of social movements

(Hipsher 1998:149). To better understand democratization, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly offer

several categories: “substantive criteria emphasizing qualities of human experience and social

ties; constitutional criteria emphasizing legal procedures such as elections and referenda;

17

political-process criteria emphasizing interactions among politically constituted actors”

(2001:265). While these three groups overlap, they offer a foundation for a more nuanced view

of democratization. Tilly warns against an oversimplification in the study of democratization,

lamenting that some scholars have a tendency to reduce all types of regimes into two categories:

democratic and authoritarian (2005:426). This results in comparative case studies in which

regimes are quantitatively judged for their degree of democracy.

One example of movement to party transformations are what Panebianco refers to as

“sponsor institutions,” which are essentially groups that turn into political parties (1988, see also

Schwartz and Lawson 2005:268). It is not likely that multiple SMOs will join together to form a

new party. Schwartz and Lawson argue that “More often, it is a single group that transforms

itself into a political party, as did the African National Congress after the fall of apartheid in

South Africa (prior to which it was an illegal movement) and the trade union-based movement of

Solidarity in Poland after the fall of communism” (2005:268).

How do Movement Outcomes Impact Politics?

Social movement and party activities tend to increase or diminish in unison, and since the

1800s it has been common for social movements to develop parties or be directly associated with

them (Van Cott 2005:6; Goldstone, ed. 2003: 4; Gunther and Montero 2002: 6; Glenn 2003:149).

Even so, social movements and political parties have traditionally been studied in separate

literatures. When they are studied together, the focus has been on “why, and with what

consequences, social movements might form political parties” (Van Cott 2005:6; see also Yishai

1994:184; Thomas 2001; Goldstone, ed. 2003; Tilly 2003). Studying party evolution from a

historical perspective allows us to better understand parties that have recently emerged from

social movements (Desai 2003:171). This is particularly true because there is no sound

18

distinction between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics (Goldstone 2003). As

Panebianco explains:

The way in which the cards are dealt out and the outcomes of the different rounds played out in the formative phase of an organization, continue in many ways to condition the life of the organization even decades afterwards…the crucial political choices made by its founding fathers, the first struggles for organizational control and the way in which the organization was formed, will leave an indelible mark. (1988:xiii)

Thus, movement outcomes can only be adequately studied within the context of the movement’s

history. In order to understand what elements of an organization’s formation are impacting the

movement’s outcomes and how, social movement researchers must look beyond policy changes.

Jack Goldstone says that while there has been an increase in study on social movement

outcomes in recent years, most have failed to do adequate research. He finds the existing

research unsatisfactory because it has kept the studies of social movement outcomes and

institutionalized politics separate, and Goldstone insists that these topics should not be studied

independently because they do not exist separately (2003:1). Scholars must examine movements

and the state together because “the very existence, actions, and structure of institutionalized

political actors are permeated by social movement activity on an ongoing basis.  Understanding

how social movements give rise to parties, shape political alignments, and interact with normal

political institutions has become essential to comprehending political dynamics” (Goldstone

2003:12).

Goldstone argues that revolutionary movements have much power in creating the new

economic system, but ultimately fail to live up to expectations. He agrees with Skocpol that

revolutions in Europe and Asia have developed out of similar economic and political beginnings,

and resulted in considerable institutional changes. However, European revolutions have also

included greater shifts in social values and denounced the old government (Goldstone 2002:214).

This leads him to insist that:

19

social-structural conditions alone could not account for the different character of revolutionary outcomes, rather, the revolutionary breakdown of the former regime offers a uniquely fluid situation in which the new revolutionary leadership has choices as to how to present itself, and how to rebuild the social and political order. The ideology of the new revolutionary regime can therefore, he argued, be decisive in determining the outcome and trajectory of the postrevolutionary state. (2002:214)

Goldstone focuses on the importance of this handover from the old regime to the new system,

explaining that in the months following the demise of the old regime there is a “honeymoon”

period in which individuals think that their hopeful desires will be realized. He notes that “the

honeymoon cannot last, for the problems that initiated state breakdown—fiscal crisis, elite

competition, and popular deprivation—do not disappear and still require solutions” (1991:422).

At this point, the new governance fails to be much better than the old government, Goldstone

explains.

As popular groups almost invariably have only local concerns and goals, the task of building a dominant coalition to address these issues falls to members of the elite. Taking the various particular complaints and the various elite and folk ideologies, and forging from these elements an ideology with broad appeal, is critical to the construction of a dominant coalition. (1991:422)

This shows that movement to party transformations will not live up to the expectations of

movement supporters and sympathizers. Nevertheless, Goldstone argues that this relationship

between social movements and institutionalized politics must be further examined, with a focus

on the ideologies and values of regimes.

PREVIOUS CASE STUDIES OF MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

There is a growing collection of case studies that addresses social movement success,

outcomes, and change. Some of these movements have also been a part of democratization or

transformed into political parties; others have achieved their goals through different methods (see

Messinger’s 1955 study of the Townsend Movement). Each case study helps provide insights,

means of comparison, and fresh theoretical ideas for other scholars to consider.

Brazilian Workers’ Party. The Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, or Worker’s Party) in

Brazil won the country’s first democratic election in several decades in 1989. Margaret Keck’s

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book is a comprehensive analysis of the PT’s trajectory, the new party’s association with the

labor movement, and the process of Brazilian democratization (1992). She asks many important

questions that are applicable to any movement to party transformation:

What were the trade-offs involved in becoming a legal party within the limits established by the military regime? How could the party simultaneously help to promote autonomous organization of the working class (broadly conceived) and represent workers and the poor at the political level? Were elected officials from the party responsible to the party membership or to a broader constituency? How could the party best insure internal democracy and widespread participation? How would it deal with internal factors? How would it resolve the electoral dilemma, that is, the competing demands of remaining closely identified with a working class base and developing a sufficiently broad appeal to win elections? Would alliances with other parties dilute its programmatic message? (1992:6)

She agrees with Panebianco’s statement that the founding of parties and institutions have

immense and long term effects on their futures (see Panebianco 1988:xiii). Keck finds that “the

PT’s initial legitimacy and its ability to survive in spite of an adverse political conjuncture has a

great deal to do with its links with an increasingly autonomous and powerful movement of

Brazilian unions for substantive change” (1992:7).

Mississippi Civil Rights Movement. The Civil Rights Movement is one of the United

States’ most prominent examples of social movement success, and Andrews sets out to examine

the role of the movement in creating change and how lasting the effects have been. He focuses

on three aspects of movement infrastructure: “leadership, organizational structure, and

resources” (2004:22). Furthermore, Andrews lays out five guidelines for selecting movement

outcomes to study. Scholars should: (1) identify broad domains of movement claims without

limiting their study to only explicit objectives, (2) appraise multiple outcomes within each of

those domains, (3) examine the collective benefits and costs to the movement constituency, (4)

assess relative outcomes, not absolute successes or failures, and (5) study the effects of the

movement in the long term, extending far beyond the movement’s decline. One significant

challenge Andrews’ work illustrates is leaders being confronted with unrealistic expectations

once they were in office. He states:

21

The pursuit of black political power was built on the assumption that black elected officials would be responsive to the demands of the black community and address the deeply entrenched inequities in the distribution of “public goods.” All facets of southern politics reflected these inequalities. As a result, newly elected black officials faced a tremendous burden of expectations, ranging from employment to paved roads. (2004:185)

This onus is likely one that most leaders face if they are elected into power while being a

member of the existing movement or after a movement to party transformation.

Chilean Shantytown Dwellers. Chile has become a model of democratization that

scholars have urged new democracies in Europe, Latin America, and Africa to follow (Cash

1993; Christian 1994). Patricia Hipsher (1998) argues that in order to have a lively democracy,

the government must allow social movements to exist and operate with a moderate degree of

freedom. In some countries, “by demobilizing movements and attempting to control popular

organizations, leaders of these new democracies and of popular movements may be alienating

large sectors of society and ultimately be undermining the development of a healthy democratic

polity” (1998:166). She notes that this has been a problem in countries like South Africa, where

the African National Congress silenced many social movements to create an easier government

transition. Hipsher warns, “if democracy is to survive in the long term, power relations must be

restructured in a more democratic way, such that social movements can have a greater voice”

(1998:166). This urges scholars to look at the way a movement that has transformed or achieved

social change deals with other social movements.

African National Congress and Palestine Liberation Organization. Mona Younis’s

comparative study of liberation and democratic transformation in South Africa and Palestine

found that they went through surprisingly similar liberations because the African National

Congress (ANC) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had comparable movement

developments and the same global circumstances. Their very different outcomes “may be

attributed to the fact that global and internal dynamics play out on a field of struggle where

22

opponents meet in particular ways circumscribed by inclusion/exclusion.  The process and

product are thus mediated by the indigenous populations' inclusion or exclusion in the settler

projects—that is, by class” (2000:20-1). Younis concludes that in both countries, “the current

political orders took shape in the very process of national liberation that produced them”

(2000:21). This again highlights the importance of the process and movements involved in

national liberation in shaping the future of the country.

Indian Political Parties. Manali Desai’s work compares policies of a leftist Indian

political party in Kerala and West Bengal. Her analysis concentrates on three dimensions of

political parties: “the social origins of party leadership, party strategies and tactics, and the

relationship of parties to movements” (2003:181). Desai also builds from Panebianco's work,

adding that “political struggles waged at one time under party leadership can for decades

afterward impact the extent of their political power. Thus there can be significant (and

unintended) ‘lag effects’ through which political struggles affect future generations” (Desai

2003:172). This makes it particularly important that social movements and parties are studied

together with their histories in mind.

Czech Republic and Slovakia. After the end of Soviet rule, Czechoslovakia split into two

new democratic countries: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. John Glenn compared the cases of

party emergence in these two countries and found that the act of governing truly transforms a

movement (2003:147). Furthermore, parties that come out of movements do not always follow

standard ideas of political parties, but instead might form around political issues (rather than

socioeconomic ones) and are prone to influence from international actors (2003:147).

Postcommunist reform is relatively unstable, and Glenn found that during this time, “leaders of

new political parties are likely to act as social movement entrepreneurs seeking to mobilize

23

potential supporters in light of varying opportunities, resources, and ways of framing their

claims” (2003:165; see also McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). International assistance for

new democracies in the Czech Republic and Slovakia focused on free elections. After these

countries held democratic elections in 1990, international funding dramatically decreased and the

state became the main source of funding for political parties (2003:167). Furthermore, in these

two case studies, the “antipolitics” that is common in revolutionary movements and their

members is “virtually powerless against the imperatives of contemporary political competition…

as social movements gain political power, even in the context of emerging democracy, they must

confront the issue of transforming themselves into parties, despite inexperience or even

reluctance to engage in party politics” (2003:168).

Conducting more comparative research in other postcommunist countries will help us

understand other variations of party emergence. Glenn suggests a comparison with Poland

“where party fragmentation hobbled postcommunist governments…or with new parties in South

Africa might provide contrasting paths of democratization” (2003:168; see also Klandermans,

Roefs, and Oliver 1998). He concludes that movement success does not guarantee successful

democratic parties, and that democratic outcomes cannot be determined by international

supervision and aid. Change “involves complex and contingent interactions among movements,

new parties seeking electoral support, the policy they seek to mobilize, and the international

agencies that provide both assistance and guidance for party formation” (2003:169).

What Theories Do Previous Case Studies Uphold?

The case studies on movement to party success tend to support the theories of Goldstone

and Panebianco. One of the main points of Panebianco and Goldstone, simply put, is that the

creation of a new political party by a former movement has large and long-lasting effects. More

24

specifically, these case studies have found that the process of liberation shapes the political order

(Younis 2000), the group’s history as a movement shapes their new party (Desai 2003), and

movements are changed when they enter the sphere of government (Glenn 2003). Keck found in

Brazil that affiliations with unions can have a significant impact on party legitimacy and survival

(1992), showing that ties with current groups can also influence movement outcomes and

change.

Goldstone also makes it clear that the new party will not be able to fix all of the problems

of the old regime (1991, 2002, 2003). Younis finds in the cases of South Africa and Palestine

that class has a role in shaping the new system (2000), and Andrews observes that civil rights

movement leaders in the United States who gained power were faced with unrealistic

expectations (Andrews 2004). Hipscher warns in particular that it is important for new parties to

allow social movements to flourish in new democracies because the problems of their former

regimes will not disappear (1998).

How Does the Literature Influence This Paper?

Some clear guidelines have emerged from this review of the literature that I am mindful

of in this paper. The notion of movement “success” is limited and outdated. Movement research

should focus on specific outcomes or broader changes, but the notions of success and failure

cannot encompass the various trajectories and influences of movements. Models of

understanding movement outcomes are constantly changing, and there may be no universally

applicable model that will work in every scenario. While this paper discusses how the ANC and

25

Solidarity fit into existing categories, I also address the nuances of the each case and show how

their outcomes are not adequately explained by these theories.

Marco Giugni wrote ten years ago in his article “Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes

and Consequences of Social Movements” that future research should provide a comprehensive

comparison of social movement outcomes, noting their different political environments, time

periods, and movement compositions (1998:388-9). While this sort of research has been greatly

lacking, the case studies previously mentioned have initiated this form of examination of social

movement outcomes.

Furthermore, these previous works shaped my guiding research questions and the

variables I used to measure them. Younis’ study of the ANC and PLO (2000) and Desai’s study

of Indian Political Parties (2003) both found that movement pasts influenced political futures,

and their works helped shape my first research question and determine which variables to use to

answer it. Glenn’s finding that successful movements do not always become successful political

parties (2003) provides the foundation for my second research question. Andrews’ five

guidelines aided my selection of variables, and my analysis of collective costs and benefits, and

the impacts of these movements after their decline (2004).

This paper aims to study social movement outcomes and changes from a nuanced,

comprehensive, and comparative perspective. I look beyond policy changes and examine the

influences of a movement’s history, emotions of movement members and leaders, public

opinion, and broader situations surrounding outcomes. Studies of social movements that create

social change should not end once movements gain political power, transform into another

organization, or even dissolve. It is crucial that these cases are studied extensively and

26

comparatively so that social scientists, politicians, activists, and citizens can better understand

the lasting power of social movements.

My case studies of the ANC in South Africa and Solidarity in Poland examine how their

pasts as social movements have influenced them as political parties and, in the case of Solidarity,

as a trade union.  These case studies show how the movements have progressed through different

stages and have experienced institutional limitations, while also exploring the role of human

emotions in their trajectories.  This includes how traditions, organizational tactics, leaders,

members, and public opinion from their histories as social movements continue to influence

them today.  The power of the ANC and Solidarity led to revolutionary social changes, and their

legacies played a crucial role in shaping what they have become today.

The case studies of Solidarity and the ANC can be assessed using theories of

institutionalization, and they build on what has already been established by scholars. Both the

ANC and Solidarity were key social movement organizations and the largest forces within their

respective social movements. It was leadership within these SMOs that decided to enter the

political realm and this project will follow the trajectory of these SMOs, not the entire social

movements. Both parties ceased to be social movement organizations (and, in the case of the

ANC, a liberation movement) when they were elected to power, entered their state-regulated

political systems, and when the process of democratic consolidation began. Solidarity continued

to operate as a trade union, though rarely challenging the power of the state.  Both went through

processes of institutionalization and co-optation when they took over the government as ruling

political parties.

After being institutionalized, both Solidarity and the ANC experienced a trend of

complacent and conservative leadership – both governments accepted the free market and

27

neoliberal system with open arms, even though these policies hurt the people these SMOs had

advocated for. Dissatisfied members left both parties, but much more so in the case of

Solidarity, where factions split off from the beginning and voter support fluctuated significantly.

The ANC’s supporters have become very complacent as a result of its monopoly over the

political system, even though the party has not followed through on the promises it made as an

SMO. Those who have left the ANC have become more radical, honed in on certain broken

promises, or given up on politics altogether.

I cannot ignore the multiple dimensions of these two groups, and the fact that they differ

from each other will definitely make the comparison more challenging, but also provide some

insights not available in more straightforward cases. Definitions like Sidney Tarrow’s say that a

social movement is different from a political party or interest group, but each of these cases fit

into two or all three of these classifications (1994).

The ANC, while there was some overlap, clearly moved from a liberation movement to a

political party, and as it moved from the old definition into the new it lost power as a movement

and gained power as a party.  It could not be equally powerful in both at the same time, but its

power as a movement was what gave the political aspect power before the first democratic

election. Now the ANC operates only as a political party, though its leaders often reference its

SMO past.

For Solidarity, the transition was not as clear cut.  When it was founded, it operated

equally as a trade union and social movement, and these identities complemented each other

rather than competed, since both challenged the socialist state.  When Solidarity was outlawed

under martial law, it was the social movement aspect that kept the fight alive – the trade union

alone probably could not have survived years in exile.  In 1988 when the political arm of

28

Solidarity was created, it had legitimacy (like the ANC) because of the power the social

movement organization and trade union components had accumulated. After entering into

politics, the social movement organization ceased to exist, and the trade union did little to help

laborers.  The Solidarity trade union has only begun to stand up for workers rights since 2001,

when it discontinued its role in politics.

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CHAPTER 2: AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS CASE STUDY

When I began learning about South Africa, I was surprised to find that the ANC as a

government is far different from what it was as a liberation movement. The ANC’s rise from a

movement in exile to a political party with approximately 70% of the vote shows the power of

activism. The rebels who spent years in jail, hiding from the police, or in exile are now

government officials. The evolution of the ANC from a liberation movement to a political party

is simultaneously a source of hope and disappointment. It shows that a social movement can

make a difference and achieve goals, yet as a political party in control, the ANC is failing to

deliver on the hard-won rights listed in the South African constitution.

History of the Movement

The South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was founded in 1912, and

became the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923. It was one of several organizations that

aimed to end racial discrimination in South Africa, but as former political analyst Kiru Naidoo

asserts, “the ANC has always been the leading force in the liberation movement” (interview

2007). Under British rule, land ownership was restricted to small areas for non-whites in South

Africa. When the Afrikaner National Party (NP) was elected to power in 1948, the ruling party

implemented a system called apartheid that encompassed more strict and organized laws of

segregation.

In 1955, the ANC met with the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's

Organization and the Congress of Democrats (Holland 1990). They called this collection the

Congress of the People, and at this meeting they created a document called the Freedom Charter.

The Freedom Charter was a declaration of basic principles, including “The People Shall

Govern!” and similar exclamations for equal rights and human rights; sharing wealth and land;

30

equality before the law; work, security, learning, culture, houses, comfort, peace and friendship.

The ANC and the entire Congress of the People felt that while politics were at the core of the

struggle, liberation included a whole host of rights that were denied by the apartheid system.

One of the key elements of apartheid was that all South Africans were required to carry a

pass card with their identifying information including race, religion, and employer. The

information in the pass card determined where non-whites could travel, and anyone who did not

have a pass card was subject to immediate arrest. On March 21, 1960 an ANC breakaway party

called the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) held a protest in which South Africans marched to the

Sharpeville township jail, turned in their pass cards, and asked to be arrested. The PAC claim

that no more than 5,000 people were part of the protest, but police estimates said the crowd grew

to 20,000 (Holland 1990). Though the reasons why are unclear, in the early afternoon the police

began firing at the crowd, and 69 people were killed and almost 200 injured in less than a minute

of firing. In response to the Sharpeville Massacre, the National Party declared a state of

emergency and banned both the ANC and the PAC.

When the ANC was banned, much of the leadership went into exile or met secretly. In

December 1961, the underground ANC announced the birth of its military wing: Umkhonto we

Sizwe (MK) – the Spear of the Nation. Co-founded by Nelson Mandela, the MK stated that their

only choices were to “submit or fight” and they would fight “in defense of our people, our future

and our freedom” (Holland 1990:132). Mandela was arrested in 1962 and spent the next 27

years of his life in jail, like many ANC and MK members (Mandela 1994).

Those who managed to avoid jail did so by following the strict top-down orders of the

ANC and by operating in tight secrecy. When political analyst Kiru Naidoo was in college, he

tried to meet with a professor who was an MK recruiter. The professor turned him away,

31

probably out of fear that Kiru was part of a setup. Kiru noted that, “he wasn’t very helpful at all,

and I think with good reason because the movement was riddled with spies and things at the

time” (interview 2007). The ANC was shaped by these decades of operating underground, and

South Africans continued to protest the NP government.

In 1989, F.W. de Klerk became President of South Africa, and immediately stressed the

importance of “real, constructive negotiation” with black leaders (Huntington 1991-1992:611).

This signified a major political opportunity for change in South Africa. While the previous

President, P.W. Botha, had campaigned with the slogan “adapt or die” and had made some

progressive changes, he certainly did not want white rule to end (Hungtinton 1991-1992:598).

After much global and economic pressure, F.W. de Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC in early

1990, and Mandela was released from prison. The ANC leadership began negotiating with the

ruling party, under preconditions that the ANC renounce violence and the NP release political

prisoners and allow opposition groups (Huntington 1991-1992:614). In April 1994, the country

had its first democratic elections, and Nelson Mandela was elected President.

The ANC’s role in the anti-apartheid struggle secured its place as the leading party. As

former ANC activist David Ntseng explained:

Obviously the ANC has had the legitimation by virtue of its history as a liberation movement, way back from how it began, the fact that most of its members went through exile, were forced to exile, imprisoned, some longer like former President Nelson Mandela. All of that legitimated its identity in relation to black people in South Africa and all people concerned with the liberation, irrespective of their race. Come 94, everyone was sick of national apartheid government. Now the alternative is this people’s movement, national liberation movement as everyone understood it at the time, and what it represented. (interview 2007)

The new ANC leaders were very idealistic in the beginning of their time in office. Politicians

opted for pay cuts and refused perks so that they would not be distanced from the people they

were elected to represent. South Africans had extremely high hopes for the ANC. As one news

32

article in May 1994 forewarned, “Mandela and his ANC may soon discover that it's easier to

oppose a government than it is to run one” (Ransdell and Eddings 1994).

The ANC was not completely unaware of the challenges it faced in the transition from a

liberation movement to a political party. Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa was the ANC’s Secretary

General immediately following the 1994 election. In an interview that year he discussed what

would be necessary to successfully transform the ANC into a political party. Ramaphosa said

that many wanted the ANC to continue to operate as “the leading force in a broad liberation

movement, with a program which includes - but extends beyond - contesting formal political

power” (Frazer 1994). He said the ANC might continue to lead social movements and organize

popular power, which are elements of civil society, not political society. This demonstrated the

ANC’s reluctance to give up their SMO identity and settle into traditional political party roles.

In 1994, Tokyo Sexwale was the ANC premier of the province that includes Johannesburg, and

he offered a less extreme path for the party. Sexwale argued that the ANC should regard itself as

in office, not in power (“Who Exactly is in Command?” 1994), implying that the ANC would be

most legitimate by working within the new system of government rather than taking over the

government. Many of the party’s critics feared the ANC would silence the opposition, and

Sexwale’s position helped to calm this apprehension.

When the ANC took office, they implemented an economic system of Black Economic

Empowerment (BEE) that aimed to help non-whites recover from the inequalities of apartheid.

Yet BEE was not a quick fix, and in 1996 the ANC adopted a new system of Growth,

Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) that the Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel supported

because it would create a more rapid economic change (Bond 2000). With the birth of GEAR,

many South Africans realized that their government had opted for a neoliberal system. David

33

Ntseng explains, “the open declaration of economic policy in the form of GEAR was for many

concerned people alarm bells ringing, to say something big is coming, or something has

happened and it caught us off guard. No one expected the turning point of 1996… it was so

obvious that the main thrust here is so that the government has an open way for the neo-liberal

agenda” (interview 2007). There was a lack of service delivery with BEE, but when GEAR was

implemented there was a rapid privatization of state owned assets. David continues, “That was

the beginning of the end of hopes for freedom and liberation, and that was the end of looking at

the ANC as this liberation movement as it were” (ibid). Former ANC activist Xolani Tsalong

was also aware of the magnitude of the adoption of GEAR. He told me, “That’s when I resigned

as a member of the ANC, because I really had to find myself a space where I could engage with

the government, with the ANC” (interview 2007). As I discuss later in the section on Service

Delivery, the liberation struggle was not only about political liberation, but also economic

liberation. By implementing an economic system that hurts the vast majority of South Africans,

the ANC took a step backwards in fully liberating the nation. When President Nelson Mandela

spoke at the ANC’s 85th anniversary party in January 1997, he admitted that the “the ANC had

made ‘fundamental and serious’ mistakes” since gaining power in 1994 (O’Loughlin 1997). For

the director of the Johannesburg-based Center for Policy Studies, Stephen Friedman, Mandela

recognized that the ANC was “in danger of losing its way both ethically and politically” (ibid).

Thabo Mbeki served as South Africa’s Co-Deputy President with the National Party’s

F.W. de Klerk from 1994 to 1996, as the sole Deputy President from 1996 to 1999, and became

President of South Africa in 1999. He spent nearly 30 years in exile while the ANC and MK

were banned, and his father spent 24 years in the Robben Island prison. As early as 1997, Thabo

Mbeki was blamed for “a perceived drift away from the ANC's tradition of grass-roots

34

consultation” (O’Loughlin 1997). Mbeki resigned as President of South Africa in September

2008, largely because his rival Jacob Zuma was elected President of the ANC in December 2007.

Jacob Zuma was also a member of the ANC and MK. After Zuma spent 10 years on

Robben Island, he worked underground in the Natal province for two years before going into

exile for 15 years. As President of the ANC, Zuma is likely to become South Africa’s President

in the April 2009 elections. He is quite popular despite the corruption and rape charges that have

been brought against him in recent years. One of the main ways that Zuma has become so

popular is by touting his Zulu identity; Zulus are the largest ethnic group in South Africa, yet the

nation’s first two Presidents were Xhosa, the second largest ethnic group.

Kgalema Motlanthe, South Africa’s current President, was elected ANC Deputy

President in 2007 and assumed the top office after Mbeki resigned in 2008. While Motlanthe is

not as well known as Mandela, Mbeki, or Zuma, he also was a member of the ANC and MK

during the time that they were banned. Motlanthe spent many years working underground for

the MK before he was arrested and also spent 10 years in the Robben Island prison. After his

release, he worked for the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and became an ANC

politician.

The ANC and its leaders have been significantly shaped by the organization’s long

liberation history. As Jack Goldstone states, the party’s politics “bear the indelible marks of that

party’s origins in the violent struggle of protest against apartheid” (Goldstone 2003:6, see also

Seidman 2001). It’s not just the ANC and party officials who have been shaped by the decades

of resistance in South Africa – the country’s history has shaped all of its citizens. Everyone who

lived during apartheid played a part in either perpetuating or dismantling the system, and the

emotions attached to the struggle have continued to shape the opinions and behavior of South

35

Africans since the transition of power in 1994. Non-whites make up over 90% of the country’s

population (SouthAfrica.info 2007) and while they did not all support the ANC specifically, they

have more rights now than they were granted during apartheid. For many citizens, this has

created a sense of indebtedness to the party, and many ANC leaders feel that their past has

entitled them to positions of power.

On December 16, 2008 a new South African political party called the Congress of the

People (COPE) was formed by former members of the ANC. COPE was founded by ex-ANC

members Mosiuoa Lekota, Mbhazima Shilowa and George Mluleki, who soon became the

party’s President, First Deputy President, and Head of Organizing, respectively (COPE website

2008). The name Congress of the People comes from the 1955 gathering where the Freedom

Charter was written (Sapa 2008). Using this historic name is part of the group’s strategy to

connect the political party with the ANC’s history as a movement and the broader liberation

struggle.

At the 2007 ANC national conference it became clear to many South Africans that the

ANC was divided when Jacob Zuma was elected President of the party. When Thabo Mbeki

resigned as President of South Africa in 2008, many of his loyal cabinet members also resigned,

including Minister of Defense Mosiuoa Lekota. Soon thereafter, Lekota organized a convention

to discuss the future of the party, and the possibility of forming a new party, and at that

convention it was decided that COPE would be created in mid-December. By December 21

2008, COPE claimed to have a total of 428,000 paid members in South Africa (Cope

Organisational Report 2008).

COPE immediately received criticism for being too focused on the rich and upper-middle

class and for simply being an anti-Zuma party. Rather than offering a new path, many feared

36

that COPE would simply be a revival of the ANC under Mbeki. Yet the party soon took a major

step away from its ANC roots. In late February 2009, Lekota lost his position as leader of the

party when Methodist Church leader Mvume Dandala was chosen to serve as the party’s

presidential candidate in the upcoming 2009 general election (Rossouw and Mataboge 2009).

Some COPE insiders told reporters that Lekota lost the position because his ANC history had

tainted him (ibid). One congress national committee member said, “Wouldn't you rather want

someone who has no ANC history, who has broader appeal to a wider range of people, including

non-ANC voters?” (ibid).

For a party that is just several months old, COPE has a very complicated relationship

with the ANC. While the full strength of this new party will not be known until the 2009 South

African general election, it may become a full fledged opposition party that will challenge the

ANC in ways that other political parties have not. Even if COPE does not become as strong as

its leaders hope and the ANC fears, it shows that the ANC is not as unified as it has presented

itself, and the power of the ANC is beginning to be challenged by former movement and party

leaders.

Key Documents

South Africa’s Constitution is one of the most progressive in the world and is highly

revered by many South Africans. As journalist Gary Govindsamy states, “In terms of the

Constitution we’ve got the best Constitution in the world. But how the Constitution protects our

own people is a factor to debate” (interview 2007). In many cases the ruling party, politicians,

police, and citizens violate the regulations stated in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights. Activist

Louisa Motha explains, “When we march, they just send the police to just hit us, for nothing, for

no reason. The Constitution, it says we can march, but they’re hitting the people, oppressing the

37

people, it’s not a good thing” (interview 2007). The Constitution outlines a clear balance of

power between the President, Cabinet, and Parliament. Yet since Mbeki became President, “the

system of government has seen growing tension between its constitutional form and the reality of

growing centralisation in the state presidency” (Butler 2007:44). Furthermore, the South African

Constitution isn’t the only guiding doctrine that the ANC government follows as it pleases.

The ANC Constitution served as the guiding document for the liberation movement, and

now states the ideals and rules of conduct for the political party. Mashumi Figlan was

thoroughly involved with the ANC for a decade through COSAS, the ANC Youth League, and

during the time he spent canvassing for the 1994 election. His knowledge of the ANC

Constitution is solid, as is his respect for it. He says:

It’s so unfair. To voice our views is what even the ANC Constitution says, that we have to voice our views.… What they preach they are not practicing. They want other people to practice, but they themselves they don’t want to practice what they preach. To treat the social movement and all other people the way they treat is not what is written in the ANC Constitution. Just because we know the Constitution of the ANC, we read the Constitution of the ANC, and I think the Constitution of the ANC is in my head. But the people who are in power, they don’t like to follow it through and through. (interview 2007)

Mashumi sees the ANC’s Constitution as a key to getting the ANC back on the right path. “If

they follow the principles of the ANC accordingly, the way it’s written, the way they put it, and

even those who died for it. If they can follow what the ANC was, I think it will be good, and they

can fix the problem in the ANC. But if they don’t want to follow the principles, they will not be

able to change” (ibid).

The Freedom Charter is another important South African document that enshrines the

human rights that the government has disregarded. Gary Govindsamy adds, “…all that’s written

in the Freedom Charter, is not being adhered to. And that is the problem. The Freedom Charter

was supposed to have been the ideal document which would have seen people get a better life.

But in most instances that document, which was adopted by everybody, is just a piece of paper

38

thrown aside” (interview 2007). Many South Africans have become disenchanted with the ANC

because of the way the party has ignored its own doctrine.

Traditions

The loyalty of members in a liberation movement in exile is crucial to the group’s

success. But the traditions that have carried over from the ANC’s time in exile are in opposition

to the traits needed for a successful democracy. In fact, there is an “explicit clash between an

authoritarian culture of national liberation and participatory democracy” (Southall 2003a:30).

One of the reasons for this conflict is that liberation movements have a sense of entitlement after

the liberation, and assume that they are the only legitimate successors (Southall 2003b:129). Yet

one of the fundamental aspects of democracy is a system where any individual or party has a fair

chance at office.

The underground ANC was very hierarchical, centralized, organized, and disciplined in

order to keep the movement operating in a unified fashion while leaders were out of the country,

in prison, or in hiding (Butler 2007:38). These characteristics did not simply disappear when the

ANC transitioned from a liberation movement to a political party. These traditions have

remained on both institutional and individual levels. As David Ntseng told me, ANC traditions

are constantly referenced when the party experiences crisis. This practice goes back to when the

ANC headquarters were in Lusaka, Zambia and enabled leaders to give consistent orders to

activists in South Africa and worldwide (interview 2007). David says it is, “the tradition of

obedience, of capturing, grasping, and internalizing the word, the direction, as coming from the

headquarters, or as coming from the national executive council, if not the national working

community. So anything that looks disobedient or deviant to that word is anti-ANC and it’s anti-

traditional” (ibid). This carries over today to the extent that when anyone so much as criticizes

39

the party, they are dismissed as anti-ANC. He continues, “It will be difficult to imagine the

ANC that believes in the voices from the margins, the voices from the grassroots, it will be

difficult to imagine the ANC that does that” (ibid). The discussions that occur on the branch

level are not questioning, but rather about how they can best understand the directions from

national headquarters.

Another tradition that has carried over from the ANC’s past is the importance of

consensus. This is a tradition from an earlier time in the ANC’s history, before the movement

was forced into exile, and it continued while the ANC was banned because unity was crucial to

the safety of the movement. In his autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela talks about

how he gained this idealized notion of democracy at tribal meetings. He wrote, “majority rule

was a foreign notion. A minority was not to be crushed by a majority” (1994:18). Yet as

Anthony Butler warns, this naïve view can have consequences because “a movement that

idealises consensus in this way is vulnerable to oligarchic domination” (2005:731). This is not

the only high-minded ANC tradition that has unfortunate consequences when put into practice by

the political party.

When trying to rise in the ANC ranks during white rule, individuals were discouraged

from campaigning. While it is not prohibited today, campaigning is regarded by the ANC

establishment as poor taste. According to the ANC National Working Committee, “One of the

main reasons for this is that when cadres of the movement do their work, this is not meant to be

with an eye on leadership positions or some other personal reward; but to serve the people”

(ANC 2001). The ANC feared that campaigning would turn members into enemies, rather than

having them work together for change. Now that the ANC is a political party with candidates

seeking to win elections, this tradition limits public knowledge before elections. There are

40

situations where ANC politicians deny that they are running for office and then show up on the

ballot, and those who do openly campaign are attacked by other party members for being “anti-

ANC” because they are not following the traditions.

In some cases, the reliance upon traditions has been perverted by ANC politicians

seeking to further their own interests. Jacob Zuma has often criticized “those who ‘tout’

themselves for leadership positions,” which is in accordance with ANC traditions (Butler

2005:733). But when Zuma was Deputy President, he would commonly refer to the “tradition”

that the Deputy President of the ANC should always become the next President, though this has

never been an ANC tradition (ibid). The lack of campaigning is a prime example of how a well-

intended tradition has been distorted, and the eager acceptance of anything referred to as an ANC

tradition has allowed politicians to further their goals while limiting the knowledge and choices

of the voters.

While ANC traditions worked to better the movement in the past, many South Africans

think the ANC’s focus needs to shift. Strict adherence to tradition made sense under the

apartheid regime when the ANC was banned, but now South Africa is a democracy and the ANC

is the ruling party. As former ANC leader Mac Maharaj says in his biography, “This is an ANC

government. We should encourage constant debate and the interchange of ideas, and we should

invite public criticism, taking it as being honestly offered and meriting honest response.…

Nobody, no matter how good his or her performance in the past, has a guarantee of perpetual

excellence” (O’Malley 2007:454). Failure to listen to the people in favor of tradition causes the

leaders to become further out of touch with the needs of the people as time goes on. As Gary

Govindsamy explains, “The ANC was indeed a liberalization organization, and in terms of the

liberation movement they had certain policies and ideologies and philosophies to follow. … Now

41

that they’ve achieved what they wanted to achieve, they’ve got to politicize the people in a

different form” (interview 2007). This implies that the shift away from over-valuing traditions

has to come from within the ANC.

Yet people both inside and outside the movement fear that this process may never come.

As professor Padraig O’Malley explains, “The ANC never had to face the consequences of its

own failures as a liberation movement. Whenever it engaged in a reexamination of the way it

conducted the struggle, it failed to implement corrective policies and regressed to old, entrenched

habits. … In government, the ANC is still immune to external criticism and is responsive only to

itself” (2007:491). Nevertheless, there is a chance that this will begin to change with time. A

growing number of the ANC’s members are citizens too young to have been involved in the

liberation struggle, and thus have “no intrinsic respect for conventions of authority in the

movement” (Butler 2007:41). As new people enter the ANC, so will fresh perspectives on how

to honor the past without blindly adhering to old traditions that are destructive to South Africans.

Political Structures and Party Cohesion

The ANC is clearly the dominant party in South Africa and has created a very unbalanced

national party system. The ANC lacks any significant competition on the national level, as well

as in most provinces, and this has decreased accountability to the electorate (Butler 43).

Furthermore, there is a weak boundary between the ANC and the South African government, as

the government has been ruled by the ANC since the 1994 democratic transition. There are

several organizational issues within the ANC that have exacerbated this situation.

To begin with, the balance of executive power is disproportionate to other branches of

power within the ANC party. There are mechanisms in place to “promote substantive

uncertainty,” including “legislative elections, separate powers, civil liberties, oppositional

42

political parties, an independent press” (Calland and Graham 2005:168). Yet there has been a

global trend toward a shift from legislative power to executive power in recent decades, and

South Africa has not been exempt (ibid). One reason for this in South Africa is that in elections

for President and Parliament, the ANC appears on the ballot, not the individual candidate.

Voters choose based on party, not personality, and this requires that ANC politicians be loyal to

the party in order to win political positions. This creates a system in which the elected leaders

are more accountable to their party than to the people they are supposed to represent.

Furthermore, while the legislature is supposed to provide a check on the executive

branch, this is quite difficult when there is not a balance of powers. The 1994 caucus code of

conduct forbids ANC Members of Parliament (MPs) from undermining party policies by using

Parliamentary structures (Lodge 2004:209). In the few cases when ANC MPs in the legislature

have questioned the executive branch, “they were subsequently penalised either through

demotions or political harassment” (Calland and Graham 2005:181). One of the best examples

of this lack of questioning from the ANC MPs is data from the 1999 Parliamentary sessions. The

Democratic Party asked 879 questions, the New National Party asked 609, the Inkatha Freedom

Party asked 182 and even though ANC MPs “constitute the majority of the legislature” they only

asked 111 questions (ibid). Two years earlier, O’Loughlin reported that “ANC members of

Parliament complain - off the record - that the leadership now gives them little or no opportunity

to debate policy before it is adopted. Potential dissidents have been silenced with threats of

disciplinary action” (1997). In 2001, ANC leaders launched a “campaign against ultraleftists and

open competition for leadership positions,” which essentially banned “even internal debate about

its lack of internal debate” (Butler 2005:732). The party also limits debate by imposing

committee chairs and by having the President and other ANC heavyweights attend caucus

43

meetings (Butler 2005:720-1). Whether MPs choose not to question orders, or simply are not

given a chance, the end result is the same. ANC decisions are made from the top down, and

Parliament does not provide an adequate check to the executive powers.

These governmental and party structures have in many ways managed to create a façade

that the ANC is a cohesive party. ANC politicians are aware:

that ‘healthy pluralism’ can destroy any party, bringing ideological division, rivalries between charismatic leaders, and patronage relationships. Even elite parties cannot act ‘democratically’ by allowing members or activists to decide on policy, leaders, and candidates. Democracy that is deep (deliberative) and wide (participatory) undermines the organisational and political pre-requisites for party effectiveness. (Butler 2005:728)

While the ideal democratic government would create and maintain a system where all concerns

can be voiced and power is challenged, the role of the political party is to obtain state power.

The ANC has used its immense electoral power to secure the party’s position as leader of the

government, and this has strengthened South Africa’s government. The ANC has managed to

introduce policies that show, “an integrated national programme of government rather than

merely a series of potentially conflicting interventions. As a result of this achievement, social

conflict has been contained, and the stability of the democratic regime enhanced” (Butler

2005:723).

This has been accomplished by socializing ANC politicians, “into secrecy, hierarchy and

closed systems of debate and organisation” (Butler 2005:723). The ANC favors collective

achievements, and strongly discourages individual accomplishments (Mpthapo 2001; African

National Congress 2004). Furthermore, the ANC has become more of a “catch all” party or a

“broad church” that takes very general stances on ordinary issues as an attempt to appeal to the

majority of society (Butler 2005:729) rather than pushing a radical agenda like the ANC did as a

social movement organization.

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The ANC holds much power because the party includes so many different groups. A

1994 article marveled that, “The ANC's claim to be a broad anti-apartheid church is well backed

by the rest of its national list. A third of its candidates are women…. There are generous

sprinklings of the various ethnic groups,… communists and trade-unionists…. The Communists

and [Congress of South African Trade Unions] are both standing under the ANC's election

banner” (“The ANC on the Road to Power”). Many thought that this heterogeneous mix would

cause the party to break up quickly. An employee of the Standard Bank of South Africa said in

1994, “It embraces everyone from Capitalists to Marxists. That's because it was a broadly based

liberation movement rather than a political party. I think the Communist Party will split off. The

trade unions, too, may find themselves in conflict because they are trying to protect a labor elite”

(“From Rebels to Rulers” 1994). Yet the ANC has managed to use this diversity to its

advantage.

While the political system has remained stable, this top-down system has ultimately

harmed democracy. There are concerns that this may go too far and South Africa may become a

country that is ruled by a personality rather than by the people, which has occurred in many other

countries in Africa and presidential democracies around the world (Przeworski, Alvarez,

Cheibub, and Limongi 2000). Mistakes made by leaders go unchallenged by lower-level

politicians (Grint 2000), and the unchecked power of the executive branch is abused by political

entrepreneurs. The position of the president has become a “winner-takes-all prize” that factions

in the ANC party fight for (Butler 2005:722), as was evident in the December 2007 election

when Jacob Zuma was elected President of the ANC. This competition for executive power

shows that the cohesion of the ANC is merely a façade. Insiders know that ANC MPs often

“disparage their institution’s bourgeois character” and there are conflicts over judicial authority

45

(Butler 2005:721). It seems that the ANC’s internal divisions have become more apparent in

recent years since Zuma was elected President of the ANC, Mbeki resigned as President of South

Africa, and the ANC breakaway party COPE was formed.

The ANC has what scholar Thomas Carothers calls the “dominant party syndrome.” Like

former national liberation movements in Mozambique and Namibia, the ANC:

view themselves as the rightful inheritors of the state they fought to capture (boosting a tendency of the party to blur the line between state and party) and the rightful representatives of all the citizens of the country (weakening the rationale for the existence of other parties). As former military movements, these parties have strong hierarchical traditions. Their roots in struggle often make their leaders prone to confusing political opposition with disloyalty to the nation. (Carothers 2006:37)

If the ANC’s reign continues, the party will risk becoming too entrenched in the state. The line

between the state and the party should not be blurred because if the ANC “effectively fuses itself

with the state—such as by channeling state resources to the party and completely populating the

state with party-based personnel—other parties will have an extremely hard time gaining any

ground” (Carothers 2006:223).

Leaders

Many South Africans have been disappointed with the ANC leadership since the

democratic transition. Retired unionist Harriet Bolton complained that when she watches the

parliamentary meetings on television she sees “half of them sitting with their eyes closed,

looking half asleep, and not paying attention, walking in and out or talking to each other, they’re

not involved enough I don’t think.… They forget why they got in” (interview 2007). This

apathy is just one of many complaints I heard about the ANC in my interviews. Xolani Tsalong

pointed out that the problems South Africans are having with their leaders are not new or unique,

and are described in Frantz Fanon’s prolific book The Wretched of the Earth (1963). Xolani told

me the book inspired him and, “created this understanding of what things would look like in the

post-colonial era, and how our former liberation movement leaders would behave, and how they

46

would be disconnected from the masses. It is exactly what is happening in South Africa today,

what Fanon projected at the time” (interview 2007). While the disappointment with leadership is

not novel, it does not make it any less painful.

The most prevalent criticism of leaders that I heard was that they are extremely greedy.

Such greed was foreshadowed by an influential South African liberation writer. Steve Biko wrote

during apartheid that, “tradition has it that whenever a group of people has tasted the lovely fruits

of wealth, security, and prestige it begins to find it more comfortable to believe in the obvious lie

and to accept it as normal that it alone is entitled to privilege. In order to believe this seriously, it

needs to convince itself of all the arguments that support the lie” (2002:88). While Biko wrote

this to explain why the formerly oppressed Afrikaners were then oppressing black South

Africans, he does not say it is unique to whites. Echoing Biko’s sentiments, Gary Govindsamy

explained that the novelty of inexperienced blacks in powerful positions that were formerly

exclusive to whites has created troubles:

To a large extent it’s a dream. You’ve taken people and you’ve put them in new positions in the new system, some of which don’t know what’s happening, don’t know what to do in that position. And many of them are trying to help but don’t have the means, don’t have the capacity. They’re handling money which they’ve never seen before, they’ve never had an idea that they were going to handle such portfolios and such large amounts of money. Our expectations are too much, so they cannot deliver, there’s a great deal of theft from within organizations, in government and liberators are now starting to line their pockets . (interview 2007)

This situation creates a lot of disillusionment. Gary continues, “our very own liberators are now

oppressing us. And that is a sad thing” (interview 2007). Activist Louisa Motha told me,

“People from government just take the money from somebody else, they never give even one

cent, they just take for themselves” (interview 2007). System Cele went so far as to say, “I think

there is nothing wrong with the ANC itself, but it’s the people who are leading it. I think it’s the

greediness, money is the thing that divides people” (interview 2007). While I think System’s view

47

underestimates the influence of structural aspects of the ANC’s operations, it shows how powerful

the citizens perceive the leaders of the ANC to be.

Several ideas about how this greediness could be overcome were put forward in the

interviews. Mashumi Figlan proposed that the leaders need to think about the needs of the

people who voted them into power. He explained, “they are there to fulfill the needs of their

family, their friends, cousins, and all those people. But if they want to take care of the people and

know that ‘these people, they voted for us to be here, to do whatever they want us to do for

them,’ they can be good, and they achieve a lot and I think this country could be a better

country” (interview 2007). Gary Govindsamy said it is a matter of education and training: “I

think it’s going to take a little while more, when the liberators are educated into understanding

that they have much more of a role to play than just lining their own pockets” (interview 2007).

He also noted that the political leaders must remember where they came from, the struggle that

brought them to where they are now, and focus on improving the lives of other people, not their

own. Gary has heard leaders say “I didn’t join the struggle to be poor,” which has caused him to

question their commitment and ideologies. This has led him to believe that:

the fight for liberation is not over. We’ve got another fight at the moment where we need to fight the liberators. The problem is that people are treating their pockets, and they can’t allow that to happen. Understandably in any society which has just been liberated we will have a situation like that. It happened all over, where colonialists insured that they will destroy everything before they give the natives their liberty. It happened in India, it happened throughout Africa, it happened in America, it happened anywhere where the natives were fighting a war of oppression and a war for their own land. (ibid)

While the historical context makes it clear that to be greedy is human nature, Gary hopes it can

be overcome if leaders think back to their beginnings. He told me, “when they stood on

platforms and they made those revolutionary speeches, it should be until death. But that is not

what has happened in a great deal of Africa, in Asia, and other parts of the world” (ibid).

Politicians must strive to live up to the standards they once judged the old regime against, and

stick to their ethics when they are tempted by their new access to wealth.

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Careerism is another significant problem within ANC leadership. The focus has shifted

from helping the people get ahead to focusing on professionalization and bureaucratization to

help the leaders get ahead within the ranks of the party and secure their positions in power

(Butler 2005:730, Butler 2007:38). However, South Africa took a major step towards limiting

careerism when the yearly floor crossing period was abolished. During this time, members of

parliament, members of provincial legislatures and local government councilors used to be able

to change political parties. Mashumi Figlan told me that the people who cross the floor aren’t

drawn towards the ideals of the ANC, “they’re just the people who want to get a job.… And the

ANC allows those people to come, and some of them they are not doing the job the way the

ANC is doing the job, or the way the ANC wants them to do their job. They’ve got their other

Constitution on this hand, and another Constitution on this hand” (interview 2007). Although the

ANC was the main benefactor of this floor crossing policy, the ANC supermajority voted to

amend the constitution to outlaw the practice in January 2009. This might have been part of an

effort to prevent ANC MPs from leaving the party to join COPE in the upcoming crossover

period.

Another factor is that some ANC leaders left the country once they realized how the

ANC was changing and did not want to be involved. These activists left because they felt

dissatisfied, marginalized, unappreciated, or disillusioned. Gary said that many of the people

who emigrated “were part of the struggle, they were liberators to the bone” (interview 2007). He

continued, “I think many people in the hierarchy of the liberation movements stepped out

because they couldn’t handle what they were seeing. They couldn’t handle that we have

opportunists and cut-throats within the organization who are bent on treating their pockets and

not giving back to the poor” (ibid).

49

Yet there are still some South Africans who think the ANC is doing a good job given the

circumstances. Former political analyst Kiru Naidoo said, “I think that the ANC has done

superbly well in government. Inheriting a country that was on the brink of civil war, inheriting a

social and economic system that was as decrepit as you could imagine, millions of people

without homes, access to drinking water, access to food, and other social services, I think the

ANC has done magnificently in that regard” (interview 2007). He argues that we have to

acknowledge that many of the ANC leaders were involved in guerilla warfare and spent decades

in exile or prison. Kiru attributes the successes of the ANC leadership to the “depth and the

breadth of talent within the ANC, and also the enormous influence that Nelson Mandela has had

in guiding and channeling the thinking of the ANC” (ibid).

Membership, Public Opinion, Emotions, and Elections

ANC membership fluctuated between 100,000 and 500,000 in its first decade as a

political party (Lodge 2004:192). The number of active and paid members continued to grow,

and was reported to be 621,237 in June 2007 (Xundu 2007). Many South Africans have

strong emotional connections to the ANC as a liberation movement, which have profound

impacts on their opinion of the ANC as a political party. One story that highlights this is how

Mashumi Figlan first heard of the ANC and Nelson Mandela.

In 1982, when Mashumi was young, he saw soldiers harass his father for smoking

tobacco. His father was too old to fight back, and when one of the young soldiers began to beat

him with a shovel, Mashumi ran, crying, to his mother at church. She told him, “It’s like that in

South Africa. They can hit you anytime they like, they can shoot you anytime they like”

(interview 2007). The next day at school, Mashumi told his friends what had happened, and they

said not to worry, “there is a man coming who’s going to take over this country, his name is

50

Mandela. And that man, once he takes over there will be no one going to hit another one. And

everybody’s going to be safe. And everybody is… going to have a car, cows, goats, sheep, and

all those things” (ibid). Mashumi was so inspired that he asked his father about Mandela as soon

as he arrived home, and was astonished when his father slapped him and said, “don’t ever talk

about that, just because you’ll go behind bars, once you talk about that” (ibid). Mashumi didn’t

understand why he was silenced when he asked about Mandela, and continued to wonder about

this great man.

Before long, Mashumi had another chance to learn about Mandela. His uncle came to

visit and drink with his father. Mashumi realized they were planning to talk about Mandela, and

so he pretended to fall asleep so that he could listen to their conversation. Mashumi tells:

So they talk freely about Mandela, now, telling each other all those things, and I was listening attentively. Then after that I woke up and I told my uncle that I want to go to the toilet. I go to the toilet, then after that I jump over the fence, went to one of my friends, and I started to tell him. I said, ‘I heard my father talking about this Mandela.’ And I told him about Mandela, all those things. So I get inspired, and the way my father was talking to my uncle about Mandela, I was so inspired. Just because the way they were talking. And I used to open my eyes a little bit, and the way they were talking I noticed they didn’t want anyone to come inside. (interview 2007)

In high school Mashumi served as chairperson of the Congress of South African Students

(COSAS), he joined the struggle with the ANC in 1986, and became the chairperson of the ANC

Youth League in his town. In 1994 he canvassed for the ANC to help win the election, and put

great faith in what the party would do for the country. He told me, “Before 1994 I believed that

once the ANC took over the rule of this country, just because in that day we believed that the son

of God would come back, Jesus Christ. I used to say, ‘the ANC is going to hand over the rule of

this country to Jesus Christ’” (ibid). Even though Mashumi has been very disappointed with

what the ANC government has done, he still feels very strongly about the liberation movement,

and particularly Nelson Mandela. Mashumi explains:

When you think about Mandela sometimes you even forget about the politics, or what he did for the country and all those things. When I think about Mandela I think about him as a father. No matter what

51

father did wrong, he’s always your father. I rate him as a very good man who knows what the poor people need. He sacrificed his life for the betterment of the poor, but there’s still no betterment of the poor. (ibid)

This story and the strong sentiments it shows are common among those who fought for liberation

in South Africa.

Kiru Naidoo also became involved with the ANC as a young child, partially because his

aunts were activists. He told me, “My own thinking has evolved with the evolution of the ANC.

Ideologically and spiritually, from the very earliest days, my thinking has always been inline

with that of the ANC” (interview 2007). In many ways, this reflects the ANC’s ability to

become a catch-all organization that has incorporated the ideologies of other liberation

organizations. Gary Govindsamy explained, “the ANC will be in power for a long time” because

“the great majority of people in the country have been politicized into believing that the ANC

will liberate them” (interview 2007). While the ANC was not the only group that fought for

liberation, it successfully “usurped… all the policies and all the philosophies of the other

organizations” to create a party that is considered united (ibid).

There are also a lot of negative emotions attached to the ANC, particularly due to what

has happened since the transition. According to Gary, “People lost a great deal when we had

liberation, white people lost a great deal. And they felt betrayed by the old order.… Even that

white soldier who protected the border did something for his own people against what he

believed were terrorists” (interview 2007). Many whites didn’t think there would ever be a black

government, so they lost hope and interest in the political situation as soon as the ANC rose to

power. But this same disillusionment has occurred for people who fought apartheid and dreamed

of a truly equal South Africa. Gary adds, “And black people also, even if they carried a placard

one day in their life, they made a contribution. Even if they voiced their opinions about not

52

wanting to pay their electricity bills in protest, they did something for the struggle.… So people

are frustrated, but they believe there is some hope that one day they will have a better life” (ibid).

Though the ANC has disappointed many people in recent years, it seems that they will

continue to get the majority of the vote, and may enjoy their position as the ruling party for years

to come. There are a variety of factors that contribute to this theory. From a historical

standpoint, Kiru Naidoo explains that liberation movements that became parties in Tanzania,

India, and Kenya stayed in power for several decades (interview 2007). These examples may

provide a reasonable prediction of how long the ANC will retain its power. Yet, even though

history often repeats itself, they do not provide a guaranteed forecast of the future. The people of

South Africa must continue to vote in favor of the ANC for the party to retain its power, and this

may happen for several reasons.

As I mentioned earlier, the ANC has become a catch-all party that has diluted its

“ideological character in the pursuit of wider electoral support” (Butler 2007:38). The ANC tries

to appeal to a variety of social groups by “concentrating on ‘bread and butter’ issues, [and]

stressing competence above ideology” (ibid). Additionally, there have not been any worthy

opposition parties in past elections. As Xolani Tsalong told me, “People will continue to vote for

the ANC because there isn’t really a strong political party of opposition” (interview 2007). Gary

Govindsamy said that many people feel there is no better party to vote for, as the ANC has made

itself the only viable option. He elaborates, “The whole question of the government of national

unity was so carefully planned and organized and put into practice, that it destroyed other

ideologies of black people. So the ANC will stay in power for a long time” (interview 2007).

In the minds of many, the ANC has used empty promises and small gestures as an

attempt to gain the votes of shack dwellers. System Cele explained,

53

They only come to us when they want our vote…. They know that if they come do something for us they can get the majority to vote for them…. They came with biryani and juice, but after the election they forget about us…. They are buying the people with biryani and those itchy blankets, the gray ones, because they know that poverty is very high in our community of people who live in the shacks. So if you come with the food, the blankets, and the clothes, it will be like you have come with the heaven, you’ve done a good thing.… People can be easily taken because they are poor. (interview 2007)

Mashumi Figlan lives in the same shack settlement, and shared similar sentiments about how the

ANC only cares about poor people when the party needs their votes. He said, “During the

elections they always promised that ‘if you vote for us, what we’re going to do, we’re going to

build houses for you, we are going to do this and this and this and this.’ Then after that, once we

finished voting, they forget about us” (interview 2007). To my informants, it seems that the

ANC is putting in a minimal effort to maintain their electoral majority, but is not concerned with

following through.

My interviews in South Africa were conducted in late 2007, before Jacob Zuma was

elected President of the ANC party, before Thabo Mbeki stepped down, and before the creation

of COPE. The feeling at the time was that due to the amount of power and support the ANC had

accumulated, it was unlikely that another party would emerge with majority support in the near

future. Gary Govindsamy said that it is fine for the ANC to maintain their rule, so long as the

party protects rights and begins to listen to the people, “The whole question of expression and

freedom of speech exists. But we have a one party state, without doubt it’s a one party state, and

that is what they want. To a certain degree I agree with it, because only the ANC will appreciate

what the people want and what the people deserve. They’re supposed to have that as a basis to

ensure that everybody gets what is enshrined in the Freedom Charter” (interview 2007). Gary

said that if the official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), were to win the

presidency, “we’re going to go back to square one. And the kind of thinking in the DA is very

much ‘fight black’, not ‘fight back’. They will resort to the same tactics that the previous

government used to insure that they ‘fight black’” (ibid). So far, opposition parties have not

54

been able to provide an alternative to the ANC that the majority of South Africans will support.

For example, the only parties other than the ANC with more than 10 seats in the 400-member

Parliament are the Democratic Alliance and the Inkatha Freedom Party, which are only strong in

the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces, respectively. COPE may fill the void that

other opposition parties have not been able to fill, but since the floor crossing period was

abolished, there will be no way to determine this new party’s strength and breadth until the April

2009 national election.

The number and percentage of votes cast for the ANC has increased in every national

election since 1994. Former political analyst Kiru Naidoo noted, “In my mind that’s really

uncanny, but also thinking as a political scientist I think that the expectation would have been

that its support base would have dwindled. My feeling is that the ANC will be solidly in power

for at least the next twenty years” (interview 2007). As addressed earlier, Kiru mentioned that

this would not be unprecedented, as parties that won liberation in other countries have stayed in

power for three or four decades (ibid). This is what scholars at the independent, non-profit

Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) refer to as the honeymoon phenomenon, when

“citizens are reluctant to vote against liberation parties which were responsible for coordinating

the popular rebellions that brought down authoritarian regimes” (Habib and Schultz-Herzenberg

2005:168). Kiru attributes the ANC’s electoral success to the party’s strategy of being

“simultaneously right, left, and center” (interview 2007). He told me that closing down the space

for other parties to operate was “a very astute political strategy for the [ANC] party, [but]

whether this is healthy for democracy and the country as a whole, I’m skeptical. I think it’s

killing off a diversity of ideological opinion” (ibid). It seems that in order for ideological

diversity to return to the South African government, an opposition party will have to fight for it.

55

Gary Govindsamy said that if a viable opposition party were to emerge, he would not be

against it, but would urge them to focus on unity and participation. He continues, “I’m not

saying that there shouldn’t be an opposition, but the opposition has to work with what Mandela

had in mind all the time, a government of national unity, so that everybody can share and

participate in the government of the day” (interview 2007). The key to addressing South

Africans’ problems is through what the liberation struggle was fighting for: democracy. If the

government ignores the people, or the people stop trying to make the ANC listen to their needs,

nothing will improve.

The ANC has taken their electoral advantage for granted in past elections. While the

South African government has institutional methods in place to guarantee substantive uncertainty

for the ruling political party, such as “legislative elections, separate powers, civil liberties,

oppositional political parties, [and] an independent press” the ANC has enjoyed security (Habib

and Schultz-Herzenberg 2005:168). Some scholars argue that the ANC’s election victories

reflect a historically derived authority rather than a present sanction to rule (Butler 2005:730).

The result is that while there are free and fair elections, South African citizens’ voting rights do

not have any significant leverage when trying to change the actions of state elites (Habib and

Schultz-Herzenberg 2005:169).

Several of the South Africans I interviewed mentioned that the elections and the

subsequent actions of ANC politicians have created a lot of disenchantment among citizens.

Gary Govindsamy said, “There’s definitely going to be a strict decline in the number of people

who are going to the polls because people are fed up of going to the polls every so often. We

have elections every little while, and the country has become so politicized that people are fed

up” (interview 2007). Election days are public holidays so that everyone has a chance to vote.

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But Gary said that while voting was a novelty in 1994, now most people are tired of standing in

long lines and would rather spend time with their family or at the beach, enjoying a braai

(barbeque) and a beer (ibid). He told me this lack of interest is largely due to the lack of service

delivery:

They’re fed up with this kind of promises being made by politicians and no delivery. They don’t get anything in return. So they’d rather pay their taxes, they’d rather pay their rates, and fight among themselves in their own little arguments to say, ‘I don’t get this, I don’t get that, our street lights are bad.’ Because people are indeed fed up. It is sad, but I think they’ve been politicized to a large degree in the beginning, and since 1994 there isn’t this enthusiasm anymore. (ibid)

Xolani Tsalong also said that fewer people are going to the polls because they are losing interest

and excitement. He rationalized, “There are no fruits, they are not benefiting from this process.

Once we go to the polling station to vote, we expect some kind of change. When that change

doesn’t happen, what’s the reason to go out there?” (interview 2007).

David Ntseng has found that people are choosing to withhold their vote because there is

not a viable alternative to the ANC. He said, “no one is ready to go anywhere but the ANC,

unless people consciously decide not to vote at all. People would rather hold their vote than take

that anywhere else. That’s the current trend at the moment that I’ve witnessed and I’ve heard

people sharing” (interview 2007). Even if people abstain from voting, the ANC will continue to

get the majority of the vote. David told me that this will persist:

unless other promising political parties emerge in the near future, and how that will happen I don’t know. I don’t know because what I can see is that people have realized that party politics really doesn’t go anywhere, it doesn’t yield any results to expect political parties to make changes. That’s part of the disillusionment that we’ve gone through with the ANC, which was most trusted. Less and less people believe that political parties will yield something. (ibid)

He thinks that people are not only frustrated with the ANC, but with party politics in general.

This could mean that the end of the ANC’s rule might not come simply from another party

getting the majority of the vote, but through a fundamental change in the governmental system.

Service Delivery

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The lack of service delivery is a major grievance for South Africans. As political

scientist Anthony Butler wrote, “Liberal freedoms and representative democracy are easily…

rendered almost meaningless by poverty and historical disadvantage” (2005:725). Xolani

Tsalong has not been impressed with how the government has handled the nation’s problems.

He said, “If I look at the situation of poor people of South Africa today, because I think that’s

how I need to measure the successes of the ANC, I will say that I’m not very happy. The

conditions of poor people continue to be worse” (interview 2007). This sentiment was echoed

again and again in my interviews. System Cele declared, “There is nothing happening. When

they’re campaigning, they can promise everything, not only this government, every political

party, they all promise the same things, but they don’t deliver. That’s why we say we don’t care

who the leader is or which political party, as long as they are going to deliver” (interview 2007).

The liberation struggle in South Africa was not just about political rights, but also about

gaining basic human and economic rights. As Gary Gonvindsamy expressed, “the ordinary

people out there want to see something in their homes, they want to see something in their

pockets, they want to live a decent life before they die” (interview 2007). While all South

Africans can vote, not all have basics like homes, food, healthcare, and employment. Gary

continued, “There’s a great deal to be done, and I think people appreciate that and understand

that. But that liberation is taking a long time to come after the liberation, where people by now

should be sitting back and enjoying the fruits of the liberation. The whole question of pension,

the whole question of a better standard of education, the whole question of better housing, and all

that’s written in the Freedom Charter, is not being adhered to” (ibid). David Ntseng took this

argument further and said that South Africans must ask, “why does this happen under the banner

of liberations? Because it doesn’t feel liberating; you don’t get the sense of freedom… [this]

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will probe them to think, and think about the fact that they are unable to prosper or be citizens

that they want to be” (interview 2007). The ANC has won the political liberation struggle, but

the right to vote becomes almost meaningless for those living in poverty.

Unemployment is often at the root of many South Africans’ problems. The most recent

statistic from March 2009 says that the national rate of unemployment is 21.9% (Isa 2009). This

number is smaller than the real number of jobless South Africans because it does not include

discouraged work-seekers, those looking for jobs in the informal economy, and the significant

population of migrants who do not have the proper documentation to file for unemployment.

Using the broad definition of South African citizens wanting work, but not necessarily actively

job-searching, 29.3% of the country was unemployed at the end of 2008 (ibid). These numbers

are the lowest they’ve been in years, and there are doubts about their accuracy since they were

announced just before the national election.

Thus far, the ANC has done little to create job opportunities for those who need them.

While Kiru Naidoo had a more positive outlook on the ANC’s progress in comparison to the

others I interviewed, he said, “I think that their record has been plain atrocious, if I had to be

really vicious about it, I think it’s just been creating jobs for friends rather than meeting the

agenda of national priorities related to the youth. So you have CEOs on massive salaries, and

whether the job is being done on the ground is quite another thing” (interview 2007). Xolani

Tsalong was similarly disappointed:

The ANC did not promise too much, they promised things that are possible to deliver, but again, what they promise is completely different from the policies that they are adopting. If you promise to create employment, but at the same time you create policies that take away people’s employment, it’s a different story together. Making those promises that they’ve made is fine, they’re not ambitious, they are good promises. But the problem is the implementation. (interview 2007)

As unemployment grew in the first decade of democracy, so did the inequalities that existed

during apartheid (Butler 2005:726). The result is a democracy with higher rates of

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unemployment and larger wealth disparities than during apartheid. To put it simply, the average

South African was better off economically during apartheid than they are in the country’s new

democracy.

The ANC has declared on several occasions since 1994 that the party will end

homelessness in South Africa. Mashumi Figlan lives in the Kennedy Road shack settlement in

Durban and he told me, “People still stay in squatters and there are fires, floods, everything bad,

crooks are there, we are really not protected. I cannot say they’ve done well just because they

say, ‘ja, we’ve got the right of expressing ourselves, we can say whatever we want to say.’ But

that is not the freedom we are fighting for, only to talk” (interview 2007). Louisa Motha also

lives at Kennedy Road, and put the issue in perspective, “We haven’t got houses, we’re shouting

for houses, even my mother today is passing away from the shacks. Myself too I will pass away

from the shacks, even my children” (interview 2007). Many residents at Kennedy Road and

other shack settlements would like to improve their shacks and make them into viable houses

with stronger materials, running water, and electricity, but this is outlawed in South Africa and

the police demolish any shacks that are improved. When the ANC has built houses, they force

shack dwellers to move into them, and the houses tend to be tens of miles from places of

employment, making them worthless for the people who are living in shack settlements in or

near the city so that they can have a job. David Ntseng grew up in a shack and is now employed

by the Church Land Programme, an NGO that works to find solutions for land reform that go

beyond the state’s process. He explained that:

land reform is going nowhere, restitution in particular is going nowhere. I think the dates for actual completion of restitution programs have been shifted three times now. The first was by 1999, 30% of land in South Africa would have been transferred from whites to blacks, it was pushed to 2004, and it was pushed to 2008. And until now only 4%, and it’s been over ten years, it’s been 4%. Now this thing of halting poverty by 2014 then becomes a dream, a far fetched dream just to lure people into hoping, hoping, hoping but nothing actually takes place on the ground. (interview 2007)

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This creates a hazardous living situation for millions of South Africans. Living in shack

settlements is dangerous for many reasons, not the least of which are the lack of hygiene without

running water or enough toilets, shack fires that are created by propane which is used for

cooking and heat, and limited shelter from the elements and wildlife.

The number of people in South Africa living with HIV/AIDS has grown rapidly since the

early 1990s (Friedman and Mottiar 2006:24). During Mandela’s presidency, he did nothing to

increase awareness and treatment of the epidemic, and many people were reluctant to be

associated with the HIV/AIDS movement through fear of being stigmatized (ibid). After leaving

office, Nelson Mandela announced that HIV causes AIDS and that he had lost a niece and two of

his nephew’s sons to AIDS. On one occasion he even wore an “HIV POSITIVE” shirt that was

part of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a social movement that aims to treat people with

HIV/AIDS and reduce new infections (Power). When the former President, a symbol of the new

South Africa, took this strong stance he helped to significantly decrease the stigma attached to

HIV/AIDS.

Though Mandela did help to improve awareness about HIV/AIDS after he left office, the

ANC has yet to have a President fully take on the issue while in office. Mbeki publicly

questioned the link between HIV and AIDS, and his former Health Minister Dr. Manto

Tshabalala-Msimang encouraged HIV positive South Africans to eat lots of beetroot and garlic

rather than promoting anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs), which scientists say are the most successful

way of combating AIDS. It also was also detrimental that the current President of the ANC,

Jacob Zuma, admitted in court when he was accused of rape, that he had unprotected sexual

intercourse with an HIV positive woman, and that the only thing he did to protect himself was

shower afterwards. Jacob Zuma’s immense popularity and the vast media coverage of this

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statement added clout to many of the South African public’s unscientific perspectives on

HIV/AIDS. While the new Minister of Health, and longtime ANC activist and member, Barbara

Hogan has the TAC’s approval for her stance on HIV/AIDS, the ANC has its work cut out for it

in terms of getting the epidemic under control.

While service delivery in South Africa has been limited, the ANC has made some

progress in improving other Southern African countries. Gary Govindsamy told me:

the President [Thabo Mbeki] is doing a fantastic job at trying to stabilize the destabilized sub-Saharan Africa so that everybody below the equator can live a proper life. People are flocking to South Africa because they believe there is gold on the streets of South Africa. And as white countries have destabilized Africa for their diamonds and gold and all that goes with it, and the wars need to be stopped in sub-Saharan Africa, so the entire sub-Saharan Africa doesn’t converge into South Africa and create problems here. And the President is doing a fantastic job in that. But also the President needs to see what is happening within his own backyard to insure that crime is curtailed and people are living a life where there is security and comfort for all. (interview 2007)

By working to improve neighboring countries, the ANC has managed to limit some migration

into South Africa, yet there are still millions of migrants, many from Zimbabwe, who are living

in South Africa and competing with citizens for jobs, houses, and other basic resources.

Xolani Tsalong summed up the problem clearly when he told me, “The issue of service

delivery is still a major issue here in South Africa. It’s going to continue to be an issue as long

as we continue to have these policies” (interview 2007). The South Africans I interviewed who

are critical of the ANC are not asking for much, just the ability to live a decent life and to

maintain their dignity. They want jobs, houses, and health care. These are reasonable requests,

and in fact these rights are guaranteed in the South African Constitution and the Freedom

Charter. Yet the people of South Africa are still denied many of the rights that the ANC fought

for during the liberation struggle.

Interactions with Civil Society and Political Society

Everyone I interviewed in South Africa complained about the ANC’s treatment of civil

society. Xolani Tsalong’s opinion is that once democracy was achieved, the government worked

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to silence civil society, and the nation has paid for it. He said, “I think the government missed an

opportunity to work with civil society in addressing some of the major service delivery problems

in the country. Civil society is desperate because we didn’t accommodate it” (interview 2007).

The ANC tried too hard to keep civil society silent due to its liberation tradition, but that should

no longer apply. He continues:

Civil society is independent of government and is therefore able to be critical of government. Some people wouldn’t take that positively. Some people look at it as an effort to criticize the ANC government. That has been a major problem.… We’ve been received as anti ANC government because of being critical. It goes back to the theme of being loyal to a post development organization, being loyal to a liberation movement, because the ANC was a liberation movement, so it expects therefore people to be very loyal to it. It becomes a different story altogether if you are critical of that movement in a post-apartheid or post-colonial era. (ibid)

Mac Maharaj, a former ANC member who had a falling out with the party, agrees that

“government and civil society have not found ways of working together without undermining

each other’s independence. Their relationship still simmers with latent tension, and has taken an

unhealthy form. At best, government tends to smother civil society; at worst, it is downright

antagonistic toward it” (O’Malley, 448-9). The government does not want to hear what people

have to say, and it ignores what it does not want to be told. When it is no longer able to ignore

these voices, the ANC has resorted to attempts to silence the public. As Louisa Motha tells us,

“they’re just trying to close the mouths of everybody…. Words from everyone have to be heard.

They mustn’t listen to just the words of the rich, or the big people, they must listen to the words

from everyone. They say it’s a government for everyone, but the way they do they don’t look

like they’re a government for everyone” (interview 2007). The police presence, brutality, and

arrests at all of the Abahlali movement’s marches and the scare tactics the ANC has used to try

to silence certain members outside of the marches are just a few examples among many.

Kiru Naidoo offers a perspective that balances a harsh reality with steadfast optimism.

He says:

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I think the ANC has effectively demobilized and decimated civil society. Now that’s strong language and I’m happy to say it in that way, because I think that what the government did was to poach the best and the brightest leaders from civil society movements into government and its apparatus. So the effect of that has been that many organizations simply collapsed. The flip side of that argument is that these organizations existed to serve the cause of national liberation. And once national liberation had been won, then their reason d’être had passed. I think in many ways, a stronger civil society would have contributed to much sounder governance and service delivery. And I’m still optimistic that the ANC will create the spaces for our civil society to flourish. (interview 2007).

If Kiru is right and the ANC creates a space for civil society, or at least allows civil society to

create and preserve its own space, the ANC’s power will begin to be checked by the public.

This is exactly what Mac Maharaj thinks the ANC needs – a strong civil society. He

says, “The check on the ANC is a healthy civil society. The check is a society that is debating.

The check is a society that does not look only at corruption but also at the abuse of power, one

that recognizes that the abuse of state power is a threat to freedom, one that debates the danger.

The check is a society that does not say, ‘Because you, the government say so, therefore it’s

right.’ It says, ‘I believe you, but I would like to be convinced.’” (O’Malley 2007:455).

Maharaj, like many others who were active in the struggle and are now critical of the ANC,

hopes that the party will return to its tradition of participation. He continues, “The vibrancy of

civil society that was present at the height of the anti-apartheid struggle has significantly

diminished. Yet the challenge for South Africa is whether we will succeed in deepening and

realizing a participatory democracy, or whether we will allow our democracy to become frozen

in formal trappings and structures. Participatory democracy requires that we encourage and

stimulate the development of civil society” (ibid). With any luck, the people of South Africa

have already begun to gain the momentum necessary to make this vision a reality, as it seems

unlikely that this change will come from the ANC.

Social movements were instrumental in the collapse of apartheid, but the ANC no longer

encourages protests and often criticizes activists who try to take action. The ANC now “calls for

active support for state institutions and demands law-abiding citizens” (Zuern 2004:3). Social

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movements are forced to choose between following state policies and forfeiting a critical

perspective, or speaking out for the people they represent and being quieted by the government.

David Ntseng told me that some social movement organizations:

will look into forming partnerships with the state, affirming what the state is doing, looking up to what the state is promising even if it doesn’t offer. That social movement of course will be legitimate in the eyes of the state. Now to me that says any organization or social movement that does the opposite, that breaks away from the state politics or state projects, then it’s launching an offensive to the state, and they will be treated by all means as an enemy, and be crushed. (interview 2007)

Luckily, not all social movements that speak out against government policies have been trampled

by the ANC.

The Abahlali baseMjondolo (Shack Dwellers) movement began in early 2005 when 750

shack dwellers blocked a major road in Durban for four hours (Abahlali BaseMjondolo 2006;

Gibson 2006:Zabalaza). They were protesting the sale of a piece of land near the Kennedy Road

settlement that had been promised for shack dweller housing (Abahlali BaseMjondolo 2006).

Abahlali has grown to be “the largest organisation of the militant poor in post-apartheid South

Africa” and includes tens of thousands of residents from almost 40 settlements in the Durban area

(ibid). Since its creation, Abahlali members and supporters have suffered over a hundred arrests

in addition to police assaults, death threats, and various other forms of intimidation (ibid). Half

of the people I interviewed in South Africa – System Cele, Mashumi Figlan, Louisa Motha, and

David Ntseng – are involved with Abahlali’s struggle, and provided in-depth information on the

movement’s interactions with the ANC.

Mashumi explained that Abahlali operates with truth, in stark contrast to the lies of the

ANC. He said, “The thing I like about Abahlali baseMjondolo is that they speak truth. If they

don’t know how to do something they say, ‘No, we don’t know how to this and this and this and

this. Can you tell us what we can do?’ That is what I like. They’re transparent, and tell the

truth, not to lie about it, just because I don’t like the people who are lying” (interview 2007). In

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his opinion, this truth is hard for the ANC leadership to handle, and why Abahlali is constantly

threatened in hopes of keeping the people quiet. Mashumi continued, “They can listen anytime

if they want to, but if they are still corrupt I don’t think they can listen to Abahlali, just because

Abahlali, they are speaking the truth all the time. But I don’t think they can associate with the

people who are only speaking truth when they don’t want to hear it” (ibid). While Abahlali will

continue to seek the attention of the ANC, Mashumi is aware that the movement cannot force the

government to be accountable. He said, “You can’t force the ANC to listen if they are not

prepared to. Or change their mind, you can’t do it” (ibid). All that Abahlali can do is protest

“the lack of service delivery because it’s our right to voice what we are dissatisfied with” (ibid).

Although the South African constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the right to

protest, at times the police have denied these rights to Abahlali members. Louisa Motha told me,

“When we march, they just send the police to just hit us, for nothing, for no reason. The

constitution it says we can march, but they’re hitting the people, oppressing the people, it’s not a

good thing” (interview 2007). Mashumi added to this idea, saying that simply because the ANC

says all South Africans are liberated does not mean that the statement is true. He explained, “If

we are involved in that new liberation, why when we express ourselves, why when we share our

opinion we are silenced, if we are all free? They must say they are free, not all of us. Just

because… whenever we are marching they are trying by all means to silence us” (interview

2007).

Even though the government has yet to give in to Abahlali’s demands, the movement has

made significant progress in giving shack dwellers the voice that all citizens in a democracy are

supposed to have. System Cele said, “Before, even though we had the right, we were not

allowed to speak for ourselves. People from the shacks were ignored when they went to the

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official’s office, they just ignored you. Now we are able to talk to our government, we are able

to talk to any official we want to talk to because we are a community” (interview 2007). Still,

the ANC remains blind to the reasons behind Abahlali’s actions, or perhaps in denial of their

responsibilities, and tries to silence the people of Abahlali. System continued, “If you are

marching they think you are mad, they don’t understand, they think we act like uneducated

people. But we are not mad, our mothers are not mad, our grannies are not mad, they are not

going to the street and jump[ing] for nothing.… We go with the memorandum with our demands

and to show them that we are not fighting. But they don’t understand what we’re doing, they just

hit us. When we march at the end they just beat us” (ibid). The way that the police and local

politicians have dealt with Abahlali show that the ANC has not yet learned how to embrace

criticism of policies as a means of improvement, and instead view protests as an attack on the

party.

The ANC has held a similar attitude towards non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

According to scholar Anthony Butler, the party has made a point of “building relationships with

non-governmental organisations that refrain from public criticism of the party and government.

It expects its partners… to refrain from public denigration of the movement and its

representatives in government. The ANC has been ruthless, adroit and successful in using its

system of alliances to its own benefit, and to produce widespread consensus around most of

government’s programmes” (2007:39). NGO worker David Ntseng explained to me that the way

the ANC treats an NGO “depends how that NGO conducts itself, or how that NGO regards itself.

If it feels it’s a quasigovernment NGO, surely it will be treated with high respects and all, or it

will be regarded highly as a partner with government, by virtue of it being quasigovernment”

(interview 2007). NGOs are caught between working with the government but giving up their

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autonomy, or staying true to their principles while being shunned by the authorities. Either

choice tends to limit the NGO’s effectiveness.

Since its founding in 1998, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) has engaged with the

ANC in the streets and in the courtroom, and won several battles. Yet there is more than meets

the eye with the relationship between the ANC and TAC. Xolani Tsalong began volunteering for

TAC in 2001, worked for the NGO full time from 2003 to 2006, and now volunteers again while

studying for a masters degree in Development Studies. He explained, “It would seem that the

relationship is very hostile between the TAC and the ANC. But we have found that there are

people within the ANC who support the TAC and the things it’s doing. But unfortunately some

of them cannot come out and support TAC publicly…. Certain leadership of the ANC doesn’t

agree with TAC. So they don’t want anyone from the ANC to come out and support TAC”

(interview 2007). Though the TAC does have support from certain individuals in certain

provinces within the ANC, these sentiments cannot be announced publicly as they are not

accepted by the party. To complicate things further, the majority of TAC members are ANC

supporters, though many are not satisfied with the government’s policies. Xolani continued, “In

2003 we embarked on a civil disobedience campaign just to force the ANC government to adopt

the initial treatment plan, which was a clear indication that those members of TAC who were

ANC supporters were not entirely happy with what the ANC government was doing at the

time…. Immediately after that, late 2003, the government adopted initial treatment plan. I think

that the pressure that we exerted on them really worked” (ibid). While this was a major success

for the TAC, the government has not followed through to provide adequate resources for

implementation of the treatment plan.

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The relationship between TAC and the government is something that the NGO has spent

a lot of time thinking about and trying to navigate so that it can be most effective. Xolani

expressed, “We’ve been going through difficult times in terms of our relationship with the

government, how government looks at civil society, it’s been really really difficult” (interview

2007). For now, the TAC has decided to operate as a watchdog of government HIV/AIDS

legislation in South Africa. Xolani stated, “As long as HIV/AIDS continues to exist, there is of

course a need for TAC to continue to exist as well…. There needs to be a watchdog to say, ‘this

is what the government promised us, these are the things that were adopted in the latest policies.’

The delivery is not there, so we demand delivery” (ibid).

The ANC originally planned to “safeguard and extend” labor and trade union rights when

the party took office in 1994 (Frazer 1994), but in many ways the ANC has failed to follow

through. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is part of the Tripartite

Alliance with the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party, and there

has been much tension between these groups (Butler 2005:727). While the ANC has rarely

created policies that serve the unions’ interests, COSATU has stayed in the alliance and

continues to encourage union members to vote for the ANC. COSATU maintains the view that

the best way to change the ANC is by continuing their partnership (Habib 2005).

Many South Africans who are actively involved in civil society are not pleased with how

the government treats them. David Ntseng is employed by an NGO, involved in a social

movement, and educated in activism, and finds this situation unacceptable. He declares, “It’s so

not on, so not on. It’s unethical; it’s not supposed to be that way. It’s immature, both at the level

of politics and at the level of governing the country. So it’s not allowed to be like that”

(interview 2007). Yet as Xolani points out, not all South Africans feel this way:

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There’s been this culture that everything’s fine now. We’ve got politics. All that the youth needs to do, is to get their education and get job opportunities. That’s it. I think that it’s been the mission of the ANC to silence the youth in the post-apartheid or post-colonial era. Because really if you look at power that the youth has, it’s very potent. It’s got huge power in influencing policies and politics, which it did before 94, ANC Youth League has been very influential in politics. But it became a different story after 94, to say, ‘things are fine now’. (interview 2007)

If future generations of South Africans continue to put a lot of trust in the government, there is a

good chance that the ANC will continue to consolidate power. The South African government

will not have much political uncertainty again if civil society members continue to partner with

the ruling party (Habib 2002; Habib 2005).

Yet there is hope that some civil society actors have begun to rise to the occasion. Xolani

says, “Civil society in South Africa has been very vocal in the past few years. I think it has

demanded space, and it continues to demand its space, and the government is beginning to listen.

Even though listening is one thing and delivering is another” (interview 2007). The number of

protests in South Africa have increased in past years, and this is a clear indication of how

dissatisfied South Africans have become. Xolani continues, “With the socio-economic

conditions the South African people are facing today, lack of employment, HIV/AIDS, and so

forth, it really forces people to unite and be vocal about these issues.… People forge alliances,

united fronts, to demand their space or demand service delivery” (ibid). This provides great

hope. As Xolani says, “I believe that if we have a strong civil society movement that really

exerts pressure on the government, there could be some change” (ibid).

Furthermore, there are some cases of the ANC encouraging civil society actors while

giving the organizations some autonomy. An example that has provided Kiru Naidoo with this

hope, that the ANC will foster the space for civil society, is the Conflict and Governance Facility

(CAGE). He told me:

This is an ostensibly civil society organization, but it’s funded through the national treasury, doing research and setting up structures in community and things, which ordinarily should not be the business of government. And government is doing this, funding it but not interfering in how it operated, not setting the

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agenda for research and the like. I feel very pleased to see that, because these were university professors, who given their positions within universities would have been very happy to be critical of government, but they were people saying, ‘the state has put money in this, but we have not been told what may or may not research, what we may or may not write.’… So there was one example I saw of something being promoted where credible research is being done and a civil society organization is developing out of it. (interview 2007)

These relationships and creation of space should extend to other realms of civil society as well,

for the government can learn much from grassroots movements. Kiru continues, “I think that

State Departments like Health, Social Services, Education and so on would benefit from closer

associations with civic movements, students’ movements, women’s movements, because often

these bodies are the ones who have their ears to the ground” (ibid). By working with civil

society, the ANC can begin to understand what the people want, and engage with an array of

opinions about how to improve this country.

Kiru’s enthusiasm is not without reservations due to an awareness of the ANC’s previous

actions. He says, “I think in many ways the ANC is failing to hear the multiplicity of voices.

There is that one body of psycho fans who will trumpet anything the ANC says. Then there’s a

whole body of people who are quite tuned out. And then there’s a body which, I’ve written

something where I described them as ‘serial critics’, they are constantly bashing everything that

the state puts forward. I think that that’s as destructive as the psycho fans” (interview 2007).

Kiru does not consider himself to be a member of any of these groups, as he tries to judge the

ANC’s actions and policies on a case by case basis. He adds, “Civil society is a very useful

sounding board for government policy, and with the upcoming ANC conference, I’m pleased

that a lot of the policy documents through SANGOCO [South African NGO Coalition], the civic

movement structures, have been fed through the local community. But whether or not those

views get fed up the system, I’m skeptical but I’d like to be optimistic” (ibid). Kiru concludes

this thought simply, “I think that government tends to be very defensive, and it need not be that

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way. There is enough room and space for both government and civil society to flourish. I think

government would be enriched if it worked more closely with civil society” (ibid).

The South African government has done a lot of work to improve their reputation and

economic relationship with western countries since the ANC took power though, as David

Ntseng points out, this is not a new phenomenon:

It’s a long story and there are so many connections to it. The fact that South Africa has brought itself to countries of Europe in a silver platter, or maybe shall I say platinum platter, is one of the reasons. You can’t open yourself up to be dictated to by the western countries, they are way ahead of you in this economic trade and what have you. They are way ahead because they started a long time ago, with manipulating resources and raw material from Africa. Now the interest of seeing this democratically elected or popular elected leadership of this country, to them it’s still a win, because then they will introduce you to some of the wonders, as understood in Western economics, of being part of the players in world economics. (interview 2007)

David says that this relationship with the West is beneficial for many of the rich South Africans,

but does not help the ordinary people, “Yet they are all represented by one government, the

liberation government” (ibid). The result is that the interests of the shack dwellers and farm

owners are not represented in these global interactions. Rich South Africans, David continues,

“are represented because it’s easy to side with other heavyweights in the Western economy. To

me it’s all linked to economic play. To grow the economy, how that is grown, is just play the

game” (ibid).

As in many other countries, the poor in South Africa are harmed by globalization. Xolani

Tsalong explained that many of the ANC’s failures can be blamed on the inability of the leaders

to stand up to global pressure. He said, “Corporate globalization is basically contributing to the

social injustices in developing nations. The World Bank, the IMF, how they seem to be

operating to make situations worse for people in poor countries.… As long as we continue to

have these institutions operating the way they are, we will continue to see some form of pressure

exerted on our leadership in developing nations” (interview 2007). Leadership must be

dedicated to eliminating social ills, and must not give in to the pressure of corporate

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globalization. Xolani continues, “You need a strong leader to say enough is enough, I am

definitely not bowing down to this pressure” (ibid). One example of the government giving in to

globalization is the country’s preparations to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup which will bring a

mass influx of visitors and media coverage from around the world. System Cele stated:

I think they are too busy preparing for 2010, we will hear on the radio that the cement is poured and the stadium is not finished yet. They forgot about us. Even the people coming from the other countries, they won’t show them [the shacks], they’ll just show them inside the city where they will stay at hotels, they won’t show them here because it will be embarrassing because they went to the other countries and said they are doing their job, they are taking care of the poor. (interview 2007)

System thinks that the politicians present a false view of South Africa to other countries, and that

when the government does gather money it is not actually used to improve the nation for all

citizens. She continued, “the people in government positions, they go to different countries

saying they are going to deliver to our people, they are going to help us, they get the money and

we do not know what they are doing with that money. They don’t come back to us to give the

report, how they are doing, what they told the people from other countries what sort of solution

they would be doing” (ibid). The ANC as a political party seems to be more focused on pleasing

people outside of South Africa than on listening to or helping its constituents.

Accountability

A topic that came up in most of my interviews is the importance of listening to the voice

of the people. This is a simple point, but something politicians often fail to acknowledge.

System Cele states, “They will talk about the people living in the shack, they don’t even know

how it would feel to live in a shack. They talk about us, about our needs, but they’re doing

nothing for us. So that’s why we’re saying don’t talk about us, talk to us, because we are the one

who are suffering” (interview 2007). It is incongruous for leaders with steady incomes, houses,

running water, proper sanitation, their own means of transportation, and so many other goods

and resources to assume that they know what impoverished people living in shacks want. Louisa

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Motha further emphasizes this point, “Come and see what’s happening. You can say you know

I’m hungry, but you never come in my house and see if I’ve got food or not. At the end of the

day you just go to the Parliament and shout, ‘my people are full,’ but you never see that thing.

You’re not coming to see the people and connecting with the people” (interview 2007). The

more the government tries to ignore the voice of the people, the longer it will take for change to

come about.

Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth spends much time dealing with this very topic.

He wrote:

In an underdeveloped country, experience proves that the important thing is not that three hundred people form a plan and decide upon carrying it out, but that the whole people plan and decide even if it takes them twice or three times as long. The fact is that the time taken up by explaining, the time ‘lost’ in treating the worker as a human being, will be caught up in the execution of the plan. People know where they are going, and why. (1963:193)

Politicians in South Africa seem to underestimate the aptitude of ordinary people, particularly

when they are poor or live in shacks. They buy into the notion that material poverty is the result

of people’s limited intellectual capacity, when in fact this poverty is a product of the politicians’

own policies. Truly listening to the people is imperative for this backwards thinking to be

disproven, and for the will of the citizens to be actualized.

Valuing what the people say and want does not have to be contradictory to ANC methods

of leadership. Gary Govindsamy adds that:

As activists in the old days we consulted with the people. We always had meetings. People’s concerns change all the time, people’s wants change all the time, and if you don’t talk to your people, if you don’t talk to your voters, you’re not going to know what they want. You’re not going to know what they have in mind. Granted, the powers that be have the means to make those changes, they have the powers to make them, but there has to be consultation. We cannot imagine what they want, we cannot dream about what they want, they must tell you what they want. (interview 2007)

If we accept that the government has the power, and the people have knowledge, an open

partnership is necessary to improve South Africa.

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Though the government may be in charge, the people are not powerless; the more they

find their voice and make it heard, the stronger they become. This is not a matter of asking the

government to make changes, it is about saying what is wrong and what should be done about it,

and then demanding that the government deliver. As Fanon tells us, “The masses should know

that the government and the party are at their service. A deserving people, in other words a

people conscious of its dignity, is a people that never forgets these facts” (1963:198). While

current civil society demands are not as strong as they were in past decades, people are once

again finding their voice and their power. As more people speak out, others gain confidence in

their own voices, and join in the demand that the government start listening and acting

accountable. According to David Ntseng:

This to me is just the beginning, there’s more to come. If more and more people believe in their own power, believe in the power of their own intellectual resources, their own strategies, their thinking capacities, their dreams, because that’s what’s how you drive them to a better future, to believe in the actualization of their dreams, their dreams to be human beings, that’s what they want, it’s nothing more than that. If movements like this one make that more and more visible to anyone and everyone, surely people will want to do the same. At the moment to me Abahlali are like a cloud of witness that need to convince everyone that as an ordinary person you can still make your voice heard, or you can force your voice to be heard. That will begin to allow other people to gain conviction and do likewise. (interview 2007)

The people of South Africa must become aware of the problems surrounding them, compare this

to their hopes for a democratic nation, and find the strength from within to make their voices

heard. Gary Govindsamy says this is important because existing ideologies do not always fit

with the current situation. He explains, “because of it’s uniqueness in terms of it’s people, in

terms of the country, in terms of the infrastructure, in terms of the geography, we need to take

issues up based on what we see with the people. That’s why I’m saying without consultation

with the people, you cannot go forward. You cannot think you know what the people want”

(interview 2007).

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One of the reasons it might be so hard for ANC politicians to listen to the public is that

sometimes what the people are asking for does not fit with the word coming from the leaders at

the top. When movements ask for basic things like homes near their workplaces or safe water,

David says that:

it doesn’t code the word from the national headquarters. Actually, it works against the word from the national headquarters because at the moment the word from the national headquarters is the BEE, the ensuring of economic growth being GEAR. Now if you have people who are forcing you to account and actually put them in a picture that says as the country this is how you transform ordinary people’s lives, it doesn’t offer that opportunity. And so, the ANC tradition then suggests you silence those voices because they are disobedient to the word. So it’s hard to imagine a transformed ANC. (interview 2007).

In this way, the traditions of the ANC prevent the government from listening to the people and

making the improvements that the public wants. Louisa Motha calls for accountability, “They

must listen to us, we mustn’t listen to them. They ignore our struggle. We came from the shacks,

we know this life, we carry on with this life, but something for us needs to change. They mustn’t

expect to just get the vote and go away” (interview 2007). The ANC’s obsession with following

tradition and top-down order is preventing politicians from listening to the citizens, and thus

hinders democratic representation and progress.

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CHAPTER 3: SOLIDARITY CASE STUDY

Solidarity is another SMO that entered into politics, yet has simultaneously remained a

union throughout its trajectory. Solidarity began as a Polish trade union and social movement,

and was very instrumental in the fall of communism and rise of democracy in Poland. Though

Solidarity originally claimed to be uninterested in politics, there were hints at a political future

from the beginning (Touraine 1983), and Solidarity’s power against Soviet rule eventually

compelled the organization to enter into politics. The parties and politicians that came out of

Solidarity experienced great fluctuations in public support throughout the 1990s. Since 2001,

Solidarity has limited its scope to that of a trade union and has begun to regain the legitimacy it

had in the 1980s.

History of the Movement

On August 14 1980, laborers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk went on strike in defense

of Anna Walentynowicz, a dismissed crane driver. Walentynowicz had co-organized the illegal

Free Trade Unions (FTU), which was established in 1978. The strike was initiated by three

fellow shipyard workers, as well as FTU and Workers Defense Committee (KOR) member

Bogdan Borusewicz, and Lech Wałęsa, a 1970 strike organizer and FTU member who had also

been fired (Wancerz-Gluza 2008). The strike continued for several days – with other shipyards,

plants, and ports joining the workers at the Lenin Shipyard. On the night of August 16, just less

than a thousand workers stayed overnight in the shipyard and established the Inter-Enterprise

Strike Committee (ISC) and its list of 21 postulates, the first being the right to independent trade

unions. The ISC’s plan was embraced by most of Poland and by the end of August, 700 plants

had joined the ISC with 700,000 workers on strike in the majority of Poland’s provinces.

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Just a month later, on September 17, 1980, representatives from individual Inter-

Enterprise Committees decided to establish a unified national organization which they called the

Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity (Niezależny Samorządny Związek

Zawodowy “Solidarność”). At its founding, Solidarity was affiliated with three million blue and

white collar workers. Solidarity’s structure then changed to include college students and farmers

and to create a National Coordinating Committee, led by Wałęsa (Wancerz-Gluza 2008). Poles

and the free world alike had great expectations for this trade union that had 10 million members

by the end of 1980 – almost half of the adult population in Poland (Sharman 2003:106; Gliksman

group meeting 2008).

Solidarity was unique not only because it was the first independent organization in a

Soviet state, but because of the attitude it maintained about the state. When the workers at

Gdansk met with the government negotiating committee in August they said, “We don’t want to

engage in politics. We’ll have nothing to do with politics. Politics is your business, not ours”

(Ost 1990:1). The goal was not to change politics, but to create a free space that was

independent of the state: “They were so eager to avoid becoming captured in the routines and lies

of the party-state that they elevated the situational ethics of oppositional behavior into a general

principal of the ‘politics of anti-politics’” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 271-2). Solidarity not only

rejected the state and its power, it wanted to eliminate power “so ‘anti-politics’ is not just the

necessary rejection of the state, but also the deliberate rejection of the state, the belief that what

is essential to a just order is not a benign government and good people in power, but rather a

viral, active, aware, self-governing, and creative society” (Ost 1990:2). Another unique aspect of

Solidarity was its commitment to pacifism, explaining that solidarity was not just the name of the

movement, but a principle to live by. This called upon “the principles of social solidarity and

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moral values in public life. By its very nature it contradicted the rules of the communist system

– thus eroding the foundations of communism in Poland” (Wancerz-Gluza 2008). Even without

trying to engage with the state, Solidarity began to shape politics in Poland simply by existing as

an institution separate from Soviet power.

These revolutionary ideas did not come only from the shipyard workers in Gdansk. The

path Solidarity followed was created in the 1970’s by democratic intellectuals who opposed the

Polish state. “The ‘anti-political’ strategy of social openness and political self-restraint, the

commitment to dialogue, and eschewal of force—all of those followed from KOR narratives that

identified political dictatorship (not just communism) as the prescribed object of anger” (Ost

2005b:191-2). This is important because these intellectuals were the ones who went into politics

using the name of Solidarity a decade later. Furthermore, Solidarity could not claim to be

outside the realm of politics and power for long because the nature of its position opposed

current politics and gave the movement power. Simply, “the very existence of Solidarity altered

the character of the state, Solidarity could no longer ignore the state. It tried for a while, but

could not do so for long” (Ost 1990:1). Without intending to, Solidarity had become a political

player.

Solidarity’s situation intensified in a matter of months. In March 1981, the police abused

several union activists and Solidarity responded by holding a four-hour warning strike, bringing

the country to a standstill (Wancerz-Gluza 2008). This strike was described by one scholar as

"the most impressive democratic mass mobilization of any European society in peacetime,

against its rulers’ wishes" (Ash 2002:155). By the autumn of 1981, Solidarity was as strong as

ever and the state quickly responded by enacting martial law on December 13, 1981. Many

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Solidarity leaders were sent to prison and about one million members, mostly the well-educated,

were forced to leave the country (Gliksman group meeting 2008).

In April 1982 the Provisional Coordinating Commission, the clandestine national

leadership of Solidarity, was formed by the leaders of underground regional organizations that

had evaded arrest. Underground Solidarity participated in political acts like street protests,

education, and uncensored publishing (Wancerz-Gluza 2008). By the time martial law formally

ended on June 22, 1983, almost 12 thousand Poles had been arrested and imprisoned for their

involvement with Solidarity. Sentencing of Solidarity members continued until mid-September

1986, when all political prisoners were released. This was largely due to a major change in the

political opportunity structure. Mikhail Gorbachev became President of the Soviet Union in

1985 and, partially due to economic pressure from several international superpowers, Gorbachev

focused on reforming the Soviet system (Paczkowski 2003). After the Soviets released all of

their Polish political prisoners the United States lifted their economic sanctions against Poland,

as requested by Lech Wałęsa and a group of intellectuals, which allowed the negotiation process

with the authorities to begin (Wancerz-Gluza 2008).

It is commonly said that Solidarity negotiated with the Polish government, but this is not

entirely true. Lech Wałęsa created the Civic Committee as a direct political branch of Solidarity

in late 1988 because the union was just beginning to revive from its time in exile (Ost 2005b:34).

This was the beginning of a faction within Solidarity. One group, which included Lech Wałęsa,

wanted to work with the government to create a new regime, while the other camp believed that

the only way to fix the system was by destroying it and did not want to collaborate with the

Soviet-ruled state (Gliksman interview 2008). The Civic Committee was composed of

Solidarity’s foremost liberal intellectuals and led the 1989 roundtable discussions on Solidarity’s

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behalf. This was a major shift in Solidarity’s focus. Rather than depending on charismatic union

leaders and activists to build public support, the round table required competent professionals

who could create a contract with the new government (Wenzel 1998:143). The Civic Committee

prioritized politics over trade union goals and Solidarity has dealt with the effects of this ever

since.

The round table began on February 6, 1989 and ended just two months later on April 5.

The Civic Committee was represented by 230 people who were selected by Lech Wałęsa

(Wancerz-Gluza 2008). It was decided that 35% of the Sejm (lower house of Parliament) and all

of the seats in the Senate would be decided by a free election (Gliksman group meeting 2008).

The remaining 65% of the Parliament would retain former socialist politicians, and this was done

largely out of fear that Solidarity would not fare well in the election (Gliksman interview 2008).

The results of the semi-free election surprised everyone. “Solidarity candidates won 160 seats in

the Sejm (practically all the seats they were allowed to contest) and all but one of the 100 seats in

the Senate” (Wancerz-Gluza 2008). Neither Solidarity nor the state had anticipated results of

this magnitude, and the public’s overwhelming support for the Solidarity’s candidates expedited

the turnover of the state.

Though Wałęsa was President, Solidarity and other unions had very little power in the

early 1990s. Lech Wałęsa’s declaration that the unions could not be strong until the economy

grew implied that when the economy began to grow, trade unions would finally gain power. In

1995, the economy began to grow, but unions did not become stronger. Solidarity membership

had decreased to about two million and continued to decline for years to come (Crowley and Ost

2001:80). The intellectuals got a step up in the new democracy while their former comrades,

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Polish laborers, paid the price. Many intellectuals gained wealth and power in their new

positions of authority, while workers dealt with unemployment and did not gain new labor rights.

Poles were not pleased with Solidarity’s leadership and thus made a move towards the

previous regime, which had given them full employment and a sense of unity. Parliamentary

changes quickly: the post-Solidarity Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Agreement (PSL-PL) won

only 5.46% of the vote in the 1991 election (Szczerbiak 2001:17). 29 parties won seats in the

1991 parliamentary election, and the largest party, the Democratic Union (UD) won only 12.31%

of the vote (Szczerbiak 2001:16-7). A majority coalition government in this parliament required

at least five parties, and thus the parliament was unstable and quite weak (Jasiewicz 1997:138).

This gave Wałęsa a lot of executive power as president of a country with an interim constitution

and ineffective parliament (Jasiewicz 1997). Many Poles were dissatisfied with the government

and in the 1995 presidential election Wałęsa lost by a narrow margin, winning 48.28% to his

opponent’s 51.72% (Szczerbiak 2001:22). At the end of 1995, just six years after the end of

Soviet rule, post-communists occupied the positions of both President and Prime Minister (Ash

2002:377).

Solidarity Trade Union leaders organized a meeting in June 1996 with other trade union

representatives and leaders of 21 right wing parties (Wenzel 1998:144). Solidarity Electoral

Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc: AWS) was created, uniting 36 political parties and other

organizations (Toole 2000:447). They hoped that this new alliance would re-create Solidarity to

have a larger scope than typical trade unions, while using the symbolic name of Solidarity to

invoke the past, though the level of connection was actually quite weak (Wenzel 1998:43 and

151; Gibala meeting 2008). Marian Krzaklewski, Solidarity’s President, traveled around Poland

speaking about the importance of God, Catholicism, and keeping abortion illegal. He said that

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these values would counter the social ills created by the “communists” and “atheists” in

government (Krzaklewski 1996).

In the 1997 election, AWS won 33.83% of the vote, giving the party 201 seats in

Parliament (Szczerbiak 1999:1402). The AWS electorate was 40% workers, 32.7%

businessmen, 22% “ordinary people”, and 18% unemployed (Szczerbiak 1999:1419). This

demonstrated that the AWS, while still strong with the workers, was also able to attract

businessmen who were typically opposed to having trade unions in their companies. The support

of the unemployed, who were largely out of work because of the weakening of unions, also

showed that AWS had appealed to a different constituency. In terms of the religiosity of AWS

voters, 36% frequently and 25% weekly attended church, while 21% were average, 12% were

sporadic attendees, and 8% never attended (Szczerbiak 1999:1422). It seems that Krzaklewski’s

campaign scheme had worked quite well – religious Poles supported AWS.

Solidarity Electoral Action operated under a strange mixture of trade union control,

corporate agreements, and religious values. Though AWS was composed of many different

political parties and other organizations, it was clear that having the name Solidarity behind it

was a major factor in the party’s success. Marian Krzaklewski was the head of Solidarity and

AWS, and AWS politicians were not allowed to run for Parliament without the union’s support

(Crowley and Ost 2001:79). What’s more, Solidarity did not oppose the AWS even when the

government implemented drastic health care and education reforms that hurt workers (Crowley

and Ost 2001:89). Like when Wałęsa was President, Solidarity discouraged unions from

organizing out of fear that they might hurt the capitalist system. At the same time, AWS was a

corporate agreement among many institutions. These included “the big state enterprises, where

Solidarity originated, but also organized professional groups, such as teachers and doctors”

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(Wenzel 1998:148). While many political parties are criticized for being too influenced by big

business, AWS was in fact a union of various corporations. AWS also took advantage of the

scale of Catholicism in Poland and used these values to create their ideological identity (Wenzel

1998:151). This helped AWS to win voters without constructing their own system of values to

promote.

By 1999 it became clear that the public was displeased with AWS, and so in 2000

Solidarity began to focus on serving as a union once again (Meardi 2005:276). They became

more concerned with increasing membership, acting professionally and autonomously, and

organizing workers (Ost 2005b:156). In 2001 Solidarity retracted its name from the party and

vowed to limit its work to that of a trade union (Gliksman group meeting 2008). It was decided

that politicians could not be active in Solidarity, and Solidarity employees and members could

not enter into politics; they must choose one role (Gliksman interview 2008). Solidarity’s

rationale was that during Soviet rule, trade unions were unable to fight for workers without

standing up to the power of the state. Now that the system had changed, Solidarity was able to

concentrate on roles traditionally delegated to trade unions (Gliksman 2005:11). Furthermore,

when Solidarity was in power it was very close to policy in Poland and could have created

reforms that helped laborers - but neither the Civic Committee nor AWS did this. While leaving

the realm of politics meant that Solidarity gave up a position with a potential for great power, the

party was then able to focus on organizing workers and acting like a typical trade union

(Gliksman group meeting 2008). Though Solidarity is no longer a social movement, some

scholars argue that the social movement history continues to influence the union (Meardi

2005:276-7). Examples of this include the union’s discourse about workers as human beings and

“by diffusing (in Tarrow’s sense) the capacity to develop collective action” (ibid).

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Key Documents

Poland’s Constitution has gone through many revisions since the transition to democracy,

and is not especially progressive or popular among Poles. In 1992, Poland’s new “Little

Constitution” that denounced socialism was enacted, and the full democratic Constitution was

finalized in 1997 (Sanford 2002:1). The process of creating the 1997 Constitution was lengthy,

and the final version was met with underwhelming public support (Sanford 2002: 91). Many

amendments were made to the 1997 Constitution so that Poland could gain European Union

membership in 2004. The result is that Poles do not know their Constitution well, and are not

invested in it.

Traditions

Solidarity has gone through many stages in its 30 year history. First there was the

formation of Solidarity in August 1980, which created an “independent social space occupied by

the new trade union” (Goodwyn 1991:347). The remainder of 1980 saw rapid movement to

another stage in which almost ten million Poles were able to experience the idea of free space by

joining the movement (ibid). The third stage for Solidarity, from 1981 until martial law,

occurred as the movement created a democratic infrastructure (ibid). After martial law ended,

many groups grew out of Solidarity, such as the Civic Committee which was created in 1988 to

organize the roundtable discussions; Solidarity as a political party from 1990 to 1995; and the

creation of the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) in 1997.

Throughout these stages, Solidarity has had different goals and at times there have been

multiple groups with competing objectives operating under the broad banner of Solidarity.

During the 1980s, Solidarity functioned “as a trade union, as a force for democratization and as a

movement for national independence” (Kennedy 1991:64). During the 1990s, Solidarity’s trade

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union functions took the backseat to political party aspirations, and became more

institutionalized (Meardi 2005:274). As a result, there are many different and competing

traditions today.

Solidarity’s ideals have changed as it has gone through its successive stages. Dr. Kemp-

Welch’s study of Solidarity’s beginnings found that the movement’s key ideals were autonomy

(1991:202-5), non-violence (205-9), compromise (210-5), pluralism (215-9), and sovereignty

(219-22). Class consciousness was also a key element of Solidarity in the early 1980s. Touraine

wrote that “Solidarity is a trade union, but it is also, more broadly, a workers’ movement,

animated by class consciousness” (1983:44). While these values did not fit Solidarity’s political

objectives in the 1990s, politicians were able to use them to gain an advantage in elections. Even

though Solidarity had effectively “split into two competing political entities, the inheritor

organizations continue[d] to rely on a moralistic identity and to appeal for popular support” in

the early 1990s (Bielasiak 1992:201). By maintaining the idea that Solidarity was a

representative of the entire citizenry, the political party was able to “remain the symbol of

political independence and the guardians of society as a whole” (ibid:202).

Political Structures and Party Cohesion

When Poland’s democratic government was created, it combined elements of two failing

systems. The current Polish governmental structure is a mix of the “decaying one-party system

and of a military-based martial law system led by a military officer who was also secretary

general of the Communist party” (Huntington 1991-1992: 582). The largest and most

immediately apparent problem with the new democratic system was the way that parties were

formed and were granted power. In 1991, there were roughly 200 political parties involved in

the Parliamentary election, and representatives from 29 political parties were elected

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(Siemienska 2006:207). In 1993 the law changed so that a party must have at least 5% of the

votes to be in Parliament (ibid) but this has not completely solved the problems of the weak party

system. Many Polish parties remain “chronically unstable, coming and going continuously on

the party scene, and failing to develop stable constituencies and lasting identities” (Carothers

2006:70). The fluidity that Solidarity and the AWS experienced as political parties was not

unique, but rather part of a larger trend in Poland in which the government and parties are “fluid,

weakly organized, and fragmented” (O’Dwyer 2006:53). Even though Solidarity is now out of

formal politics, Poland’s democracy is still “sagging under the weight of political

disillusionment. Clearly, voters do not like governments they perceive as corrupt, but when

party competition is not robust enough to offer them clear choices and accountability, they

withdraw, which only furthers the cycle of patronage politics and voter disillusionment.”

(ibid:193) This has been particularly evident in records of voter turnout in the past two decades.

The amount of power that a party or union has directly relates to the amount of “good”

and “bad” they can do. In the early 1980s, Solidarity had gained substantial power from the

people, but very little as an institution. This institutional power was taken away during martial

law, began to return during the round table negotiations, and came on full force when the Civic

Committee was in office. When Wałęsa was not reelected this power decreased, grew again with

the AWS in office, and shrunk once more when Solidarity decided to leave politics. Solidarity

has been able to maintain their level of power as a union since 2001.

Many of Solidarity’s problems arose from a lack of unity between supporters and leaders.

Factions of Solidarity first formed in the late 1980s, and have continued to grow since then. The

AWS was able to create a new sense of togetherness by making religion a central aspect of its

campaign in an overwhelmingly Catholic country. However, this unity was very different from

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the camaraderie that workers shared under Soviet rule and many continue to miss today. Since

functioning solely as a trade union, Solidarity has no longer needed to juggle political and union

decisions that are inherently in conflict. This has helped to recreate the sentiment for which the

union was originally named.

Leaders

Solidarity began with a collection of strong-willed, highly motivated, and well educated

leaders. It is difficult to overstate the importance of these leaders in the rise of the movement,

and particularly that of Lech Wałęsa, because “Solidarity was propelled from illegality to

government in a matter of weeks largely by its leader’s force of character and personal

following” (Kemp-Welch 1991:200). Over time many leaders left the party and a lot of those

who stayed with Solidarity did so for personal gains. Lech Wałęsa is an extreme example of

this. During his time in politics he ruled Solidarity like a dictator and his ego grew out of control

(Boyes 1994; Jasiewicz 1997; Kurski 1993). Poles know this side of him and his tarnished

reputation has hurt Solidarity’s as well.

When Solidarity reemerged from its time in exile it was frail and its leaders rebuilt the

union to stay that way. “Instead of building a strong union, Solidarity set out to build a weak

one, meaning a union that would follow the government as it pursued a painful economic

reform” (Crowley and Ost 2001:82). Much of this was Lech Wałęsa’s doing, though it is unclear

if he intentionally meant to sabotage the union or was simply too caught up in his own power.

During the early 80s, Wałęsa stood by his statement that “Solidarity will not be divided or

destroyed” (Ash 2002:375). Yet his tune changed once he began to gain power. In September

1989 Wałęsa told the Gazeta Wyborcza, “We will not catch up to Europe if we build a strong

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union.... We cannot have a strong trade union until we have a strong economy” (Gazeta

Wyborcza 1989).

Wałęsa’s campaign for the 1990 presidency exacerbated the divisions in Solidarity. The

Polish constitution does not allow politicians to be involved in non-governmental organizations,

including trade unions, so Wałęsa ran as a nonparty candidate (Gliksman interview 2008; Linz

and Stepan 1996:274). He stayed true to his anti-political stance and “articulated the need to

maintain the value of spontaneity and antiformal politics, not of institutionalization” (Linz and

Stepan 1996:274). The campaign had two sides – Wałęsa was both conveying the growing

concerns of the Polish people and at the same time addressing his own discontent at his limited

role as Chairman of Solidarity after the 1989 semi-free elections (Ash 2002:373). Wałęsa won

the elections in December 1990 and was Poland’s president for the following five years.

According to Adam Gliksman, a Solidarity employee, Wałęsa has the type of personality

that always wants to be on top, to be the best (interview 2008). For some this was apparent from

the beginning: “even in 1980-1 the young Wałęsa had a high-handed, authoritarian style, and a

rather ambivalent attitude to democracy. World fame and the Nobel Prize greatly strengthened

these inclinations” (Ash 2002:374). Though almost everyone in Poland had something about

Wałęsa to criticize, they realized he was important for the country's democratic transition

(Goodwyn 1991:344). Critics warned that Wałęsa’s tendency to act like Solidarity’s dictator

would transfer into his new role as President, and some went so far as to say that Wałęsa’s

physical being was changed when he came into power (Ash 2002:374, Goodwyn 1991:346).

One of the most worrying symptoms was, “his habit of talking about himself in the third person,

as ‘Wałęsa’. Wałęsa could not accept this, he would say, Wałęsa will not do that. But he said

many different, often contradictory things, and seemed genuinely unsure of the direction in

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which he wanted to go” (Ash 2002:374). Regardless of Wałęsa’s intentions and egotism, the

policies he promoted as president were counter to his previous trade union motives, and

ultimately hurt Polish laborers.

Membership, Public Opinion, Emotions, and Elections

Voter turnout has been a major problem since the beginning of the new Polish

democracy. In the June 1989 election, roughly four in ten eligible voters stayed home, and

another two in ten voted against Solidarity (Jasiewicz 1992:186). A major factor in the low

turnout was that many voters didn’t know what their political positions were in the new system

(Tworzecki 2003:241). Soviet rule had been so repressive, and without being able to unify

behind Solidarity, many people weren’t sure who to support or what their beliefs were. The

large number of political parties to choose from made the process of voting even more daunting.

Turnout for local and Parliamentary elections has also been remarkably low. Turnout for

Parliamentary elections has ranged from 42% to 52%, and has been between 33% and 45% in

local elections (Siemienska 2006:224). What is even more disappointing is that the 45% turnout

for a local election was not the result of an “increased interest in the local elections, but instead

reflected the bundling of local elections with those for the newly established regional and district

governments (Zarycki 1999). That the turnout for elections for two brand-new, much-trumpeted

levels of government was only 45 percent was in fact a sign of public apathy” (O’Dwyer

2006:127). While public apathy is apparent, the reasons behind it are not as easy to determine.

On the one hand it could be a lack of interest in politics altogether, or it might reflect negative

feelings towards the current political parties and their policies (Siemienska 2006:225).

Public opinion of Solidarity has not been consistent over the years. Following the end of

martial law in Poland, there was a sharp decrease in public confidence in all institutions,

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including Solidarity. While Solidarity enjoyed 90% public support in 1981, this declined to only

11% to 13% in 1984 and 1985 (Mason 1992:160). By 1988, Solidarity’s public support was

back up to 25%, and grew to 75% in 1989 (ibid). From 1988 to 1989, the public perception that

Solidarity was a beneficial institution for society increased from 18.2% to 67.2% (ibid). Yet

after the new democracy was in place, Poles again lost their confidence in Solidarity. In an early

1997 poll, “political parties enjoyed the lowest level of confidence (only 12.8 percent trusted

parties a "great deal" and "quite a lot"). Parties were followed by trade unions, with 19.9 percent

approval rates. The share of respondents trusting government, Parliament and the civil service

was in the range of 30-40 percent” (Siemienska 2006:213). It appears the public’s support of

institutions and Solidarity was unreliable.

Most of the workers originally involved with Solidarity have clearly lost in the transition

to democracy. A Professor of European Studies met with workers in the Gdansk (formerly

Lenin) Shipyard in 1999, almost two decades after the uprising there that started Solidarity. He

described the workers as “gloomy” and “disillusioned,” and he only talked to those who had

managed to stay employed (Ash 2002: 379). Workers were the ones who paid the price for the

new market economy, and they explained that their new liberties mean nothing without

prosperity. “Yes, they had freedom: but what good was that if you had no money to buy the

shiny goods in the shops? And what use was a passport if you could not afford to travel? They

had imagined capitalism to be very different. They deeply resented the fact that former

communists had not only gone unpunished but also made private fortunes in transition—and a

political comeback as well” (Ash 2002: 379-80). Furthermore, they actually missed some

aspects of life under Soviet rule. With the new freedom, each man was only looking out for

himself and they did not have the solidarity that was necessary under the old regime. Security in

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numbers was a thing of the past. Some of the former workmates of these laborers are now their

bosses, and run private, capitalist, union-free businesses. Anna Walentynowicz, the crane driver

who started the 1980 strikes, takes an even more extreme view. She says that, “The people were

cheated and, contrary to appearances, Solidarity was used to destroy the nation, to plunge it into

poverty, to create conditions that are even worse than under communism” (Ash 2002: 379).

Solidarity will never again have the 10 million members it once had in the early 1980s,

but this should not be regarded as a loss because the scope of the organization has also shrunk.

Solidarity’s membership was so high in the 80s because it was a trade union and a social

movement. Since the movement is no longer needed to fight Soviet rule, Solidarity cannot

expect to have the same membership that it did before. Civic Committee and AWS members

came and went much like the voters, showing instability rather than loyal support. Since 2001,

Solidarity has begun to gradually gain union members and now has about 1.1 million. This

should not be seen as a failure compared to the numbers during the 1980s and 90s, but rather as a

small success when measured against past numbers of trade union members.

Service Delivery

Many Poles thought life would improve drastically once the state was overthrown and

Poland entered an era of democracy and the free market. In reality, "standards of living declined

steadily, the share of citizens with incomes far below the social minimum continued to rise,

unemployment rates were increasing and services offered by the Polish welfare state continued

to decrease" (Siemienska 2006:203). Democracy and capitalism are not magical fixes; like any

system they have flaws, and contain different sets of challenges. The new government was

aware of this and allowed the free market to take its toll on the public, and purposely didn’t build

strong trade unions to protect workers from the free market (Ost 2005a:6-8). Laborers also

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understood that the transition would not be an overnight success, but felt betrayed and believed

that this new system had set them up for failure (Ost 2005a:7). Though Solidarity had a great

deal of power, they used it primarily to expedite the transition to a liberal market economy

(Crowley and Ost 2001:93). The results were that real wages declined 30% from 1989 to 1991,

unemployment grew into the double-digits, workers no longer had self-management boards, and

new jobs were created without basic health and safety conditions (Crowley and Ost 2001:80).

Poles were disappointed with Solidarity for several reasons. The first was the widespread

unemployment. This occurred because large state-owned companies had to be privatized in the

new system, resulting in widespread dismissals, and even some corporate closures (Gliksman

2005:37). The national unemployment rate reached 12% in 1997, and in some regions it was as

high as 20% (Siemienska 2006:209). The service sector grew while industries shrank, so finding

a new job required significant retraining. Secondly, Poland lacked the social unity that Solidarity

had provided during Soviet rule. “Solidarity was a part of their identity, of their emotional

life…. There was no mistaking a genuine pain, sorrow, and often bitterness felt at the parting of

ways with former comrades” (Ash 2002:375). Without a unifying force to keep people together,

they felt very much alone.

Joining the European Union was a step in the right direction for workers. The EU courts

are a place where workers can fight to protect their rights and the EU even gives some

protections to trade unions (Gliksman group meeting 2008). Furthermore, the EU allows Poland

to work with Western European trade unions and creates growth in civil society (Gliksman

2005:40). While EU membership has not solved union grievances in Poland, it has helped to

move the country in the right direction.

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Trade unions in Poland remain weak, and Solidarity is no exception. Unions exist in just

25% of companies and only 10% of laborers (about 2 million people) are unionized (Gliksman

group meeting 2008). The most significant way to increase the power of trade unions is by

increasing membership and so this has become a priority for Solidarity (Gliksman 2005:40).

One of their greatest challenges is that Solidarity fights for the rights of all workers, not just

those that are unionized, so most laborers don’t see any reason to join because they can reap the

benefits without membership (Gliksman group meeting 2008). Another problem is that young

people do not know much about Solidarity. They either don’t know its role in Polish history,

think it is a political party, or blame it for price increases since the fall of Soviet rule (Gliksman

group meeting 2008). Polish businesses have developed in recent years, but it is the companies

that are benefiting, not the workers. Employers have found ways to get employees to fake self-

employment or hire without contracts, which are practices that Solidarity is fighting to end

(Gliksman group meeting 2008).

Interactions with Civil Society and Political Society

Poland was one of few countries under Soviet rule in which social movements helped

overthrow the regime. Surprisingly, the nations that had active civil societies before 1990 have

very limited civil societies now. According to O’Dwyer:

Ironically, the total collapse of the communist regimes in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia in 1989 sealed the fate of the dissident movements that overthrew them. Without the communist enemy, these informally organized dissident movements collapsed entirely, [d]riven (sic) by internal conflicts, and spawning new, constantly subdividing factions. Solidarity was the most dramatic example of this failure to translate the shared experience of opposition into organizational capital. (2006:20)

By the late 1990s, Poles participated in protests equally or less often than other post-soviet

countries (Siemienska 2006:227). The only protest of any considerable size following the

democratic transition was a railway strike in 1990. Solidarity immediately denounced the strike

and told the workers to return to their jobs without gaining anything (Crowley and Ost 2001:85).

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With labor representatives functioning to prevent workers from protesting the system, it became

close to impossible for workers to get ahead. In December 1992 it seemed that Solidarity might

be making progress. The union organized a nation-wide coal miners’ strike that involved

180,000 miners; it was the largest coal strike in European history. Solidarity then explained that

it only wanted to demonstrate the union’s leadership ability, not benefit the strikers, and settled

without winning anything significant for the workers (Błaziak 1994).

This created a difficult situation for the activists who had shunned the political life after

Solidarity gained power because there were limited options for them to participate in civil

society (Carothers 206:23). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Poland are weak and

tend to be focused on professional interests, not public welfare (Kurczewski and Kurczewska

2001). Social movements are rather frail and, other than unions for specific industries or

peasants, collective action is infrequent (Frybes and Kuczyn´ski 2002). According to a national

survey of Poles, since the democratic transition: 20.4% have signed a petition, 9.8% have

demonstrated, 5.5% have taken part in a boycott, 4.1% have participated in a strike, and 2.2%

have occupied a building (Siemienska 2006:225). While some have argued that the lack of

voting might be attributed to Polish society’s “ethical motivations which do not square well with

the pragmatic and compromise-seeking orientations needed for participation in today's political

life” (Siemienska 2006:231), this analysis does not explain the lack of non-participatory political

and social action in Poland. Given that roughly half of all Poles were members of Solidarity

during Soviet rule, these percentages show just how limited civil society has become in a

democracy. In the last decade there have been signs of youth protest, yet they have only

occurred “in cultural forms (hip-hop music, deviance) and, interestingly, against, not in

continuity with, the generation that made Solidarity. Although Polish society has been defined as

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one of the most rebellious in the world (Ekiert and Kubik 2001), the opposite seems true”

(Meardi 2005:272).

Solidarity, according to employee Adam Gliksman, has begun to recognize the

importance of social dialogue and is trying to encourage it (2005:31-4). Furthermore, Solidarity

is now critical of the government’s inadequate treatment of social dialogue “as nothing more

than a bothersome necessity,” to quote a 2004 report from the Małopolska region (Gliksman

2005:35-6). The report goes on to condemn the government’s treatment of trade unions. It

declares, “Obstructing the actions of trade unions and restricting workers’ rights by changing the

Labour Code, supposedly in order to improve the situation of the employment market, has no

positive effects. The effect that the modifications made to the Labour Code allegedly had on the

level of unemployment in Poland is still unknown, however, since the level is still very high, one

can assume that the effect was miniscule if any” (Gliksman 2005:36). It seems that for the first

time since the 1980s, Solidarity has found its voice.

Other trade unions are also displeased with what Solidarity has become, even if these

other unions don’t have many strengths of their own. The OPZZ, National Confederation of

Trade Unions, was created by the socialist government in 1984 after Solidarity was outlawed and

there was an open space for a new union to fill (OPZZ 2006). These two remain the largest

unions in Poland, though their structures and views differ. Solidarity has regional headquarters

all functioning as part of the national institution. OPZZ is a national association with 90 trade

union organizations that are voluntary members (ibid). When I visited one of these groups, the

NSZZ Pracowników, it appeared that the union building, leadership, and methods had not

changed in decades. This seems to be indicative of the larger organization: “OPZZ remains too

hobbled by its past, saddled with a conservative local leadership of mostly older men with low-

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level managerial positions that makes it inaqequate as an organ of labor protest” (Crowley and

Ost 2001: 80-1). The Vice Presidents of the NSZZ Pracowników, Marian Skubisz and Jan

Mazgaz, told me that three years ago they had 24,000 workers but now only 10,500 (group

meeting 2008). Employers still need more workers on the production line, but they are hiring

short term workers, who get less pay and have worse conditions while leasing companies make

most of the money. On issues like this, the OPZZ and Solidarity work together and have

changed some work codes and regulations. Together, they have made some progress in keeping

workers from getting fired, or at least making sure that they get their full wages and severance

pay (Mazgaz and Marian 2008 group meeting).

The larger the scale of the issue, the harder it is for these unions to work together.

Solidarity employee Adam Gliksman told me that on issues about what happens within a

corporation, and even within a region, OPZZ and Solidarity tend to agree (interview 2008).

However when national scale issues come into play, so do politics, and this is where the unions

have the greatest trouble finding common ground (ibid). Typically, trade unions are leftist

organizations, but Solidarity was created as a response to the socialist government and thus has

been on the right since it was founded. The OPZZ was created by the socialist government and

as a result is on the left, as is typical of trade unions.

Knowing OPZZ’s background, it becomes difficult to take their criticism of Solidarity

too seriously, even if they have some valid arguments. The Vice Presidents of NPZZ

Pracowników lamented that the main problem with Solidarity is that it relies too much on the

government and should be independent of the government (Mazgaz and Marian 2008 group

meeting). Given that OPZZ was created by the socialist government and has worked closely

with the Polish government at times when post-communists have been President or Prime

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Minister, the same could be said about the OPZZ. Both parties see the government as a major

source of power but have not had many opportunities to harness that power to establish

regulations that help workers. My other major critique is that a union must be opposite the

government in order to protect workers. If there is a conflict they cannot be subservient to the

state; they must support laborers. This is indeed something Solidarity has struggled with,

particularly during the 1990s, but has made great improvements in this area since they left

politics in 2001.

Solidarity originally rejected the value of the state, but after the regime change began to

revere it. Only after suffering a political defeat in 2000 did the union learn that they could act –

like a typical trade union – outside of the government and still have a valid place in the system.

The AWS was extremely involved with corporations, but Solidarity is once again working for

laborers, much to the chagrin of businessmen. While Solidarity does not see eye to eye with

other Polish trade unions, it has made valiant efforts to cooperate with OPZZ in situations where

their goals are the same.

Accountability

Solidarity began as the voice of the people, but in the early 1990s when Wałęsa was

president he abandoned the workers he had once represented. When the AWS was created, it

tried to get in touch with Poles through a different method—religion—and initially succeeded.

However, the party continued to work in a top-down fashion and the politicians’ ideas of what

was good for the country often failed to take the pleas of citizens into consideration.

Furthermore, the Solidarity trade union didn’t actually work for laborers but became a pawn for

the government in the 1990s. It had access to a great deal of power but did not responsibly look

after workers’ needs. This was particularly detrimental for the country, as the majority of the

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Polish workforce consisted of laborers in the agricultural and industrial industries until the

service industry took the lead in the mid-2000s (Kosc 2004; Ministry of Labour and Social

Policy 2008). Only since Solidarity decided to work solely as a trade union has it begun to

improve things for laborers, as it sought to do in its early history.

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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS

My research focuses on two distinct, though at times interrelated, questions. First, how

have the pasts of ANC and Solidarity as movements influenced them as political parties and, in

the case of Solidarity, as a union? Second, what is the role and legitimacy of these successful

former liberation movements in the new democracies they helped to create? In order to most

thoroughly answer these questions, I will not address the first, and then the second, or each case

study separately. Instead, my analysis will follow the same order as the subsections in the case

studies (history of the movement, key documents, traditions, etc.). This arrangement allows me

to draw comparisons between the two cases and to address either or both guiding questions as

they are applicable, and showing how they relate to the guiding literature.

History of the Movements

There are some very obvious differences between circumstances in South Africa and

Poland, as well as in the histories of the ANC and Solidarity, that must be established before

delving into a deeper comparative analysis. While there are some similarities, apartheid and

Soviet rule were very different political systems. At a basic level, apartheid exacerbated racial

distinctions and Soviet rule sought to end class distinctions. South Africa is a very diverse

country, with citizens of various ethnicities, religions, and languages. Poles, on the other hand,

are mostly white, Catholic, and speak Polish. The ANC was founded in 1923, and the

movement’s roots go back to 1912 with the creation of the South African Native National

Congress (SANNC). Solidarity is much younger; it was created in 1980, and has roots going

back to the Workers Defense Committee’s (KOR) formation in 1970. Furthermore, the ANC

was founded before apartheid, though it clearly positioned itself against apartheid once it came

into being, whereas Solidarity was created in response to Soviet rule.

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Key Documents

South Africa’s Constitution and the Freedom Charter are well known and highly regarded

by the country’s citizens. Many of the South Africans I interviewed talked about how the ANC

has not followed these guiding documents, and that the party could improve simply by following

the standards it set. Poland’s Constitution has gone through many changes, and is neither well

known nor highly regarded by the public. When Solidarity began, the Inter-Enterprise Strike

Committee (ISC) list of 21 postulates served as a guiding document of sorts, but it has been long

forgotten by the union and the Poles.

This demonstrates a contrast between how the ANC and Solidarity’s pasts have continued

to influence their parties and countries. The two key documents in South Africa were created

with much input from the ANC, and before the movement had fully transformed into a political

party. These documents have remained relatively unchanged, and provide a way for the people

to judge the party against what it promised as a social movement. Poland lacks similar guiding

documents, as the current constitution includes many sections that Solidarity did not influence

and the constitution was updated after the AWS dissolved.

Traditions

The ANC began as a liberation movement with a focus on open debate and seeking

consensus. When the ANC was banned and went into exile, it became a top-down system in

which secrecy was of the upmost importance. These traditions from the ANC’s decades in exile

continue to dictate the actions of ANC politicians and the attitude of the political party today.

The tradition of consensus has been renewed, but in a more authoritarian sense as it is combined

with the top-down structure, and open debate is now limited by the party. For the ANC, several

key traditions from its movement past continue to guide the party and its leaders.

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Solidarity went through many different stages that were not as fluid as the ANC’s

trajectory. Furthermore, Solidarity operated as both a movement and as a union; thus the goals

of Solidarity changed often, and at times different branches had competing goals. The political

parties that have come out of Solidarity have not placed the same emphasis on class-

consciousness, autonomy, non-violence, compromise, pluralism, and sovereignty. Nevertheless,

the Civic Committee and AWS used Solidarity’s past to gain an electoral advantage as many

voters still identify with Solidarity’s traditional platform. In contrast to the case with the ANC,

however, these traditions have not guided the parties once in office.

Political Structures and Party Cohesion

The ANC has been the dominant political party in South Africa since the first democratic

elections in 1994. While there are opposition parties, they have lacked a broad enough base to

serve as a legitimate challenge to the ANC’s rule, though this may change with the creation of

COPE. The South African government has three branches that are supposed to foster a system of

checks and balances, but in reality the executive branch dominates and is rarely questioned. This

is an example of how an ANC tradition, the top-down system from the movement’s time in exile,

has carried over and impacts not only how the ANC party functions, but also the national

government’s structure. The ANC has a history of breakaway parties, the most notable being the

Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which led the protest that resulted in the Sharpeville Massacre

and the banning of the ANC. This history makes it even more understandable that the ANC has

worked throughout its time in exile to be perceived as united against the government, and now

strives to be a united party. Without competition from other parties, checks on executive power,

or debates within the ANC, South Africa’s democracy suffers.

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Solidarity did not originally plan to become a political party, and instead preached anti-

politics. This is similar to the situation in the neighboring Czech Republic and Slovakia, where

Glenn found that even though the movements wanted to remain outside of politics, the power

they gained forced them to become parties (2003:168). The Polish political system got off to a

rough start because it began with too many political parties, which made it difficult for citizens

to understand differences between them and to choose who to vote for. Political parties from

Solidarity have been in power twice, but each time it was a different party, they were in office

for only one term at a time, and they were not well established; in fact neither party exists today.

Both parties used their connections with Solidarity to help build their support, the Civic

Committee based on members and leadership, and the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)

through use of its name. Yet Wałęsa did not work to support unions, and AWS used an entirely

different platform that centered around Catholicism. Once these parties gained power, they

limited the ability of the government to accomplish things. While the Solidarity Leaders won the

most votes of any party in the first democratic political election, they did not live up to voters’

expectations and failed to be reelected in the following election. The instability of party politics

in Poland has created a lot of disillusionment, and very few people vote, which has weakened the

country’s democracy.

Solidarity struggled with the notion that it could exist solely as a union and still be able to

make changes. This goes back to the distinction between being a polity member and a

challenger (Lo 1992; Tilly 1978). While the Civic Committee and AWS were in government,

Solidarity was a polity member because it was so closely affiliated with these parties and had

reliable access to their politicians. Yet Solidarity was no longer able to make its voice heard or

organize the people like it did during the 1980s when the union and movement were challengers

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to the government. By staying out of politics since 2000, Solidarity has been able to regain a

position that can create change by working as a challenger rather than a polity member.

Both of the political parties coming out of the ANC and Solidarity gained office in their

country’s first free elections, but after that point their trajectories diverge. South Africa’s ANC

and Poland’s Civic Committee gained power in these new democracies with strong public

backing. It is likely that chaos would have ensued if for some reason these parties, which had led

the public struggles against their respective authoritarian regimes, had not gained significant

political power to lead the democratic transition. While the ANC has remained solidly in power,

and Solidarity’s political parties failed to gain reelection, both country’s democracies have

suffered. The ANC is so powerful that it has inhibited the development of viable alternatives to

ANC rule, and Solidarity’s lack of continuity and inability to stay in office have discouraged

citizens from participating in the democracy.

Leaders

The leaders of the ANC were very idealistic when the democratic transition came about,

but this soon changed. Politicians who spent decades ‘paying their dues’ for the liberation

struggle felt entitled to their positions of power in the ANC. In the interviews I conducted,

politicians were described as being apathetic, disconnected, greedy, and motivated only by their

careers. Some former leaders were appalled by this, and either left politics, the ANC, or South

Africa

Solidarity’s leadership parallels that of the ANC in many ways. As in the South African

liberation struggle, Solidarity’s leaders were key in the rise of the movement and the democratic

transition. Yet once the Civic Committee was created, many leaders left Solidarity, and those

who stayed did so for personal gains. The Civic Committee’s leadership was also very self-

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centered, but unlike in South Africa, in Poland this centered around the President. Wałęsa’s

egotistical personality is in stark comparison to Mandela’s warm and forgiving persona.

The rise of new elites in both countries caused leaders and supporters of the original

movements to shy away from the political parties that they helped to create. According to

Lawrence Goodwyn, a historian of democratic and social movements, this is somewhat

inevitable. He wrote, “All societies are governed by elites… even when nonelites gain power,

the governing presumptions they attempt to codify into custom have the purpose of providing

ethical protection for themselves as a privileged stratum” (Goodwyn 1991:354). Both the ANC

and Solidarity support this theory. Goodwyn continued, “the dynamics of political struggle,

especially struggle against powerful adversaries habituated to the use of a number of modes of

cultural and physical repression, make the maintenance of communitarian behavior extremely

difficult to sustain over time. Abused people can simply get too angry to behave democratically”

(1991:355-6). By applying this analysis to the cases in South Africa and Poland, it seems that

both the ANC and Solidarity’s histories as movements contributed to the changes in the

behaviors of the movements’ leaders once they were in positions of political power. While these

changes often happen in political parties that do not have movement histories, both groups’ pasts

in the struggle created an added sense of entitlement that has compounded these issues.

Furthermore, these leadership problems harm the democratic process and accountability, and

have created public distrust in the political system.

The perceptions of leaders in both the ANC and Solidarity fit with other case studies of

movement success. Andrews’ study of the Mississippi Civil Rights Movement found that

movement supporters are likely to have unrealistic expectations for their leaders who take public

office (2004). My study did not seek to determine whether South Africans and Poles had

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realistic expectations of their leaders, but in both countries it appears that the leaders have not

lived up to the public’s expectations. Part of this may be attributed to what Glenn found in the

Czech Republic and Slovakia—leaders of SMOs who enter into politics are likely to act like

“social movement entrepreneurs” (2003:165). Activists want their leaders to take the high

ground, and become disappointed when their leaders become politicians who deal with capitalist

realities.

Membership, Public Opinion, Emotions, and Elections

Since the transition to democracy, the ANC has actually increased both the number and

percentage of votes the party has won in national elections. There are many emotions attached to

the struggle in South Africa, and also to the ANC. Most South Africans alive today were born

after the ANC was founded, and grew up believing that it would offer a better life than the

former regimes. As Mashumi Figlan told me, many South Africans thought that the ANC’s rise

to power would mean the ‘coming of Jesus Christ’, and many regard Mandela as a father figure

whom they love unconditionally. Another reason for the ANC’s success is that the party

strategically co-opted different political ideologies from other groups that were active in the

struggle, which has effectively removed them as alternatives to the ruling party. The ANC has

successfully used its social movement past, and the high public regard and strong emotions that

were part of that history, towards maintaining a political lead now that the ANC is a party.

Though the ANC remains popular, many South Africans of every race feel betrayed by

the ANC. Poor South Africans in particular are frustrated that the ANC has used false promises

and bribes to gain votes. The ANC has such a large support base that it can take votes for

granted, and because there have not been any competitive opposition parties, the citizens do not

have much leverage over the ANC. What’s more, the ANC sees their significant election lead as

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proof of how democratic their party is. The Durban City manager, Dr. Michael Sutcliffe, went

so far as to say, “The ANC has led this continent and probably leads the world in terms of

democratic practices” (Lander 2007). While the South African government holds regular free

and fair elections, when the ANC wins national elections by roughly 70% this should be seen as

a red flag that other aspects of the system are not as democratic as they could be. The lack of

alternatives, both in the hearts and minds of the citizens and on the ballot, show that the ANC has

been winning a stacked game. It remains to be seen if the creation of COPE will change this,

and if the ANC will finally have a suitable opponent that will force the ruling party to compete

for votes.

Public opinions of Solidarity have been inconsistent since its founding, and membership

has never been as high as the union membership was in the early 1980s. While the Civic

Committee and AWS were able to win elections, voter turnout has been low for all Polish

elections, and the political parties that came out of Solidarity no longer exist and do not hold any

lasting power. Many of the workers who were involved with the union and movement aspects of

Solidarity are now disillusioned, though Solidarity did gain more support and members once it

went back to being only a union. Overall, Solidarity lacks the public sway that ANC has been

able to maintain. Part of this may be due to Solidarity’s shorter and inconsistent history which

did not allow for the kind of emotional attachments that South Africans have with the ANC. The

widespread lack of attachment to Solidarity, and all Polish political parties, has hindered the

democratic process in Poland because so many citizens are disillusioned and do not feel

compelled to vote.

Both the ANC and Solidarity are examples of how movements continue to have a lot of

power over the public, even when they are no longer SMOs, fail to live up to previous

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expectations, and even when they adopt a completely different political platform. This fits with

Panebianco’s statement that the formation of an organization can continue to shape it for decades

(1988:xiii). Furthermore, the initial popularity of both the Civic Committee and AWS, which

came from their association with Solidarity, is very similar to Keck’s finding that the Workers’

Party (PT) in Brazil first gained legitimacy because it was linked to the unions movement

(1992:7).

Service Delivery

Many scholars have stressed that a government’s legitimacy comes from its effectiveness

(Lipset 1960; Huntinton 1991; Siemienska 2006:204). In the cases of the new democracies in

South Africa and Poland, both have been quite ineffective at providing basic services and

improving the quality of life for their citizens. For both countries, the standards of living have

decreased and unemployment has increased since the democratic transition. In South Africa, the

conditions are much worse for poor people than before, the government has failed to create new

job opportunities, homelessness has increased, and the government has not made stopping the

HIV/AIDS epidemic a priority. This is appalling to citizens who know that the Constitution and

the Freedom Charter promise healthcare, jobs, homes, food, and sanitation to everyone in South

Africa. While the situation in Poland is not as dire, thanks in large part to the European Union,

Solidarity’s time in politics created a country where unions are weak and have low membership

—the opposite of Solidarity’s original goals.

In both countries, the lack of sufficient service delivery is the result of adopting neo-

liberal and capitalist economic systems that participate in the global market. This makes it

harder than it was during apartheid for South Africans who are not highly skilled, well educated,

or well connected to find employment with livable wages. In Poland, prices were controlled by

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the government and everyone had employment and basic goods and services during Soviet rule.

While Poles now have political freedoms, they are coupled with a liberal economic system that

does not guarantee employment and service delivery for everyone.

The liberation struggles of both the ANC and Solidarity focused on issues of ‘political

liberation,’ as was demonstrated by both movements transforming into parties and leading

roundtable discussions to aid the political transitions to democracy. The new political freedoms

in South Africa and Poland demonstrate the most significant progress made by these liberation

groups, even though these movements were also centered around economic and human rights.

Both movements had platforms that called for ‘economic liberation’. For the ANC as a

movement, economic liberation did not mean a neo-liberal system, but rather a more socialist

system that provided everyone with basic goods and services so that they could be free from

poverty, hunger, homelessness, and disease. For Solidarity as a union and a movement,

economic liberation meant freedoms for workers including the rights to form independent trade

unions and go on strikes. The ANC and Solidarity also fought for fundamental human rights

such as freedom, justice, and equality. There is still much work to be done so that South

Africans and Poles can achieve the economic and human rights that these movements once

fought for.

Interactions with Civil Society and Political Society

During apartheid, the ANC worked with other liberation groups, even though they often

had conflicting ideologies. This has continued in the new democracy, as the ANC has remained

a member of the Tripartite Alliance, and has worked with various unions. Yet while the ANC

has worked with different civil society and political society actors within the country, the party

tends to only enter into these relationships when the other group is willing to bend to the ANC’s

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agenda. The party has worked to silence groups that criticize or try to change the ANC’s policies

because they regard such actions as anti-ANC. This overly-defensive aspect of the party seems

to be a continuance of how the ANC dealt with opposition during apartheid.

Though social movements, NGOs, and unions in South Africa have made some progress

in recent years, they remain relatively weak. While the ANC has made a point of not giving in to

civil society and political actors within the country, the party has worked to improve its

reputation with Western countries. The ANC has catered to foreign powers at the expense of the

needs of its own citizens and the country’s democracy. In order to behave democratically, the

ANC must learn to constructively deal with criticism, rather that working to silence dissent.

Given that Poland had the most active civil society of any country that was ruled by the

Soviets, the current lack of civil society activity in the nation is shocking. By denouncing a

strike in 1990 and then holding a strike in 1992 purely to demonstrate leadership abilities,

Solidarity quickly made it clear that it was no longer fighting for workers rights. Poles seem to

be so disillusioned by the results of their previous activism that many have simply given up, both

in terms of participating within the current structure and in trying to change it. This has been

terrible for the country’s democratic process, as most people do not vote and, as in other Eastern

European countries, there are very few institutions working to keep the Polish government in

check (Butler 2005:720). Though Solidarity as a union has had trouble finding common ground

with other unions on national issues, it has begun to regain power outside of the sphere of

politics, and may be able to help strengthen Poland’s democracy if it continues on this trajectory.

Hipscher’s study of Chilean Shantytown Dwellers stated that the government must allow

social movements to exist and have some freedoms in order for Chile to have a lively democracy

(1998). This fits with what scholars and activists are calling for in South Africa; to allow civil

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society to have its own space so that it can provide constructive, democratic feedback and ideas.

However, the problem in Poland is not that the government banned movements, but rather that

the citizens have given up on activism. It seems that this is due to the great disillusionment

created by the outcomes of past civil society actions in Poland.

Accountability

Government accountability to the people is minimal in both South Africa and Poland.

The ANC no longer listens to average citizens and does not consult with communities as the

movement used to. Furthermore, the party’s top-down system means that politicians do not feel

pressured to answer the people on the bottom. The parties that came out of Solidarity abandoned

the workers who were so crucial to the movement, and the union was submissive to government

power. However, now that Solidarity is operating once again as a union, it has begun to slowly

re-focus on what laborers want. Overall, both the ANC and Solidarity’s minimal accountability

to the people whom they are supposed to be representing has been detrimental to their

legitimacy.

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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

One of the first discussions of social movement outcomes was in William Gamson’s The

Strategy of Social Protest where he asked, “what do we conclude about a group that

accomplishes exactly what it set out to achieve and then finds its victory empty of real meaning

for its presumed beneficiaries?” (1975:28). Gamson’s use of the world “exactly” is problematic

since it is impossible to determine a group’s aims because they change during different stages of

the movement, and similarly their outcomes vary over time. Yet Gamson’s fundamental

question is central to the results of this paper so, rather than discredit Gamson’s inquiry due to

his choice of wording, I seek to answer his question with the word “exactly” omitted.

The African National Congress and Solidarity are two prime cases of liberation

movements that achieved their primary goals and have been touted worldwide as examples of

great political change. Both movements peacefully ushered the old, non-democratic regimes out

of their countries and replaced them with procedurally sound democracies. Yet the presumed

beneficiaries, non-whites in South Africa and workers in Poland, have found that these new

political and economic systems do not guarantee a satisfactory quality of life. Though these

cases clearly match the situation Gamson presents, the answer to his question is not as

immediately apparent.

The simplest and most cynical answer is that these changes only mattered for the rulers of

these societies, and the conditions of the general public did not improve. Democracy is not a

perfect political system, equality is unattainable, and those who try to dismantle the hegemonic

structure will either become leaders like those they despise or end up worse off in the new

system. Power differentials, hierarchies, and hegemony will always exist. If this is true, then

social movement outcomes do not matter and social movements are altogether inconsequential.

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Nonetheless, activism persists. It is easy to give up and to settle for what you are given,

yet people around the world continue to struggle for improvement no matter how miniscule the

rewards may be. Citizens have strong ideas about how their members of their communities

should behave, the proper role of their government, and the quality of life they deserve.

Movements provide hope that change is possible and serve as a tool of the people when the

political system is not providing the results or accountability that citizens want. When people

become involved with movements based on their deep-seated beliefs of how things should be,

they can become emotionally attached to the organization. This emotional connection is likely to

grow as people invest more time and energy into the struggle, and allows positive outcomes to be

cherished more by activist, as was demonstrated by the national public response to the end of

apartheid in South Africa. However this emotional attachment to movements also makes

disappointments, such as the results of capitalist economies in South Africa and Poland, even

more devastating.

The answer to Gamson’s question is complicated because it involves the role of

emotions, which can be difficult to judge because emotions are not always rational or reasonable.

Emotions played an important role in the success of the anti-apartheid struggle and yet because

of their emotional attachment to the movement’s history, many citizens have not been willing to

give up on the ANC even though the political party is not serving their best interests. Emotions

also aided the Polish case, where workers’ commitment to activism was instrumental in the end

of Soviet rule. However Poles quickly became disillusioned with the new democratic system

and most do not vote while even fewer participate in forms of activism. These cases demonstrate

how the role of emotions was able to help both national liberation movements achieve

democracy. Yet the resulting attachment in South Africa and disillusionment in Poland have

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limited the ability of the people to hold their leaders accountable in their new democracies.

Emotions have helped these groups to accomplish what they set out to achieve while also

preventing the presumed beneficiaries from achieving the quality of life they want.

The cases of South Africa and Poland show that fundamental political changes are

possible. Though not everything that the people wanted, the rights and liberties that came with

these new democracies are a big step in the right direction because they provide the public with

more control over government institutions. If properly utilized, the public’s power over these

new democratic structures may lead to the implementation of policies that truly serve the

interests of the majority. Thus far, emotions have restricted citizens from taking advantage of

their rights to vote, organize, and protest in ways that were not possible under their old regimes.

While there are still some structural economic and political factors that have limited the progress

of non-whites in South Africa and workers in Poland, emotions have further hindered the ability

of these presumed beneficiaries to fully utilize their institutional gains to their benefit.

This paper set out to show how the ANC and Solidarity’s pasts as movements have

affected them as political parties and, for Solidarity, as a union. I found that these parties have

been influenced and aided by their pasts as SMOs, though different factors have had different

effects on each group. Guiding documents written by the ANC during the struggle and soon

after taking office are not always strictly adhered to by the party. Instead, South African citizens

refer to the Freedom Charter and Constitution to show how the ANC should behave and to

determine what progress should be made. While these key documents are important in South

Africa, Poland and Solidarity lack any equivalent documents.

Most traditions from the ANC’s founding, including consulting with citizens, have little

bearing on how the party conducts itself. However, the top-down ways of the ANC during its

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decades in exile continue to impact the party and its politicians. This history is so powerful that

it has influenced the government’s structure and set the party’s tone. Solidarity’s traditions still

appeal to Poles, and were utilized by the Civic Committee and Solidarity Electoral Action

(AWS) to win elections, but did not influence their time in office.

The ANC’s political structure and façade of party cohesion come out of the movement’s

secrecy, top-down system, and emphasis on unity that were necessary in exile. While this aspect

of the party is heavily influenced by its liberation movement past, the veneer of unity is slowly

beginning to fade. Solidarity’s history was used as a foundation for both the Civic Committee

and AWS to gain support and stand out against the many Polish political parties. While the

Civic Committee was run by leaders who were also involved in Solidarity, the AWS used

Solidarity’s name and was otherwise disconnected from the movement’s past.

The leaders of both the ANC and Solidarity filled crucial positions of power in their

respective new democracies, which aided the handover of power. Yet, as social movement

scholars have found in other cases of movement success, these leaders were ultimately unable to

live up to expectations. This may be attributed to inflated egos or greed caused by being in new

positions of power, a sense of entitlement after paying dues during the struggle, lack of

experience, the young democratic systems, or unrealistic expectations on the part of the citizens.

The ANC has maintained a lot of public support and continues to win elections in large

part because of their history as a liberation movement. This support is not simply based on

reason, but also an emotional attachment that developed during the struggle against apartheid and

subsequent democratization. While Solidarity does have some lasting clout, as demonstrated by

the ability of the Civic Committee and AWS to use their affiliations with Solidarity to gain votes,

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Solidarity has not experienced the same degree of lasting affection that the ANC has enjoyed.

This is likely a result of Solidarity's rocky record of public support and shorter history.

The ANC's current interactions with civil society are significantly shaped by the party's

history as an SMO. Rather than promoting dissent for the sake of democracy, the ANC is

defensive and often tries to silence criticism, as it did during the liberation struggle. When the

Civic Committee and AWS were in office they also limited the trade union aspects of Solidarity,

and Lech Wałęsa even said that civil society should be weak to give the government time to

become strong. The unfortunate result is that Poles are discouraged and disillusioned, and as a

result, Polish civil society is small and rather inactive.

Secondly, this paper examines the role and legitimacy of these successful former

movements in the new democracies they helped to create. Both countries are certainly more

democratic than they were under the previous regimes, but there is much substantive progress to

be made. Furthermore, while citizens have new political rights, their overall quality of life is not

what they expected under the new democracies.

The ANC has taken its position of power for granted because there have not been any

viable opposition parties and because a growing number and percentage of citizens have voted

for the ANC in previous elections. This has weakened South Africa's democracy because the

ANC does not need to provide basic services or be accountable to the people in order to be

reelected. Poland has the opposite problem; party politics are very unstable and most people

don't vote. The lack of participation and continuity limit the nation's ability to become a vibrant

democracy. South African leaders who have taken advantage of the ANC's power and Polish

leaders who have used Solidarity's history only to gain power, have lost legitimacy in the eyes of

the people, and consequently created distrust of their governments and of the democratic process.

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The extent of support for the ANC has become a warning sign for the quality of the

country’s democracy. While there are many reasons why the ANC has such an immense

electoral advantage, so far there have not been any parties that have provided adequate

competition, and the result is that the ANC has enough politicians in office that it can change the

Constitution. The right to vote means very little when the results seem inevitable, even if the

process is just. On the other hand, the lack of attachment to Solidarity or any other Polish

parties, has hindered Poland’s democratic process because so few citizens vote.

People in both South Africa and Poland have been disillusioned by their countries’ shifts

to neo-liberal and capitalist economic systems. While they have new political rights, these are

not fully guaranteed in South Africa and not taken advantage of in Poland. Yet the primary

concerns of many people are not about their political freedoms, but their general quality of life.

Service delivery has been particularly lacking in South Africa, where joblessness, homelessness,

and HIV/AIDS are major concerns. Poland remains one of the poorest countries in the European

Union, and has had problems with unemployment and poverty. The standard of living has

decreased for the average citizen in both countries, and this has tainted their opinions of the

legitimacy of their governments. Particularly in South Africa, there is a feeling that the

liberation struggle is not yet over, as citizens are still waiting for an economic liberation to go

along with their political liberation.

The ANC’s interactions with South African civil society have not been particularly

democratic. When NGOs, unions, or SMOs are willing to act as the ANC dictates, the party has

no problem with these other groups. Yet when civil society criticizes ANC policies, they are

dismissed and devalued by the ruling party. On the other hand, the ANC has often catered to the

will of Western nations and participated in globalization in a way that has not benefited the

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majority of South Africans. While Poland’s participation in the European Union has been

beneficial for its citizens, Polish civil society is not faring well. This trend began when the Civic

Committee was in office and shunned unions and workers strikes. Then, while Solidarity

Electoral Action (AWS) was in power, Solidarity continued to stand aside as workers rights were

trampled. Solidarity is now slowly gaining legitimacy as a union that it is staying outside of

politics, but Polish civil society remains weak.

Government accountability in South Africa is minimal, as the ANC has not had any

viable opponents in past elections and has been able to take the citizens votes, and thus the

party’s position in power, for granted. This may change in coming months if the Congress of the

People (COPE) proves to be a viable opposition party. Solidarity was not accountable to Polish

workers during the 1990s, largely due to the political parties affiliated with the union. Luckily,

Solidarity has begun to work for laborers’ rights again since 2000, and has gained some

legitimacy in this regard.

This work contributes to the growing literature on movement outcomes in several ways.

First, it finds that when an SMO targets the state to gain political rights, the movement’s

outcomes and politics are not only intertwined, but inseparable. This fits with Goldstone's

argument that scholars should not study movement outcomes and institutionalized politics

separately (2003). Though Solidarity fought with an anti-political stance, by challenging the

Soviet regime it was forced to become a political player, and ultimately spawned a political party

in order to successfully end Soviet rule and transition into a new democracy. The ANC had

political aspirations early on, so its transition to a political party is not surprising. While

Solidarity has now left the realm of politics, its movement past has had a lasting impression on

the Polish governmental system, civil society, and the political participation of Polish citizens.

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Furthermore, this study details how movement pasts have influenced the political parties

and union that grew out of them. This agrees with Panebianco's theory that “the way in which

the cards are dealt out and the outcomes of the different rounds played out in the formative phase

of an organization, continue in many ways to condition the life of the organization even decades

afterwards” (1988:xiii). Desai (2003), Goldstone (2002), and Younis (2000) have all built on

Panebianco's work, and my study adds to this growing body of scholarship.

Additionally, this paper demonstrates how social movement outcomes are complex, and

provides a detailed, historical, and comparative approach to studying these outcomes, as Giugni

suggested (1998). This serves as an example of social movement scholarship that goes beyond

the success or failure dichotomy, and is not limited to biographical consequences, policy

outcomes, or institutionalization. This study seeks to better understand outcomes without being

confined to established categories, with hopes that this may become a more common practice

among social movement researchers.

Further research should be done on social movement outcomes, both in party

transformations and otherwise, following these principles. This type of scholarship will work to

balance the academic understanding of social movements that is so focused on creation and

maintenance, but not outcomes. Perhaps more importantly, this research will provide current

leaders of parties or unions with social movement pasts with a framework to better understand

their position. Moreover, it will provide a foundation for current social movement leaders and

activists to plan ahead so that they may make formative decisions that create more favorable and

long-lasting outcomes.

Finally, this paper demonstrates how the emotional attachment approach to social

movement scholarship ties into movement outcomes and party transformations. Earlier social

119

movement theorists would have dismissed this attachment as irrational or the result of a

psychological disorder. In context, the extent of South Africans' emotional connections to the

ANC and the leaders of the liberation struggle are significant. When compared to the Polish case

study through examination of personal accounts, survey data, and election results, clear

distinctions arise between the roles of emotions in shaping the trajectories of the ANC and

Solidarity. While human, cultural, and emotional aspects are not easily quantifiable, my results

show that such studies are not fruitless. Furthermore, it reveals how emotions can both help and

hinder social movement outcomes that benefit movement members and supporters.

120

Interviews and Group Meetings

Bolton, Harriet. former Garment Workers’ Industrial Union Secretary. Personal interview.

Durban, South Africa. 26 November 2007

Cele, System. Abahlali member, Kennedy Road informal settlement resident. Personal interview.

Durban, South Africa. 21 November 2007

Figlan, Lindelani (Mashumi). former COSAS chairperson, former ANC Youth League

chairperson, Abahlali Vice-President, Kennedy Road informal settlement resident.

Personal interview. Durban, South Africa. 15 November 2007

Gibala, Lukasz. Parliament Member from the Citizens Platform (PO). Group Meeting. Krakow,

Poland. 7 April 2008.

Gliksman, Adam. Public Relations and International Relations for Solidarity in the Małopolska

region. Group Meeting. Krakow, Poland. 31 Jan. 2008.

Gliksman, Adam. Public Relations and International Relations for Solidarity in the Małopolska

region. Personal interview. Krakow, Poland. 17 April 2008.

Govindsamy, Gary. former liberation activist, SABC News Bulletin Editor for Lotus FM.

Personal interview. Durban, South Africa. 20 November 2007

Mazgaz, Jan and Marian Skubisz. Co-Vice Presidents for NSZZ Pracowników. Group Meeting.

Krakow, Poland. 8 April 2008.

Motha, Louisa. Abahlali Coordinator, Motala Heights informal settlement resident. Personal

interview. Durban, South Africa. 21 November 2007

Naidoo,Kiru former member of countless ANC affiliated organizations, researcher, teacher,

political analyst. Personal interview. Durban, South Africa. 20 November 2007

121

Ntseng, David. former liberation activist, Church Land Programme Employee, Abahlali member.

Personal interview. Durban, South Africa. 28 November 2007

Tsalong, Xolani former ANC Youth League member, former TAC employee, masters student in

Development at UKZN. Personal interview. Durban, South Africa. 19 November 2007

122

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Appendix A. South Africa Interview Questions

1. What is the history of your activism? 

2. Which groups have you been involved with and when? 

3. How involved have you been?

4. What are the reasons for any changes in your activism over time, both before and after

1994?

5. What are your current feelings about the ANC?

6. What do you think the ANC has done well?

7. Where do you think the ANC has failed to deliver?

8. What do you think about the current state of South Africa?

9. What are your hopes for the future of South Africa?

10. What are your hopes for the future of the ANC?

11. What are your hopes for the future of the South African government?

12. What is your analysis of how the ANC has changed from a liberation movement to a

political party?

13. What do you think about how the ANC interacts with, treats, and has relationships with

social movements now, and how this differs from the past?

14. How should the people of South Africa fix current problems? (voting, activism,

individual responsibility/choice, etc.)

15. What is your opinion of current social movements, created both before and after 1994?

16. What motivates your activism?  How to you keep on struggling when there is so much

still to be done?

142

17. Do you think there is too much complacency and passivity in South Africa today, and

among the youth?  Why or why not?

18. How long will the ANC remain in power?  How will the end of the ANC’s power come

about?

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Appendix B. Poland Interview Questions

1. What is the influence of Solidarnosc’s history as a ruling party on their current trade

union activities?

2. What is behind Solidarnosc’s decision to stay out of the political realm?

3. What are the challenges and benefits of the union’s current position?

4. What practices are in place for Solidarnosc to hear and represent the opinions of its

members?

5. How does the union arrive at decisions?

6. How free are lower-level employees and leaders to disagree with the top-level leaders

within Solidarnosc?

7. What are some of Solidarnosc’s greatest successes and strengths?

8. What are some of Solidarnosc’s biggest challenges and failures?

9. To what extent does Solidarnosc’s power impact Poland on a national level? Local level?

10. What is the future of Solidarnosc?

11. What is the public opinion of Solidarnosc?

12. What is Solidarnosc’s relationship with civil society like?

13. What is Solidarnosc’s relationship with other trade unions?

14. When Solidarnosc entered into politics, did the organization's goals change from those

they originally outlined when the union formed in 1980?

15. How would you describe Solidarnosc’s political and social views on a left to right

continuum?  how have they changed over time?

16. How has founder and former Polish President Lech Wałęsa’s reputation affected public

opinion of Solidarnosc?

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