the rok-u.s. joint political and military response to north korean armed provocations

8/13/2019 The ROK-U.S. Joint Political and Military Response to North Korean Armed Provocations

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a report of the csis

korea chair

October 2011

Author Sung-Chool Lee

Foreword byJohn J. Hamre

The ROK-U.S. Joint Politicaland Military Response to NorthKorean Armed Provocations


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a report of the csiskorea chair

The ROK-U.S. Joint Political andMilitary Response to North Kore Armed Provocations

October 2011

Author Sung-Chool Lee

Foreword byJohn J. Hamre


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About CSIS

At a time o new global opportunities and challenges, the Center or Strategic and InternationalStudies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to decisionmakers ingovernment, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan, nonprotorganization headquartered in Washington, D.C., CSIS conducts research and analysis and devel-ops policy initiatives that look into the uture and anticipate change.

Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height o the Cold War, CSISwas dedicated to nding ways or America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a orce orgood in the world.

Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one o the worlds preeminent international policyinstitutions, with more than 220 ull-time staff and a large network o affiliated scholars ocusedon de ense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging rom energy andclimate to global development and economic integration.

Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman o the CSIS Board o rustees in 1999, andJohn J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chie executive officer since 2000.

CSIS does not take specic policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should beunderstood to be solely those o the author(s)

2011 by the Center or Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

ISBN 978-0-89206-672-8

Center or Strategic and International Studies1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006

el: (202) 887-0200Fax: (202) 775-3199Web: www.csis.org


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contents

Foreword iv

Preface v

Introduction 1

Strategic Value of the Korean Peninsula to the United States and China 2

Comparison of State Capacities between South Korea and North Korea 2Geopolitical Signi cance of the Korean Peninsula 4How the United States and China Evaluate the Strategic Value of the Korean Peninsula 4

The Evolving Nature of North Korean Armed Provocations 7

The Real State of Affairs in North Korea 7The Likelihood of North Korean Armed Provocations 7The Changing Nature of North Korean Armed Provocations 8Possible Patterns of North Korean Armed Provocations 9

Guidelines for Improving the ROK-U.S. Joint Response 10

Mapping Out the ROK-U.S. Joint Response 10Close Dialogue with China 16Enhancement of ROK Military Preparedness 17

Conclusion 20

About the Author 22


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iv |

foreword

Te security situation on the Korean peninsula remains complex and difficult. Last year, NorthKorean orces twice attacked South Korea, in one instance sinking a ship and killing 47 sailors and,in another, bombing civilians on a South Korean island in an unprovoked artillery barrage. TeKorean military was criticized at the time or a weak response. A closer analysis o the circum-stances in each instance produces a ar more nuanced perspective. Nonetheless, both instancesrevealed signicant areas where improvement is needed.

Te United States has a clear interest in how South Korea responds to these circumstances.

We retain a signicant number o orces in Korea, in orming our 60-plus-year commitment to thesecurity and independence o the Republic o Korea. In the early days o our alliance, the UnitedStates carried a large share o the de ense burden. Over the years, the Korean military has grown insophistication and competence and now shoulders the overwhelming burden or Korean de ense.Yet U.S. resources are still vital in selected areas, and our political commitment to Korea remainsundiminished.

Te developments o 2010 require action on behal o Korea. And that action needs to be co-ordinated between Korea and the United States. Tat is the thrust o General Sung-Chool Lees ex-tended essay. General Lee outlines in a clear and concise way how Korea is reassessing its securitysituation, as well as the steps that need to be taken by the Korean de ense establishment to deter

more effectively threatening actions by North Korea. General Lee also examines the changing na-ture o the operational security partnership between the ROK and U.S. military organizations andwhat should be considered as next steps to coordinate more effectively our shared operations.

Te Center or Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has been gratied to have GeneralLee with us as a senior ellow this past year. Tis essay makes a substantial contribution to improv-ing the operation o our security alliance.

John J. HamrePresident and CEOCSIS


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preface

Tis report on the joint political and military response o the Republic o Korea (ROK) and theUnited States to North Korean armed provocations is based on the knowledge, experience, andinsight gained rom my military career. As such, this study ocuses on elaborating my personalperspective on the subject matter rather than outlining some conceptual ideas based on detailedanalysis and is not written in the usual scholarly ashion, which may cite or re er to other academ-ic articles or data.

In writing this report, I have also paid particular attention to avoiding discussions o conden-

tial military material. Moreover, this paper may contain ideas that differ rom political or militaryconventions and may not mirror the policies o the government o the Republic o Korea. Tis,however, does not discredit this report as being an accurate and genuine assessment o the currentsituation in the Korean peninsula and, more broadly, Northeast Asia.

I am very thank ul to John Hamre, president o CSIS, and Victor Cha, CSIS Korea Chair,whose encouragement and support made my visiting ellowship at CSIS invaluable. I offer myregards and blessings to all o those who supported me during my research.


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IntroductionIn the spring o 2011, a series o so-called Jasmine Revolutions in the Middle East and NorthA rica uprooted the very oundation o long-entrenched regimes in the region. Needless to say,

such sudden change has brought unexpected con usion and shock to those Arab states and theirleaders. Amid this time o uncertainty and unpredictability in how the regional political climatewill un old, the person who would be most receptive to and disconcerted by the current exigenciesexperienced by the affected political leaders may be the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il.

Te hereditary dictatorship o the Kim amily rom Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il and now pos-sibly to his youngest son, Kim Jong Unhas ruled North Korea or the past six decades in a waythat turned the North Korean populace into religious anatics who idolize the Dear Leader. Asa result o this long-lasting system, a system that is both abnormal and perverse in nature, NorthKorea suffers rom serious political, economic, and social problems, not to mention widespread

amine. From 1990 onward, urther economic downturns, ood shortages, and diplomatic isolationhave only worsened living conditions in the North and aggravated the peoples general discontent.

In an effort to prevent these vulnerabilities rom affecting North Koreas political system, theNorth Korean regime militarized the entire country, and it has been actively using its military tomaintain the stability o Kim Jong Ils regimes and trans er power to Kim Jong Un. In North Ko-rea, the traditional relationship between politics and the military has been reversed under the ban-ner o the Military First policy, which can be best characterized as subordinating governance tothe military to attain the rulers specic political objectives. In such circumstances, Kim Jong Il haspursued an aggressive security strategy to mitigate internal instability by creating external tension,while enhancing his military orcesin particular, his asymmetric orces, including North Koreasnuclear capabilitiesand using those orces to continue sustained armed provocations.

In Northeast Asia, the regional balance o power has been gradually moving away rom thestatus quo as China achieves rapid economic growth and Japan suffers a setback ollowing the tri-ple disasters o March 11 (the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichiplant). Tis shif in regional power, in turn, has strengthened Chinas bid or regional hegemony.Along with its dramatic economic and military rise, China has emerged as a signicant power inthe international arena with its G2the United States and China status. With regard to the twoKoreas, China has been actively engaging in the matters affecting the Korean peninsula, and itholds decisive keys to solving some, i not most, o the problems there.

the roku.s. joint politicaland military responseto north korean armedprovocations


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2 | the rok-u.s. joint political and military response to north korean armed provocations

Considering that China is North Koreas only ally, it is now imperative that both Washingtonand Seoul cooperate and coordinate with Beijing to solve the issues concerning North Korea.Yet, in response to the recent North Korean armed provocations, it appeared that Beijing did notcondemn or punish but, rather, sided with Pyongyang. Tat decision demonstrates not only thatChina can position itsel as a possible counterpoise to the ROK-U.S.-Japan relationship, whichwould pose major hurdles in dealing with North Korea, but also that there is a need to closelyscrutinize the security implications o Chinas rise rom a broader perspective.

Te Republic o Korea and the United States, on the other hand, have urther enhanced theirstrategic alliance to a new degree. Te ROK-U.S. alliance has broadened the scope o cooperationand coordination to global economic, environmental, and climate-related issues as well as regionaland military issues. . Moreover, both Washington and Seoul have agreed to suspend all ood andnancial aid to North Korea except or minimum humanitarian aid until the North demonstratessubstantial changes in its policies, while at the same time exerting pressure on Pyongyang to giveup its nuclear program and improve its human rights record.

Considering these security challenges in Northeast Asia, additional actors that may affectNorth Koreas internal problems include North Koreas uture succession, economic problems, and

ood shortages; Chinas support or North Korea and its engagement policy toward the Koreanpeninsula; and the ROK-U.S. common demand to North Korea or denuclearization and theirsuspension o urther economic aid.

Faced with political, economic, and social difficulties, North Korea is most likely to resort toarmed provocations in order to turn domestic attention away rom internal problems, maintainthe current regimes stability, and trans er power success ully to the next leader to sustain theregimes survival. Tis report will examine how the ROK-U.S. alliance should react to potentialNorth Korean armed provocations rom political and military perspectives.

Strategic Value of the Korean Peninsulato the United States and China

Comparison of State Capacities between South Koreaand North KoreaSouth Korea is the only country among those that gained independence ollowing World War II tohave success ully achieved both a ree market economy and a liberal democracy. Its governmentis one o the worlds most respected democracies and its people enjoy ull reedoms o speech,press, and religion. South Koreans zeal or educationofen re erred to as education everhaschanged South Korea rom a nation where the majority o the adult population had no ormalschooling to one o the most literate and well-educated nations in the world. Te substantial sizeo private education expenses almost matches expenditures or public education. About 85 percento high school graduates in South Korea attend college, and o those who study abroad, the largestnumbers attend schools in the United States and China.

South Koreas GDP is ranked 12th in the world, Te country is the seventh-largest exporterand tenth-largest importer o goods. oday, it is also the fh-biggest trading partner with theUnited States and the third-biggest trading partner with China. South Korea has achieved rapid


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economic growth, driven primarily by its talented human capital. Heavily involved in internationaltrade, South Korean industrialists have specialized in the production o specic goodsespeciallythose or sale in oreign markets. Tese include semiconductors, ships, automobiles, steel, andelectronic equipment, all o which are world-class quality.

In military aspects, South Korea maintains the seventh-largest military orce in the world, and

dispatched its troops to wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and A ghanistan ollowing the Korean War. Con-sisting o the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Republic o Korea Armed Forces is equipped withhigh-tech weapons, many o which are developed with Korean technologies, while others, such asghter jets and missiles, are managed with imported systems.

While the wartime operational control o its orces currently lies with the ROK-U.S. Com-bined Forces Command (CFC), ROK Armed Forces controls its own orces in the areas o militarydevelopment, organization and structure, military maintenance and management, budget plan-ning, and exercise and training. Since the Korean War in 1950, the ROK military has developedin a way that suits the purpose o its combined operations with the United States Forces Korea(USFK). Tanks to the high level o education o its service members, the ROK military has suc-cess ully managed to apply U.S. operation protocols and has adopted advanced intelligence capa-bilities. Moreover, South Koreas open conscription system has enabled the military to operate at arelatively low cost. Considering that more than 80 percent o those conscripted have some collegeeducation, ROK troops are highly capable o operating high-tech systems effectively.

Additionally, South Korean cultureranging rom arts and literature to entertainment andlmshas become increasingly popular across China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. On a globalstage, South Korea increasingly plays a central role in acilitating international dialogue and coop-eration.

Te remarkable economic growth o South Korea has served as a viable model or developingcountries. Many o its high-tech products are immensely popular in the global market, and SouthKoreas dispatch o its troops to various conict regions has also attracted global attention.

North Korea has maintained the sixth-largest military in the world and continues to build upits military with the development o strategic and tactical means despite the collapse o its econo-my. Pyongyang has developed and uses its nuclear capabilities, missiles, chemical and biologicalweapons, long-range artillery (LRA), and special operations orces as a means or exing its politi-cal muscles. Regarding its nuclear development, North Korea is at the stage o developing enricheduranium, presumably to urther enhance its nuclear weapons proli eration.

Since the 1990s, widespread amine and diplomatic isolation have impoverished North Koreaseconomy, evidenced by its meager GDP, inability to provide basic goods or social wel are to itsown people, and deterioration o many industrial acilities. Annually, more than one-third o theNorth Korean population suffers rom ood shortages.

Yet, North Korea can potentially achieve sustained economic growth i it makes effective useo its abundant natural resources and cheap labor orce. South Koreas economic strength, richhuman capital, and technological advancements, alongside North Koreas nuclear capabilities,abundance o human labor, and underdeveloped natural resources, are all important or evaluatingthe strategic value, economy, and geopolitical risks o the Korean peninsula. Going orward, a uni-ed Korea ollowing a North Korean regime change will attract not only regional but also globalattention.


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Geopolitical Signi cance of the Korean PeninsulaTe Korean peninsula is at the heart o Northeast Asia. It shares its northern border with Chinaand Russia, western border with China across the Yellow Sea, and eastern border with Japan acrossthe East Sea.

Northeast Asia comprises three o the largest economies in the world, namely Japan, China,and Russia, as well as the two Koreas. In this region, the Korean peninsula acts as a bridgeheador transportation and trade and has played a strategic role or major maritime powers such as the

United States and Japan. Furthermore, the Korean peninsula, being the easternmost tip o Eurasia,has served as a hub or various global networks.

From a military perspective, the Korean peninsula is located at an intersection o land and seawith signicant military potential. It can work either as a orward base or as a stepping stone orChina, which looks to expand its sphere o inuence across the Pacic Ocean. For Japan and theUnited States, the Korean peninsula is a key strategic beachhead and bridge that enables them tomaintain their maritime inuence in Northeast Asia and beyond.

Due to its geographical location and its potential to both catalyze and prevent sudden trans-ormations, the Korean peninsula has been an area where the interests o land and sea powers cancollide or converge. Te division o the Korean peninsula was a subject o discussion between theend o the nineteenth century and the beginning o the twentieth century, but its actual implemen-tation, a result o differing U.S. and Soviet ideologies ollowing the Korean War, lends weight tothe notion that this area will continue to be an area o competition among different orces. Becauseexercising total control over the Korean peninsula can potentially disrupt the regional balance opower among the worlds superpowers, the struggle or power surrounding the Korean peninsulawill likely continue and, in turn, the situation in the Korean peninsula will continue to be affectedby the power relations among competing countries.

Owing to the dual role that the Korean peninsula plays or Northeast Asiaas both a bufferzone and a last line o de ense or major powers-the side whose inuence the peninsula allsunder can shif the power balance among regional countries to a signicant degree.

How the United States and China Evaluate the Strategic Valueof the Korean PeninsulaMore than one-quarter o the worlds population live in Northeast Asia. Economically, the regionis responsible or more than 22 percent o global production. In addition, our o the six larg-est military powers are located there. In this context, the Korean peninsula plays a critical rolein acilitating regional peace, prosperity, and cooperation. Due to the Korean peninsulas uniquegeographical position and political signicance, both the United States and China have treated thisarea with great caution and interest.

Te United States strategy toward the Korean peninsula is built primarily on the need tomaintain the balance o power by keeping China and Russia in check, and to preserve and de endJapan. By establishing a democratic government in South Korea and supporting South Korea dur-ing the Korean War, the United States achieved its objectives o preventing the southward expan-sion o Communism and preventing any single country rom asserting regional hegemony.


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In the post-Cold War era, unlike the Soviet Union, which tried to exert its inuence as a superpower with its military might, China has been using its economic success to challenge the worldorder led by the United States. Seen in this light, the United States can check Chinas rise by usingthe Korean peninsula as its rontline military base. Because o the Korean peninsulas strategiclocation, South Korea can almost be seen as an important U.S. aircraf carrier, stationed at thecenter o Northeast Asia. Considering that the military standoff between Pyongyang and Seoulnecessitates a greater U.S. military uture presence in the region, the United States is able to usethe tension in Korea as a pretext or exing its muscles vis--vis China. During joint maritimeexercises with South Korea, or example, the United States sent its aircraf carrier to the Yellow Sea

ollowing the sinking o the South Korean Navy shipCheonan last March.

Te Korean peninsulas potential capacities are not only benecial to U.S. national interests,but also compatible with U.S. values; namely, South Korea has embraced democratic developmentand success ully implemented a market economy. South Korea is ofen cited as one o the mostsuccess ul cases o U.S. military intervention and nation building ollowing WWII, and it has nowbecome the United States fh-largest trading partner.

North Korea, on the contrary, poses a great challenge to the United States, second only to theinsurgencies in Iraq and A ghanistan. In particular, the denuclearization and nonproli erationcommitment o the United States will most likely be tested by how it deals with North Korea. IPyongyang were to develop a long-range nuclear weapons delivery system that could reach thecontinental United States, it would carry ar-reaching implications or U.S. policymakers. In addi-tion to the nuclear threat, the high likelihood o sudden change ollowing abrupt regime change orsocial instability in North Korea could orce both China and South Korea to ace serious securitychallenges. In such situations, the end result could also be catastrophic to the United States, espe-cially i North Koreas nuclear capabilities were to get out o control, or worse, all into the hands orogue terrorist groups.

North Korea understands the high stakes surrounding its provocations. As a result, it care ully

selects its timing and means in testing the strength o the ROK-U.S. joint response. In this sensi-tive security environment, North Koreas denuclearization, the prevention o urther provocations,and the enhanced strength o the ROK-U.S. alliance will all play a key role in protecting Americaninterests.

China, on the other hand, is exercising its military inuence by citing its historical back-ground and geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula, while reiterating the importance othis region to its national interest and stability. China has stead astly held the position that it willtake steps to prevent hegemonic or heavy-handed measures in the Korean peninsula.

Amid its power struggle with the United States, China believes the Korean peninsula, with itsgeographical value, can unction as a barrier and a buffer zone against urther expansion o U.S.

inuence in Northeast Asia. Economic growth has been the main driving orce behind Chinasrapid international rise, its internal political stability, and its expansion o inuence in NortheastAsia. Tere ore, maintaining that economic vitality has been Chinas core national interest, anapproach reected in its political and diplomatic policies. In this context, South Koreas market,technology, and industrial acilities and tourist industries have been invaluable to Chinas eco-nomic rise.


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North Koreas inherent political system and socioeconomic structure is a double-edged swordor China. Even though stabilization in North Korea would reduce its military and diplomatic

threat and contribute to Chinas economic development, China would be deprived o its crucialrole as a necessary diplomatic intermediary i Pyongyang were to independently decide to give upits nuclear program or improve relations with the United States Te resulting diminished diplo-matic role could potentially weaken Chinas stature in the international arena. Moreover, romChinas standpoint, the opening and re orm o North Koreas economy will sharply increase thelikelihood o unication, which, in turn, would not only eliminate the buffer zone but also signalthe beginning o signicant re ugee and ethnic minority problems.

As North Koreas politics, economy, and society become more unstable, and Pyongyang seeksmore desperately to develop its nuclear capabilities, China will gain more leverage over its NorthKorean counterparts. China can use this leverage to exercise exclusive authority over North Ko-reas economy and natural resources. In addition, the ongoing tension between the two Koreas willonly strengthen Chinas diplomatic position due to its inuence over the North.

Yet, North Koreas development o nuclear weapons and its worrisome military- ocused sys-tem have also led neighboring countries to increase their de ense spending, and have even gener-ated nuclear proli eration in other countries. Tis scenario may hamper Chinas national strategicpursuit o regional stability.

China is most anxious about North Koreas social unrest leading quickly to a breakdown o theKim regime. Tis could cause a large inux o North Korean re ugees across the Chinese borderand signal the beginning o serious ROK-U.S. combined military operations, even the unicationo the two Koreas, all o which are serious concerns to China Tere ore, China will seek to main-tain a situation that is benecial to its national interesta situation where the Korean peninsularemains divided, the two Koreas remain in critical tension, and the North Korea regime is pro-Chinese.

One must not orget that the United States and China share common ground in wanting toavoid an all-out war and denuclearize the Korean peninsula, thereby achieving regional stability.Yet even though North Koreas provocations counter national interests o both the United Statesand China, the two countries desired goals or North Korea are by no means identical. Te UnitedStates pursues absolute stability, as it believes that increased stability in the Korean peninsula willallow less room there or a secure Chinese oothold; China, on the other hand, believes it hasnothing to lose as long as it can exploit the tension between the two Koreas to its advantage andNorth Koreas occasional provocations do not escalate to a total war.. Chinas attitude was openlyapparent afer the sinking o Cheonan and the shelling o Yeonpyeong Island.

Tere ore, it is necessary that the ROK-U.S. alliance respond to North Koreas provocationsby considering Chinas strategy, nding commonalities in their own strategies, and strengthening

efforts to consolidate the available military diplomatic and political tools.


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military power. As a result, a systematic pattern has emerged where North Korea has built up itsmilitary and then engaged in provocations in pursuit o a specic political objective. In particular,North Korea has an advantage over South Korea in asymmetric war are capabilities. Due to itsextensive arsenal o weapons o mass destruction (WMD), LRA, large special operations orces,and submarines, Pyongyang is prepared to provoke Seoul through various means when it deems itnecessary.

Despite its diplomatic isolation and economic ailure, North Korea takes advantage o itsmilitary superiority over South Korea. By adopting brinkmanship tactics, North Korea continuesto test the strength o the alliance o the Republic o Korea and the United States, believing thatSouth Korea will cave in because it has more to lose in the event o total war. In past provocations,North Korea has witnessed South Koreas lukewarm response, amplied dissent within the South,and a decline in South Korean troops morale. Tat experience has urther motivated North Koreato disturb the stability in the peninsula in order to negotiate benets rom others.

In other words, North Koreas perception o its external environment has urther increasedthe possibility o uture provocations. Te North believes China will be on its side, regardless owhether it engages in provocations short o an all-out war. It has taken its relationship with China,South Korea, and the United States into its strategic planning and has concluded that those coun-tries will not con ront it militarily. Rather than give in to U.S. sanctions, North Korea has usedeconomic sanctions and diplomatic isolation as a way o consolidating its internal unity.

Still, North Korea is aggrieved by South Koreas hard-line policy and the various internationalsanctions and regulations imposed upon it. As South Korea improves its international statusby,

or example, hosting the 2010 G20 Summit and the Nuclear Security Summitit is possible thatthe North will be tempted to create an atmosphere o tension in an effort to expand its inuence.South Koreas inner political conict and its increasingly lax attitude to national security have alsoprovided North Korean sympathizers in the South with more room or maneuvering.

In short, in 2012 North Korea will continue to pursue its goal o building a strong and pros-perous state by continuing its nuclear weapons program and taking steps to carry out the trans ero power. In addition, based on its superiority over South Korea in asymmetric war are capabili-ties, it will carry out different types o provocations in order to gain U.S. acceptance o NorthKorea as a nuclear state.

The Changing Nature of North Korean Armed ProvocationsSince the signing o the Armistice Agreement in 1953, North Korea has threatened the stabilityand peace o the Korean peninsula by initiating armed provocations o different degree at least 30times. As a result, the Korean peninsula remains a living relic o the Cold War.

Until the 1990s, North Korea blatantly used its military power to shake the stability o the twoKoreas. Te Korean Peoples Army sent its special orces and spies on various occasions, the mostnotorious examples being the Blue House raid in 1968, the axe murders at the Korean Demili-tarized Zone (DMZ) in 1976, and the bombing o the South Korean presidential delegation inRangoon in 1983. At the time, the dual purpose o North Koreas acts o terrorism was to increasethe pro-Communist voice in South Korea and create the tension that could acilitate reunica-tion o the two Koreas under Communist rule and based on North Korean military and economicsuperiority.


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Afer 2000, North Korean provocations mani ested much more diversity as Pyongyang beganusing both military and nonmilitary means. Te current provocations have been unexpected,extensive, and lethal. Te rst and second naval battle near Yeonpyeong Island, the sinking o theCheonan, the shelling o Yeonpyeong Island, nuclear tests, and missile launches all demonstrateNorth Koreas new offensive pattern. Amid these provocations, Pyongyang also strongly demandednullication o the 1953 armistice and the Northern Limit Line (NLL), which acts as the de actomaritime boundary between North and South Korea . Using this pattern o sudden aggression withsimultaneous and persistent demands or the invalidation o the 1953 Armistice, Pyongyang sets

avorable grounds not only or negotiations with Washington but also or its hopes to receive oodaid and attain internal stability.

Facing serious internal threats, the North Korean regime has blamed its internal problems onexternal pressures. Amid much domestic uncertainty, Pyongyang has repeatedly directed ex-tremely con rontational rhetoric toward Seoul and Washington, which provided some legitimacy

or uture provocation and made it difficult or the ROK military to estimate the timing o suchoffensive measures. Furthermore, the North has utilized means o surprise beyond imagination orits provocations , by disclosing its nuclear and highly enriched uranium (HEU) acilities, con-

ducting missile tests, dispatching submarines, and launching LRA attacks. Yet, immediately afera provocation, North Korea has ofen ended the ensuing conict so quickly that it has managed tonot only avoid international sanctions but also shif the blame onto South Korea or its dispropor-tionate response.

In the oreseeable uture, the Kim regime will continue to adopt brinkmanship tactics to pro-long its rule. o pursue this course o action, North Korean leaders will use extreme, coercive, and violent measures to attain a set o specic political objectives. Tey could use such armed provo-cation measures even as they try to set up a more avorable negotiation environment with SouthKorea and the United States, as Pyongyang believes its ties with Beijing can discourage both Seouland Washington rom engaging in acts that can threaten the survival o the Kim regime.

Possible Patterns of North Korean Armed ProvocationsNorth Korea has the military power capable o initiating both low-intensive and high-intensiveprovocations. It uses its superiority over the ROK Army in asymmetric war are capabilitiesin-cluding WMDs, missiles, special operations orces, LRA, and submarinesto stage new provoca-tions.

Te possibility o a surprise provocation with various means and methods along with simulta-neous demands or dialogue has steadily increased and complicated ROK efforts to predict utureNorth Korean actions. While a ull-scale war is not impossible, the North Korean regime is morelikely to engage in limited local provocations by using its asymmetric orces or nonmilitary provo-cations, considering the economic ailure, imminent power succession, and internal instabilitywithin North Korean society, and it will use nuclear and conventional weapons in hopes o deter-ring Seoul and Washington rom overly escalating the conict. In short, while trying to avoid anescalation o tension, North Korea will not sacrice its bargaining power in negotiations and willtry to retain higher ground. Also, it will likely adjust the intensity o a uture provocation basedupon its internal and external needs.

Based on these observations, possible North Korean armed provocations include the ollow-ing possibilities: (1) an attack on ROK vessels in the nearby sea, (2) an attack on ROK vessels by


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submarine, (3) shelling o the Republic o Koreas Northwestern Islands in the Yellow Sea, (4) car-rying out surprise landing operations on the Republic o Koreas western islands, (5) an attack onROK reconnaissance aircraf by missile, and (6) surprise attacks on ROK troops within the DMZ.North Korea can also provoke South Korea by nonmilitary means, including (1) cyber war are, (2)terrorist attacks, (3) taking South Korean workers and/or visitors in North Korea as hostages, (4)nuclear or missile tests, and (5) kidnapping or assassination o key South Korean officials.

Pyongyang will limit its provocations to South Koreas military targets as much as possible.Yet, it will seek to deliver as much damage and shock to Seoul and Washington as it desires. Itsattack will be care ully planned and secretly implemented in order to complicate South Koreas e -

orts to track down the attacks origin, thereby delaying the possibility or an immediate response.

Guidelines for Improving the ROK-U.S. JointResponse

Mapping Out the ROK-U.S. Joint ResponseIn the event o uture North Korean armed provocations, it is imperative that South Korea and theUnited States care ully coordinate their response, because a disjointed response would only revealthe vulnerabilities o the ROK-U.S. alliance to North Korea. Because South Koreas tepid responseto North Korean provocations can aggravate a situation, i not lead to urther provocation, SouthKorea and the United States should take strong punitive measures against the North. In takingretaliatory measures, both countries should not take their own course but rather coordinate withone another based on mutual trust and solid preparation.

De nition of North Korean Armed Provocations

I North Korea were to provoke with its military, South Korea and the United States should rstidenti y common ground and then determine to what extent North Koreas action can be consid-ered provocative. Because the ROK-U.S. joint response would take place only afer North Koreanprovocation, dening what action constitutes provocation is important or South Korea and theUnited States, as this question is directly related to the steps both countries should take in re-sponse.

How can we dene North Korean armed provocation? In other words, what kind o NorthKorean action constitutes as armed provocation? o answer this requires taking the ollowing

actors into account: intention, the means and methods o provocation, breach o sovereignty andinternational law, and extent o damage.

Here, we dene a North Korean armed provocation as an intentional military action by NorthKorea that breaches the sovereignty of South Korea or the United States and violates internationallaw for the attainment of specic political, military, or diplomatic objectives.

Based on this denition, South Korea and the United States should distinguish different typeso provocation and respond accordingly. Under the provided denition, or example, i NorthKorea intentionally used military measures to breach the sovereignty o South Korea or the UnitedStates and cause loss o li e and property, its action would be categorized as a direct armed provo-cation. In this case, a strong military reprisal rom the ROK-U.S. alliance should be the priority,


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and the shelling o Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, 2010, is a case in point. However, i NorthKorea violated international law and exacerbated tension in Northeast Asia, but did not breachanother countrys sovereignty or cause loss o li e or property, that action would be categorized asthreatening armed provocation. In this case, Seoul and Washington would be advised to pursuediplomatic solutions. Relevant cases are North Koreas nuclear development, missile tests, con ron-tational rhetoric, and large-scale military maneuvers in the nearby Yellow Sea.

Tree types o North Korean threats jeopardize peace and stability in the Korean peninsula,and more broadly, Northeast Asia and global affairs. First, North Korea can use military means toaggravate South Korea, thereby encroaching on South Koreas sovereignty and inicting damage.Second, a sudden collapse o North Korea or general revolt can occur, carrying pro ound implica-tions and possibly quickly spiraling out o control. Tird, North Koreas continued pursuit o itsnuclear program and ultimate production o deliverable nuclear warheads pose a grave threat toregional security.

With regard to these North Korean threats, South Korea, the United States, and China viewthese situations through different lenses. South Korea has ocused on preventing another NorthKorean provocation and urging North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons. However, consid-ering that dismantling Pyongyangs nuclear program requires international coordination and sanc-tions, South Koreas immediate concern should be preventing uture North Korean provocations.

Ironically, rom Chinas perspective, although North Koreas provocation and nuclear proli -eration are sensitive international issues, these problems strengthen its role in the region. China,there ore, will likely keep its time-honored Communist alliance with the ailing North Koreanregime to preserve the status quo. Beijing de ends Pyongyang on the grounds that, were NorthKorea to collapse, it would have to contend with large numbers o North Korean re ugees cross-ing the Chinese border. Moreover, as such collapse could reasonably be related to the likelihood oROK-led unication o the Koreas, the Chinese are deeply concerned about any scenarios involv-ing sudden change in the North.

On the other hand, the United States ully acknowledges that North Korean provocations andthe possibility o a sudden North Korean collapse threaten stability in the Korean peninsula andare adverse to U.S. national interests. Tere ore, the United States has been acting as a balancing

orce in Northeast Asia, trying to discourage North Korean provocations by deploying strong re-sponsive orces on the peninsula. For Washington, however, North Koreas denuclearization is con-sidered the top priority in its Korea policy, as it poses the most immediate threat to U.S. security.

In sum, South Korea, the United States, and China share common ground in their belie thatNorth Korean threats need to be properly managed, yet their evaluations, outlooks, and responsesto North Korean threats diverge.

North Koreas Objectives and Intention Behind its ProvocationsAlthough North Korea has requently resorted to armed military threats, it does not desire anescalated inter-Korean conict, as its economy and military spending have allen ar behind thoseo South Korea and the country has been suffering rom severe economic depression since 1990.

Here, it appears that North Koreas objective behind its provocations has changed rom theoriginal goal o the Communist unication o the two Koreas to a more modest goal o preser- vation and stability o the Kim regime.


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With this new objective, North Korea seems to intentionally build up tension in the Koreanpeninsula in order to achieve internal stability, success ully complete a hereditary trans er opower, improve its negotiating leverage over the United States, obtain economic aid, and attractChinas attention to enhance its legitimacy. In addition, by strongly pushing or nullication o the1953 Armistice and by developing nuclear weapons, North Korea apparently intends to continuecon ronting South Korea militarily.

It comes as no surprise, then, that North Koreas objectives and intentions are closely linked toits methods o provocation. On one hand, when the North launches a surprise attack on the Southcausing loss o li e and property, the North has the ollowing motivations: polarizing South Koreaspublic opinion, instigating decline in ROK troops morale, attracting international attention, andstrengthening the militarys role in North Korea. North Korea will pay close attention to creatingpolitical, economic, and military tension in South Korea by making South Koreans ully aware othe North Korean threat.

On the other hand, when North Korea engages in nuclear or missile tests that violate inter-national law but do not cause damage or encroach on South Koreas sovereignty, it is attemptingto leverage its negotiating position vis--vis the United States, attract Chinas attention, and boostnational condence. Moreover, North Koreas breaches o the 1953 Armistice along the NLL andDMZ in addition to its threatening rhetoric toward the South are aimed at instigating ear withinSouth Korea and rein orcing the Kim amilys rule in North Korea.

Regardless o the kind o provocation it carries out, Pyongyangs overarching objectives will beto strengthen its negotiating power with the United States, preserve internal stability, produce ten-sions within South Korea, and use the outcomes as grounds to press or demands o economic aid.

In particular, North Koreas incursions across the NLL have become more requent since theend o 1990s. Te North persistently tried to invalidate the NLL and weaken the ROK-U.S. alli-ance by exploiting the varying opinions between South Korea and the United States on the NLLissue. Surprisingly, even some South Korean politicians have advocated the renegotiation o theNLL, citing the murky historical and legal background o the NLLs establishment. However, therenegotiation o the NLL and concession o the maritime border in the Yellow Sea could be seri-ously harm ul to security or the South. I Seoul were to cave in to Pyongyangs demands, not onlywould its national pride be permanently damaged; such concessions would also render SouthKoreas de ense o its western islands virtually impossible. Accepting Pyongyangs demands wouldnot guarantee an end to North Korean provocation in the area. In the worst-case scenario, SouthKoreas concession would give North Korea urther incentive to provoke South Korea in pursuit oextracting more rewards.

As such, to prevent North Korea rom exploiting the divergence o opinions between the Re-public o Korea and United States, the two countries must rmly establish a common position. I

the threat o inter-Korean war becomes completely obsolete and a solid and peace ul system is es-tablished in the peninsula, then the status o the NLL can be revisited as needed. In the meantime,only when NLL is clearly established and commonly accepted will it be possible to deter NorthKorean provocations and allow reedom o maneuver in the Northwestern Islands.

Laying the Groundwork for the ROK-U.S. Joint Response to North KoreanArmed Provocations


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Te ROK-U.S. joint response to North Korean provocations should incorporate both militaryand nonmilitary means. South Korea and the United States should be well-prepared to retaliateaccordingly immediately ollowing a North Korean provocation and to use orce i necessary. Mili-tary means involve taking appropriate military retribution to prevent North Korea rom attaininga political objective, whereas nonmilitary means involve delivering tangible and direct damage toNorth Koreas governance through economic and diplomatic measures, such as the sanction onNorth Koreas Banco Delta Asia accounts. Te ROK-U.S. combined military action or joint mili-tary response should especially assess and agree upon certain measures, including the degree othe response, possible consequences, and the assigned responsibilities between the two countries.

Because the degree o military response determines the means and methods, this should bedecided afer much deliberation. Here, we distinguish responses aimed at deterrence rom re-sponses aimed at punishment: A response aimed at deterrence ocuses on preventing the escala-tion o conict, repelling North Koreas attack, and restoring the status quo, while a responseaimed at punishment emphasizes striking some o North Koreas key military targets and destroy-ing the enemys will to ght, even at the risk o escalating the conict. Such a hard-line responsecan also have a positive effect on North Korean policymakers strategic decisionmaking by casting

ear and doubt on a course o retribution..Conventionally, according to the provisions o international law, a response aimed at deter-

rence would be regarded as an appropriate course o action. Tere ore, the armistice rules oengagement have constrained the scope o the ROK-U.S. joint response. Nevertheless, the recentNorth Korean provocations have occurred so unexpectedly and quickly that the current armisticerules o engagement, with their limits on available options and hindrance o a prompt response,have proven almost useless or deterrence against ollow- up provocations by the North. Tere ore,in the near uture i North Korea were to provoke South Korea, South Korea and the United Statesshould reconsider the time constraints and contemplate a wider array o policy options includingpunitive measures. Seouls and Washingtons assertive stance will go a long way to protecting state

sovereignty and promoting national pride.Until now, South Korea and the United States have pre erred cautious to assertive and passive

to active responses to North Korean provocations while abiding by the Armistice Agreement andexpecting the North to change its behavior by its own volition. However, as the recent North Ko-rean provocations, including the torpedoing o the Cheonan and the shelling o Yeonpyeong Islandhave demonstrated, these past efforts have proven ruitless. Chinas lukewarm response and the in-stability in North Korea only make uture provocations more likely. In the ace o increasingly boldNorth Korean provocations, South Korea should no longer tolerate threats to its security. Now isthe time to break the cycle o North Korean provocations by a show o orce.

Historically, demonstrations o orce have succeeded in various incidents. First, the U.S. showo orce afer the USSPueblo kidnapping resulted in North Korea releasing the remaining crew-members. Second, the U.S. militarys Operation Paul Bunyan and move to De ense ReadinessCondition (DEFCON) status ollowing the DMZ axe murders in 1976 led to North Korean leaderKim Il-sung expressing regret. Tird, North Korea, sensing an imminent U.S. military response

ollowing the rst North Korean nuclear crisis, met with the United States to resume the secondround o talks in Geneva in 1993. Lastly, U.S. economic sanctions on North Koreas Banco DeltaAsia bank account were a major driving orce behind the February 13 Agreement in 2007. Tese

our examples illustrate that North Korea has made concessions when South Korea and the UnitedStates were willing to use orce.


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I South Korea and the United States were to take military sel -de ense measures, they shouldalso closely communicate with one another to agree on the desired end-state o their actions.When North Korea intentionally violates South Koreas sovereignty or harms civilians, the level othe ROK-U.S. joint response should be strong enough to instill disorder and ear in North Korea.Also, depending on the manner o the North Korean provocation, the response o South Koreaand the United States should emphasize neutralizing North Koreas high-value military targets.Tese targets include units and headquarters that were involved in the provocation, acilities thatare signicant and whose targeting would send a strong message to the North Korean leadership,and core strategic capabilities, including nuclear and missile acilities. o elaborate, these wouldinclude the unit rom which the provocation originated, its higher command posts o regiment ordivisions, battalion-level artillery and mechanized units, air-de ense acilities, and symbols relatedto the Kim amily. Te ROK-U.S. sel -de ense measures should inict damage to these key militarypoints comparable to at least 10 percent to 20 percent o the received battle damage. Should SouthKorea and the United States consider retaliatory measures, they must have national support andexecute the military operation success ully. Moreover, the action plans should be not only trans-parent and legitimate but also acknowledged as an inevitable act o sel -de ense.

Clearly setting out how to delegate authority in the event o an ROK-U.S. joint response isthe key to success. Here, a range o actors rom operational control (OPCON) in wartime andpeacetime, crisis management measures, the characteristics o weapons systems, and internationalrelationscan all have a certain bearing on the specic authority delegated to South Korea andthe United States Also, operational control o ROK orces is divided between the chairman o theJoint Chie s o Staff (JCS) o ROK Armed Forces in peacetime and the ROK-U.S. Combined ForcesCommand (CFC) commander in wartime. Tere ore, both sides should take steps to minimizethe gap in command, control, and coordination that could possibly arise rom this dichotomizedoperational control. Currently, to narrow this gap, the CFC commander also exercises CombinedDelegated Authority (CODA), which allows him to exercise authority over units o the ROK orcesplaced under wartime OPCON during peacetime.

In the case o the response aimed at punishment, one cannot exclude the possibility that astrong ROK-U.S. response could quickly escalate the conict and trigger all-out war, depending onNorth Koreas reaction. In this scenario, consistency o operational control is essential. However,because operational control o ROK orces will remain divided until 2015, it is inevitable that thechairman o the ROK JCS will lead the initial response and the United States Forces Korea com-mander will be in a supporting role. Because such an initial response aimed at punishment willrequire ROK-U.S. combined orces and, in particular, U.S. surveillance and reconnaissance capa-bilities, it will be invaluable to possess guided weapons and a stealth-equipped air orce and it isadvised that both South Korea and the United States be sufficiently prepared or deployment andemployment o such orces.

Stakes are extremely high; i an initial response rom South Korea is aimed at punishment andthe United States is reluctant to escalate the conict, this disjointed communication can heightenanxiety and concern in South Korea. Hence, an active and timely deployment o U.S. bridgingcapabilities is critical in this initial response.

I North Korea were to then respond by urther escalating the conict and react by using itsmilitary, the Republic o Korea and the United States would have to retaliate likewise. In this situa-tion, the United States would most likely declare a crisis, elevate the DEFCON level, strengthen its


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de ensive posture, and prepare to trans er wartime operational control rom the ROK JCS to theCFC commander.

On the other hand, South Korea, though it would partially agree to the U.S. measures, willwant to continue responsive operations controlled by the chairman o ROK JCS, based on theassessment that the escalation to an all-out war is unlikely, considering North Korean military

capabilities and their intent.Afer all, Seoul must also concern itsel with the potentially devastating effects on South Ko-

reas politics, economy, and society o a U.S. declaration o crisis and elevation o DEFCON. As aresult, it will want to continue peacetime operational control under the chairman o the ROK JCSwhile maintaining the autonomy to pursue strong and rapid measures.

o resolve these discrepancies, it may be use ul to classi y North Koreas reactions into severalcategories and establish a red line or each category. Should North Korea cross this red line,appropriate countermeasures such as the declaration o combined crisis and the elevation o theDEFCON level would ollow. In this situation, the command relationship should be trans ormed,with the CFC commander operating as supported commander. An example o crossing the red

line is North Koreas use o its artillery, missiles, or aircraf to attack the capital region or twoseparate regions resulting in not only military but also civilian casualties.

In sum, U.S. support o ROK JCS-led responsive operations is critical in demonstrating thatthe response o the ROK-U.S. alliance is not merely diplomatic or rhetorical in nature, but is anactive politico-military pact that puts words into action.

Steps for Pressuring the North Korean Nuclear SystemNorth Korea has persistently pursued nuclear development since the 1960s or the purpose o uni-

ying the two Koreas under Communist rule. North Korea considered the United States and theROK-U.S. alliance to be the biggest obstacle to unication and persuaded itsel that only nuclear

weapons could be a means decisive enough to hold off a possible U.S. invasion. Tereafer, NorthKorea has regarded nuclear weapons as a means o survival and as a symbol o bold leadership tohelp strengthen internal stability. It rmly believes its nuclear program not only prevents the South

rom absorbing the North, but also helps North Korean authorities tighten their grip on the popu-lation. Especially, against the backdrop o economic depression and domestic discontent in theearly 1990s, the North Korean regime suspects that any hint at re orm or opening o its economycould quickly lead to its demise. Tere ore, it has clung more strongly to the development onuclear capabilities in order to preserve its rule.

Moreover, the North Korean regime has used nuclear weapons as a means o extorting benetsrom the United States, Japan, Russia, and China. Over the past 20 years, North Korea has learned

that other countries cannot orce North Koreas hand so long as it possesses nuclear weapons.

Meantime, as it pre ers the North Korean regime to stay in place rather than endure a regimecollapse, China will not abandon North Korea over the issue o denuclearization. Tere ore, themore strongly Washington pressures Pyongyang to denuclearize, the closer China will be drawn toNorth Korea. Beijing remains reluctant to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis with any physi-cal means.

Based on the observations highlighted above, North Koreas denuclearization will be highlyunlikely unless the North Korean regime risks its own survival by voluntarily making radical po-litical and economic changes and withdrawing its aggressive stance on South Korea.


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North Koreas nuclear weapons development not only poses an existential military threat toSouth Korea but also tilts the balance o power to it, which in turn creates the situation whereSouth Korea is held almost as North Koreas hostage. Tough South Korea has built advancedmilitary capabilities to offset North Koreas conventional orce superiority, thereby providing somedeterrence, North Koreas nuclear weapons give it an advantage in military competition over SouthKorea. Furthermore, nuclear weapons also enhance North Koreas bargaining power in coercingconcessions rom the South. Continuation o the current military standoff, there ore, will onlyincrease the tension in the Korean peninsula and accelerate the arms race in the Northeast Asianregion.

As o now, North Korea is estimated to possess approximately 40 kilograms o plutoniumstock and six to eight nuclear warheads, and is suspected o pursuing an HEU program. It hasalready aunted its nuclear capabilities though two nuclear tests, and recently the possibility oa third nuclear test has sur aced.. Assuming North Korea continues its nuclear program, it willeventually advance to a stage where it possesses a small, lightweight nuclear arsenal. In otherwords, the level o North Korean nuclear development has already reached a serious and criticalstage. Tere ore, it is time or the Republic o Korea and the United States to devise more practical

means that will yield tangible results to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem.Te approach through dialogueprimarily with the Six-Party alkshas virtually ailed, with

no perceptible outcome due to the lukewarm stance o China and the brinksmanship tactics oNorth Korea. While the basic approach regarding North Koreas nuclear program should still be toengage North Korea through dialogue, we should also maintain a two-track approach that com-bines dialogue and more direct pressure. Dialogue should consistently continue being pursuedthrough both bilateral and multilateral channels. By playing a more proactive role in the negotia-tion process, South Korea can strengthen the U.S. position over North Korea. I North Korea doesnot take substantial steps to meet its international obligations and reeze its nuclear program,South Korea and the United States should adopt additional sanctions and unequivocally state that

they are willing to engage in physical measures. Both countries should also remind China o itsimportant role in North Koreas denuclearization.

o avoid alling prey to North Koreas strategy o stalling, both the Republic o Korea and theUnited States should set out deadlines or each stage o denuclearization. I North Korea does notmeet these deadlines, South Korea and the United States should seriously consider the deploymento tactical nuclear weapons and F-22 ghter jets to the Korean peninsula, as well as the enhance-ment o other necessary military means, including surveillance, reconnaissance, interception, andprecision-strike assets. I necessary, South Korea should bear the nancial burden o the deploy-ment. Granted that the aggressive ROK-U.S. stance will temporarily escalate the tension betweenthe two Koreas, this hard-lined posture will ultimately not only orce North Korea to submit to themounting pressure o the Republic o Korea and the United States, but also usher in lasting peacein the Korean peninsula.

Close Dialogue with ChinaChina is North Koreas only ally and has continuously provided political, economic, diplomatic,and military support to the North. As China and North Korea share not only their border but alsotheir view on the national interests o the two countries, the ROK-U.S. joint response to NorthKorean provocations is advised to take Chinas possible reaction into account.


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South Korea and the United States should clearly acknowledge the amount o inuence Chinacan exert over North Korea, and try to harness more cooperation rom China through closedialogue while dealing with the North Korea conundrum. Such dialogue with China should ocuson securing Chinas role in deterring uture North Korean provocations and on establishing thelegitimacy o the ROK-U.S. joint response. In addition, by emphasizing the gravity o North Ko-rean provocations, the Republic o Korea and the United States must make clear to China that thetenuous status quo in the Korean peninsula can quickly spiral out o control.

During dialogue with China, South Korea and the United States should also simultaneouslytry to curb Chinas inuence in resolving the North Korea issue and limit the array o diplomaticmeasures it could take. Tis can be done by pursuing dialogue but responding as necessary toNorth Korean provocations with strong punitive measures beyond the Chinese expectation.

Only when the Republic o Korea and the United States strongly retaliate to North Koreanprovocations can both countries break the vicious cycle o North Koreas provocative behavior andbe less prone to rely on China or making diplomatic breakthroughs.

In regard to a strong ROK-U.S. response, China understands that all-out war would be det-

rimental to Chinese national interests. Tere ore, China will likely make strong efforts to preventrising tension in the region by containing and deterring North Korea rom engaging in urthermilitary actions.

While engaging in close dialogue with China, it is necessary that South Korea take the lead inpersistently and tenaciously communicating ROK-U.S. preliminary discussions, with the UnitedStates providing a supporting role. Tis will augment the Chinese perception that it must take amore engaged role and commit greater effort in Korean peninsula-related issues. Tis will alsohelp enable China to accept multilateral security cooperation rameworks and a U.S.-led com-prehensive alliance in the Northeast Asia region and allow China to understand the ROK-U.S.combined effort to manage the North Korean provocation and its response within the boundarieso the two Koreas.

Te United States role is to help members o the United Nations and key countries in North-east Asia understand the strategy behind the ROK-U.S. alliance. Te United States is an entitycapable o building up international pressure to nudge China into the role o a responsible stake-holder regarding the North Korea dilemma.

Enhancement of ROK Military Preparedness

Proactive Deterrence: A New South Korean ApproachIn the ace o North Koreas buildup o asymmetric war are capabilities and requent provocations,

South Korea should acquire advanced military assets and ensure that the North understands theRepublic o Koreas will to respond when needed to North Korean provocations. In other words,South Koreas strategy should shif to proactive deterrence, including stronger sel -de ense mea-sures.

o enhance the effectiveness o this strategy o proactive deterrence, Operational Plan(OPLAN) 5027 should clearly stipulate that the United States will provide a nuclear umbrella.South Korea should also speci y possible types o North Koreas asymmetric threats and plan itsresponse accordingly.


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Integration and Expansion of Defense Information CapabilitiesMilitary intelligence should play the role o not only supporting operations but leading themthrough detailed analysis, assessment, and estimates based on the intelligence gathered by collec-tion plat orms. However, South Koreas capacity to support theater war are in the Korean penin-sula with military intelligence is severely limited, as the ROK military only possesses intelligencecapabilities that can provide armistice indicators and warnings. Tere ore, it is necessary that theRepublic o Korea and the United States construct a common database containing target in orma-tion that can directly support operations.

Tere is also a need to establish intelligence systems that can integrate and share military intel-ligence in order to enhance the coordination among intelligence agencies. Creating a combinedintelligence organization that can promote common intelligence collection between the Republico Korea and the United States, as well as improving the interoperability o Command, Control,Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems, is also critical.

Furthermore, South Korea must be able not only to eld tactical and strategic-level intel-ligence assets in advance; it must also devise a comprehensive plan to train a highly pro essionalintelligence staff to prepare or trans er o wartime operational control, and enhance surveillanceand reconnaissance capabilities against North Korean asymmetric orces and deep area operations.

Improving Crisis Management CapabilitiesTe efforts o South Koreas Ministry o National De ense and Joint Chie s o Staff during crisesshould be unied through improved organizational and personnel systems. It is o utmost impor-tance that greater human resources be invested in the command and control center o the ROKJoint Chie s o Staff, as it unctions as the main crisis action organization that carries out a series omeasures to monitor situations, disseminate in ormation, provide estimates, and conduct courseso action. Pro essional public affairs personnel are also necessary and will be need to be cultivated,as effective and timely public relations will be important in the initial stage o response to a crisis.Last but not least, enhancing in ormation sharing and coordination between South Korea and theUnited States or seamless and timely action in a crisis situation will be vital.

Responding to North Koreas Cyber ThreatsAlthough North Korea has trained a large number o hackers to carry out cyber terrorism onSouth Korea, South Korea has yet to strengthen its efforts, coordination systems, and legal stat-utes regarding cyber attacks in government, private sector, and military organizations. New andeffective legislation enacted by the South Korean government is necessary to enable coordinationamong government branches, private corporations, and the military.

Also, South Korea must urther develop cyber war are-related military organizations, doc-trines, and operational requirements, and train experts in in ormation protection technology.

Preparing for a Growing North Korean Asymmetric Threat Since the 1990s, North Korea has been steadily developing its asymmetric war are capabilitiesin order to attain military superiority against the South. I the North were to use such capabili-ties, which include nuclear weapons, missiles, long-range artillery, special war are orces, and


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capabilities that can respond to North Korean asymmetric threats, while taking into account theROK-U.S. alliance as well as the potential level o U.S. support.

Training Military Personnel and Improving ROK Military EducationSystems

While the overall educational level and intellectual capacity o ROK orces are world-class, there isstill work to be done to improve the morale, discipline, and pro essionalism o the service mem-bers. Radical changes in the education and training institutions and their curricula are necessaryto nurture better human resources and make the ROK military stronger. Tese measures includereshuffling components in human resources, cultivating ethics and leadership among high-rank-ing officers, maintaining just and consistent personnel management, and promoting greater trustand respect toward the military rom politicians and the general public. o this end, acquisition oresources and increased investment will be crucial.

ConclusionWith the rise o China and the threat rom North Korea, the security landscape in Northeast Asiahas become more uncertain and unstable. Tere ore, South Korea and the United States shouldnavigate this ragile security environment care ully. Recently, North Korea, being burdened withpolitical, economic, and social instability, has believed that engaging in external provocations isthe only course o action that can guarantee its internal stability and elicit economic aid.

Based on its growing power in the international arena and inuence over North Korea, Chinahas been condoning North Korean provocations with the goal o seizing the initiative to gain hege-mony over the Northeast Asia region. Tis, in turn, has had only a negative impact on the ROK-U.S. joint efforts to prevent and deter provocations rom the North.

In such a context, the ROK-U.S. joint response against two major North Korean provocations,the sinking o the Cheonan and the shelling o Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, was possibly the bestcourse o action based on principles, but it ailed to deliver a satis actory outcome to South Koreancitizens. Te degree o readiness, timing, and strength o the response ell short o public expecta-tions, and the response was concentrated mostly on pursuing a diplomatic course. Such measuresonly enhanced Chinas leverage in the diplomatic arena and ailed to convince North Korea o thepossibility o retaliation, there ore ailing to provide deterrence against uture provocations.

Instead, the response against North Korean provocation should be conducted to a degree thatcan prevent North Korea rom attaining its goals and, possibly lead to North Korea demanding anapology rom South Korea or the attack. Tis can be accomplished only through inicting signi-cant damage on the North, utilizing the superior combined orces o the Republic o Korea and the

United States. Such a response will not only compel the North to abandon its strategy o armedaggression, but also help limit Chinas diplomatic inuence in the affairs o the Korean peninsula.

Considering that China pre ers to use security challenges in the Korean peninsula to its advantage rather than to seek a undamental solution to them, relying on China to take the initiative vis--vis North Korea is not a viable policy.

Te ROK-U.S. joint response requires close consultation and coordination rom the initialstage o determining the classication o any North Korean provocation. In particular, during the


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initial response operations led by the ROK JCS, the provision o U.S. bridging capabilities is criti-cal. Te response aimed at punishment requires strong military measures as it should target someo North Koreas high-value military targets and, i necessary, threaten North Koreas leadership.

During this military operation, the supported-supporting relationship between the Republico Korea and the United States should be structured clearly. Rather than the ROK-U.S. CFC lead-

ing operations in the early stages, providing a common assessment o red lines on characterizingtypes o North Korean provocations will be more practical and effective. I the situation deterio-rates and there is growing concern about all-out war, operational control should then be trans-

erred to the CFC.

Looking back at past experiences, it is apparent that solving the North Korea dilemma solelythrough dialogue has inherent limits. We should there ore combine engagement through dialoguewith strong pressure to intervene in response to North Koreas stalling tactics. In addition to plac-ing high-tech F-22 ghter jets in South Korea, it is necessary to send a clear message to the Norththat all available means o nuclear deterrence, including the deployment o tactical nuclear weap-ons in the Korean peninsula, will be used. As or how to handle North Koreas nuclear weapons,strong pressure and clearly dened deadlines or incremental denuclearization should be estab-lished to contain the Norths proli eration.

o prevent North Korea rom engaging in uture provocations, enhancing the ROK militariesreadiness posture should be the top priority. o this end, a complete armistice readiness posture aswell as a more proactive deterrence strategy should be established. Moreover, signicant invest-ment in intelligence capabilities and other areas o vulnerability is needed to prepare against NorthKorean asymmetric threats. Finally, re orming the ROK JCS organizational structure to achieverapid response capabilities, nurturing highly qualied military personnel, and improving the jointcoordination o the ROK military are the most immediate tasks ahead o us.


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about the author

Sung-Chool Lee began his ellowship with the Office o Korea Chair at CSIS in March 2011.A retired general in the Republic o Korea Army, General Lee served as deputy commander oROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and commander o the Ground Component Command

ollowing his promotion to our-star general in 2008. As the commanding general, he planned andexecuted tasks in preparation or uture trans er o wartime operational control rom the UnitedStates to the Republic o Korea. He is dedicated to urther strengthening the ROK-U.S. allianceand improving theater operations capabilities o the ROK Armed Forces. In 2010, General Lee

served as security adviser to President Lee Myung-bak on the Presidential Special Security Revieweam in the investigation o the March 29 sinking o the Cheonan. General Lee holds a BA romthe ROK Military Academy and received an MBA rom Chonbuk National University. He previ-ously served as commander o the 5th Corps, ROK Army, and as chie director o strategy plan-ning, J5, at ROK Joint Chie s o Staff.


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1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org

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the rok-u.s. joint political and military response to north korean armed provocations

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