1

The relationship between political trust, generalized trust

and European identity among adolescents

(Work in progress)

Marc Hooghe, Soetkin Verhaegen, Ellen Quintelier

Centre for Citizenship and Democracy

KU Leuven, Belgium

Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference

Bordeaux 4-7 July 2013

2

Abstract

Identification with the political community and trust within this community are the basis of an

as legitimate perceived political system. Therefore, the EU explicitly recognized the

importance of the citizens of the EU member states by granting them the official status of

‘European citizens’ since the Maastricht Treaty (1992). While this is a formal construct, it

also implied the formalization of a feeling of community among Europeans. In the current

study, we aim to explore what young EU citizens identify with when they identify as EU

citizens. Do they identify with the EU community as a community built on political

institutions, or with a community built on citizens? We test this by investigating the

relationship between political trust and generalized trust with European identity. A multilevel

analysis, on the data of the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2009 among

adolescents in 21 EU member states, shows a stronger relationship between political trust and

European identity than between generalized trust and European identity. This indicates that

citizens rather relate to the political community of institutions than to a European citizenry.

This finding supports the perennial criticism against the European integration project that it is

an elite-based project. Additionally, further analysis on Belgian panel data shows that it is

more likely that European identity leads to political trust than the reverse pattern is likely to

occur.

3

Introduction

A well-functioning democratic system needs to be legitimate. A feeling of political

community is the basis of an as legitimate perceived political system that organizes the

political community because “ legitimacy is derived by the perception of the political process

as originating ‘from the people’ and serving ‘for the people’” (Harteveld, Meer, & Vries,

2013, p. 2). Therefore, the EU explicitly recognized the importance of the citizens of the EU

member states by granting them the official status of ‘European citizens’ since the Maastricht

Treaty. While European citizenship was established as a formal construct – granting people

rights and imposing duties – it also implied the formalization of a feeling of community

among Europeans. This feeling of belonging is referred to as European identity, which has

been a booming field of research since the start of the 21st century (Risse, 2010). This

development caused a so called ‘soft turn’ in European studies moving away from attitudes

and economic explanations for integration towards the more affective trait of identification.

Two main lines of empirical research can be distinguished in the study of European identity.

First, there is a group of studies that tries to find the main sources that drive the development

of a (stronger) European identity. The effect has been studied of cognitive skills, transnational

mobility, media, personal characteristics and even attitudes towards the member state one

belongs to (Duchesne & Frognier, 2008; Faas, 2007; Fligstein, 2008; Sigalas, 2010). Second,

and more recently, the call is made to first find out more thoroughly what this European

identity actually means to citizens and how it can be measured in all its aspects (Bruter,

2008). Importantly, multiple-item measurements for European identity are proposed and a

distinction is made between regarding being a European citizen as a cultural or as a civic band

among Europeans. In the current study, we want to add a third focus to the research of

European identity by trying to find out more about the conception of the political community

citizens identify with: do they identify with the EU community as based on the political

institutions or based on citizens? From previous insights about political trust, generalized trust

and the link between trust and European identity, we learned that when people hold a sense of

community, they trust this community. But do they trust the political institutions or do they

rather trust their fellow citizens? To answer this question, we aim to get more insight into the

significance of political and generalized trust as explanatory variables for the formation of

European identity.

4

We argue that a relationship between European identity and political trust in the EU would

reflect that the elite-led cooperation within the EU project still marks what people relate to

when they identify as European citizens. This would support the perennial criticism against

the European integration project that it is an elite-based project (Loveless & Rohrschneider,

2011). This would imply that when citizens identify as EU citizens, they relate these feelings

first to the political institutions, exemplified by feelings of political trust. This is what we call

the top-down construction of European identity. This would mean that the political elite first

created EU institutions and then ‘created’ citizens (Shore, 2000). To the contrary, it could also

be that over time this elite-led cooperation and accordingly identification has spilled over into

mutual trust between citizens (Klingemann & Weldon, 2013). This would mean that European

identity is rather linked with feelings towards the community of European citizens such as

generalized trust towards others. This follows the bottom up perspective.

We will test this relationship by using both political trust in EU institutions and generalized

trust to explain levels of European identity. By setting out both types of trust against each

other, we get an indication whether European identity rather means identification with the

political institutions (political trust) or with the community of European citizens (generalized

trust). Especially as we witness decreased levels of political trust during the current recession,

it is important to be aware of the impact this might have on ways people relate to the EU. If

political trust and European identity are related, we should be concerned about the impact

these lower levels of trust might have people’s identification with the EU (Inglehart, 1970). In

a similar way, a decline in generalized trust might have severe complications for the European

identity if both are substantially linked: a decline in generalized trust might limit the chances

to speak of a true European Community (Howe, 2010).

In the following sections we will first present the current state of the art in studies about

political and generalized trust in the EU context and define what we mean when we talk about

European identity, political trust and generalized trust. Second, we describe the data gathered

to test the relationship between both types of trust and European identity. Third, multilevel

cross-lagged and structural equation analyses are carried out to test this relationship and

fourth, the implications for our perception of the European integration project as an elite-

based project will be discussed.

5

Political trust, generalized trust and its relationship with European identity

After a short summary of the way in which we view European identity, we present a review of

the (limited amount of) research so far on generalized trust and political trust, how it is

defined and most importantly its relationship with European identity.

European identity

In this study, we aim to explore what adolescents identify with when they have a European

identity. Therefore, we use a relatively broad and commonly used definition (and

measurement as will be shown in the following section) of European identity, as a feeling of

belonging to the EU community (Bruter, 2003; Citrin & Sides, 2004; Fligstein, 2008;

Herrmann & Brewer, 2004; Risse, 2010). European identity is seen as a social identity which

provides a stable linkage between the individual perception of the self and the social group to

which a person belongs (Brewer, 2001). It places the individual within the structure of a social

group and attaches meaning to this place in the group. We explicitly do not define what would

be the building blocks of this community, as this is the main interest of our research: is

European identity rather built on political institutions (reflected as a stronger relationship

between political trust and European identity), or on a community of citizens (reflected as a

stronger relationship between generalized trust and European identity)? Also, we follow the

theoretical claim that people combine different types of identity (Fligstein, Polyakova, &

Sandholtz, 2012; Risse, 2010; Sen, 2006). A European identity can, for instance, be combined

with a national identity, a gender identity, a religious identity… and all of these aspects

become more or less prevalent in different types of situations.

Political trust

Political trust is trust in “the core institutions of the state, including the legislature, executive,

and judicial branches of government” (Norris, 2011, p. 29). This means that this definition of

political trust does not reflect trust in specific office holders at a certain point in time. It

reflects trust in the institutions in general. Only a limited number of studies in the field of EU

has focused on political trust so far (Arnold, Sapir, & Zapryanova, 2012). These studies

inquired political trust in the EU, more specifically by studying the relationship between trust

in EU institutions and trust in national institutions. Anderson (1998), for instance, stated that

trust in national institutions could be used as a reason to trust representatives at the

international level. He argues that citizens base their assessment of the European Union on

their evaluation of national institutions and, in particular, on satisfaction or dissatisfaction

6

with national politics. In this argumentation, political trust is used as an instrument to value

the functioning of the European institutions. People who trust their national parliament and

government will also support them in European decision-making. However, the above cited

work of Anderson (1998) does not talk about identity, but about support. While this might

work for support for European integration, the question remains whether a rational evaluation

of political trust at the national level would mediate a relationship of a rather abstract feeling

of identification. Norris (2011) suggests this should be the case: “Diffuse support [which is

defined in such a way that it includes political trust] represents more lasting bonds to the

nation-state, as exemplified by feelings of national pride and identity, as well as by adherence

to core regime values and principles. Diffuse support is expected to be particularly important

for stability in fragile states emerging from deep-rooted internal conflict, as well as for

processes of regime transition, by strengthening popular acceptance of the legitimacy of new

constitutional arrangements and the authority of officeholders.” (Norris, 2011, p. 22). In this

way, she argues that political trust should be related to identity, especially among new

regimes such as the European Union. This leads to the first hypothesis that political trust is

positively related to European identity.

Generalized trust

A second stream of research explores the effect of generalized trust on European identity

(Delhey, 2007; Klingemann & Weldon, 2013). It has been argued that to develop a common

European identity, citizens should trust each other. As most people do not know many other

European citizens, generalized trust (towards undefined others) may be used as a prerequisite.

Scheuer and Schmitt even suggest a causal relationship by noting that: “Trust is a

fundamental condition for the development of a sense of community.” (Scheuer & Schmitt,

2009, p. 559). Similar claims have been made by Uslaner (2002), who argued that a certain

level of trust is a prerequisite for a community. Trusters believe in a common culture,

underlying shared values, value diversity and common understanding. People with more

generalized trust have the expectation that people in the community in which they operate

share their norms and values (Kaina, 2004). The feeling to belong to this community is

labeled as a shared group identity. This means that there is a strong connection between

generalized trust and European identity. In this literature, most of the time, researchers

explored the relationship between trust towards specific groups of Europeans (sometimes

referred to as generalized trust towards Europeans), but this should be defined as

7

particularized trust, not generalized trust as it refers to a specific – geographically defined –

group of citizens. Because the interest in our study is about the feeling of belonging to the

community of EU citizens as a whole, we study the relationship with generalized trust.

Research that links the traditional generalized trust question (Rosenberg, 1956) with European

identity, however, is much rarer. Scheuer and Schmitt (2009) concluded in their descriptive

study about trust in people from other member states – measured as dyadic trust among

member states – that the ‘core’ EU member states in the North-West are most trusted, people

in Southern member states follow closely and the newer Eastern member states are regarded

as least trustworthy. Klingemann and Weldon (2013) built on Scheuer and Schmitt’s study

and tried to explain the reason for differences in trust between citizens of different member

states in the long-term. They argue that while cultural and economic differences might be an

obstacle to mutual trust in the short-run, they “can learn to trust one another and build a sense

of community over time’ (Klingemann & Weldon, 2013, p. 457). Also, both studies share the

idea that generalized trust and European identity are related. We therefore formulate the

second hypothesis: generalized trust stimulates a sense of European identity, as generalized

trusters presume that most people they meet share their values.

The reciprocal relationship between trust and identity

In the previous section it is explained why a relationship is expected to exist between political

and generalized trust on the one hand and European identity on the other hand. In this section,

we address the reciprocal relationship between each type of trust and European identity.

As a third hypothesis we argue that generalized trust is more likely to lead to the formation of

a shared identity because identities are built through social interaction (Kaina, 2004). For a

common sense of community to come about, people need to interact - even in the most

abstract way- and this is more likely to happen among people that have a general feeling of

trust in the other. Generalized trust is in this argument seen as the basis of shared experiences

and interaction: “Since the growth of a shared sense of community requires a space of

common experiences, interpersonal relations based on trust create the opportunity structures

of such experiences.” (Kaina, 2004, p. 119). People with generalized trust presume that others

will share the same norms and values because they believe in a common culture, underlying

shared values, value diversity and common understanding (Uslaner, 2002).

8

For an abstract, large and foremost relatively new community as the European Union,

however, we have argued that political institutions probably play a role in the formation of a

European community and the associated European identity as well. As interaction with a

wider group of European citizens is less likely to occur, people can rely on the fact that they

are governed by political institutions which agree upon a set of shared norms and values they

believe in within the larger European society. Therefore, we expect that people that trust the

political institutions more will develop a stronger European identity. This proposed

mechanism follows a functional reasoning about trust, assuming that trust is built on

expectations (Kaina, 2004). These expectations help to reduce the complexity of social

interaction and are built on common values and norms. Accordingly, we argue that first a

relation of trust needs to be established with the political institutions we are familiar with that

guard a common set of values and norms and then we can use these expectations to start

identifying with the European community the political institutions engaged in. In a later

stadium European identity, as identifying with a political community, can also function as

some kind of a feedback loop, encouraging people to trust the political institutions that agreed

upon engaging in a common European community, because they are part of this community

(Harteveld et al., 2013). These processes can take place simultaneously. For example, political

trust is not expected to stop contributing to a common European identity at a certain point. A

reciprocal relationship is expected to develop after a certain amount of time when European

identity gets stronger. As a fourth hypothesis we therefore state that, in causal terms, the

relationship between political trust and European identity will be stronger than that European

identity induces political trust because the EU is still a relatively new construct.

9

Data and methods

We use the data of the European module of the International Civic and Citizenship Education

Study (ICCS) 2009 to test the first and the second hypothesis that political trust and

generalized trust are positively related to European identity (Kerr, Sturman, Schulz, & Burge,

2009). The data were gathered between February and May 2009 among 70,502 adolescents

(average age of 14.4 years) in 21 EU member states.i The respondents filled out a self-

administered paper survey at school. At least 150 schools were selected in each country by

using a random sample proportional to school size and in each school one class of the ninth

grade was randomly sampled. The average response rate was, after replacement, 89.5%. As

adolescents are clustered in countries, we use a 2-level regression analysis to account for

national differences that could explain a difference in European identity between countries.

For the test of the reciprocal relationship between generalized trust and political trust on the

one hand (hypotheses 3 and 4), and European identity on the other hand, a cross lagged

structural regression analysis is carried out on the data of the Parent-Child Socialization Study

2012-2013 (Hooghe, Quintelier, Verhaegen, Boonen, & Meeusen, 2012). This is a panel study

among adolescents for which the data was collected once during spring 2012 (T1) and once

during spring 2013 (T2) in 59 schools in the Flemish region of Belgium. In total, 2,825

adolescents took part in both waves of the panel study. The average age of the adolescents

was 15 years old in 2012 and 16 years old in 2013. As this is a panel study, we can use these

data to get more insight in the specific relationship between trust and European identity

because there is a time-lag in the data. Also, the same questions were included in both the

ICCS 2009 and PCSS 2012-2013 study and the ninth grade was surveyed in both studies, so

data are comparable. Analyses are performed with the programs Stata version 12.1 and Mplus

version 7.

Measurements

All indicators are measured with the very similar survey questions in both the ICCS 2009

survey and in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey. In this way the comparative part of the analysis

fits the analysis about the reciprocal relationship between political and generalized trust and

European identity. In the following section an overview will be presented of the used items

and the results of the factor analyses testing the validity of the theoretically assumed factor

10

scales underlying the survey items for all three measurement points in time (ICCS 2009,

PCSS 2012 and PCSS 2013).

European identity is measured with the items presented in Table 1 with response options

ranging on a 4-point Likert scale. Principal component analysis (PCA) is used on the different

datasets to test whether all four items measure one single underlying concept, as theoretically

expected. The high factor loadings, the Cronbach’s α of 0.756 and the Eigenvalue of 2.326

indicate that these items indeed form a reliable and internally consistent measure for the ICCS

2009 data. The same conclusion can be drawn from the results of the PCA on each wave of

the PCSS 2012-2013 data.

Table 1. Factor loadings and significance tests of principal component analysis (PCA) and

confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) European identity Observed indicators ICCS 2009 Observed indicator PCSS 2012 PCSS 2013

I see myself as European 0.721 I see myself as a citizen

of the EU

0.764 0.776

I am proud to live in

Europe

0.793 I am proud to live in

Europe

0.822 0.818

I feel part of the EU 0.757 I feel part of the EU 0.791 0.779

I am proud my country is a

member of the EU

0.794 I am proud that Belgium

is a member of the EU

0.788 0.808

Cronbach’s α 0.762 Cronbach’s α 0.798 0.805

Eigenvalue 2.350 Eigenvalue 2.506 2.529

Explained variance 59% Explained variance 63% 63%

N 68,405 N 3,218 3. 176

Source: ICCS 2009; PCSS 2012-2013.

Note: The question asked in the ICCS 2009 survey was: “How much do you agree or disagree with the

following statements?” (1= strongly disagree; 4= strongly agree).

The question asked in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey was: “Indicate to what extent these statements about

the EU agree with your opinion.” (1= strongly disagree; 4= strongly agree). Indicators are treated as

ordinal variables.

Both the ICCS 2009 survey and the PCSS 2012-2013 survey included 4 indicators to measure

political trust. Slightly different survey items were used in the two studies (see Table 2), but

both tap into a wide spectrum of political trust. We excluded trust in European institutions,

because that would give us a tautological measurement, if we look at its relationship with

European identity. Building on the work of Hooghe (2011), we expect that most of the

variance of all these observed indicators will be explained by a single factor. This factor is

expected to measure political trust which can be defined as “a comprehensive evaluation of

the political culture that is prevailing within a political system and not as an evaluation of

each and every actor individually.” (Hooghe, 2011, p. 270). The PCA to test the validity and

11

one dimensionality of the scale. As expected, the Cronbach’s α and Eigenvalues indicate that

these expectations are met by the data for every measurement point in time.

Table 2. Factor loadings and significance tests of principal component analysis (PCA) and

confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) political trust Observed indicator ICCS 2009 Observed indicator PCSS 2012 PCSS 2013

National parliament 0.840 Belgian parliament 0.916 0.926

Local government 0.735 Regional parliament

(Flemish or Brussels

parliament)

0.898 0.914

National government 0.830 Belgian government 0.884 0.905

Political parties 0.818 Political parties 0.871 0.855

Cronbach’s α 0.820 Cronbach’s α 0.913 0.921

Eigenvalue 2.603 Eigenvalue 3.185 3.242

Explained variance 65% Explained variance 80% 81%

N 67,969 N 3,207 3,165

Source: ICCS 2009; PCSS 2012-2013.

Note: The question asked in the ICCS 2009 survey was: “How much do you trust each of the following

institutions?” (1= not at all, 4= completely).

The question asked in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey was: “Can you indicate for each of the following

institutions whether you trust it or not?” (0= totally no trust, 10= a lot of trust).

Generalized trust is measured with the ICCS 2009 item: “How much do you trust other

people” (1= not at all, 4= completely). This variable should be treated as an ordinal variable.

The question asked in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey was: “Generally speaking, would you say

that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people or that most people can be trusted?” with a

11-point scale that ranges from 0 (you can’t be too careful) to 10 (most people can be trusted).

This variable can be treated as a continuous variable.

Controls are included for political interest, SES, gender and citizenship status because

previous research suggests they are related to both the exogenous and the endogenous

variables of interest in this study. First, people that are more interested in political and social

matters are found to identify more strongly as European and have more trust in political

institutions and other people (Inglehart, 1970; Munoz, Torcal, & Bonet, 2011; Wallace,

Datler, & Spannring, 2005). Therefore, political interest could be a confounding factor

between political and generalized trust and European identity, so we should control for

political interest in order to estimate the path between political and generalized trust and

European identity without this influence. In the ICCS 2009 survey, political interest is

measured by 5 different items. These items all load on one underlying factor, which we label

as political interest. The individual factor loadings derived from a principal component

analysis are presented in Appendix 1. We use this factor scale in our multilevel analysis.

12

Political interest is measured in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey by the item “How interested are

you in social problems and politics?” measured on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from not

being interested to being very interested. Second, a higher socio-economic status seems to be

related to a stronger EU identity because this group is more likely to benefit from explicit

benefits of European integration, such as traveling or working abroad (Fligstein, 2008). Also,

it is found to be positively related to both political trust and generalized trust (Berg & Hjerm,

2010; Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle, & Trappers, 2008). Therefore, we include a measure of the

number of books each adolescent reports to have at home. Magazines, comics and

schoolbooks are not included in this count. This is a common indicator used to measure socio-

economic status in similar studies (Flanagan, 2012). In the ICCS dataset the response options

ranged from 1 to 6 (from having 0-10 books to having more than 500 books at home). In the

PCSS study this is measured on a 7-point scale ranging from having no books at home to

having more than 500 books at home. Third, previous studies indicated that females tend to

have a weaker European identity, that they are less interested in political and social matters,

and that they have higher levels of political trust and generalized trust (Agirdag, Huyst, &

Van Houtte, 2012; Berg & Hjerm, 2010; Hooghe et al., 2008; Munoz et al., 2011). Gender is

included as a dummy variable where boys are coded as zero and girls are coded as one.

Fourth, adolescents that were not born in the EU tend to have a weaker European identity

(Agirdag et al., 2012). Unfortunately, the data of ICCS 2009 only allow making a distinction

between native respondents (born in the country of test in which they filled out the survey)

and immigrants (born in another country). A distinction between intra-EU immigrants and

extra-EU immigrants is not possible with these data. Correspondingly, we constructed the

same categories for the PCSS 2012-2013 dataset. These categories are included in the analysis

as dummy variables. Adolescents born in the country of test (ICCS 2009) or in Belgium

(PCSS 2012-2013) are the largest group and thus selected as the reference category.

In the first analysis, we control for the clustering of respondents within different member

states. As a control variable on the country level, we first include the measure ‘control of

corruption’ from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), retrieved from the

Worldbank. This indicator measures “perceptions of the extent to which public power is

exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption” (Worldbank,

2013). We use the mean score of corruption control for all 21 member states included in the

ICCS 2009 dataset. The data of the GWI were collected among citizens, entrepreneurs and

experts in the public, private and NGO sectors. It is important to control for this variable as it

13

has been shown that corruption levels are highly salient and influence people’s attitudes about

the EU and political trust (Harteveld et al., 2013; Munoz et al., 2011). It is argued here that

citizens of more corrupt member states tend to search for compensation of the bad governance

in their country (Arnold et al., 2012). In our study, this would mean that a higher level of

corruption in a member state would lower the level of political trust and lift people’s affinity

with the EU. By controlling for this, we measure the relationship between political trust and

European identity among respondents, regardless of this difference between member states.

Additionally, corruption is also found to be negatively correlated with trust in other people, so

controlling for corruption seems to be appropriate (Delhey, 2007). Second, we control for the

general climate in the member state towards or against European integration based on data of

Eurobarometer 72.4 (spring 2009). The question was asked whether respondents perceive the

European membership of their country as ‘a good thing’, ‘neither a good nor a bad thing’, or

‘a bad thing’ (Eurobarometer 72.4). A scale was constructed by attributing the value 0 to the

statement that ‘membership is a good thing’, 0.5 to ‘neither a good nor a bad thing’ and 1 to ‘a

bad thing’, which resulted in an average score between 0 and 1 for every member state

(Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005).

Analyses

We are interested in both the relationship of political trust and generalized trust with

European identity in a comparative setting in different EU member states and in the specific

reciprocal relationship between political trust and generalized trust and European identity.

Therefore, the first analysis performs a test of which type of trust correlates more strongly

with European identity among adolescents across 21 EU member states. The second analysis

of the PCSS 2012-2013 panel study allows for a closer look into the reciprocity of the

relationship between both types of trust and European identity.

European identity as identification with political institutions or with a citizenry? A

comparative analysis

First, we provide a few descriptive statistics about the dependent variable (European identity)

and the main explanatory variables (political trust and generalized trust). On average, the

respondents have a score of 3.059 on 4 on the European identity scale. The lowest mean score

14

is found in Latvia (2.757/4) and the highest mean score is found in Italy (3.330/4). The mean

score of political trust is 2.625/4 and the mean score of generalized trust is 2.667 on 4. At first

sight, political trust is most strongly correlated with European identity (Pearson’s correlation=

0.261; p<0.001 in contrast to 0.114; p<0.001 between generalized trust en European identity).

These significant correlations show that it is useful to perform a more sophisticated analysis

of these relationships.

The multilevel model is built in three steps. First the null model is estimated, in which only

the 2-level structure of the data is included. This model is the Null model (presented in Table

3) and the intra-cluster correlation (ICC), which is calculated from the variance at each level,

shows that 4.9% of the variance in European identity is explained by the country in which a

respondent lives. Therefore, it is a logical step to take this structure of the data into account.

The likelihood ratio test also indicates that the multilevel model is significantly better than a

simple regression model.

As a second step, the control variables are added to the model. As expected, female

respondents have a slightly weaker European identity than male respondents and adolescents

that were born outside the country of test identify less as European as well. Respondents with

a higher socio-economic status and respondents that are more interested in political and social

matters have a stronger European identity. On the country level, we see that adolescents tend

to have a weaker European identity if they live in a member state where the general climate

among the population is more Eurosceptic. So even at a young age, people adapt to the

political culture of a nation. These relationships meet our expectations, but it is surprising

that no significant relationship is found between the level of corruption in a member state and

European identity. The variance in European identity among individuals is lowered by 3.4%

by including these control variables. The unexplained variance on the country level is lowered

by one third by including the level 2 control variables. This decrease is caused by the

inclusion of the measure of Euroscepticism.

In the third step, the explanatory variables are added. Political trust and generalized trust both

prove to be significantly and positively correlated with European identity. However, the

relationship is over four times stronger with political trust. This indicates that a European

identity rather reflects a bond with the political institutions, than with a European citizenry.

The inclusion of the trust variables to the model lowers the unexplained variance between

respondents with 4.9% in comparison to the model with control variables only. The rise in log

15

likelihood also shows that this model is better than the second model. In an additional test (the

results can be obtained from the authors), we ran Model III without the inclusion of political

trust. In this model, the coefficient of generalized trust was higher (β =0.095; SE=0.004). This

indicates that part of this relationship with European identity should actually be attributed to

political trust.

Table 3. Multilevel model European identity

Model I

Null model

Model II

Controls

Model III

Trust

β SE β SE β SE

Intercept -0.009 0.052 0.001 0.043 0.001 0.039

Individual level

Female -0.042*** 0.004 -0.040*** 0.004

Books at home 0.015*** 0.004 0.025*** 0.004

Political interest 0.161*** 0.004 0.094*** 0.004

Immigrant -0.082*** 0.004 -0.073*** 0.004

Political trust 0.212*** 0.004

Generalized trust 0.052*** 0.004

Country level

Corruption 0.040 0.044 -0.014 0.040

Eurosceptic

climate

-0.140** 0.042 -0.133** 0.038

Variance level 2 0.057 0.038 0.032

Variance level 1 0.944 0.912 0.867

ICC 4.9% 4.0% 3.6%

Log likelihood -87900.252 -86803.649 -85212.741

Source: ICCS 2009 and Eurobarometer 72.4.

Note: N (level 1)= 63,201; N (level 2)= 21; Standardized coefficients (β) are given in order to be

able to compare the size of the effects; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

The reciprocal relationship between political and generalized trust and European identity.

A two wave panel analysis

Again, we start with a few descriptive statistics about the main variables of the analysis. In

2012 the mean score on European identity is 2.89 on 4 and in 2013 the mean score is 2.87 on

4. The mean score of generalized trust is 5.10 on 10 in 2012 and 4.80 on 10 in 2013. For

political trust, we find a mean score of 5.09 on 10 in 2012 and 4.94 on 10 in 2013. The three

variables are also significantly correlated. The Pearson’s correlation between generalized trust

at T1 and European identity at T2 is 0.054 (p=0.009), between political trust at T1 and

European identity at T2 it is 0.228 (p=0.000) and generalized trust and political trust strongly

correlate as well (Pearson’s correlation is 0.149 with p=0.000 at T1 and r=0.142 with p=0.000

16

at T2). As already shown by the previous analysis, the correlation between political trust and

European identity is higher than the correlation between generalized trust and European

identity.

The test of the reciprocal relationship between political trust and generalized trust on the one

hand, and European identity on the other hand, is carried out by using structural regression

modeling in different steps (Kline, 2011). We start with identifying an adequate measurement

model using confirmatory factor analysis and then proceed by estimating a cross-laged

structural regression model. This stepwise approach contributes to the reliability of the cross-

lagged structural regression model.

As a first step of the analysis, the factor scales were tested by confirmatory factor analyses. In

the structural regression analysis, CFA is used to explore the variation and co-variation

between the survey items that are hypothesized to reflect European identity. Accordingly, a

one factor measurement model is tested with the weight least squares estimation method for

ordinal variables. The errors of the indicators measuring proudness of living in Europe and

that one’s country is a member of the EU are allowed to correlate. Both indicators measure

the affective value people attribute to their EU membership. Consequently, these indicators

are more strongly correlated. The CFA in Table 4 shows that all items load on one factor at

both measured points in time, as expected by our theoretical expectations. In general, the

comparative fit index (CFI) ranges from 0 to 1 and a CFI of 0.95 or higher indicates a

reasonably well fit (not a perfect fit as assumed in the stricter χ²-test). The root mean square

error of approximation (RMSEA) also indicates reasonably well fit and as the RMSEA values

in our model are lower than 0.05, the close-fit hypothesis is accepted as well (Kline, 2011).

The test of our theoretical assumption that all observed indicators are largely explained by the

latent factor European identity therefore closely fits reality.

17

Table 4. Factor loadings and significance tests of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA)

European identity

Observed indicator PCSS 2012 PCSS 2013

I see myself as a citizen of the EU 1.000 1.000

I am proud to live in Europe 0.934 0.898

I feel part of the EU 1.058 0.987

I am proud that Belgium is a member of the

EU

0.869 0.871

χ² (df; p) 2.977 (1; 0.084) 4.245 (1; 0.039)

CFI 1.000 1.000

RMSEA 0.029 0.037

N 2,410 2,428

Source: PCSS 2012-2013.

Note: The question asked in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey was: “Indicate to what extent these

statements about the EU agree with your opinion.” (1= strongly disagree; 4= strongly agree).

Indicators are treated as ordinal variables.

A similar test is performed for the measurement scale of political trust. In the PCSS 2012-

2013 data 4 indicators were observed. Building on the work of Hooghe (2011), we expect that

most of the variance of all these observed indicators will be explained by a single factor. This

factor is expected to measure political trust which can be defined as “a comprehensive

evaluation of the political culture that is prevailing within a political system and not as an

evaluation of each and every actor individually.” (Hooghe, 2011, p. 270). A CFA was used to

test the structure of the data and is presented in Table 5. The maximum likelihood estimation

method was used for the indicators of the PCSS 2012-2013 survey as they can be treated as

continuous measures because they are measured on a 11-point scale. In the analyses of the

PCSS 2012-2013 data, covariance between trust in the Belgian parliament and trust in the

regional parliament were allowed because both measures are explained by trust in the

parliament. The highest significance level of the χ²-test is met and CFI values are close to 1,

so we can assume that the measurement scale meets the expectation of one dimensionality.

18

Table 5. Factor loadings and significance tests of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) political

trust Observed indicator PCSS 2012 PCSS 2013

Belgian parliament 1.000 1.000

Regional parliament (Flemish or Brussels

parliament)

0.939 0.955

Belgian government 1.129 1.074

Political parties 1.016 0.897

χ² (df; p) 32.198 (1; 0.000) 89.540 (1; 0.000)

CFI 0.995 0.988

RMSEA 0.115 0.191

N 2378 2426

Source: PCSS 2012-2013.

Note: The question asked in the PCSS 2012-2013 survey was: “Can you indicate for each of the

following institutions whether you trust it or not?” (0= totally no trust, 10= a lot of trust).

As all constructed factor scales proved to meet the criteria, we can be confident that each

group of indicators measures one latent concept (theoretically labeled as European identity or

political trust measured at a certain point in time).

As a second step, all latent variables are estimated using confirmatory factor analysis in the

same model, allowing for all possible covariances between the factors. The model fit proves

to be strong (χ²= 763.213 with df=44 and p=0.000; CFI= 0.874; RMSEA= 0.082), indicating

that the measurement model adequately fits the structure of the data and can be used for a

structural regression analysis.

As a third step, the structural regression model is estimated. The resulting model is presented

in Figure 1. The direct effects between generalized trust at time 1 (T1) and generalized trust at

time 2 (T2), between political trust at T1 and political trust at T2 and between European

identity at T1 and at T2 indicate the persistence of these attitudes and of European identity

between the two measure points in time. A highly significant positive relationship is found

between each pair of variables. At T1 all exogenous variables are allowed to covary.

Generalized trust and political trust are highly correlated, as already indicated by the simple

Pearson’s correlation, presented earlier in this section. In accordance with the findings of the

multilevel analysis, we also see here that political trust is more strongly correlated to

European identity than generalized trust is. While in the ICCS 2009 data the latter relationship

is found to be much weaker than the relationship between political trust and European

identity, we do not even find a significant relationship between generalized trust and

European identity in the PCSS 2012-2013 data (controlling for correlations with political

19

trust). At T2 the disturbance terms of generalized trust, political trust and European identity

are allowed to correlate and findings are very similar to the findings at T1 (S. E. Anderson &

Williams, 1992).

The cross-lagged effects are of main interest in this study as they present the test of the

reciprocal relationship between both political and generalized trust on the one hand, and

European identity on the other hand. These effects are indicated with the letters A, B, C and D

in Figure 1. All cross-lagged relationships are included in the same model, because these

attitudes and European identity are strongly related to each other. Separate tests – without the

control for other paths – are therefore not sufficient. By estimating the relationships between

generalized trust at T1 and European identity at T2 (path A) and between political trust at T1

and European identity at T2 (path D) in the same model as the relationships between

European identity at T1 and generalized trust at T2 (path B) and between European identity at

T1 and political trust at T2 (path C), these parameters can be compared with each other.

Theoretically, we expect that identification with the EU can be built on trust in political

institutions and on trust in other people. As the EU is mainly built by the political elite in the

wake of World War II, we also expect that this relationship will be strongest between political

trust and European identity. The results from our cross-lagged structural regression model

show that this relation indeed not even significantly exists between generalized trust and

European identity. For the relationship between political trust at T1 and European identity at

T2 we find a positive significant result (path D: b=0.029; p<0.010). However, we also find a

significant relationship between European identity at T1 and political trust at T2 (path C:

b=0.164; p<0.010). The introduction of a time lag and path C therefore indicates that the

correlation found in the comparative analysis not only shows that people with more political

trust tend to have a stronger European identity (path D), but it also indicates that European

identity would induce political trust (path C). This finding challenges our expectation that it is

mainly political trust that leads to the strengthening of European identity, instead of that the

strengthening of European identity increases trust in political institutions.

To establish whether path C is stronger than path D, we estimate a model where we impose

the constrain that the relationship between path C is equal to path D. If this constrained model

fits the data less well than the model without constrains, we know that the parameters are not

equal. In that case, this indicates that either the path from political trust to European identity

or the path from European identity to political trust is stronger. If the constrained model does

20

not fit the data less well than the model without constrains, this shows that the reciprocal

relationship between political trust and European identity does not have a dominant direction.

We use a difference test based on the χ² of the unconstrained and the constrained model

because the factor measuring European identity affects ordinal variables (Muthén & Muthén,

2012). This test shows that the constrained model fits the data significantly worse (χ²=6.691;

df=1 ; p=0.010) than the unconstrained model, so we can conclude that the path that indicates

that respondents with a stronger European identity at T1 will develop more political trust at

T2 is stronger than that respondents that trust political institutions more will develop a

stronger European identity.

Discussion

From these two analyses we can conclude that European identity rather reflects identification

with political institutions than with a citizenry, but that the relationship is stronger from

European identity to political trust than the other way around. In addition to these main

results, we also found that generalized trust in significantly related to European identity, but

that this relationship is reduced or even absent when political trust is included in the equation.

This means that the first hypothesis is confirmed by the data. The stronger relationship of

European identity with political trust confirms our expectation that the history and the nature

of the EU as a relatively young and abstract community is reflected in the European

community people identify with. People that identify more as European, relate more to the

political institutions that engaged their national communities in the European community.

This supports the idea of the EU being built by a political elite instead of its emergence from

the people. The weakness (and even absence in the structural regression model) of the

relationship between generalized trust and European identity rejects the second hypothesis

and goes against Deutsch’s statement (1966) that the sense of community in the EU consists –

amongst others – of both interpersonal trust and political identification. However, it is hard to

state that people that identify as European do not relate to the EU as a community of citizens

at all. The results of the additional test rather suggest that the trust people have in the

generalized other is largely connected to the extent to which they trust the political institutions

as the reference and guardians for shared norms and values. The incorporation of this test in

our study meets the concern raised by Harteveld et al. (2013) that it is unclear whether

political trust is based on interpersonal trust. Our tests gave more insight into this relationship,

21

but further research that has its main focus on this issue is needed to get a really clear view on

how these two types of trust interact. For the test of the third hypothesis concerning the

reciprocal relationship between generalized trust and European identity, we did not even find

significant paths. The fourth hypothesis is rejected by the finding that the relationship is

stronger from European identity to political trust. This suggests that the feedback-loop that

could come about in a later stadium of community building already starts to materialize

among adolescents.

As noted in the first part of this paper, research into the relationship between trust and

European identity is relatively scarce. However, the highly significant relationship between

political trust and European identity highlights the importance of the question what this means

and how this relationship works. The current research explored part of this relationship in

both a geographically comparative design and with a panel design in which the same group of

respondents was surveyed at two points in time. This study focused at a specific segment of

the population: adolescents. They are an interesting group for this kind of research tapping

into the development of a social identity, because this mainly develops and then consolidates

during adolescence. However, we do not believe that all is said about this topic yet, so more

research should definitely address this relationship in the future, both theoretically and

empirically.

22

Figure 1. Cross-lagged structural regression model

Source: PCSS 2012-2013.

Note: N= 2,420. χ²=489.720, df= 69, p=0.000. CFI= 0.950. RMSEA= 0.050. (ns) not significant; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Unstandardized estimates

are presented with standard errors between parentheses. For the control variables only significant relationships are presented. As no significant relationship

was found with socio-economic status (books at home) and with citizenship status (being born outside Belgium), these variables are not presented in the

figure.

0.6

24 (

0.6

29)*

**

0.404 (0.020)***

0.236 (0.023)***

0.035 (0.028) (ns)

0.519 (0.022)***

0.693 (0.025)***

0.372 (0.029)***

0.051 (0.031) (ns)

Political trust

T1

Generalized trust

T1

Generalized trust

T2

European

identity T1

Political trust

T2

European

identity T2

0.3

45 (

0.0

60)*

**

Gender (1=

female)

Political

interest

23

References:

Agirdag, O., Huyst, P., & Van Houtte, M. (2012). Determinants of the Formation of a

European Identity among Children: Individual- and School-Level Influences. JCMS:

Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(2), 198–213. doi:10.1111/j.1468-

5965.2011.02205.x

Anderson, C. J. (1998). When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and

Support for European Integration. Comparative Political Studies, 31(5), 569–601.

doi:10.1177/0010414098031005002

Anderson, S. E., & Williams, L. J. (1992). Assumptions About Unmeasured Variables With

Studies of Reciprocal Relationships: The Case of Employee Attitudes. Journal of

Applied Psychology, 77(5), 638–650.

Arnold, C., Sapir, E. V., & Zapryanova, G. (2012). Trust in the institutions of the European

Union: A cross-country examination. European Integration online Papers, 16(2).

doi:10.1695/2012008

Berg, L., & Hjerm, M. (2010). National Identity and Political Trust. Perspectives on

European Politics and Society, 11(4), 390–407. doi:10.1080/15705854.2010.524403

Brewer, M. B. (2001). The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications Political Psychology.

Political Psychology, 22(1), 115–125.

Bruter, M. (2003). Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols

on Civic and Cultural European Identity. Comparative Political Studies, 36(10), 1148–

1179. doi:10.1177/0010414003257609

Bruter, M. (2008). Identity in the European Union – Problems of Measurement , Modelling &

Paradoxical Patterns of Influence. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 4(4),

273–285.

Citrin, J., & Sides, J. (2004). More than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New

Europe. In R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse, & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Transnational Identities:

Becoming European in the EU (pp. 161–185). Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield

Publishers.

Delhey, J. (2007). Do Enlargements Make the European Union Less Cohesive ? An Analysis

of Trust between EU Nationalities. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(2), 253–279.

Deutsch, K. W. (1966). Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the

Foundations of Nationality. (T. Press, Ed.). Cambridge: Massa.

Duchesne, S., & Frognier, A.-P. (2008). National and European Identifications: A Dual

Relationship. Comparative European Politics, 6(2), 143–168.

European Commission (2012) Eurobarometer 72.4 (2009) TNS OPINION & SOCIAL,

Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4994 Data file Version

3.0.0, doi: 10.4232/1.11141

24

Faas, D. (2007). Youth, Europe and the Nation: The Political Knowledge, Interests and

Identities of the New Generation of European Youth. Journal of Youth Studies, 10(2),

161–181. Retrieved from

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13676260601120161

Flanagan, C. A. (2012). Teenage Citizens: Political Theories of the Young. Harvard: Harvard

University Press.

Fligstein, N. (2008). Euroclash: The EU, European Identity and the Future of Europe.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fligstein, N., Polyakova, A., & Sandholtz, W. (2012). European Integration, Nationalism and

European Identity. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(1), 106–122.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02230.x

Harteveld, E., Meer, T. van der M., & Vries, C. E. D. V. (2013). In Europe we trust?

Exploring three logics of trust in the European Union. European Union Politics, (1), 24.

doi:10.1177/1465116513491018

Herrmann, R., & Brewer, M. B. (2004). Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the

EU. In R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse, & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Transnational Identities:

Becoming European in the EU (pp. 1–22). Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Hooghe, M. (2011). Why There is Basically Only One Form of Political Trust. The British

Journal of Politics & International Relations, 13(2), 269–275. doi:10.1111/j.1467-

856X.2010.00447.x

Hooghe, M., Quintelier, E., Verhaegen, S., Boonen, J., & Meeusen, C. (2012). Parent-Child

Socialization Study (2012) Technical Report. Leuven.

Hooghe, M., Reeskens, T., Stolle, D., & Trappers, A. (2008). Ethnic Diversity and

Generalized Trust in Europe: A Cross-National Multilevel Study. Comparative Political

Studies, 42(2), 198–223. doi:10.1177/0010414008325286

Howe, P. (2010). Citizens Adrift. The Democratic Disengagement of Young Canadians.

Vancouver: UBC Press.

Inglehart, R. (1970). Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity. Comparative Politics,

3(1), 45–70.

Kaina, V. (2004). European identity, legitimacy, and trust: conceptual considerations and

perspectives on empirical research.

Kerr, D., Sturman, L., Schulz, W., & Burge, B. (2009). ICCS 2009 European Report ICCS

2009 European Report - Civic knowledge, attitudes, and engagement among lower-

secondary students in 24 European countries. Design.

Kline, R. B. (2011). Principles and Practice of Strucutral Equation Modeling. New York:

The Guilford Press.

25

Klingemann, H.-D., & Weldon, S. (2013). A crisis of integration? The development of

transnational dyadic trust in the European Union, 1954-2004. European Journal of

Political Research, 52(4), 457–482.

Loveless, M., & Rohrschneider, R. (2011). Public perceptions of the EU as a system of

governance. Living Reviews in European Governance, 6(2), 1–37.

Lubbers, M., & Scheepers, P. (2005). Political versus instrumental Euro-scepticism: mapping

scepticism in European countries and regions. European Union Politics, 6(2), 223–242.

Munoz, J., Torcal, M., & Bonet, E. (2011). Institutional trust and multilevel government in the

European Union: Congruence or compensation? European Union Politics, 12(4), 551–

574. doi:10.1177/1465116511419250

Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (2012). Mplus User’s Guide. Los Angeles.

Norris, P. (2011). Democratic Deficit. Critical Citizens Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Risse, T. (2010). A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres.

Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Rosenberg, M. (1956). Misantropy and Political Ideology. American Sociological Review,

21(6), 690–695.

Scheuer, A., & Schmitt, H. (2009). Dynamics in European Political Identity. Journal of

European Integration, 31(5), 551–568. doi:10.1080/07036330903145856

Sen, A. (2006). Identity and violence: The Illusion of Destiny. Identity and violence :The

Illusion of Destiny (pp. 149–197). New York: Norton.

Shore, C. (2000). Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration. London:

Routledge.

Sigalas, E. (2010). Cross-border mobility and European identity: The effectiveness of

intergroup contact during the ERASMUS year abroad. European Union Politics, 11(2),

241–265. doi:10.1177/1465116510363656

Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The Moral Foundations of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Wallace, C., Datler, G., & Spannring, R. (2005). Young People and European Citizenship.

Reihe Soziologie.

Worldbank, (2013). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved from

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm#sources.

26

Appendix

Appendix 1. Factor loadings principal component analysis on interest in political and social

issues Interest in political and social issues

Interest in political issues in the community 0.777

Interest in political issues in the country 0.864

Interest in social issues in the country 0.800

Interest in politics in other countries 0.786

Interest in international politics 0.819

Eigenvalue 3.278

Explained variance 66%

Cronbach’s Alpha 0.868

N 63,201

Source: ICCS 2009.

Notes

i The research was carried out in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic,

Denmark, UK, Spain, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia,

Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. It is important to remark that the national

educational authorities were responsible for financing this research. More precisely this meant

for Belgium that only the Dutch language community participated. The French speaking

community did not allocate financial resources to participate. In the UK only England

participated, not Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Netherlands did originally take

part in the study, but the Dutch research team failed to meet the required response rate and

therefore the Dutch data are not included in the dataset and the current analysis. The ICCS

was also implemented in various countries outside Europe, but self-evidently these

questionnaires did not include questions about European citizenship.