the relationship of potential hazards towards...
TRANSCRIPT
THE RELATIONSHIP OF POTENTIAL HAZARDS TOWARDS
SAFETY IMPACT AT MALAYSIAN FLOATING STORAGE
FACILITY
SALEHUDDIN BIN MD FADZIL
UNIVERSITI TUN HUSSEIN ONN MALAYSIA
THE RELATIONSHIP OF POTENTIAL HAZARDS TOWARDS SAFETY
IMPACT AT MALAYSIAN FLOATING STORAGE FACILITY
SALEHUDDIN BIN MD FADZIL
A thesis submitted in
fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the
Degree of Master of Science in Technology Management
Faculty of Technology Management and Business
Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia
AUGUST, 2016
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DEDICATION
To my lovely wife, my kids, my father and mother, relatives, friends....
I also want to dedicate it to my Supervisor....
To everyone who I know, and all people I will know them in future....
For their genuine pride. To all these loving people, this thesis is dedicated.
DEDICATION
CLARATIO
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
All praise is to ALLAH, the most exalted the most high to which we all depend for
sustenance and cherishment.
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my capable supervisor, Assoc. Prof.
Dr. Hj. Rosmaini Bin Hj. Tasmin for helping me to develop that interest and zeal in
research and also for all the guidance and counselling throughout the period of this
research, thank you sir.
I would also like to thank the management of Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia
for giving good facilities for students. Furthermore, to the entire academic and non-
academic staff of the Faculty of Technology Management and Business and also the
Centre for Postgraduate Studies for all their support and guidance, and to all staff in
UTHM.
I would also like to thank all staffs at FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, colleague at Petronas
Carigali and all facility in this study for their contribution and commitment.
My sincere appreciation goes to my family members, especially to my wife for support
and prayers, and to my parents who showed me that life is not easy and must be
working hard to get what we want. There is no amount of word that would express my
gratitude to you. All what I am going to say is that may ALLAH (S.W.T) grant you
all your heart desires in this world and hereafter.
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ABSTRACT
Floating storage facility is increasingly becoming the preferred solution for new
installation in offshore industry. The facility has the ability to handle changes of oil
reservoir and process as well as offering storage and offloading at the same time. With
the straight forward of building and conversion based on the ship building technology,
the system will easily contribute to the potential hazard or risk that is difficult to
quantify due to short of experience, if compared to shipping industry. This thesis gives
an overview of the potential hazards during normal activity and the safety impact to
personnel, asset and environment. The list of potential hazard is generated and
compiled during reviewing of the literature from journals, conference proceedings,
databases and guidelines related to offshore operation safety. The research study
followed Risk Assessment approach by using Risk Matrix as a tool to measure the
level of potential hazard. Survey data also analyzed through statistical method of
analysis using SPSS. The tools from ANOVA One Way and T-Test were used to
analyze further the significant differences of demographic facility towards potential
hazards. Tool from Pearson Correlation is used to analyze the data for the relationship
of the potential hazard towards safety impact of the facility. The research study
described the potential hazards mainly from marine activities that should be
considered at the floating storage facility operated in Malaysia. The findings reported
that the age of facility has significant difference for ship collision, from the perspective
of facility’s demographic. The result also shows mooring system having significant
difference for hull failure since the statistical finding is significant. For the level of
hazard, it shows that on the first ranking is hydrocarbon release followed by
occupational accident, ship collision and hull failure. The result shows positive,
significant and yet low extent for the relationship of potential hazards towards safety
impact of the facility. The findings from the collected experience-based and research
survey data can be applied to facilitate the development of rationalized approaches for
the top management in decision-making for the safety guideline, policy making and
investment towards the floating storage facility.
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ABSTRAK
Fasiliti penyimpanan terapung sedang berkembang pesat menjadi penyelesaian kepada
pemasangan yang baharu dalam industri luar pesisir pantai. Fasiliti ini berkemampuan
mengendalikan perubahan kepada takungan minyak dan proses disamping
menawarkan penyimpanan dan pemindahan pada masa yang sama. Dengan terus
kepada pembinaan dan penukaran berdasarkan teknologi pembinaan kapal, sistem
tersebut dengan mudah terdedah kepada potensi bahaya atau risiko yang sukar
diklasifikasikan kerana pengalaman yang singkat jika dibandingkan dengan industri
perkapalan.Tesis ini akan memberikan pandangan terhadap potensi bahaya semasa
aktiviti biasa dan impak keselamatan terhadap pekerja, aset dan persekitaran. Senarai
potensi bahaya ini dihasil dan disusunkan semasa semakan terhadap karya dari jurnal,
pembentangan persidangan, pangkalan data dan garispanduan yang berkenaan kepada
operasi di luar persisir pantai. Kajian penyelidikan ini telah menggunapakai
pendekatan dari Penilaian Risiko yang menggunakan Risiko Matriks sebagai alatan
untuk mengukur paras potensi bahaya. Data penyelidikan ini dianalisis melalui
penggunaan statistic daripada analisis SPSS. Peralatan analisis tersebut adalah
ANOVA One Way dan T-Test yang digunapakai untuk menganalisis seterusnya
perbezaan yang signifikan dari fasiliti tersebut terhadap potensi bahaya. Korelasi
Pearson pula menganalisis data untuk perhubungan potensi bahaya terhadap impak
keselamatan di fasiliti tersebut. Kajian tersebut menerangkan potensi bahaya daripada
aktiviti marin yang diambil kira di fasiliti penyimpanan terapung yang beroperasi di
Malaysia. Hasil kajian melapurkan umur fasiliti mempunyai perbezaan signifikan
terhadap pelanggaran kapal dari segi perspektif fasiliti. Keputusan juga menunjukkan
sistem tambatan mempunyai perbezaan yang signifikan kepada kerosakan badan kapal
di mana statistik menunjukkan ia adalah signifikan. Paras potensi bahaya yang
menunjukkan tahap pertama adalah perlepasan hidrokarbon dan diikuti oleh
kemalangan pekerjaan, pelanggaran kapal dan kerosakan badan kapal. Hasil dapatan
korelasi adalah positif, signifikan, namun pada tahap rendah terhadap perhubungan
potensi bahaya terhadap impak keselamatan fasiliti. Keputusan daripada pengumpulan
data, pengalaman dan kajian penyelidikan akan menentu ukuran terhadap
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perkembangan pendekatan yang rasional untuk pihak atasan mengaplikasikannya
dalam membuat keputusan bagi garis panduan keselamatan, pembentukan polisi dan
pelaburan terhadap fasiliti penyimpanan terapung.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE i
DECLARATION ii
DEDICATION iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iv
ABSTRACT v
ABSTRAK vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS viii
LIST OF TABLES xii
LIST OF FIGURES xv
LIST OF SYMBOL and ABBREVIATIONS xvii
LIST OF APPENDICES xviii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview 1
1.2 Floating Storage Facility 4
1.3 Potential hazard onboard facility 12
1.4 Problem statement 15
1.5 Research questions 18
1.6 Research aim 18
1.7 Research objective 18
1.8 Scope of the research 19
1.9 Summary 19
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction 20
2.2 Potential hazard at the floating facility 22
2.2.1 Hydrocarbon release 22
2.2.1.1 Pipeline failure/burst 23
2.2.1.2 Flexible riser failure 24
2.2.1.3 Tank venting 26
2.2.1.4 Loss of well control (blowout) 27
2.2.2 Ship collision 29
2.2.2.1 Offloading tanker impact 32
2.2.2.2 Offshore support vessel impact 34
2.2.2.3 Merchant vessel impact 35
2.2.3 Hull failure 37
2.2.3.1 Failure in ballasting-capsize 39
2.2.3.2 Corrosion release 40
2.2.3.3 Adverse weather condition 42
2.2.4 Occupational accidents 46
2.2.4.1 General maintenance works 47
2.2.4.2 Helicopter impact 49
2.2.4.3 Manual handlings 51
2.2.4.4 Dropped object 53
2.3 Conceptual diagram and theoretical framework 58
2.4 Demographic of floating facility 61
2.4.1 FSO Angsi 61
2.4.2 FSO Cendor 61
2.4.3 FSO Abu 62
2.4.4 FPSO Kikeh 62
2.5 Summary 62
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction 63
3.2 The scope of study facility 63
3.3 The method of study 66
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3.3.1 Risk matrix 66
3.3.2 SPSS 68
3.4 Pilot study 68
3.5 Sampling method 69
3.6 Survey questionnaire 70
3.7 Summary 71
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
4.1 Introduction 72
4.2 Analysis ANOVA One Way 73
4.2.1 Age of facility 73
4.2.2 Manpower 75
4.2.3 Storage capacity 77
4.3 T-Test 78
4.3.1 Type of mooring system 79
4.4 Pearson correlation 80
4.4.1 Relationship of potential hazards
towards safety impact 80
4.5 Risk matrix 82
4.5.1 Potential hazards towards Personnel 82
4.5.2 Potential hazards towards Asset 84
4.5.3 Potential hazards towards Environment 85
4.6 Summary of level potential hazards 87
4.7 Summary 88
CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
5.1 Introduction 90
5.2 Discussion of the data collection 91
5.3 Discussion of the findings 91
5.3.1 Level of potential hazards 92
5.3.2 Significance difference for demographic
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facility towards potential hazard 94
5.3.3 Relationship of potential hazard towards
safety impact 99
5.4 Implication of the study 100
5.5 Suggestion for future research 101
5.6 Contribution from the study 103
5.7 Conclusion 106
REFERENCES 108
APPENDIX A Facility Information 116
APPENDIX B Weather forecast for Abu
Cluster Field, Terengganu 121
APPENDIX C FVSB HSE Management
System List 123
APPENDIX D The questionnaire for the study 124
APPENDIX E SPSS Sheets 131
APPENDIX F Vitae 173
PUBLICATION LIST 175
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LIST OF TABLES
1.0 Number and cost of worldwide floaters orders,
2000-2011. Source data from RigLogix, 2011 11
1.1 The statistic of occurrences for floating, production,
storage and offloading facility for year 1990 – 2007
(Oil and Gas UK 2009) 14
1.2 The statistic of Incident Investigation Report (IIR)
from year 2003 to year 2011 by PMO Petronas Carigali
(HSE Online 2011) 15
1.3 Number of accidental events for different Types of Unit 17
1.4 List of facilities in this study 19
2.0 Summary of events associated with event
reported incident, HSE (2006) 38
2.1 Overview of less serious accidents due to
environmental impacts to FPSOs in the
North European waters, Vinnem (2000) 44
2.2 Wave data for operational – 1 year return
period (Abu Cluster Field, Malaysia) 44
2.3 Environmental condition for storm – wave,
current, wind for 100 years condition. (Abu
Cluster Field, Malaysia) 45
2.4 Severity of injury and kind of accidents in
2009/10 (UK HSE, 2010) 48
2.5 Helicopter accidents in North Sea for the period
of 1999-2009 (Harrera et al., 2010) 50
3.0 ISO 17776 Risk Matrix (DNV, 2001) 67
3.1 Morgan Table 1970 for Determining Random
Sample Size from a given population 69
4.0 Total correspondence and percentage 72
4.1 Analysis Anova One Way; comparison from
Potential Hazard with Age of Facility 73
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4.2 Analysis Tukey LSD Test for ship collision
from Age of Facility 74
4.3 Analysis Anova One Way; comparison from
Potential Hazard with manpower 75
4.4 Analysis Anova One Way; comparison from
Potential Hazard with Storage Capacity 77
4.5 T-Test Analysis; comparison of Potential
Hazard with type of Mooring System 79
4.6 Pearson Correlation Analysis for Potential
Hazard towards the Personnel 80
4.7 Pearson Correlation Analysis for Potential
Hazard towards the Asset 80
4.8 Pearson Correlation Analysis for Potential
Hazard towards the Environment 81
4.9 Level of hydrocarbon release towards the
personnel 82
4.10 Level of ship collision towards the personnel 82
4.11 Level of hull failure towards the personnel 83
4.12 Level of occupational accidents towards the
personnel 83
4.13 Level of hydrocarbon release towards the asset 84
4.14 Level of ship collision towards the asset 84
4.15 Level of hull failure towards the asset 84
4.16 Level of occupational accidents towards the
asset 85
4.17 Level of hydrocarbon release towards the
environment 85
4.18 Level of ship collision towards the environment 86
4.19 Level of hull failure towards the environment 86
4.20 Level of occupational accidents towards the
environment 86
4.21 Summary of level potential hazards according
To ISO 17776 Risk Matrix (DNV, 2001) 87
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5.1 Level of potential hazards for Malaysian floating
storage facility according to Risk Matrix 92
5.2 The summary of significant difference between
demographic of floating facility and potential
hazards by using Anova One Way and T-Test 94
5.3 Comparative summary of Turret Moored
and Spread Moored F(P)SO Systems
(Howel et al. 2006) 98
5.4 The summary for relationship of potential hazards
Towards safety impact by using Pearson Correlation 99
5.5 Priority of action for the level of hazard
according to risk matrix 104
5.6 The ranking of 4 potential hazards towards safety
impact 105
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LIST OF FIGURES
1.0 Deepwater development system (wikipedia) 2
1.1 FPSO Kikeh anchoring picture 5
1.2 FPSO compartmentalizing of the ship 6
2.0 The hazard from hydrocarbon release 22
2.1 The hazard from ship collision 29
2.2 Ranking of Risk Influencing Factor (RIF) group
combination (expert judgement) by
Vinnem et al. (2003) 31
2.3 FPSO offloading incidents per year for UK
Sector distributed on the defined categories
by Jenman et al. (2005) 34
2.4 The hazard from hull failure 37
2.5 Wave related incident in UK HSE Study by
Smith (2003) 43
2.6 The hazard from occupational accidents 46
2.7 All severities of injury in 2009/10
(UK HSE, 2010) 47
2.8 Fatality due to Helicopter Incident by Petronas
HSE Division (2012) 50
2.9 Pictures of common manual handling at
Offshore facility 51
2.10 Ergonomic Offshore Accident – UK HSE
Statistic 2011/2012 52
2.11 Crane and lifting operation incidents in year
2011 (Dobson, 2012) 54
2.12 Crane and lifting operation incidents in year
2012 (Dobson, 2012) 54
2.13 Other dropped objects in year 2011
(Dobson, 2012) 55
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2.14 Other dropped objects in year 2012
(Dobson, 2012) 56
2.15 The conceptual diagram of relationship between
Potential hazards towards safety impact at
Malaysian floating storage facility 59
2.16 A Theoretical Framework based on Risk
Assessment (ABS, 2000) 60
3.0 Depiction of floating storage facility in this study 64
3.1 Research Flowchart (Rasil, 2006) 65
xvii
LIST OF SYMBOL and ABBREVIATIONS
ABS - American Bureau of Shipping (classification society)
BV - Bureau Veritas (classification society)
BOP - Blowout Preventer
BS - British Standard
Bbls - Barrels
DNV - Det Norsk Veritas (classification society)
FVSB - FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd
FandG - Fire and Gas
FPSO - Floating Production Storage and Offloading
FSO - Floating Storage and Offloading
HSE - Health Safety and Environment
IG - Inert Gas
ISO - International Standard Organization
MARPOL - Marine Pollution
MISC - Malaysian International Shipping Corporation
MT - Metric Tonne
OGP - Oil and Gas Producer
OSV - Offshore Support Vessel
PMO - Peninsular Malaysian Operation
QRH - Quick Release Hook
SOLAS - Safety of Life at Sea
SWL - Safe Working Load
SPSS - Statistical Product and Services Solutions
xviii
LIST OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX TITLE PAGE
A Facility information 116
B Weather forecast for Abu Cluster Field,
Terengganu, Malaysia 121
C FVSB HSE Management System List 123
D The questionnaire for this study 124
E SPSS sheets 131
F Vitae 173
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Offshore floating storage facility presents a unique combination of equipment and
conditions not observed in any other industry. Although there are few aspects of the
industry which are completely new, the application in an offshore environment can
result in new potential hazards which must be identified and controlled.
Much of the oil and gas processing equipment which utilized on offshore facilities is
similar to the equipment used onshore for oil production activities or in chemical
process plants. Therefore, many of the hazards associated with the process equipment
are well known. However, the inherent space constraints on offshore structures have
resulted in the application of some new process equipment and more importantly,
making it difficult to mitigate hazards which separate the equipment, personnel and
hazardous materials. Due to the facilities are located at remote locations, personnel
who operate or service at offshore facilities typically live and work at offshore for
extended periods of time. In many ways, these aspects of offshore operations are
similar to those found in shipping industry. However, the operations that take place on
offshore oil and gas production are different than those which take place on trading
ships.
Another difference between offshore and onshore oil and gas production is the relative
complexity of drilling and construction activities, which contributes significantly to
the risk. Due to the remoteness of most offshore facilities and the challenges presented
by marine environment, drilling and construction projects are typically major
undertakings which require the use of large and expensive marine vessel (drill ship,
derrick barges, supply vessel, diver-support vessels, etc.). These non-routine
operations dramatically increase the number of persons onboard a facility and the level
marine activity, material handling and other support activities over more routine
production activities.
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Figure 1.0: Deepwater development system (Wikipedia)
As shown by Figure 1.0, the offshore facilities can be divided into several types along
with their respective functions:
i. Fixed Platform (FP) consists of a jacket (a tall vertical section made of
tubular steel members supported by piles driven into the seabed) with a
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deck placed on top, providing space for crew quarters, a drilling rig, and
production facilities. The fixed platform is economically feasible for
installation in water depths up to 1,500 feet.
ii. Compliant Tower (CT) consists of a narrow, flexible tower and a piled
foundation that can support a conventional deck for drilling and production
operations. Unlike the fixed platform, the compliant tower withstands large
lateral forces by sustaining significant lateral deflections, and is usually
used in water depths between 1,000 and 2,000 feet.
iii. Tension Leg Platform (TLP) consists of a floating structure held in place
by vertical, tensioned tendons connected to the sea floor by pile-secured
templates. Tensioned tendons provide for the use of a TLP in a broad water
depth range with limited vertical motion. The larger TLP's have been
successfully deployed in water depths approaching 4,000 feet.
iv. Mini-Tension Leg Platform (Mini-TLP) is a floating mini-tension leg
platform of relatively low cost developed for production of smaller
deepwater reserves which would be uneconomic to produce using more
conventional deepwater production systems. It can also be used as a utility,
satellite, or early production platform for larger deepwater discoveries. The
world's first Mini-TLP was installed in the Gulf of Mexico in 1998.
v. SPAR Platform (SPAR) consists of a large diameter single vertical
cylinder supporting a deck. It has a typical fixed platform topside (surface
deck with drilling and production equipment), three types of risers
(production, drilling, and export), and a hull which is moored using a taut
caternary system of six to twenty lines anchored into the seafloor. SPAR's
are presently used in water depths up to 3,000 feet, although existing
technology can extend its use to water depths as great as 7,500 feet.
vi. Floating Production System (FPS) consists of a semi-submersible unit
which is equipped with drilling and production equipment. It is anchored
in place with wire rope and chain, or can be dynamically positioned using
rotating thrusters. Production from subsea wells is transported to the
surface deck through production risers designed to accommodate platform
motion. The FPS can be used in a range of water depths from 600 to 7,500
feet.
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vii. Subsea System (SS) ranges from single subsea wells producing to a nearby
platform, FPS, or TLP to multiple wells producing through a manifold and
pipeline system to a distant production facility. These systems are presently
used in water depths greater than 5,000 feet.
viii. Floating Production, Storage & Offloading System (FPSO) consists of
a large tanker type vessel moored to the seafloor. An FPSO is designed to
process and stow production from nearby subsea wells and to periodically
offload the stored oil to a smaller shuttle tanker. The shuttle tanker then
transports the oil to an onshore facility for further processing. An FPSO
may be suited for marginally economic fields located in remote deepwater
areas where a pipeline infrastructure does not exist.
1.2 Floating Storage Facility
Floating storage facility nowadays are becoming the preferred solution for new
installation of oil and gas fields as oil industry seeks better economic solutions to its
new challenges. The facility is suited for both small marginal fields and large deep-
water reserves (Wilne, 1998). The floating storage facility is the most commonly used
as the floating facility due to cost reasons and practical advantages if compared to
fixed installation. With the straight forward of building and conversion, based on the
ship building technology, the expensive offshore works can be kept to minimum as
most of the construction, hook-up and commissioning can be completed inshore with
significantly less cost (Alford, 1997). The floating facility has the ability to handle
changes of oil reservoir and process as well as offering storage and offloading
facilities. With this significant and comprehensiveness of the system, it will easily
contribute the potential hazard or risk that is difficult to quantify due to short of
experience if compared to shipping industry.
5
Figure1.1: FPSO Kikeh anchoring picture
For the construction of floating facility, two options can be considered. First option is
the conversion of an existing vessel. With the condition of the vessel and accepted by
the Classification Society, the selected tanker is converted to become floating storage
and offloading facility. Such equipment is installed to suite for the facility to receive
oil and gas from designated oil well via subsea pipeline. Figure 1.0 shows one of the
examples, FPSO Kikeh which was converted from existing sailing vessel to floating
storage and offloading facility. Another option for oil storage is by building a new
purposely built floating facility. The concept of this huge oil storage is rather similar
with the converted vessel. Both facilities are expected to remain on the designated
location for up to 20 years with all the environmental conditions taken into
consideration. Some of the facilities are designed to suite the process of keeping the
hydrocarbon which is located on top of the vessel. The floating facilities are designed
to avoid any dry docking as compared to the practice of conventional sailing vessel.
This poses new challenges as on-site repairing can become very difficult and
equipment failure may have adverse consequences for vessel safety (Wilne, 1998).
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Figure 1.2 : FPSO compartmentalizing of the ship (Gilbert and Ward, 2001).
It is important to know the basic arrangement of the facility to understand further on
the operations that currently occur before studying the potential hazards surrounding
the area. The facility is divided to several compartment and equipment such as process,
storage, mooring system, utilities and offloading equipment. Figure 1.1 shows the
example of FPSO compartmentalizing of the ship, according to Gilbert and Ward
(2001). The basic arrangements of facility can be divided to the following areas:
i. Process Area
The process plant is usually placed on the frame structure elevated at a height of about
3.5 meters above the main deck. Equipment modules most sensitive to motions are
likely to be placed towards midships. The modules are assembled in such a way to
allow easy implementation and also fulfill the production requirements of the field.
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ii. Tank arrangement
Several tanks are dedicated to store the processing crude depending upon the ship
design capacity. Each tank is equipped with heating coil system to heat up the crude
to maintain the viscosity of storage crude.
iii. Mooring system
The vessel is permanently moored in position to its field. Majority of the vessel in
Malaysian waters are using External Bow Turret System with Single Point Mooring.
This type of mooring is connected to the seabed by mooring lines which is attached to
anchor piles or drag anchors. This design will tolerate the vessel to rotate 3600
depending upon the sea current condition. And some of the vessels are also installed
with Spread Mooring System to fix the position permanently. Each of the system is
designed to withstand up to 100 years environmental condition.
iv. Shuttle tanker mooring system
The shuttle tanker is moored to floating vessel by tandem mooring system during
offloading. The facility is able to moor above 150,000 DWT shuttle tanker with offtake
parcel more than 100,000 bbls. The main components of this system are hawser and
Quick Release Hook (QRH). QRH which commonly located at centre line of aft upper
deck is provided with hydraulic operating system to ensure hawser is released under
maximum load condition under monitoring system. The QRH is remotely controlled
from CCR as well as local control.
v. Custody metering system
A custody metering skid installed on an elevated platform on upper deck for metering
during offloading activity. The height of the metering skid is to comply with the
statutory requirement. The custody metering skid is designed for a nominal offload
capacity up to 20,000 bbls/hr.
vi. Inert gas (IG) and tank venting system
The existing system is normally retained and is modified in accordance to SOLAS
74/2000 requirement and national regulations. The flue gas from exhaust boiler is
directed through IG cooling system before entering cargo tanks.
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vii. Cargo system
The cargo system comprises of crude oil and fuel gas from turret swivel system to
production process and subsequently distributed to storage tanks. The offloading is
carried out at the stern of the facility via floating flexible hose, which is monitored by
a metering skid. This line is equipped with a double closure marine break away
coupling to minimize accidental oil spills. Additionally, it protects oil transfer system
from tensile overloading when export tanker drifting away. This also prevents any
surge pressure in case of incorrect valve control at export tanker.
viii. Power generation and distribution
Main power supply on the facility is generated by either gas turbine or steam turbine
generators, depending upon the design capacity. The generators are suitable for
parallel operation which allows load sharing of different diver and rating. Emergency
diesel generator is installed to be initiated automatically, soon after a blackout.
ix. Escape and evacuation system
The muster areas are designated at strategic places with adequate exit signage for the
personnel evacuation during emergency. The escape routes are provided with proper
illumination and signage on every level leading to the muster areas.
x. Active fire protection system
The purpose of active fire protection systems onboard floating facilities are to:
Control fires and limit escalation.
Reduce the effects of a fire to allow personnel to undertake emergency response
activities or to escape and evacuate if necessary.
Extinguish the fire where it is considered safe to do so.
Limit the damage to structure and equipment.
The normal active fire protection systems provided onboard floating facilities are as
follows:
Fire deluge and water curtain system
Engine room fire extinguisher system
Main deck foam system
Helideck fire protection system
9
Galley fire extinguisher system
xi. Passive fire protection system
For normal operation and design, the floating facilities are equipped with passive fire
protection to control and mitigate the hazard. The passive fire protection systems
provided onboard floating facilities are as follow:
A60 fire insulation wall at control room, fire control station and accommodation.
A0 fire insulation wall at deck plate and deck head.
xii. Fire and Gas detection
The Fire and Gas (F&G) system is designed and installed to provide detection of fire
or a leak of flammable vapour onboard the floating storage facility, in a rapid and
reliable way.
The F&G system function as below:
Provide early and reliable detection of the presence of fire or flammable vapours.
Alert the personnel.
Initiate protective action.
The Fire and Gas system will receive input signals from end devices such as flame
detectors, heat detectors, smoke detectors, gas detectors and manual fire alarm call
points. These will protect personnel and equipment by providing automatic equipment
shutdown and activation of fire suppression equipment.
xiii. Lifesaving appliances
Lifesaving equipment for personnel evacuation and rescue are distributed strategically
around the floating facility. Lifesaving appliances are designed in compliance with
SOLAS requirements and Flag Administration.
The totally enclosed self-propelled survival crafts lifeboats, with 100% capacity for
persons onboard are installed in suitable type davits at ideal location on port and
starboard side of boat deck.
In addition, the other lifesaving system, the life rafts are installed and located at port
side, starboard side and main deck with 100% capacity for persons onboard if lifeboats
are failing to engage. The life buoys with flame proof illumination are located at the
various and strategic place for man overboard.
10
xiv. Manpower philosophy and responsibility
Each facility has different numbers of manpower depending upon the respective duties
and responsibilities. This mainly consists of the regular crew for operation and
maintenance, as well as contractor for various activities onboard.
As described by Offshore Journal (2000), there are several advantages and
disadvantages for the floating storage to be operated at offshore location.
Advantages:
Cheaper than deepwater pipelines.
Development will take place earlier.
Render some fields commercial that are not developable due to infrastructure
access or other transport limitations.
Balance competition for smaller producers with larger producers.
Able to store tons of fluid.
Generally insensitive to depth, so can work in deepwater.
Contractors can lease the vessel.
Is gradually becoming a commodity as mobile service offshore.
Pipeline contractors still competitive because increased number of fields
made commercial in deepwater and ultra-deepwater by the FPSO option.
Vessel can connect to pipeline almost anywhere.
Disadvantages:
Takes 1-2 years to convert or build.
Companies compete with own pipeline infra-structure.
Companies must conduct timely and costly environmental study for a
specific field once accepted.
11
Table 1.0: Number and cost of worldwide floaters orders, 2000-2011.
Source: RigLogix, 2011.
Table 1.0 above shows the number and cost of worldwide floaters order in 2000 to
2011. There were three orders in 2001 and two orders in 2002. As orders increased in
the middle part of the decade, price rose. Following the 2008 recession, order declined
markedly but prices only declined marginally (Mark and Brian, 2012). In 2011, the
demand of the floaters starts to increase back together with the price with an average
600 to 700 million dollars for 27 units ordered.
In business operation perspective, when external cost tends to increase top
management strives to decrease internal operational expenses, in whichever potential
areas within their circle of influence. Hence, potential hazard could impact hugely into
unexpected expense, if disaster happens. Furthermore, this subject matter is within
their control. As such, it must be mitigated and controlled by identifying existing
potential hazards. This prevention measure can be initiated through an identification
process of audit and assessment, on board of the facility by a committee of relevant
staff members.
12
1.3 Potential hazard onboard facility
Hazard identification is a formal activity to examine all aspects of the operation under
consideration using a pro-forma approach. It depends on the quality of the input data
available and is typically performed as a table-top exercise lead by an experienced
facilitator and the participation by representatives covering the full range of design
and operational expertise for the system under consideration (Spires, 2001). As
pointed out by Spires (2001), the hazard identification has considered a total of 11
different hazard categories that exists during the production phase of development.
The hazards considered were categorized as listed below:
i. Blowout
ii. Riser and pipeline leaks
iii. Process leak
iv. Non-process fire and explosions
v. Cargo storage events
vi. Marine accidents on the FPSO
vii. Offloading accidents
viii. Tanker transportation
ix. Non-process spill
x. Ship collision
xi. Transportation (supply vessel and helicopters)
Biasotto and Rouhan (2004) explain that each identified hazard is analyzed in terms
of its functional failure, failure mode, consequences (including the possible different
scenarios), existing barriers, control methods and repair strategies. The identified
hazards are qualitatively classified on the basis of the like-hood and the related
consequences regarding risks to personnel, to environment and to asset and production
(Biasotto and Rouhan, 2004).
The major hazard to the offshore oil and gas facility is not much different from others
as described in lesson learn of the offshore accidents. They are clearly categorized as:
loss of well control or blowout, fire from the process plant, explosion from the process
plant, H2S and naturally occurring radioactive materials from reservoir, extreme
weather, ship collision, seismic events and helicopter or other aircraft impact
(Galbraith and Terry, 2008). For the past few years, the major accidents happen
13
involving multiples fatalities, equipment damage and environment impact that require
high cost to overcome the situation. Khan et al. (2004) also point out that the main
hazards on offshore installation are the processed fluids and processing operations, the
sea environment and the process links between the reservoir and other installations.
The lesson-learnt is part of the process to identify the hazards and mitigate them to as
minimum as possible. These unfortunate events have happened to ‘Alexander L
Kjelland – structure failure during adverse weather condition’, ‘Ocean Ranger –
capsized due to ballasting’, ‘Piper Alpha – hydrocarbon release’ and ‘Helicopter Super
Puma crash at Cormorant’, as described in “The Offshore Industry – Learning from
Accidents” by Galbraith and Terry (2008).
Khan et al. (2004) also mentioned that the main hazards on offshore installations are
the process fluids and processing operations, the sea environment and the process links
between the reservoir and other installations. Vinnem (2000) described, there are some
differences with respect to how the risk contributions are categorized, but there are
nevertheless some clear observations that could be made:
Hydrocarbon associated risk (process, turret and riser) is the highest
contribution for all FPSOs considered.
Collision risk represents a significant contribution for two of the FPSOs (all
potential collision scenarios are included but shuttle tanker impact is the
dominating contribution).
Occupational accidents and accidents during helicopter transport were only
included for one of the cases.
The statistics from offshore overseas facility and offshore Malaysian facility are also
taken to show the total number of incident and accident for the past few years of
operation. This is for reference and guidance as such actual incident will give direct
impact to personnel, assets and environment. The experienced-based data from
offshore UKCS and Petronas Carigali Health Safety and Environment have been
collected and compiled for reference.
14
The statistic of occurrences for floating production storage and offloading facility for
year 1990 – 2007 is shown in table 1.1 based on the HSE UK (Oil and Gas UK 2009).
It shows the total number of 685 occurrences happening during 17 years of floating
storage facilities which are operated in UK.
Table 1.1: The statistic of occurrences for floating, production, storage and offloading facility for year 1990 – 2007(Oil and Gas UK 2009).
The highest occurrence shows the total numbers of 404 from oil spill and hydrocarbon
release. This occurrence represents the severe impact to the environment. The second
highest is falling object with 96 occurrences, followed by crane accident and fire at
the facility. The falling object, crane accident and fire can be representing the impact
to personnel and facility asset. The number of ‘0’ shows that there is no occurrence
happens to the facility but it might be happening if the awareness of the hazard is not
seriously taken into consideration.
Table 1.2 shows the statistic of Incident Investigation Report (IIR) from 1/1/2003 to
31/3/2011 that has been reported by PMO Petronas Carigali Health Safety and
Environment (HSE) Department. The reports were taken from 7 locations in
Peninsular Malaysia; i.e, Abu cluster, Anding, Penara Lukut, FPSO Perintis, Puteri,
Sotong and Malong. Based on the statistics, 66 IIRs were reported from these
locations, as shown in the table.
15 0 0 0 17 71 296
69 0 0 1 2 1 1 1
404
6 0 3 270
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Anchor failure
Blowout
Capsize
Collision
Contact
Crane
Explosion
Falling object
Fire
Foundering
Grounding
Helicopter
Leakage
List
Machinery
Off position
Spill/release
Structural
Towing/towline
Well problem
Others
Occurrences
15
Table 1.2: The statistic of Incident Investigation Report (IIR) from year 2003 to year 2011 by PMO Petronas Carigali (HSE Online 2011).
As for the safety impact of operation in Malaysia, only one fatality, 10 equipment
damages and 1 oil spill recorded with highest 18 near misses had happened for over 8
years of statistics (HSE Petronas Carigali, 2011).
1.4 Problem statement
The floating storage facility was primary installed for storing and offloading
petroleum crude oil related activity. Nowadays, with the modern technology, the
facility becomes offshore producing installation; hence, storage facility and offloading
terminal are all merged into one integrated infrastructure. The facility allows oil
companies to produce oil in more remotes areas and in deeper water. As such, floating
storage facility would have been making it economically possible, in comparison to
other technology. The facility allows storage of crude oil and offloading of tankers in
the field rather than requiring a pipeline to transport oil to offshore terminal facility.
However, the provision of storage and offloading has introduced respective potential
hazards. Hence, this challenge requires wisdom and experience to manage the
associated risks.
1
810
1 2 1
7
1
9
2
18
1 3 202468
101214161820
Business interruption
Effluen
t discharge
quality
Equipmen
t dam
age
Fatality
Fire non process
Fire process
First aid
Hazard
Hydrocarbon release
Med
ical treatmen
t
Near miss
Oil spill (crude oil)
Public/security/others
Rectricted work days
Incident Investigation Report (IIR)
16
The floating storage facility in Malaysia nowadays also has typical similar problems
on the potential hazards being handled, in comparison to other storage facility around
the globe. Some of the hazards are being studied and have been taken into
consideration during facility’s design stage. But the projection of the level of hazards
is not known until the facility is fully in operation at the oil field. The level of hazards
during design stage is applied as a guideline, in order to establish some safety
procedure in preventing incident and accident case at the facility. With these guideline
and procedure, the management of each facility will impose several safety campaigns
for enhancing the awareness level. This may prevent death to personnel, damage to
property and oil pollution to the environment. Despite the continuous effort being
taken by the management, the problem still arises where we can see that the incident
and accident still happen nowadays. The actual level of hazards needs to be studied
further. The relationship towards the safety impact also needs to be highlighted so that
the implication to personnel, asset and environment can be determined further.
A more detailed analyses of past accidents and events have been performed based on
the database (World Offshore Accident Dataset) of DNV. This is one of the most
reliable and most complete databases of failure, incidents and accidents in the offshore
oil and gas sector (Christou and Konstantinidou, 2012).
Table 1.3 provides the number of accidental events for the different types of unit by
Christou and Konstantinidou (2012). The information given included all types of
offshore facilities from the European area. Within the WOAD database, the records
are classified in 4 categories:
- Insignificant events
- Near-misses
- Incidents/Hazardous situations
- Accidents
17
Table 1.3: Number of accidental events for different Types of Unit
Type of Unit Accidents Incidents/Hazardous situation
Near miss Insignificant
Barge (not drilling)
41 20 2 0
Concrete structure
81 419 74 136
Drill barge 65 22 0 2 Drill ship 91 65 3 4 Drilling tender 10 4 0 1 Flare 1 0 0 1 FPSO/FSU 10 68 8 23 Helicopter-Offshore duty
238 17 13 3
Jacket 716 889 127 252 Jackup 552 210 13 33 Loading buoy 13 19 2 5 Mobile unit (not drill)
18 3 0 0
Unkn.fixed struct/others
3 3 0 1
Pipeline 139 111 1 4 Semi-submersible
227 626 147 119
Ship, not drilling or production
6 27 1 8
Submersible 19 5 0 1 Subsea install/complete
4 6 0 2
Tension leg platform
13 132 22 29
Well support structure
122 36 2 2
Insignificant events represent hazardous situation, with very minor consequences. In
most of the cases, no damage was registered and repairs were not required. Small spills
of crude oil and chemicals are also included in this category. The database also
includes very minor personnel injuries, such as “lost time incidents”.
Near-misses represent events that might have or could have developed into an
accidental situation. No damage and no repair was required also in these cases.
Incidents represent hazardous situation which have not developed into an accidental
situation. Low degree of damage was recorded but repair/replacements usually were
required. This type includes also events causing minor injuries to personnel or health
injuries.
Accidents represent hazardous situation which have developed into an accidental
situation. In addition, for all situation/events causing fatalities and severe injuries this
type of event has been used.
18
1.5 Research questions
Research questions are the process of gathering data, synthesizing information to
develop an understanding of overall study, and seeking answers which consist of the
following elements:
a. What is the level of hydrocarbon release, ship collision, hull failure and
occupational accidents at the floating storage facility?
b. What are the significant differences between the elements of demographic
facility towards the element of potential hazards?
c. Is there any relationship between potential hazards and the safety impact of the
facility?
1.6 Research aim
This study describes the potential hazards, mainly from marine activities, that should
be considered at the floating storage facility operating in Malaysia. This contributes to
better understanding on the level of potential hazard onboard the floating storage
facility and also the impact from the potential hazard to the personnel, asset and
environment. The findings from the collected experience-based and research survey
data will eventually facilitate the development of rationalized approaches for the top
management in decision-making for the safety guideline, policy making and
investment towards the floating storage facility.
1.7 Research objective
In associating with hazard or risk that contributed to the facility, the main aim of this
research is to focus on the following objectives:
a. To measure the level of potential hazard that consists of several key safety
elements such as, hydrocarbon release, ship collision, hull failure and
occupational accidents at floating storage facility.
b. To analyze the significant differences between the element of demographic
floating facility towards element of potential hazard.
c. To investigate the relationship between potential hazard towards the safety
impact of the facility.
19
1.8 Scope of the research
The conceptual diagram is serving as a guide for further evaluation of the relationship
between potential hazards and safety impact. This study focuses on the floating storage
that currently operates at Malaysian waters. This research also measures the level of
significant differences between the elements of demographic floating facility. Each of
the floating storage facilities are operated by different field owners, hence this could
depict their delivery capability, reliability and integrity towards the safety aspect on
the facilities. Table 1.0 shows the selected facilities that currently operate in Malaysia
for this study.
Table1.4: List of facilities in this study
Name of facilities Field Owner
1. FSO Angsi Talisman Energy
2. FSO Cendor Petrofac Malaysia Ltd
3. FSO Abu Petronas Carigali
4. FPSO Kikeh Murphy Oil Ltd
1.9 Summary
In general, the floating storage facility is the combination of offshore traditional
process technology and marine technology. Thus, it is quite dependable on overall
operational safety control. It is essential that scenarios involving potential hazards are
assessed at an early stage in the design of new facilities, in order to optimize technical
and operational solutions. This study is conducted to establish the research survey data
of potential hazards for floating storage facility. In addition, research assessment is
engaged on hazards’ level, significant differences from demographic facility towards
potential hazards and the relationship between potential hazards towards safety
impact. This is based on the actual data of each facility operated at the field for the
past few years. In chapter 2, the literature review elaborates on the potential hazards
being involved at the floating storage facility. The hazards include the hydrocarbon
release, ship collision, hull failure and occupational accidents.
20
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
The floating storage structure has been used widely and reliably throughout the oil
industry for many years. The floating storage facility was primarily installed as for
storage and offloading activity. Nowadays, with the modern technology, the facility
becomes offshore producing installation, storage facility and offloading terminal all
rolled into one single unit. Moan et al. (2002) describe that the floating storage and
production unit is a vessel that receives oil and gas from subsea wells through flow
lines known as risers. The vessels can be a purpose-built ship or semi-submersible, or
a converted shipping line tanker. This facility is commonly known as floating,
production, storage and offloading (FPSO). The vessel without production system is
termed as floating, storage and offloading (FSO).
Moan et al. (2002) explain that the vessel should perform five functions:
Process oil and gas through the production processing facilities;
Receive oil and gas through the riser system;
Discharge oil, gas and water through the riser and/or offloading system;
Store oil onboard the vessel, using tanks, piping and inert gas system;
Remain on position by means of a mooring system or station-keeping system.
Vinnem (2000) explains from the operational safety perspective of FPSOs: initial
summary report; although the facilities are becoming more common, operational
safety performance may still be considered somewhat unproven, especially when
compared to fixed installations. Furthermore, floating installations are more dependent
21
on continued operation of some of the marine control systems, during a critical
situation. There is accordingly a need to understand the aspects of operational safety
for the facilities, in order to enable a proactive approach to safety, particularly in the
following areas:
Turret operations and flexible risers
Simultaneous marine and production activities
Vessel movement/weather exposure
Production, ballasting and offloading
The floating storage and offloading facility has the ability to handle changes of oil
reservoir and process, as well as offering storage and offloading of the treated crude
to other export tankers. With this significant and comprehensiveness of the system, it
will easily contribute to the potential hazard or risk which is difficult to quantify due
to FPSO’s limited experience if compared to long time spanning of shipping industry.
The hazard is defined as a situation with a potential source of harm that are causing
human injury, damage to the environment, damage to property or any combination of
such event (BS EN ISO 17776:2002). It may be a physical situation (e.g. a shuttle
tanker is a hazard because it may collide with the production installation), an activity
(e.g. crane operations are a hazard because the load might drop) or a material (e.g. fuel
oil is a hazard because it might catch fire). The essence of a hazard is that it has a
potential for causing harm, regardless of how likely or unlikely such occurrence might
be.
22
2.2 Potential hazard at the floating storage facility
2.2.1 Hydrocarbon release
Figure 2.0: The hazard from hydrocarbon release
Hydrocarbon release is one of the potential hazards that can cause fire and explosion
to the facility. These events have the potential to cause catastrophic loss of facility and
multiple fatalities. Figure 2.0 shows the hazard from hydrocarbon release such as
pipeline failure or burst, flexible riser failure, tank venting and loss of well control or
blowout. The activities involve receiving produced oil from the process facilities,
distributing it to the storage tanks under controlled conditions and discharging the final
product to the off-take tanker. The process facilities may be above the deck of the
storage vessel as they would be on an FPSO, or they may be a remote platform as they
would be for an FSO. In this case, it is assumed that the process facility delivers
‘treated crude oil’ to the storage facility as most of the base sediment and water have
been removed consistently with normal specifications for crude oil transportation.
Although crude handling of the facility is similar in many aspects to crude oil handling
tanker, the facility is continuously loading the product whilst carrying out the other
operations as well. Concurrent operations and the sequence of these operations can
Pipeline failure/burst
Flexible riser failure
Tank venting
Loss of well control (blowout)
23
differ greatly from conventional tankers and result in the greatest risks to be managed
through procedures and system design.
As described by Vinnem (2000) that there are some differences with respect to how
the contributions of hazards are categorized. But, there are nevertheless some clear
observations that the hydrocarbon associated risk from process, turret and riser are the
highest contribution for all floating storage facility considered. Khan et al. (2004) also
mentioned that the source of major hazard in offshore processing are the inventories
of flammable materials in the risers, associated pipelines of the reservoir, slug
catchers, separators, heat exchanger and high speed rotating equipment such as
turbines, compressors, export pumps and reinjection pumps. Therefore, these items
should be the main targets for inherently safer approaches. Hydrocarbon release, in
this context, is defined as gas or oil leaks (including condensation) from process flow,
well flow or flexible risers with a release rate greater than 0.1 kg/s (Aven et al., 2006)
The most significant disaster due to hydrocarbon release is offshore production
platform, called Piper Alpha on July 1988. It is believed that the leak came from pipe
work connected to a condensation pump. A safety valve had been removed from this
pipe work for overhaul and maintenance. The pump itself was undergoing
maintenance work. When the pipe work from which the safety valve had been
removed was pressurized at start – up following a shift change, the first leak occurred.
The leaks continued until the massive leakage of condensate gas ignited, causing an
explosion which led to large oil fires. The heat ruptured the riser of a gas pipeline
produced further massive explosion and fireball that engulfed Piper Alpha. Ultimately,
167 people died, including the 2 man crew of a fast rescue boat dispatched from a
standby vessel. All these chains of events took just 22 minutes with 62 people survived
(Galbraith and Terry, 2008).
2.2.1.1 Pipeline failure/burst
The pipeline failure or burst can cause massive hydrocarbon release to atmosphere. If
this situation cannot be controlled, there will be a fire and explosion to the facility
which causes major disaster. For offshore pipelines, the cleanup can be extremely
difficult and the consequences to the environment might be severe. The main cause of
24
pipeline ruptures and leaks are corrosion (both internal and external), construction
damage, welding failure, incorrect operation and third party damage, such as ship
anchors and bottom trawls (Rygg, 2002).
The Piper Alpha catastrophe in 1988 revealed the potential of operational failures with
respect to dramatically destroying an entire offshore installation. When a severe
hydrocarbon leak occurred due to operational oversights, other safety barriers
collapsed mainly due to lack of prudent safety culture (Vinnem, 2006). In most FPSO
Safety Cases, the areas identified to be potentially highest risk are the engine room,
process plant and the turret. For the turret and process area, the Safety Case is generally
based on the likelihood and consequences of a process facilities explosion. It is
assumed that a release of gas or process fluids in the process areas would, if ignited,
lead to a jet fire. Other explosion scenarios are also considered (Wall et al., 2001)
Wall et al. (2001) also describe that the consequences of turret explosion could
typically be:
Structural damage or plastic deformation of the turret. Missile generation is
not considered credible. No potential for escalation to the gas injection
manifold.
Fatality to all individuals involved in the initial blast.
Serious injury confined to turret and immediate surrounding area. High
number of serious casualties.
Local escape and evacuation routes are potentially destroyed or damaged.
Process area inventories are potentially vulnerable to escalation but not
envisaged.
For the disconnect-able turret designs the connection and disconnection is an
important part of the turret safety case.
2.2.1.2 Flexible riser failure
There are two types of configuration system when referring to FSO or FPSO. Spread-
Moored System and Turret Moored System are quite common, in use for the floating
storage facility around the globe. Turret Moored System may be fixed internally to the
hull or mounted on an extension of the hull. The mooring lines are spread radially
from the turret and anchored to the sea bed via drag embedment anchors. The turret
108
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